The Ironic Tragedy of Human Rights

Charles Blattberg
(Université de Montréal)

If you are kissing your child or your wife, say that it is a human being you are kissing; if the wife or child dies, you will not be disturbed.

Epictetus\(^1\)

I wish you to write a book on the power of the words, and the processes by which the human feelings form affinities with them.

Coleridge\(^2\)

I

The way the international human rights movement tells it, the 1948 United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights marked the moment when the idea of human rights finally came into its own on the world stage. More than anything, the Declaration was a response to the Holocaust, to both its perpetrators and the failure of the rest of the world adequately to come to the aid of its victims.\(^3\) Since that year, however, we have seen many more cases of mass murder and genocide. Think of China, Bali, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Guatemala, the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Darfur, and China again. Of course, one could always claim that such horrors would have been even more frequent if not for the Declaration. But I want to argue otherwise. Because I believe that human rights have made mass murder and genocide more, rather than less, likely.

I begin with a puzzle. Consider the following. First: “The right to life of 6 million human beings was violated by the Nazis.” Second, an excerpt from Jean Améry’s account of his torture at the hands of an SS man:

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\(^{3}\) For an alternative, more accurate account, see Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010).

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In the bunker there hung from the vaulted ceiling a chain that above ran into a roll. At its bottom end it bore a heavy broadly curved iron hook. I was led to the instrument. The hook gripped into the shackle that held my hands together behind my back. Then I was raised with the chain until I hung about a meter over the floor. In such a position, or rather, when hanging this way, with your hands behind your back, for a short time you can hold at a half-oblique through muscular force. During these few minutes, when you are already expending your utmost strength, when sweat has already appeared on your forehead and lips, and you are breathing in gasps, you will not answer any questions. Accomplices? Addresses? Meeting places? You hardly hear it. All your life is gathered in a single, limited area of the body, the shoulder joints, and it does not react; for it exhausts itself completely in the expenditure of energy. But this cannot last long, even with people who have a strong physical constitution. As for me, I had to give up rather quickly. And now there was a crackling and splintering in my shoulders that my body has not forgotten until this hour. The balls sprang from their sockets. My own body weight caused luxation; I fell into a void and now hung by my dislocated arms, which had been torn high from behind and were now twisted over my head. Torture, from Latin *torquere*, to twist. What visual instruction in etymology! At the same time, the blows from the horsewhip showered down on my body, and some of them sliced cleanly through the light summer trousers that I was wearing on this twenty-third of July 1943.4

Now I ask you: Which of the two has the greater impact? Which stays with you, and might even keep you up at night? Otherwise put, which is more powerful? Surely it is the second. Yet the reality represented by the first is infinitely worse.

Of all people, it is Joseph Stalin who tells us why. As he once purportedly declared, “One death is a tragedy, a million a statistic.”5 Indeed, I must confess to a purposive inaccuracy above.

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5 Or as one psychologist put it more recently, “Because vivid information is more ‘available’ and easier to recall than pallid information, it often has a disproportionate influence on judgments.” Scott Plous, *The Psychology of Judgment and Decision Making* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993), p. 126.
The correct figure for the Nazis’ victims is over 22 million; 6 million refers to the Jews alone.\textsuperscript{6} That so many people tend to overlook this is a testament not to their callousness, but to the inherent weakness of numbers for carrying meaning, for establishing fields of significance when in competition with powerful narratives such as that of Nazi antisemitism.\textsuperscript{7} This is also why Hiroshima and Nagasaki have always been more notable than Dresden, even though the Allied bombing of the latter was long believed to have produced, by some estimates, 30,000 more civilian deaths. The lesson here should be clear: when it comes to the appreciation of historical events, literacy is more effective than numeracy because the contextual or “thick” is more meaningful – more powerful – than the abstract or “thin.” There’s a reason why classical rhetoricians used to refer to vivid, detailed description as \textit{enargeia}.\textsuperscript{8}

Human rights talk, however, is thin. It refers to a biological species as well as to a series of universal, independently distinct things (the right to life, the right not to be tortured, etc.) that its members are said to bear. That’s why rights can often be found on lists, as with the various charters, schedules, and declarations. Yet these only isolate them from our concerns as social beings immersed in particular cultural practices. Because as John Locke once put it, “Words become general by being made the signs of general ideas: and ideas become general, by separating from them the circumstances of time and place, and any other ideas that may determine them to this or that particular existence.”\textsuperscript{9} The problem, in other words, is that we tend to be interested in things precisely when they exist in a context with others. Indeed, the very word “interest” comes from the Latin \textit{interesse}, which means “to be between,” while the \textit{OED} tells us that the root of “abstraction” denotes a “drawing away from” and that of its opposite, “contextual,” means “woven together.” Whence that everyday question “How’s things?”, which expresses our interest in someone precisely because it refers to the whole nexus of things that they’re attached to, are concerned about.\textsuperscript{10} Or think of how difficult it is to memorize lists of isolated words when studying


\textsuperscript{7} See my “Antisemitism and the Aesthetic,” \textit{The Philosophical Forum} 52, no. 3 (Fall 2021): 189–210.


\textsuperscript{10} For more on this sense of “things,” see Martin Heidegger, “The Thing,” in \textit{Poetry, Language, Thought}, trans.
a new language: as lexical approaches to language acquisition have shown, collocations, patterns of words, are much easier to grasp and retain.\footnote{See, for example, Michael Lewis, ed., \textit{Teaching Collocation: Further Developments in the Lexical Approach} (Hove, East Sussex: Language Teaching Publications, 2000). Indeed, memory researchers have found that a thing is made memorable precisely when it’s associated meaningfully or “encoded” with things one already knows. See Daniel L. Schacter, \textit{Searching for Memory: The Brain, the Mind, and the Past} (New York: HarperCollins, 1996), ch. 2.}

Here’s another example: salt and sodium chloride (NaCl), thick and thin ways, respectively, of referring to the “same” thing. NaCl stands alone; because it’s definable with a set of necessary and sufficient conditions, its properties are universal rather than relative to context. Salt, however, has a history, or rather histories, narratives that are integrated with myriad cultural practices: it has served as a form of currency, as a means of bringing luck (by throwing it over one’s shoulder), as a condiment, and so on.\footnote{For more, see Mark Kurlansky, \textit{Salt: A World History} (New York: Walker and Co., 2002).} That’s why salt is so much more meaningful than NaCl, and so why we care about it more.

I should emphasize that my complaint about human rights is not at all with the values they are meant to represent, but rather with what happens to those values when they’re articulated abstractly. Because abstraction, again, disempowers; it detracts from a value’s ability to motivate people to uphold it. Hubert L. Dreyfus once made this point as follows: “it is a fundamental and strange characteristic of our lives that insofar as we turn our most personal concerns into objects, which we can study and choose, they no longer have a grip on us.”\footnote{Dreyfus, \textit{What Computers Still Can’t Do: A Critique of Artificial Intelligence} (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992, 3rd ed.), p. 275.} In fact, abstractions can even serve as a defensive mechanism when we need to distance ourselves from people’s suffering. Think of the numbers that the Nazis tattooed on concentration camp prisoners to identify them without having to use their names, or of the euphemisms of military jargon: “collateral damage” for the deaths of civilians; “incontinent ordnances” for wayward bombs; and “traumatic amputation” for the blowing off of arms and legs. Or consider Boris Pasternak’s reaction when, visiting the Soviet countryside in the early 1930s, he bore witness to the incredible suffering of the peasantry there: “There was such inhuman, unimaginable misery, such a terrible disaster, that it began to seem almost abstract . . . [For it] would not fit within the bounds of consciousness.”\footnote{Quoted in Martin Amis, \textit{Koba the Dread: Laughter and the Twenty Million} (Toronto: Vintage, 2002), p. 128.}
The problem with human rights talk, then, is precisely that it takes people out of our consciousness. I’d even go so far as to say that referring to them as members of a species, as “humans” rather than as “persons,” takes them out of their social context and so, once again, makes us care less about them. That is why I think Hannah Arendt was on to something when she noticed how “a man who is nothing but a man has lost the very qualities which make it possible for other people to treat him as a fellow man.” And it is why Michael Ignatieff was wrong to have declared that “we are all Shakespeare’s ‘thing itself’: unaccommodated man, the poor, bare forked animal.” Indeed, it is just because this thing itself “has become the subject – and the rationale – for the modern universal human rights culture” that we need to recognize how that rationale undermines itself.

We can reach the same conclusion by taking account of the kind of equality associated with the idea of human rights. To those such as Richard Rorty, the idea’s global diffusion constitutes progress because it brings “an increase in our ability to see more and more differences among people as morally irrelevant.” But this encourages us to view people as equal because essentially the same, and equality as so understood – equality as uniformity – is the equality of abstractions. No wonder it was so useful to the Marquis de Sade, as Maurice Blanchot describes:

To consider human beings from the standpoint of quantity kills them more completely than does the physical violence that annihilates them. The criminal unites, perhaps, in an indissoluble way with the man he kills. But even while sacrificing his victim, the libertine, on the other hand, only experiences the need to sacrifice a thousand more. He seems strangely free of any connection to his victim. In his eyes, his victim does not exist for him or herself, his victim is not a distinct

15 Needless to say, I think those such as the personalist Jacques Maritain who used the expression “human persons” in order to reject atomist individualism failed to go far enough, as is evident from their support for the idea of human rights. See Samuel Moyn, Christian Human Rights (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015), esp. chs. 1–2.


being, but a simple component, indefinitely exchangeable, within an enormous erotic equation. To read declarations like this one – “Nothing is more enjoyable for me, nothing excites me like a large number of beings” – we better understand why Sade makes use of the idea of equality as support for so much of his argumentation. All men are equal: this means that no creature is worth more than another, every being is interchangeable, each one has only the meaning of one unit within an infinite number. Before the Unique Being, all beings are equal in worthlessness, and the Unique Being, as he reduces them to nothing, only makes this nothingness manifest.  

In affirming the equal uniformity of his victims, then, the Sadean libertine does not so much “dehumanize” as “depersonalize” them, which alone is considered a necessary step towards their destruction. The target, in other words, is not their membership in a certain species, but their particularity as persons, their ability to constitute unique meanings, to affirm that certain things matter.  

If evil’s aim was only to reveal its victims as, or make them into, animals, then how to account for the Nazis’ concern with animal welfare? Hitler was a well-known vegetarian, and Reichsmarschal Göring not only barred vivisection in all scientific work, noting the “unbearable torture and suffering in animal experiments,” but he also threatened to commit to concentration camps all “those who still think they can treat animals as inanimate property.” Unlike most clichés, the belief that the Nazis thought Jews weren’t human has little basis in truth. For the Nazis’ record of humiliating their victims before killing them suggests that their racism was more a matter of targeting a certain variety of the human species than of denying their membership in that species. They chose their victims, in other words, because they saw them as persons of a certain

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type, namely those whose “matterings” blocked the Nazis’ “creative” project, the reign of the Third Reich. Whence Joseph Goebbels in 1943:

The excuse [lackeys of the Jews] give for their provocative conduct is always the same: the Jews are after all human beings too. We never denied that, just as we never denied the humanity of murderers, child rapists, thieves and pimps…[T]he Jews must be removed from the German community, for they endanger our national unity . . . There is only one effective measure: cut them out.23

To combat such evil, then, we certainly need to assert the dignity of the persecuted, but as persons rather than as human beings, which is to say in a way that honours their uniqueness, their identities. The Nigerian writer Chinua Achebe points us towards precisely this way of respecting people when he has one of his fictional characters say the following:

Let me ask a question. How do we salute our fellows when we come in and see them massed in assembly so huge we cannot hope to greet them one by one, to call each man by his title? Do we not say: To everyone his due? Have you thought what a wise practice our fathers fashioned out of those simple words? To every man his own! To each his chosen title! We can all see how that handful of words can save us from the ache of four hundred handshakes and the headache of remembering a like multitude of praise-names. But it does not end there. It is saying to us: Every man has what is his; do not bypass him to enter his compound.24

This is a general but still thick, still contextual way of referring to people. Both thick and thin, that is, are domains in which meaning may range from the specific to the general (e.g. thick: from salt to spice; thin: from NaCl to ionic crystal). So we need to distinguish between “generalizing” and “abstracting” if we’re to appreciate how thick and thin are qualitatively – and not merely


quantitatively – different. In so doing, it should become easier to recognize that Rorty contradicts himself when he both recommends the power of thick expression to raise the concern about oppression and suffering as well as endorses human rights culture.\textsuperscript{25} To Rorty, it makes sense for those who would deliberate about justice at the global level to tell a “relatively abstract and sketchy story,” one that invokes “abstract principles.”\textsuperscript{26} But stories present events together in a context; any truly narrative ethics, then, must remain thick.

So it is just because human rights doctrines tend to be invoked in order to counteract our tendency toward particularistic circles of concern that we should reject them, since it is precisely such circles that motivate us to act ethically. Once, Ralph Waldo Emerson declared the following: “Do not tell me, as a good man did to-day, of my obligation to put all poor men in good situations. Are they my poor? I tell thee, thou foolish philanthropist, that I grudge the dollar, the dime, the cent, I give to such men as do not belong to me and to whom I do not belong.”\textsuperscript{27} And years later, his compatriot Samantha Power offered a critique of American foreign policy that shows it to have been guided by the spirit of Emerson’s declaration.\textsuperscript{28} The response to this, however, shouldn’t be to call on Americans to abolish their particularistic circles of concern in favour of duties to humanitarian assistance, those that derive from some set of universal, positive human rights. Because they simply will not do it.\textsuperscript{29} Nor should we try to convince them that they ought to worry about what happens “over there” because it will, sooner or later, impact upon those they care about “over here.” Because that, too, rarely works for long. No, what Americans need to recognize is that their poor are also over there, which is to say that their circle of concern is already much wider than they’re aware. So they need to be told convincing thick stories, both fictional and

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\item Rorty does the first in “Habermas, Derrida, and the Functions of Philosophy,” pp. 322–23; and the second in “Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality,” both in \textit{Truth and Progress: Philosophical Papers}, vol. 3 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). Rorty’s blurring of the distinction between thick and thin reflects his pragmatist failure to distinguish between the methodologies of the human and the natural sciences, but it would take me too far afield to show how here.
\item Power, \textit{A Problem from Hell": America and the Age of Genocide} (New York: HarperCollins, 2002).
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nonfictional, that empower global values, the ones that everyone shares. Such stories are effective not because they engage our aesthetic sentiments, as Rorty would claim, but because they encourage the use of a practical form of reason – one that, much like Aristotle’s practical wisdom (phronēsis), helps people to develop the dispositions appropriate to given contexts, to arrive at good, which is to say reasonable, interpretations of those contexts. The lesson of such stories for people like Emerson? That we are all compatriots.30

Teaching it would make a difference. I think of my own country, Canada. Even though its constitution contains a Charter of Rights and Freedoms that includes no positive, socio-economic rights, and even though it has ratified the UN Declaration, which does, the Canadian state redistributes over ten times more wealth to the Canadian poor than it does to severely impoverished foreigners.31 Why is this? Because the former are recognized not as rights-bearers but as fellow citizens, members of a shared civic or political community. This community isn’t based on some theory of justice, but on the sense that we Canadians share a particular, historical good in common, one that we have for some time now been striving to express in our laws.32

Now if I, as a Canadian, can feel an obligation to millions of compatriots, the vast majority of whom I shall never meet, then it should be obvious that this is a number without limit, which is to say that it’s possible for someone to feel an attachment to billions and not only millions. However, the presence of the world’s civic or political community (one that, it goes without saying, contains many other communities within it) has been obscured by all the talk of human rights. Hence its weakness, and hence the stinginess of many when faced with the needs of many more.

II

The rise of human rights has also served as an ironic tragedy of sorts for those philosophers who have tried to lend it intellectual support. On the whole, they may be divided into two groups. One attempts to interlock rights within systematically unified theories of justice, thereby fixing the


31 In 2004, for example, it spent $1,241 million on foreign aid and $13,413 million on domestic social assistance. See Statistics Canada.

priorities between them. The other rejects such theories as infeasible, and asserts instead that the best we can do when rights conflict is to negotiate, to compromise or balance them against each other. Both approaches are counterproductive, however.

Today, it is cosmopolitan theorists who lead the first group. But in so doing, they fail to see that their abstractions not only disempower but also bring a degree of unreality to their claims. For they end up committing an error parallel to the one that Martin Heidegger identified with epistemology since Descartes: just as epistemologists fail to see how their subject-object dualism, and so their talk of “mental representations” such as beliefs and desires, presupposes a prereflective background of everyday practices, cosmopolitan theorists miss the fact that their ideology, their way of ranking values, cannot be derived from philosophy. This is because the values that an ideology affirms can only be fully articulated when they have “shown up” or emerged from our prereflective background of practices in particular historical contexts, and that only happens when they are involved in a conflict. Dragging them out in the abstract leads to either their (albeit sometimes creative) distortion, or the confusion that comes from making vague and contradictory claims. The problem with cosmopolitan theorists, in other words, is that they fail to put conflict first.

Consider Martha C. Nussbaum’s Stoic cosmopolitanism. In a well-known essay, she offers a defence of “the person whose allegiance is to the worldwide community of human beings.” Her approach is grounded in a certain philosophical anthropology, one that “recognizes in people what is especially fundamental about them, most worthy of respect and acknowledgement: their aspirations to justice and goodness and their capacity for reasoning this connection.” This leads to a concern with people’s welfare and so with coming to the aid of those suffering from poverty or oppression. Whence Nussbaum’s call for Americans to reform their educational system in order that students may learn about such things as “the problems of hunger and pollution in India, and the implication of these problems for the larger issues of global hunger and global ecology.” Because if we are “above all, citizens of a world of human beings,” then focusing on these aspects of Indian experience makes a great deal of sense.

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34 Nussbaum, “Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism,” in Joshua Cohen, ed., *For Love of Country?* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2002). The quotations in this and the next three paragraphs are all from this essay or from Nussbaum’s “Reply” in the same book.
However, Nussbaum isn’t very clear about what she means by “above all.” For example, sometimes it seems as though her argument is altogether incompatible with national sentiments, as when she asserts that they constitute but “a colourful idol,” or that national boundaries are not “salient” because a person’s nationality is “a morally irrelevant characteristic.” Such claims then lead her to argue that we should be like the Stoic who affirms “only” reason and love of humanity and, for this reason, willingly enters into a kind of “exile” by refusing “to be defined by his local origins and group memberships.” That, Nussbaum tells us, is the cosmopolitan way, and only it is “principled,” only its values are “morally good.”

Sometimes, however, Nussbaum’s preference for the global over the local appears far less one-sided, as when she says that the world community is, “fundamentally, the source of our moral obligations,” and that our “fundamental allegiance” should go to it. Because “fundamental” here could always mean “much more important” and yet not exclusively so. This reading is encouraged by Nussbaum’s claim that, although people must “centrally” affirm humanity and world citizenship as “the focus” of civic education, it is acceptable for them to continue to feel attached to their “particular loves.” It is even appropriate to give one’s own sphere “special care,” and to devote “special attention to the history and current situation of [one’s] own nation” – as long, that is, as we do so “in addition” to learning about other cultures. For “we should also work to make all human beings part of our community of dialogue and concern, base our political deliberations on that interlocking commonality, and give the circle that defines our humanity special attention and respect.”

So Nussbaum is somewhat vague about what it means to give humanity our fundamental allegiance. It could involve bestowing it our sole allegiance, since this alone is moral, or it could mean no more than awarding it greater priority over more local concerns. Doing the latter could itself consist of trumping those local concerns whenever there is a conflict, or simply outweighing them to some degree, or even that the global and the local should be considered more or less equally weighty depending on the circumstances. Indeed, the issue is made no clearer on the few occasions when Nussbaum writes about what her position would mean in practice. For example, agreeing with her that we should “most seriously consider” the rights of other human beings is said to entail accepting “large-scale economic and political consequences,” yet Nussbaum says nothing about what these might be. And when she finally does “put conflict first” by posing two specific practical questions – “May I give my daughter an expensive college education, while
children all over the world are starving and effective relief agencies exist? May Americans enjoy their currently high standard of living, when there are reasons to think the globe as a whole could not sustain that level of consumption?” – her reply goes no further than declaring that “these are hard questions, and there will and should be much debate about the proper answers.” While her call to dialogue is certainly welcome, it is hard to see how it is compatible with her belief that “world citizenship . . . places exacting demands on the imaginings of each of us.”

Thomas Pogge is a much more thoroughgoing cosmopolitan theorist, and so he partly avoids this contradiction by suggesting that personal questions such as the one Nussbaum poses about the cost of her daughter’s education are unnecessary. Pogge follows John Rawls in arguing that political justice is a matter of our having certain responsibilities towards the institutions we participate in but not as regards other individuals or collective agents. This is why Pogge focuses on the global economic order. Moreover, he appears (at least to me) to make a very strong case that it bears responsibility for severe poverty in the developing world, and that this poverty could be eliminated at very little cost to the developed world. He also goes further, however. Given that, in our day, about one-third of all human deaths (some 50,000 premature deaths daily) have poverty-related causes, Pogge implies that the citizens of developed countries can be compared to the Germans who supported the Nazis during the Second World War. For we are “hunger’s willing executioners . . . accomplices in a monumental crime against humanity.”

Although Pogge doesn’t come out and say so, one would think that, if he is right, then a Nuremberg-like trial is in order, if only for our leaders (though why stop there?). Regardless, I

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35 Nussbaum’s priorities are made no clearer when, in later articles, she sums-up her position as calling for “a complicated dialogue between local attachments and loyalty to humanity,” one in which we’re to ask “how much humanity requires of us, and how much we are entitled to give to our own.” From Nussbaum, “The Capabilities Approach and Ethical Cosmopolitanism: A Response to Noah Feldman,” Yale Law Journal Pocket Part, 20 October 2007, p. 125; and “Compassion and Terror,” Daedalus 132, no. 1 (Winter 2003): 10–27, p. 22. When Nussbaum refrains from asserting priorities in this way, her approach seems to me to reflect not the monism characteristic of a theory of justice, but an Aristotelian pluralism. See my From Pluralist to Patriotic Politics: Putting Practice First (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 71–72.


think the reason Pogge feels confident enough in his position to suggest that a crime is being committed is that his cosmopolitanism is — like so many practical positions derived from philosophy — inclined to legalism. Because that is simply part of what it means to be a theorist today, namely, to believe that one’s theory’s abstract principles are systematically unified and so that, like the relatively uncontroversial statutes of law, they should be considered above the conflicts of everyday politics. It’s because Pogge thinks that he has the correct theory, and so that his position is not one over which reasonable people can disagree, that he would have us turn to the courts instead of to political dialogue.

Indeed, Pogge’s theory is also behind why he thinks personal as distinct from institutional questions are irrelevant. For as he sees it, we simply cannot

make our ordinary economic decisions in such a way as to avoid aggravating anyone’s severe poverty. Endorsing this aim is pointless because we cannot possibly live up to it. In the present world it is completely beyond the capacity of affluent individuals to shape their economic conduct so as to avoid causing any poverty deaths in the poor countries.40

But this is just not true. Changing our conduct even slightly could make a very real difference to some people. For example, by regularly donating but a fraction of our disposable income to organizations that work to alleviate poverty, real lives could be saved.

Let’s be specific. A fine watch, say one valued at US$300, could be sold and the money sent to, say, an OXFAM emergency relief program. Yet many people, including myself, cosmopolitans such as Nussbaum and Pogge, and even egalitarians such as G.A. Cohen,41 still choose to wear such watches — not to mention buy the odd fashionable outfit (equivalent to two lives?), dine out (one life per meal?), or go to the cinema (half a life per film?). My point is not that we absolutely must forgo these things.42 Rather, it is that our choice not to says something about our ethical

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42 Peter Singer would disagree: “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 1, no. 1 (Spring 1972): 229–43. Given that I believe his argument, which is based on abstract principles, is sound, I obviously question
priorities, namely, that our concern for “humans the world over” is not especially deep. No surprise, then, that even Nussbaum and Pogge’s cosmopolitanisms appear to have room for granting priority to our own needs, or to those with whom we have personal relationships, over the basic needs of all human beings. Only the needs of our country or the other communities of which we may be members seem to be permanently downgraded.

But then this helps us to see that only a very small number of people can be described as giving priority “above all” other considerations to the needs of humanity. And there is a very simple reason why this must be so: heroism is, by definition, exceptional.43 Because that, I believe, is what giving overriding loyalty to an abstraction such as “the needs of all human beings” amounts to: the greatness of the hero (or saint). And heroism, it should go without say, is beyond ideology, indeed beyond politics.44

Moreover, since humanity is an abstraction, we ought to object to all of the loose cosmopolitan talk about the existence of a “community of human beings” – not because there is no global community, but because those who belong to it need to be seen as particular, culture-endowed persons rather than as members of a biological species. Otherwise put, real communities are thick, historical entities. To the cosmopolitan theorist, however, we should be transcending the particular and affirming the universal, since anything else gives “an accident of history a false air of moral weight and glory.”45 Nussbaum continues:

The accident of being born a Sri Lankan, or a Jew, or a female, or an African-American, or a poor person, is just that – an accident of birth. It is not and should not the wisdom of invoking such arguments when it comes to ethics.

43 Of course, those who rescued Jews in Nazi Europe, the focus of Kristen Renwick Monroe’s study, The Heart of Altruism: Perceptions of A Common Humanity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), were very rare. See also Norman Geras’ Solidarity in the Conversation of Mankind: The Ungroundable Liberalism of Richard Rorty (London: Verso, 1995), ch. 1, where Geras shows that, pace Rorty, those rescuers’ sense of obligation to humanity cannot be considered an extension of their ordinary, partial loyalties.

44 For an amusing account of one man’s decision to try to live in this way and the effect it has on him and his family, see the novel by Nick Hornby, How to Be Good (New York: Riverhead Books, 2001). For an indication that most people don’t tend to act altruistically, consider the psychological study which shows that people are more willing to contribute to charity when they see it as part of an exchange, e.g. when they’re offered something for their donation, even when that thing holds little appeal. See J.G. Holmes, D.T. Miller, and M.J. Lerner, “Committing Altruism under the Cloak of Self-Interest: The Exchange Fiction,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 38, no. 2 (March 2002): 144–51.

45 Nussbaum, “Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism,” p. 11.
be taken to be a determinant of moral worth. Human personhood, by which I mean the possession of practical reason and other basic moral capacities, is the source of our moral worth, and this worth is equal.\textsuperscript{46}

But surely the fact that one has been born human and not, say, a dog is just as arbitrary.\textsuperscript{47} If the reply is that animals should be added to the category of those who deserve recognition as morally equal, then one has only to mention vegetation. Because the moment the life of a vegetable is considered as important as that of a person, then it’s obvious that something has gone seriously wrong.\textsuperscript{48}

III
I’ve said that there is a second group of philosophers who support the language of human rights in a counterproductive way. These are the “value pluralists” led by Isaiah Berlin, Stuart Hampshire, and Bernard Williams.\textsuperscript{49} Given that they favour the many over the one, they would have us reject any and all attempts at formulating a universal, systematically unified theory of justice. But in asserting an opposite, fragmenting extreme, they leave little room for the idea of a global civic or political community. As a result, their support for the values that human rights are intended to uphold is weak at best.

Here’s why. Value pluralists come to human rights from their belief that there exists a minimal global ethic, one present in all the world’s cultures and which stands for such fundamental prohibitions as those against murder, torture, and other forms of gross cruelty.\textsuperscript{50} The ethic doesn’t express a global common good, however, so much as a small group of values, values that are often

\textsuperscript{46} Nussbaum, “Reply,” p. 133.
\textsuperscript{47} Nussbaum has indicated that she is aware of this sort of objection, but she does not (as a cosmopolitan) respond to it. See ibid., p. 151 n. 12.
\textsuperscript{48} Unless, of course, one is singing along with the English Canadian comedy trio The Arrogant Worms and their song “Carrot Juice is Murder,” in \textit{Russell’s Shorts} (Kingston, ON: Arrogant Worms, 2003).
\textsuperscript{49} For a recent study, see Edward Hall, \textit{Value, Conflict, and Order: Berlin, Hampshire, Williams, and the Realist Revival in Political Theory} (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2021).
incommensurable with both each other and any other values that people from different cultures may hold. And since they can be expressed in the language of rights, and since rights are no more than significant moral interests that are open to being compromised,\(^{51}\) it makes sense to try and negotiate them when they conflict, that is, to make trade-offs and concessions in the hopes of reaching a balanced accommodation. True, the parties remain “natural enemies,”\(^{52}\) but they may still tolerate one other to some degree. That said, the absence of a global community means that we should expect any balances they strike to favour local conceptions of justice. So while there’s nothing in principle preventing value pluralists from supporting foreign interventions for humanitarian reasons, say, they will only do so rather tepidly. Here, for example, is Williams: “the consideration of victims’ suffering is likely to determine policy only occasionally. It is hard to imagine a world in which it could be otherwise.”\(^{53}\)

This denial of global patriotism by value pluralists is something that, it must be said, they share with realpolitik nationalists. Recall Joseph de Maistre’s famous quip about having “seen Frenchmen, Italians, Russians, etc.; thanks to Montesquieu, I even know that one can be Persian. But as for man, I declare that I have never in my life met him.”\(^{54}\) To Maistre, this means that because talk of a unified humanity is false, we must accept that there will always be conflict between peoples and so that, as his intellectual descendant Carl Schmitt famously argued, the world is divided into friends and enemies.\(^{55}\) Of course, unlike in value pluralism, these enemies

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\(^{52}\) Hampshire, pp. 72, 74.

\(^{53}\) Williams, “Humanitarianism and the Right to Intervene,” in *In the Beginning Was the Deed*, p. 153. This position shares much with that of Michael Walzer, who has admitted that he “is not even aware that there is a world such that one could be a citizen of it.” Walzer, “Spheres of Affection,” in Cohen, ed., *For Love of Country*, p. 125. This, I suspect, is why he’s willing to go no further than honouring “exceptions” to the norm of non-intervention, and so why he ends up with his own rather tepid position: “Any state capable of stopping the slaughter has a right, at least, to try to do so.” Walzer, “The Politics of Rescue,” in *Arguing about War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), p. 81; and *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations* (New York: Basic Books, 1977), p. 108. Walzer’s tepidity forces me to note the irony of the latter book’s epigraph, which is taken from the *Yad Va-shem* Holocaust Memorial in Jerusalem.


are assumed to be incapable of negotiating in good faith; when they do talk, they don’t engage in genuine dialogue since they’re merely using force by other means. Nevertheless, both value pluralists and those into realpolitik can be accused of failing to recognize that it is possible to conflict with a friend and indeed respond in ways that strive to maintain and perhaps even enhance the friendship. All that’s necessary is for us to treat our friends as “opponents” who are not also “adversaries.” And since opponents can certainly arise across borders, we ought, once again, to do our best to uphold the common good of the global political community and so see ourselves as citizens of the world who, to varying but never negligible degrees, belong to each other. Perhaps the time has come for the United Nations to issue passports that would represent this world citizenship and so the importance of treating everyone as a compatriot.

IV
The arguments above will, I know, appear counterintuitive to many. After all, human rights have become the basis of some of the most celebrated campaigns, both practical and intellectual, on the world stage. And the activists leading them certainly do not seem to be lacking in passion for justice. My hunch, however, is that this is because they are driven not so much by a wish to fulfil certain practical values in the world, as by motivations that are best characterized as aesthetic at worst, or religious at best.57

In any case, I want to conclude by noting how the lack of enthusiasm demonstrated by the vast majority of people when challenged to defend human rights in practice has led activists to favour enforcement mechanisms. The more cosmopolitan among them call for an international legal order able to punish states, while others point to the effectiveness of local constitutional regimes.58 I believe both sides of this debate have gone astray, however. Because in being so concerned with telling people how they ought to act while neglecting their motivations for doing so, the defenders of human rights have failed to see that the only real guarantee of our liberties and


welfare comes from people being willing to stand up for them. It’s what’s in their hearts or minds that matters.

But oh, replies the human rights advocate, how ugly are those hearts or minds! Think of the millions of Germans who supported the Nazis, or the many Bolsheviks, especially the Stalinists, not to mention the Maoists and everyone else responsible for, or complicit in, mass murder during the past century – it’s just because of such unspeakable horrors that enforcement appears necessary. People can be terrible, we cannot trust them, and so we need institutional mechanisms that are beyond their reach in order to protect them from themselves. Hence Ignatieff: “We build on the testimony of fear, rather than on the expectations of hope.”

But we simply do not have the luxury to abandon hope. This is not only because, historically, judiciaries have tended to reflect rather than challenge prevailing political and economic currents. It is also because judges, in articulating their rulings in terms of rights, do little to convince majorities of their justness; indeed, it is just because of this that their rulings often encourage backlashes. What else should we expect from decisions that are based on either the application of an abstract theory of justice or the balancing of whatever rights are said to have clashed in the given case? Neither leaves much room for the conversations necessary if citizens are to be truly reconciled to the law. Nor should we forget that the rulings are just that – rulings – which is to say impositions meant to be backed up by the police.

The danger here is that, while the docile can always be expected to go along, they will also be the first to change direction the moment the wind does. We ought not to assume, moreover, that people will become reconciled to those rulings in time (as if there ever was enough time). For this to happen it’s necessary to live with them peacefully for more than a generation – which is highly unlikely given the deep diversity of contexts and cultures in the world; conflict, not peace, will remain the norm. That is why states, including any future global state, need to decide for themselves whether their constitutions should be justiciable or not. And it is why these decisions

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60 “In the societies of our world today, judges do not stand out as protectors of liberty, of the rights of man, of the unprivileged, nor have they insisted that holders of great economic power, private or public, should use it with moderation. Their view of the public interest, when it has gone beyond the interest of governments, has not been wide enough to embrace the interests of political, ethnic, social or other minorities. Only occasionally has the power of the supreme judiciary been exercised in the positive assertion of fundamental values. In both democratic and totalitarian societies, the judiciary has naturally served the prevailing political and economic forces. Politically, judges are parasitic.” J.A.G. Griffith, The Politics of the Judiciary (London: HarperCollins, 1997, 5th ed.), p. 342.

61 The chief aim here should be for each to strive for a version of what I have called the “civic balance,” one
should be taken in the knowledge that, if one finds oneself worrying that people do not care enough, then the grim reality is that, at the end of the day, there is nothing to do other than to try and convince them to care more. Because anything else, it seems, only makes them care less.

between laws just in content and laws just in (democratic) form. See my *From Pluralist to Patriotic Politics*, pp. 195–96.