

of economic models must be a theory of rational choice.—Luc Bovens, *University of Colorado at Boulder and Edelstein Center, Hebrew University*.

HEIDEGGER, Martin. *Platon: Sophistes*. Gesamtausgabe, II. Abteilung: Vorlesungen 1919–1944, Band 19. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1992. xxxi + 668 pp. n.p.—This volume contains the text of a lecture course Heidegger presented in Marburg in the winter semester of 1924/25, just a year before completing his work on the manuscript for *Being and Time*. A lengthy introductory section examines the concept of truth in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Metaphysics*. The "Main Section" presents a detailed commentary on the Greek text of Plato's *Sophist*. Part 1 deals with the various attempts made at the beginning of the dialogue (219a–236c) to define "the factual existence of the sophist." Part 2 is devoted to the ontological discussion which arises out of these attempts (236e–264b).

Heidegger refers frequently to the Aristotelian definition of the human being as *zōon logon echōn*. The term *logos* he takes to mean "discourse," especially discourse that is made public and shared with others; thus Aristotle's definition is understood to identify speech as a central human phenomenon. According to Heidegger, however, Aristotle also recognizes another human possibility, closely related to discourse yet distinct. More basic than speech is the human capacity for "seeing" the things themselves, for making present what our speech is about. Everyday human existence is dominated by obscurity and by "empty talk" (*Gerede*), in which the capacity for seeing is not fully activated. There is always a possibility, however, of moving from obscurity and emptiness to authentic presence. As the lecture makes clear, it is this basic phenomenological contrast that underlies Heidegger's interpretation of the Greek concept of truth as *alētheia*, as an "un-coveredness" of the things themselves (p. 16).

Heidegger calls attention to Aristotle's use of the verb *alētheuein*. He takes Aristotle to be saying that human beings are essentially "in the truth," that truth is "an essential characteristic of human existence itself" (p. 23). One manifestation of the tendency toward truth is *phronēsis*, a capacity for disclosing the human situations in which action takes place and one's own being is at issue. Although he does not fully develop the idea, Heidegger does identify some ways in which the truth of *phronēsis* is contrasted with corresponding forms of concealment. The allegedly higher truth of *sophia*, "authentic understanding," also represents a contrast with concealment. As Heidegger points out, Aristotle clarifies *sophia* by showing how it emerges from the relative obscurity of experience, art, and science. Each of these reflects a kind of partial exercise of the capacity for truth: something is "seen" in each, even though the *archai* or "starting points" remain obscure.

This introductory discussion of Aristotle is relevant because the *Sophist* turns out, on Heidegger's reading, to revolve around an understanding