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*Hume's Science of Human Nature: Scientific Realism, Reason,  
and Substantial Explanation* by David Landy (review)

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increasing amount of secondary literature, much of it is (reasonably enough) articles about this or that aspect of her views. If you want to get an overall grasp on what's going on in Cavendish's philosophy, this book is an excellent guide. While it engages throughout with existing literature, it also gives a comprehensive and clear overview, and finds in the notions of order and regularity a plausible framework within which to organize Cavendish's many and diverse views. Inevitably, questions remain, and there are places where one would like to hear more. Nonetheless, overall I strongly recommend this book to anyone interested in the philosophical views of Margaret Cavendish.

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David Landy. *Hume's Science of Human Nature: Scientific Realism, Reason, and Substantial Explanation*. New York: Routledge, 2018. Pp. 266. Cloth, \$140.00.

In his bold and excellent book on Hume's scientific methodology, David Landy positions himself between the "Deductive-Nomological" reading, which explains particular phenomena in terms of empirical regularities, and the "New Hume" position, which considers empirical regularities to be the *explananda* and unknowable essences the *explanans*. Landy sides with the New Humeans, except that for him the essences, or "theoretical posits," are knowable. These essences become knowable, despite their being in principle unobservable, through the tool of "perceptible models." Landy argues that "theoretical posits are only possible via the deployment of a perceptible model," and he explains that perceptual models allow us to specify "determinate ways that the represented theoretical entity both resembles and differs from some perceptible object" (53).

The problem, however, is to specify the determinate way in which an object differs from a perceptible model when the difference concerns the imperceptible. Consider the cases that Landy identifies as the "two most important distinctions that Hume draws in the Treatise, the impression-idea distinction and the simple-complex distinction" (53). As for the latter, Landy maintains that it is not possible to perceive simples as such because experience is always and necessarily complex, and that, nonetheless, we can represent simples by taking complex perceptions as models. But how do we represent the simplicity of simple perceptions? Landy writes that "relative ideas as the New Humeans understand them are out" (53), precisely because they lack pictorial content. However, his own solution is not convincing either: what pictorial content can a perceptible model supply to the representation of simple perceptions? In places, he seems to say that simple perceptions are represented via their explanatory power. But then, New Humean essences too are represented, and thus knowable, in this way.

Moreover, Landy's defense of his claim that simple perceptions are unobservable is problematic. Having argued that the revival set of "simple idea" is a set of complex ideas, because that is all we can ever perceive, Landy briefly discusses the possibility that we might "focus" or "attend" to the simple elements of complex ideas and thereby perceive simple objects. Landy objects that the notions of focus and attention "are nowhere to be found" in Hume's theory of general representation (36). First of all, this is not true. Hume's discussion of the *distinction of reason* between figure and color is full of this language. Hume writes that we "view them in different aspects," that we can "consider only the figure," that we "tacitly carry our eye," that we "view its resemblance," that we can "still keep in our eye the resemblance" (T I.1.7.18). Second, Landy himself relies on this language in his own interpretation of Hume's impression-idea distinction. He argues that, in establishing this distinction, Hume is "drawing his reader's attention to the phenomenal qualities by which each [perception] can be recognized: their force and vivacity" (44–45). Indeed, it seems that we can focus on the force and vivacity of our perceptions while ignoring their content and other relations, even though we never experience force and vivacity alone either.

Finally, the “grounding” role Landy ascribes to his theoretical posits is questionable. Landy argues that the essences we discover ground phenomenal differences. He uses the following model: we pre-theoretically distinguish gold and lead, and then we discover that differences in atomic weights ground the phenomenal differences (47). The same, he claims, is true of the distinction between impressions and ideas: we distinguish them via phenomenal differences, and then discover that ideas are copies while impressions are mental originals. This difference is supposed to ground the phenomenal differences. However, whereas we can explain the observable differences between lead and gold in terms of their respective atomic weights, the relation between copy-original on the one hand, and strength of force and vivacity on the other hand, seems unintelligible. What, in the fact of being an original, explains the particular force and vivacity of a perception? Why not say instead that there merely is a correlation between the two? Indeed, Hume explicitly identifies cases in which copies are more forceful and vivacious than originals. What, then, is the import of the thesis that one distinction grounds the other?

In the rest of the book, Landy consistently applies the tool of the perceptible model in his treatment of Hume’s ideas of substance, body, necessary connection, and personal identity. While I am convinced that Hume does rely on perceptible models—an important result in its own right—I do not think it plausible that he also considers the objects represented by perceptible models to be “unobservable in principle.” Furthermore, if these objects are observable, the difference between the resulting view and the Deductive-Nomological one is not clear.

What is clear, however, is that Landy does an outstanding job of highlighting the significance of some long-standing debates regarding Hume’s theory of representation by showing how they affect important questions about Hume’s account of scientific explanation and science in general.

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Ryan Hanley. *Love’s Enlightenment. Rethinking Charity in Modernity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017. Pp. xv + 182. Cloth, \$99.99.

What place should love of others occupy in moral and political philosophy? As Ryan Patrick Hanley explains in this impressive study, many contemporary philosophers have recently tried to revive a moral psychology of love to remedy the egocentrism and narcissism that often seem to characterize modern life. But is love the answer to the problems we face today and how much can we expect of it? To try to answer these questions, Hanley turns to the ideas of four eighteenth-century philosophers for illumination: David Hume on humanity, Jean-Jacques Rousseau on pity, Adam Smith on sympathy, and Immanuel Kant on love.

All four philosophers, Hanley argues, helped to shape a distinctively modern understanding of love. Traditional ideas of love (Platonic *eros*, Aristotelian *philia*, and Christian *agape*) presuppose a concept of transcendence, but this appeal to transcendence is firmly rejected by the modern theories under discussion, which instead reconceptualize “love as a preeminent form of other-directed sentiment” (14). The book aims to take stock of what is gained and lost in this shift away from transcendental love. Hanley’s overarching argument, in brief, is that while all four philosophers succeed in showing how other-directed sentiments can mitigate the worst effects of egocentrism, they also offer us reasons to be skeptical about the prospects of harnessing these sentiments to develop strong social bonds throughout society.

The book’s central chapters provide sophisticated and nuanced expositions of Hume, Rousseau, Smith, and Kant, in each case situating the philosopher’s reflections on love within their broader epistemological and moral theories. While debates within the secondary scholarship are usually relegated to the endnotes, Hanley clearly knows the literature