CHAPTER SEVEN

Memory in Analytic Philosophy

Sven Bernecker

Remembering is a fundamental cognitive process that is involved in virtually all other important cognitive functions such as reasoning, perception, problem solving, and speech. Since memory is a central component of the mind, it is not surprising that theorizing about memory is as old as philosophy itself. Contemporary philosophers are primarily interested in the role of memory in various metaphysical and epistemological debates. Memory is frequently discussed in relation to epistemic justification, personal identity, externalism about mental content,[1] and the experience of time[2]—and, to a lesser extent, collective and cultural identity,[3] nonconceptual mental content,[4] the hypotheses

1 Peter Ludlow and Norah Martin, eds., *Externalism and Self-Knowledge* (Stanford: Center for the Study of Language and Information Press, 1998).

2 Christoph Hoerl and Teresa McCormack, *Time and Memory: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

3 Jeffery K. Olick, Vered Vinitzky-Seroussi, and Daniel Levy, eds., *The Collective Memory Reader* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

4 M. G. F. Martin, "Perception, Concepts, and Memory," *Philosophical Review* 101 (1992): 745–63.

of situated, embedded, or extended cognition,[5] as well as the ethics of memory.[6]

I will begin in section 1 by characterizing the standard taxonomy of memory. Following this, I will offer a tentative analysis of the kind of memory philosophers discuss the most—propositional memory (section 2). Section 3 concerns the question of whether memory is a form of knowledge and whether we have reasons to trust our memories. Section 4 examines whether memory is merely a preservative source of justification and knowledge or whether it can also function as a generative source. Finally, section 5 deals with the dependence of memory on personal identity through time.

1. Kinds of Memory

Philosophers typically impose a tripartite division on the types of memory: experiential (personal), propositional (factual), and practical (procedural) memory.[7] *Experiential memory* consists in the evocation of a past experience, allowing one to re-experience the original situation and go over what it was like. Experiential memory has two characteristics. First, one can experientially remember only what one has personally experienced. Experiential memory is restricted to cases in which the claim to remember something incorporates the claim to have experienced it for oneself. Second, experiential memory represents the remembered event from the first-person perspective and involves qualitative experiences (qualia) and imagery.

Propositional memory is memory of true propositions (facts).[8] One can remember propositions about the past (e.g., that Columbus discovered

5 Edwin Hutchins, *Cognition in the Wild* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995); and Richard Menary, ed., *The Extended Mind* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2010).

6 Jeffrey Blustein, *The Moral Demands on Memory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); and Avishai Margalit, *The Ethics of Memory* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002).

7 Don Locke, *Memory* (London: Macmillan, 1971), chaps 5–7; and Norman Malcolm, "Three Forms of Memory," in *Knowledge and Certainty*, 200–221 (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1963).

8 The term "proposition" refers to the content or meaning of a meaningful declarative sentence.

America in 1492), the present (e.g., that one's spouse is currently shopping), the future (e.g., that one has a dentist's appointment next Tuesday), as well as timeless truths (e.g., that $2 + 2 = 4$). Though the proposition remembered need not be about the past, one's learning of what one remembers must precede the remembering. One cannot remember that *p* (where "p" stands for any proposition) if one has only just learned that *p*. Unlike experiential memory, propositional memory is not limited to things with which one has had direct or personal acquaintance. One need not have witnessed the event to remember, say, that Columbus discovered America in 1492. Consequently propositional memory doesn't require qualitative experiences and imagery.

Experiential and propositional memory have in common that they seek to represent the world and that their contents can in principle be articulated. Neither of the features apply to *practical memory*, or remembering how to do something. Practical memory stores previously acquired skills. An example of practical memory is remembering how to swim. To remember how to swim, one need not be able to articulate or describe the activity of swimming. Due to the fundamental differences between practical memory on the one hand, and experiential and propositional memory on the other, there is reason to doubt that memory is a natural kind, that is, a "natural" grouping or ordering rather than one that depends on humans.[9]

Although the three kinds of memory are each associated with a particular grammatical construction—remembering *such-and-such itself*, remembering *that* such-and-such, remembering *how* to do such-and-such—grammar provides only a rough guide to which form of memory is involved. Experiential memories can be expressed not only by a combination of the verb "to remember" with a gerund (e.g., I remember having spent a few days in Paris) but also by a that-clause (e.g., I remember that I spent a few days in Paris). The same memory report can be an expression of experiential and of propositional memory.

9 Kourken Michaelian, "Is Memory a Natural Kind?" *Memory Studies* 4 (2011): 170–89.

Apart from the distinction between propositional, experiential, and practical memory, philosophers usually distinguish between kinds of memory according to a number of other criteria. They distinguish between veridical and ostensible memory, between memory contents in the first-person mode and the third-person mode, between inferential and noninferential memory, between conceptual and nonconceptual memory contents, between occurrent and dispositional memory, between conscious, subconscious, and unconscious memories, as well as between explicit and implicit memory.

2. The Concept of Memory

When one examines what it takes for someone to remember something, one must do so from some point of view. One can work from the point of view of the subject, taking into account only that which is available to the subject at the given time, or one can work from the point of view of someone who knows all the relevant facts, some of which might not be available to the subject. Roughly speaking, those who adopt the subject's point of view for making these evaluations are *methodological internalists* about memory, and those who adopt a bird's-eye view are *methodological externalists*. The majority of philosophical studies of memory adopt methodological externalism.

The propositions that are the object of memory can be of two different kinds.[10] When I remember that *p*, "p" can stand for a past mental state of mine (e.g., that *I believed* that Columbus discovered America in 1492) or for any other state of affair (e.g., that Columbus discovered America in 1492). Propositional memory of one's own mental states may be called *introversive memory*. Propositional memory of other things than one's own mental states may be called *extroversive memory*. The content of extroversive memory can be in the third-person mode (e.g., that Columbus discovered America in 1492) or the first-person

10 Sven Bernecker, *Memory: A Philosophical Study* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 34–45.

mode (e.g., that Columbus discovered *my* continent of residence 521 years before *I* was born). The content of introversive memory is necessarily in the first-person mode.

Extroversive memory in the first-person mode may be analyzed in something like the following way: a subject S remembers that p, only if (i) S represents that p (*present representation condition*), (ii) S represented at some earlier time that p^* (*past representation condition*), (iii) p is true (*truth condition*), (iv) p is identical with, or sufficiently similar to, p^* (*content condition*), and (v) S's present representation that p is suitably connected to his past representation that p^* (*connection condition*).

The truth condition demands that one can only remember what is the case. The representation conditions, the connection condition, and the content condition exclude relearning from the ranks of remembering. The representation conditions are motivated by the thought that because memory retains previously acquired representations, the analysis of memory must include some provision for one's having had the representation in question and for one's still having the representation. The term "representation" is meant to indicate that the attitude of a memory state need not be one of believing or knowing. (There will be more on this issue in section 3.) The connection condition is motivated by the intuition that to remember something implies not merely that the subject represented the thing in the past, but that his current representation is due to, that it comes about because of, his past representation. Finally, the content condition requires that the memory content is the same as, or sufficiently similar to, a content one has previously represented. In what respect and to what extent may content tokens differ from one another while still being memory-related? According to the most worked out proposal, the contents of two diachronic representations—p and p^*—are sufficiently similar to be memory-related only if the content of the later representation, p, is entailed by the content of the earlier representation, p^*.[11]

11 Sven Bernecker, *Memory: A Philosophical Study* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), chap. 8; for a dissenting view, see Kourken Michaelian, "Is Memory a Natural Kind?" *Memory Studies* 4 (2011): 170–89.

The interpretations of the memory connection proposed in the literature fall into three categories: the evidential retention theory, the simple retention theory, and the causal retention theory. The *causal retention theory* is by far the most popular of the three. It claims that to remember something, the present representation must not only correspond to, but must also be suitably causally connected to, the corresponding representation in the past. The crucial issue, however, is what should count as a suitable causal connection. Not just any sort of causal connection will suffice for memory; some causal chains are not of the appropriate sort, they are deviant. The classical formulation of the causal retention condition has it that the past representation must be causally operative in producing (intervening) memory traces that are in turn causally operative in producing the present recollective representation.[12] Past representations are stored in memory traces that represent the original event and provide a causal link between the original episode and the subject's ability to remember the event.[13]

The main competitors to the causal retention theory are the evidential and the simple retention theories. Proponents of the *simple retention theory* hold that for a past and a present mental state to be memory-related, what is required is merely that by virtue of having had the past mental state one acquired an ability or disposition that one retained and now exercises by occupying the present mental state; there need not be a causal connection between the past and present mental state.[14] According to the *evidential retention theory*, for a piece of knowledge to qualify as a memory, the grounds (evidence, reasons) supporting it must be the same as those supporting the original piece of knowledge

12 C. B. Martin and Max Deutscher, "Remembering," *Philosophical Review* 75 (1966): 161–96.

13 For an exposition and defense of the causal theory of memory, see G. E. M. Anscombe, "Memory, 'Experience,' and Causation," in *Collected Philosophical Papers II: Metaphysics and Philosophy of Mind*, 120–30 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1981); and Sven Bernecker, *Memory: A Philosophical Study* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), chaps 4 and 5. Among the critics of the causal theory are Robert K. Shope, "Remembering, Knowledge, and Memory Traces," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 33 (1973): 303–22; and Eddy M. Zemach, "Memory: What It Is, and What It Cannot Possibly Be," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 46 (1983): 31–44.

14 Roger Squires, "Memory Unchained," *Philosophical Review* 78 (1969): 178–96.

that has been retained. In other words, for you to remember that *p* you must know that *p*, you must have known that *p* in the past, and your grounds for believing *p* in the past must be the same as your grounds for believing that *p* now. On this view, retaining knowledge involves not only retaining known propositions but also supporting reasons.[15]

3. Memory and Knowledge

According to received wisdom in contemporary epistemology, memory is long-standing or continuing knowledge. To remember something is to know it. Given this *epistemic theory of memory*, the representation conditions in the analysis of extroversive memory in the first-person mode (see §2) need to be replaced by knowledge conditions: a subject *S* remembers that *p* only if (i′) *S* knows that *p* (*present knowledge condition*), (ii′) *S* knew at some earlier time that p^* (*past knowledge condition*), (iii′) *p* is identical with, or sufficiently similar to, p^* (*content condition*), and (iv′) *S*'s present knowing that *p* is suitably connected to his past knowing that p^* (*connection condition*).[16] Since epistemologists of all stripes agree that knowledge requires truth, the epistemic account of extroversive memory manages without a separate truth condition.

Given that memory implies knowledge and given that knowledge implies fully justified (however construed) true belief, it follows (by transitivity of implication) that memory implies belief, truth, and justification. (I use "justification" to refer to that, whatever precisely it is,

15 Andrew Naylor, "B Remembers that P from Time T," *Journal of Philosophy* 68 (1971): 29–41.

16 The epistemic theory of memory is endorsed, among others, by G. E. M. Anscombe, "Memory, 'Experience,' and Causation," in *Collected Philosophical Papers II: Metaphysics and Philosophy of Mind*, 120–30 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1981); Robert Audi, *Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge*, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2003), 69; A. J. Ayer, *The Problem of Knowledge* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1956), 138, 147–48; Fred Dretske and Palle Yourgrau, "Lost Knowledge," *Journal of Philosophy* 80 (1983): 356–67; Michael Huemer, "The Problem of Memory Knowledge," *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 80 (1999): 346–57; John L. Pollock and Joseph Cruz, *Contemporary Theories of Knowledge*, 2d ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), 46–48; Sydney Shoemaker, "Persons and Their Pasts," in *Identity, Cause, and Mind*, 19–48 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003), 43; and Timothy Williamson, *Knowledge and Its Limits* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 37–38.

which together with truth makes the difference between knowledge and mere true belief.) Everyone agrees that both knowledge and memory imply truth.[17] The task of evaluating the epistemic theory of knowledge is therefore a matter of assessing the tenability of the belief constraint and the justification constraint.

The following case appears to speak against the thesis that memory implies belief: Susan finds herself with the veridical flashbulb thought that she was kidnapped when she was a small girl. Nothing of what Susan knows or believes about her past connects with the thought that she has been kidnapped. Since she can't make sense of the thought and since the likelihood of being kidnapped is rather low, Susan takes the thought to be merely imaginary. If acceptance is a component of (occurrent and dispositional) belief, Susan does not *believe* that she was kidnapped. It takes considerable convincing by witnesses before she finally accepts that she has been kidnapped when a small girl (and that the flashbulb thought springs from memory rather than imagination). And when she finally accepts the thought she acquires a novel belief rather than reviving a dormant one. So it seems that not only one can remember that *p* without believing that one remembers that *p*, but also one can remember that *p* without believing that which one remembers, namely *p*.[18]

The thesis that memory implies justification can be challenged using cases where someone remembers something but where there is some defeating information such that he isn't justified in believing what he remembers. Suppose Susan learns on Monday that Columbus discovered America in 1492. She comes to know this fact. On Tuesday Susan's trustworthy friends play a practical joke on her. They tell her that Columbus discovered America in 1494 and present her with plausible

17 For a nonfactive conception knowledge see Allan Hazlett, "The Myth of Factive Verbs," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 80 (2010): 497–522; Allan Hazlett, "Factive Presupposition and the Truth Condition on Knowledge," *Acta Analytica* 27 (2012): 461–78; for a response, see John Turri, "Mythology of the Factive," *Logos & Episteme* 2 (2011): 143–52.

18 Sven Bernecker, *Memory: A Philosophical Study* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 83–90; see also Blake Myers-Schulz and Eric Schwitzgebel, "Knowing That P Without Believing That P," *Noûs* 47 (2013): 371–84.

yet misleading evidence to this effect. Given the incompatibility of full justification with the presence of undefeated defeaters, Susan does *not* know on Wednesday that Columbus discovered America in 1492, for she is unable to rule out the relevant alternative that it happened in 1494. Susan fails to know on Wednesday that Columbus discovered America in 1492, despite the fact that she still remembers this fact from what she knew on Monday. This case seems to suggest that one can remember what one knew but doesn't know anymore—even though one continues to truly believe it—for the reason that one isn't anymore fully justified in believing it.[19]

If these cases hold up to scrutiny they cast doubt on the widespread view whereupon memory is long-standing or continuing knowledge. It appears one can not only remember something one doesn't believe but also one can acquire some plausible yet misleading evidence that destroys the status as justified belief of the once-genuine justified belief that one still remembers.

While it is questionable that each and every memory counts as knowledge, it is unquestionable that some memories count as pieces of knowledge. But if there is memory knowledge, memory must be reliable. And this raises the question of what, if anything, speaks in favor of the general reliability of memory. We all trust our ostensible memories to some greater or lesser degree. Yet what reasons, if any, do we have for believing that events we seem to remember actually happened? Is Bertrand Russell right in claiming that there is no logical impossibility in the hypothesis that the world sprang into being five minutes ago, exactly as it then was, with a population that seemed to remember a wholly unreal past?[20] Some have tried to dismiss this skeptical hypothesis

19 See Sven Bernecker, *Memory: A Philosophical Study* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 71–83; and Sven Bernecker "Further Thoughts on Memory: Replies to Schechtman, Adams, and Goldberg," *Philosophical Studies* 153 (2011): 112–16; for dissenting views, see Fred Adams, "Husker Du?" *Philosophical Studies* 153 (2011): 81–94; and Andrew Moon, "Remembering Entails Knowing," *Synthese* 190 (January 2012): 2717–729.

20 Bertrand Russell, *The Analysis of Mind*, Introduction by T. Baldwin (London: Routledge, 1995), 159–160.

as incoherent.[21] The problem with this antiskeptical strategy is that it seems to rely on a version of verificationism that is usually deemed less plausible than the skeptical hypothesis itself.[22]

The task of responding to Russell's skeptical challenge and of validating our ostensible memories is formidable. Any inductive argument for the trustworthiness of ostensible memory representations is open to the charge of vicious circularity. Any attempt to confirm the validity of memory representations relies on memory. We don't seem to be able to put our reliance on memories in question and then demonstrate the reliability of a given ostensible memory.[23] But how else should we validate our ostensible memories? Three proposals can be found in the literature. Some suggest that we can validate our ostensible seeming memories by examining the degree to which they cohere. Such coherence or congruence is said to raise the probability of what is remembered to the level of practical certainty.[24] Others argue that the general reliability of ostensible memories is an analytic truth.[25] Yet another approach to the problem of justifying memory is to hold that the reliability of ostensible memory is an axiom of all of our epistemic endeavors; it can neither be proven nor disproven but must be assumed.[26]

21 Norman Malcolm, "Memory and the Past," in *Knowledge and Certainty*, 187–202 (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1963); and Marcus G. Singer, "Meaning, Memory, and the Moment of Creation," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 63 (1963): 187–202.

22 Verificationism is the view that a statement or question is only legitimate if there is some way to determine whether the statement is true or false, or what would be an answer to the question.

23 Sven Bernecker, *The Metaphysics of Memory* (Dordrecht: Springer, 2008), 97–104, 126–133.

24 Clarence Irving Lewis, *An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation* (La Salle: Open Court, 1946), chap. 11; cf. Erik J. Olsson, *Against Coherence: Truth Probability, and Justification* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), chap. 3.

25 Analytic truths are knowable by knowing the meanings of the constituent words alone, unlike synthetic truths whose truth is knowable by both knowing the meaning of the words and something about the world. Norman Malcolm, "Memory and the Past," in *Knowledge and Certainty*, 187–202 (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1963); and Sydney Shoemaker, *Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1963), 229.

26 Bertrand Russell, *Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits*, Introduction by J. G. Slater (London: Routledge, 2009), 163–73; and John T. Saunders, "Skepticism and Memory," *Philosophical Review* 72 (1963): 477–86.

4. Memory and Justification

Another debate in contemporary epistemology concerns the question of whether memory is merely a preservative source of justification and knowledge or whether it can also function as a generative source. The standard picture has it that if one justifiedly believes (knows) something on the basis of memory, then one must have acquired the justification (knowledge) in a nonmemorial way (by, say, testimony, perception, or reasoning) at some earlier time. Memory cannot make a belief acquire an epistemic status superior to the one it had at the time the belief was originally acquired. The best memory can do is to preserve the epistemic status the belief had at the time of encoding. So if my memory belief that I had cereal for breakfast counts as justified (known), I must have already justifiedly believed (known) that I am having cereal for breakfast when I did. This view is known as *preservationism.*[27]

What is required for the preservation of justification? According to *internalism about justification*, a belief is justified if the bearer of the belief has direct access to, and directly recognizes, his grounds (evidence, reasons) for that belief. The problem with this view is that we frequently forget the grounds for our beliefs while retaining the beliefs themselves. Suppose you come to justifiedly believe that *p* on the basis of a trustworthy friend's having told you so. It is possible that you retain the belief that *p* while forgetting the fact that it was a trustworthy friend of yours who told you that *p*. But if, for all you know, you could have acquired the belief on the basis of some *unreliable* source then, given internalism, you are not any longer justified in believing *p*. So it appears that the combination of internalism and preservationism is committed to the implausible claim that retained beliefs

27 Preservationism about memorial justification is endorsed, among others, by Michael Dummett, "Testimony and Memory," in *The Seas of Language*, 411–28 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); Alvin Plantinga, *Warrant and Proper Function* (New York: Oxford University Press), 61; and Thomas D. Senor, "Preserving Preservationism: A Reply to Lackey," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 74 (2007): 199–208.

are not justified unless the past grounds are recalled. This is known as the *problem of forgotten evidence.*[28]

In light of the problem of forgotten evidence many epistemologists subscribe to *externalism about memorial justification.* This is the view that one's initial justification for a belief continues, so long as one merely continues to hold the belief—regardless of whether one is aware of one's initial grounds. The view according to which a belief may inherit its justificatory status is known as the *principle of continuous justification.*[29]

Recently, preservationism has come under attack. A number of epistemologists have challenged the idea that memory can do no more than preserve the epistemic status of the stored beliefs. They claim that memory can generate belief, justification, and knowledge and, hence, that it can function as an epistemically generative source. This view is called *generativism.* Three generativist proposals have been put forward in the literature.

According to one generativist proposal, it is the experience of recalling that generates justification for memory beliefs. A parallel is drawn between memory and perception. In a standard case of perceptual belief, one is "appeared to" in a certain way and, on the basis of this appearance, comes to justifiedly believe something about the perceptual surroundings. Similarly, when one remembers something one has a recollection and, on the basis of this phenomenal state, comes to justifiedly believe something about the past. The idea is that if one bases one's belief that *p* on one's state of seeming to remember that *p*, and *p* is undefeated, then one is at least prima facie justified in believing *p*.[30]

28 Alvin I. Goldman, "Internalism Exposed," *Journal of Philosophy* 96 (1999): 271–93; and Timothy Williamson, "On Being Justified in One's Head," in *Rationality and the Good: Critical Essays on the Ethics and Epistemology of Robert Audi*, ed. Mark Timmons, John Greco, and Alfred R. Mele, 106–22 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

29 Sven Bernecker, *The Metaphysics of Memory* (Dordrecht: Springer, 2008), 117–26.

30 Robert Audi, "Memorial Justification," *Philosophical Topics* 23 (1995): 31–45; Michael Huemer, "The Problem of Memory Knowledge," *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 80 (1999): 346–57; John L. Pollock and Joseph Cruz, *Contemporary Theories of Knowledge*, 2d ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), chap. 2; and Robert Schroer, "Memory Foundationalism and the Problem of Unforgotten Carelessness," *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 89 (2008): 74–85.

Even if it is taken for granted that there is a distinctive phenomenology that attends all justified memory beliefs and if it is taken for granted that memory beliefs are justified in virtue of their experiential features, this generativist proposal has some counterintuitive consequences. If the epistemic status of a belief improves simply in virtue of being recalled, then a belief receives an epistemic boost every time it is retrieved from memory. But it seems implausible to suppose that, everything else being equal, a belief that is retrieved frequently enjoys a better epistemic status than a belief that is retrieved rarely. There does not seem to be neat correlation between the positive epistemic status a belief has and the number of times it has been retrieved from memory. This is known as the *epistemic boost problem*.[31]

Another generativist proposal has it that memory generates justification by generating belief.[32] Consider the following case: while Susan is avidly lecturing, a bell rings indicating the end of the lecture. Susan doesn't notice that the bell is ringing and continues the lecture. After some time, a student asks her whether she has forgotten the time. At that moment Susan remembers that the dismissal bell had rung, even though she didn't previously believe that it had rung. The auditory experience had failed to break into her consciousness at the time it occurred, but passed into her memory nonetheless. Given that belief is a necessary condition for justified belief (knowledge), Susan acquires a new justified belief (knowledge) when she recalls what she heard while lecturing.

The problem with cases of inattentive remembering like this one is that the positive epistemic status of the memory belief is not due to memory. It is the subject's prior sense experience that justifies his later belief. Here memory generates a nonepistemic component of

31 Matthew McGrath, "Memory and Epistemic Conservatism," *Synthese* 157 (2007): 1–24; and Thomas D. Senor, "Internalistic Foundationalism and the Justification of Memory Belief," *Synthese* 94 (1993): 453–76.

32 Jennifer Lackey, "Memory as a Generative Epistemic Source," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 70 (2005): 636–58; and Jennifer Lackey, "Why Memory Really Is a Generative Epistemic Source: A Reply to Senor," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 74 (2007): 209–19.

knowledge, namely belief, but doesn't contribute to an increase in justification.[33]

A third generativist proposal claims that memory can generate justification for a stored belief due to changes in the relationship of the belief to defeaters.[34] Consider the following case: Susan acquires a belief from hearsay that would be justified (known) if she didn't have a misleading defeater whereupon the testifier is an unreliable informant.[35] The belief is unjustified because Susan holds on to it in spite of the presence of a misleading defeater. Then the belief is faithfully stored in memory. At some later time, Susan has forgotten about the misleading defeater that did the defeating work while still remembering the belief that was originally defeated. Given that the presence of the misleading defeater is the only reason Susan wasn't justified before, her belief *is* justified when the defeater has disappeared. Thus Susan justifiedly believes (knows) something from memory that she didn't justifiedly believe (know) before.

Two comments. First, there are numerous ways for a defeater to disappear that don't involve activity on the part of the epistemic subject. Mental state defeaters preventing a memory belief from counting as justified can disappear due to a neural breakdown, the intervention of a neuroscientist, or the introduction of a defeater-defeater. Following the proposal under consideration, it would be appropriate to say in all of these cases that memory "generates" new justification (knowledge). This use of the term "generative" seems highly contrived. Second, in the example at hand memory plays a purely preservative role. All the elements required for the memory belief to be justified are already

33 Sven Bernecker, *Memory: A Philosophical Study* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 96–103; and Thomas D. Senor, "Preserving Preservationism: A Reply to Lackey," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 74 (2007): 199–208.

34 Jennifer Lackey, "Memory as a Generative Epistemic Source," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 70 (2005): 636–58; and Jennifer Lackey, "Why Memory Really Is a Generative Epistemic Source: A Reply to Senor," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 74 (2007): 209–19.

35 Mental state defeaters are conditions internal to the perspective of the subject (such as experiences, beliefs, withholdings) that cancel, reduce, or even prevent justification. Misleading defeaters are such that they only attain their power to defeat by motivating an inference to a false proposition.

present when the belief was acquired and encoded. Unless the original belief had justificatory potential, the memory belief couldn't count as justified. Memory "generates" justification only by unleashing the justificatory potential that was already present at the time the belief was initially entertained.[36]

5. Memory and Personal Identity

Introversive memory as well as extroversive memory in the first-person mode demand that the rememberer is the same person as the one who had the past representation. For when the memory content involves an indexical reference to the rememberer like in remembering that *I* had cereal for breakfast the truth condition on memory requires that it was in fact *me* who had cereal for breakfast.[37] The person remembering having had cereal must be the same as the person who had cereal. There is an on-going debate among philosophers of mind and metaphysicians whether the dependence of (some kinds of) memory on personal identity through time is of a *logical* or a *contingent* kind.

Many philosophers hold, first, that personal identity consists in psychological connectedness and continuity and, second, that experiential memories are an important ingredient of psychological connectedness and continuity. On this view, a person who exists at one time is numerically identical with a person who exists at a later time only if the later person can experientially remember experiences the former person had. But the notion of experiential memory cannot be used to define personal identity if, on the other hand, the notion of memory logically implies the notion of personal identity. This objection to the memory criterion of personal identity is known as the *circularity objection*.

36 Sven Bernecker, *Memory: A Philosophical Study* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 96–103; and Thomas D. Senor, "Preserving Preservationism: A Reply to Lackey," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 74 (2007): 199–208.

37 Indexicals are linguistic expressions whose reference shifts from context to context. Paradigm examples are "I," "here," "now," "today," "he," "she," and "that."

Some propose to solve the circularity objection by getting rid of the identity-involving conditions for experiential memory.[38] They define experiential memory in terms of *quasi-memory* that lacks the identity-involving conditions characteristic of experiential memory. Quasi-memory is like ordinary experiential memory in all phenomenal and causal respects, except that it is not restricted to experiences of one's own past. Quasi-memory doesn't presuppose that the bearer of the past experience is co-personal with the bearer of the present state of seeming to remember having had that experience. Experiential memories are said to be a special case of quasi-memories: they are quasi-memories where the past experiencer and the present rememberer are the same person. Anyone who is in a state of remembering having had experience *e* is in a state of quasi-remembering having had experience *e*. And because quasi-memory doesn't imply personal identity, memory doesn't either. Whenever one remembers having an experience, then, as a matter of fact, the memory experience corresponds to, and is causally related to, an experience that one had. But such an exceptionless empirical uniformity, it is argued, should not be confused with logical necessity. That experiential memory presupposes personal identity is a contingent fact having to do with the kind of world we inhabit rather than a necessary fact.

The notion of quasi-memory has come under attack from different sides. There are, among others, objections from holism about mental content[39] and from the immunity to error through misidentification.[40] Advocates of quasi-memory have developed responses to each of these objections.

38 Derek Parfit, *Reasons and Persons* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 219–223; and Sydney Shoemaker, "Persons and Their Pasts," in *Identity, Cause, and Mind*, 19–48 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003).

39 Marya Schechtman, "Personhood and Personal Identity," *Journal of Philosophy* 87 (1990): 71–92; Marya Schechtman, "Memory and Identity," *Philosophical Studies* 153 (2011): 65–79; and Marc Slors, "Personal Identity, Memory, and Circularity: An Alternative for Q-Memory," *Journal of Philosophy* 98 (2001): 186–214.

40 Gareth Evans, *The Varieties of Reference*, ed. John McDowell (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), chap. 7; and John McDowell, "Reductionism and the First Person," in *Reading Parfit*, ed. Jonathan Dancy, 230–50 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997).

According to holism about mental content (also known as *meaning holism*), a memory trace in your brain undergoes a change of content when it is implanted in my brain, for the trace's content depends both on inferential connections to other mental states that are possessed by you but not by me, and on the absence of inferential connections to other mental states that are possessed by me but not by you. If inferential connections co-constitute mental content, as the holist claims, the clash between a quasi-memory and its newly acquired mental context will result in the quasi-memory's having a very different content or, rather, no content at all. Cases of quasi-memory are not just cases in which the quasi-memory differs qualitatively from the experience that caused it; rather, they are cases in which there is no similarity in content between the newly inserted brain state and its causal origin.

One of the problems with the holist's attack on quasi-memory is that research on retrograde amnesia and on dissociative disorders (such as schizophrenia and multiple personality disorder) suggest that the mineness of an experiential memory can indeed be separated from the content of the memory.[41] People suffering from dissociative disorders, for instance, manage to integrate "experiential memories" from a seemingly foreign psychology into their frame of mind.

Granted that experiential memory is a special case of quasi-memory, first-person judgments based on experiential memory are identification-dependent: an inference is required to establish myself as the subject of the past experience by quasi-memory reports. Since inferences are error-prone, experiential memories turn out to be vulnerable to error through misidentification. This is where some critics of quasi-memory dig in their heels. They claim that our experiential memories enjoy a *logical* immunity to error through misidentification and it is only in unusual circumstances that the self-attribution of past experiences is

41 Stanley B. Klein and Shaun Nichols, "Memory and the Sense of Personal Identity," *Mind* 121 (2013): 677–702; Georg Northoff, "Are 'Q-Memories' Empirically Realistic? A Neurophilosophical Approach," *Philosophical Psychology* 13 (2000): 191–211; and Rebecca Roache, "A Defence of Quasi-Memory," *Philosophy* 81 (2006): 323–55.

based on inferences. Therefore, experiential memory is not a kind of quasi-memory.

It is not clear that this line of attack on the notion of quasi-memory is valid. Granted that first-person judgments based on experiential memories usually do not involve inferential self-identifications, it does not follow that such judgments enjoy a *logical* immunity to error through misidentification. My judgment that *I* had cereal for breakfast may be vulnerable to certain sorts of misidentification errors (maybe it wasn't *me* who had cereal for breakfast), even though having justification for the judgment does not require me to consider those errors and rule them out. I need not engage in a process of identification for the justification to rely on identification. So the fact that a judgment is identification-free does not show that it is *logically* rather than merely *de facto* immune to errors of misidentification.[42]

42 James Pryor, "Immunity to Error Through Misidentification," *Philosophical Topics* 26 (1999): 271–304.

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Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and certain other countries.

Published in the United States of America by
Oxford University Press
198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Memory : a history / edited by Dmitri Nikulin.
pages cm. — (Oxford philosophical concepts)
ISBN 978-0-19-979384-6 (paperback)—ISBN 978-0-19-979383-9 (hardcover)
1. Memory (Philosophy) I. Nikulin, D. V. (Dmitrii Vladimirovich), editor.
II. Nikulin, D. V. (Dmitrii Vladimirovich). Memory in ancient philosophy.
BD181.7.M485 2015
128'.3—dc23 2014041245

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