EPISTEMIC TEMPERANCE

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ABSTRACT

The idea of epistemic temperance is introduced and explicated through a discussion of Plato’s understanding of it. A variety of psychological and epistemic phenomena (including confirmation bias, self-serving bias, etc.) are presented which arise due to epistemic intemperance, or the inappropriate influence of conations on cognition. Two cases familiar to philosophers, self-deception and racial prejudice, are discussed as the result of epistemic intemperance though they are not typically seen as having a common cause. Finally, epistemic temperance is distinguished from epistemic justice, as these have been conflated.

Motivation may affect reasoning through reliance on a biased set of cognitive processes: strategies for accessing, constructing, and evaluating beliefs . . . By motivation I mean any wish, desire, or preference that concerns the outcome of a given reasoning task . . .

Ziva Kunda, “The Case for Motivated Reasoning”

People may treat evidence in a biased way when they are motivated by the desire to defend beliefs that they wish to maintain.

Raymond Nickerson, “Confirmation Bias”

The self-serving bias refers to a tendency for people to take personal responsibility for their desirable outcomes yet externalize responsibility for their undesirable outcomes.


The Pollyanna Principle states that people process pleasant information more accurately and efficiently than less pleasant information.

M. W. Matlin and V. Gawron, “Individual Differences in Pollyannaism”

People’s motivational states—their wishes and preferences— influence their processing of visual stimuli.

E. Balcetis and D. Dunning, “See What You Want to See”

The subject of the present essay is to introduce a neglected epistemic virtue, epistemic temperance, and to argue that it plays a large and yet unnoticed role outside virtue epistemology per se, specifically in moral psychology and social epistemology. Understanding epistemic temperance allows for a unified explanation for a wide sweep
of psychological and epistemic phenomena, as exemplified by the plethora of epigraphs. A full articulation of the logos of this virtue is beyond the scope of a single paper, as this would involve an articulation of all its associated vices and the phenomena glossed by the epigraphs (among others), though a rough-hewn version is possible. The focus will be on the effects of passions (including emotions), appetites, and desires on belief-formation, while topics such as the temperate pursuit of epistemic matters will be (mostly) left for another day. This is to be followed by a discussion of how epistemic temperance elucidates the etiology of two phenomena, self-deception and racial prejudice, which are already familiar to philosophers and yet not conceived of as having a common cause. Finally, as epistemic injustice has become such an important topic in social epistemology and because epistemic intemperance causes a large share of the epistemic injustice in the world, how these forms of intemperance and injustice are related is addressed. The general hope is to indicate ways for us to improve the management of our belief-forming processes, while providing a basis for future related work in moral and epistemic virtue theory.

Temperance simpliciter is one of the four cardinal virtues: temperance, courage, justice, and wisdom. These may be understood on a classical model of virtues as character traits adapted for the purpose of managing unavoidable elements of human life. Temperance manages appetites, desires, and passions; courage manages danger and fear; justice manages social relations; and wisdom, a more foundational virtue, necessary for all others, manages thought and behavior in general. Of the cardinal virtues, temperance is by far the most neglected, and as a result the least well understood. (Indeed, philosophers seem far more interested in akrasia, or weakness of will, than they are in the virtue of temperance, despite temperance being the virtue which represents a properly developed will.) Here, the word “intemperance” will refer both to matters of weakness of will, incontinence, and compulsion, where one’s desires point in opposing directions, but also to actions involving gluttonous, wanton, or self-indulgent behavior: behavior in which all one’s desires are aligned in favor of doing what is acknowledged to be wrong or bad. Thus, the possession of perseverance, strength of will, or grit is independent of having temperance per se since gluttons and addicts can demonstrate grit and determination in pursuit of their pleasure.

Temperance involves training or disciplining oneself so that one becomes a person who lives in peace with one’s appetites, desires, and passions, though this is not due to a deficit of these affective impulses: on the contrary, temperate people have healthy appetites, desires, and passions and have them in a salutary measure. To use Plato’s metaphor, temperance is the state of character in which people live in “harmony” with their desires, appetites, and passions (Republic 431e). Temperate people have learned to be tempted by only what they ought to be tempted by, and are not otherwise tempted. In this way, temperate people do not need to resist temptation; temperate people have outgrown the need for continence. It is worth noting that “temperance,” as it appears in the American “Temperance Movement,” is taken to be synonymous with “abstinence,” but this is as absurd as defining “courage” as being synonymous with “recklessness.” Abstinence is a vice of temperance, associated with a misguided and overweening resistance to relaxation and pleasure. Temperate people indulge in, and even occasionally ought to binge upon appropriate pleasures: what is a marital “honeymoon,” after all, if not a licensed sexual binge? Contrary to appearances, temperance is not the enemy of pleasure and fun but rather the enemy of behavior that is stupid, shameful, and regrettable. Indeed, temperance enhances our ability to experience pleasure
and fun, as wanton debauchery is ultimately enervating and debilitating.

Unfortunately, there has been sharp disagreement about scope and nature of temperance since the days in which the ancient Greeks called it “sophrosyne.” All agreed that it was a cardinal virtue, importantly related to living with tranquility (ataraxia), but Socrates and Plato described a very different purview for the virtue than Aristotle, and probably neither of these two views is sufficient on its own. Following Socrates, Plato famously articulates an intellectualist account of virtue in general, including temperance, and thereby denies the possibility of the otherwise unfortunately familiar experience of weakness of will (Protagoras, 352b-358d). In Charmides, the dialogue most devoted to temperance and one which will occupy our attention again below, Plato centrally focuses on the epistemic aspects of the virtue. Aristotle, on the other hand, accepts the existence of weakness of will, but limits the scope of temperance to the management of only the sensual pleasures we share with other animals, in particular touch and taste, explicitly excluding the other senses and excluding pleasures of the mind (Nicomachean Ethics, III, 10). He further restricts the relevant pleasures of touch and taste alone to those which are “peculiar” to people (NE, III, 11), by which he seems to refer to what we would today call “fetishes.” These restrictions seem odd and arbitrary from a contemporary point of view: it would be inapt for anyone, Aristotle included, to deny that people who over-indulge in reality TV, gossip, Schadenfreude, and rubbernecking (gawking) are indulging in vices of in-temperance. We now recognize that people can neurotically, compulsively, and/or obsessively over-indulge in any of the bodily senses and in almost any form of behavior. Since there seemed to be little agreement between the ancients on these fundamental issues, while each defends aspects of temperance that seem to be apt as far as they go, a better, more catholic account of it will allow both for weakness of will, as a common psychological phenomenon, and for temperance to manage the way our appetites, desires, and passions can inform and affect our epistemic practices. (For stylistic reasons, let “conations” refer to the sum total of a person’s passions, emotions, appetites, desires, preferences, interests, wishes, etc.)

There is, however, a point of agreement between Plato and Aristotle on the virtues in general which allows us solid ground from which to begin. And this is that the virtues involve the proper function (ergon) of the mind. When the capacities that constitute a person’s mind are functioning properly, excellently, or virtuously, they reliably yield true beliefs and effective decision-making so that the person’s actions lead to or constitute his or her well-lived life (eudaimonia). With regard to temperance, this implies the mind’s ability to properly function despite the presence of what would otherwise arouse conations which would have an adverse effect on deliberation and action. So, a basic gloss of temperance is that temperate people are those whose conations only appropriately affect deliberation and action for the sake of attaining eudaimonia. And so, as a place to begin, epistemic temperance is the epistemic virtue by which a person’s practices of belief-formation and deliberation are only influenced by conations in appropriate ways.

One might think that conations ought never to influence the production of belief, but this would be too quick. What is an inquiry or a “search for knowledge,” if not the product of a desire to know the truth? There is nothing inherently wrong with being motivated by our conations to investigate the world, and even to investigate it for the purpose of satisfying our temperate desires. Indeed, research shows that when subjects are motivated to be accurate in their reasoning, they do better at avoiding cognitive errors. In pursuit of satisfying our conations we learn much about
the world and, when conations are temperate, they can help steer us well through the world. Not only do they motivate us to find what we require to survive and flourish, but they also have cognitive roles to play. We can, for instance, learn about ourselves, our values, and our priorities by observing our desires and passions, especially when these take us by surprise: for example, we might find ourselves sticking up for someone whom we have not thought much about, but our doing so manifests our values.\(^{15}\)

The problem comes when our conations start to affect not our belief-forming pursuits but rather affect the very content of our “first-order” beliefs, so that we do not end up believing what is true or what the evidence warrants, but rather we believe what we want or hope to believe to be the truth. Obvious and fairly gross examples are the way that jealousy can lead to paranoia, anger can cause us to jump to conclusions, and lust can keep us from appreciating that “No” in fact means no. Again, the problem is not in letting what we want to be true influence our investigations: we test our hypotheses to see if they are true, and we often and blamelessly desire and hope our hypotheses are true. Epistemic intemperance paradigmatically occurs when our desire for a particular belief to be true causes us to believe it; instead of believing the truth, we believe what we want to be true.\(^{16}\) This is a failure of epistemic temperance.

The idea is not, however, that epistemically intemperate people go around believing whatever they want, willy-nilly, regardless of how outlandish it might be. Rather, they allow themselves to believe the world to be as close to what they want it to be as they can justify or rationalize in their own minds; epistemic intemperance is constrained by what it takes people to maintain an illusion of objectivity.\(^{17}\) The inappropriate influence of our conations on our beliefs, both subtle and not so subtle, is ubiquitous in human cognition and, whenever they do so influence how, rather than why, we make judgments or form beliefs, we find the vice of epistemic intemperance.

If we understand conations as propositional attitudes (wantings, wishings, desirings, hopings, etc.) then we may describe the situations which call for epistemic temperance as those in which we are pursuing the truth in the presence of conations that take as their content propositions that are in fact false. When what we hope to be true and what is true do not align, the epistemically temperate person reliably believes the truth: epistemically temperate judgment and deliberation are guided solely by evidence, especially in those cases in which we wish the evidence were different than it is.

As noted, Aristotle’s account of temperance is limited to the sensual, more “animalistic” aspects ourselves, and so is too narrow for us to use as a basis for understanding epistemic temperance. Plato, on the other hand, with his intellectualist proclivities, gives us a richer account of epistemic temperance, the substance of which is found in the dialogue *Charmides*.\(^{18}\) This is perhaps most well-known as a Platonic protreptic, a form of hortatory writing that works by undermining the reader’s presumptions about a topic. Here, Socrates is trying to persuade Charmides (who ends up later in life being Plato’s uncle), a promising and attractive youth, to take up a life of philosophy, flirting with him all the while. It is in some ways an odd dialogue, but what is important for us is how its discussion of temperance (sophrosune) explicitly casts it in epistemic terms and, anticipating contemporary concerns, the fact that a central topic of the dialogue is how we evaluate the testimony of others and make judgments regarding people’s expertise.

Plato’s development of (epistemic) temperance presented begins with a discussion of the dictum *Know Thyself*, where Critias denies that this should be thought of as a greeting to those entering the oracle at Delphi. Rather, he says it should be understood as explicitly
practical and cautionary advice: “Know Thyself” and “Be Temperate” mean the same (164e). Consider the position of people who are about to ask the Delphic soothsayers for advice. Before doing so, the oracle counsels them to “check” themselves and their desires, to not expect or ask for too much, but rather only for what is appropriate to the circumstance. Saying “Know Thyself” to someone, or to oneself, when the addressee is known to want something, is like saying “Nothing in Excess,” or “Don’t let your Eyes be Bigger than your Stomach” (164e-165b).

It is through this self-check that we arrive at the central epistemic element of temperance: one must have self-knowledge in order to manage one’s conations well: one must know about one’s conations and be aware of their possible improper intrusion into belief-formation and deliberation. True, one must also value what one ought to value in order to be temperate, and this involves axiological knowledge of the world, which may be thought of as an element of practical wisdom (phronesis) and not temperance. More on this below, but for the present, Plato seems right to think that having self-knowledge is the subtlest yet most important aspect of epistemic temperance. The reason self-knowledge becomes so important is because of the multifarious ways our conations can implicitly influence our judgment without our awareness. The role of the will with regard to temperance is also taken up below but again for the moment, we may simply note that people who let their conations inform their beliefs can fool themselves into thinking they have knowledge when, in fact, they do not. This involves a lack of self-knowledge which causes further malfunctions in the formation of beliefs.

Socrates sums up this practical yet epistemic conception of temperance as follows:

So, the temperate man alone will know himself and be able to examine what he in fact knows and what he doesn’t, and he will be capable of looking at other people in the same way to see what any of them knows and thinks he knows, if he does know; and what, on the other hand, he thinks he knows, but does not. No one else will be able to do that. In fact, that is being temperate and temperance and knowing oneself—knowing what one knows and what one doesn’t (167a).19

Everyone recognizes the absurdity of letting people be the judge of their own case, and yet this is exactly what self-knowledge requires: reflexive judgments of the self by the self. Tricky business, indeed. If, however, you have tempered your character to reliably make accurate self-assessments, then you possess the virtue of temperance. Leaving aside cases of justified false belief, if you are temperate, you will not only know what you know and what you do not know, but you will also know when other people know and when they do not: just as one’s self-knowledge will not be perverted by conations, one’s knowledge of what others know or fail to know will be similarly veridical. If we have a distorted view of ourselves, our judgments of others are likely to be distorted as well, while a correct view of ourselves probabilizes a correct view of others. There are, of course, other possible hindrances to self-knowledge besides the inappropriate influence of conations on judgment, so the conclusion can only be that temperance is necessary but not sufficient for self-knowledge. Socrates is overstating the case by saying that “knowing what one knows and what one doesn’t” simply “is being temperate and temperance and knowing oneself.” Nevertheless, given the variety of manifestations of epistemic intemperance to be discussed below (foreshadowed by the epigraphs above), it should become clear that being temperate is not some minor prerequisite for self-knowledge, but rather manages those powerful, naturally endemic psychological forces—conations—which are most apt to wrongly influence how one thinks about oneself and others.
So, self-knowledge is key to epistemic temperance (and temperance generally): it is by managing well the content of our conations and the strength of our feelings that allows us an accurate view of ourselves. One of the most common and most neglected impediments to having justified beliefs occurs when we allow our conative capacities to distort our judgment. This is not meant to be a deep thought, but it is one that contemporary epistemologists have not much discussed: our appetites, desires, and passions can cloud our judgments, and epistemic temperance is the virtue by which one becomes the kind of person who reliably avoids these problems and thereby is more likely to make trustworthy self-judgments, and trustworthy judgments of others’ as well.²⁰

Before moving on to applications of epistemic temperance, its bearing on the will requires some attention. There are obviously cases of weakness of will that may arise with regard to epistemic intemperance: one may know that one really ought to be reading something for work while reaching for a newspaper or some pulp fiction. And wanton self-indulgence in low quality epistemic materials has been discussed by Heather Battaly (2010).²¹ These sorts of issues, however, seem less central to epistemic temperance when this is understood as having one’s belief-forming mechanisms functioning reliably in the face of opposing conations (though undoubtedly, an epistemic diet restricted to such low-quality materials would inevitably take its toll). It does not seem possible to wantonly or self-indulgently accept what we know to be false simply because it is something we want to be true. We have already seen how these mechanisms malfunction without our knowledge and a discussion of self-deception will follow below. On top of these issues, however, is the familiar epistemological thesis that, while there are exceptions, we cannot will ourselves to believe what we want to believe, that our beliefs are involuntary.²²

If belief is not voluntary, what role can the virtue of epistemic temperance play? Of course, this worry is not only one for epistemic temperance.²³ But if weakness of the will is one of the central vices which temperate people avoid (without requiring recourse to continence), and the will is not directly involved in belief formation, then it is not clear what role the virtue is supposed to have. There are in fact more and less direct ways that temperance can play a role. When confronted with some undesirable fact, we can attend to it or ignore it, and this does seem to be voluntary in the relevant way. Perhaps we are aware of evidence that a trusted friend has done something wrong and we cannot bear to think about it. This inability to scrutinize evidence does seem like a weakness of will not to be found in those who are epistemically temperate. The less direct influence of epistemic temperance comes from the development of character involved in learning to be temperate.

This is to appeal to what William Alston (1988) calls “long range voluntary control” over our beliefs. He understands this notion by way of a contrast with “immediate control” in which one is able to bring about a state of affairs “right away, in one uninterrupted intentional act.” The thought is that we may train ourselves in certain ways, “by doing something (usually a number of different things) repeatedly over a considerable period of time, interrupted by activity directed to other goals” (p. 275). And while Alston does not take up virtue in this article, this is the sort of training that is part of becoming intellectually virtuous generally. Since sophrosune is often translated as “self-discipline” (though perhaps “self-regulation” is more felicitious), being an autodidact is obviously central to expertise in this long-term training.²⁴ Ultimately, only you can temper your own mettle.

With regard to epistemic temperance, our acquisition of the character trait will be due to reflection on our mistakes, our attending and
scrutinizing our intellectual habits and typical sources of information, etc. We can become aware of phenomena like those glossed in the epigraphs and through our awareness hone our ability to detect epistemic intemperance. Indeed, we can start learning to how to take responsibility for even our implicit biases in a way which may allow us to correct for them as well. Through this sort of deliberate and reflective developmental process, we may come to naturally form beliefs and deliberate in an epistemically temperate manner, without normally having to think about it at all. So, even if we cannot simply voluntarily and wantonly believe what we wish to be true, we can do so by way of akratically ignoring evidence for something undesired and only attending to those facts which support the desired belief. Epistemic continence could be understood as applying in those cases in which we must “force” ourselves to attend to these undesirable facts, while epistemically temperate people do so willingly, valuing truth over the pleasure of believing to be true what one merely wishes to be true.

In turning now more to specifically psychological matters, a natural defense mechanism used by human beings to lessen cognitive dissonance is to resolve matters in a way that allows us to continue to think well of ourselves, of our choices and behavior, and of our judgments (Kunda 1990). Common-sense says that being obsessively racked by self-doubt or negativity will end quickly and badly in a nasty and brutish world. As Bishop Butler so insightfully pointed out, while there are exceptions to the rule (people who are overly hard on themselves), it is quite normal for us to be generally partial to ourselves and those close to us, and to whatever we happen to be passionate about. And these conations can lead us to be biased in the judgments we make about ourselves and what we want and/or care about. Now, there is a good case to be made for the moral justifiability of sometimes treating ourselves and those close to us with a special partiality: we need only recall Bernard Williams’ discussion of the man forced to choose between saving from drowning either his wife or a stranger, and where impartial thinking constitutes having “one thought too many.” It is not always wrong to let our “self-love” (to use Butler’s archaic locution) or our love of others influence our actions. But matters are different when it comes to epistemology and how we form beliefs. Perhaps there are exceptional cases in which it is proper to let our affections and attachments cloud our judgments, but these are the unusual exceptions to the rule; as we say, “desperate times call for desperate measures.” In general however, as noted, our judgment-making faculties and belief-forming mechanisms are designed to detect the truth when there is a truth out there to be detected, and they malfunction if they rightly detect the existence of the truth but the content of the beliefs we form are “gilded and stained” (to coin Hume) by what pleases us or by our conations (more on this below). We do not reliably see the world accurately if we look at it through rose-colored glasses, and our judgments about people, ourselves included, will be similarly inaccurate if they are influenced by what we desire to be true or untrue, as dictated by what is convenient for us.

This is crucial for studying social epistemology as much as it is for attaining self-knowledge. Notice how the quote above from Socrates about temperate people gives equal weight to knowing when others know as it gives to knowing when one has self-knowledge. People willing to call themselves “experts” are easy to come by. (Many epistemically intemperate people want to think of themselves as experts and so do think of themselves that way though they are not.) So, in those important yet complex social situations in which we have to rely on the testimony of experts to help us solve a problem or to discover the truth about a sublime
matter, there are often a number of disagreeing “experts” from which to choose, a number of contradicting “expert” opinions, where it is obvious that not all of them can be correct. We often have to choose our experts. The Greeks, of course, were very much aware of this. In essence, what Plato was arguing for in *Charmides* is that only temperate people are experts in detecting experts. It is reasonable to wonder how temperance alone could accomplish this, and in fact (as noted above) it is not sufficient, as the virtue of *phronesis*, or practical wisdom, is also necessary. (For the time being, *phronesis* can be understood as accurately valuing the good and thinking rationally based on these values.) Temperance, armed with practical wisdom, allows us to evaluate, in a reliably truth-conducive manner, the claims of various “experts,” as well as to evaluate the experts themselves. From the point of view of social epistemology, in particular, temperate people are reliably capable of being objective and having their judgments about the testimony of others be untainted by desires for a particular outcome. Their conations about what they personally want or which experts they hope to be correct do not interfere with their judgment. If wisdom is necessary for good procedural deliberation in general, temperance ensures that these deliberations are not viciously tainted by appetites, desires, and passions regarding what we wish, want, or hope to be true.

And yet, contemporary psychological research displays the manifold ubiquity of these vicious thought-patterns. Humans process pleasant news more accurately and efficiently than bad news; we tend to avoid even looking at unpleasant pictures. There is a positive correlation between the probability that one will believe a proposition and the probability that one considers it desirable. When things turn out as we desire, we attribute the success to our abilities while, when they fail to turn out this way, we blame the circumstances or just bad luck. Research shows that the desire for self-esteem, the desire to be successful, etc., can not only cause biased memory and belief searches but can also influence reasoning, by way of a biased selection of heuristics; (as noted) reasoning can be unduly affected by the discomfort of cognitive dissonance and other states of arousal. Contemporary research on confirmation bias show that we have a penchant for looking for evidence which confirms our preexisting beliefs, while discounting, failing to look at, or even outright ignoring evidence that disconfirms those beliefs. What could be more commonplace today than the observation that conservatives look to conservative news outlets for their news while liberals look to liberal news outlets? We tend to seek information based only on hypotheses we have already formed, prefer evidence which supports these hypotheses, and look for and over-weigh positive cases that confirm what we already think. Old scientific theories do not die upon disconfirmation but rather fade away as an older generation dies off. Pseudo-scientific theories such as astrology, alchemy, witch-hunting, and the rationalization of various evil social policies, such as slavery, are also social outcomes of epistemic intemperance. People are gullible ("There’s a sucker born every minute") and are more gullible when they are told what they want to hear. The problems arise not just in reasoning and belief-formation, but extend into perception: one study shows that subjects tended to interpret an ambiguous figure, which could be either a “B” or a “13,” as the sign of what would bring an outcome they favored. Other studies show that desirable objects are perceived to be closer than undesirable objects and are seen more quickly.

While there is obviously a lot of work in empirical psychology that can be subsumed under the heading of “Epistemic Intemperance,” there is similarly work to be done by
moral psychologists and social epistemologists. Here, as brief examples of such work, two typically disparate philosophical issues are brought under the vice of epistemic in-temperance: self-deception and prejudice.

The literature on self-deception is quite large and there is much disagreement over how the details of an account should be spelled out. Nevertheless, the general philosophical consensus seems to be that “self-deception is motivated by a conative state, like a desire or an emotion.” This way of thinking about self-deception is not new: as Butler sums up his “explanation” of self-deceit, “. . . there are, you see, two things, which may thus prejudice and darken the understanding itself: that over-fondness for ourselves, which we are all so liable to; and also being under the power of any particular passion or appetite, or engaged in any particular pursuit.” To see how this plays out in the contemporary literature, we may look briefly at the prominent views of Alfred Mele and Robert Audi. Despite the important differences between their views, they agree that desires play the driving role in creating self-deceptive beliefs.

Mele analyzes a subject’s “entering self-deception” with respect to the belief that $p$ as follows (where (ii) most concerns us):

1. The belief that $p$ which S acquires is false.
2. S’s desiring that $p$ leads S to manipulate (i.e., to treat inappropriately) a datum or data relevant, or at least seemingly relevant, to the truth value of $p$.
3. This manipulation is the cause of S’s acquiring the belief that $p$.
4. If, in the causal chain between desire and manipulation or in that between manipulation and belief-acquisition, there are any accidental intermediaries (links), or intermediaries intentionally introduced by another agent, these intermediaries do not make S (significantly) less responsible for acquiring the belief that $p$ than he would otherwise have been (1983, p. 370).

While the core of Audi’s account of self-deception is as follows (where (3) most concerns us):

A person, S . . . is in self-deception, with respect to a proposition, $p$, if and only if S (1) unconsciously knows that not-$p$ (or has reason to believe, and unconsciously and truly believes, that not-$p$); (2) sincerely avows, or is disposed to avow sincerely, that $p$; and (3) has at least one want [or desire] which explains, in part, both why S’s belief that not-$p$ is unconscious and why S is disposed to avow that $p$, even when presented with what he sees is evidence against $p$ (1997, p. 122).

Leaving the divergent details aside, our best current understanding of self-deception is that it is caused by the inappropriate influence of a conative state on a subject’s belief-forming mechanisms, which fits precisely the understanding of epistemic in-temperance laid out above.

There is less consensus about the nature of prejudice, especially racial prejudice. Prejudicial judgment, taken as a general idea, is too large to explore here, but it does seem likely that to a significant degree, common forms of prejudice are caused by epistemic in-temperance. Racist and sexist beliefs are perpetuated in part because they confirm to those who accept them what those people want to believe about the races and sexes. For example, one prominent theory of racism emerging from evolutionary psychology, and confirmed to some degree by developmental psychology, argues that categorizing by race is a by-product of processes that evolved to detect coalitional alliances, promoting in-group favoritism and out-group indifference or hostility.

One important understanding of racism comes from Franz Fanon, when he says that racists, “can find salvation only in a passion-driven commitment such as is found in certain psychoses.” Fanon’s reference to a “passion-driven commitment” places
epistemic intemperance at the source of racism. This gets at the psychological truth more thoroughly than an account of racism as, say, simply a failure of rationality, or as a failure to universalize one’s beliefs. In any instance of such a failure, there is an explanation for what drives the failure, and it is insightful to locate this cause in conations. Humans often believe that people who are not “like them” are “barbarians” or “savages” or are “less than” or inferior because, at some level, this is what they want to believe. It is comforting to find ourselves superior to others. Fanon is not alone, of course, in seeing conative elements fueling racist belief, and sexist belief is easily seen in the same light. Recently, Miranda Fricker defends a view of prejudice which is similar to Fanon’s, insofar as she builds a conative component, an “affective investment,” explicitly into her “general conception” of prejudice as the very root of the problem:

> Prejudices are judgments, which may have a positive or negative valence [a favorable or unfavorable bias], and which may display some (typically, epistemically culpable) resistance to counter-evidence owing to some affective investment on the part of the subject. (p. 35)

And so, we may locate a highly plausible theory of racist and sexist prejudices as being powered by the inappropriate influence of conations on our beliefs, which again signals the presence of the vice of epistemic intemperance.

Since Fricker’s work has already entered the discussion, and because social epistemologists now see the importance of what she named “epistemic injustice” in the evaluation of testimony, it is important to see how epistemic intemperance is the cause of much of the epistemic injustice in the world. In fact, unjustified epistemic bias is (most) often due to an inappropriate influence of some conation on belief formation. To see why this is so, we may begin by distinguishing epistemic injustice from epistemic intemperance as they are easily conflated. The relationship between the two is complicated. Fricker’s book on epistemic injustice undoubtedly does an excellent job at characterizing in detail many of the harms done to the victims of epistemic injustice. And indeed, even phrasing this as “harms done to the victims of epistemic injustice” invites one to think that epistemic injustice is ultimately the cause of the harm. In fact, however, we cannot validly infer that because an epistemic injustice is done to someone that the cause of it is the perpetrator’s character trait of being epistemically unjust. Epistemic injustice, as a social fact experienced by its victims, is not always the result of the character trait referred to as “being epistemically unjust,” rather epistemic injustice can be caused by epistemic intemperance, intellectual cowardice, or outright reckless foolishness. If we wish to eradicate the social phenomenon we now know of as epistemic injustice, the elimination of the character trait of being epistemically unjust will not suffice.

To focus on the relation between the traits of being epistemically unjust and epistemically intemperate, we may attend to an exchange between Rosalind Hursthouse and Christine Swanton regarding how moral injustice is related to moral intemperance. Consider a military quartermaster who steals chocolate from the troops for the sake of selling it on the black market at a high wartime profit. Here, it seems clear, that the injustice done to the soldiers was done from a wrongful appropriation of their property that is characteristic of moral injustice. The Greek word for this vice is pleonexia, which is often translated as “greed,” though this translation is not adequate, as a miser may greedily hoard justly earned gains without committing an injustice. It is better to see it as Kant did: that this quartermaster’s injustice is due to a failure of proper self-respect and respect for others which is...
ultimately caused by arrogance that results in the improper arrogation of property or respect. But consider a different case, one in which the quartermaster steals the chocolate, not to resell it, but because of a glutinous and overwhelming desire to binge upon it. In this case, the troops are certainly done an identical injustice when compared to the case of theft for profit, they are harmed in the same way and to the same degree, but the cause of the injustice is not arrogant injustice but rather (wanton or incontinent) intemperance. So, being arrogant can cause injustice to be done to other people: arrogant people arrogate from their victims what is not theirs. As a character trait, we can understand epistemic injustice on this same model: epistemically arrogant people fail to give proper respect to those whose opinions they discount, or those whom they silence altogether. Epistemic justice, on this picture, is the character trait by which one’s judgments are guided by both proper self-respect and respect for others. Agreeing with Fricker, it is certainly (and unfortunately) easy to find instances of epistemic injustice, harms perpetrated upon victims, which are the result of the perpetrator having the trait of being epistemically unjust in judging the reliability of the testimony of others.

But remembering the quartermaster who steals because of gluttony, we should note that, perhaps most often, instances of epistemic injustice are caused by epistemic intemperance, that is, due to the inappropriate influence of conations in forming judgments about the testimony of others. This can occur because one may fall victim to any of the psychological/cognitive malfunctions referenced above. We end up believing what we want to believe. We accept or reject testimony based on how much it pleases us or how much we want it to be true, etc. And if we might err in self-indulgently and unreflectively giving into our desires by believing what we want to be true, we might also be guilty of what could be called, “epistemic abstinence,” which would be various forms of the epistemic vices of cynicism, overweening skepticism, niggardly closed-mindedness, and truculent dogmatism. One may, out of sheer mulish stubbornness, refuse to accept true testimony or change one’s views or revise one’s beliefs, regardless of the evidence. If epistemic gluttony is found in indiscriminately believing whatever is convenient, epistemic abstinence is thick-headed inflexibility. And all these vices of epistemic intemperance could result in epistemic injustice.

So, while it is ultimately an empirical question, it is perhaps not unrealistic to think that epistemic intemperance causes the lion’s share of the epistemic injustice in the world: arrogance is certainly not uncommon, but perhaps nothing so easily infects our judgments of others and their testimony as much as our desires, wishes, and hopes for certain outcomes over others. If the analysis of prejudicial judgment given above, in Fanon’s terms of “passion-driven commitment,” turns out to be correct, then epistemic intemperance, as manifested by prejudicial judgment, will be the cause of most epistemic injustice. Add to this other instances of epistemic injustice caused by epistemic intemperance in the guise of motivated reasoning, confirmation bias, and self-deception and we have a particularly poisonous and powerful and seductive cocktail of epistemic vice.

Epistemic temperance is the bulwark against such temptation, a crucial and yet, until now, unrecognized epistemic virtue. More work needs to be done to fully comprehend its logos and its associated vices.

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Many thanks to my 2015 graduate seminar at the University of Connecticut on epistemic vices for much helpful discussion. An ancestor of this paper was read and received helpful discussion at the University of Edinburgh and at The Conference on Epistemic Injustice at the University of Bristol, June 2014. I thank for their helpful input Nathan Ballantyne, Anne Baril, Heather Battaly, David Dunning, Miranda Fricker, Sandy Goldberg, Lewis Gordon, Peter J. Graham, John Greco, Susan Haack, Allan Hazlett, Casey Johnson, Nathan Kellen, Ian Kidd, Michael Lynch, Al Mele, Duncan Pritchard, Alessandra Tanesini, Raul Vargas, Allen Wilson, and anonymous referees.


4. In June 2016, the *Philosopher’s Index* lists 6018 hits for publications with the word “justice” in the title, 1061 hits for “wisdom” in the title, 238 similar hits for “courage,” 280 for “akrasia ∨ weakness of will,” and only 21 hits for “temperance.” A Boolean search of full texts for “temperance ∧ (akrasia ∨ weakness of will)” yielded only 4 hits. In Sarah Stroud and Christine Tappolet’s edited volume, *Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), the words “temperance,” “moderation,” and “discipline” do not appear once.


7. In *Plato’s Moral Theory*, Terence Irwin has defended the idea that the tripartite division of the mind found in *Republic* allows for an account of akrasia to emerge, though in his later work, *Plato’s Ethics*, he does not conclude that one can know the wrongness of an action which one finds pleasurable. See, *Plato’s Moral Theory* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977) and *Plato’s Ethics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).


10. “Conations” is apt, but may be too wide if it is taken to include all volitions. For example, fear may be taken to be a conation, but is managed by courage and not temperance, and the line between fear
and revulsion (the opposite of desire) is vague. In general, however, the lines between the virtues need not be precise, and “conations” does appropriately connote our appetites, desires, and passions.


18. While there are some differences between the account of temperance in *Charmides* and *Republic*, they need not engage us here. Both accounts focus on the role of reason in the intellect for the management of desires, appetites, and passions.


21. Battaly also discusses a form of “epistemic insensibility,” taken from an Aristotelian account of the vice of deficiency with regard to temperance. While this is obviously relevant to a full understanding of the virtue of epistemic temperance, the focus here is on how temperance is involved in reliably forming beliefs and to that degree these projects are at least somewhat orthogonal to each other. See Aristotle’s discussion of temperance in book VII of *Nicomachean Ethics* and Battaly, “Detecting Epistemic Vice in Higher Education,” in *Journal of Philosophy of Education* vol. 47, no. 2 (2013), 263–280.


23. See, for example, Baehr’s discussion of the issue with regard to courage (p. 174, 2011).

24. The translation is not entirely happy, as “self-discipline” has fairly rigid and even brittle connotations whereas temperate people are flexible and resilient; “self-control” is even worse as it conflates temperance with continence.


26. There is an analogy here to an on-going discussion over the possibility of fearless courage. If courage requires responding to danger or threats to well-being, how does it seem as if especially courageous people can operate in what seems to be a naturally fearless way? Reckless people are fearless too, but they are not courageous. The answer is found in the developmental process by which courage is learned, so that one starts to naturally not be afraid by what would cause a beginner fear. So too, epistemically temperate people will naturally not be tempted by what would be tempting to someone less virtuous. For the debate on fearless courage, see Baehr (p. 169, 2011), and Robert Roberts and W. Jay Wood, *Intellectual Virtues* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).


29. William James argues that this is only apt when the circumstances are “forced” and “momentous” and the options are “live.” See James, “The Will to Believe” in *The Will to Believe and Other Essays*
For a contemporary discussion, see McKay and Dennett “The Evolution of Misbelief,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences vol. 32 (2009), 493–561.


31. For example, in Gorgias (455e), the discussion of how Pericles convinced the people of Athens to build the Middle Wall. For discussion of these issues in Plato, see Scott Labarge, “Socrates and the Recognition of Experts,” Apeiron vol. 30, no. 4 (1997), 51–62.

32. The relation of the moral virtues to each other is a debated issue. Some of the ancient Greeks, thought that in fact there is only one virtue, *phronesis*, or practical rationality, and courage is simply practical rationality in the face of danger, justice is the same in the face of the distribution of goods, etc. See Russell (2009). There are “limited” versions of the “unity of virtues” thesis, see notably, Neera Badhwar “The Limited Unity of Virtues,” Noûs vol. 30, no. 3 (1996), 306–29. See also my (2014) chapter 3. It is reasonable to think that the virtue of open-mindedness is actually an aspect of temperance, as honesty is an aspect of justice, and endurance an aspect of courage. For general discussions of open-mindedness, see Wayne Riggs, “Open-mindedness,” in Virtue and Vice, ed. H. Battaly (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010); Baehr (2011).


35. For an overview, see Shepperd et al (2008).

36. For an overview, see Kunda (1990).


41. This is the first item discussed by Neil Van Leeuwen, under the section heading “Lines of consensus,” in his entry on “Self-Deception” in International Encyclopedia of Ethics, ed. Hugh LaFollette (Hoboken: Wiley Blackwell) 2013.

42. Butler (1900).


48. In Fricker’s *Epistemic Injustice*, this invalid inference occurs in a two-word parenthetical phrase. On page 4, she identifies “identity prejudice” as the “central” cause of epistemic injustice, where “identity prejudice” is prejudice against a person as a result of that person’s social type. The inference itself occurs at page 92, as she introduces the “anti-prejudicial virtue,” the particular purpose of which is that it “neutralizes prejudice in . . . judgements of credibility.” In identifying this virtue, she writes, “Let us call it (what else?) the virtue of *testimonial justice*,” and the parenthetical question is where the invalidity enthymematically occurs. Rather, no single virtue can correct for all the causes of prejudicial judgment. Fricker does acknowledge in the same paragraph that virtues other than justice might be involved in the just evaluation of testimony, but nevertheless claims that testimonial justice is “the anti-prejudicial virtue.”


51. Similar comments may be made about servility causing injustice, which leads one to see how it may make sense to see justice itself as a mean between arrogance and servility. For more on justice as a personal character trait seen in this way, see my (2011); see also Alessandra Tanesini, “‘Calm Down Dear’: Intellectual Arrogance, Silencing, and Ignorance,” *Aristotelian Society* supplementary vol. 90, no. 1 (2016), 71–92. For discussion of the immorality involved in being servile, see Thomas Hill, Jr. “Servility and Self-Respect,” *The Monist* vol. 57, no. 1 (1973), 87–104; Jean Hampton, “Selflessness and Loss of Self,” *Social Philosophy and Policy* vol. 10, no. 1 (1993), 135–65.