The Concealed Influence of Custom: Hume's Treatise *from the Inside Out* by Jay L. Garfield (review)

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the mind may not be a *thing*, but it remains a "substance" (in the way the ancient Stoics construed substances [26–36]). The mind is an *active principle* that translates collections of properties into something meaningful. *Because* we are minds, we do not perceive free-floating sensations of brownness, tallness, and solidity: we perceive *trees*. As Daniel puts it, "A mind is nothing other than the *existence of* ideas in a particular configuration" (77). The latter part of this sentence is important. If Daniel is right, Berkeley's view is not that the mere existence of ideas constitutes a mind; rather, a mind is the existence of collections of ideas *rendered meaningful*.

I have already referred to an entry in Berkeley's notebooks (written around 1706–8 and first published in 1871). Another entry is important for Daniel's reading of Berkeley: "[The] substance of a spirit is that it acts, causes, wills, operates, or if you please (to avoid the quibble that may be made on the word *it*), to act, cause, will, operate" (28). Berkeley's point is that a spirit is not some*thing* that engages in certain acts, it is the *doing* of those acts. Our ordinary language may refer to the mind as an '*it*,' but here ordinary language is wrong. However, Berkeley never reiterates these sentiments in any of his published work. This has struck many commentators as significant, particularly because Berkeley defends some claims that seem inconsistent with these remarks in his published works. Daniel does not see this as a problem and cites Berkeley's notebooks throughout. I would go so far as to say that the notebooks form the bedrock of his interpretation of Berkeley's philosophy of mind.

Daniel thinks others are reluctant to appeal to the notebooks so liberally because of "the Black List hypothesis" (295–97). This is the idea that views expressed in notebook entries marked with a '+' were later discarded by Berkeley. He thus attempts to debunk the hypothesis, especially in appendix 1. But I think there is a wider problem here. Even putting the Black List hypothesis aside, Daniel's use of Berkeley's notebooks opens itself up to criticism. As I have suggested, many of Daniel's interpretative claims are founded on writing that was never supposed to be published. Daniel has a response to this kind of concern; he points out that other thinkers, like Leibniz, are interpreted on the basis of unpublished works like correspondences (295–96). But there is an important difference between a personal notebook and a correspondence: the latter has an *audience* (even if it is an audience of one). That provides accountability and a reason to express the views one wishes to be seen to hold. Berkeley's notebooks, however, were not written for anyone but himself. As Daniel notes, it is unfortunate we cannot read the sequel to the *Principles*, where Berkeley promised to say more about the mind (295). But I am unconvinced that this justifies simply using the notebooks in its absence—as Daniel suggests (295, 300).

Daniel's interpretation is idiosyncratic and challenges many of the presuppositions we are likely to bring with us when we think about Berkeley's account of the mind. While it remains a challenge to understand what a Berkeleian mind is according to Daniel, perhaps this is the price we have to pay if we take Berkeley's own idiosyncrasies, such as his radical anti-abstractionism, seriously. For that reason, I recommend this book to advanced readers of Berkeley and those interested in a new narrative account of Berkeley's place in early modern philosophy.

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Jay L. Garfield. *The Concealed Influence of Custom: Hume's* Treatise *from the Inside Out*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019. Pp. xiv + 320. Hardback, $75.00.

One of the interpretive principles Jay Garfield follows in this book is the "cover principle": "If you are unsure about what Hume is doing, close the book and read the cover" (4). The principle did not help when I was unsure about what Garfield was doing. The book starts with too many and incompatible goals. Garfield claims that book 2 of Hume's *Treatise* is foundational to the entire *Treatise* and that "by taking Book II as foundational, we come to a reading that reconciles Hume's skepticism and his naturalism, and that the key to

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this reconciliation is his communitarianism" (3). But Garfield also insists that we should read the *Treatise* "as an early text in cognitive science" (6). He also maintains that Hume "almost always deploys exactly the same form of argument: a Pyrrhonian dissolution of an apparently irreconcilable duality" (25). There is also Garfield's "pseudo-idea principle": "For most philosophically important terms, Hume will not provide an analysis of an idea, but a demonstration that no idea corresponds to a term that appears to make sense" (22). Additionally, he writes that part of his project is to reveal "resonances between Hume's approach to philosophy and that of . . . Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti" (x). None of these themes are truly developed and presented in a cohesive manner in the book.

Garfield's main thesis is that custom has normative power for Hume. But when he turns to his discussions of various subjects, instead of *showing* us how custom plays this role, he merely *says* that it does. In his treatment of the passions, he engages in nitty-gritty analysis of Hume's distinctions between calm versus violent, direct versus indirect passions, and it is not clear why these extensive discussions are necessary for his purposes. From what I could gather, the passions ground communitarianism because they have other people who are embedded in communities and social customs *as their objects*. Garfield's explicit reminders that the passions are unintelligible unless we assume there are other people are very dated, and they address only the concerns of Hume scholars Garfield cites throughout his book who were writing more than forty years ago, including Laird from 1932.

Despite the foundational role book 2 is supposed to play, Garfield focuses heavily on book 1 of the *Treatise*, and several of his chapters consist mostly of close readings of block quotes. There is a long chapter on the idea of necessary connection that is distractingly repetitive: there is a "warm-up" nine-step argument for a "principal" eighteen-step argument. Then there is a nineteen-step "summary" of the principal argument. Then there is Garfield's five-step summary of Hume's summary argument. Finally, there is a five-step "Let us clean things up a bit" argument (133–44). The book includes extended discussions of skepticism with regard to reason and the senses. Garfield devotes a whole chapter, mysteriously called "Living Carelessly," to Hume's worry, in the *Appendix*, concerning the unity of perceptions that constitutes a mind. Garfield's own solution is "to sink to the physical level, and to locate the original principles that generate the effective illusion of the unity of mind from a plurality of disunified cognitive processes in subdoxastic cognitive and brain processes" (270). However, if Hume thought appealing to the brain would solve this problem, he would have done so, just as he does in other places (*T* 1.2.5.20, 1.4.2.25, and 1.4.4.13).

I found Garfield's chapter on some of the historical and social background of the notion of custom most interesting. But Garfield's main thesis there that Hume's "custom" is normative and has its origins in "debates about custom in the law and about the relationship between customary and common law in England that occupied British legal theory in the eighteenth century" (21) is weakly supported: "Hume studied the law and had a deep interest in history. . . . His legal and historical studies would have acquainted him with the debates" (35). And because Hume was aware of certain debates, it is "therefore essential to read Hume's use of the word *custom*, so frequent in the *Treatise*, and his appeals to regularity in the context both of natural law and of ethics in the context of this legal history" (35). Thus Garfield maintains that Hume always pays attention to "what we *customarily* do, how we *customarily* think, and always with a view to its norm-constituting power" (33).

However, the authority of what we customarily do or think is in serious tension with Garfield's "pseudo-idea principle." Garfield argues that Hume reveals to us that we do not have certain ideas we believe we have: "of a self, of causation, or of external existence" (22) as well as "agent freedom" (23). Garfield writes that part of "Hume's philosophical program" is to deliver "the verdict that, despite our conviction to the contrary, we have no such concept[s], in virtue of having no corresponding impression[s]" (22). But substitute 'conviction' with 'conventions' to see the tension most clearly. These ideas are alive and well in our communities. Hume is declaring that *we* are wrong because, of all things, we are missing something that *Hume calls* "impressions," which is *his* name for certain appearances in the mind (*T* 1.1.1.1). For Garfield, the communitarian Hume trumps the pseudo-idea

Hume. He argues that when Hume turns "to the question of the nature and source of our knowledge, whether or not founded in *sensation*, it is always modulated by *custom*. Sensation might provide the starting point for cognition, but the normative dimensions of knowledge derive not from its sensory origins, but from our psychological and social epistemic customs" (21). Obviously, normative dimensions of knowledge derive from social epistemic customs; we do not *detect* them in the world. But Hume is not following custom when he maintains that, where there are no impressions, there are no ideas.

Garfield then insists that just because an idea is missing "it does not follow that the term itself cannot be used meaningfully" (22), and he portrays Hume as a "nominalist" and "a genuine precursor of Wittgenstein's use theory of meaning—according to which meaning often consists purely in verbal customs" (22). But consider Hume's discussion of general terms in the *Treatise*. Having declared that all ideas are particulars, Hume is pressed to identify the ideas associated with general terms (*T* 1.1.7). Hume's problem is to account for how general terms are meaningful when there are no such things as general ideas. Hume finds the solution, not in our customs and conventions, but in Berkeley's theory of general terms. For Hume, words derive their meaning from ideas. Garfield seems to realize this later in the book when he notes that, as "Hume points out . . . if we have no idea of causation, there is no sense at all in our making claims about causal relations. We are simply talking nonsense when we do, using words to which no ideas correspond, although we are under the misapprehension that they do" (149). Indeed, one of the things Hume reveals about us is that "we are capable of talking complete nonsense when we think we are making sense" (114).

I found Garfield's close reading of texts to contain serious misinterpretations. Garfield characterizes the notion of a passion as "an introspective impression of an idea" (52); a "passion must be an impression of the idea, and so is necessarily *cognitive*" (53). And: "the judgments that are involved in the passion necessarily take their objects conceptually. That is, we are joyful, angry, afraid, or envious for *reasons*" (53). But passions are not impressions of ideas. For Hume, passions are *caused* either by impressions of sense directly or by the ideas of these impressions. Passions are impressions of reflection, but this does not mean that they are necessarily cognitive, or that we have passions for reasons.

Garfield quotes the following passage from Hume: "Thus tho' causation be a *philosophical* relation, as implying contiguity, succession, and constant conjunction, yet 'tis only so far as it is a *natural* relation, and produces a union among our ideas, that we are able to reason upon it, or draw any inference from it" (*T* 1.3.6.16). He then explains that when we "consider causality as a *philosophical* relation, we consider it as a cognitive reflex—as the tendency of the mind" or as "a propensity of the mind, mediated by processes in the imagination and by social practices of explanation" (127). But the philosophical relation of causation has nothing to do with cognitive reflexes and everything to do with our observations of events in the world.

Garfield's book explores interesting themes, and I find the challenge of reconciling normative custom with the pseudo-idea principle exciting, but Garfield does not acknowledge this and other tensions, and he then contorts Hume's texts to make it all fit somehow. Students reading his book should be warned of the significant misinterpretations.

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Margaret Schabas and Carl Wennerlind. *A Philosopher's Economist: Hume and the Rise of Capitalism*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2020. Pp. xv + 328. Cloth, $45.00.

Hume scholarship in the history of economic thought has advanced since Eugene Rotwein's 1955 collection *Writings on Economics: David Hume*, later reprinted with a new introduction by Margaret Schabas (New York: Routledge, 2006). However, as Schabas and Carl Wennerlind correctly observe, "There is as yet no monograph in English devoted to a