I was very honored by the article “The object of the subject2*” in which Lance A. Kair quotes extensively one of my articles “The philosophy of language and the ontology of knowledge” (ref PLOC).

His article seems quite interesting, unfortunately his English is much too sophisticated for me who was not born an English speaker. My understanding of the arguments is too uncertain to be able to provide justified responses or comments.

Nevertheless I would like to make two remarks about Lance's article:

1) The article “The philosophy of language and the ontology of knowledge” (ref PLOC) is not really suitable for Lance's use of it. Indeed, in this article, I only recall the key elements of the Ontology of Knowledge (OK), without justification, the main subject being philosophy of language. The articles ref {OdC, REAL or TRANS} which detail the foundations of the OK would have been more useful to Lance in developing his argument and would have avoided many errors of interpretation of OK. In particular, Lance interprets Interdependence as a kind of correlation between objects and subject whereas, according to the OK, Interdependence is the very essence of reality.

2) I completely approve of the Lance's general idea that knowledge of the subject only ever speaks to the subject himself and of nothing more than the subject himself. And yet, when due to their mode of emergence, objects of this knowledge seem to occupy part of a space (whatever it may be) which would contain them, it is tempting for the subject to give this space the name of Reality. The conventional western philosophies (and science) gave in to this temptation. They came to distinguish the Subject {place-of-the-mind} from the Reality {place-of-the-objects} whereas Reality is only the "objectified" or rather "objectivized" aspect of knowledge of the subject. From this artificial distinction followed a great confusion, a dispute that lasted for centuries, and still does, between different -isms with infinitesimal differences, from which the most influential parties emerge victorious each at his turn.

In reaction to this confusion, Lance proposes a "pivotal" re-orientation taking as a model "mental health counseling". He suggests considering the way objects of knowledge emerge and are organized, not in correlation with objects of Reality but with the subject for himself and knowledge for itself.

The difference between Lance's theses and OK is that Lance proposes a psychological approach for this re-orientation while the OK proposes to transcend the subject's mind to reveal its logical principles.

That's the specific subject I would like to delve into here : the transcendance of meaning.

This is necessary for understanding the OK and could be beneficial to “mental health counseling”.

Meaning is not a given.

Whether the object of knowledge is the external world, the subject as an object for his own knowledge or the inter-subjective part that we call language, culture, social norm etc., everything that the subject thinks “becomes” the subject and in this way modifies the knowing subject. By thinking about the world the subject becomes himself. The subject is neither a mental-container nor a mental-processor of knowledge, he is and becomes knowledge.

We tend to believe that thinking is something we do in addition to living, that there are thoughts in a mind and a mind that thinks in a body that lives.

This is wrong: Thoughts are nothing other than thinking and thinking is nothing other than living. The difference is just a matter of description.

Now it is trivial to say that the knowing subject only knows through meaning. The idea carried by an object, a word or an image only becomes knowledge through the subject who gives it meaning, whatever the modalities and conditions of possibility of the emergence of meaning.

We must then distinguish a dual reality of meaning:
-On the one hand the meaning for what it says to the subject: that in which the meaning is intelligible to him. For example: The thought of “red” is intelligible to the subject, both as a concept or an immediate sensation. Since we are entirely real, our thinking is real and the meaning for what it says is real.

-On the other hand, meaning for what it is in the mind: for its real nature. Not for the worldly reality that the color red denotes but for the reality of the mind from which the concept or the immediate sensation of “red” emerges. And this is not the physical nature of the brain that thinks “red” because this physical nature doesn't tell you about meaning.

The term dual reality should not deceive us, it does not designate two realities but two aspects of a reality: a flock of 100 sheep is nothing other than the hundred sheep that compose it, nor even the bonds that make them up unite.

Meaning for what it says is not another “thing” than meaning for what it is, knowledge is not “another thing” than that which knows.

The meaning in the subject is not “another thing” than the subject's spirit nor even than the act of its emergence.

Expressed in the first person: my reality and my thoughts are one.

Meaning is not an isomorphic image of reality
Both aspects of meaning are real, yet meaning for what it is does not have the formal attributes of meaning for what it says.

Some of the most obvious examples:

The idea of the One thing: Of course, this object in front of me is made up of billions of cells and in that sense it is not One in reality. But in the reality of the mind from which it emerges, the lived idea of this One object is not One either. It is even probable that the reality (of the mind) from which the experienced idea of this object emerges cannot be separated from the reality from which all other experienced ideas emerge. It is the same for concepts.

The idea of number: The experienced idea of these 20 objects in front of me does not emerge in my mind as 20 distinct realities. So the idea of cardinality 'for what it tells me' does not have its equivalent in my thought for what it is.

The idea of the Whole: The view of the starry sky rises in me the experienced idea of a Whole within which I exist. But I know this Whole only in my knowledge and the reality of my knowledge is in me subject. Everything that does not become my knowledge does not exist for me.

And my consciousness is One as condition of possibility of meaning.

Thus, the lived idea of the Whole tells me that “the Whole contains the One” while for what it is “the One contains the Whole”.

The idea of the present moment: The theory of Relativity has shown us that the concept of “present moment of the universe” does not correspond to any reality. But it is just as true that in the subject, the reality from which the experienced thought of a “present moment of the universe” emerges cannot be all in the present. By what miracle of connectivity could this thought bring together the multitude of information which constitutes such a complex idea in an instant without temporal depth?

The idea of change: If the idea of the present moment is not present in its reality, what about the experienced idea of change: what trajectory follows the reality of the thought that represents a change of the object X from a state X₁ to a state X₂ if the states X₁ (resp.X₂) of X are not present in the reality of my spirit at time 1 (resp.2)? So when Quantum Mechanics wonders about the trajectory of the particle X from state X₁ to state X₂ it forgets that the very idea of such a trajectory has no reality.

We could mention in a similar way the ideas of point, place, order, extension, distance...

This enumeration imposes the rational evidence that the reality from which our knowledge emerges does not have the form that our knowledge gives to the world.

Possibly our universe has a form other than that which we attribute to it in representation and certainly the idea of the world in its reality does not have the formal attributes of the world that it represents.

The world described is incommensurable with the reality of the spirit which describes it.

So much so that the reality of our mind from which our representation emerges is not subject to the spatio-temporal framework that it describes and the disjointed objects which furnish our world do not have their formal equivalent in the reality of the mind.

The most realistic among realists must admit this evidence: The emergence of meaning out of the reality of the mind, which is a necessary condition for our knowledge of the world, is not an isomorphism.
Now if realism can maintain that there is a reality independent of the mind, it cannot deny that the mind is an obligatory passage for the representation of this reality.

And since meaning determines the action that changes reality, meaning cannot deny (except by a theological a priori) that meaning is a reality.

The realism/idealism opposition is therefore, strictly speaking, meaningless.

If we can speak of a reality independent of the mind, we must admit: on the one hand that the mind is nothing other than reality and on the other hand that the idea of the world which emerges in the mind is incommensurable to its reality.

The emergence of the idea of the world out of its reality is at best a metamorphosis or even a morphogenesis.

**The success of our confrontation with reality does not found realism**

To overcome this problem, various theories bring into play the idea of confrontation: whatever the reality of the meaning, the representation is made isomorphic with reality by the confrontation between predictions resulting from the representation and experience of reality:

> Let’s consider my representation \( r(W) \) of the reality of the world \( W \). From \( r(W) \) I deduce the prediction \( p.r(A) \) of an experience \( r(A) \). If the experience \( r(A) \) reveals different from \( p.r(A) \), an adaptive type system corrects the extensional structure of my concepts (i.e. my multiplicity) until all (or almost all) predictions \( p.r(x) \) are confirmed by an \( r(x) \) experiment. The representation \( r \) is then qualified as an isomorphic application from reality \( W \) to its representation \( r(W) \).

Unfortunately, this confrontation misses its objective because we only confront predictions having meaning according to \( r \) with experiences having meaning according to \( r \). It is therefore not all the possibles in \( W \) which serve as the basis of experience for adaptation but only the possibles in \( r(W) \).

Thus, if we must admit that there is Reality, \( r(W) \) only represents a world \( W \) possible according to rules of the representation \( r \).

\( r(W) \) is meaning for the subject and meaning is a reality, therefore \( r(W) \) is a reality, but nothing allows us to assert that the \( W \) represented is Reality, not even commensurable with Reality.

In other words, the representation \( (r(W)) \) is a reality, the subject who represents is a reality but what is represented \( (W) \) is not necessarily a reality.

**Formal constraints imposed by representation**

In the previous paragraph we showed to what extent the representation differs from the reality of what represents, likewise we can highlight some of the formal rules that the representation function \( r \) imposes on \( r(W) \):

1) **The existence of the subject**: Only what becomes the subject makes sense, that is to say can be represented as existing. Only what contributes to the existence of the subject exists for him. The subject's experience of reality is therefore limited to the 'trace' of his existence in the reality.

2) **The unity of the subject**: “contributing to the existence of the subject” requires participating in the persistence of his unity, that is to say in his individuation. The subject's experience of reality, the trace of his existence in reality, is an individuated singularity. The resulting formal constraint is twofold: on the one hand all existing things for the subject must “converge” towards his becoming, which imposes an interdependence between existing things and on the other hand the meaning of all possibilities merges into the becoming of the subject, which imposes a “limit” on \( r(W) \). The thought of the universe is “logically limited” to the One thought of the subject. The probabilities of all possibles in the universe merge into the single certitude of the subject's becoming himself.

3) **Succession**: We have seen that a present state of thought is not contained in the present moment. Thought in its reality is not a state that is changing. Meaning is an act.

> For the OK the meaning of a representation, for what it is, is its own expansion according to a distribution of conditional probabilities: the meaning of \( r(W) \) is the probability distribution of experiences \( r(y), r(z), r(t) \ldots \) possible « knowing» \( r(W) \).

If the representation \( r(W) \) in the subject requires \( r(x), r(y), r(z) \), etc. to follow eachother in an irreversible manner, no possible experience (meaningful) will be able to contradict this succession.

To paraphrase Einstein: through the window of a moving train, I can only experience a moving landscape. The subject's experience of reality is limited to an irreversible succession of meanings while the subject's reality is not subject to time.
for example: the truth of the concept (635=292+343) is not subject to time and yet, to have the (mental) experience of this truth, I must perform the operation, in one sense or the other, which imposes on me an irreversible succession between data and result.

4) **Continuity:** None of our ideas, for what it is, can be separated from the rest of our thought, for what it is. The reality of our thinking cannot be cut. The article ref CONT shows that this non-cuttablility of thought imposes on the subject the continuity of his representation.

The subject's experience of reality is constrained to a continuous variation of meaning while the subject's reality is only unfounded and complex, ie not cuttable which does not mean continuous.

5) **Non-contradiction:** Although the concepts of X and ¬X coexist in the mind as possible meanings, the meanings of X and ¬X as attributes existing in the present are incompatible.

The reason is that X is only meant as existing if its meaning is a necessary condition to the subject's becoming and then ¬X would mean non-existence of the subject, what is contrary to 1)

Non-contradiction is therefore a constraint imposed by the representation function r of the existing and not by the reality from which the representation emerges.

The experience of reality by the subject is limited to non-contradictory experiences among all possible experiences.

These examples show that confrontation cannot guarantee the isomorphism of the representation and its adaptive principle but only its idoneity, that is to say its capacity to maintain its own coherence.

The formal rules of empirical experience (in mundo non datur...) are, essentially, imposed by the mode of emergence of meaning in the subject.

Reality could therefore very well be incommensurate with the meaning we give it and we have already shown that this is the case for what our spirit actually is compared to what it tells us.

**Ontology of Knowledge and Mental Health Counseling**

Here are some thoughts from the OK which might be of interest for “Mental Health Counseling”

- Studying representation for itself, that is to say describing meaning as a reality and how it emerges out of the reality of the subject, is a complementary approach to normative and psychological approaches. Since for OK the meaning emerges by separation of the subject's unity, such an approach would likely be more holistic than constructive ones.

The other benefit with this logical approach might be epistemic: In a way a logical analysis transcends the ethic bias attached to normative and psychological analysis. It could even be computer-modelized.

- One should distinguish two aspects of the subject:
  1) The subject as reality prior to meaning (called singularity-subject)
  
  The subject-singularity must be understood with no consideration neither to time nor to space. It is not limited to the physical enveloppe of the subject but rather involves all interdependence connected to the singularity-subject.
  2) The subject as meaning (called knowing-subject)

  The knowing subject is a wave of meaning travelling through the singularity-subject. This wave of irreversible change (of meaning) is animated by the very nature of meaning: meaning is a probability of meaning.

- Because the knowing-subject is bound to the singularity-subject, anything the subject knows participates to his individuation. The unity of the subject's thought is therefore not a probabilistic miracle but it is induced by a singularity out of time. However the paths toward this persistent unity are contingent and some structures of the “becoming self” might be more efficient than other. Is it possible to improve logical structures?

- Adequacy of representation is not a miracle, Darwin's theory gives a satisfactory explanation for it. The Darwinian selection considered as a Reality would simply be: *the adequate representations prevail with time*.

But if we consider it as a Knowledge we must add the constraint that the knowing-subject must have been selected by the law prior to know the law.

As knowing-subjects we live and will always live in the subset of possible Realities were we have already won the selection game.
- In the reality of thought there is not a thought specific to an object. The thought of an object emerges through conditions of possibility which mobilize the whole spirit.
- Objects have no eigen-meaning, there is only extensional meaning.

- The mind of the subject is not constructed with thoughts but on the contrary it is by separation of the subject's unity that the thoughts are induced.
- Objects with distinct meaning are not disjoint thoughts.

- Existence of an object is relative to a subject. The attribute of existence is not an universal truth. The existence of X might well be inter-subjectively shared, it does not make of it an universal truth.
  Note: I wonder if this can contribute to mental health or not.

* [https://www.academia.edu/118960466/THE_OBJECT_OF_THE_SUBJECT_2](https://www.academia.edu/118960466/THE_OBJECT_OF_THE_SUBJECT_2)
The Author: Jean-Louis Boucon
mail: boucon.jean-louis@neuf.fr
Blog: http://jlboucon-philo.over-blog.com/
tel: +33682072266

Références:

Publications by the author: available in pdf on Philpoeple.org

Ref ODC Introduction to the ontology of Knowledge
Ref RLPS Logico-philosophical summary of Ontology of Knowledge
Ref PLOC The philosophy of language and OK
Ref BOIR Beyond the Opposition Idealism vs Realism
Ref TRANS The OK and the transcendantal
Ref SOLI Is OK a solipsism?
Ref LOGEX From Logical to Existing
Ref LAMG The OK, Logic, arithmetics, set theory and geometry
Ref BQOC Beyond Qbism with the OK.
Ref FQAQ Four questions about QBism and their answers by OK
Ref MOND The OK and the form of the world
Ref TSWK Time space and world as knowledge
Ref CNT A natural concept of time
Ref BLOC Bloc universe and indeterminacy
Ref CQOK What means Continuous and Quantified within OK

Published Book:
Ref UPF: L’Univers n’a pas la forme
Jean-Louis Boucon
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