How to Refer: Objective Context vs. Intentional Context

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Abstract. In "Demonstratives" Kaplan claims that the occurrence of a demonstrative must be supplemented by an act of *demonstration*, like a pointing (a feature of the objective context). Conversely in "Afterthoughts" Kaplan argues that the occurrence of a demonstrative must be supplemented by a *directing intention* (a feature of the intentional context). I present the two theories in competition and try to identify the constraints an intention must satisfy in order to have semantic relevance. My claim is that the analysis of demonstrative reference provides a reliable test for our intuitions on the relation between objective and intentional context. I argue that the speaker's intentions can play a semantic role only if they satisfy an *Availability Constraint:* an intention must be made available or communicated to the addressee, and for that purpose the speaker can exploit any feature of the objective context. This thesis implies the reconciliation between "Demonstratives" and "Afterthoughts".

1 Introduction

As it is well known, in "Demonstratives" David Kaplan claims that the occurrence of a demonstrative must be supplemented by an act of *demonstration*, like a pointing (a feature of the objective context). Conversely in "Afterthoughts" Kaplan argues that the occurrence of a demonstrative must be supplemented by a *directing intention*, the referential intention the speaker associate with the expression (a feature of the intentional context). In this paper, I will present the two theories in competition and try to identify the constraints an intention must satisfy in order to have semantic relevance. My claim is that the analysis of demonstrative reference provides a reliable test for our intuitions on communicative mechanisms, and more specifically on the relation between objective and intentional context. In particular, I will argue that the speaker's intentions can play a semantic role only if they satisfy an *Availability Constraint:* an intention must be made available or communicated to the addressee, and for that purpose the speaker can exploit any feature of the objective context (words, gestures,

relevance or uniqueness of the referent in the context of utterance). This thesis implies the reconciliation between "Demonstratives" and "Afterthoughts".

The structure of the paper is the following:

In section 2. I present the distinction between indexicals and demonstratives.

In section 3. I analyse Kaplan's two theories of demonstratives.

In section 4. I offer a reconstruction of the objective perspective on context - according to which the reference of a demonstrative is determined by objective facts of the utterance context.

In section 5. I present a reconstruction of the intentional perspective on context - according to which the reference of a demonstrative is determined by adding certain features of the speaker's intention.

In section 6. I raise some objections against the intentional perspective on context.

In section 7. my analysis of demonstrative reference provides a test for our intuitions on communicative mechanisms, and more specifically on the relation between objective and intentional context.

In the conclusion, I argue that the speaker's intentions can play a role in semantics only if they satisfy an Availability Constraint, that is to say if they can be recognised by the addressee.

2 Indexicals and Demonstratives

Indexicals and demonstratives are referential expressions depending, for their semantic value, on the context of utterance: they have a reference only given a context of utterance. The conventional meaning of an indexical sentence like

(1) *I am drunk*,

independently of any context whatsoever, cannot determine the truth conditions of the sentence: to evaluate the sentence, the referent of *I* must be identified. The truth conditions of an indexical sentence are thus indirectly determined, as a function of the context of utterance of the sentence, and in particular as a function of the values of the indexicals. According to Kaplan and Perry, a function (or *characte*r) is assigned to each indexical expression as a type; given a context, the character determines the *content* of the occurrence – which is a function from circumstances of evaluation (possible world and time) to semantic values.

In "Demonstratives", Kaplan introduces the distinction between pure indexicals (expressions like *I, here, now*) and demonstratives (expressions like *this, that, she, he*). As I said, the language conventions associate with a pure indexical as a type a rule fixing the reference of the occurrences of the expression in context. The semantic value of an indexical (its content, its truth conditional import) is thus determined by a conventional rule and by a contextual parameter, which is a publicly available aspect of the utterance situation (the *objective context*). The character of an indexical encodes the specific contextual co-ordinate that is relevant for the determination of its semantic value: for *I* the relevant parameter will be the speaker of the utterance, for

here the place of the utterance, for *now* the time of the utterance, and so on: the designation is then automatic, "given meaning and public contextual facts".[1]

Conversely, the meaning of a demonstrative, like *she* in the sentence

(2) *She is drunk*,

by itself doesn't constitute an automatic rule for identifying, given a context, the referent of the expression. The semantics of *she* cannot determine unambiguously its reference: if, for instance, in the context of utterance of (2) there is more than one woman, the expression *she* can identify any woman in the same way.

3 Demonstration vs. Intention

According to Kaplan in "Demonstratives", the occurrence of a demonstrative must be supplemented by a *demonstration*, an act of demonstration like a pointing: "typically, though not invariably, a (visual) presentation of a local object discriminated by a pointing".[2] The relevant semantic unit is then the demonstrative associated with a demonstration.[3] The act of demonstration is *semantically relevant* in order to complete the character of a demonstrative. The act of demonstration that could accompany a pure indexical is, in turn, either emphatic (as when one utters *I* pointing to oneself) or irrelevant (as when one utters *I* pointing to someone else: in this case, the referent of *I* remains the speaker): once the context of utterance is fixed, the linguistic rules governing the use of the indexicals determine completely, automatically and unambiguously their reference, no matter what the speaker's intentions are.

However, according to Kaplan, a demonstration does not always require an action on the speaker's part, as when we shout

(3) *Stop that man*

if there is only one man, or only one man rushing toward the door, or only one man running completely naked. Or there may be a convention identifying the *demonstratum* with any object appearing on a "demonstration platform"; or else the speaker may exploit a natural demonstration, as an explosion or a shooting star.[4] In this way, the speaker may exploit a gesture, or the uniqueness of the *demonstratum* in the context of utterance, or its saliency, or its relevance. Likewise, we can interpret in terms of uniqueness or relevance of the *demonstratum* the cases of non visual perceptual demonstratives, as in

That noise is driving me crazy[5];
This smell is delicious;
This flavour reminds me of something.

All the examples, in fact, are appropriate only if there is only one noise (or smell or flavour), or only one relevant noise in the context of utterance.

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[1] [23], p. 595.

[2] [16], p. 490.

[3] Cf. [16], p. 492: "The referent of a pure indexical depends on context, and the referent of a demonstrative depends on the associated demonstration".

[4] Cf. [16], p. 525f.

[5] Cf. [25], p. 200f.

In "Afterthoughts", Kaplan modifies his own theory. He now acknowledges that even a gesture associated with an occurrence of a demonstrative, constituting the act of demonstration, may be insufficient to disambiguate the expression. Just imagine the sentence

(4) *I like that*

uttered by someone pointing clearly and unambiguously to a dog: the expression *that* could designate the dog, or his coat, or a button of the coat, or the colour of the coat or, for that matter, any spatial region or molecule between the speaker's finger and the dog. The gesture then does not have a semantic role anymore; for Kaplan the relevant factor is now "the speaker's directing intention". The demonstration has only the role of manifesting the intention, of externalising it – a role of pragmatic aid to communication: "I am now inclined… to regard the demonstration as a mere externalization of this inner intention. The externalization is an aid to communication, like speaking more slowly and loudly, but is of no semantic significance".[6] Every occurrence of the same demonstrative as a type has to be associated not with an act of demonstration but with an intention.[7] In this sense, a demonstrative is different from an indexical: once the context of utterance is fixed, the linguistic rules governing the use of the indexicals determine completely, automatically and unambiguously their reference, no matter what the speaker's intentions are.[8]

Kaplan doesn't offer an explicit and fully satisfactory explanation of why he now favours IPC, and thinks demonstrations are not semantically significant. The arguments are made explicit by Marga Reimer and Kent Bach in a group of articles published at the beginning of the 90's in *Analysis* and *Philosophical Studies*. In what follows, I will reconstruct the two competing theories:

- the objective perspective on context (OPC): according to Kaplan 1977, the reference of a demonstrative is determined by objective facts of the context of utterance.
- the intentional perspective on context (IPC): according to Kaplan 1989, the reference of a demonstrative is determined by completing the character of the demonstrative with features of the speaker's intention.

We will see that, according to Bach, Reimer doesn't offer a fair reconstruction of IPC. In her reconstruction, the intentional perspective is reduced to a sort of Humpty Dumpty theory of language, according to which the speaker has a proposition in mind, and hopes that the addressee is a mind reader. I will first try to offer a better reconstruction of IPC and then try to identify the constraints an intention must satisfy in order to have semantic relevance.

4 Reimer and OPC

It is usual to distinguish between:

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[6] [18], p. 582.

[7] [18], p. 588: "The directing intention is the element that differentiates the 'meaning' of one syntactic occurrence of a demonstrative from another, creating the *potential* for distinct referents, and creating the actuality of equivocation".

[8] Cf. [7]. For a different perspective on the pure indexicals/demonstratives distinction, see [9].

- the context in terms of intentional states of the participants, or shared assumptions[9] - what we can call the subjective context, or the cognitive context, or the *intentional* context;
- the context in terms of relevant states of affairs occurring in the world - the *objective* context.[10]

As I said, the reference of a demonstrative doesn't appear to be bound by semantic rules in the way the reference of an indexical seems to be: the semantic rule by itself doesn't determine the reference of the demonstrative expression in the light of the context of utterance. The question to be answered is: what do we have to add to semantic rules and context of utterance in order to have a complete proposition:

− something like a demonstration – that is a feature of the *objective* context (OPC), or rather
− something like an intention – that is a feature of the *intentional* context (IPC)?

To answer this question, let's examine some of Reimer's examples. In all cases, the reference of the demonstrative seems to be individuated by the speaker's gesture, or else by an element of the context in the objective sense, by public contextual facts.

Case I. "Cases in which the demonstrated object is clearly not the object toward which the speaker has a 'directing intention'".[11] Suppose John grabs a bunch of keys on the desk, saying:

(5) *These are mine*.

He intends to refer to his own keys, but mistakenly grabs his officemate's keys. Intuitively, in this case, the reference is individuated by an objective aspect of the utterance situation, that is John's ostensive gesture. The keys on the desk belong to his officemate, hence (5) is false.

Case II. "Cases in which the demonstrated object is neither perceived by the speaker, nor the object the speaker 'has in mind'".[12] A classic example is provided by Kaplan in "Dthat". John points, without turning and looking, to the place on the wall which was occupied by a picture of Carnap and utters:

(6) *That is a picture of one of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century*.

But, unbeknownst to him, the picture has been replaced by Spiro Agnew's portrait. Even if John intends to refer to Carnap's picture - or, as Kaplan writes, "has in mind" Carnap's picture[13] - he in fact refers to Agnew's picture: (6) cannot be taken as true.

Case III. "Cases in which there appears to be neither a demonstration nor a demonstratum, despite the presence of a 'directing intention'".[14] Suppose that John and Mary are in the park, observing several dogs (all equally salient) playing and running together. John intends to point and refer to his dog Fido, and utters

(7) *That dog is Fido*

but sudden paralysis prevents him from pointing or making any ostensive gesture, like nodding or glancing. According to Reimer, a supporter of IPC is committed to say that, if it is the speaker's intention that rules, then the reference of *that dog* is the dog

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[9] Assumptions *actually* shared, as in [10], or only *supposedly* shared, as in [30].
[10] On the distinction between cognitive and objective context cf. [14], [21], [22], and [29].
[11] [25], p.189.
[12] [25], p.190.
[13] [17], p. 396.
[14] [25], p.190.

John "has in mind". However, our intuitions are different. Since no dog was being demonstrated, no dog was referred to: like the description *the black dog* is empty if there is no black dog, the demonstrative description *that dog* is empty if no dog is demonstrated, and (7) doesn't express any proposition.

Case IV. If there is no demonstration, salience gets semantic significance in order to complete the character of the demonstrative. As in case III. John and Mary are in the park, observing several dogs playing and running together. John intends to point and refer to his dog Fido, and utters (7), but sudden paralysis prevents him from pointing or making any ostensive gesture. But suppose that Spot has made himself especially salient by his hysterical barking. In this case, intuitively, the reference of *that dog* seems individuated by salience. Mary is justified in taking John as referring to the most salient dog in the context of utterance, no matter what John's intentions are. The most salient dog in the context of utterance is Spot: (7) succeeds in expressing a proposition, but a false one.

Case V. However, the ostensive gesture generally overrides salience. As in case III. John and Mary are in the park, observing several dogs playing and running together. Suppose that Spot has made himself especially salient by his hysterical barking. John intends refer to his dog Fido, and, pointing directly to Fido, utters (7). Intuitively, in this case it is the gesture that has semantic significance and discriminates the referent from the other candidates: even if another dog, Spot, was more salient in the context of utterance, *that dog* refers to Fido and (7) is true.

Case VI. The ostensive gesture overrides the speaker's intentions. As in case III. John and Mary are in the park, observing several dogs playing and running together. John intends to point and refer to his dog Fido, and utters (7), but a nervous tic makes his arm move in the direction of another dog, Spot. Following the intentional perspective, one should say that if it is the speaker's intention that rules, then the reference is the dog John has in mind. But, intuitively, the reference seems individuated by John's gesture – even if unintentional – and his intentions seem irrelevant: (7) expresses a false proposition.

It seems, then, that in all the cases under examination, the speaker's intention doesn't play any essential role, that is any semantic role in determining the reference of the demonstrative – which is fixed (when it is fixed) by the objective context.

5 Bach and IPC

The main point of Bach's defence of IPC is to show that a communicative intention requires more than just 'having in mind'. According to Bach's theory of referential intentions "a referential intention is part of a communicative intention, an intention whose distinctive feature is that 'its fulfilment consists in its recognition'… A referential intention… involves intending one's audience to identify something as the referent by means of thinking of it in a certain identifiable way".[15]

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[15] [3], p. 296. On referential intentions, see also [5] and [6]. As it is well known, Bach's theory is a development of Grice's, and of his intention-based and inferential view of communication.

Let's start with Kaplan's classic example (**Case II**). In Bach's reconstruction, two intentions must be attributed to the speaker:

    a. the intention to refer to Carnap's portrait;

    b. the intention to refer to the portrait on the wall behind him.

Although John intended to refer to Carnap's portrait, he didn't intend his addressee to recognise *that intention* (a.); the intention he intended the addressee to recognise was that referring to the portrait on the wall behind him (b.). The referential intention is this last one: "the one which you intend and expect your audience to recognize and rely on in order to identify a certain [picture] as the referent".[16]

The analysis of Kaplan's example is easily extended to **Case I** (John's keys). Although John intends to refer to his own keys, he doesn't intend Mary to recognise this intention; the intention he intends Mary to recognise is that referring to the keys he grabbed. The intention semantically relevant is this last one. Even if John intends to refer to his own keys, he in fact refers to the keys he grabbed – which happen to belong to Mary. John's words express the proposition that the keys he grabbed are his: since they belong to Mary, (5) is false.

Let's now see **Case III** (the paralysis). Although John intends to refer to his own dog, he doesn't intend Mary to recognise this intention; the intention he intends Mary to recognise is that referring to the dog he is pointing at. But of course he has not done what it is necessary to enable Mary to recognise this very intention: so, Bach argues, the relevant intention is empty: "[IPC] does not say that such an intention can be fulfilled even if *no* act of demonstration is performed when, as in the example, the fulfilment of this intention requires such an act. After all, the intention in this case is to refer to what is being pointed at".[17]

Case IV (salience)**.** Although John intends to refer to his own dog, he doesn't intend Mary to recognise this intention; the intention he intends Mary to recognise is that referring to *the relevant dog* in the context of utterance. The intention semantically relevant is this last one: there is no act of pointing, no explosion or falling star, in other words there is no further evidence – except relevance - permitting Mary to identify John's communicative intention. John's words express the proposition that the relevant dog in the context of utterance is his: since the relevant dog is the dog barking hysterically, and since Spot, and not Fido, is barking hysterically, (7) is false.

The same goes for **Case V** (the gesture overriding salience)**.** Although John intends to refer to his own dog, he doesn't intend Mary to recognise this intention; the intention he intends Mary to recognise is that referring to the dog he is pointing at. IPC agrees here with OPC.

Case VI (John's tic). Although John intends to refer to his own dog, he doesn't intend Mary to recognise this intention; the intention he intends Mary to recognise is that referring to the dog he is pointing at. The intention semantically relevant is this last one, for the act of pointing (even if unintentional - but, and this is crucial, not recognised as such) is the only evidence permitting Mary to identify John's communicative intention. John's words express the proposition that the dog he is pointing at (Spot) is his: (7) is false.

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[16] [4], p. 143.

[17] [3], p. 298.

Let's sum up. Suppose that the speaker utters the expression *that dog*: if the dog he intends to refer to is the only dog in the context of utterance, or the most salient dog, the demonstrative expression doesn't require any other action on the speaker's part. In all the other cases, if there are several dogs all equally salient, the speaker must complete the character of the demonstrative expression with an act of demonstration, like pointing, glancing, or nodding. The speaker has then the referential intention to refer to the dog he is pointing at: notice that pointing is only a way of making an object salient, and has no semantic significance, but only a pragmatic one - like speaking more slowly and loudly.

6 Some Objections against IPC

I agree with Bach analysis, and with his distinction between two kinds of intentions in a referential act: background intentions (as the intention of referring to Fido, or to Carnap's picture) and fundamental intentions (as the intention of referring to the dog the speaker is pointing at, or to the portrait on the wall behind him). Yet, in my opinion, even if interpreted in this way, IPC may still raise some objections. Let's see some of them.

Case VII. Suppose that John and Mary are in the park, observing several dogs (all equally salient) playing and running together. John has the intention of showing Mary his dog Fido; to help her discriminate his dog among all the other dogs, he tells her that Fido has a bad limp. Then, pointing at Fido, he utters:

(7) *That dog is Fido.*

The reference of the expression *that dog* if Fido, hence (7) is true.

Case VIII. Like case VII, with the following exceptions: Fido clearly has no limp, but another dog, Spot, clearly has. Though Fido is in the most direct line with John's finger, John could possibly be taken as pointing, perhaps not too precisely, at Spot. Limping is the most relevant contextual information for discriminating the referent; in case VIII the reference of the expression *that dog* if Spot, hence (7) is false.

Case IX. Like case VII, with the following exceptions: John has been telling Mary many distinctive features Fido has: he has a bad limp, is huge, ferocious-looking, has a black leather collar with studs, and looks like a pit bull. All these things are true of Fido, except for the limp, and no other dog in the park is remotely like that, especially Spot, who has a bad limp, but is small, frail, with a red collar, and looks like a French poodle. In this scenario, Mary has enough independent contextual information to discriminate the reference of *that dog*: the reference is Fido, hence (7) is true.

It seems that the speaker's intentions are *neither necessary nor sufficient* to fix the reference of a demonstrative. In case VIII, the reference (Spot) is fixed *despite* John's intentions - which have Fido as object. In case IX, the reference (Fido) is fixed *independently* of John's intentions: even if John associates no intention with his use of the demonstrative, the reference would be discriminated by the information previously given. Not any intention, then, is a good candidate to fix the reference of a demonstrative. Let's examine one last case.

Case X. Like case VII, with the following exception: Spot has made himself especially salient by his hysterical barking. Suppose that John utters (7) with the intention

of referring to Fido - a dog non-salient John is not pointing at. In this context, John's intention of referring to Fido, using no gesture, nodding, nor glancing, would be *bizarre*, i. e. unconnected with a context or a behaviour that would enable Mary to discriminate the intended dog.

7 Good Intentions

IPC, as I interpret it, requires communicative intentions to be non-arbitrary – that is connected with a behaviour that will enable the addressee to identify the referent.[18] In other words, an intention, to be semantically relevant, must satisfy what I propose to call an *Availability Constraint*, that is it must be communicated or made available to the addressee.[19] Mary can't recognise any intention John could have: she can't read John's mind. In case X, the only manifest basis for Mary to identify John's communicative intention is the presence, in the context of utterance, of a dog having made himself especially salient (for instance by his hysterical barking).

Let me state my point once again, in a slightly different way.[20] According to Reimer there are only two plausible accounts of the *proposition* John's words express in case X:
– a) Spot belongs to John;
– b) Fido belongs to John.
Following Bach's theory of communicative intentions, we should say that in case X the proposition John's words express is:
– c) the relevant dog belongs to John,
or
– c') the dog John succeeded in calling Mary's attention to belongs to John.
Since the relevant dog is the one barking hysterically, Spot, and since Spot doesn't belong to John, (7) is false.

Likewise in Kaplan's classic example

(6) *That is a picture of one of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century*,
there are three accounts of the proposition expressed by John's words:
– a) the picture of Agnew is a picture of one of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century;
– b) the picture of Carnap is a picture of one of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century;

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[18] On this point, see [28], p. 198: Roberts speaks of "reasonable referential intentions", basing his argument on Donnellan's treatment of reasonable expectations and intentions: "On Donnellan's view… one's intentions are limited by reasonable expectations, which in turn are limited by established practices and particular stipulations" (p.196); cf. [11], pp. 212-214.

[19] But, in my opinion, not to *any* competent speaker, as Garcia Carpintero proposes; cf. [12], p. 537: "I will take demonstrations to be sets of *deictical intentions* manifested in features of the context of utterance available as such to any competent user". On this point, see [8], chapter X; Marina Sbisà suggests to extend this availability constraint to all the "relevant participants" (personal communication).

[20] I am indebted to Chris Gauker for helping me reformulating my argument in the following way.

- c) the picture on the wall behind him is a picture of one of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century.

c) is the proposition expressed by (6): since the picture on the wall behind John is Agnew's portrait, (6) cannot be taken as true. The proposition c) can account both for what John's words express and for what John wants to convey. b) is the proposition that John expects Mary to *infer* on the basis of the proposition c) – which is the proposition his words *express*: c) satisfies the Availability Constraint, but b) doesn't.

Not *any* intention satisfies the Availability Constraint, just the "good" ones. A "good" communicative intention is something an addressee, in normal circumstances, is able to work out using
1. external facts,
2. linguistic co-text,
3. background knowledge.

Of course, those three kinds of contextual information are nothing more than a way of spelling out relevance.[21]

1. First, we have the information inferred from the extralinguistic or physical context - available to both speaker and addressee. As we said, the demonstrative expression *that dog* doesn't require any action on the speaker's part if the dog he intends to refer to is the only dog in the context of utterance, or the only dog among cats and birds, or the most salient dog (for "external" reasons, as, for example, his behaviour) in the context of utterance.

2. Second, we have the information inferred from the linguistic co-text. Suppose that, during the conversation in the park, John and Mary mention Spot; in this case a demonstrative (non anaphorical) use of

(8) *That dog costs a fortune*

will refer quite naturally to Spot. Notice that it is possible to build more sophisticated examples, referring not only to objects explicitly mentioned in the previous conversation, but only presupposed. In the same situation, if John utters

(9) *That collar costs a fortune*

the demonstrative expression *that collar* will refer to Spot's collar, even if no collar was already mentioned in the conversation.

3. Third, we have the information inferred from the knowledge shared by speaker and addressee, because they belong to the same community, or to the same subcommunity. Just think to the vertiginous amount of information two friends share, and may take as basis for the recognition of their interlocutor's communicative intentions. Suppose that John loves big, ferocious dogs, and Mary knows it. They are in a park observing several dogs all equally salient (for external reasons), and John utters

(10) *That dog is mine*:

Mary will easily determine the reference of *that dog* if there are dozens of French poodles but only one Rottweiler.

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[21] I am well aware that relevance needs a definition far more accurate than the one given in this paper: for a more detailed analysis, see [8].

8 Conclusion

In my paper, I have presented two competing perspectives on the problem of the determination of the demonstrative reference - OPC and IPC - and I have tried to offer a fair reconstruction of IPC. According to Kaplan 1989, the addressee must take into account the speaker's intentions to identify the reference of the demonstratives. In my paper, the analysis of demonstrative reference has provided a reliable test for our intuitions on communicative mechanisms, and more specifically on the relation between objective and intentional context. Therefore, this analysis has been the starting point for a more general reflection on the notion of communicative intention. Examples have been provided to argue that the speaker's communicative intentions can play a semantic role only if they satisfy an Availability Constraint, that is to say if they are reasonable and not arbitrary, and can be recognised by the addressee: reference is determined by public behaviour, by intentional *acts* and not by intentions as mental objects.[22] In other words, to be semantically relevant, an intention must be made available or communicated to the addressee, and for that purpose the speaker can exploit any feature of the objective context - words, gestures, relevance or uniqueness of the referent in the context of utterance: elements of the intentional context can be identified only *through* the identification of elements of the objective context.[23] This thesis implies the reconciliation between "Demonstratives" – in which Kaplan claims that the occurrence of a demonstrative must be supplemented by a *demonstration*, like a pointing (a feature of the objective context) - and "Afterthoughts" – in which, conversely, Kaplan argues that the occurrence of a demonstrative must be supplemented by a *directing intention*, the referential intention the speaker associate with the expression (a feature of the intentional context).[24]

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[22] Cf. [28], p. 199.

[23] Of course one might object to my reconstruction - saying that, if only available intentions have semantic import, it is what makes them available and not their being real intentions in somebody's mind that counts. This would amount to say that the very notion of intention is problematic. I am indebted to an anonymous referee for this observation.

[24] I wish to thank Chris Gauker, Carlo Penco, Stefano Predelli, Marina Sbisà and Nicla Vassallo for extensive discussions on many points related to the topic of this paper.

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