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REGULAR PAPER

The Anti-Individualistic Turn in the Ethics of Collegiality: Can Good Colleagues Be Epistemically Vicious?

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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to show that the nascent field of ethics of collegiality may considerably benefit from a symbiosis with virtue and vice epistemology. We start by bringing the epistemic virtue and vice perspective to the table by showing that competence, deemed as an essential characteristic of a good colleague (Betzler & Löschke 2021), should be construed broadly to encompass epistemic competence. By endorsing the anti-individualistic stance in epistemology as well as context-specificity of epistemic traits, we show how the individual vice of a colleague can have a positive epistemic outcome for the team while individual virtue can be damaging if all team members share it thereby contributing to the negative epistemic outcome. We argue that the evaluation and analysis of collegial relationships should be done through one's contribution to the team dynamics: without this collectivist perspective, the ethics of collegiality cannot aspire to become encompassing normative theory.

Keywords anti-individualism · epistemic competence · ethics of collegiality · virtue epistemology · vice epistemology

1 Introduction

Would you consider a superficial, procrastinating person *a good colleague*? Can a bunch of closed-minded colleagues constitute a *valuable* cadre of a particular company? These are the questions we came to think about while surveying the recent lit-

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erature on the ethics of collegiality and experimental philosophy.[1] Experimental work on the notion of a colleague expands on previous work on dual-character concepts.[2] Specifically, such a notion apparently has both *normative* and *descriptive* dimensions. The normative dimension captures our expectations pertaining to persons we would call "colleagues". In other words, we behave in a particular manner when we consider someone to be more than a mere coworker, and our actions and words toward that person should conform to collegial standards. Reuter, Löschke, and Betzler report that their results indicate an important piece of information: if a colleague underperforms and violates our expectations, we hold her morally responsible.

Two of Reuter's co-authors, Monika Betzler and Jörg Löschke, have theoretically framed their previous empirical analysis and inaugurated the ethics of collegiality. As they rightly point out, collegial relationships are *sui generis* relationships that have escaped the attention of philosophers even though there are myriads of empirical studies stressing the importance of such relationships for employee satisfaction and organizational effectiveness. They draw a similar conclusion to the one in their joint paper with Reuter, namely that these relationships are intrinsically valuable due to *collegial recognition* and *collegial solidarity.* Recognition is granted only if our colleagues excel at their jobs since we – *qua* peers – are in the position to assess their expertise. Thus, it is not enough that a person is loyal and willing to help (i.e., expressing solidarity); rather, she must be competent and skillful as well. This is in line with studies suggesting that employees' incompetence could have more detrimental effects than moral vices in sectors like financial services.[3]

We were mainly influenced by Betzler's and Löschke's hints that being *a good colleague* and *a loyal employee* can be mutually exclusive in some instances since solidarity with a peer may induce disloyalty to the same employer.[4] Hence, our aim is to examine the interplay between normative demands we put on individual colleagues and employees taken as a collective body. Specifically, we are interested in the following questions: **(*I*)** is it possible that bad (i.e., epistemically vicious) colleagues constitute an efficient body of employees, and **(*II*)** is it possible that colleagues of epistemically virtuous character constitute a counterproductive body of employees? Our strategy of tackling **(*I*)** and **(*II*)** revolves around the particular scenario where *X* violates the typical criteria for being considered a good colleague by exhibiting φ and then assessing what the possession of φ entails on the collectivist level, i.e., from the perspective of *X*'s contribution to the team. In a similar vein, we go over a similar scenario where *X* fulfills the typical criteria for being considered a good colleague

[1] See Monika Betzler and Jörg Löschke, "Collegial Relationships," *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24* (2021): 213–229; Kevin Reuter, Jörg Löschke and Monika Betzler, "What is a Colleague? The Descriptive and Normative Dimension of a Dual-character Concept," *Philosophical Psychology 33* (2020): 997–1017.

[2] See Joshua Knobe, Sandeep Prasada and George E Newman, "Dual Character Concepts and the Normative Dimension of Conceptual Representation," *Cognition 127* (2013): 242–257.

[3] See Boudewijn De Bruin, "Ethics management in banking and finance," in N. Morris & D. Vines (eds.), *Capital Failure: Rebuilding Trust in Financial Services* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 255–276; Boudewijn De Bruin *Ethics and the Global Financial Crisis: Why Incompetence is Worse than Greed* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

[4] See Monika Betzler and Jörg Löschke, op. cit.

by exhibiting Ψ and then exploring consequences regarding X's contribution to the team based on Ψ.

The structure of the paper goes as follows: we start by endorsing the framework of *vice and virtue epistemology*, where we also locate the important *anti-individualistic* moments in order to build a bridge between such a framework and the ethics of collegiality (Sects. 1 & 2). We then proceed to analyze questions **(*I*)** and **(*II*)** through the above-sketched strategy, which we boost with illustrative examples (Sects. 3 & 4). We contend that although previous considerations in the ethics of collegiality offered an individualistic image of a colleague, it would be beneficial to incorporate an anti-individualistic image from the very moment of the inauguration of the subfield. The reason why one should turn to the anti-individualistic aspect of the concept of a colleague has to do with normative demands that can fluctuate heavily when such a concept plays a role in a collectivist context. Hence, it is paramount to develop further both the conceptual and empirical aspects of the ethics of collegiality by probing the recently proposed normative framework and examining the exigencies of epistemic and moral diversity of specific professions.

2 Forging Links Between The Ethics of Collegiality and Virtue & Vice Epistemology

Before jumping to work teams in the next Section, we will address what makes one a good colleague in order to establish a transparent link between virtue and vice framework and the ethics of collegiality. We will start by elucidating Monika Betzler and Jörg Löschke's account of collegial relationships in order to sketch how the epistemic character plays an important role in detecting good collegial behavior besides the collegial relationship goods such as solidarity and recognition.

Betzler & Löschke (2021) claim that two people can be considered colleagues if they share the same domain of activity, institutional affiliation, or work purpose, and, finally, the level of responsibility. These criteria may vary in such a way that one can fluctuate, whereas the other remains fixed. For instance, in cases of interdisciplinary teams and laboratories, the employees can have different domains of activity, but they are colleagues nonetheless since they share affiliation or work purpose (as in CERN, where such teams comprise members from a variety of institutions). An administrative assistant and CEO do not share the same level of responsibility, but in a broader, institutional sense, they are colleagues since their loyalties belong to the company where they work. The colleagues establish a relationship precisely because of the features they share – which are further deepened through different work-related circumstances that guide their daily task performance. Of course, the relationships may be either valuable or not, depending on mutual recognition and solidarity. Simply put, if you are a responsible and reliable person who regularly assists her co-workers, there is a good chance you're seen as one of the *good* colleagues at your workplace. However, as Betzler & Löschke rightly notice, we care about the colleague that actually manages to help since mere willingness to appear helpful is not enough. This is because we are in a position to assess and validate each other's conduct in a work-

related context, namely professional skills, people skills, and ability to contribute to a common goal or work purpose.

However, this is where the loyalties can be tested. Recall the collegial relationship between the administrative assistant and CEO. They are both loyal to their company, but they differ regarding the assessment of each other's contribution to a common goal. The administrative assistant may have noticed that the CEO's decisions are negatively affecting the company's profit and (coincidentally?) boosting the profits of the rival company. Additionally, the CEO is unwilling to revise her decisions in light of the criticism or relevant information provided by the administrative assistant;rather, she blames employees for company losses. This means that not only does the CEO exhibits disloyalty and a lack of solidarity with the other employees, but also a considerable amount of closed-mindedness and dogmatism. Thus, the administrative assistant can choose to be either loyal to the company – i.e., the organizational framework of co-workers and colleagues – and try to expose the alleged harmful behavior of their boss or to remain a good employee by respecting her employer's decisions. In this case, being a good colleague and loyal employee clashes, and the clash has to do with CEO's poor job performance which is, in turn, provoked by CEO's *epistemic vices*.

In recent years, vice epistemology has steadily emerged as an independent subfield of epistemology which is tightly intertwined with more developed virtue epistemology.[5] Both sub-fields juggle with two domains – namely, moral and epistemic, thereby blurring the demarcation line between the domains. In the case of virtue epistemology, a clear link to virtue ethics has already been established by Aristotle and acknowledged by pioneers such as Zagzebski.[6] In this sense, one can regard virtue epistemology as a sort of extension of virtue ethics to the intellectual domain.[7] In the

[5] See Quassim Cassam, "Vice Epistemology," *The Monist 99* (2016): 159–180.; Quassim Cassam, *Vices of the Mind* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019); Heather Battaly, "Varieties of Epistemic Vice," in J. Matheson and R. Vitz (eds.), *The Ethics of Belief* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 51–76; Ian James Kidd, "Charging Others with Epistemic Vice," *The Monist 99* (2016): 181–197; Ian James Kidd, Heather Battaly and Quassim Cassam, *Vice Epistemology* (London: Routledge, 2020).

[6] See Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics* (c. 350 BCE), trans. D. Ross (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998); Linda Zagzebski, *Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

[7] Of course, this does not imply that every aspect of virtue epistemology has an ethical background. A decade before Linda Zagzebski's seminal book which contributed to inaugurating the subfield in the mainstream epistemology, Sosa reached for the notion of "intellectual virtues" to help dissolving the seemingly never-ending debate between foundationalists and coherentists in epistemology (See Ernest Sosa, "The Raft and the Pyramid: Coherence versus Foundations in the Theory of Knowledge," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1980): 3–25.). In that sense, intellectual virtues were merely an imported tool that should serve a new purpose in traditional analytic epistemology. Our point here is similar to Baehr, who gives an excellent overview of the structural similarities between virtue ethics and virtue epistemology (See Jason Baehr, "Virtue Epistemology, Virtue Ethics, and the Structure of Virtue" in H Battaly (ed.), *Routledge Handbook of Virtue Epistemology* (New York: Routledge, 2018): pp. 144–162). However, it is worth noting that when philosophers pay attention to the analysis of specific virtues, ethical background becomes either implicitly or explicitly assumed (for instance, see Nancy E. Snow, "Intellectual Humility," in: H Battaly (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Virtue Epistemology (New York: Routledge, 2018): 178–196; Laura Beeby, "Epistemic Justice: Three Models of Virtues" in: H Battaly (ed.), *Routledge Handbook of Virtue Epistemology* (New York: Routledge, 2018): 232–244; Ian James

case of vice epistemology, the tension between two main camps – motivational and consequential accounts of vice – stems from the parallel positions in ethics.

We are particularly interested in the framework of virtue and vice epistemology since both subfields try to discern what makes one an excellent thinker – be it in the form of particular virtues one should exhibit or vices one should battle against. In this regard, virtue and vice epistemology have identified and conceptually analyzed numerous traits that constitute significant aspects of epistemic character and hence help or hinder acquiring and maintaining knowledge such as perseverance, epistemic humility, open-mindedness, intellectual arrogance, close-mindedness, gullibility and others. In other words, this framework should spell out the features which make one's *epistemic profile* favorable or unfavorable. Virtues and vices embedded in one's epistemic profile are assumed to impact practical performance in different areas, such as educational attainment, business and financial decision-making and productivity in organizations.[8]

Collegial relations are another domain in which the epistemic profile could be of paramount importance, as our crude sketch of the relationship between CEO and administrative assistant suggests. Betzler & Löschke point out that their account of collegial relationships suggests that one must be *competent* to be deemed a good colleague.[9] Nonetheless, despite being competent, our colleagues may be endowed with an epistemically corrupt character, which can influence how well someone does their job. For instance, if a person lacks epistemic perseverance, there is little chance that she will become a good scientist, regardless of her talent or Ivy League education, which could make her, at least *prima facie*, perfectly adequate for the appointment. Such a person would have no epistemic means to deal successfully with frequent rejection from journals or time-consuming experiment failures. We firmly believe that besides the competence *sensu stricto*, which is based on education and a set of skills necessary for performing the job at hand, *epistemic competence* also dictates how we are perceived and valued by our colleagues and vice versa. This means that intricacies surrounding the notion of an adequate epistemic profile should also be among the preoccupations of the ethicists of collegiality. Our aim is to make the first step in this direction by showing what can be learned from vice and virtue epistemology when it comes to the conduct of work collectives, i.e., assemblies of individual colleagues.[10]

Kidd, "Epistemic Courage and the Harms of Epistemic Life." in: H Battaly (ed.) *Routledge Handbook of Virtue Epistemology* (New York: Routledge, 2018): 244–256.

[8] See Jason Baehr, "Educating for Intellectual Virtues: From Theory to Practice,"*Journal of the Philosophy of Education 47* (2013): 248–262; De Bruin (2014), op. cit.; Christopher Baird and Thomas S Calvard, "Epistemic Vices in Organizations: Knowledge, Truth, and Unethical Conduct," *Journal of Business Ethics 160*(2019): 263–276.

[9] Betzler & Löschke, op. cit.

[10] Baird & Calvard outline the interface between business ethics and applied vice epistemology, i.e., how vices such as malevolence, insouciance, hubris and justice impact organizations (See Baird & Calvard, op. cit.). Nonetheless, whereas their focus is on institutional and organizational aspects, we pay attention to teams and work collectives that constitute such organizations and institutions. In other words, we provide a fine-grained analysis of collegial relationships akin to Betzler & Löschke, and leave the coarse-grained analysis of links between business ethics and the ethics of collegiality for future work (See Betzler & Löschke, op. cit.).

3 From the Collectivist Point of View

The vast majority of professions hinge on working in teams – be they smaller or larger ones – because task performance usually requires the cooperative effort of multiple individuals. As we have already stressed, the moral traits of an individual, along with her epistemic traits, namely, epistemic virtues and vices, will have a substantial impact on her relationship with other team members or coworkers. Of course, not all epistemic traits are equally relevant for different situations in the workplace and different vocations. When participating in a cooperative task, the interaction is mediated by the epistemic traits of the persons involved. For instance, while working in the laboratory, colleagues who are curious and inquisitive will be appreciated. On the other hand, if one is employed in a bookkeeping company, where virtually every task requires attention to detail, one's attentiveness is more important than being curious or inquisitive. To sum up, epistemic traits are intertwined with one's job performance and collegial relations, and one's epistemic competence influences how one is perceived within a work collective. So far, the story checks out.

However, we should not think of work collective only as the environment in which collegial relations take place since several phenomena indicate that one should think of groups or collectives as *independent epistemic agents*.[11] It is fairly facile to propound that epistemic or cognitive characteristics of individual members influence the behavior of the group. Nonetheless, this influence is rarely transparent or easily predictable due to the complex intragroup dynamics, which demands a fine-grained analysis. Therefore, it seems instructive to consider groups as independent epistemic agents and crucial subject matter in epistemology (and its subfields). This, in turn, implies that group behavior should be analyzed in terms of collectives to which one can ascribe both virtues and vices before trying to give a fine-grained analysis of such behavior. When it comes to the ethics of collegiality, putting the collective *as an* independent agent into focus seems reasonable because collegial relations are embedded into the collective task performance and shared goals in the workplace.

In the rest of the section, we will motivate the collectivistic turn in virtue and vice epistemology, which should, in turn, inform the ethics of collegiality. The upshot is, thus, to comment on previous work in both virtue and vice epistemology and to sketch the crisscrossing between collective take on virtues and vices and their context-specificity.

Virtue and vice epistemology were predominantly individualistic from their inception. However, significant steps have been taken toward anti-individualism in the

[11] We endorse the broad definition of Palermos and Pritchard who see epistemic group agents as "groups of individuals who exist and gain knowledge in virtue of a shared common cognitive character that primarily consists of a distributed cognitive ability" (See Orestis Palermos and Duncan Pritchard, "Extended Knowledge and Social Epistemology," *Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 2* (2013): 105–120, p. 115). However, we see "collectives" as groups of colleagues and coworkers who gain knowledge and act in virtue of a shared workload and in accordance with their epistemic profile. Nonetheless, we use the two terms interchangeably throughout the paper, along with the term "team" or "teamwork", since all these point to the anti-individualist perspective that we want to emphasize.

last decade.[12] Reza Lahroodi (2007) was among the first to argue that any collective could possess some epistemic traits which its members lack. Thus, for instance, the church committee could manifest close-mindedness regarding LGBTQ rights, despite the fact that perhaps the vast majority or even all of its members are individually open-minded about this issue. Lahroodi sides with *non-summativists*. Philosophers inclined to this position hold that a group may have a particular virtue or vice even if no member has that particular trait, and conversely, even if all members have such a trait, the group nevertheless may fail to have it. On the other hand, *summativists* claim that groups *per se* cannot exhibit epistemic traits but rather individuals.[13] In other words, when we attribute an epistemic trait, be it virtue or vice, to a group, we are actually attributing that trait to a majority or even to all group members. That being so if all individuals are open-minded, the group cannot fail to act open-mindedly. The main lesson of non-summativism – that groups can exhibit epistemic traits that are not present in individual members – seems to be relevant to our idea of expanding the scope of the ethics of collegiality. If we can encounter epistemic traits at a collective level that are not a mere reflection of the individual's characteristics, then taking the collective perspective into account is indispensable to gaining a thorough understanding of collegial interactions. We have no intention of digging deeper into the debate between summativist and non-summativists. Admittedly, the key point of our paper – that individual virtue or vice can have an opposite, collective-dependent aspect that must be incorporated into the ethics of collegiality – can be interpreted as cleaving closer to non-summativism in a rudimentary sense.

Nonetheless, even if one preferred to steer clear from coming to terms with either summativists or non-summativists, the anti-individualistic ideas in virtue and vice epistemology were just around the corner. Thus, Anita Konzelmann Ziv (2013), following the suggestion made by Hookway (2003), developed the view that individual virtues and vices, through their integration into collective traits, may undergo a change in value: individual vices can be integrated into collective virtue.[14] Consider Hookway's example: a research team could benefit from individual dogmatism since if it were that all members were open-minded, then their joint work would end up being utterly inefficient since they would seriously ponder even wild speculations.[15] Konzelmann Ziv backs up Hookway's example by describing the process of aggregation of virtue constituents that can absorb non-intentional deflection or negative behavioral patterns. In this way, epistemically negative side effects of indi-

[12] See Christopher Hookway, "How to Be a Virtue Epistemologist." in: M. DePaul & L. Zagzebski (eds.), *Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003): 183–202; Reza Lahroodi "Collective Epistemic Virtue," Social Epistemology 21 (2007): 281–297; Anita Konzelmann Ziv, "Collective Epistemic Agency: Virtue and the Spice of Vice," in: H.B. Schmid, D. Sites & M. Webe (eds.), *Collective Epistemology* (Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, 2011): 45–72; Neil Levy and Mark Alfano, "Knowledge from Vice: Deeply Social Epistemology," *Mind 129*(2020): 887–915.

[13] See Jennifer Lackey, *The Epistemology of Groups* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021).

[14] See Ziv, op. cit.; Hookway, op. cit.

[15] Hookway, op. cit., p. 189.

vidual members' behavior can be built in and contribute to the epistemically virtuous collective.[16]

Furthermore, we believe that Konzelmann Ziv's account can be taken to show the underlying connection between the ethics of collegiality and vice and virtue epistemology. The virtuous or vicious behavior of a colleague can have different epistemic side effects from the perspective of a group's behavior, which is exactly what we are stressing as an unexamined aspect of collegial relations within a working collective. To use picturesque language à la Konzelmann Ziv, the already spiced dish that proved flavorful in the past is a safe bet when one has to create a menu from scratch.

Now, after motivating and exploring anti-individualism in the vice and virtue epistemology, let us turn to the context-specificity of epistemic traits that is, in fact, closely related to the anti-individualism we endorsed. In his recent article from 2018, Paul Smart coins the term *Mandevillian intelligence* to account for situations when epistemic characteristics and cognitive properties of individual agents that usually impede performance start contributing to collective intelligence. This idea could be backed up by several studies in social epistemology and the psychology of collective intelligence. The research in these fields indicates that individual negative traits such as *dogmatism* or cognitive biases such as *confirmation bias* can actually lead to the improved task performance of groups.[17] Thus, confirmation bias may be used for proactive reasoning, i.e., for strengthening a group's argumentative strategy for defending its point of view, whereas a healthy dose of dogmatism ensures that persons working within a network won't fail to converge to a consensus on a particular question, which would otherwise impede the division of labor and, ultimately, reaching the shared goal.

Additionally, Smart introduces *virtue relativism* as a counterpart position to both virtue reliabilism and virtue responsibilism, which is directly inspired by the phenomenon of Mandevillian intelligence. Therefore, in his view, vices and virtues constitutive of our cognitive character exhibit context-specificity: in some cases, e.g., when instances of Mandevillian intelligence occur, the context of evaluation fluctuates according to the level on which we focus. In other words, we can put either the individual agent or a group of individual agents under the spotlight, depending on whether we are working in traditional analytic epistemology or social epistemology.[18]

[16] What counts when we assess the epistemic and ethical correctness of a group's behavior is whether side-effects were intentionally or non-intentionally vicious. If the side-effects are non-intentionally vicious and promote positive conduct of a group, as was the case in Hookway's original example, then the epistemic vice can be regarded as an exotic spice that contributes to a well-cooked dish (Ziv, op. cit., p. 63). Konzelmann Ziv's account is particularly apt for linking with recently coined terms such as epistemic blameworthiness (Cassam 2019, op. cit.). In the case of intentionally vicious side-effects, one has the right to hold group behavior epistemically (and morally) responsible without necessarily deferring to considerations regarding the group's motives.

[17] See Kevin Zollman, "The Epistemic Benefit of Transient Diversity," *Erkenntnis 72* (2010): 17–35; Bo Xu, Renjing Liu and Zhengwen He, "Individual Irrationality, Network Structure, and Collective Intelligence: An Agent-Based Simulation Approach," *Complexity 21* (2016): 44–54; Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber, "Why Do Humans Reason? Arguments for an Argumentative Theory,' *Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34* (2o11): 57–111.

[18] Smart, PR "Mandevillian Intelligence: From Individual Vice to Collective Virtue," in: A.J. Carter, A. Clark, J. Kallestrup, O.J. Palermos, and D. Pritchard (eds.), *Socially Extended Epistemology* (Oxford:

We want to further impel the collectivist account of epistemic trait relativism for the sake of refining the ethics of collegiality by showing that a fine-grained analysis of a group's moral conduct does, in fact, starts with the assumption that groups could be independent agents. Astola, inspired by Smart, argues that, *per analogiam*, one can postulate *Mandevillian morality* that arises in collaborative undertakings through which it is possible to refine normative ethical theories such as virtue ethics.[19] Astola starts with endorsing collectivism, a metaethical position according to which a group can have moral responsibility inasmuch individuals can, and then proceeds to show how groups can exhibit collective virtues. Such virtues can be role-specific, such as academia-specific virtues (e.g., being an honest researcher or patient and dedicated educator), but when embedded in a particular social context, vices can contribute to collective virtue as well.

The takeaway message of this section is the following. The current framework of the ethics of collegiality seems to be oriented towards individualism. The point is, however, that when evaluating our co-workers, this should not be done by relying on personal preferences and how pleasant or unpleasant it is for us to interact with them, given that our relationship is *professional* rather than based on friendship. Even though collegial relations closely resemble relations between friends, the assessment of one's competence for the job sets apart the two kinds of relations. Once the competence in question is understood as epistemic competence, the turn towards anti-individualism becomes more natural: as the frameworks of virtue and vice epistemology have been brought to light, the collective perspective changes our criteria for virtuous or vicious conduct since individual virtues or vices can have an adverse effect on the collective level. Furthermore, we do not only claim that the ethics of collegiality can gain a lot from incorporating a collective perspective on the relativity of epistemic traits, given that collegial relations take place precisely in teams. Rather, we want to give at least a rough idea of how the ethics of collegiality *cannot* offer an encompassing analysis of the notion of a good colleague without taking such a perspective into account similarly as Astola sketches how virtue ethics *qua* normative ethical theory *cannot* be considered coherent and applicable without means to account for Mandevillian morality, or as Smart insists how the insights from collective intelligence research must be incorporated into contemporary epistemology to understand the dynamics of knowledge transfer.

4 Every Vicious Colleague Has its Excuse Ready – A Virtuous Work Collective

In the previous sections, we introduced the framework of virtue and vice epistemology as well as the anti-individualistic turn in these fields, which should serve as a role model for the nascent field of ethics of collegiality. In the following two sections, we will argue that shifting the perspective from the individual to the collective level

Oxford University Press, 2018) 253–274, p 256.

[19] See Mandi Astola, "Mandevillian Virtues," *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24* (2021): 19–32; Smart, op. cit.

can shed light on the *relativism* of epistemic traits, which, in turn, reveals the tension between being a good colleague and being a good employee. Epistemic traits, viz., epistemic virtues and vices, are highly dependent on our judgments and evaluations. This essentially means that we judge our colleagues with respect to the instantiation of their epistemic traits in *specific contexts*, such as teamwork. Specific contexts, thus, dictate whether the same epistemic trait may be judged as an epistemic virtue or vice.

We will first cover vices that may seem more akin to virtues on the collective level. The importance of epistemic vices for studying the organizational aspects of teamwork has already been noticed, albeit not spelled out within the framework of ethics of collegiality.[20] In a nutshell, the ethicists of collegiality have to incorporate the collective level into their considerations to understand what normative demands can be put on our colleagues – sometimes, being a loyal employee who contributes to the team intersects with being a vicious colleague. However, instead of presenting a catalog of epistemic vices that our colleagues should not be endowed with, we propose a contrasting strategy. We will examine the case of an agent endowed with a specific vice and spell out the consequences of such an epistemic profile for the team.

A person, let us call her Jules, can be described as a *quitter* – she will probably renounce her intellectual goals as soon as she hits an obstacle.[21] Thus, Jules tends to easily discard an idea for a project at the very moment when likely shortcomings of her idea become evident. She also promptly forsakes a line of inquiry when it becomes tedious or too demanding. Quitters, as Jules is, abandon their intentions because they are not willing to put in the effort required to carry those intentions out. In other words, having this epistemic trait means that a person lacks perseverance. A colleague lacking perseverance would be deemed a bad colleague. Recall that recognition and solidarity are two key features that make collegial relations intrinsically valuable – recognition is granted only if our colleagues are epistemically competent, and solidarity is expressed through concrete acts. *Prima facie*, Jules hardly deserves recognition from her colleagues, given that she lacks the perseverance to complete any task, which also suggests that she is incapable of solidarity since she does not assume the responsibility for the consequences of her quitting but rather leaves others to grapple with her workload. However, Jules may still be a valuable employee, i.e., someone who contributes to the team's task performance and the company's efficiency. We contend that the ethics of collegiality, being a framework that should help you discern good colleagues from bad ones according to the set of normative criteria, needs to find space for valuable employees with an unfavorable epistemic profile who make their teams better than they would be without them.

Imagine now that Jules is a part of the team that has invested considerable resources into a particular project. However, since this project does not yield the desired results, a rational decision would be to abandon it and move on to a new one. Nevertheless, given the extraordinary effort that the team has put into the current

[20] See Chun Wei Choo, *The Inquiring Organization: How Organizations Acquire Knowledge and Seek Information* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016); Baird & Calvard, op. cit.

[21] See Heather Battaly, "Quitting, Procrastinating, and Slacking Off," in: Kidd, I. J., Battaly, H., & Cassam, Q. (eds), Vice Epistemology (London: Routledge, 2020): 167–189.

project, most of the members are not ready to step down from the project but instead want to give it another chance. When focusing on the efficiency of the entire company, the team's decision comes across as a bad one because they are going to waste more time and resources. This tendency of the majority of team members to continue investing efforts and time into the doomed project is, in fact, a manifestation of the *sunk cost fallacy*.[22] The sunk cost fallacy arises precisely when people cannot give up their commitments and, instead, stick to their guns, even though evidence indicates that this is a suboptimal course of action. In our example, the team needs to cut their losses as soon as possible.

Thus, Jules as a typical quitter can serve as a role model for team conduct. In other words, her being epistemically vicious can provoke epistemically beneficial outcomes on the collective level when the team endorses Jules' decision to abandon the failed project. Thus, her contribution to the team is nowhere near epistemically negative: even though Jules is a bad colleague, she is a valuable employee since her lack of perseverance may halt excessive and biased commitment to doomed projects with irretrievable investments. Picture that Jules works for a hedge fund, where it is paramount to know when it is the right time to take a specific risk mitigation strategy to handle the market. Her quitting tendency may directly result in investment gains. For instance, although her colleagues would not deem her competent enough to consult her vis-à-vis risk management strategies needed for long-term financial planning, Jules may often opt for back-to-back hedging. A back-to-back strategy amounts to immediately purchasing resources on the commodity market the moment they are made available. For Jules, who lacks perseverance when it comes to her job, choosing this strategy means she does not have to dwell on the tedious details of different investments. As opposed to her team, that would (without Jules' contribution) end up considering myriads of alternative strategies and, thus, losing optimal position in the market; Jules' quitting could be a factor in her hedge fund's profitable decision-making.

Similarly, if Jules is a part of a scientific team within a particular institute, her quitting may impact the team's decision to halt unsuccessful experimentation or abandon a static research program even when the team is reluctant to do so. For instance, imagine that Jules is a paleornithologist in a team that zealously defends the theory of avian origins according to which birds are not dinosaurs, specifically maniraptoran theropods. Given a plethora of evidence and theoretical considerations that such a research program is a stagnant or even a degenerate one in Lakatosian terms, Jules as a quitter, would positively influence her team's behavior by prompting them to stop losing time and precious funding on a lost cause thereby mitigating their collective sunk cost fallacy.[23] To sum up, in all the above-described cases, the team ends up being more productive despite Jules being epistemically vicious.

[22] See Hal Arkes and Peter Ayton, "The Sunk Cost and Concorde Effects: Are Humans Less Rational than Lower Animals?" *Psychological Bulletin 125*(1999): 591–600; Hal R Arkes and Catherine Blumer (1985) "The Psychology of Sunk Cost," *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 35*(1985): 124–140; Howard Garland and Donald E Conlon (1998) "Too Close to Quit: The Role of Project Completion in Maintaining Commitment," *Journal of Applied Social Psychology 28* (1998): 2025–2048.

[23] See Joyce C Havstad and Adam N Smith, "Fossils with Feathers and Philosophy of Science," *Systematic Biology 68* (2019): 840–861.

In both described situations, on the individual level, Jules seems like a colleague you would not really appreciate – you would probably deem that she will leave you in the lurch in the middle of the project and that you will have to do it all by yourself. However, on the collective level, Jules' epistemic vice can come across as productive, making her a valuable and good employee. Of course, this does not mean you will have more confidence in her on a daily basis or start looking at her differently. Nonetheless, being a good or bad colleague has another, perhaps even irreducible, aspect besides your relationship with Jules – her contribution to the team and, subsequently, her resourcefulness as an employee. When judging whether she is a good colleague or a bad one, these are all factors that should guide your judgment. More abstractly, when charting the space for the application of the ethics of collegiality, these are all factors that should aid in delineating the normative criteria for collegial relations.

What is particularly interesting here is that the opposite conduct of Jules, i.e., epistemically virtuous conduct, would have adverse effects. A person endowed with intellectual perseverance would refuse to give up in situations where decision-making is corrupted by the sunk-cost fallacy. One could, however, maintain that good judgment could set apart instances of intellectual perseverance that are virtuous from those that are not.[24] Judging by the experimental results which indicate that high-cognitive-ability subjects are not less prone to the manifestation of a sunk-cost fallacy than low-cognitive-ability subjects, Jules's favorable epistemic profile does not make her immune to irrational behavior prompted by the sunk-cost fallacy.[25] Rather, only if she were explicitly trained to recognize the sunk-cost situations and act accordingly (i.e., stop being perseverant) this line of argument would hold. In other words, epistemic virtues and good judgment for distinguishing virtuous instances from vicious ones do not come as means through which one has epistemically unsullied access to reality. Being endowed with an epistemic virtue does not mean that one is bias-free. Nonetheless, in the above-described cases, Jules' negative pattern of behavior *did* give rise to good judgment, albeit of her team who resisted the sunk-cost fallacy thanks to her *lack of intellectual perseverance*.

However, one could further argue that this lack of perseverance leading to an epistemically better outcome on the collective level may represent the case of mere epistemic luck.[26] In other words, the good judgment of Jules' team may seem like a fortuitous circumstance rather than a bona fide epistemic outcome resulting from Jules' consistent behavior in the workplace, which is grounded in her epistemic profile. Nonetheless, there is a consistency requirement for epistemic traits so that they can be regarded as constitutive of one's epistemic profile. Alfano introduced two kinds of epistemic traits, namely high-fidelity and low-fidelity traits.[27] The former requires almost perfect consistency, whereas the latter may allow for exceptions.

[24] Battaly 2020, op. cit., p. 171. The same thing was pointed out by the anonymous reviewer.

[25] See Corina Haita-Falah, "Sunk-cost Fallacy and Cognitive Ability in Individual Decision-Making," *Journal of Economic Psychology 58* (2017): 44–59.

[26] We thank the anonymous reviewer for pressing us to address this line of argument that goes against our claims.

[27] Mark Alfano, *Character as Moral Fiction* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

Jules' lack of perseverance can be seen as a high-fidelity epistemic vice – were she prone to making exceptions in her behavior, she would not be a quitter but rather a lazy person. The almost perfect consistency of her behavior in the workplace is closely intertwined with her unfavorable epistemic profile, which, in turn, rules out the assumption that the positive epistemic outcome on the collective level can be seen as mere epistemic luck.

Now when the worries with the example have been cast aside, we are going to further spice it up. Not only that Jules tends to abandon projects when things get tough, but even in circumstances when she is obliged to put in at least some effort, she still finds ways to cut corners and frequently avoids committing herself to any goals. Moreover, Jules is consistently performing her tasks sloppily and carelessly, even though she knows this is wrong and could harm her reputation within the work collective. However, she does not care for social recognition. In a nutshell, her vice consists in *slacking off*.[28] Although slacking has been acknowledged as a negative epistemic character trait, consequences of such conduct may be recognized as virtuous when perfectionism seems too costly in the epistemic sense or detrimental in hostile epistemic environments.[29] We want to show here that slacking could be beneficial for collectives, thereby blurring the line between a bad colleague and a valuable employee. Recall the case when Jules was a paleornithologist.

Let us assume now that Jules is a textbook example of a slacker before her quitting tendency kicks in and let us return to the case when Jules works in a team composed of her fellow scientists. How could anyone deem Jules a valuable asset given the predominantly publish-or-perish outlook of academia and priority race in science? Jules would then be a prototype of a bad colleague, and her colleagues would probably be quite bothered with her sense of entitlement – she gets to be a part of the team and yet does not live up to others' intellectual expectations.[30] Nevertheless, in a quite subtle manner, Jules is an integral part of the team: her sloppiness makes her colleagues more vigilant and dedicated since they are always on the lookout for mistakes. It seems that even though she cuts corners and underachieves, her team thrives and flourishes not by working harder inasmuch working smarter. She may rest on her laurels and avoid working at all costs, be it through slacking or quitting, but she levels up the game on the collective level.

Moreover, our spiced example shows that the increase in productivity should not be the *only* parameter for either a good employee or colleague. The very presence of slackers challenges our productivity-obsessed working milieus by pointing out that leisure time and a carefree attitude need not be disregarded if one wants to create a healthier working environment where we can be more in tune with who we are rather than with that we have accomplished.[31] This is yet another aspect that the ethics of collegiality should address straightforwardly: should we still count among good colleagues the ones who violate our expectations by being authentic to themselves, even if the professed authenticity means being epistemically vicious? For those readers

[28] Battaly 2020, op. cit., p. 181; Alison Suen, *Why is it Okay to be a Slacker* (Routledge, 2021), p. 54.

[29] See John Perry, *The Art of Procrastination* (New York: Workman Publishing, 2012).

[30] Suen, op. cit., p. 136.

[31] See Suen, op. cit., Ch. 7.

whose intuition prompts them to answer negatively to this question, we will analyze the example of epistemically virtuous colleagues whose actions on the collective level would still bring about a negative outcome.

5 How Many Colleagues of Virtuous Intellect Does it Take to Corrupt a Work Collective?

It seems almost trivial that a *good* colleague would be someone who has as many epistemic virtues as possible. As we have already hinted, the very presence of epistemic virtues is usually indicative of competence. The role of epistemic virtues such as intellectual humility and open-mindedness have already been tackled within the scientific context both in empirical and theoretical work.[32] We aim to show that the virtue of intellectual humility can, in some cases, turn maleficent on the collective level and spell out the consequences of such cases for the ethics of collegiality. The strategy is quite similar to the one in the previous section: we will examine the case when individual team members have a specific virtue and spell out the consequences of such an intellectual outlook for the whole team.

Imagine a small-scale team of three people, Jim, Elliot, and Mary, working in a think-tank specializing in marketing services. All three persons are endowed with the virtue of *intellectual* or *epistemic humility*. A person who possesses this virtue is aware of her epistemic and cognitive limitations.[33] Therefore, an intellectually humble person will not be inclined to overestimate the scope of her knowledge or her intellectual capacities. Likewise, such a person will be able to adequately revise her own beliefs and ideas in the presence of opposing evidence and criticism. This virtue is usually compared to complementary epistemic vice, namely *epistemic arrogance*. When we describe someone as epistemically arrogant, we want to convey that someone is overconfident in their abilities, usually manifested through an inability to accept one's own mistakes. On the other hand, an intellectually humble person knows exactly what her intellectual weaknesses are and what mistakes she is prone to and is ready to face them.

Now let us return to our think-tank team. It appears that an intellectually humble teammate would always be preferred to an intellectually arrogant one and that such

[32] See Mark Alfano, Kathryn Iurino, Paul Stey, Brian Robinson, Markus Christen, Feng Yu and Daniel Lapsley, "Development and Validation of a Multidimensional Measure of Intellectual Humility," *PLoS One 12* (2017): 1–28; Matteo Colombo, Kevin Strangmann, Lieke Houkes, Zhasmina Kostadinova and Mark J Brandt, "Intellectually Humble, but Prejudiced People. A Paradox of Intellectual Virtue," *Review of Philosophy and Psychology 12* (2021): 353–371; Jack MC Kwong, "Open-mindedness as a Critical Virtue," *Topoi* 35 (2016): 403–411; Jack MC Kwong JMC (2021) The Social Dimension of Open-Mindedness. *Erkenntnis* (2021), doi:https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-020-00348-8; Ian M Church and Peter L Samuelson, *Intellectual Humility: An Introduction to Philosophy and Science* (Bloomsbury Academic Press, 2017); Mark Alfano, Michael P Lynch and Alessandra Tanesini, *The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Humility* (London, NY: Routledge, 2021).

[33] See Robert C Roberts, W Jay Wood, *Intellectual Virtues: An Essay in Regulative Epistemology* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007); Dennis Whitcomb, Heather Battaly, Jason Baehr and Daniel Howard-Snyder, "Intellectual Humility: Owning Our Limitations," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94* (2017): 509–539.

an epistemic virtue would contribute to better team performance in every instance. It is undoubtedly much more convenient to work with someone who doesn't believe she always needs to have the last word and is willing to admit and amend her mistakes. However, before jumping to conclusions, let us further develop the example. The three intellectually humble colleagues make up a small content writing team within a think tank, and they are tasked with putting forward a bold and provocative advertising idea for a product that has been on the market for a long time but now needs to be rebranded and targeted to a broader group of consumers. This task is far from straightforward, and every prospective proposal involves a high risk of failure, which essentially means that a think tank will lose a serious amount of money.

The three colleagues will present their ideas to each other. Since every single idea has flaws and carries potential hazards, Jim and Elliot will engage in spelling out the shortcomings when Mary presents her ideas. As they are all intellectually humble, Mary will respond to this case of peer disagreement by taking criticism seriously. Thus, if only one of them disagrees with the proposed idea, it is highly likely that the idea will get either discarded or a matter of prolonged discussion since holding one's ground is not something an intellectually humble person would do.[34] An intellectually humble person must, at minimum, take criticism seriously rather than immediately dismissing it as unfounded. However, this is time-costly and requires additional intellectual effort. Additionally, since there are no sure bets in the marketing, and each idea is flawed, both Jim and Elliot will, in fact, have to deal with comparable criticism. Each team member will then start weighing critical remarks and improving or even drastically revising their proposal to make it better.

The above-described situation in the team has several possible pitfalls concerning the prospects of completing the task at hand. To begin with, it is dubious whether such a team could ever arrive at quick and effective solutions even when they would be backed into a corner by deadlines or other work problems. Second, and maybe even more crucially, it is pretty unlikely that this team would manage to develop sufficiently bold and unique ideas. It appears that a high level of intellectual humility in the team and continual critical reflection on suggested ideas might have a detrimental impact on creativity and hamper innovation, as every idea would end up discarded in order to minimize risks.

Even though intellectual humility is a desirable quality in a colleague on an individual level, it appears that its cumulative effect on the collective level is far from beneficial. Too many colleagues with similar epistemic profiles in one place might, quite ironically, open the door for unproductivity, lack of creativity, or any sort of team inefficiency, as well as an unhealthy work atmosphere. As a result, it would be more advantageous to have at least one epistemically arrogant person in the team who would not pay too much attention to criticism; instead, she would be highly motivated and confident enough to push her ideas forward. Essentially, this is in line with the results in social epistemology as presented in the seminal paper by Hong &

[34] See Duncan Pritchard "Intellectual Humility and the Epistemology of Disagreement," *Synthese 198* (2021): 1711–1723.

Page.[35] They argued that a group of diverse agents could outperform highly competent agents in efficient problem-solving. When these results are connected with the rest of the considerations in this paper, it becomes easier to see why we think that the uniform epistemic character of team members could easily stray into a stalemate. At least one of the possible solutions could be, we believe, to bring in a "rotten apple" to the team in the form of a stubborn, dogmatic, or arrogant teammate who may alter workplace dynamics and prevent epistemically humble colleagues from excessive intellectual wandering.

One caveat is due here. We have argued at the very beginning of the paper that competence as an essential characteristic of a good colleague can be understood as epistemic competence. However, judging by the examples in this Sect., it would follow that epistemic competence should include vices, which may seem odd. You would not expect a good colleague to be dogmatic. Nonetheless, the epistemic output on the collective level shows that dogmatic colleagues are good for the team. This is, again, the prototypical example of the tension between being a good colleague and a valuable or loyal employee, and this tension seems to be an integral part of the framework of the ethics of collegiality that must be taken into account. Generally, we are not opposed to the idea that epistemic competence comes with vices – let him who is without sin cast the first stone. Experts in one field can be ignorant and prejudiced against other fields, persons striving to be moral come with several personality flaws despite their attempts to minimize their influence by acting morally, and, therefore, epistemically competent colleagues may afford an epistemic vice that has a beneficial impact on the team's task performance.

The above-described scenario with intellectually humble colleagues suggests that unanticipated trade-offs between specific virtues, such as epistemic humility and creativity, as well as between virtues and vices, can be traced and further explored. We hope that future empirical studies could back up such a claim, but for the time being, we contend that it is not implausible that particular epistemic features influence others in a manner that virtues may come with a vice or two. While selecting teammates or employees, we will perhaps come to terms with the fact that some desirable traits – that may be essential for the job – come at the cost of epistemically or morally objectionable traits. In a nutshell, you can't have your cake and eat it. Thus, for instance, Gino & Ariely have shown that a high degree of creativity is associated with moral flexibility in the sense of dishonesty and a tendency to cheat.[36] So, if we want a highly creative colleague, we may need to be prepared to compromise and turn a blind eye to their lack of moral fortitude. Similarly, we strived to argue in Sects. 4 & 5 that it is sometimes advisable to accept and tolerate epistemic vices in our colleagues in order to improve team performance, as well as that epistemic virtues *per se* cannot guarantee positive outcomes on the team level.

[35] Lu Hong and Scott E Page, "Groups of Diverse Problem Solvers Can Outperform Groups of High-ability Problem Solvers," *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 101* (2004): 16385–16389.

[36] See Francesca Gino and Dan Ariely, "The Dark Side of Creativity: Original Thinkers can be More Dishonest," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 102* (2012): 445–459.

6 Conclusion

The key idea behind this paper was to canvass how the ethics of collegiality can tremendously benefit from virtue and vice epistemology, specifically from an anti-individualist stance. We first pointed out that competence, which largely determines how we assess our colleagues as good or bad, according to Betzler & Löschke, should be understood broadly, i.e., as incorporating epistemic competence as well.[37] Second, we showed how the epistemic character of our colleagues could be evaluated through contribution to the collective, which, in turn, should fill in the ethics of collegiality.

However, we owe the reader some clarifications regarding some of the conundrums that may arise while digesting the previous sections. For instance, is it safe to say that we should not blame epistemically vicious colleagues since we can never be sure that some unexpected benefit for our team will appear in due course? Besides, do our [38]considerations entail that employers should deliberately choose epistemically vicious employees hoping that they will contribute to profitable and successful team output? Finally, would it rather be the case that epistemically vicious colleagues could create an atmosphere of mistrust among colleagues, thereby jeopardizing the performance of employees?

As for the first conundrum, our take is that we should neither expect nor require epistemic perfection from our colleagues because that would be counterproductive in the long run. Thus, even if our colleague's epistemic character seems unfavorable and does not meet our expectations, that does not mean that she is ineffectual in team performance and dynamics. Our considerations, therefore, suggest that we should harness a healthy amount of tolerance towards the epistemic vices of our colleagues, which may look less disappointing after taking a bigger picture into account. Additionally, we wanted to stress in the paper that individual and collective perspectives could seem substantially closer as we begin to accept that our colleagues come with baggage but also hidden gems.

As for the second conundrum regarding employers' hiring choice, we propose that they strive for epistemic diversity and choose employees of various epistemic profiles for teams, including *prima facie* undesirable profiles. In general, it is crucial not just what sort of epistemic character the employee has but also how that epistemic character interacts with the characters of other workers and what kind of team dynamics it produces. Both of the examples we have considered imply that, in certain cases, epistemic vices might be beneficial at the group level due to their influence on intra-team dynamics.

Finally, although, for the time being, the implications of the symbiosis between the ethics of collegiality and virtue and vice epistemology may seem too output-oriented, the real game-changer will be the development of empirical tools for assessing the epistemic character of colleagues. Significant progress has already been made in the empirical analysis of individual epistemic virtues, and pioneering scales for measur-

[37] See Betzler & Löschke, op. cit.

[38] We thank the anonymous reviewer for this insightful remark, although we believe that the full response to this remark is out of the scope of this paper and merits a study on its own.

ing virtues and vices have been proposed, too.[39] The development of empirical tools and piling up of experimental studies will allow for further application of philosophical insights into management and human resources, thereby informing employers about the relevance of future employees' epistemic character for their companies. This brings us to the third conundrum. A more nuanced analysis of the performance of collectives could be obtained by applying qualitative and quantitative tools to observe and assess the impact of epistemically vicious employees on the team. This would give the ethics of collegiality a practical twist: in the age of polarization and mistrust, the field could offer important policy briefs on how to make a functional team consisting of both rotten apples and good eggs that could build trust and solidarity despite (or thanks to) their differences.

[39] See Angela L Duckworth, Christopher Peterson, Michael D Matthews and Dennis R Kelly, "Grit: Perseverance and Passion for Long-Term Goals," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 92* (2007): 1087–1101; Benjamin R Meagher, Joseph C Leman, Caitlyn A Heidenga, Michala R Ringquist and Wade C Rowatt, "Intellectual Humility in Conversation: Distinct Behavioral Indicators of Self and Peer Ratings," *The Journal of Positive Psychology 16* (2021): 417–429; Colombo M, Strangmann K, Houkes L, Kostadinova Z, & Brandt MJ, op. cit.; Alfano M, Iurino K, Stey P, Robinson B, Christen M, Yu F, Lapsley D (2017), op. cit.; Megan Haggard, Wade C Rowatt, Joseph C Leman, Benjamin Meagher, Courtney Moore, Thomas Fergus, Dennis Whitcomb, Heather Battaly, Jason Baehr, Jason, Dan Howard-Snyder, "Finding Middle Ground between Intellectual Arrogance Intellectual Servility: Development and Assessment of the Limitations-owning Intellectual Humility Scale," *Personality and Individual Differences 124* (2018): 184–193; Vlast Sikimić, Tijana Nikitović, Miljan Vasić and Vanja Subotić, "Do Political Attitudes Matter for Epistemic Decisions of Scientists?" *Review of Philosophy and Psychology* 12 (2020): 775–801; Marco Meyer, Mark Alfano and Boudewijn de Bruin, "The Development and Validation of the Epistemic Vice Scale," *Review of Philosophy and Psychology* (2021), https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-021-00562-5.