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"We Will Walk without Fear," in *Spare Rib Reader: 100 Issues of Women's Liberation*, ed. Marsha Rowe (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1982), pp. 590–594. The UK women demos petered out in the 1990s and were revived in 2004 by the LFN.

25. To enact a scene of anachronism is to also realize that transgender debates were happening in suffrage-related UK publications such as *The Freewoman* in 1912, and that queer counter-protests involving drag took place during the beginnings of the British women's liberation movement. See Lucy Delap, "Individualism and Introspection: The Framing of Feminism in the Freewoman," in *Feminist Media History: Suffrage, Periodicals and the Public Sphere*, ed. Maria DiCenzo, Lucy Delap, and Leila Ryan (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), pp. 182–183; and Deborah M. Withers, *Sisterhood Revisited: Feminism in Bristol 1973–1975* (Bristol: HammerOn Press, 2011), p. 33.


32. Terese Jonsson, "Ladyfest, Race, and the Politics of Coalition Building," *Race Revue* 5, ed. Humaira Saeed (Manchester: Self-Published, 2007), p. 2. Ladyfests are autonomous art, activist, and music festivals with a women-positive and feminist focus. They were first launched in Olympia, Washington, in 2000, and have since become transnational events.


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**CHAPTER 3**

**The Interruptive Feminine:**

**Aleatory Time and Feminist Politics**

*Emanuela Bianchi*

Do modes of gender and sexuality have a time? Or more specifically, does it make sense to speak about women's time or queer time as different modes of lived temporality, and if so, can thinking through these temporalities illuminate and enliven feminist politics? Feminist and queer thinkers of time have argued that a linear, progressive conception of lifetime and history is not only distinctively modern, but is also rooted in patriarchal kinship, in male/masculine styles of embodied experience, and in a philosophical tradition that understands itself either as a practice of death or transcendental freedom—incorporeal and absolute.¹ Temporality is at stake in numerous dimensions of our lives: embodied, phenomenological, familial, historical, social, academic, metaphysical, and existential. None of these are reducible to one another, yet they arguably form a complex in which the temporal textures of other kinds of lives—women's lives, queer lives, non-Western lives, black lives, subaltern lives, trans lives, disabled lives, or even lives beyond the human or animal—are often suppressed and rendered invisible.

In the twentieth century, philosophers such as Simone de Beauvoir and Julia Kristeva provided a vocabulary for thinking temporality in sexed and gendered terms. In *The Second Sex*, de Beauvoir analyzed women's time as cyclical and static, entrapping women in the plane of inmanence from which they have little access to the linear projects of transcendent subjectivity so dear to existentialism.² In her important essay on feminist generations, "Women's Time," Kristeva complicated this scene by drawing attention to a certain jouissance to be
found in feminine cyclicity as it corresponds with the rhythms of the cosmos, and also by directing us to the Nietzschean category of monumental time to describe the temporality of women. Monumental time is time transformed into a kind of stasis; time expanded so far beyond the line of the project and history, or that of a life ending in death, that it can hardly be called time at all but rather becomes an all-encompassing "imaginary space." While they may offer redeeming pleasures, these modalities of time also situate women outside history and politics—beyond the social as such. These accounts obviously draw on women's bodily experiences—the cyclicity of menstruation and reproduction—and their accompanying association with the register of species-being, as well as women's traditional labor and practices, functional and affective: the ever-repeated tasks of housekeeping, food preparation, child rearing, caring for bodies and psyches, mourning, and so on. Such allocations risk placing women in a certain bind: if we wish to follow linear projects and participate in public life, we must shake off our experiential, affective ties and associations with the cyclical, and enter into the time of masculinity. Or, conversely, if we seek a transvaluation of feminine time, we find that these modes threaten to exclude us from the narrative and transformative potentials of history, entrapping us in the realms of nature and the household, bound to cyclical temporality and monumental eternity.

Here I want to move beyond these potentially stultifying binds, tracing out and bringing into focus a rather different and submerged dimension of temporality that has accrued to the side of women and the queer under Western patriarchy and metaphysics—what I will call "interruptive time." Interruptivity indicates a kind of being in time that is both interruptible and interrupting; in its middle-voiced formulation may be heard simultaneously the passive capacity to be interrupted and the active ability to interrupt. The association of interruption with the feminine is discernable at the very inception of patriarchal metaphysics. I will accordingly trace it from Aristotle, through phenomenologies of female body experience, and then bring it into dialogue with recent work on queer temporality, considering some consequences of interruptivity for queer and feminist politics. As Donna Haraway has argued, the association of women with what is passive in certain strands of (especially second wave) feminist thought, exemplified by Catharine MacKinnon's assertion that "man fucks woman; subject verb object," achieves "a totalization producing what Western patriarchy itself never succeeded in doing—feminists' consciousness of the non-existence of women, except as products of men's desire." Instead of countering this picture with a fully legible activity (figured in MacKinnon's current work by a benevolent, enlightened, white, Western feminism reaching out to rescue an object, passive, brown, non-Western victim of trafficking), a politics cognizant of an opaque and subterranean aleatory interruptivity opens us to the radically contingent possibility that both patriarchy and the metaphysics that constitutes it may—suddenly or slowly—finally play themselves out.

**Aristotelian Interruptions**

As a philosopher of antiquity, Aristotle is not yet concerned with the idea of history, nor progress, nor does he conceive human subjectivity as a project of freedom. Indeed, we might say that he is not concerned with any of the features that are typically associated with modern linear time, and although his teleological world is directed toward an end, it is not historical but metaphysical. The heavens move in circles and the earth proceeds in cycles, natural beings are born and grow, and men make things, act in the world, and organize themselves, all in pursuit of what is best: the good and the divine. Aristotle's own conception of time in the *Physics* as "following on" from motion means that it is in his account of motion rather than time, and specifically in the movement of natural generation, that we may find the association of the feminine with what waylays and interrupts the unfolding of natural teleology.

As is well known, for Aristotle any phenomenon may be explained by recourse to four kinds of cause or explanation: material, formal, efficient, and final. In nature, the latter three are really the same: an adult (male) horse causes another horse to come to be, and the adult horse is also both the form and the final cause of the resulting foal's development. In effect, there are thus only two causes at play here: the material on the one hand, and the formal/efficient/final on the other, and these are apportioned to each of the sexes. According to the famous account of sexual reproduction in Aristotle's *Generation of Animals*, the form is transmitted through the male semen, while the female contributes only matter to the offspring, which as many feminist commentators have pointed out relegates the female to the order of pure passivity. The female contributes only the matter, while the semen provides form, or *logos*, and the spark of soul for the new creature. But a difficulty in this schema immediately appears, for if the male contributes form, how is it possible that a female offspring might result, as it indeed does approximately half of the time?
Aristotle's answer is that a female is the result of a disruption in the process, an error in the matter due to insufficient heat, which may occur because of some exigency such as youth or old age, or a wind in the south.\textsuperscript{11}

While Aristotle normally portrays matter as passive or at best inclined toward form "as the ugly desires the beautiful, and as the female desires the male," this account discloses a submerged feminine materiality with the capacity to interrupt the smooth unfolding of nature's processes.\textsuperscript{12} The female, then, is characterized less by passive materiality than by matter's irrepressible unruliness or its unaccountable aleatory propensities, invisible within Aristotle's traditional rubric of the four causes. Indeed, in the \textit{Physics}, chance and spontaneous motions in nature appear as accidental supplements to the four essential causes.\textsuperscript{13} Instead of being identified with nature, then, the female is the result of forces that act against nature as a constant interruption in the natural unfolding of motion toward what is best, even though she is of course also necessary for the continuance of the species.\textsuperscript{14} In this ancient scene, then, the opposition between masculine and feminine time is less an opposition between linear and cyclical time (as we moderns would have it) than one between a continuous cyclical and teleological time that is masculine, and an aleatory and interruptive time marked as feminine.

I want to suggest that retrieving this ancient articulation of the feminine as aleatory may be a fruitful gesture for contemporary feminist politics. Although radical epochal shifts have occurred since antiquity in everything from formations of personhood and politics to the very outlines of the cosmos, the ancient association of the feminine with passivity and the masculine with what is active is still very much alive in our contemporary world, persisting even in contemporary accounts of the biology of sexual reproduction.\textsuperscript{15} At the time of writing, I am listening to news reports of the death of Osama bin Laden. The first press release by John Brennan, the White House's counterterrorism chief, announced that bin Laden had used his wife as a human shield and that she, as a consequence, had been killed—a story eagerly embraced by a public intent on envisioning the last moments of a misogynist Islamic monster. The next day, White House spokesperson Jay Carney said that bin Laden's wife had rushed the invading commandos and was shot in the leg, but was still alive. It is worth wondering how the almost unimaginably courageous action of this unnamed woman—swerving in as if from nowhere like Lucretius's \textit{climaxen, rushing the commandos}—became so quickly reformulated as mute passivity, how she was so quickly reduced to an object, tool, and obstacle—a shield—in a scene of action that can and must take place between men alone. If the dominant modern construction of temporality has shifted to that of linear historical progress, I contend that this ancient notion of an aleatory feminine offers a nonessential temporal, phenomenological, ethical, and political modality that supplies a vitally necessary resistance to that masculine narrative.

While I am aware of the theoretical risk involved in the elision of a clear distinction between "female," "women," and "the feminine," I am interested in a certain metaphysical complex they form, embodied in the procrustean fabric of our philosophical and cultural inheritance, of which passivity is the most resounding characteristic. Women may be more or less feminine, and indeed more or less female, and yet they, we, are inductively caught up in and bound to negotiate a sex/gender complex framed by a patriarchal metaphysics that posits a dualism between activity and passivity. The aleatory feminism I am articulating here is an intervention into that ancient, persistent metaphysics, and in fact grows out of it as its monstrous, queer symptom, claiming the goddess Fortuna and the interruptive forces of Dionysus for a politics that strenuously resists even the possibility of fixed identity and essence. After all, if what is found at the level of nature is no longer what is \textit{in illo tempore} monumental, frozen, essential, passive, and fixed, then what is found in the psyche, and in social, political, and philosophical dimensions, can hardly be fixed either. The argument here is not quite analogical, and not quite causal, and not quite organic. The claim is rather that at different levels of magnification and temporal duration, each with its own formations, assemblages, and topographies, the aleatory and the interruptive is at work, and may be harnessed for feminist ends.\textsuperscript{16}

\textbf{Interrupted Bodies}

Beginning with the register of materiality and corporeality, it is worth noticing that we encounter interruption as an insistent trope at the level of female bodily experience. The woman's menstrual cycle is not experienced as a continuous cycle, but as a punctuation that interrupts her daily activities with messy blood flow and sometimes painful cramping. In penetrative intercourse, the very boundary of the body is interrupted. If a woman becomes pregnant, her very being is further interrupted by the new presence. If she miscarries, that interruption is itself interrupted. If she breastfeeds a child, the hunger of another being interrupts her bodily integrity, and she literally, materially, flows out of herself, becoming food and nourishment for another.
As a primary caretaker, she is continually interrupted by the various and more or less immediate demands for sustenance and attention by those she cares for. In her classic second wave essay “Throwing Like a Girl,” Iris Marion Young describes the inhibitions and discontinuities that beset the girl in her movement through the world: the girl fears that, for example, she cannot reach the apple up in the tree, so she does not really jump for it; her riveness by immanence and the weighty drag of objecthood continually thwart her in her projects, undermining her motility and her ability to make the space around her own. Her awareness of her materiality as such, as well as her subjection to the gaze of the other, is experienced as interruption of a linear trajectory toward a goal. Yet in reflecting upon that essay 20 years later, Young is critical of her own acceptance of the specific temporality of the linear project as universal, and the examples of “sport, labor, and travel” as paradigms of free movement. She asks us to consider a Tillie Olsen character canning tomatoes while minding a baby, commenting: “The movement is plural and engaged, to and fro, here and yonder, rather than unified and singly directed.” In “Pregnant Embodiment,” Young transvalues the impositions of maternity, viewing them less as a weighty immanence than an ofentimes pleasurable awareness:

As I sit with friends listening to jazz in a darkened bar, I feel within me the kicking of the fetus, as if it follows the rhythm of the music. In attending to my pregnant body in such circumstances, I do not feel myself alienated from it, as in illness. I merely notice its borders and rumblings with interest, sometimes with pleasure, and this esthetic interest does not divert me from my business.

These rhythms of the maternal body certainly resonate with Kristeva’s account of the semiotic chora—the dimension of the material, rhythmic, pleasurable drives that inhabit language identified with the space of the mother’s womb—but in this essay, Young rather connects movement in pregnancy with a spatial awareness emanating from the body, and with a mode of motility that is decidedly not linear, namely dancing. In dance—especially in improvisational dance—movement is ambiguously active and passive as one alternately responds to and anticipates the music, creating a flow of rhythm and syncopation that is not known or conceived in advance. Does music, even sound more generally, or perhaps any sense experience, stand here in the place of a longed-for Other that would interrupt the monotony of passive femininity? Or does it signify a more primordial enmeshment in the world—a sensual, corporeal immersion beginning with the iambic maternal heartbeat, and with which we thereafter find ourselves entangled in sensorimotor relations of call and response, call-response, anticipation, play, and interruption? Associating a phenomenology of women’s bodily comportment, and especially pregnant embodiment, with the aleatory qualities of dance, enmeshment in sound, and the improvisational space of the jazz club, Young’s narrative takes us far from a reading of feminine corporeality as passive and interrupted by a transcendent exteriority, toward an understanding of this bodily experience as interruptive.

From Feminine Time to Queer/Feminist Time

This interruptivity I am locating on the side of the feminine (albeit strategically and provisionally) also brings us closer to the lived temporaliologies of queer subjects. Queer theorists such as Elizabeth Freeman and Judith Halberstam have argued compellingly for a substantial phenomenological difference in the way time is structured, experienced, and created in queer lives and texts. Freeman describes how seemingly innocuous phenomena such as schedules, calendars, time zones, and even wristwatches function as a kind of Foucauldian “implantation,” granting what she calls “chrononormativity” and appearing to give a “natural” sense of time while regulating populations and individuals. Halberstam argues that the experience and logic of lived temporality in the hegemonic, heteronormative mode are structured first and foremost by the scheduling demands of family, and are governed by certain beliefs about childrearing, generational cycles of inheritance, the work ethic and demands of the workweek, wage labor, and capitalist accumulation. She contrasts this “straight time” with the time of certain modes of life on the margins experienced by queers, but also “ravers, club kids, HIV-positive barebackers, rent boys, sex workers, homeless people, drug dealers, and the unemployed”—all of whom she includes as “queer subjects” whose experience of and relationship to temporality is radically, qualitatively at odds with straight life. Queer temporality veers away from normative time in unpredictable ways. The queer spaces of the nightclub and the bathhouse, the bar and certain areas of the park, come alive when good children are sleeping, and are experienced under a different sort of temporal logic—an accountable and dilated time, often altered by drugs and alcohol, where watches are not consulted
and whose narratives are sculpted through fantastical and gender-reconfiguring performances, the skill of the DJ, and the dance of the hookup. Such practices of radical openness to the aleatory encounter, with their intensification of pleasures and dangers, and their stark contrast with the times and rhythms of heteronormative reproduc- tivity, have been assiduously theorized by Lee Edelman and others as involving a necessary accession to the death drive.26

In the face of this, it may seem perverse to argue that pregnancy and motherhood share in this queer temporal quality. However, as Freeman argues, this queer temporality is not simply a time of the new and different, of open erotic counternormativity poised away from the reproductive imperative. It is rather “weighed down” by a certain history, whether that of the queer archive or of certain failed political projects such as the Equal Rights Amendment campaign of the 1970s,27 or by a faintly embarrassing second wave lesbian-feminist past characterized by a stifling essentialism, for which a repetitive cyclicity or even mononormality in Kristeva’s sense was the governing temporal schema. Freeman complicates the queer emphasis on the counternormative, the aleatory and the new with what she calls “temporal drag”—a queer engagement with a sometimes hard-to-love past whose tangencies may also be erotic and affective—a queer past with which queer subjects are necessarily entangled, and which thereby necessarily conditions queer presents and futures.28

While I am not concerned here with the specific practices of queer history, foregrounding a relation to the past or pasts is nonetheless central to my formulation of interruptivity insofar as it advocates and also enacts a certain “working through” of a patriarchal legacy in which we are seemingly relentlessly mired. Such working through requires the painstaking work of tarrying with what drags us down and holds us back, with what repeats as well as with what is different and new. The radicality of this openness, that of aleatory interruptivity, is that it is neither simply an openness to or libidinal drive toward life, love, production, or reproduction, nor a queer accession to the death drive whether figured as stasis or destruction. Rather, the aleatory roll of the dice is embedded in a context that it interrupt, giving unpredictable outcomes: love, life, and/or death. This, in turn, should alert us to the possibility that this mode of being may not, in fact, be sustainable without certain basic protections. Living this interruptivity is also to live with a certain vulnerability: one may be easily brutalized through abuses of hospitality, be subjected to aggression by those threatened by this most courageous mode of being, be instrumentalized by state and biopolitical forces, and so on.29 Any formulation of women’s time as interruptivity must take into account the necessity for protecting against hostile and unwanted interruptions as well as promoting a liberatory transvaluation of interrupted time as a mode of living in precarity, in openness to what is aleatory, and to strange, new, queer formations of kinship, gender, and social life.

Women’s characteristic capacity to be interrupted, by the demands of family, by pregnancy, in their labor as caregivers and as managers of human relations, and as a flexible and often home-based labor force, requires specific theoretical and legal measures to provide a degree of protection against exploitation. Here we might usefully turn to Dracula Cornell’s conception of the imaginary domain as a resource that resonates in the sphere of interpersonal ethics as well as that of political ontology and legal rights.30 Cornell formulated this notion in order to articulate a minimalist legal standard that would protect women from unwanted encroachments in relation to abortion, sexual harassment, and pornography, creating a zone in which they would be free to imagine themselves as whole and integral. She draws on the psychoanalytic notion of the imaginary as a fantasized, temporalized bodily boundary: bodily integrity and individuation grounded not by recourse to a past, a history, or an ontological present, but by appeal to the temporality of the future anterior—the tense of the “shall have been.” The imaginary does not deny the aleatory as a factual, material dimension of corporeality and lived temporality. According to this analysis, the bounded and enclosed body, uninterrupted, is always a matter of fantasy; unachievable in the here and now, and therefore always futural and projective. But for Cornell’s psychoanalytically nuanced argument, the protection of this imaginary domain must be considered a legal right, since despite its futural and fantasized status, it nonetheless functions in personal development as a minimum condition for individuation and thus personhood. In order to become a person, one must have access to a vision of oneself as a being free from interruption and encroachment with a right to bodily integrity, and the right to that projective vision must be publically recognized and protected under the law.

Developing a feminist conception of being as interruptive thus requires a framework for freedom from interruption, but it also forms a possible ground for a mode of feminist politics that is neither simply reactive, nor simply exhausted by the protection of one’s ability to open and close one’s bodily boundary at will. The interruptive is also that which disrupts, simply because that is part of what it means to be on intimate terms with the aleatory encounter, and
this interruptivity thus reveals the precarity of the existing (hetero-patriarchal, white-supremacist, capitalist) order. This analysis thus points toward a feminism that would rush toward commandos from nowhere, that would take to the streets, that would—in the words of queercore singer Lynn Breedlove—“unleash the teenage boy within” or—as Twitter sensation Feminist Hulk puts it—“smash patriarchy, smash gender binary,” and that would rise up, burgeon, and celebrate with an eye to neither origin nor telos, but with humor, guile, and a healthy disrespect for authority. The much-remarked-upon presence of women in the uprisings in the Arab Spring of 2011; the visibility of women during antiscuts protests in Britain in 2010 and 2011; and the Slutwalk protests mushrooming across the United States, Canada, and Europe at the time of writing all testify to this interruptive and aleatory feminist spirit.

Interruptivity reveals corporeality, sensation, play, and sexuality. It is a sensuous activity that is also always responsive—motor and sensory—and this receptive/creative capacity is itself not something that ever stays in one place. In all its openness and motility, the radically counternormative force of aleatory interruptivity cannot ultimately sustain or retain its articulation with what is specifically feminine. Interruptivity countenances all possibilities, all reconfigurations of past and present circumstances, including queer and transgender reconfigurations of gender and sex. Interruptivity is as much trans and intersex as it is feminine; it is necessarily open to differences (all differences in embodiment and circumstance) among and between women and queers, or indeed anyone, male or female, intersex or trans bodied, who is committed to challenging fortified, essentialized, and teleologically egoic modes of subjectivity and sociality.

Starting from a feminine conception of temporality as interruptive thus opens up to an understanding of the opaque interruptivity of being as such. The restless encounter and negotiation with what is exterior—welcoming, incorporating, hosting, and shutting out, from moment to moment growing into whatever it is that we are in the process of becoming—must take place without forgetting that the “welcome” is also always a contextualized performative act, laden with a past but never simply a matter of factual passivity. With minimal conditions in place securing women from the travails of interruption, but not jettisoning its value as an openness to the unexpected encounter, we are freed up to imagine and enact other modalities of lived temporality beyond the dichotomies of feminine and masculine, queer and straight: toward generative, protean, and as-yet unthought temporalities to come.

Notes

1. Obviously this version of “dominant time” is schematic and fails to capture various complex philosophical understandings of historicity and temporality, and particularly ways of being toward the future that might include dialectical materialism, Messianism, utopianism, Heidegger’s temporal ek-stases, “destining,” the Derridean à venir, and so on. While space constraints prevent my addressing any of these conceptions directly in this paper, the account I develop here may function as a critical engagement with any one of them.


4. Ibid., p. 354.


9. Ibid., 11, 3, 194b24f.

from the symbolic law that will subsequently interrupt it through the destructive wave of negation issuing from the death drive and the paternal function. Here, I want instead to emphasize a continuity, in which aleatory interruptivity is already at work in the \textit{chora} on the side of the maternal and the feminine, not just as a later intervention on the side of the masculine.


27. The Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), seeking to constitutionally guarantee equal rights on the basis of sex, was approved by Congress in 1972 but failed to gain the required state ratification and was therefore dismissed in 1982.


29. Rosalyn Diprose, "Women's Bodies Giving Time for Hospitality," \textit{Fyaatia} 24:2 (2009), pp. 142–163, considers various political developments in which women's time has been interrupted and redirected, put to the work of national security, of public health, and of economic production. Such instrumentalizing encroachments on women's given time obviously needs to be strenuously resisted.


32. This position is closely aligned with that developed by Elizabeth Grosz, "Becoming...An Introduction," in \textit{Becomings: Explorations in Time, Memory and Futures}, ed. Elizabeth Grosz (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999).