Emotion and Language in Philosophy

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Abstract

In this chapter, we start by spelling out three important features that distinguish expressives—utterances that express emotions and other affects—from descriptives, including those that describe emotions (Section 1). Drawing on recent insights from the philosophy of emotion and value (2), we show how these three features derive from the nature of affects, concentrating on emotions (3). We then spell out how theories of non-natural meaning and communication in the philosophy of language allow claims that expressives inherit their meaning from specificities of emotions—namely, from being felt, evaluative attitudes toward propositional or non-propositional contents (4).

1. Expressives vs. descriptives: three benchmarks

Supposing that utterances (1)–(3) and (4)–(9) respectively refer to the same phenomena, compare groups A and B.

Group A:

(1) Outrageous!
(2) Ouch!!!
(3) The frogs won it again!

Group B:

(4) What the government did was wrong.
(5) I feel outraged by what the government did.
(6) This boiling oil has burned my hand and this is bad for me.
(7) I feel a great pain.
(8) The French won the World Cup again and I believe that the French are contemptible.
(9) The French won the World Cup again and I feel contempt toward the French.
Even if we take into account the fact that the utterances in B are about the same states of affairs as the ones in A, there still is an intuitive sense that they do not mean the same thing. The meaning of (1) is not exactly that of (4) or (5), the meaning of (2) cannot be reduced to the meaning of (6) or (7), and the meaning of (3) is somehow different from that of (8) and (9). The kind of meaning found in group A is usually called “expressive meaning” (the corresponding utterances “expressives”) and that in group B “descriptive meaning” (the utterances ”descriptives”) (see Wharton 2016 for a review). Following this use, ‘expressive’ is restricted to being expressive of affects.

To start, observe that the distinction is not as sharp as we may initially think as there are clearly cases where the descriptive and the expressive seem to blend. Consider the beginning of Byron’s Darkness:

I had a dream, which was not all a dream.
The bright sun was extinguish’d, and the stars
Did wander darkling in the eternal space,
Rayless, and pathless, and the icy earth
Swung blind and blackening in the moonless air

These five verses do not fall neatly on the descriptive side—because they are so poetically evocative and aesthetically charged, and we can well imagine that Byron used them to express an affective experience. Nor do they fall neatly on the expressive side—they are a description of Byron’s dream or wandering imagination and, although embellished, it is probably not far from being a literal description. Sometimes, then, utterances fall in between paradigmatic expressives and descriptives. Also noteworthy in relation to these five verses is that it is entirely possible to find expressives which have the linguistic form of descriptives: i.e., utterances that are devoid of exclamation marks, swear words, or any other linguistic markers of expressives. We can even suppose that any linguistic item might, given a certain context, become an expressive. A sentence as vapid as “The boat has departed”, provided a tragic background, could mean “Alas, how regretful I feel!” The distinction we are interested in then is not about the linguistic form (not the syntax, the lexicon, or even the prosody), but about what is meant by these utterances. As a consequence, although we will take these
sentences in group B to be descriptives and not expressives, the same string of words could very well be expressives provided certain background conditions or a particular way of pronouncing them (e.g., “What the government did was wrong” said in an overtly angry voice).

With these important caveats in mind, let us review three intuitive considerations—which we shall discuss in more detail below—that we may think support the distinction. These will then serve as important benchmarks for our effort to account for the nature of expressives.

(a) **Hot vs. cold.** Expressives always appear to convey affects (emotions, desires, moods, sentiments, pleasures, pains, whims, etc.), and that is not true of descriptives. Affects regroup a large class of psychological states whose main feature resides in the way they are felt—including positive or negative hedonic tones and various felt reverberations from changes in the body. In contrast, descriptives seem to simply convey beliefs or other doxastic attitudes that the speaker might have (supposition, conjecture, etc.) about how the world is. As such, and to use the usual metaphors in the area, descriptives seem to communicate mental states whose phenomenology—i.e. the way they feel like—is ”cold” as opposed to the alleged “hotness” of affective states. So, while the meaning of (4)–(9) is tightly linked with affects, the type of meaning to which they belong—descriptive meaning—need not be. By contrast, there are no examples of expressive meaning which are completely detached from affects: expressives always involve affects which the utterer wishes to, or unintendedly does, communicate.

(b) **Fit vs. true.** Truth and falsity are the normative standards by which descriptives are evaluated. This, however, does not seem to be the case for expressives. Compare, for instance, (2) and (7) while imagining that the person doesn’t feel pain. We would say of (7) that it is literally false, but not of (2). Similarly, whether we think it appropriate or not to use the word “frog” to express contempt toward the French as in (3), it seems independent of whether we take the sentence to be true or false. Of expressives, as well as of the affects they convey, it is more natural to say that they are (un)fitting, (in)appropriate, or (un)deserved than to say that they are true of false. This is in sharp contrast with descriptives and the doxastic attitudes they communicate, of which we readily say that they are true or false.
(c) Direct vs. indirect. While descriptives can and do sometimes convey affects, expressives’ distinctiveness is to do so directly. If one describes one’s affects, as in (4)–(9), one in fact communicates a thought one has about an affect, a thought that is typically hidden from the audience. When expressing an affect, however, as in (1)–(3), it seems as though one directly shows the affect, or at least some of its components (e.g. facial, vocal, and gestural expressions, certain action tendencies, certain verbal behaviours) of which the audience might be directly aware. This arguably constitutes a communicative path that is more direct than the one going through a description referring to a doxastic attitude (i.e. a belief–like state) of the communicator (Foolen 2012). One way of putting this direct vs. indirect distinction is to say that in descriptives (4)–(9), one is told about an affect, while in expressives such as (1)–(3), one is shown an affect.

These intuitive considerations and others have convinced many linguists and philosophers that expressives and descriptives form two distinct categories of utterances (but not the only two). The same scholars, however, disagree on how exactly to account for the relevant dissimilarities and on how and whether the meaning they convey is different. For instance, some have argued that a distinct trait of expressives is that their meaning is non-propositional and so cannot be analysed through ordinary truth-conditional semantics (Kaplan 1999, Potts 2007, Blakemore 2011, Wharton 2016), while others have offered an analysis of the meaning of (terms usually considered as) expressives that only appeals to propositions (Schlenker 2007, Williamson 2009, Hom 2008).

This chapter unfolds in the following way: In Section 2, we present relevant insights from the main current theories of emotion and value. In Section 3, we explain how these features of affects are relevant in accounting for the properties that distinguish expressives from descriptives. In Section 4, we draw on familiar territory in the theory of language and pragmatics to explain why understanding the meaning of expressives requires understanding the affects that communicators express. In Section 5, we briefly suggest three ways of cashing out the requirement unveiled in the preceding sections.
2. Philosophical insights on emotions

Let us start by stressing something obvious about the three benchmarks we have just reviewed—(a) hot vs. cold, (b) fit vs. true, and (c) direct vs. indirect. The distinction between expressives and descriptives seem to revolve around the existence of a privileged relation between expressives and affects. It is even tempting to think that the three benchmarks all derive from the nature of the affects that expressives aim at communicating. In this section, drawing on the recent philosophy of emotions and value, we show how thinking about the nature of emotions and cognates not only make sense of the intuitions we have started with, but promises to put constraints on the relation between language and emotion, and especially on what mental state an audience must recover when understanding the meaning of an expressive. Note that we use “affect” to refer to a broad class of psychological phenomena which includes emotions as well as affective dispositions (fear of height, arachnophobia, francophilia), moods (grumpy, elated, depressed), kinds of desires (cravings, horniness, perhaps hunger and thirst), or affective character traits (being generous, courageous, greedy). Even though expressives may convey any affect (e.g., certain slurs may express homophobia, which is an affective disposition), we focus on emotion. As the best studied affect, we hope that what we know of emotion will be central to understanding all other affects (see Prinz 2004: ch. 8 or Deonna and Teroni 2012: ch. 9 for how emotions relate to other affects and help understanding them). Understanding expressives by understanding emotions thus seems to be a perfect starting point.

According to the main current philosophical theories of emotions, the latter are psychological episodes, experiences in fact, that present aspects of the environment as having this or that significance or, as philosophers like to say, as having this or that evaluative property (see reviews by Deonna, Tappolet and Teroni 2018; Scarantino and de Sousa 2018). For example, in fear we experience something as relating to *dangerousness* (one evaluative property). In anger, we experience something as relating to *offensiveness* (another evaluative property). In amusement, we experience something as relating to *funniness* (yet another). This is why philosophers often claim that emotions are forms of evaluation and psychologists say that they are appraisals of a specific sort: they relate us to the various evaluative aspects of our environment given the various concerns we have while negotiating it. The fact that emotions are forms of evaluations is a recurring idea from Plato and Aristotle onwards (e.g., Rhetoric 1378a20-23). More recently, the conception of emotions as evaluations has received extended philosophical treatments—we shall discuss the most important theories within this tradition below. In psychology, the same idea is developed, especially within the appraisal theory of
emotions (Arnold 1960). See in particular the concept of core relational themes (Lazarus 1991) or that of molar value of appraisals (Moors and Scherer 2013). The notion of evaluation or appraisal is also present in the other main psychological theories of emotion (which may use different terms for a similar concept): basic emotion theory (Ekman 1992) and psychological constructivism (Russell and Barrett 2015: ch. 8 and 13).

Not every philosopher accepts that emotions are kinds of evaluations. In fact, predominant figures such as Descartes, Malebranche, Leibniz, Hume, Kant, James, and Ayer considered emotions as entirely non-cognitive attitudes: i.e., mental states (or mental events) that do not “say” anything about the world, that cannot supply any new knowledge, cannot be more or less fit to the environment, and are unable to preserve (or even fail to preserve) information about the world. For non-cognitivists, emotions are considered as essentially irrational (e.g. Kant 1798/2006) or arrational (e.g. James 1884, Ayer 1936, Searle 1983). These philosophers thus support the cliché opposition between reason and passion—Kant (1798) went as far as calling affects “an illness of the mind” because they “shut out the sovereignty of reason”. Today, philosophers such as Whiting (2011) and Shargel (2015) still claim that emotions are mere subjective feelings with no cognitive content.

However, the arguments given by philosophers and cognitive psychologists since the 1950s have convinced a sizable majority of philosophers that emotions involve a component whose goal is to gather and manage information from the world and the organism’s relation to it that is relevant to the organism’s well-being. This component of emotions, usually called “appraisal” or “evaluation”, is a cognitive component of emotion in the sense that its function is to improve the knowledge of the organism, to acquire and treat information, just like perception or memory (cognition comes from Latin cognoscere, ‘get to know’). Some have dubbed it “hot cognition” to contrast it to the “cold cognition” which excludes affects (memory, kinds of attention, problem solving, perception) (Brand 1985; Lodge & Taber 2005). Like other cognitive mechanisms, emotion’s evaluations can succeed or fail to perform their information-processing function, which may allow or prevent organisms to react in an adapted way to the world. This cognitive function of emotion thus enables the organism to react effectively, much better than if it was deprived of emotions. As some philosophers like to put it, emotions thus help apprehend evaluative properties: i.e., get to know and manage those features of the world that have positive or negative value for the organism navigating in it. The widespread recognition of this cognitive component in emotion has made the stark opposition between
passion and reason obsolete. Emotions are now usually considered as (at least partially) rational phenomena.

Even though emotions relate us to evaluative properties through cognitive mechanisms, it seems to be a mistake to think of the emotions as representing evaluative properties in the way in which doxastic states (beliefs, judgments, conjectures, etc.) represent properties. In other words, emotions are not mere feelings (as non-cognitivists claimed), but neither are they mere judgments—see Robert Solomon (1993) or Martha Nussbaum (2001) who, taking their lead from Stoic philosophers such as Seneca, have claimed that emotions are judgments, judgments that some evaluative properties are present in the relevant environment. Contrary to what this theory predicts, it has seemed to many that being afraid of x relates us to x’s dangerousness in a way that is quite different from the way in which a cold judgment that x is dangerous relates us to x’s dangerousness. (We will elaborate on this point later.) For various defences of the difference between judgments and emotions, see Greenspan (1988), Deigh (1994), Goldie (2000), Tappolet (2000, 2016), or Döring (2007).

But then, if emotions are not evaluative judgments, how do emotions enable us to access information about evaluative properties? In particular, how can we articulate the difference in this respect between emotions, on the one hand, and doxastic states (beliefs, judgments, suppositions, conjectures, etc.) on the other? To answer these questions, we will now briefly present the most popular philosophical theories on emotions today. We won’t rely on any of the following theories in particular, but we will put aside the judgment theories (Solomon 1993, Nussbaum 2001) and the non-cognitive theories we have already mentioned (Whiting 2011, Shargel 2015; see also Hutto 2012) for reasons that will become clear. Anyway, these theories are not among the main contenders in philosophy of emotion today. For an in-depth review of philosophical theories on emotion see Scarantino and de Sousa (2018).

One popular view today is the perceptual theory, which claims that emotions are perceptions of evaluative properties (see Tappolet 2000, 2016; Prinz 2004; Deonna 2006, and Döring 2007 for various versions). This theory was mainly developed in opposition to the idea that emotions are evaluative judgments: i.e., judgments that the object of the emotion possesses the relevant evaluative property. Perceptualists reject the judgment theory for three main reasons.

First, because emotions, by contrast with evaluative judgments, do not necessitate a mastery of evaluative concepts: e.g., even if sadness is always an evaluation that one suffers an
irrevocable loss, one need not master the concept of “irrevocable loss” to be sad, but this is not
ture for the judgment that one suffers an irrevocable loss. That emotions can be nonconceptual
allows accepting, on the one hand, that babies and cognitively unsophisticated animals can have
emotions while, on the other hand, rejecting that they have the conceptual capacities required
for evaluative judgments. And, we can observe in passing that a similar argument can be made
against psychological constructivist theories such as that of Barrett (see Barrett and Russell: ch
4), which requires one to possess concepts of emotions in order to undergo the corresponding
emotion.

Second, the capacity for emotions and judgments would be supported by different
“parts” of the mind/brain, by different mental mechanisms. This would explain why we can, at
the very same time, both judge that something is not dangerous (e.g. a horror movie or a
rollercoaster ride) while still being afraid of it. If emotions were judgments, such a situation
would require one to both judge that p (e.g. x is dangerous) and not-p (x is not dangerous) is
the case at the same time, which would be highly irrational. However, it is not highly irrational
to be afraid of a horror movie or of a roller-coaster ride while believing we are not in danger.
The comparison with perception is made even stronger here when one thinks of phenomena
such as the Müller-Lyer illusion where two lines of the exact same length are seen as having
different lengths because of the chevrons that surround the lines (the figures resemble >—< and
<—>). In such cases, we can be certain that the two lines have the same length, but we still
perceive them as having different lengths and, again, this is not highly irrational. Because
of such similarities, the horror movie and the roller-coaster ride cases have been called “emotional
illusions”.

Third, emotions, like perceptions, have a salient phenomenal character—i.e., they give
rise to an intense subjective impression, a character which determines what it is like to be in
these states. The way it is like to perceive, or to undergo an emotion strongly determines what
these perceptions and emotions are. By contrast, it is not clear that judgments possess a
phenomenal character at all, and if they do, it is very mild compared to that of perceptions and
emotions and does not strongly determine what judgments are. What it is like to judge that the
Swiss are wealthy, as a judgment, is not phenomenologically salient, contrary to hearing the
distinctive sound of a bell or to being disgusted by rotten meat.

Close cousins to the perceptual theory are what Scarantino and de Sousa (2018) call the
“evaluative feeling theory” (Goldie 2000, Ratcliff 2005, Helm 2009, Kriegel 2014) and the
the perceptual theory, these theories focus on the non-conceptual and phenomenologically salient nature of emotions as well as on how emotions can help us navigate the world by supplying precious information and/or a precious processing of information.

Even though perceptual theories were mainly developed as a reaction against judgment theory, they resemble the latter in several aspects; in particular if, like most perceptual theorists, perception is understood in a traditional way which excludes the perception of action properties. First, although unlike judgements, perceptions are not literally true or false, they are nevertheless evaluable as more or less accurate, and this correctness condition usually depends on faithfully representing a stable, action-independent, external reality. Secondly, perceptions, like judgment, are typically considered as part of “cold cognition”. Thirdly, one striking resemblance that the perceptual theories as well as the evaluative feeling theory and the patterns of salience theory have with the judgment theory is that all of them focus on the knowledge-acquisition functions of emotions—on how emotions gather and process information—rather than on their action-oriented functions—the roles they play with respect to orienting us and making us react to the world by inclining us to approach, get away from, try to destroy, or act in other ways toward their objects.

The role that emotions play with respect to orienting us and making us react to the world comes out clearly if we think of the relevant evaluative experiences that emotions exemplify as various forms of felt engagements with the relevant aspects of the environment. This aspect of emotions is highlighted by action-oriented theories (Deonna and Teroni 2012, 2014, 2015; Scarantino 2014, 2015). According to them, emotions are felt, bodily, evaluative attitudes toward various contents (the latter may or may not be propositional). In other words, fear and anger are felt bodily attitudes subjects have toward the dangers and offenses that they encounter, attitudes that distinguish themselves notably through the specific bodily readiness they involve. At the phenomenological level—the way they feel like—these various states of bodily readiness are accompanied by pleasant or unpleasant hedonic tones and subtended by the feelings of various patterns of physiological changes (e.g., more sweat, changes in heartbeats, stopping of digestion) and motor reactions (e.g., the muscle contractions underlying facial, corporal, and vocal expression). This is how, in fear, we come to feel our body as mobilized to neutralize something; in anger, we come to feel a preparedness for a form of active hostility. According to this picture, feeling our bodies prepared or mobilized in these various ways constitute experiencing the evaluative attitude that the emotions are—this is the sense in which emotions are conscious evaluations, and it is markedly different from the kind of representation in place
in evaluative judgments. While emotions (e.g. feeling spiteful toward someone) and evaluative judgments or beliefs (judging that someone is contemptible) share many features, then—both relate us to evaluative properties—they do so in markedly different ways.

Note however that if appraisal theorists such as Moors and Scherer (2013) or Lazarus (1991) are correct, we do somehow unconsciously, non-conceptually, and quite primitively represent something as dangerous when we are afraid. This is the sense of representing in which we categorize stimuli as dangerous when we are afraid, but this categorization is very different from conceptual, logical, or linguistic categorizations that philosophers have in mind when they say, e.g., that beliefs represent states of affairs. For a detailed defence that emotions represent evaluative properties unconsciously, see Bonard (2021a: ch. 9).

Action-oriented theories, such as the motivational theory (Scarantino 2014, 2015) and the attitudinal theory (Deonna and Teroni 2012, 2014, 2015, see also Gert 2018), thus focus on how emotions relate to action tendencies, and can be considered as philosophical heirs to the psychological theory of Nico Frijda (1986), as well as McDougall’s (1923), Bull’s (1951) and Arnold’s (1960) emotion theories. Both the attitudinal and the motivational theories accept the three arguments given by perceptualists against judgmentalists mentioned above: that emotions can be nonconceptual, involve different mental mechanisms than judgments, and possess a strong phenomenology (although this is not necessary for Scarantino 2014). Yet, they further insist that emotions are also very different from perceptions.

The most important difference is that emotions are chiefly characterized by their action tendencies and associated phenomenology, an ingredient perceptual theories are at great pains to capture (for more further important differences between emotion and perception, see Deonna and Teroni 2012). For example, in fear, we tend to avoid what we are afraid of; in anger, we tend to be aggressive; in joy, we feel like being proactive; in disgust, we tend to actively reject what is apprehended as disgusting; in surprise, we tend to enquire about what is surprising; in sadness, we feel prevented from interacting with a cared object. Emotions do not necessarily cause actions, as they allow responses that are relatively flexible, and so are different from automatic reflexes, like the gag or knee-jerk reflexes, as the latter make us react in ways which we cannot control. Nevertheless, emotions tend to make us act in certain ways, and the physiological changes that go with emotions prepare us to react in these ways. In fear, our blood circulates faster to better deploy our muscles so as to avoid what we are afraid of, and we have rushes of adrenalines which have many consequences that help an efficient response (e.g., digestion stops, which allows allocating more energy to avoiding what is feared). These action
tendencies and the physiological changes which subtend them make emotions very different from regular perception.

Indeed, action tendencies are not necessary for seeing, hearing or touching, and the physiological changes subtending perception (e.g., firing of optical nerves, retraction of the pupil, activity in the visual cortex) are of a very different nature than those subtending the action tendencies of emotions (besides modifications in the central nervous system, emotions involve modifications in the sympathetic nervous system, in sweat, heartbeats, muscular activity, hormonal secretion, and more). Both the motivational and the attitudinal theory have insisted that emotions are essentially related to inclinations to act, and the latter theory has focused in particular on how the phenomenology characteristic of these felt inclinations contrasts with the presentational phenomenology advocated by perceptual theories. The difficulty for perceptual theories to capture the agential dimension of emotions and of the way they assimilate the link of emotions to value properties in presentational terms constitutes a major challenge for these theories. As we will see in the next section, different emotion theories may be used to cash out the benchmarks with which we started (hotness, fitness, and directedness), but to anticipate a little, let us already note that, on the face of it, the action-oriented theories appear to be in the best position to do so.

Note however that if emotions are considered as perception of calls for action (as in Deonna 2006), perceptions of affordances (Gibson 1977), or of action properties (Nanay 2013), then perception and emotion can be considered to be much more similar than with a more traditional theory of perception. Nevertheless, some of the differences discussed in Deonna and Teroni (2014) remain. Furthermore, the concept of perception in such theories is stretched to its limits and this is not what some of the most prominent perceptual theorists defend (Tappolet 2000, 2016, Döring 2007). However, see Prinz (2004) for a perceptual theory that is embodied and therefore more amenable to an action-oriented account.

3. How the particularities of emotions subtend those of expressives

In this section, we show how the insights from the philosophical theories of emotions just presented shed light on the benchmarks with which we started (Section 1). Grounding expressives in emotions is, we believe, the best strategy to make sense of the distinctive nature of expressives compared to descriptives, and thus of how language can express, and not only describe, emotions. Indeed, we can start by observing that the three benchmarks distinguishing
expressives from descriptives—(a) hot vs. cold, (b) fit vs. true, and (c) direct vs. indirect—allow tracing back the relevant features of expressives to their emotional origins.

First, we can understand the “hotness” of emotions in light of their experiential dimension and contrast it to the experiential dimension of beliefs or other doxastic states. As we have just seen, emotions typically have a rich and diverse phenomenology, from valence to various dimensions of bodily arousal, via more or less urgent, empowering, and arousing tendencies to perform certain actions. The particular phenomenal character of emotions, the special way it is like to undergo them, certainly is an important part of what a speaker is communicating when using an expressive.

Second, the way we have described emotions promises to shed light on the specific normative standards or correctness conditions by which we assess emotions as opposed to beliefs, i.e., (in)appropriate, (un)fit, or (un)merited rather than true (false). This is especially salient if we conceive of emotions as forms of felt engagement or attitudes taken toward something or some state of affairs in the world, an engagement or attitude that is appropriate to have toward or merited by states of affairs instantiating the evaluative properties associated with each emotion. To someone who is afraid of a dog on a leash on the other side of the street, we shall say that her emotion is inappropriate to the circumstances or not merited by them because they are not dangerous. We will not say “Your emotion is false” (D’arms and Jacobson, 2000). Our understanding of expressives then should reflect the fact that part of what is recovered is not simply a way of representing truly or falsely how the world is evaluatively speaking—as in doxastic attitudes and descriptives—but an engagement with the world that we conceive of as more or less appropriate. Beliefs fulfil their function (they are correct) when they are true; emotions fulfil their function (and, as philosophers of emotion say, they are “correct”) when appropriate, fitting or merited.

Note that the idea that emotions fit their object or that objects merit or deserve emotional response in the sense intended here has been the most prominent in the theory of value, particularly in the so-called fitting-attitude (FA) analysis of value. Various versions have been proposed in the last 130 years and they may differ quite importantly. Franz Brentano (1889/1969) is often seen as the father of this kind of approach and Ewing (1948, 1959) as one of its most notable advocates. See McDowell (1985) and Scanlon (1998) for recent and influential developments. Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen (2004) provide historical background and present some variants of the FA analysis. Within this tradition and directly connecting to emotions, see D’arms and Jacobson (2000). See Bonard (2021b) for a review of
the different ways in which contemporary philosophical theories have claimed that emotions are evaluations and how these ways relate to the way emotions are viewed in affective sciences.

Observe that in conceiving emotions as distinct forms of *attitudes* we have toward various *contents*, we make it clear how we can relate to evaluative properties without any need to consciously represent or judge that the world has these evaluative properties. Compare with the attitude of believing. While believing is that attitude that is correct to have toward contents (i.e. propositions) that are true, the subject need not consciously represent or judge the content as true in order to believe it. The relation to truth in belief is entirely accounted for in terms of the attitude that believing is. Now, the same can be said about the attitude of fearing. While fear is that attitude that is correct to have toward contents that are dangerous, the subject need not consciously represent or judge the content as dangerous in order to be afraid. The relation to danger in fear is entirely accounted for in terms of the psychological attitude that fearing is (Deonna and Teroni 2015). In particular, as remarked above, one need not possess the concept of danger to be afraid just as one would not need to possess the concept of truth to have beliefs.

This connects emotions with expressives in two ways: first, we can now envisage what it means for the speaker to be affectively rather than doxastically attuned to how the world is evaluatively speaking. Second, ascribing an attitude that is correct if there is danger (i.e., fear) is not at all the same as ascribing an attitude that is correct when the proposition that there is danger is true (i.e., belief or judgment). The felt, bodily, action-ready engagement we have highlighted makes emotions quite different from evaluative judgments and beliefs, even though they both are kinds of evaluations.

We must keep this in mind when studying expressives because this difference in the kind of evaluation involved sharply sets expressives apart from descriptives, such as (4) and (5) or (8) and (9), which communicate one’s evaluative judgments or beliefs rather than one’s emotions. Next, we can begin to see how the attitudinal dimension of emotion can be exploited to capture the sense in which the meaning of expressives might be non-propositional, in the sense that it is not merely made of concepts syntactically structured like affirmative sentences. Let us highlight that by “proposition” we thus mean something else than a mere set of possible worlds, as most philosophers writing on emotions do (see Crane 1992 or Camp 2018 for this notion of “non-propositional”). We can capture that by reflecting again on the correctness conditions of both types of attitudes. Belief is necessarily a *propositional* attitude, an attitude whose content has the form of a syntactically structured proposition and that is correct if and only if the proposition is true. Fear, however, as we have noticed, need not be a propositional
attitude. Fear of x (a snake, an exam, etc.) appears to be an *objectual* attitude, an attitude whose content is an object and that is correct if and only if x is dangerous.

Third, recall our third benchmark regarding expressives: they seem to mean by directly showing rather than indirectly saying. Our description of the emotions is such as to make it clear why they—as opposed to beliefs, for example—could be shown. If emotions are felt bodily attitudes toward aspects of the environment, then what is felt by the subject—i.e., her bodily attitude or posture—may be something an observer can also become directly aware of (Green 2007: ch. 1). The posture of an angry person, the action tendencies typical of sadness, or the facial or vocal expression of happiness are directly observable or hearable, and these observable/hearable expressions can be considered as proper components of emotions, along with physiological changes or appraisal processes (Moors and Scherer 2013). In the context of the understanding of expressives, we may then become interested in the kind of *awareness* of emotion that is required to count as someone understanding the relevant expressive.

We can thus plainly see how the distinctive features of expressives we have highlighted—(a) hot vs. cold, (b) fit vs. true, and (c) direct vs. indirect—seem to derive quite directly from distinctive features of emotions—their phenomenology, their correctness condition, and their nature as felt bodily attitudes.

Although different emotion theories may be able to account for the way these three features of expressives are grounded in emotions, observe that at first sight action-oriented theories seem to be in the best position to do so. A quick comparison between action-like states and perception-like states—the two main contenders—in relation to our benchmarks will corroborate this verdict. **Hotness:** The feelings associated with action or action-readiness typically possess a bodily, dynamic, active, hot phenomenology that contrasts markedly with that of perception and its characteristic presentational, passive, or contemplative phenomenology, wherein the world appears to be made manifest to the subject. **Fittingness:** Being (un)fit, (un)merited, and (in)appropriate are typical standards with which we evaluate actions, but this is not so for perceptions, which are either accurate or not. **Directness:** Finally, actions, by contrast to perceptions, can be directly shown.

In addition to the three features which we have discussed, let us observe that the philosophical theories that highlight the intimate relation that emotions have with action-tendencies also explain a further trait typical of expressives, one which we have not previously discussed, but that is worth mentioning: expressives seem not only to be about the states of the
world and of the expresser, but also about how the addressee should react. As Dorit Bar-On (2017) puts it:

Expressive communication, in general, is in a sense Janus-faced. It points inward, to the psychological state it expresses, at the same time as it points outward, toward the object or event at which the state is directed, as well as toward ensuing behaviors. (Bar-On 2017: 304, our italics)

If emotions not only have a cognitive function (i.e., gathering and processing information) but also an action-oriented function, as Deonna and Teroni (2012), Scarantino (2014), or Gert (2018) argue, then the nature of emotion nicely elucidates how expressives, by communicating action-oriented states, also have the function of pointing “toward ensuing behaviors” (by warning, asking for help, for retribution, etc.).

We have tried to hone in on some crucial features of emotions so as to unearth some important aspects of what it takes to understand their occurrence in other people. In doing this, we have largely ignored the specific context of our question, namely that we are after an account of what it takes to understand the affect of someone trying to communicate this affect through an expressive utterance. The next section is dedicated to explaining the manner in which we conceive of the notion of expressive meaning in the light of (neo- or post-)Gricean pragmatics and speech act theory.

4. Communicating through expressives

In this section, we explain how the kind of meaning found in language (called “non-natural meaning” by Grice) is fixed by the psychological states the speaker is intent on communicating. This philosophy of language framework will then allow us to show why expressive meaning is fixed by the affective states the speaker is intent on communicating, concentrating on emotions.

4.1 Natural vs. non-natural meaning

To understand how philosophers have conceived of linguistic meaning since the 1950s, it is important to introduce the distinction between so-called natural and non-natural meaning (Grice 1957, a similar distinction can already be found in Marty 1875 and Welby 1903). This
distinction will then allow us to better explain the relation that expressive language has with emotions.

Here are typical cases of natural meanings (which we write meaning, or means.):

(10) Smoke means, fire.
(11) The number of rings on this trunk means, the tree was 123 years old.
(12) His red cheeks means, he is embarrassed.

Typical cases of non-natural meanings (which we write meaning, or means, or mean as) are the following:

(13) Those three rings on the bell mean, that the bus is full.
(14) By saying “And the dishes...” Joe meant, that Sam should do the dishes.
(15) “La neige est blanche” means, “Snow is white”.

As Fred Dretske (1986, 2008) has argued, we can interpret Grice’s natural meaning along the following lines: natural signs are indicators; what they mean, is what they indicate to be so. They can do this thanks to certain lawful (including biological) relations, objective constraints, or probable association between the sign and what constitutes their meaning.. For instance, the fact that there are 123 dark rings on a tree trunk can mean, the fact that the tree was 123 years old when it was cut thanks to the lawful constraint that, every year, winter is colder than summer, which affects the tree growth and create these dark rings. Example (12) above possesses both expressive and natural meaning: in this case, the red chicks are a natural sign for embarrassment because of lawful psycho-physiological relations between embarrassment and blushing (an uncontrollable cue).

Since we focus on language, and since linguistic meaning always belongs to non-natural meaning, we shall essentially focus on non-natural expressive meaning. But let us observe three things. First, natural expressives inherit their meaning from affective states: a facial expression of a monkey means that he or she is unhappy because there are lawful relations (or, at least, statistically strong correlations) between facial expressions and emotions (Chevalier-Skolnikoff 1973).

Second, emotional non-natural meaning is typically based on, and makes use of, expressive natural meaning, as Wharton (2009) rightly emphasized. For instance, “Ouch!” in English or “Aïe!” in French mean, that their utterer is in pain partially because they are conventionalized forms of the initial natural meanings of uncontrollable vocal expression of pain (we can imagine a cry of pain resembling that of other primates). Similarly, if you ask me
“Should we go to this restaurant?” and I reply by sticking my tongue, frowning my eyebrows, and wrinkling my nose, I can thereby mean something like “No, I really don’t like the food there” because I have imitated a facial expression that means disgust in the first place.

Third, even in cases where there are no obvious links between natural meaning of affects and non-natural expressive meanings—for instance, when someone utters “Outrageous!”—there still seems to be some ingredient of the non-linguistic natural meanings of affects that is preserved in the expressive signal. In this case, the fact that it is not a fully-fledged sentence, but only a one-word exclamation points to the fact that, when we are highly aroused by anger, we tend to utter short exclamations as opposed to lengthy and sophisticated signals.

Let us now turn to what is distinct about non-natural meaning in expressives. Unlike its natural counterpart, non-natural meaning doesn’t depend on lawful relations or statistical correlations between the signal and its meaning. It rather depends on the speaker’s overt intentions to communicate and to inform their audience about something. In (13), the sound of the bell means that the bus is full not because of a lawful relation, but because people have started using the bell with this intention. Similarly, the meaning of (14) can go through because Sam understands what Joe intends to mean. The non-natural meaning of a linguistic signal—its message—comes from what the speaker overtly intends to communicate.

This is tightly linked to the thesis famously defended by Searle (1969, 1983) that François Recanati (1993) calls “the primacy of the psychological over the linguistic” and which will be important in the arguments that follow: it is primarily and primitively psychological states—beliefs, desires, emotions, perceptions, etc.—that possess intentionality, the capacity of being about something, of having a content. The fact that utterances can be about things in the world, that they can have meaningful content, is inherited from the intentionality of speaker’s psychological states.

4.2 Expressive non-natural meaning

Now to the crucial step: non-natural meaning is expressive (as opposed to descriptive) when the psychological state that is overtly communicated, and from which the utterance inherits its meaning, is an affect, and most often it is an emotion that is so overtly communicated. In other words, linguistic meaning is inherited from a mental state (the primacy of the psychological over the linguistic), and in the case of expressives, the meaning in question is fixed by the conveyed affective state (emotions, moods, whims, urges, phobias, etc.).
We can also spell this out within a Gricean framework of communication (understood broadly to include Grice 1989, “neo-Griceans” such as Horn 1984, 2004; Levinson 2000; or “post-Griceans” such as Sperber and Wilson 1986/95, 2015 or Wharton 2009). A central idea within this framework is that what one means by an utterance (often called the speaker meaning) should be cashed out in terms of a communicative intention that can be split between (at least) two sub-intentions: the sub-intention to make something manifest to the audience, and the sub-intention that the first sub-intention be publicly recognizable. If all goes well, the audience infers what was intended to be made manifest (the content of the first sub-intention) and that this was intended to become part of the public sphere, or more precisely to update the context between speakers and audience, the context being all the information and commitments that are mutually assumed in the context of the discourse (García-Carpintero 2015). So, if we focus now on, say, (2) (i.e., “Outrageous!”), the kind of utterance we are interested in, the Gricean framework predicts that the speaker, by producing this utterance, intends to make something manifest to the audience—her outrage (attitude) about what the government did (content of the attitude)—and she intends that this be publicly recognized. Once the audience has inferred what was intended to be made manifest (the outrage about what the government did) and that this was intended to update the context between audience and speaker, then the audience has understood what the speaker meant by (2). Another illustration, using (3) above (i.e., “The frogs won it again!”): the speaker has the intention to make it publicly recognizable that, by producing the word “frogs”, she intends to make manifest that she is disposed to feel contempt (attitude) toward the French (content).

You might have noticed that we are cautious to disentangle the attitude and the content conveyed. This is because expressives and descriptives can inherit their meaning from psychological states that possess the same content: they differ only in the attitude they express. To illustrate the distinction, note that all of the following communicate different attitudes about the same content: “I judge that p”, “I’m happy that p”, “I desire that p”, “I intend to make it the case that p”.

Developing insights from Grice (1989) as well as Austin (1962), Strawson (1964), and Searle (1969, 1979), speech act theory offers the possibility of capturing further this distinction. An important hypothesis in speech act theory has it that we can distinguish types of illocutionary acts by types of psychological attitudes that speakers intend to communicate, even when these attitudes are about the same content. Illocutionary acts are the different things we do in using language: e.g., ask questions, describe an event, make a promise, insult someone,
declare our love, etc. Illocutionary acts are achieved when the audience understands to what end we use language. I achieve the illocutionary act of asking a question when my audience understands that I have used language to this end.

The idea that we can individuate illocutionary acts on the basis of the psychological attitudes they express has been methodically pursued by Bach and Harnish (1979): “Since illocutionary intents are fulfilled if the hearer recognizes the attitudes expressed by the speaker, types of illocutionary intents correspond to types of expressed attitudes” (Bach and Harnish 1979: 39). For instance, according to them (and many other speech act theorists), assertions express beliefs about the world, orders express desires that the audience does something, promises express intentions to do something, and thanks express gratitude toward the audience’s deed, etc. Expressive meaning then, according to a plausible version of this view, is the meaning of utterances whose illocutionary intent is to express affects (e.g., thanks are expressives since their illocutionary intent is to express gratitude). The illocutionary intent of expressives would then be fulfilled when the speaker gets the hearer to recognize his or her intention to express the affect in question. By contrast, descriptive meaning would be the meaning of utterances whose illocutionary intent is to express doxastic states.

Note that there exist multiple kinds of speech act theory beside that developed by Bach and Harnish and each of them may have something different to say about expressives. However we lack the space to spell this out (furthermore, expressives are often left aside by speech act theorists as they often concentrate on affirmations, orders, and questions). For a detailed introduction to the different kinds of speech act theory as well as preeminent examples of its recent developments, see Fogal et al. (2018).

The Gricean framework, together with speech act theory, is one way of cashing out the ideas presented here. Another one is to draw from biology and appeal to a signal model as it is developed in, e.g., Skyrms (2010). In particular, Green (2007, 2019) develops an account of self-expression within a broader account of animal signals which is very fruitful for analysing expressives, and especially perhaps emotional natural meaning and nonverbal emotion expression. All the claims presented here can be advantageously pursued within the latter framework.

This short review of the relevant philosophical literature on emotions and standard frameworks in the philosophy of language leads us to conclude the following: because the non-natural meaning of an utterance (overall illocutionary act) is inherited from the overall
psychological state (attitude+content) the speaker is intent on communicating, what makes the non-natural meaning of an utterance an expressive utterance is the specificity of the affective state (attitude+content) the speaker is intent on communicating with this utterance. This is why a proper analysis of how language express emotions, of what expressives are, requires an in-depth analysis of the nature of emotions and other affective states.

5. Conclusion

We have begun this chapter by presenting what we considered to be three of the most salient features of expressives as opposed to descriptives. (a) *Hot vs. Cold*. Expressives inherit their meaning from mental states which are phenomenologically “hot”—the feelings of affects include positive or negative hedonic tones, various felt reverberations from changes in the body, and felt action tendencies. By contrast, descriptives inherit the coldness of the doxastic attitude they communicate. Think of the difference between someone stating “Someone has covered my car with graffiti” and the same person yelling “Shit!!!!”. (b) *Fit vs. True*. Expressives can be assessed as more or less fit or appropriate, but we do not usually qualify them as literally true or false: a “Yuck!!!” would be deemed inappropriate if it were directed at a delicious dish, but it wouldn’t be qualified as literally false. (c) *Direct vs. Indirect*. Expressives can directly show the affects they express because they constitute part of their manifestation, belonging to the motor expression and/or action tendency components of affects. By contrast, even when descriptives are about affects, they indirectly report them.

We then explained how these three features of expressives—hot, (in)appropriate, direct—derive naturally from a picture of affects depicting them as felt bodily reactions to stimuli evaluated as relevant to the concerns of the person undergoing the affect. We have spelled out how both (neo- or post-)Gricean theories of communication as well as speech act theory can easily explain this matter of fact by considering expressives as utterances which inherit their meaning from the properties of both attitudes and contents of affects, noting that a signalling theory may advantageously analyse this out as well.

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