

PHILOSOPHERS ON PHILOSOPHY: THE 2020 PHILPAPERS SURVEY

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1. Introduction

What are the philosophical views of contemporary professional philosophers? And how do these views change over time?

In November 2009, we carried out the first PhilPapers Survey. We surveyed 931 philosophers from 99 philosophy departments in Australia, Canada, continental Europe, New Zealand, the US, and the UK on their answers to 30 philosophical questions. The results of this survey were published as "What Do Philosophers Believe?" (2014) and have been widely discussed.¹

In October 2020, we carried out a follow-up survey: the 2020 PhilPapers Survey. It was intended to make at least three additional contributions.

First: the 2020 Survey allowed longitudinal comparisons of results in 2009 and 2020, giving information about how the views of professional philosophers have changed over time.

Second: the target population for the survey was enlarged from faculty members of 99 selected departments in a few selected countries to a broader group including philosophers from around the world who publish in English. This allows broader information about views within the English-speaking philosophical community.

Third: the list of questions was expanded from 30 questions to 100 questions, allowing information about a broader range of philosophical topics.

As we argued in "What Do Philosophers Believe?" (2014), surveys like this can play at least three roles within philosophy. First, today's sociology is tomorrow's history, and these results may be of some use to future historians of philosophy. Second, philosophers often appeal to sociological claims about the distributions of views among philosophers, for example in justifying which views should be taken seriously, and it makes sense for these claims to be well-grounded. Third, if philosophy has any tendency to converge to the truth, then philosophers' views

1. This survey was also replicated and extended by Yaden & Anderson (in press).

might provide some guidance about the truth of philosophical views. It is not clear whether philosophy tends to converge to the truth, so we don't make the third claim about guidance, but surveys can clearly play the first two roles in philosophical practice.

We begin by describing the methodology for the survey, including the target population and the questions. We then go on to discuss the main results of the 2020 survey, the longitudinal comparison to the 2009 survey, and relationships between answers to the survey. We end with a discussion of selection bias in the group of respondents and of correcting results to remove this bias.

2. Methodology

The PhilPapers Survey was conducted online from October 15, 2020 to November 16, 2020. Full details on the methods and the results can be found on the survey website at survey2020.philpeople.org.

2.1 Target population

In the 2009 survey, we were restricted to a relatively small group of departments for which we had faculty lists (mainly drawn from the Philosophical Gourmet Report's faculty lists for ranked departments). In 2020, the PhilPeople database included information on philosophers and philosophy departments around the world (with strongest coverage on English-speaking and English-publishing philosophers), so we could survey a broader and more representative group.

After a period of consultation, we decided on a target group including:

(1) in Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, the UK, and the US: all regular faculty members (tenure-track or permanent) in BA-granting philosophy departments with four or more members (according to the PhilPeople database); and

(2) in all other countries: English-publishing philosophers in BA-granting philosophy departments with four or more English-publishing faculty members.

For the purposes of this study, we defined an English-publishing philosopher as someone with one or more publications (according to the PhilPapers database) in one of a wide range of English-language venues. We restricted to English-publishing philosophers because we do not have adequate information on philosophers who do not publish in English, and the majority of our questions are drawn from English-language traditions.

For meaningful longitudinal comparisons, we also designated a "2009-comparable departments" target group of 100 departments in the same regions as the 2009 survey, selected by similar criteria (all Ph.D.-granting departments with a 2017-2018 Philosophical Gourmet Report score of 1.9 or above, plus two leading departments with MA programs and a selected group of European departments based on expert recommendations). This group was used only for longitudinal comparisons.

We used data entry from departmental websites to supplement existing PhilPeople records and make our information as complete as possible. After data entry and cleanup, our target population included 7685 philosophers, including 6112 in group (1) and 1573 in group (2). The 2009-comparable target group included 2407 philosophers. The online data is imperfect, so our group of 7685 philosophers almost certainly excludes some philosophers who meet criterion (1) or (2) and includes some philosophers who do not.

Every member of the target group was sent an initial email invitation to take the survey, followed by additional email requests after approximately 10 days and 20 days if they had not yet responded.

2.2 Philosophical questions

In the 2009 survey, we asked 30 questions each with 2-4 answer options: for example, "God: theism or atheism?" and "Mind: physicalism or nonphysicalism?".

In the 2020 survey, we used the 30 questions from the 2009 survey unaltered (although we made some answer options slightly more

Free will: libertarianism, compatibilism, or no free will?

Accept: libertarianism

Lean toward: libertarianism

Accept: compatibilism

Lean toward: compatibilism

Accept: no free will

Lean toward: no free will

Alternative view

Evaluate multiple options (e.g. accept more than one, reject all)

The question is too unclear to answer

There is no fact of the matter

Insufficiently familiar with the issue

Agnostic/undecided

Other

Comment ▼

Submit

Figure 1: Example survey form for one philosophical question.

fine-grained, as discussed below), to allow meaningful longitudinal comparisons. We expanded the list of 30 questions to a list of 40 main questions that would be asked of all participants. We also added a further group of 60 additional (often more specialized) questions, each of which would be asked to one-sixth of participants (selected randomly). As a result, each participant was asked to answer a minimum of 50 questions (40 main questions and 10 additional questions). Participants were also given the option of answering some or all of the other 50 additional questions if they chose to, with a maximum of 100 philosophical

Evaluate multiple options (e.g. accept more than one, reject all)

no free will Lean toward ▼

libertarianism Reject ▼

compatibilism ✓ Accept
Lean toward
Neutral
Lean against
Reject

Add alternative

Figure 2: Selecting combinations of answers.

questions per participant.

We determined the 70 new questions through an extended period of consultation, including consultation with PhilPapers editors and extended discussion on social media including PhilPeople, Facebook, and philosophy blogs. We also had a lengthy period of beta testing the survey questions and the survey interface with PhilPapers editors using the interface. We aimed for questions that covered many areas of philosophy, that worked in the multiple choice format, and that would be familiar to at least half of our target population.

The 100 resulting questions included approximately 50 questions drawn from metaphysics and epistemology (broadly construed), 30 questions drawn from value theory, 9 from the philosophy of science, logic, and mathematics, 6 from the history of philosophy, and 5 from metaphilosophy.

As in 2009, we did not include any questions drawn from non-Western and non-analytic traditions, as it proved too difficult to find questions from these traditions that met the familiarity and multiple-choice constraints. We attempted to include some new questions reflecting philosophy as it stands in 2020 (adding two questions each about gender and race, for example), but we acknowledge an overall bias toward certain relatively traditional issues in the analytic and English-

speaking canons. In retrospect, we could have done more to reflect the diversity of contemporary philosophy. In future surveys, we will try to do so.

As in the earlier survey, we allowed respondents to indicate that they “accept” or “lean toward” a view, and we allowed a range of other options. The options are shown in Figure 1. We changed the 2009 answer options slightly to allow respondents more fine-grained options when endorsing multiple answers. Where the 2009 survey just had an option for “Accept both” (binary questions) or “Accept more than one” (ternary questions), the 2020 survey allowed respondents to accept, reject, or lean toward or against each answer separately if they chose to (as shown on Figure 2). We also allowed respondents to write in alternative answers if they chose to. Two questions, one about other minds and one about philosophical methods, were given special treatment because we didn’t expect a majority of respondents to choose a single answer to these questions. For these questions, respondents had to say whether they accept or reject each option individually as if they had selected “Evaluate multiple options”.

2.3 *Philosophical orientation*

Respondents were asked the following questions about their philosophical orientation:

Areas of specialization: Respondents had to choose from the following list of areas (the primary areas in the PhilPapers category system): 17th/18th Century Philosophy; 19th Century Philosophy; 20th Century Philosophy; Aesthetics; African/Africana Philosophy; Ancient Greek Philosophy; Applied Ethics; Asian Philosophy, Continental Philosophy; Decision Theory; Epistemology; European Philosophy; Feminist Philosophy; General Philosophy of Science; Logic and Philosophy of Logic; Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy; Meta-ethics; Metaphilosophy; Metaphysics; Normative Ethics; Philosophy of Action; Philosophy of Biology; Philosophy of Cognitive Science; Philosophy of Computing and Information; Philosophy of Gender, Race, and Sexuality; Philos-

ophy of Language; Philosophy of Law; Philosophy of Mathematics; Philosophy of Mind; Philosophy of Physical Science; Philosophy of Religion; Philosophy of Social Science; Philosophy of the Americas; and Social and Political Philosophy.

Philosophical tradition: As in 2009, respondents could choose either “analytic”, “continental”, or “other tradition”. When selecting “other tradition” they could enter a tradition as free text.

Identification with philosophers: Respondents were asked “For which nonliving philosophers X would you describe yourself or your work as X-ian, or the equivalent?” Respondents could choose from a list of well-known philosophers or select “other” to specify philosophers manually. The 2009 list was based on online surveys of the greatest philosophers of the last 200 years and of all time. It included: Anscombe, Aquinas, Aristotle, Augustine, Berkeley, Carnap, Davidson, Descartes, Frege, Hegel, Heidegger, Hobbes, Hume, Husserl, Kant, Kierkegaard, Leibniz, Lewis, Locke, Marx, Mill, Moore, Nietzsche, Plato, Quine, Rawls, Rousseau, Russell, Socrates, Spinoza, and Wittgenstein. For 2020 we added Dewey, Foucault, James, Merleau-Ponty, Peirce, Popper, Reid, Rorty, Sellars, and Whitehead (the ten most popular write-in choices in 2009); Parfit and Putnam (the leading candidates per previous criteria who died since the previous survey); and Arendt, Avicenna, Beauvoir, Buddha, Confucius, Deleuze, Derrida, Du Bois, Laozi, Nagarjuna, Rand, Sartre, and Wollstonecraft (to expand coverage of other traditions).

2.4 *Background questions*

Respondents were also asked the following background questions: year of birth, nationality, gender, doctorate in philosophy (specifying the granting institution and year), and current affiliation (including role).

2.5 *Consent*

Under consent guidelines approved by The Western University Non-Medical Research Ethics Board, respondents were told how their answers would be used, and at the end of the survey were asked to consent

to the use of their answers. The Survey was anonymous by default, although respondents were given the option to make their answers public eventually. Respondents were also told that their answers would be retained for use in possible follow-up surveys, and that any question could be skipped if they were uncomfortable in answering.

3. Main survey results

Of the main target population of 7685 philosophers, 1785 (23%) completed the survey. Of these, 522 completed exactly 50 questions, 925 completed all 100, and 338 answered 51-99 questions (see Figure 3). An additional 487 initially gave their consent but did not complete the survey.




Figure 3: Numbers of answers per respondent.

Of the 2009-comparable population of 2407 philosophers, 648 (27%) completed the survey. Of these, 193 completed exactly 50 questions, 116 completed 51-99, and 339 completed all 100.

The results presented below are results for all questions answered by all respondents who completed the survey (whether they completed 50 questions, 100 questions, or something in between). These results are therefore subject to possible selection bias both among respondents to the survey and among respondents who chose to complete more than 50 questions. We discuss and analyze these sorts of selection bias in Section 8.

3.1 Main questions

The results for the 40 main questions (those asked of all respondents) are shown in Table 1. For each question and each option, Table 1 presents the total number of respondents and the percentage who either “accept” or “lean toward” that option. This figure can be calculated either as an “inclusive” figure, where respondents who endorse multiple options are included in the totals for each options, or as an “exclusive” figure, which counts only respondents who endorse that option and no other option. We present inclusive figures in all cases. To simplify the table, we present exclusive figures only when at least one of them differs by 3% or more from inclusive figures. This gives some indication of questions for which choosing multiple options is popular. The last question shows respondents who reject options rather than exclusive numbers. The figures include all respondents who completed the survey except those who indicated “insufficiently familiar with the issue” or who skipped the question. The survey website offers a detailed breakdown of “other” answers.

The figures in Table 1 should not be longitudinally compared to the main results presented in the 2009 PhilPapers Survey paper, for three main reasons. First, the 2020 population is much broader (not restricted to 99 departments). Second, the 2020 survey made it easier to endorse multiple answers than the 2009 survey. Third, the main results

presented in the 2009 paper included respondents who skipped the question or checked “insufficiently familiar”, whereas the results below exclude those respondents. For meaningful longitudinal comparisons, see Section 5, where we present 2020 results that are more directly comparable to the 2009 results (restricting to 2009-comparable departments, exclusive answers, and including skip/unfamiliar answers under “other”).

Table 1: Main questions: respondents who accept or lean toward each answer.

Questions and answers	n	%	Exclusive	
A priori knowledge				
Yes	1274	72.8		
No	323	18.5		
Other	152	8.7		
Abstract objects				
Platonism	629	38.4		
Nominalism	686	41.9		
Other	323	19.7		
Aesthetic value				
Objective	740	43.5	683	40.2
Subjective	690	40.6	632	37.2
Other	322	18.9		
Aim of philosophy (which is most important?)				
Truth/knowledge	747	42.2	313	17.7
Understanding	988	55.8	524	29.6
Wisdom	552	31.2	178	10.1
Happiness	224	12.6	24	1.4

Goodness/justice	402	22.7	55	3.1
Other	191	10.8		
Analytic-synthetic distinction				
Yes	1064	62.5		
No	439	25.8		
Other	203	11.9		
Eating animals and animal products (is it permissible to eat animals and/or animal products in ordinary circumstances?)				
Omnivorism (yes and yes)	847	48.0		
Vegetarianism (no and yes)	467	26.5		
Veganism (no and no)	324	18.4		
Other	174	9.9		
Epistemic justification				
Internalism	579	35.7	493	30.4
Externalism	819	50.5	735	45.3
Other	292	18.0		
Experience machine (would you enter?)				
Yes	219	13.3		
No	1262	76.9		
Other	160	9.7		
External world				
Idealism	117	6.6		
Skepticism	96	5.4		
Non-skeptical realism	1403	79.5		
Other	172	9.8		
Footbridge (pushing man off bridge will save five on track below, what ought one do?)				
Push	382	22.0		
Don't push	975	56.0		
Other	382	22.0		

Free will				
Compatibilism	1040	59.2		
Libertarianism	331	18.8		
No free will	197	11.2		
Other	200	11.4		
Gender				
Biological	480	29.0	250	15.1
Psychological	356	21.5	71	4.3
Social	1043	63.1	711	43.0
Unreal	70	4.2	27	1.6
Other	245	14.8		
God				
Theism	335	18.9		
Atheism	1185	66.9		
Other	248	14.0		
Knowledge claims				
Contextualism	805	54.6		
Relativism	80	5.4		
Invariantism	376	25.5		
Other	241	16.4		
Knowledge				
Empiricism	756	43.9	642	37.3
Rationalism	577	33.5	461	26.8
Other	475	27.6		
Laws of nature				
Humean	486	31.3		
Non-humean	844	54.3		
Other	231	14.9		
Logic				
Classical	759	53.6	689	48.7

Non-classical	374	26.4	308	21.8
Other	342	24.2		
Meaning of life				
Subjective	570	33.0	489	28.3
Objective	553	32.1	476	27.6
Nonexistent	278	16.1	257	14.9
Other	407	23.6		
Mental content				
Internalism	399	26.4	332	21.9
Externalism	880	58.1	815	53.8
Other	297	19.6		
Meta-ethics				
Moral realism	1067	62.1		
Moral anti-realism	449	26.1		
Other	202	11.8		
Metaphilosophy				
Naturalism	777	50.2		
Non-naturalism	482	31.1		
Other	296	19.1		
Mind				
Physicalism	900	51.9		
Non-physicalism	556	32.1		
Other	276	15.9		
Moral judgment				
Cognitivism	1133	69.3		
Non-cognitivism	339	20.7		
Other	169	10.3		
Moral motivation				
Internalism	586	41.0		
Externalism	562	39.3		

Other	315	22.0		
Newcomb's problem				
One box	334	31.2		
Two boxes	418	39.0		
Other	323	30.2		
Normative ethics				
Deontology	558	32.1	343	19.7
Consequentialism	532	30.6	373	21.4
Virtue ethics	644	37.0	436	25.0
Other	316	18.2		
Perceptual experience				
Disjunctivism	207	15.6	183	13.8
Qualia theory	200	15.1	176	13.3
Representationalism	520	39.3	478	36.1
Sense-datum theory	66	5.0	51	3.9
Other	372	28.1		
Personal identity				
Biological view	308	19.1	252	15.6
Psychological view	705	43.7	637	39.4
Further-fact view	240	14.9	216	13.4
Other	429	26.6		
Philosophical progress (is there any?)				
None	68	3.8		
A little	827	46.6		
A lot	740	41.7		
Other	149	8.4		
Political philosophy				
Communitarianism	419	27.3	339	22.1
Egalitarianism	677	44.0	588	38.3
Libertarianism	206	13.4	158	10.3

Other	315	20.5		
Proper names				
Fregean	458	36.1		
Millian	491	38.7		
Other	323	25.5		
Race				
Biological	308	18.7	189	11.5
Social	1046	63.4	871	52.8
Unreal	248	15.0	188	11.4
Other	219	13.3		
Science				
Scientific realism	1222	72.4		
Scientific anti-realism	254	15.0		
Other	217	12.8		
Teletransporter (new matter)				
Survival	555	35.2		
Death	631	40.1		
Other	390	24.8		
Time				
A-theory	306	27.2		
B-theory	429	38.2		
Other	406	36.2		
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?)				
Switch	1101	63.4		
Don't switch	231	13.3		
Other	407	23.4		
Truth				
Correspondence	844	51.4	794	48.3
Deflationary	403	24.5	365	22.2

Epistemic	167	10.2	144	8.8
Other	276	16.8		
Vagueness				
Epistemic	346	24.2	233	16.3
Metaphysical	298	20.8	217	15.2
Semantic	746	52.1	609	42.6
Other	223	15.6		
Zombies				
Inconceivable	264	16.4		
Conceivable but not possible	588	36.5		
Metaphysically possible	393	24.4		
Other	362	22.5		
Philosophical methods (which methods are the most useful/important?)				
			<u>Reject n & %</u>	
Conceptual analysis	1229	70.9	201	11.6
Conceptual engineering	684	39.5	357	20.6
Empirical philosophy	1040	60.0	251	14.5
Experimental philosophy	565	32.6	623	35.9
Formal philosophy	962	55.5	223	12.9
Intuition-based philosophy	857	49.5	503	29.0
Linguistic philosophy	800	46.2	373	21.5
Other	124	7.2		

Among the 40 main questions, views mentioned most often as alternative answers (according to a semi-automated analysis) included: abstract objects: Aristotelian realism (24 respondents, or 1.5%); aesthetic value: intersubjective (25); knowledge: pragmatism (30), knowledge: Kantian (25), God: agnosticism (23); logic: pluralism (35); normative ethics: pluralism (31), normative ethics: particularism (23), perceptual experience: direct realism (23), perceptual experience: phenomenological (20), philosophical methods: phenomenology (30), truth: pragmatism (26). More information on combined and alternative answers can be found on the survey website on the pages presenting detailed results

for each question.

Main questions for which combined answers were the most popular include: aim of philosophy (27%), gender (20%), normative ethics (15%), race (10%), knowledge (8%), political philosophy (8%), and vagueness (8%).

The “pluralism” answers in the cases of logic and normative ethics (as well as numerous cases discussed in the next section) bring out that pluralist views were often expressed as alternative answers (choosing “Alternative view” and then endorsing pluralism) rather than as combined answers (choosing “Evaluate multiple options”, and then endorsing multiple views). On the logic question, for example, 76 respondents endorsed a combined answer (accepting or leaning toward both classical and nonclassical logic) while 35 endorsed pluralism as an alternative answer. Insofar as pluralism can be considered a combined view, a consequence is that combined answer numbers alone may somewhat understate the popularity of combined views, and information on both alternative and combined answers is required for a full analysis.²

3.2 Additional questions

The results for the additional questions are found in Table 2. Of the 60 additional questions, one-sixth of the 1785 respondents, or about 300 respondents, were presented with the question as part of their mandatory 50 questions. Typically, another 800 respondents (45%) were presented with the question by answering additional questions, for a total of around 1100 respondents (62%) presented with the question.

2. A few questions relate to previously published results. For example, results for the question “Eating animals and animal products” tend to confirm the results obtained by Schwitzgebel et al. (2021), who found that 60% of ethicists and 45% of other philosophers rate eating meat negatively on a 0-9 normative scale. We find that 44.9% of respondents accept or lean towards vegetarianism or veganism. Among respondents with an AOS in Normative Ethics, the percentage increases slightly to 48.74%. In addition, the question on philosophical method is consistent with the finding by Bonino et al. (2020) that formal methods are widely used in analytic philosophy. We found that 55.5% of respondents hold that formal philosophy is among the most useful methods.

The figures below include these respondents, excluding those who chose to skip the question or who indicated “insufficiently familiar”. As before, the results are subject to selection bias, which is discussed in Section 8.

Table 2: Additional questions: respondents who accept or lean toward each answer.

Questions and answers	n	%	Exclusive	
Abortion (first trimester, no special circumstances)				
Permissible	917	81.7		
Impermissible	147	13.1		
Other	61	5.4		
Aesthetic experience				
Perception	193	28.2	171	25.0
Pleasure	97	14.2	76	11.1
Sui generis	255	37.2	245	35.8
Other	167	24.4		
Analysis of knowledge				
Justified true belief	242	23.6		
Other analysis	330	32.2		
No analysis	314	30.6		
Other	142	13.9		
Arguments for theism (which argument is strongest?)				
Cosmological	214	20.9	170	16.6
Design	181	17.7	142	13.9
Ontological	91	8.9	70	6.8
Pragmatic	146	14.2	119	11.6
Moral	96	9.4	65	6.3
Other	258	25.2		
Belief or credence (which is more fundamental?)				

Belief	237	30.6		
Credence	242	31.3		
Neither	151	19.5		
Other	149	19.3		
Capital punishment				
Permissible	199	17.7		
Impermissible	843	75.1		
Other	80	7.1		
Causation				
Counterfactual/diff.-making	332	37.2	298	33.4
Process/production	201	22.5	167	18.7
Primitive	183	20.5	169	18.9
Nonexistent	37	4.1	34	3.8
Other	184	20.6		
Chinese room				
Understands	184	17.8		
Doesn't understand	692	67.1		
Other	154	14.9		
Concepts				
Nativism	241	28.1	200	23.3
Empiricism	432	50.3	387	45.1
Other	215	25.1		
Consciousness				
Dualism	224	22.0	204	20.0
Eliminativism	46	4.5	39	3.8
Functionalism	337	33.0	301	29.5
Identity theory	136	13.3	117	11.5
Panpsychism	77	7.5	62	6.1
Other	232	22.7		
Continuum hypothesis (does it have a determinate truth-value?)				

Determinate	180	37.7		
Indeterminate	137	28.7		
Other	161	33.7		
Cosmological fine-tuning (what explains it?)				
Design	140	17.3		
Multiverse	122	15.1		
Brute fact	259	32.1		
No fine-tuning	175	21.7		
Other	144	17.8		
Environmental ethics				
Anthropocentric	376	42.2		
Non-anthropocentric	451	50.7		
Other	79	8.9		
Extended mind				
Yes	488	51.3		
No	353	37.1		
Other	112	11.8		
Foundations of mathematics				
Constructivism/intuitionism	92	15.3	82	13.7
Formalism	37	6.2	31	5.2
Logicism	71	11.8	62	10.3
Structuralism	127	21.2	107	17.8
Set-theoretic	92	15.3	78	13.0
Other	206	34.3		
Gender categories				
Preserve	201	20.4		
Revise	500	50.9		
Eliminate	160	16.3		
Other	150	15.3		
Grounds of intentionality				

Causal/teleological	249	34.7	214	29.8
Inferential	68	9.5	48	6.7
Interpretational	108	15.1	87	12.1
Phenomenal	90	12.6	72	10.0
Primitive	98	13.7	89	12.4
Other	160	22.3		
Hard problem of consciousness (is there one?)				
Yes	623	62.4		
No	297	29.8		
Other	79	7.9		
Human genetic engineering				
Permissible	680	64.2		
Impermissible	206	19.5		
Other	171	16.1		
Hume (what is his view?)				
Skeptic	318	36.5	252	28.9
Naturalist	479	54.9	413	47.4
Other	138	15.8		
Immortality (would you choose it?)				
Yes	500	44.9		
No	460	41.3		
Other	151	13.6		
Interlevel metaphysics (which is the most useful?)				
Grounding	218	29.1	167	22.3
Identity	86	11.5	51	6.8
Realization	157	21.0	106	14.2
Supervenience	185	24.7	138	18.4
Other	212	28.3		
Justification				
Coherentism	225	23.7	182	19.2

Infinitism	19	2.0	14	1.5
Nonreliabilist foundationalism	239	25.2	207	21.8
Reliabilism	319	33.6	274	28.8
Other	207	21.8		
Kant (what is his view?)				
One world	328	45.4		
Two worlds	252	34.9		
Other	145	20.1		
Law				
Legal positivism	244	39.5		
Legal non-positivism	278	45.0		
Other	99	16.0		
Material composition				
Nihilism	47	8.2		
Restrictivism	201	35.0		
Universalism	157	27.4		
Other	173	30.1		
Metaontology				
Heavyweight realism	272	38.6		
Deflationary realism	198	28.1		
Anti-realism	84	11.9		
Other	152	21.6		
Method in history of philosophy (which do you prefer?)				
Analytic/rational reconstruction	569	60.8	402	42.9
Contextual/historicist	416	44.4	251	26.8
Other	112	12.0		
Method in political philosophy (which do you prefer?)				
Ideal theory	255	32.4	176	22.4
Non-ideal theory	456	58.0	377	48.0
Other	148	18.8		

Mind uploading (brain replaced by digital emulation)				
Survival	279	27.5		
Death	551	54.2		
Other	187	18.4		
Moral principles				
Moral generalism	537	54.6		
Moral particularism	332	33.7		
Other	127	12.9		
Morality				
Non-naturalism	272	26.6	248	24.2
Naturalist realism	324	31.6	288	28.1
Constructivism	213	20.8	181	17.7
Expressivism	109	10.6	84	8.2
Error theory	54	5.3	40	3.9
Other	119	11.6		
Normative concepts (which is most fundamental?)				
Fit	63	7.3	43	5.0
Ought	122	14.2	91	10.6
Reasons	219	25.4	185	21.5
Value	322	37.4	282	32.8
Other	211	24.5		
Ought implies can				
Yes	682	62.9		
No	307	28.3		
Other	98	9.0		
Philosophical knowledge (is there any?)				
None	40	3.6		
A little	361	32.5		
A lot	624	56.2		
Other	90	8.1		

Plato (what is his view?)				
Knowledge only of forms	335	52.8		
Knowledge also of concrete things	179	28.2		
Other	122	19.2		
Politics				
Capitalism	323	29.5	286	26.1
Socialism	580	53.0	532	48.6
Other	211	19.3		
Possible worlds				
Abstract	583	54.8		
Concrete	49	4.6		
Nonexistent	319	30.0		
Other	116	10.9		
Practical reason				
Aristotelian	344	38.7	305	34.3
Humean	272	30.6	251	28.3
Kantian	168	18.9	141	15.9
Other	143	16.1		
Principle of sufficient reason				
True	336	35.9		
False	428	45.7		
Other	173	18.5		
Properties				
Classes	89	11.5		
Immanent universals	160	20.6		
Transcendent universals	154	19.8		
Tropes	119	15.3		
Nonexistent	63	8.1		
Other	226	29.1		
Propositional attitudes				

Dispositional	250	31.5	205	25.8
Phenomenal	55	6.9	35	4.4
Representational	369	46.5	325	40.9
Nonexistent	28	3.5	26	3.3
Other	150	18.9		
Propositions				
Sets	68	8.4		
Structured entities	311	38.3		
Simple entities	56	6.9		
Acts	66	8.1		
Nonexistent	125	15.4		
Other	203	25.0		
Quantum mechanics				
Collapse	95	17.1	82	14.7
Hidden-variables	122	21.9	104	18.7
Many-worlds	108	19.4	95	17.1
Epistemic	71	12.8	63	11.3
Other	178	32.0		
Race categories				
Preserve	77	8.2		
Revise	305	32.3		
Eliminate	381	40.4		
Other	196	20.8		
Rational disagreement (can two people with the same evidence rationally disagree?)				
Non-permissivism	193	19.4		
Permissivism	698	70.2		
Other	104	10.5		
Response to external-world skepticism (which is strongest?)				
Abductive	206	22.1	160	17.2

Contextualist	100	10.7	72	7.7
Dogmatist	125	13.4	94	10.1
Epistemic externalist	176	18.9	136	14.6
Semantic externalist	78	8.4	50	5.4
Pragmatic	212	22.8	170	18.3
Other	160	17.2		
Semantic content (which expressions are context-dependent?)				
Minimalism (no more than a few)	73	9.4		
Moderate contextualism (intermediate)	409	52.5		
Radical contextualism (most or all)	199	25.5		
Other	102	13.1		
Sleeping beauty (woken once if heads, woken twice if tails, credence in heads on waking?)				
One-third	119	27.7		
One-half	80	18.6		
Other	229	53.4		
Spacetime				
Relationism	284	45.4		
Substantivalism	172	27.5		
Other	169	27.0		
Statue and lump				
One thing	288	30.1		
Two things	400	41.8		
Other	269	28.1		
Temporal ontology				
Presentism	135	18.4		
Eternalism	293	39.9		
Growing block	125	17.0		
Other	183	24.9		

Theory of reference				
Causal	406	46.3	360	41.0
Descriptive	194	22.1	149	17.0
Deflationary	132	15.1	123	14.0
Other	189	21.6		
Time travel				
Metaphysically possible	401	42.3		
Metaphysically impossible	389	41.0		
Other	158	16.7		
True contradictions				
Impossible	660	71.4		
Possible but non-actual	44	4.8		
Actual	115	12.4		
Other	108	11.7		
Units of selection				
Genes	297	43.5	225	33.0
Organisms	294	43.1	223	32.7
Other	159	23.3		
Values in science (is ideal scientific reasoning necessarily sensitive or insensitive to non-epistemic values?)				
Necessarily value-free	170	17.7		
Necessarily value-laden	423	44.0		
Can be either	299	31.1		
Other	69	7.2		
Well-being				
Hedonism/experientialism	123	12.7	98	10.1
Desire satisfaction	180	18.6	146	15.1
Objective list	514	53.2	483	49.9
Other	194	20.1		
Wittgenstein (which do you prefer?)				

Early	237	24.6	200	20.8
Late	554	57.5	515	53.5
Other	166	17.2		
Other minds (for which groups are some members conscious?)			<u>Reject n & %</u>	
Adult humans	1039	95.1	2	0.2
Cats	967	88.6	43	3.9
Fish	713	65.3	161	14.7
Flies	377	34.5	419	38.4
Worms	264	24.2	509	46.6
Plants	79	7.2	870	79.7
Particles	22	2.0	973	89.1
Newborn babies	921	84.3	53	4.9
Current AI systems	37	3.4	900	82.4
Future AI systems	428	39.2	293	26.8
Other	51	4.7		

Additional questions for which combined answers were the most popular include: arguments for theism (18%), method in history (15%), response to skepticism (8%), method in political philosophy (7%), Wittgenstein (7%), and units of selection (7%).

Views mentioned most often as alternative answers included: arguments for theism: none (32 respondents, or 3.2%), consciousness: hylomorphism (12 mentions), foundations of mathematics: Platonism (15), method in history of philosophy: both (15), method in political philosophy: both (13), statue and lump: nihilism (10), units of selection: multilevel selection (29), units of selection: groups (11), well-being: hybrid (13), Wittgenstein: neither (29), Wittgenstein: both (14). As in the previous section, it is evident that combined views (e.g. "both", "hybrid", "multilevel") were often expressed by alternative answers as well as by combined answers.

4. Demographics

4.1 Geography

Each respondent is associated with up to three countries: nationality, country of PhD, country of affiliation. The nationalities, countries of primary affiliation, countries of PhD of respondents can be found in Tables 3a, 3b, and 4, respectively. The USA is far ahead on all three lists, followed by the UK, followed by Australia, Canada, and Germany in varying orders, and then numerous European countries such as Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden. The leading non-European countries (aside from Australia, Canada, NZ, and the US) were Israel, Brazil, and Colombia (nationality); and Israel, Brazil, Singapore, Hong Kong, South Africa, and Mexico (affiliation).

4.2 Gender and age.

Just over 20% of respondents who indicated gender indicated "female", while about .5% indicated "other", with the rest indicating "male". The number of female respondents who completed the survey is slightly lower than numbers in previously reported gender distributions (see Leslie et al. (2015), Schwitzgebel & Cushman (2012), Schwitzgebel & Cushman (2015)). As seen in Table 13 in Section 8, there appears to be a small gender effect in response bias.

The most common decade of birth was the 1970s (500), followed by the 1980s (424) and the 1960s (395). Figure 4 shows the breakdown of years of birth in slices of five years, with genders color-coded. The gender imbalance appears to be somewhat smaller among the youngest respondents.

4.3 Philosophical orientation

The most common areas of specialization (in order) were epistemology, metaphysics, normative ethics, and philosophy of mind. A large majority of respondents specified an analytic orientation, followed by a continental orientation and write-in choices including pragmatism, history, and a number identifying with multiple orientations. On iden-

Table 3: Countries.

(a) Nationality.		(b) Primary affiliation.	
Nationality	n	Country of affiliation	n
USA	859	USA	1004
UK	163	UK	203
Canada	127	Canada	123
Germany	89	Australia	73
Australia	59	Germany	56
Italy	38	Sweden	34
Sweden	29	Netherlands	34
New Zealand	24	Italy	24
Netherlands	22	Spain	23
Spain	20	New Zealand	20
Israel	18	Israel	18
Belgium	13	Norway	15
France	13	Brazil	12
Denmark	12	Switzerland	12
Poland	11	Singapore	12
Switzerland	11	Hong Kong	12
Ireland	11	Belgium	11
Norway	10	Denmark	10
Austria	9	Austria	10
Brazil	9	France	10
Finland	7	Poland	9
Colombia	6	Ireland	8
Romania	5	South Africa	6
Portugal	5	Mexico	5
Greece	5	Other	44
Other	64	No answer	13
No answer	146		




Figure 4: Breakdown of years of birth and gender.

Table 4: Country of PhD.

Country of PhD	n
USA	835
UK	162
Australia	51
Canada	49
Germany	40
Netherlands	17
Sweden	14
Spain	10
Belgium	8
Italy	6
Switzerland	5
Other	30
No answer	540

tification with nonliving philosophers, the leaders included Aristotle, Hume, Kant, Wittgenstein, Lewis, and Quine, with many write-in options included (see Table 7).

5. Longitudinal analysis

This section compares the 2020 and 2009 results with respect to their 30 shared questions. The longitudinal results discussed in this section can be found in Table 18 in Appendix A.

For the purpose of longitudinal comparison, we restricted the 2020 results to the target group of 100 2009-comparable departments in Australasia, Europe, and North America. As explained in Section 2, the 2009-comparable departments were selected using ranking criteria analogous to those used in the 2009 survey.

It should be noted that the 2009-comparable department group differs systematically from the broader target population in a number of respects. Demographically, it includes a higher proportion of UK-

Figure 5: Areas of specialization.




Table 5: Gender.

Gender	n
Male	1365
Female	357
Prefer not to say	25
Other gender	9
No answer	29

Table 6: Philosophical traditions.

Philosophical traditions	Respondents
Analytic	1430
Other tradition	169
Continental	113
Both	17
Pragmatism	13
History	5
Aristotelian	3
No answer	73

based philosophers and analytic-tradition philosophers than the target population. Philosophically, it includes a lower proportion of theists, along with many other differences evident in comparing the 2020 results in Table 1 (all departments) to the results under "Comparable departments" in Table 18.

For longitudinal purposes, we use "exclusive" rather than "inclusive" answer figures: that is, we exclude respondents who endorse multiple options. Exclusive answers were used in presenting our 2009 results, so using them here maximizes continuity with existing results. Furthermore, inclusive answers were handled somewhat differently in 2009 and 2020, so using exclusive answers maximizes comparability of the results. Using them should make no difference to relative results on

Table 7: Philosophers most identified with.

Aristotle (238)	Davidson (44)	Sellars (16)
Hume (221)	Leibniz (41)	Nāgārjuna (15)
Kant (188)	Anscombe (39)	Du Bois (13)
Wittgenstein (117)	Nietzsche (39)	Rorty (13)
Lewis (117)	Moore (39)	Sartre (13)
Quine (107)	Hegel (38)	Berkeley (12)
Frege (95)	Heidegger (34)	Austin (9)
Carnap (80)	Locke (33)	Wollstonecraft (9)
Russell (80)	Husserl (33)	Grice (8)
Plato (74)	Spinoza (32)	Derrida (8)
Rawls (71)	Reid (32)	Whitehead (7)
Mill (67)	Merleau-Ponty (28)	Rousseau (7)
Aquinas (56)	Foucault (27)	Sidgwick (7)
Marx (52)	Beauvoir (26)	Confucius (7)
Socrates (49)	Peirce (26)	Ramsey (6)
Descartes (48)	Augustine (23)	Buddha (6)
James (47)	Kierkegaard (22)	Zhuangzi (6)
Parfit (46)	Arendt (18)	Schopenhauer (6)
Dewey (45)	Popper (18)	Deleuze (5)
Putnam (44)	Hobbes (16)	Dummett (5)

binary questions (though absolute results are lower in some cases, as multiple options could be chosen more easily in 2020 than in 2009). On non-binary questions, this method sets aside fine-grained information about respondents who endorse some but not all of the options; but since this fine-grained information was not available in the 2009 survey, it would be hard to use it for longitudinal purposes. We have also included “skip” and “insufficiently familiar” answers as “other” answers in this context, to maximize continuity with how results were presented in 2009.

Our main longitudinal measure is the *swing* toward or against a position on the survey, defined as its relative strength in 2020 minus its relative strength in 2009. The relative strength of a position on a survey is defined as the percentage of respondents who endorse it exclusively, minus the average percentage of respondents who endorse some option exclusively (averaged across all options). For example, in a binary question, if 50% of respondents endorse X exclusively, and 30% of respondents endorse Y exclusively, the relative strength of X is 10% (50% - 40%) and the relative strength of Y is -10% (30% - 40%). The swing is then the change in these relative strengths over time. There is no perfect measure of swing when more than two options are present, but our definition has the nice feature that all swings on a given question sum to zero. Furthermore, in cases where all positions increase or decrease by the same amount (5%, say), as discussed above, the swing toward each position will be zero. The biggest swings toward any position from 2009 to 2020 are shown on Table 8.

The biggest swings in the 2020 survey are away from invariantism and toward contextualism about knowledge claims, and toward non-classical logic, externalism about moral motivation, a priori knowledge, and Humeanism about laws of nature. Changes can be divided into swings toward a majority view (contextualism, a priori knowledge, free will compatibilism) and swings toward a minority view (moral externalism, Humeanism, subjective aesthetic value, trolley non-switching). For binary questions, these swings are accompanied by a corresponding swing away from the alternative minority views (a priori knowledge:

no) or majority view (moral internalism, non-Humeanism, objective aesthetic value, trolley switching). Among non-binary questions, the largest swings away include swings away from a minority view (invariantism) and a majority view (correspondence theory of truth). In two cases the majority (or at least plurality) view changed: from an objective to a subjective view of aesthetic value, and from internalism to externalism about moral motivation.

Our data also allows longitudinal comparisons over the same people in 2009 and 2020: that is, over respondents in the 2009 target group who also responded in 2020 (regardless of whether they were in the target group in 2020). We have included these “same people” results with a corresponding swing, to shed light on the issue of how individual views may change over time. The biggest swings for this longitudinal comparison can be found in Table 9. Most swings are under 2%, which tends to confirm the oft-reported impression that philosophers do not commonly change their views.

In order to better understand relationships between institutional and personal changes in views, we computed swing numbers for departments excluding the individuals who answered both surveys (institutional swings) and plotted them against swing numbers for individuals who answered both surveys (personal swings). Figure 6 shows a scatter plot of these swings, with the correlations of positions with year of birth color-coded. As might be expected, we can see that institutional swings are sometimes importantly different from personal swings: for example, there is an institutional swing toward a priori knowledge but a personal swing against, while the reverse is true for metaphysical naturalism. In these cases and many other (but not all) cases, views with higher institutional swings relative to personal swings are also views that are more popular with younger voters. This suggests that, as one might expect, much but not all of the difference between institutional and personal swings is due to popularity among younger faculty members who did not take the 2009 survey.

We can also measure longitudinal changes in demographic and background questions in the 2009-comparable target group. It should




Figure 6: Institutional-ex-personal-swing vs personal swing.

Table 8: Largest swings from 2009 to 2020 across comparable departments.

Answer	Swing
Knowledge claims: invariantism	-7.5
Logic: non-classical	6.7
Knowledge claims: contextualism	5.1
Moral motivation: externalism	4.4
A priori knowledge: yes	4.3
Laws of nature: Humean	4.3
Free will: compatibilism	3.5
Truth: correspondence	-3.4
Aesthetic value: subjective	3.4
Trolley problem: don't switch	3.1

be noted that these increases and decreases may reflect changes from 2009 to 2020 in respondent bias (see Section 8) rather than changes in the profession. The number of respondents specifying "female" rose from 17.4% to 22%. The most common decade of birth shifted from the 1960s to the 1970s. Respondents were more often Canadian-born, more often Australian-affiliated, and more often had a UK Ph.D. Areas of specialization with the largest relative increases included (in order) applied ethics, philosophy of cognitive science, social and political philosophy, normative ethics, and epistemology. Areas with the largest relative decreases included philosophy of physical science, ancient Greek philosophy, philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of religion, 19th century philosophy, and 17th/18th century philosophy. Identification with the continental tradition was down from 3.8% to 1.8%. Philosophers with the largest relative increases in identification include Descartes, Lewis, Leibniz, and Marx, while those with largest relative decreases include Davidson, Wittgenstein, Locke, and Hegel.

The survey website includes some further longitudinal comparisons,

Table 9: Largest swings from 2009 to 2020 across the same people (target 2009 respondents who also responded in 2020).

Answer	Swing
Trolley problem: don't switch	5.9
Knowledge claims: invariantism	-5.4
Logic: non-classical	4.8
Normative ethics: virtue ethics	4.4
Moral judgment: non-cognitivism	4.2
Knowledge claims: contextualism	4.1
Normative ethics: consequentialism	-4.0
Free will: no free will	-4.0
Abstract objects: Platonism	3.9
Zombies: metaphysically possible	3.1

including comparisons across "same departments" (the 99 target departments from 2009, compared across 2009 and 2020). It also includes comparisons using "weighted scores" (0 for rejecting a view, .25 for leaning against it, .5 for other, .75 for leaning toward it, 1 for accepting it). These scores are more fine-grained than the percentages used elsewhere, which in effect assign 0 for the first three options and 1 for the last two.

6. Correlations

One of the aims of this survey was to get a clearer sense of relationships between philosophical views within the target population. The most highly significant correlations between survey answers can be found in Tables 19-25 in Appendix B. More correlations are available on the survey's website.

These correlations were calculated as follows. We first assigned a numerical variable for each main answer option (e.g., mind: physicalism or mind: non-physicalism) to a philosophical question. For each

respondent, this variable was assigned a value ranging from -2 to 2 depending on whether the respondent rejects, leans toward rejecting, is neutral on (including “agnostic” answers), leans toward accepting, or accepts the position corresponding to the option. When a respondent selects “accept: X” or “lean toward: X” in the main interface without evaluating multiple options, we consider that they also reject or lean against the other options respectively. When they evaluate multiple options, we use those evaluations separately. Respondents who gave answers falling under “other” but that are not considered neutral were left out of correlation calculations for all relevant pairs of variables.

For binary questions, we have included correlation results for only one main answer option (the first option listed in Table 1, e.g. mind: physicalism). The second option (e.g. mind: non-physicalism) is usually strongly anti-correlated with the first, so correlations here will have a similar magnitude in the opposite direction.

For most non-binary questions, we consider correlation results for all main answer options, but a few questions were given a special treatment. The “other minds” question, which asked respondents to say whether they accept that entities of various levels of complexity have consciousness (AIs and living things from plants to humans), was split into two questions: consciousness in living things and consciousness in AIs. We assigned respondents a single numerical answer to the first question based on the most complex living things to which they assigned consciousness. We assigned respondents a numerical answer to the second question based on the most advanced AI systems to which they assigned consciousness. Answers to the three-option questions “philosophical knowledge” and “philosophical progress” were similarly converted to a linear scale.

For demographic and orientation questions, each possible answer (e.g., “AOS: Feminist philosophy”) was assigned a variable whose value is 2 for a respondent who selected that answer, 0 for respondents who specified another answer, and N/A for respondents who skipped the question.




Figure 7: Variance explained by 10 first principal components.

7. Dimensionality reduction and clustering

We performed component and cluster analyses to get a clearer sense of the extent to which answers to the main questions can be distilled to a smaller number of underlying views. These results should be taken with a grain of salt, as they are heavily dependent on which questions and topics are included in the survey.

Our principal component analysis used only one of the numerical variables described in the preceding section for each question, so a total of 101 variables (for non-binary questions, we selected the variable corresponding to the most popular option).³ As shown in Figure 7, we found that a few principal components can explain a modest amount of variance. Six components explain 2% or more of the variance each. The two first components explain considerable variance at 12.3% and 8.8% respectively. The variables most correlated with these two first components are represented in Figure 8. The first component correlates with a combination of rationalism (or non-empiricism) and realism, especially in the moral domain. The second component is harder to label but might correlate with a science-friendly outlook.

To try to shed more light on the nature of views that might unify

3. All variables were normalized and imputed (using R’s missMDA package; Josse & Husson 2016).




Figure 8: First and second principal components. The axes represent correlation coefficients between variables and components.

God: theism	3.5%
Mind: physicalism	3.5%
Metaphilosophy: naturalism	3.1%
Meaning of life: objective	3.1%
Meta-ethics: moral realism	2.9%
Abortion: permissible	2.7%
Abstract objects: Platonism	2.4%
Moral judgment: cognitivism	2.3%
Laws of nature: Humean	2.2%
Knowledge: Empiricism	2.1%

Table 10: Variables that explain 2% or more of the variance using linear regression.

answers to our questions, we performed linear regressions on the same variables (normalized to a mean of 0 and variance of 1). Table 10 shows the answers that explain 2% or more of the variance among other answers, with the percentage of variance (of all other 100 answers).

We also built multivariate models, employing an iterative procedure to determine which variables should be treated as independent and dependent. We first selected as independent the variable that explains the most variance among other variables (“God: theism”). We then iteratively selected the independent variables that can explain the most additional variance when added to previously selected independent variables.⁴ We found that 10 variables could explain 11.9% of variance. Table 11 shows the variables that were selected by our procedure and the cumulative variance explained.

Clustering methods can also be used to assess relatedness of answers. We used $1 - |\rho_{A,B}|$ (one minus the absolute value of the Pearson correlation coefficient between A and B) as our distance metric. Figure 9 shows the result of clustering the 101 answer options described above using

4. Variance explained is measured as the sum of adjusted r-squared values for all dependent variables.

God: theism	3.5%
Meta-ethics: moral realism	5.5%
A priori knowledge: yes	6.6%
Science: scientific realism	7.5%
Temporal ontology: eternalism	8.3%
Gender: social	9.1%
Mental content: internalism	9.9%
Abstract objects: Platonism	10.6%
Mind uploading: survival	11.3%
Normative ethics: virtue ethics	11.9%

Table 11: Cumulative variance explained by linear models of up to 10 independent variables.

hierarchical clustering with the “average” method, which minimizes the mean distance between members of joined clusters. Other hierarchical clustering methods yielded less readable and balanced trees. Figure 9 allows us to see that while there are some strong correlations between answers and some form small clusters, the correlations do not amount to large clusters of closely related views. Note that because the distance metric used is based on the absolute values of correlation coefficients, anti-correlated positions are often clustered together.

8. Selection bias

Selection bias arises when the group who responds to a survey question is not a random sample of the target population. In our survey, selection bias takes two forms. First, the philosophers who respond to the survey at all (completing at least 50 questions and consenting) are not a random sample of the target population. We call this *respondent bias*. Second, respondents have the option to complete more than 50 (up to 100) questions, and the group who do so are not a random sample of the overall group of respondents. We call this *enthusiast bias*.

The results presented in Section 3 are subject to respondent bias and enthusiast bias, so they cannot be considered accurate guides to the




Figure 9: Hierarchical clustering (“average” method) of answer options using $1 - |\rho_{A,B}|$ as distance metric. The position of a junction corresponds to the mean distance between the components of the two branches it joins together. The dotted line marks a mean distance of .8, or a mean correlation between cluster members of .2. Clusters with a mean distance below this threshold are uniformly colored (colors are reused elsewhere within the graph).

distribution of views in our target population as a whole. To use survey responses to assess the distribution of views in our target population as a whole, we need to correct for respondent bias and enthusiast bias.

Enthusiast bias: Enthusiast bias does not affect the 40 main questions, which all respondents answered as part of their 50 mandatory questions. It affects only the 60 additional questions.

To correct for enthusiast bias on these questions, we can simply restrict our analysis to those *First-50 respondents*, who answered these questions as part of their 50 mandatory questions. This group should be a random sample of respondents as a whole. This information is shown in Table 14 under the “F50” column. Enthusiast bias is reflected in the difference between the “All” column and the “F50” column.

We can also assess enthusiast bias by calculating correlations between the number of questions answered by a respondent and their various answers to questions. The highest correlations are shown in Table 12.

Table 12: Correlations between number of answers and demographic answers where $|r| \geq .05$.

Answer	r
Tradition: Continental	-0.13
Gender: male	0.13
Gender: female	-0.12
Tradition: Analytic	0.12
AOS: M&E	0.1
Region of PhD: US	0.09
AOS: Traditions	-0.06
Gender: other	-0.06
Region of affiliation: Canada	-0.06
Region of PhD: Asia	-0.05
AOS: Value theory	-0.05

Table 13: Biases as proportion of respondents divided by proportion of population for (a) AOS clusters, (b) region of affiliation, and (c) gender.

Group	(a)	(b)	(c)	
	Bias	Region	Bias	Gender
M&E	1.54	Africa	0.67	Male
Value Theory	0.89	Asia	1.11	Female
S.L.M	0.93	Canada	0.83	
History	0.73	Europe	0.96	
Traditions	0.51	United Kingdom	1.15	
		Oceania	1.38	
		Latin America	1.05	
		United States	0.97	

Respondent bias: It is less straightforward to assess and correct for respondent bias, as we have less information on philosophers in the target population who did not participate in the survey. However, we were able to rely on the PhilPeople database, which was updated with extensive data entry for relevant departments prior to the launch of the survey. This database contains entries for almost all members of the target population, including their affiliations (hence their regions of affiliation). We estimated AOS using PhilPeople’s publication attributions (taking the AOS of an individual to be the PhilPapers cluster-level topic in which they have the most publications). We estimated gender using PhilPeople’s gender guessing algorithm, which, roughly, assigns gender based on first name statistics from US census records. There are many cases in which the algorithm cannot confidently assign a gender. We treat these cases as a third category. There are limitations on using census data for guessing gender, but these limitations should not affect our results so long as all gender identities are guessed equally well based on census data.

We used this information to assess and correct for respondent bias

with respect to AOS, region of affiliation, and gender.⁵ The (modest) biases that we have identified are summarized in Table 13. Tables 14 and ?? in summarize the additional and main results corrected for AOS and gender, respectively. Relatively few results are corrected by more than 3 percentage points, and only two are corrected by more than 5% compared to First-50 answers: propositional attitudes: representational (-6.15%) and true contradictions: impossible (-9.72%). We did not make regional corrections because regions of affiliation are not very strongly correlated with philosophical views (see Table 20) and the number of data points at our disposal did not allow a three-way stratification of respondents.

It remains possible and likely that there are respondent biases that go beyond AOS, gender, and region of affiliation, but our ability to measure them is limited by the limited information that we have about nonrespondents in the target population.

Table 14: Bias corrections for the additional questions. All = inclusive percentage of all answers (including skips and “insufficiently familiar”, so the figures are lower than in Table 2). F50 = percentage of answers among respondents’ mandatory questions (the first-50 group). Cor. = F50 with gender and specialization correction. Corrections of 3% or more are starred.

Questions and answers	All	F50	Cor.
Abortion			
Permissible	77.7	79.0	77.71
Impermissible	12.5	12.7	12.92

Aesthetic experience			
Perception	17.2	16.9	16.15
Pleasure	8.6	9.4	8.97
Sui generis	22.7	21.6	23.8
Analysis of knowledge			
Justified true belief	21.4	22.9	24.93
Other analysis	29.2	32.5	30.49
No analysis	27.8	25.7	22.66 *
Arguments for theism			
Cosmological	18.8	14.9	14.18
Design	15.9	13.6	12.51
Ontological	8.0	8.0	9.1
Pragmatic	12.8	13.3	15.49
Moral	8.4	10.2	10.9
Belief or credence			
Belief	20.8	22.6	21.8
Credence	21.2	20.5	20.3
Neither	13.2	12.1	10.75
Capital punishment			
Permissible	17.1	17.1	15.46
Impermissible	72.4	73.9	75.37
Causation			
Counterfact./diff.-making	28.9	32.8	32.17
Process/production	17.5	16.6	16.44
Primitive	15.9	15.3	13.63
Nonexistent	3.2	3.1	2.77
Chinese room			
Understands	16.0	16.2	14.23
Doesn't understand	60.0	60.1	59.57
Concepts			

5. To correct for these biases, we gave more or less weight to respondents to achieve a representation of attributes that matches the population.

Nativism	21.4	22.0	21.55
Empiricism	38.4	40.9	42.12
Consciousness			
Dualism	19.4	17.9	15.12
Eliminativism	4.0	4.2	4.0
Functionalism	29.2	30.9	28.89
Identity theory	11.8	11.1	9.64
Panpsychism	6.7	6.2	8.0
Continuum hypothesis			
Determinate	16.2	16.6	15.06
Indeterminate	12.3	10.2	9.77
Cosmological fine-tuning			
Design	12.2	9.2	8.51
Multiverse	10.7	12.5	12.83
Brute fact	22.6	25.2	25.17
No fine-tuning	15.3	15.4	15.03
Environmental ethics			
Anthropocentric	32.9	30.7	31.56
Non-anthropocentric	39.4	37.5	38.69
Extended mind			
Yes	43.1	44.1	42.6
No	31.2	27.1	25.68
Foundations of mathematics			
Constructivism/intuitionism	8.2	10.2	10.87
Formalism	3.3	2.1	2.32
Logicism	6.3	4.6	3.37
Structuralism	11.3	14.4	14.36
Set-theoretic	8.2	8.1	6.64
Gender categories			
Preserve	17.4	17.2	15.14

Revise	43.2	48.3	48.42
Eliminate	13.8	17.2	18.66
Grounds of intentionality			
Causal/teleological	21.9	21.9	20.61
Inferential	6.0	5.8	5.34
Interpretational	9.5	11.9	12.75
Phenomenal	7.9	7.7	9.92
Primitive	8.6	10.0	9.82
Hard problem of consciousness			
Yes	54.6	56.0	54.63
No	26.0	23.2	25.01
Human genetic engineering			
Permissible	58.8	56.3	53.14 *
Impermissible	17.8	17.3	19.75
Hume			
Skeptic	28.0	30.4	30.27
Naturalist	42.2	39.5	44.11 *
Immortality			
Yes	43.3	36.7	35.27
No	39.9	44.1	45.86
Interlevel metaphysics			
Grounding	19.3	17.2	14.88
Identity	7.6	7.8	6.26
Realization	13.9	16.2	14.83
Supervenience	16.4	17.9	16.95
Justification			
Coherentism	19.4	24.7	27.66
Infinitism	1.6	2.8	2.98
Nonreliabilist found.	20.7	17.4	14.37 *
Reliabilism	27.6	29.1	26.03 *

Kant			
One world	28.8	33.2	36.68 *
Two worlds	22.1	22.5	23.18
Law			
Legal positivism	21.8	22.4	23.6
Legal non-positivism	24.8	26.5	27.11
Material composition			
Nihilism	4.1	6.1	4.97
Restrictivism	17.7	15.5	13.49
Universalism	13.9	11.3	9.02
Morality			
Non-naturalism	23.8	24.8	24.4
Naturalist realism	28.4	27.7	27.45
Constructivism	18.7	20.1	22.3
Expressivism	9.5	10.5	8.11
Error theory	4.7	5.1	4.54
Metaontology			
Heavyweight realism	24.0	24.2	20.36 *
Deflationary realism	17.5	18.8	17.76
Anti-realism	7.4	6.1	6.4
Method in history of philosophy			
Analytic/rational reconstruction	49.3	49.8	50.05
Contextual/historicist	36.0	45.5	47.76
Method in political philosophy			
Ideal theory	22.3	23.7	24.19
Non-ideal theory	39.9	43.1	45.92
Mind uploading			
Survival	25.0	24.7	25.13
Death	49.4	51.7	51.92
Moral principles			

Moral generalism	46.3	43.8	43.82
Moral particularism	28.6	31.0	31.99
Normative concepts			
Fit	5.7	4.3	4.81
Ought	11.0	9.7	9.66
Reasons	19.7	24.8	27.72
Value	28.9	29.8	29.79
Other minds			
Adult humans	89.3	91.8	90.78
Cats	83.1	83.9	81.84
Fish	61.3	61.8	60.18
Flies	32.4	32.7	34.67
Worms	22.7	22.4	23.99
Plants	6.8	7.0	7.91
Particles	1.9	1.2	0.97
Newborn babies	79.1	83.0	81.74
Current AI systems	3.2	3.3	3.94
Future AI systems	36.8	37.9	35.21
Ought implies can			
Yes	59.3	56.7	57.24
No	26.7	27.3	28.07
Philosophical knowledge			
None	3.4	3.6	4.23
A little	31.0	32.1	33.01
A lot	53.5	54.9	53.27
Plato			
Knowledge only of forms	29.8	29.2	32.79 *
Knowledge also of concrete things	15.9	17.9	19.83
Politics			
Capitalism	28.1	25.3	23.75

Socialism	50.5	50.7	54.28 *
Possible worlds			
Abstract	50.0	51.3	47.25 *
Concrete	4.2	3.2	2.05
Nonexistent	27.4	25.6	28.8 *
Practical reason			
Aristotelian	30.3	32.9	34.72
Humean	23.9	25.3	25.06
Kantian	14.8	15.8	16.15
Principle of sufficient reason			
True	29.9	31.5	31.7
False	38.0	38.8	38.41
Properties			
Classes	7.9	11.0	10.43
Immanent universals	14.3	18.2	16.62
Transcendent universals	13.7	16.5	14.57
Tropes	10.6	7.9	7.27
Nonexistent	5.6	3.1	3.83
Propositional attitudes			
Dispositional	22.2	21.6	20.54
Phenomenal	4.9	4.2	5.39
Representational	32.7	30.9	24.75 *
Nonexistent	2.5	1.9	2.88
Propositions			
Sets	5.9	5.5	4.74
Structured entities	27.2	25.4	22.88
Simple entities	4.9	7.1	6.26
Acts	5.8	5.8	6.72
Nonexistent	10.9	10.6	11.1
Quantum mechanics			

Collapse	8.5	6.8	6.1
Hidden-variables	11.0	9.2	8.69
Many-worlds	9.7	8.2	8.53
Epistemic	6.4	6.1	5.79
Race categories			
Preserve	6.5	8.3	7.87
Revise	25.8	27.2	28.93
Eliminate	32.3	33.3	33.83
Response to external-world skepticism			
Abductive	18.1	16.2	15.8
Contextualist	8.8	9.3	8.58
Dogmatist	11.0	10.0	8.25
Epistemic externalist	15.5	16.9	16.0
Semantic externalist	6.9	9.0	8.06
Pragmatic	18.7	17.6	20.06
Rational disagreement			
Non-permissivism	16.7	16.6	18.58
Permissivism	60.5	65.1	62.26
Semantic content			
Minimalism (no more than a few)	6.4	5.7	4.79
Moderate contextualism (intermediate)	35.7	37.7	36.66
Radical contextualism (most or all)	17.3	16.8	18.08
Sleeping beauty			
One-third	10.5	11.3	9.78
One-half	7.1	6.8	5.88
Spacetime			
Relationism	25.1	24.7	29.05 *
Substantivalism	15.2	14.4	10.48 *
Statue and lump			
One thing	25.4	25.6	25.41

Two things	35.3	37.4	34.17 *
Temporal ontology			
Presentism	12.1	11.0	8.88
Eternalism	26.3	25.3	21.55 *
Growing block	11.2	10.1	10.45
Theory of reference			
Causal	35.9	37.0	32.99 *
Descriptive	17.2	17.0	14.72
Deflationary	11.7	11.3	11.39
Time travel			
Metaphysically possible	34.9	34.6	30.97 *
Metaphysically impossible	33.9	35.5	39.05 *
True contradictions			
Impossible	58.5	54.2	44.78 *
Possible but non-actual	3.9	5.4	5.35
Actual	10.2	9.0	9.73
Units of selection			
Genes	26.3	27.9	27.52
Organisms	26.0	26.9	28.43
Values in science			
Necessarily value-free	15.3	17.2	15.58
Necessarily value-laden	38.0	40.7	42.69
Can be either	26.8	27.2	26.62
Well-being			
Hedonism/experientialism	10.7	11.0	11.06
Desire satisfaction	15.6	17.9	16.19
Objective list	44.7	44.1	43.4
Wittgenstein			
Early	20.7	19.8	18.58
Late	48.4	49.0	50.23

Table 15: Bias corrections for the 40 main questions. All = inclusive percentage of all answers (including skips and “insufficiently familiar”, so the figures are lower than in Table 1). Cor. = Percentage of answers with gender and specialization correction applied. Corrections of 3% or more are starred.

Questions and answers	All	Cor.
A priori knowledge		
Yes	71.4	68.95
No	18.1	19.56
Abstract objects		
Platonism	35.2	32.53
Nominalism	38.4	39.29
Aesthetic value		
Objective	41.5	40.13
Subjective	38.7	39.05
Analytic-synthetic distinction		
Yes	59.6	57.5
No	24.6	25.05
Knowledge		
Empiricism	42.4	42.39
Rationalism	32.3	31.06
Epistemic justification		
Internalism	32.4	30.19
Externalism	45.9	45.05
Free will		
Compatibilism	58.3	57.83
Libertarianism	18.5	18.34
No free will	11.0	10.56

God			Internalism	32.8	33.81
Theism	18.8	19.08	Externalism	31.5	29.86
Atheism	66.4	64.94	Moral judgment		
External world			Cognitivism	63.5	60.72
Idealism	6.6	8.02	Non-cognitivism	19.0	18.97
Skepticism	5.4	5.78	Newcomb's problem		
Non-skeptical realism	78.6	75.24 *	One box	18.7	17.35
Knowledge claims			Two boxes	23.4	21.18
Contextualism	45.1	46.78	Normative ethics		
Relativism	4.5	4.47	Deontology	31.3	30.83
Invariantism	21.1	18.43	Consequentialism	29.8	28.7
Laws of nature			Virtue ethics	36.1	38.34
Humean	27.2	27.39	Perceptual experience		
Non-humean	47.3	44.97	Disjunctivism	11.6	11.05
Logic			Qualia theory	11.2	10.91
Classical	42.5	39.76	Representationalism	29.1	26.56
Non-classical	21.0	21.29	Sense-datum theory	3.7	3.85
Mental content			Personal identity		
Internalism	22.4	21.68	Biological view	17.3	16.43
Externalism	49.3	46.13 *	Psychological view	39.5	39.46
Meta-ethics			Further-fact view	13.4	12.73
Moral realism	59.8	57.74	Political philosophy		
Moral anti-realism	25.2	25.43	Communitarianism	23.5	24.46
Metaphilosophy			Egalitarianism	37.9	38.8
Naturalism	43.5	42.0	Libertarianism	11.5	10.75
Non-naturalism	27.0	26.68	Proper names		
Mind			Fregean	25.7	24.36
Physicalism	50.4	48.53	Millian	27.5	24.4 *
Non-physicalism	31.1	31.17	Science		
Moral motivation			Scientific realism	68.5	64.74 *

Scientific anti-realism	14.2	15.97
Teletransporter		
Survival	31.1	30.09
Death	35.4	33.73
Time		
A-theory	17.1	16.07
B-theory	24.0	21.27
Trolley problem		
Switch	61.7	58.64 *
Don't switch	12.9	12.84
Truth		
Correspondence	47.3	44.02 *
Deflationary	22.6	21.84
Epistemic	9.4	10.88
Zombies		
Inconceivable	14.8	14.0
Conceivable but not pos.	32.9	32.66
Metaphysically possible	22.0	20.19
Aim of philosophy		
Truth/knowledge	41.8	40.18
Understanding	55.4	54.6
Wisdom	30.9	32.97
Happiness	12.5	13.44
Goodness/justice	22.5	23.92
Eating animals and animal products		
Omnivorism (yes and yes)	47.5	46.9
Vegetarianism (no and yes)	26.2	26.75
Veganism (no and no)	18.2	18.48
Experience machine		
Yes	12.3	13.03

No	70.7	68.3
Footbridge		
Push	21.4	20.19
Don't push	54.6	53.14
Gender		
Biological	26.9	27.89
Psychological	19.9	20.93
Social	58.4	59.88
Unreal	3.9	3.77
Meaning of life		
Subjective	31.9	31.71
Objective	31.0	30.23
Nonexistent	15.6	15.83
Philosophical progress		
None	3.8	4.88
A little	46.3	46.76
A lot	41.5	38.28 *
Philosophical methods		
Conceptual analysis	68.9	69.47
Conceptual engineering	38.3	36.63
Empirical philosophy	58.3	57.37
Experimental philosophy	31.7	31.36
Formal philosophy	53.9	50.38 *
Intuition-based philosophy	48.0	45.36
Linguistic philosophy	44.8	43.46
Race		
Biological	17.3	16.69
Social	58.6	59.42
Unreal	13.9	14.48
Vagueness		

Epistemic	19.4	18.64
Metaphysical	16.7	17.15
Semantic	41.8	38.69 *

9. Specialist effects

As in 2009, we were interested to see whether and when specialists in the area of a question tend to give different answers than non-specialists. We associated every question with at least one (sometimes two) area of specialization, which we call *the associated AOS*. We use AOS as a useful if imperfect proxy for research specialization on a given question. For every question, we then compared specialist answers (percentages of non-“other” responses to each answer over respondents in the associated AOS) to non-specialist answers (percentages of non-“other” responses over respondents who are not in the associated AOS). Effects that are significant at the .05 level or better (based on a chi-squared test) are shown in Table 26 in Appendix C.

By far the biggest specialist effects are in the philosophy of religion, where 78% of specialists endorsed theism compared to 17% of nonspecialists, and 74% endorsed design as an account of fine-tuning compared to 13% of nonspecialists. The next biggest effects are on metaontology (metaphysicians favor heavyweight realism more than nonspecialists), gender and race (philosophers of gender, race, and sexuality favor social views), Newcomb’s problem (decision theorists favor two-boxing), and aesthetic value (aestheticians favor objective views).

Of course there can be many different sources of specialist effects. In some cases, prior philosophical views may influence one’s specialization. In other cases, specialization may influence philosophical views. In still other cases, there may be a complex interaction between specialization and views. If one looked to surveys like this as a guide to truth, there is perhaps a case for giving special weight to specialist opinion, at least in cases where one thinks that specialization influences view rather than vice versa. However, our data do not speak directly to the direction of influence, and do not tell us anything about whether specialist opinion

correlates with philosophical truth.

10. Order effects

There is an order effect between two questions Q₁ and Q₂ if responses to Q₁ when it is presented after Q₂ differ significantly from responses to Q₁ when it is presented before Q₂. There exist a number of studies of order effects on philosophical questions, with many focusing especially on order effects between questions about the trolley case and questions about the footbridge case. Prior studies have demonstrated order effects on these questions among both professional philosophers (Schwitzgebel and Cushman 2015; 2012) and non-philosophers (Petrich and O’Neill 1996; Lanteri et al 2008).

It is natural to suppose that some of our questions might produce order effects. We assessed order effects for pairs of questions using exclusive normalized percentages that do not include any “other” answers and applying a chi-squared test to assess the significance of differences found. For the most part, in this project we did not engage in hypothesis testing, but given prior work on these issues, we formulated and tested a few hypotheses about order effects.

First, we formulated the primary hypothesis that there may be an order effect between the footbridge and the trolley questions. Consistently with prior work, we found a highly significant effect with Q₁ = trolley and Q₂ = footbridge ($p = 2 \times 10^{-8}$). We found only a weakly significant effect with Q₁ = footbridge and Q₂ = trolley ($p = .03$). These results are summarized in Table 16.

To investigate the footbridge/trolley effect further, we computed the order effect for each answer to each of these questions (four answers in total). We found that there is a statistically significant difference in the distribution of answers between the before and after conditions only among respondents who answer “don’t push” to the footbridge question ($p = 6 \times 10^{-8}$). Respondents who are presented the footbridge question first and answer “don’t push” are more likely to answer “don’t switch” on the trolley question than respondents who are presented with the footbridge second and answer “don’t push”. We don’t find

Table 16: Order effect for the Trolley and Footbridge questions.

Answer	Footbridge first?	
	Yes	No
Trolley problem: switch	89.2%	77.5%
Trolley problem: don't switch	10.8%	22.5%
Footbridge: push	30.6%	25.3%
Footbridge: don't push	69.4%	74.7%

such a clearly significant effect in the other cases. These results are summarized in Table 17.

Table 17: Breakdown by Footbridge answer then order.

Footbridge answer	Push		Don't push	
	Yes	No	Yes	No
Trolley: switch	98.5%	100%	67.1%	83.6%
Trolley: don't switch	1.5%	0	32.9%	16.5%

Second, we formulated secondary hypotheses regarding possible order effects involving nine other pairs of questions on related topics (chosen somewhat arbitrarily from many pairs of related questions): footbridge vs. normative ethics, aim of philosophy vs. philosophical progress, personal identity vs. teletransporter, fine-tuning vs. theism, hard problem of consciousness vs. mind, material composition vs. metaontology, semantic content vs. knowledge claims, consciousness vs. other minds, Chinese room vs. other minds. These nine pairs of questions give rise to eighteen possible comparisons. After correcting for multiple comparisons, none of these comparisons was significant at $p < .05$.

Finally, we assessed order effects for every pair of questions (9900

comparisons), whether or not we had formulated hypotheses regarding those questions. By chance alone, we would expect one result to be significant at $p < 10^{-4}$. In fact, two results were significant at that level: the pair with $Q_1 = \text{trolley}$ and $Q_2 = \text{footbridge}$ ($p = 2 \times 10^{-8}$ as above) and the pair with $Q_1 = \text{moral judgment}$ and $Q_2 = \text{concepts}$ ($p = 4 \times 10^{-6}$), with 80% and 61% of respondents respectively endorsing cognitivism about moral judgment when presented before and after the question about concepts (nativism or empiricism). The second result is significant (at $p < .05$) even when correcting for multiple comparisons. Unlike the first result, the second result does not correspond to a prior hypothesis (and there is no obvious relation between the questions). In the absence of further hypothesis-testing, it remains unsettled whether the second result is a genuine effect or a random fluctuation.

Overall, the results regarding the footbridge/trolley order effects are congruent with results from earlier studies. The result concerning concepts and cognitivism has not yet survived a similar process of robust testing. In any case, it is apparent that the footbridge/trolley order effect is unusually strong, and that order effects of this strength may be more the exception than the rule.

11. Conclusion

As we noted in the introduction, the 2020 PhilPapers Survey was intended to make at least three contributions over and above the 2009 PhilPapers Survey. It was intended to give information about a broader group of academic philosophers' views about a broader range of philosophical questions, and it was intended to give some information about longitudinal changes in philosophers' views over time. Our results suggest that it succeeded in these aims.

That said, the survey's success in these aims is relative and far from complete. There are clear limitations on our survey population and on our survey questions, including (among other limitations) a strong analytic and English-language bias in both. There is considerable room for future work surveying a broader range of philosophers on a broader range of topics, giving more extensive information about philosophers'

philosophical views and how they change over time.

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Appendix A. Longitudinal comparison

Table 18: Longitudinal comparison.

Qs and As	Comparable departments				Same people			
	09%	20%	ch.	Swng	09%	20%	ch.	Swng
A priori knowledge								
Yes	71.1	74.8	↑3.7	↑4.3	73.9	71.5	↓2.4	↓1.5
No	18.4	13.6	↓4.8	↓4.3	16.0	16.6	↑0.6	↑1.5
Other	10.5	11.6			10.1	11.9		
Abstract objects								
Platonism	39.3	37.2	↓2.1	↓0.6	37.1	39.5	↑2.4	↑3.9
Nominalism	37.7	36.7	↓1.0	↑0.6	39.5	34.1	↓5.4	↓3.9
Other	23.0	26.1			23.4	26.4		
Aesthetic value								
Objective	41.0	37.8	↓3.2	↓3.4	36.8	36.2	↓0.6	↑1.5
Subjective	34.5	38.1	↑3.6	↑3.4	39.8	36.2	↓3.6	↓1.5
Other	24.5	24.1			23.4	27.6		
Analytic-synthetic distinction								
Yes	64.9	63.7	↓1.2	↑2.6	65.0	64.1	↓0.9	↑1.9
No	27.1	20.7	↓6.4	↓2.6	26.7	22.0	↓4.7	↓1.9
Other	8.0	15.6			8.3	13.9		
Epistemic justification								
Internalism	26.4	27.9	↑1.5	↑0.7	30.0	30.6	↑0.6	↑1.8
Externalism	42.7	42.9	↑0.2	↓0.7	43.6	40.7	↓2.9	↓1.8
Other	30.9	29.2			26.4	28.7		
External world								
Idealism	4.3	4.0	↓0.3	↓0.5	2.7	4.2	↑1.5	↑1.5
Skepticism	4.8	4.3	↓0.5	↓0.8	5.9	6.5	↑0.6	↑0.6
Non-skeptical realism	81.6	83.2	↑1.6	↑1.3	81.9	79.8	↓2.1	↓2.1
Other	9.3	8.5			9.5	9.5		
Free will								
Compatibilism	59.1	62.8	↑3.7	↑3.5	60.8	62.0	↑1.2	↑2.6
Libertarianism	13.7	12.8	↓0.9	↓1.1	12.2	12.2	—	↑1.4
No free will	12.2	10.0	↓2.2	↓2.4	14.8	9.5	↓5.3	↓4.0
Other	15.0	14.4			12.2	16.3		
God								
Theism	14.6	12.5	↓2.1	↓1.8	10.1	10.7	↑0.6	↑1.0

Qs and As	Comparable departments				Same people			
	09%	20%	ch.	Swng	09%	20%	ch.	Swng
Atheism	72.8	74.2	↑1.4	↑1.8	78.6	77.2	↓1.4	↓1.0
Other	12.6	13.3			11.3	12.1		
Knowledge								
Empiricism	35.0	33.0	↓2.0	↓1.4	36.2	35.9	↓0.3	↑1.3
Rationalism	27.8	28.7	↑0.9	↑1.4	30.3	27.3	↓3.0	↓1.3
Other	37.2	38.3			33.5	36.8		
Knowledge claims								
Contextualism	40.1	42.4	↑2.3	↑5.1	39.2	40.1	↑0.9	↑4.1
Relativism	2.9	2.6	↓0.3	↑2.4	4.2	2.4	↓1.8	↑1.4
Invariantism	31.1	21.0	↓10.1	↓7.5	31.5	22.8	↓8.7	↓5.4
Other	25.9	34.0			25.1	34.7		
Laws of nature								
Humean	24.7	24.4	↓0.3	↑4.3	25.2	25.8	↑0.6	↑1.9
Non-humean	57.1	48.3	↓8.8	↓4.3	52.5	49.3	↓3.2	↓1.9
Other	18.2	27.3			22.3	24.9		
Logic								
Classical	51.6	39.8	↓11.8	↓6.7	52.5	44.5	↓8.0	↓4.8
Non-classical	15.4	17.0	↑1.6	↑6.7	13.6	15.1	↑1.5	↑4.8
Other	33.0	43.2			33.9	40.4		
Mental content								
Internalism	20.0	18.2	↓1.8	↓0.4	19.9	21.1	↑1.2	↑2.2
Externalism	51.1	50.2	↓0.9	↑0.4	51.3	48.1	↓3.2	↓2.2
Other	28.9	31.6			28.8	30.8		
Meta-ethics								
Moral realism	56.4	59.9	↑3.5	↑2.7	54.9	56.4	↑1.5	↑2.2
Moral anti-realism	27.7	25.8	↓1.9	↓2.7	30.6	27.6	↓3.0	↓2.2
Other	15.9	14.3			14.5	16.0		
Metaphilosophy								
Naturalism	49.8	43.2	↓6.6	↓1.7	47.5	49.0	↑1.5	↑2.8
Non-naturalism	25.9	22.7	↓3.2	↑1.7	27.0	22.8	↓4.2	↓2.8
Other	24.3	34.1			25.5	28.2		
Mind								
Physicalism	56.5	57.4	↑0.9	↑1.1	61.1	59.3	↓1.8	↓1.2
Non-physicalism	27.1	25.8	↓1.3	↓1.1	24.3	24.9	↑0.6	↑1.2
Other	16.4	16.8			14.6	15.8		
Moral judgment								
Cognitivism	65.7	63.4	↓2.3	↓1.5	69.1	62.9	↓6.2	↓4.2
Non-cognitivism	17.0	17.6	↑0.6	↑1.5	16.6	18.7	↑2.1	↑4.2

Qs and As	Comparable departments				Same people			
	09%	20%	ch.	Swng	09%	20%	ch.	Swng
Other	17.3	19.0			14.3	18.4		
Moral motivation								
Internalism	34.9	29.6	↓5.3	↓4.4	34.7	32.6	↓2.1	—
Externalism	29.8	33.2	↑3.4	↑4.4	34.7	32.6	↓2.1	—
Other	35.3	37.2			30.6	34.8		
Newcomb's problem								
One box	21.3	20.1	↓1.2	↓0.5	23.1	21.7	↓1.4	—
Two boxes	31.4	31.2	↓0.2	↑0.5	35.0	33.5	↓1.5	—
Other	47.3	48.7			41.9	44.8		
Normative ethics								
Deontology	25.9	22.5	↓3.4	↓1.5	22.8	20.8	↓2.0	↓0.4
Consequentialism	23.6	21.3	↓2.3	↓0.5	29.4	23.7	↓5.7	↓4.0
Virtue ethics	18.2	18.2	—	↑1.9	16.0	18.7	↑2.7	↑4.4
Other	32.3	38.0			31.8	36.8		
Perceptual experience								
Disjunctivism	11.0	11.1	↑0.1	↑1.4	9.2	8.6	↓0.6	↑0.9
Qualia theory	12.2	10.8	↓1.4	↓0.2	16.6	12.2	↓4.4	↓3.0
Representationalism	31.5	28.9	↓2.6	↓1.4	28.2	28.5	↑0.3	↑1.8
Sense-datum theory	3.1	2.2	↓0.9	↑0.3	3.6	2.4	↓1.2	↑0.3
Other	42.2	47.0			42.4	48.3		
Personal identity								
Biological view	16.9	15.3	↓1.6	↓2.0	17.5	17.5	—	↑0.3
Psychological view	33.6	37.0	↑3.4	↑3.0	35.6	37.7	↑2.1	↑2.4
Further-fact view	12.2	11.6	↓0.6	↓1.1	10.7	7.7	↓3.0	↓2.7
Other	37.3	36.1			36.2	37.1		
Proper names								
Fregean	28.7	27.0	↓1.7	↑0.3	27.6	25.5	↓2.1	↓0.5
Millian	34.5	32.3	↓2.2	↓0.3	35.9	34.7	↓1.2	↑0.5
Other	36.8	40.7			36.5	39.8		
Science								
Scientific realism	75.1	73.6	↓1.5	↓0.3	76.3	73.6	↓2.7	↓0.7
Scientific anti-realism	11.6	10.6	↓1.0	↑0.3	11.6	10.4	↓1.2	↑0.7
Other	13.3	15.8			12.1	16.0		
Teletransporter								
Survival	36.2	36.0	↓0.2	↓1.7	39.5	35.9	↓3.6	↓2.2
Death	31.1	34.3	↑3.2	↑1.7	32.9	33.8	↑0.9	↑2.2
Other	32.7	29.7			27.6	30.3		
Time								

Qs and As	Comparable departments				Same people			
	09%	20%	ch.	Swng	09%	20%	ch.	Swng
A-theory	15.5	13.9	↓1.6	↓1.8	13.6	13.9	↑0.3	↑1.8
B-theory	26.3	28.4	↑2.1	↑1.8	30.3	27.0	↓3.3	↓1.8
Other	58.2	57.7			56.1	59.1		
Trolley problem								
Switch	68.2	66.2	↓2.0	↓3.1	74.8	67.4	↓7.4	↓5.9
Don't switch	7.6	11.9	↑4.3	↑3.1	6.2	10.7	↑4.5	↑5.9
Other	24.2	21.9			19.0	21.9		
Truth								
Correspondence	50.8	44.4	↓6.4	↓3.4	48.1	46.3	↓1.8	↑0.4
Deflationary	24.8	23.8	↓1.0	↑1.9	29.4	24.6	↓4.8	↓2.6
Epistemic	6.9	5.4	↓1.5	↑1.5	4.7	4.7	—	↑2.2
Other	17.5	26.4			17.8	24.4		
Zombies								
Inconceivable	16.0	13.1	↓2.9	↓1.2	18.7	16.0	↓2.7	↓1.1
Conceivable but not pos.	35.6	36.9	↑1.3	↑3.0	35.9	32.3	↓3.6	↓2.0
Metaphysically possible	23.3	19.9	↓3.4	↓1.8	20.2	21.7	↑1.5	↑3.1
Other	25.1	30.1			25.2	30.0		

Appendix B. Correlations

All correlations listed below have a p-value of less than 0.0001.

Table 19: Strongest correlations between main answers.

Answer A	Answer B	r	n
Cosmological fine-tuning: design	God: theism	0.72	708
Temporal ontology: eternalism	Time: A-theory	-0.7	534
Consciousness: dualism	Mind: physicalism	-0.69	838
Abortion: permissible	Cosmological fine-tuning: design	-0.68	629
Mind uploading: survival	Teletransporter: survival	0.65	806
Abortion: permissible	God: theism	-0.65	1016
Metaphilosophy: naturalism	Mind: physicalism	0.62	1231
Meta-ethics: moral realism	Moral judgment: cognitivism	0.6	1439
Temporal ontology: presentism	Time: A-theory	0.59	535
Metaphilosophy: naturalism	Morality: non-naturalism	-0.58	775
Cosmological fine-tuning: design	Meaning of life: objective	0.55	609
Aesthetic value: objective	Meaning of life: objective	0.52	1227
God: theism	Mind: physicalism	-0.52	1477
Consciousness: dualism	Metaphilosophy: naturalism	-0.52	734

Answer A	Answer B	r	n
Cosmological fine-tuning: design	Metaphilosophy: naturalism	-0.51	619
Metaontology: heavyweight realism	Truth: correspondence	0.5	575
God: theism	Meaning of life: objective	0.5	1311
Consciousness: dualism	Cosmological fine-tuning: design	0.5	578
Normative ethics: virtue ethics	Practical reason: Aristotelian	0.5	716
Philosophical knowledge	Philosophical progress	0.5	986
Normative ethics: deontology	Practical reason: Kantian	0.5	709
Metaontology: anti-realism	Science: scientific realism	-0.5	583
Cosmological fine-tuning: design	Mind: physicalism	-0.5	691
Cosmological fine-tuning: design	Free will: libertarianism	0.5	716
Abstract objects: Platonism	Properties: transcendent universals	0.5	614
A priori knowledge: yes	Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes	0.5	1524
Normative ethics: consequentialism	Practical reason: Humean	0.49	712
Aesthetic value: objective	Meta-ethics: moral realism	0.49	1382
Political philosophy: libertarianism	Politics: capitalism	0.48	720
Meaning of life: objective	Meta-ethics: moral realism	0.48	1272
God: theism	Metaphilosophy: naturalism	-0.47	1270
Meta-ethics: moral realism	Morality: expressivism	-0.47	903
Moral judgment: cognitivism	Morality: expressivism	-0.47	883
Consciousness: dualism	Morality: non-naturalism	0.47	699
Meaning of life: objective	Practical reason: Humean	-0.47	661
Metaontology: heavyweight realism	Truth: deflationary	-0.46	573
Meaning of life: objective	Well-being: objective list	0.46	705
Cosmological fine-tuning: multiverse	Quantum mechanics: many-worlds	0.46	377
Abstract objects: Platonism	Propositions: nonexistent	-0.46	637
Gender: biological	Gender categories: preserve	0.45	811
Free will: libertarianism	God: theism	0.45	1531
Consciousness: functionalism	Mind: physicalism	0.45	840
Knowledge: empiricism	Metaphilosophy: naturalism	0.45	1070
Abortion: permissible	Meaning of life: objective	-0.45	866
Gender: social	Race: social	0.45	1340
Gender: biological	Race: biological	0.44	1324
Gender: social	Gender categories: preserve	-0.44	822
Epistemic justification: internalism	Mental content: internalism	0.44	1222
Epistemic justification: internalism	Justif.: reliabilism	-0.44	765
Abortion: permissible	Free will: libertarianism	-0.44	1007
Meaning of life: objective	Metaphilosophy: naturalism	-0.43	1097
Abortion: permissible	Consciousness: dualism	-0.43	765
Abstract objects: Platonism	Knowledge: empiricism	-0.43	1131
Abortion: permissible	Mind: physicalism	0.43	970
Metaphilosophy: naturalism	Phil. method: empirical phil.	0.43	1267
Consciousness: dualism	God: theism	0.43	850
Abortion: permissible	Metaphilosophy: naturalism	0.43	858
Possible worlds: nonexistent	Propositions: nonexistent	0.43	612
Free will: libertarianism	Mind: physicalism	-0.43	1466
Footbridge: push	Normative ethics: consequentialism	0.42	1327
Gender categories: revise	Race categories: revise	0.42	686

Answer A	Answer B	r	n
Abortion: permissible	Gender categories: preserve	-0.42	762
Epistemic justification: internalism	Justif.: nonreliabilist found.	0.42	763
Properties: nonexistent	Propositions: nonexistent	0.42	494
Metaontology: deflationary realism	Truth: deflationary	0.41	572
Meaning of life: objective	Mind: physicalism	-0.41	1250
Theory of reference: deflationary	Truth: correspondence	-0.4	684
Gender categories: preserve	Race categories: preserve	0.4	686
Cosmological fine-tuning: design	Morality: non-naturalism	0.4	592
Mind: physicalism	Morality: non-naturalism	-0.4	861
Moral principles: moral generalism	Normative ethics: virtue ethics	-0.4	812
Grounds of intentionality: phenomenal	Propositional attitudes: phenomenal	0.4	468
Possible worlds: abstract	Propositions: nonexistent	-0.4	613
Meta-ethics: moral realism	Practical reason: Humean	-0.4	743
Consciousness: dualism	Free will: libertarianism	0.4	855
Practical reason: Humean	Well-being: objective list	-0.4	593
Free will: libertarianism	Metaphilosophy: naturalism	-0.39	1266
Metaontology: heavyweight realism	Moral judgment: cognitivism	0.39	569
Meta-ethics: moral realism	Metaontology: heavyweight realism	0.39	598
Mental content: internalism	Theory of reference: descriptive	0.39	670
Metaontology: deflationary realism	Truth: correspondence	-0.39	574
Theory of reference: deflationary	Truth: deflationary	0.39	683
Metaphilosophy: naturalism	Practical reason: Humean	0.39	656
Cosmological fine-tuning: design	Gender categories: preserve	0.38	536
Gender categories: eliminate	Race categories: eliminate	0.38	687
Consciousness: dualism	Meaning of life: objective	0.38	731
Gender categories: preserve	Politics: capitalism	0.38	674
Consciousness: dualism	Zombies: metaphysically possible	0.38	763
Meta-ethics: moral realism	Morality: error theory	-0.38	901
Aesthetic value: objective	Well-being: objective list	0.38	764
Concepts: nativism	Knowledge: empiricism	-0.38	601
God: theism	Human genetic eng.: permissible	-0.38	904
Logic: classical	True contradictions: impossible	0.38	690
Proper names: Fregean	Theory of reference: descriptive	0.37	607
Abstract objects: Platonism	Meta-ethics: moral realism	0.37	1324
Temporal ontology: growing block	Time: A-theory	0.37	533
Meaning of life: objective	Morality: non-naturalism	0.37	766
Grounds of intentionality: causal/teleo.	Theory of reference: causal	0.37	478
Laws of nature: Humean	Practical reason: Humean	0.37	693
Aesthetic value: objective	Practical reason: Humean	-0.37	708
Morality: non-naturalism	Personal identity: further-fact view	0.37	746
Aesthetic value: objective	Moral judgment: cognitivism	0.37	1330
Politics: capitalism	Race: biological	0.37	808
Consciousness: dualism	Hard problem of consc.: yes	0.37	711
Meaning of life: objective	Practical reason: Aristotelian	0.37	662
Knowledge: empiricism	Morality: non-naturalism	-0.36	741
External world: non-skeptical realism	Science: scientific realism	0.36	1474
Abstract objects: Platonism	Metaontology: heavyweight realism	0.36	552

Answer A	Answer B	r	n
Cosmological fine-tuning: design	Immortality: yes	0.36	625
Meta-ethics: moral realism	Morality: non-naturalism	0.36	901
Temporal ontology: eternalism	Time travel: metaphysically possible	0.36	539
Abortion: permissible	Human genetic eng.: permissible	0.36	826
Metaontology: heavyweight realism	Theory of reference: deflationary	-0.36	457
Aesthetic value: objective	Meaning of life: subjective	-0.36	1228
Meaning of life: objective	Moral judgment: cognitivism	0.36	1227
A priori knowledge: yes	Knowledge: empiricism	-0.36	1258
Mind uploading: survival	Personal identity: psychological view	0.36	733
Consciousness in AIs	Mind uploading: survival	0.36	768
Logic: classical	True contradictions: actual	-0.36	690
Consciousness on complexity scale	Other minds: newborn babies	0.36	1051
Knowledge: empiricism	Laws of nature: Humean	0.36	1128
Cosmological fine-tuning: design	Personal identity: further-fact view	0.36	597
Cosmological fine-tuning: brute fact	God: theism	-0.35	707
Aesthetic value: objective	Cosmological fine-tuning: design	0.35	648
Abortion: permissible	Gender: social	0.35	908
Knowledge: empiricism	Mind: physicalism	0.35	1212
Chinese room: understands	Consciousness: dualism	-0.35	691

Table 20: Strongest correlations between region of affiliation and main answers.

Region	Answer	r	n
Region of affiliation: Europe	Aim of philosophy: wisdom	-0.1	1543
Region of affiliation: Europe	Capital punishment: permissible	-0.14	1059
Region of affiliation: Europe	Human genetic eng.: permissible	-0.15	960
Region of affiliation: Europe	Moral judgment: cognitivism	-0.12	1530
Region of affiliation: Europe	Political philosophy: libertarianism	0.11	1316
Region of affiliation: Europe	Race: social	-0.2	1473
Region of affiliation: Europe	Race: unreal	0.17	1443
Region of affiliation: Europe	Race categories: revise	-0.14	834
Region of affiliation: Latin America	Arguments for theism: moral	0.14	833
Region of affiliation: US	Capital punishment: permissible	0.14	1059
Region of affiliation: US	God: theism	0.1	1633
Region of affiliation: US	Immortality: yes	0.13	1027
Region of affiliation: US	Meaning of life: objective	0.11	1367
Region of affiliation: US	Meta-ethics: moral realism	0.12	1574
Region of affiliation: US	Moral judgment: cognitivism	0.11	1530
Region of affiliation: US	Normative ethics: consequentialism	-0.13	1499
Region of affiliation: US	Perceptual experience: qualia theory	0.13	1128
Region of affiliation: US	Race: social	0.19	1473
Region of affiliation: US	Race: unreal	-0.12	1443
Region of affiliation: US	Well-being: hedonism/experientialism	-0.14	850

Table 21: Strongest correlations between nationality and main answers.

Region	Answer	r	n
Nationality: Europe	Aim of philosophy: wisdom	-0.11	1436
Nationality: Europe	Capital punishment: permissible	-0.19	1007
Nationality: Europe	Human genetic eng.: permissible	-0.13	913
Nationality: Europe	Immortality: yes	-0.14	970
Nationality: Europe	Meta-ethics: moral realism	-0.12	1460
Nationality: Europe	Moral judgment: cognitivism	-0.15	1420
Nationality: Europe	Morality: expressivism	0.13	895
Nationality: Europe	Race: social	-0.22	1380
Nationality: Europe	Race: unreal	0.18	1355
Nationality: Europe	Race categories: eliminate	0.14	794
Nationality: Europe	Race categories: revise	-0.16	794
Nationality: UK	Personal identity: biological view	0.12	1233
Nationality: UK	Well-being: desire satisfaction	-0.15	797
Nationality: Oceania	Free will: compatibilism	0.1	1502
Nationality: Oceania	Properties: classes	0.16	638
Nationality: US	Abortion: permissible	-0.13	1022
Nationality: US	Aim of philosophy: wisdom	0.12	1436
Nationality: US	Capital punishment: permissible	0.18	1007
Nationality: US	Cosmological fine-tuning: design	0.15	706
Nationality: US	God: theism	0.15	1514
Nationality: US	Immortality: yes	0.16	970
Nationality: US	Meaning of life: objective	0.13	1278
Nationality: US	Meta-ethics: moral realism	0.13	1460
Nationality: US	Moral judgment: cognitivism	0.13	1420
Nationality: US	Normative ethics: consequentialism	-0.13	1398
Nationality: US	Perceptual experience: qualia theory	0.15	1048
Nationality: US	Properties: transcendent universals	0.15	639
Nationality: US	Race: social	0.2	1380
Nationality: US	Race: unreal	-0.15	1355
Nationality: US	Zombies: metaphysically possible	0.12	1310

Table 22: Strongest correlations between region of PhD and main answers.

Region	Region	r	n
Region of PhD: Canada	Analysis of knowledge: justified true belief	0.16	706
Region of PhD: Europe	Meta-ethics: moral realism	-0.14	1105
Region of PhD: Europe	Political philosophy: libertarianism	0.13	907
Region of PhD: Europe	Race: social	-0.15	1013
Region of PhD: UK	Analysis of knowledge: justified true belief	-0.15	706

Region	Region	r	n
Region of PhD: UK	Analysis of knowledge: no analysis	0.2	705
Region of PhD: UK	Perceptual experience: disjunctivism	0.15	795
Region of PhD: Oceania	Morality: non-naturalism	-0.15	688
Region of PhD: Oceania	Practical reason: Humean	0.16	592
Region of PhD: Oceania	Proper names: Fregean	0.14	795
Region of PhD: US	God: theism	0.12	1141
Region of PhD: US	Knowledge: empiricism	-0.14	908
Region of PhD: US	Meaning of life: objective	0.14	953
Region of PhD: US	Meta-ethics: moral realism	0.13	1105
Region of PhD: US	Perceptual experience: qualia theory	0.14	793
Region of PhD: US	Race: social	0.14	1013

Table 23: Strongest correlations between year of birth and main answers. Positively correlated items are associated with younger respondents.

Answer	r	n
Eating animals/products of: veganism	0.27	1497
Eating animals/products of: omnivorism	-0.24	1499
External-world skepticism: dogmatist	0.21	779
Gender: biological	-0.19	1326
Interlevel metaphysics: grounding	0.19	595
Race: social	0.19	1358
Time travel: metaphysically possible	0.18	819
Law: legal positivism	0.17	554
External-world skepticism: semantic externalist	0.16	777
Gender: social	0.15	1339
Phil. method: conceptual engineering	0.15	1496
Morality: non-naturalism	0.15	877
Immortality: yes	0.14	960
Phil. method: empirical phil.	0.13	1496
Phil. method: formal philosophy	0.13	1496
Race: biological	-0.11	1358

Table 24: Strongest correlations between gender: female and main answers.

Answer	r	n
Material composition: nihilism	0.21	470
Politics: capitalism	-0.19	896
External-world skepticism: pragmatic	0.19	825
Eating animals/products of: omnivorism	-0.16	1598

Answer	r	n
Environmental ethics: anthropocentric	-0.16	828
Race: social	0.16	1449
Gender: social	0.16	1427
Immortality: yes	-0.15	1008
External world: idealism	0.15	1595
Morality: constructivism	0.15	933
Truth: epistemic	0.15	1433
Capital punishment: permissible	-0.15	1045
Gender: biological	-0.15	1412
Eating animals/products of: vegetarianism	0.14	1600
Laws of nature: Humean	0.14	1438
Values in science: necessarily value-laden	0.13	895
True contradictions: impossible	-0.13	848
Gender categories: preserve	-0.13	877
Trolley problem: switch	-0.13	1419
Race: biological	-0.13	1448
Eating animals/products of: veganism	0.12	1596
External world: non-skeptical realism	-0.12	1592
Philosophical progress	-0.12	1600

Table 25: Strongest correlations between areas of specialization and main answers.

AOS	Answer	r	n
17th/18th Century Phil.	Consciousness: panpsychism	0.16	889
17th/18th Century Phil.	External world: idealism	0.13	1595
17th/18th Century Phil.	External world: non-skeptical realism	-0.13	1592
17th/18th Century Phil.	Practical reason: Kantian	0.15	795
19th Century Phil.	External world: idealism	0.2	1595
19th Century Phil.	External world: non-skeptical realism	-0.14	1592
19th Century Phil.	Justif.: coherentism	0.15	825
19th Century Phil.	Philosophical progress	-0.15	1601
19th Century Phil.	True contradictions: impossible	-0.17	860
19th Century Phil.	Truth: correspondence	-0.15	1433
19th Century Phil.	Truth: epistemic	0.13	1429
20th Century Phil.	Truth: correspondence	-0.13	1433
Ancient Greek and Roman Phil.	Normative ethics: virtue ethics	0.15	1475
Ancient Greek and Roman Phil.	Political philosophy: communitarianism	0.15	1297
Ancient Greek and Roman Phil.	Practical reason: Aristotelian	0.26	798
Ancient Greek and Roman Phil.	Practical reason: Humean	-0.22	797
Applied Ethics	Analysis of knowledge: no analysis	-0.14	943
Applied Ethics	Moral principles: moral generalism	0.13	911
Applied Ethics	Perceptual experience: sense-datum theory	0.16	1109
Asian Phil.	Consciousness: panpsychism	0.18	889

AOS	Answer	r	n
Continental Phil.	External world: idealism	0.18	1595
Continental Phil.	External world: non-skeptical realism	-0.13	1592
Continental Phil.	Method hist. phil.: analytic/rational reconstruction	-0.2	855
Continental Phil.	Mind: physicalism	-0.15	1524
Continental Phil.	Phil. method: formal philosophy	-0.15	1599
Continental Phil.	Propositional attitudes: representational	-0.21	714
Continental Phil.	Science: scientific realism	-0.18	1509
Continental Phil.	True contradictions: actual	0.18	860
Continental Phil.	True contradictions: impossible	-0.2	860
Decision Theory	Mind uploading: survival	0.15	897
Decision Theory	Newcomb's problem: one box	-0.13	964
Decision Theory	Phil. method: formal philosophy	0.14	1599
Decision Theory	Politics: capitalism	0.15	913
Decision Theory	Practical reason: Aristotelian	-0.14	798
Decision Theory	Practical reason: Humean	0.21	797
Epistemology	Analysis of knowledge: justified true belief	-0.13	945
Epistemology	Justif.: coherentism	-0.16	825
Epistemology	Justif.: infinitism	-0.16	815
Epistemology	Justif.: nonreliabilist found.	0.16	824
Epistemology	Knowledge claims: contextualism	-0.18	1335
Epistemology	Knowledge claims: invariantism	0.15	1332
Epistemology	External-world skepticism: pragmatic	-0.14	836
Feminist Phil.	Eating animals/products of: veganism	0.13	1598
Feminist Phil.	Gender: biological	-0.13	1423
Feminist Phil.	Gender: social	0.14	1436
Feminist Phil.	Race: social	0.14	1452
General Phil. of Science	Causation: nonexistent	-0.14	802
General Phil. of Science	Causation: primitive	-0.14	802
General Phil. of Science	Knowledge: empiricism	0.15	1288
General Phil. of Science	Metaphilosophy: naturalism	0.14	1315
General Phil. of Science	Normative ethics: consequentialism	0.14	1472
General Phil. of Science	Phil. method: intuition-based	-0.17	1599
General Phil. of Science	Phil. method: linguistic philosophy	-0.13	1599
General Phil. of Science	Principle of sufficient reason: true	-0.16	872
Logic and Phil. of Logic	Phil. method: formal philosophy	0.2	1599
Logic and Phil. of Logic	Principle of sufficient reason: true	-0.14	872
Logic and Phil. of Logic	Wittgenstein: early	0.14	864
Medieval and Renaissance Phil.	Abortion: permissible	-0.29	1074
Medieval and Renaissance Phil.	Arguments for theism: cosmological	0.19	835
Medieval and Renaissance Phil.	Causation: primitive	0.14	802
Medieval and Renaissance Phil.	Cosmological fine-tuning: brute fact	-0.17	741
Medieval and Renaissance Phil.	Cosmological fine-tuning: design	0.3	742
Medieval and Renaissance Phil.	Free will: libertarianism	0.16	1592
Medieval and Renaissance Phil.	Gender categories: preserve	0.13	887
Medieval and Renaissance Phil.	God: theism	0.25	1604
Medieval and Renaissance Phil.	Material composition: restrictivism	0.21	479
Medieval and Renaissance Phil.	Meaning of life: objective	0.13	1350

AOS	Answer	r	n
Medieval and Renaissance Phil.	Metaphilosophy: naturalism	-0.14	1315
Medieval and Renaissance Phil.	Mind uploading: survival	-0.16	897
Medieval and Renaissance Phil.	Normative ethics: consequentialism	-0.13	1472
Medieval and Renaissance Phil.	Normative ethics: virtue ethics	0.14	1475
Medieval and Renaissance Phil.	Practical reason: Aristotelian	0.27	798
Medieval and Renaissance Phil.	Practical reason: Humean	-0.21	797
Medieval and Renaissance Phil.	Practical reason: Kantian	-0.17	795
Medieval and Renaissance Phil.	Principle of sufficient reason: true	0.15	872
Meta-Ethics	Interlevel metaphysics: grounding	0.19	626
Meta-Ethics	Phil. method: intuition-based	0.16	1599
Metaphilosophy	Interlevel metaphysics: identity	0.21	619
Metaphysics	Abstract objects: Platonism	0.18	1413
Metaphysics	Arguments for theism: pragmatic	-0.15	824
Metaphysics	Continuum hypothesis: determinate	0.21	436
Metaphysics	Cosmological fine-tuning: design	0.16	742
Metaphysics	Extended mind: yes	-0.16	879
Metaphysics	External world: skepticism	-0.15	1593
Metaphysics	Justif.: coherentism	-0.18	825
Metaphysics	Justif.: nonreliabilist found.	0.17	824
Metaphysics	Knowledge: empiricism	-0.15	1288
Metaphysics	Laws of nature: Humean	-0.14	1429
Metaphysics	Material composition: nihilism	-0.26	479
Metaphysics	Metaontology: anti-realism	-0.22	615
Metaphysics	Metaontology: deflationary realism	-0.23	616
Metaphysics	Metaontology: heavyweight realism	0.29	618
Metaphysics	Method hist. phil.: analytic/rational reconstruction	0.17	855
Metaphysics	Morality: constructivism	-0.17	940
Metaphysics	Morality: non-naturalism	0.13	936
Metaphysics	Other minds: newborn babies	0.13	1031
Metaphysics	Properties: classes	-0.21	670
Metaphysics	External-world skepticism: pragmatic	-0.18	836
Metaphysics	Science: scientific realism	0.15	1509
Metaphysics	Spacetime: relationism	-0.22	574
Metaphysics	Temporal ontology: eternalism	0.19	654
Metaphysics	Temporal ontology: growing block	-0.22	652
Metaphysics	Theory of reference: deflationary	-0.15	753
Metaphysics	Time travel: metaphysically possible	0.13	871
Metaphysics	Truth: correspondence	0.13	1433
Metaphysics	Truth: epistemic	-0.17	1429
Metaphysics	Wittgenstein: early	0.19	864
Normative Ethics	Meaning of life: objective	0.14	1350
Normative Ethics	Moral judgment: cognitivism	0.15	1500
Normative Ethics	Moral principles: moral generalism	0.2	911
Normative Ethics	Phil. method: intuition-based	0.15	1599
Phil. of Biology	Knowledge: empiricism	0.14	1288
Phil. of Biology	Moral judgment: cognitivism	-0.14	1500
Phil. of Cognitive Science	Causation: primitive	-0.14	802

AOS	Answer	r	n
Phil. of Cognitive Science	Chinese room: understands	0.13	923
Phil. of Cognitive Science	Consciousness: dualism	-0.18	888
Phil. of Cognitive Science	Grounds of intentionality: causal/teleo.	0.17	648
Phil. of Cognitive Science	Grounds of intentionality: primitive	-0.18	646
Phil. of Cognitive Science	Hard problem of consc.: yes	-0.17	941
Phil. of Cognitive Science	Justif.: nonreliabilist found.	-0.16	824
Phil. of Cognitive Science	Knowledge: empiricism	0.14	1288
Phil. of Cognitive Science	Metaphilosophy: naturalism	0.21	1315
Phil. of Cognitive Science	Mind: physicalism	0.21	1524
Phil. of Cognitive Science	Morality: non-naturalism	-0.13	936
Phil. of Cognitive Science	Perceptual experience: representationalism	0.14	1120
Phil. of Cognitive Science	Phil. method: empirical phil.	0.22	1599
Phil. of Cognitive Science	Phil. method: experimental philosophy	0.15	1599
Phil. of Cognitive Science	Practical reason: Humean	0.14	797
Phil. of Gender: Race: and Sexuality	Values in science: necessarily value-laden	0.14	907
Phil. of Language	Abstract objects: Platonism	0.14	1413
Phil. of Language	Analysis of knowledge: no analysis	0.14	943
Phil. of Language	Phil. method: formal philosophy	0.14	1599
Phil. of Language	Phil. method: linguistic philosophy	0.23	1599
Phil. of Language	Possible worlds: abstract	0.15	980
Phil. of Language	Possible worlds: nonexistent	-0.15	980
Phil. of Language	Principle of sufficient reason: true	-0.16	872
Phil. of Language	External-world skepticism: contextualist	0.15	824
Phil. of Law	Normative ethics: deontology	0.13	1472
Phil. of Mathematics	Foundations of math: logicism	-0.19	514
Phil. of Mind	Other minds: newborn babies	0.13	1031
Phil. of Mind	Perceptual experience: qualia theory	-0.13	1113
Phil. of Mind	Perceptual experience: sense-datum theory	-0.21	1109
Phil. of Physical Science	Causation: primitive	-0.14	802
Phil. of Religion	Abortion: permissible	-0.42	1074
Phil. of Religion	Aesthetic value: objective	0.16	1453
Phil. of Religion	Aim of philosophy: wisdom	0.13	1514
Phil. of Religion	Capital punishment: permissible	0.18	1054
Phil. of Religion	Causation: counterfactual/difference-making	-0.18	811
Phil. of Religion	Causation: primitive	0.19	802
Phil. of Religion	Chinese room: understands	-0.15	923
Phil. of Religion	Consciousness: dualism	0.28	888
Phil. of Religion	Consciousness: functionalism	-0.22	890
Phil. of Religion	Cosmological fine-tuning: brute fact	-0.26	741
Phil. of Religion	Cosmological fine-tuning: design	0.48	742
Phil. of Religion	Cosmological fine-tuning: multiverse	-0.22	742
Phil. of Religion	Cosmological fine-tuning: no fine-tuning	-0.21	738
Phil. of Religion	Eating animals/products of: omnivorism	0.14	1601
Phil. of Religion	Free will: compatibilism	-0.22	1595
Phil. of Religion	Free will: libertarianism	0.28	1592
Phil. of Religion	Gender: social	-0.14	1436
Phil. of Religion	Gender categories: preserve	0.2	887

AOS	Answer	r	n
Phil. of Religion	Gender categories: revise	-0.14	890
Phil. of Religion	God: theism	0.4	1604
Phil. of Religion	Hard problem of consc.: yes	0.14	941
Phil. of Religion	Human genetic eng.: permissible	-0.14	956
Phil. of Religion	Immortality: yes	0.26	1023
Phil. of Religion	Justif.: coherentism	-0.14	825
Phil. of Religion	Justif.: nonreliabilist found.	0.14	824
Phil. of Religion	Laws of nature: Humean	-0.15	1429
Phil. of Religion	Meaning of life: nonexistent	-0.17	1334
Phil. of Religion	Meaning of life: objective	0.26	1350
Phil. of Religion	Meaning of life: subjective	-0.18	1352
Phil. of Religion	Meta-ethics: moral realism	0.16	1547
Phil. of Religion	Metaontology: heavyweight realism	0.19	618
Phil. of Religion	Metaphilosophy: naturalism	-0.29	1315
Phil. of Religion	Mind: physicalism	-0.23	1524
Phil. of Religion	Mind uploading: survival	-0.13	897
Phil. of Religion	Moral judgment: cognitivism	0.14	1500
Phil. of Religion	Morality: constructivism	-0.17	940
Phil. of Religion	Morality: error theory	-0.14	936
Phil. of Religion	Morality: non-naturalism	0.23	936
Phil. of Religion	Personal identity: further-fact view	0.16	1298
Phil. of Religion	Personal identity: psychological view	-0.17	1309
Phil. of Religion	Politics: capitalism	0.2	913
Phil. of Religion	Practical reason: Aristotelian	0.15	798
Phil. of Religion	Principle of sufficient reason: true	0.2	872
Phil. of Religion	Semantic content: minimalism	0.17	725
Phil. of Religion	Truth: correspondence	0.15	1433
Phil. of Religion	Truth: deflationary	-0.13	1430
Phil. of Religion	Well-being: desire satisfaction	-0.15	847
Phil. of Religion	Well-being: objective list	0.17	846
Phil. of Social Science	Practical reason: Humean	0.14	797
Social and Political Phil.	Justif.: coherentism	0.14	825
Social and Political Phil.	Morality: constructivism	0.15	940
Social and Political Phil.	Normative ethics: deontology	0.16	1472
Social and Political Phil.	Phil. method: formal philosophy	-0.13	1599
Social and Political Phil.	Political philosophy: communitarianism	-0.21	1297
Social and Political Phil.	Political philosophy: egalitarianism	0.18	1300
Social and Political Phil.	Propositional attitudes: phenomenal	0.16	702
Social and Political Phil.	Propositions: acts	0.15	707

Appendix C. Specialist effects

Table 26: Largest specialist effects. Column S is the percentage of non-“other” answers among specialists (inclusive of combination answers). NS is the percentage of non-“other” answers among non-specialists. Differences of more than 15% are starred.

Speciality	Answer	S	NS	Δ	
17th/18th Century Philosophy	Principle of sufficient reason: true	60.5	41.9	18.5	*
Aesthetics	Aesthetic value: objective	75.0	52.6	22.4	*
Applied Ethics	Eating animals and animal products: omnivorism (yes and yes)	40.6	55.1	-14.5	
Applied Ethics	Human genetic engineering: permissible	82.8	75.8	7.0	
Decision Theory	Newcomb’s problem: one box	22.7	46.1	-23.4	*
Epistemology	A priori knowledge: yes	82.9	79.0	4.0	
Epistemology	Knowledge: empiricism	56.0	63.5	-7.5	
Epistemology	Epistemic justification: internalism	54.6	40.3	14.3	
Epistemology	External world: idealism	4.3	8.3	-4.1	
Epistemology	Knowledge claims: contextualism	49.8	71.3	-21.4	*
Epistemology	Analysis of knowledge: justified true belief	20.2	30.4	-10.3	
Epistemology	Belief or credence: credence	29.7	43.3	-13.6	
Epistemology	Justification: coherentism	21.5	34.6	-13.1	
Epistemology	Justification: nonreliabilist foundationalism	47.4	25.7	21.6	*
Epistemology	Response to external-world skepticism: dogmatist	27.6	11.7	15.9	*
Epistemology	Response to external-world skepticism: epistemic externalist	31.6	19.5	12.1	
Epistemology	Sleeping beauty: one-third	69.4	54.3	15.1	*
General Philosophy of Science	Science: scientific realism	76.5	84.3	-7.8	
History of Western Philosophy	Method in history of philosophy: analytic/rational reconstruction	57.9	74.1	-16.2	*
Logic and Philosophy of Logic	Logic: classical	54.3	73.2	-18.9	*
Meta-Ethics	Moral judgment: cognitivism	83.0	76.8	6.2	
Meta-Ethics	Morality: non-naturalism	39.2	28.5	10.8	
Meta-Ethics	Morality: constructivism	18.3	24.8	-6.5	
Meta-Ethics	Morality: expressivism	16.3	11.3	5.1	
Meta-Ethics	Normative concepts: fit	17.5	8.1	9.5	
Meta-Ethics	Ought implies can: yes	76.8	67.8	9.0	
Metaphilosophy	Aim of philosophy: understanding	73.5	62.2	11.4	
Metaphilosophy	Philosophical methods: conceptual analysis	62.5	78.6	-16.1	*
Metaphilosophy	Philosophical knowledge: none	12.2	3.5	8.7	
Metaphilosophy	Philosophical knowledge: a little	22.4	36.0	-13.6	
Metaphysics	Abstract objects: Platonism	64.2	43.2	21.0	*
Metaphysics	External world: skepticism	2.6	7.0	-4.4	
Metaphysics	Laws of nature: Humean	26.2	40.1	-14.0	
Metaphysics	Personal identity: psychological view	52.1	62.1	-10.1	
Metaphysics	Causation: counterfactual/difference-making	39.4	50.0	-10.6	
Metaphysics	Causation: process/production	35.4	25.8	9.6	
Metaphysics	Causation: primitive	32.3	23.4	8.9	

Speciality	Answer	S	NS	Δ	
Metaphysics	Interlevel metaphysics: grounding	53.1	35.5	17.6	*
Metaphysics	Interlevel metaphysics: identity	24.9	12.0	12.8	
Metaphysics	Material composition: nihilism	5.9	17.0	-11.1	
Metaphysics	Metaontology: heavyweight realism	69.2	39.7	29.5	*
Metaphysics	Metaontology: deflationary realism	22.7	43.0	-20.3	*
Metaphysics	Principle of sufficient reason: true	36.3	47.2	-10.9	
Metaphysics	Properties: classes	7.9	21.2	-13.2	
Metaphysics	Properties: transcendent universals	35.1	24.1	11.1	
Metaphysics	Temporal ontology: eternalism	64.8	46.4	18.3	*
Metaphysics	Time travel: metaphysically possible	60.6	46.9	13.7	
Normative Ethics	Normative ethics: deontology	48.7	37.2	11.5	
Normative Ethics	Trolley problem: switch	87.8	82.1	5.7	
Normative Ethics	Footbridge: push	24.2	29.4	-5.2	
Normative Ethics	Moral principles: moral generalism	75.9	58.6	17.4	*
Philosophy of Cognitive Science	Chinese room: understands	40.2	18.9	21.3	*
Philosophy of Gender, Race, and Sexuality	Gender: biological	15.0	35.7	-20.8	*
Philosophy of Gender, Race, and Sexuality	Gender: social	95.3	72.4	22.9	*
Philosophy of Gender, Race, and Sexuality	Race: biological	9.5	22.6	-13.0	
Philosophy of Gender, Race, and Sexuality	Race: social	96.2	71.5	24.7	*
Philosophy of Gender, Race, and Sexuality	Gender categories: preserve	7.0	25.8	-18.7	*
Philosophy of Language	Knowledge claims: contextualism	59.0	67.2	-8.2	
Philosophy of Language	Proper names: Fregean	40.3	51.6	-11.3	
Philosophy of Language	Truth: deflationary	36.8	28.2	8.5	
Philosophy of Language	Vagueness: epistemic	20.2	31.0	-10.8	
Philosophy of Language	Semantic content: minimalism (no more than a few)	15.8	8.9	6.9	
Philosophy of Mathematics	Foundations of mathematics: structuralism	52.9	30.8	22.2	*
Philosophy of Mind	Mind: physicalism	66.6	60.8	5.8	
Philosophy of Mind	Perceptual experience: representationalism	63.8	51.9	12.0	
Philosophy of Mind	Zombies: inconceivable	27.1	19.6	7.4	
Philosophy of Mind	Concepts: nativism	46.3	35.6	10.7	
Philosophy of Mind	Grounds of intentionality: phenomenal	22.4	13.0	9.4	
Philosophy of Mind	Mind uploading: survival	39.2	31.9	7.3	
Philosophy of Mind	Other minds: cats	97.3	91.8	5.5	
Philosophy of Mind	Other minds: fish	78.3	65.9	12.3	
Philosophy of Mind	Other minds: flies	44.8	33.9	10.9	
Philosophy of Mind	Other minds: worms	29.9	24.2	5.7	
Philosophy of Mind	Other minds: newborn babies	94.1	87.1	7.1	
Philosophy of Mind	Other minds: current AI systems	0.9	4.3	-3.4	
Philosophy of Mind	Propositional attitudes: representational	63.4	55.2	8.1	
Philosophy of Physical Science	Quantum mechanics: collapse	48.1	23.8	24.3	*
Philosophy of Religion	God: theism	77.8	17.0	60.8	*
Philosophy of Religion	Arguments for theism: cosmological	46.8	32.1	14.7	
Philosophy of Religion	Arguments for theism: design	40.4	27.0	13.4	
Philosophy of Religion	Cosmological fine-tuning: design	73.7	12.5	61.2	*
Philosophy of Religion	Cosmological fine-tuning: multiverse	5.3	20.9	-15.6	*
Philosophy of Religion	Cosmological fine-tuning: brute fact	13.7	43.9	-30.2	*
Social and Political Philosophy	Political philosophy: communitarianism	22.6	38.0	-15.4	*

Speciality	Answer	S	NS	Δ	
Social and Political Philosophy	Political philosophy: egalitarianism	70.6	53.7	16.9	*
Value Theory	Experience machine: yes	12.9	16.4	-3.5	
Value Theory	Meaning of life: objective	47.9	37.7	10.2	
Value Theory	Well-being: desire satisfaction	19.8	27.2	-7.4	