

See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/329614876>

# Phenomenological Reflections on Instincts

Article in *Studia Phaenomenologica* · January 2018

DOI: 10.5840/studphaen2018186

---

CITATIONS

0

READS

7

1 author:



Kristjan Laasik

Zhejiang University

11 PUBLICATIONS 5 CITATIONS

SEE PROFILE

# Phenomenological Reflections on Instincts

**Kristjan Laasik**

*Zhejiang University*

---

**Abstract:** The familiar Husserlian conception of fulfillment involves a contrast between the same content as being represented emptily and then (more) fully, and also the idea that the empty givenness is rightly conceived in terms of anticipations of fullness. Since perceptual experiences provide a paradigmatic case of such fulfillment, I will call it “P-fulfillment.” Additionally, there is also the fulfillment of our wants, wishes, and desires. Taking wants as the paradigmatic case, I will call it “W-fulfillment.” In this paper, I consider the applicability of these conceptions of fulfillment to Husserl’s views of instincts, and conclude that the fulfillment of instincts is best understood not as P-fulfillment or W-fulfillment, but as *sui generis*, “I-fulfillment,” which is distinguished by its peculiarly retrospective nature, and by the fact that when it reveals something, it can also give rise to determinacy where previously there was none.

**Keywords:** Edmund Husserl, genetic phenomenology, instincts, perception, fulfillment.

## I

In Edmund Husserl’s discussions of intentionality, the notion of fulfillment plays a central role. Experiences that are intentional, i.e., involving directedness to objects or states of affairs, are conceived with a view to what it takes to achieve their fulfillment, i.e., a kind of immediate (“intuitive,” “full”) evidential disclosure with regard to what they represent merely “emptily.” E.g., if I judge that there is a gash on the back side of a tomato, it takes a visual experience of the tomato’s back side to either “fulfill” or “disappoint” this judgment. Husserl also conceives of perceptual experiences themselves as coming to fulfillment as they go through phases of representing something in increasing

degrees of fullness, e.g., when see a tomato and then proceed to explore it from different sides. This familiar conception of fulfillment involves a contrast between the same content as being represented empty and then (more) fully, and it also involves the idea that the empty givenness is rightly conceived in terms of anticipations of fullness. E.g., the tomato's back side is given empty to me *now*, say, as red and round, insofar as I anticipate that upon my moving over to take a look, it *will* appear to me as such.

Broadly conceived, this idea of “doxic fulfillment” applies to cases such as meaning intentions, judgments, and perceptions. I prefer to call it “P-fulfillment,” to foreground perceptual experience as the paradigmatic case. Despite the breadth of this idea, Husserl's view is that there are kinds of intentional act, e.g., will, wish, and desire, the fulfillment of which cannot be conceived in this way. We might call the fulfillments of these acts “practical fulfillments,” but I will call them “W-fulfillments,” so as to draw the reader's attention to *want* as the paradigmatic case. Husserl has expressed the view that it is only in the case of W-fulfillments that we can speak of “fulfillments” in the literal, as opposed to a kind of metaphorical, sense—suggestive of the idea that P- and W-fulfillment have no common genus.<sup>1</sup> One upshot of this view is that, in trying to understand the meaning of W-fulfillment, we can be guided by our understanding of the everyday concept of fulfillment, viz., of wants and wishes.

The present emphasis on the paradigmatic cases of sensuous perceptual experience, and the experience of wanting, may seem reminiscent of the way some analytic philosophers speak of beliefs and desires as paradigmatic cases of propositional attitudes, regarding the other propositional attitudes either as basically similar to beliefs, viz., in having a mind-to-world direction of fit, or to desires, viz., in having a world-to-mind direction of fit<sup>2</sup>. But we are not talking (primarily) about propositional attitudes, and it seems that even the idea of a direction of fit—an idea which allows for a unified account of beliefs and desires in terms of their satisfaction conditions—is not applicable here. The “fit,” on such a view, is a kind of mind-world correspondence, yet the idea of fulfillment, if we consider the important case of P-fulfillment, is not conceived in terms of such mind-world correspondence, but, strictly speaking, in terms of relations among different experiences, or different phases of an experience. We must therefore beware of inappropriate application of these mainstream ideas to the issues at hand.

I distinguish between P- and W-fulfillment, in order to consider both notions in relation to Husserl's views of instincts, i.e., natural urges or impulses, e.g., for food, sex, self-defense, etc., and try to determine whether either of these ideas is applicable to the fulfillment of instincts. The idea of P-fulfillment has its breadth, as well as its high level of philosophical articulation, to

<sup>1</sup> Husserl 1970: 217.

<sup>2</sup> Searle 1983: 4–13.

recommend itself; but the idea of W-fulfillment also merits consideration, since Husserl regards instinct as a kind of indeterminate desire.<sup>3</sup> Instincts thus seem to fit naturally among phenomena such as will, wish, desire, and action. However, in this paper I will argue against both ideas, and propose instead that the fulfillment of instincts is *sui generis*: I will call it “I-fulfillment.” Despite embracing the *sui generis* view, I believe that a consideration of the ideas of P- and W-fulfillment can be of considerable help in understanding I-fulfillment. I also believe that the idea of I-fulfillment casts important light on the Husserlian project of genetic phenomenology.

My main thesis is conceived as an argumentative claim, not an exegetic one. There already exist outstanding exegetic discussions of Husserl’s phenomenology of instincts, notably, Lee 1993, and Mensch 2010. While I will draw upon the relevant Husserlian discussions, as well as discussions in the secondary literature, it is not my aim to establish what Husserl’s view (probably) was, on the point at issue.<sup>4</sup> Rather, I aim to arrive at an independent answer that I deem to be strongly supported and able to meet objections. The reader should keep this in mind in critically considering the way I proceed in this paper, particularly in assessing my uses of the primary and secondary literature. That said, I take my viewpoint to be phenomenological, and it will be seen that I arrive at my answer, in important part, by drawing upon Husserl’s views in his recently published discussions concerning the instinctual striving for nourishment.

## II

Having already sketched the ideas of P- and W-fulfillment in an introductory fashion, I will now provide a more thorough exposition of either idea, with a focus, especially in the case of P-fulfillment, on the distinctions between fullness vs. determinacy, and fulfillment vs. closer determination—ideas which will be relevant to us with a view to the already mentioned “indeterminacy” of instincts.

P-fulfillment is rightly understood in terms of the contrast between the same content as being experienced emptily and fully.<sup>5</sup> Clearly the idea is also

<sup>3</sup> Husserl 2014: 83–87.

<sup>4</sup> Primary sources on instincts can be found in Husserl 2006, Husserl 2008, and Husserl 2014, Part II. For a listing of the relevant sections in Husserl 2006 and 2008, see Husserl 2014: xlv, n. 2. In an interesting recent contribution to the secondary literature, Matt Bower challenges Lee’s and Mensch’s views regarding Husserl’s position on the relation between instinct and affection, as well as concerning which instinct is rightly regarded as the fundamental instinct (Bower 2014). For a reply to Bower, see De Palma 2015. Another noteworthy recent contribution to the phenomenology of instincts is Keeping 2006.

<sup>5</sup> I am here presenting the Husserlian views as I have absorbed them from various Husserlian texts, especially Husserl 1989 and Husserl 1997. I draw mainly upon these texts, rather than the *Logical Investigations* (LI), for what I take to be an important reason. Namely, in the LI Husserl works with a kind of two-tier account of fulfillment. In the paradigmatic case of

that such transitions from empty to full givenness do actually occur, and that they are a ubiquitous aspect of our perceptual experiences. But if so, we need also accommodate the point that some further details may come into view when we turn the object around, and that this does, indeed, nearly always happen. For example, there may be some defect on the back side of a tennis ball, with regard to which I had no expectations either way. When further details and aspects of the object come into view, there is what Husserl refers to as “closer determination.” There is fulfillment (as well as disappointment) in perception, but there is also closer determination.

The notion of closer determination presupposes that of determinacy. When I speak about something’s being given determinately, it has to do with what detail is given in experience, or with one’s experiencing something as being one way, rather than another. The object is given either as round or as square, and either as having or as not having a color defect on the back side. Determinacy comes in degrees: the way I experience the object or some aspect of the object can leave open a broader or a narrower range of ways in which it can be. If the experience leaves open a relatively narrow range of options, the object is given more determinately; if it leaves open a relatively broader range of options, the object is given more indeterminately. For example, I might experience the back side of the tennis ball as yellow, or I might have a more determinate experience of the yellow as being different in various places (perhaps due to a lost ball’s exposure to weather), and the yellow surface as having a certain texture. But while my experience of something, e.g., the back side of the tennis ball, can be completely empty, it can never be *completely* indeterminate, as that would be tantamount to not experiencing anything at all: it would be tantamount to not experiencing any objects or properties. Nor can it be the case that something is given with the utmost, unsurpassable determinacy. Whether it be an object or some property of the object, it is always possible to determine it more closely. You could, for example, examine the object through a magnifying lens and notice that what you took to be a more or less perfectly spherical shape is, upon closer examination, rather irregular and uneven.

Fulfillments occasion closer determination, and closer determination leads us to have a richer set of expectations regarding the object. There is thus a close connection between the two processes, but they nevertheless are not one and the same process. It is usually the case that the parts that are given emptily, such as the back side, are given less determinately than the parts that

an objectifying act, fulfillment consists in a kind of higher-level act, effecting a synthesis of congruence (*Deckung*) of the act matter of the signitive act (e.g., a judgment) and the intuitive act (e.g., a perceptual experience). This is rather a narrow view of doxic fulfillment. Indeed, the two-tier idea of fulfillment even fails to capture the fulfillment of objectifying acts like a perceptual experience, in the course of its unfolding. I therefore wish to bypass this restrictive notion, and consider what I take to be the more expansive and flexible one-tier notion, which Husserl discusses in other texts, such as Husserl 1989 and Husserl 1997. It is with a view to this concern that I cast my discussion in terms of P-fulfillment.

are given intuitively, such as the front side, but it need not be the case. For example, we might be dealing with an object, or a kind of object, with which the perceiver is very familiar, in which case not only the front side but also the back side would be given very determinately. Nor is it the case that closer determination can occur only by fulfillment. No, it can be the case that someone informs the perceiver about what is on the back side of the object, and his experience of it therefore becomes more determinate.

So as to give the reader a clearer picture of how Husserl conceives of these ideas, I will sketch aspects of his discussion in *Thing and Space* (TS), a 1907 lecture series, where he discusses perceptual experience, with a particular focus on how we experience the spatiality of perceptual objects. More generally, we will learn how Husserl conceives of the “apprehension” of perceptual objects. Thus, in § 15 of TS, Husserl distinguishes from presentational (*darstellend*) contents the apprehension (*Auffassung*, also translated as “interpretation”). The presentational contents reside *reell* in the perceptual acts, they make up the sensation of what is actually presented to us: e.g., the sensed color, the sensed roughness, or the sensed form. However, the sensed color is to be distinguished from the perceived color, e.g., the color of the perceived house. In order for us to perceive objects, the perception must contain a certain “surplus” over what is sensed,

We call this excess the apprehension-character, and we say that the contents of sensation undergo apprehension. These contents would in themselves be, as it were, dead matter, but through the apprehension they acquire animating significance in such a way that they are able to present an object.<sup>6</sup>

The notion of apprehension is not first introduced in TS. Husserl already discusses the notion in the *Logical Investigations* (LI), §§ 26, 27. There, “apprehension” aims to capture sense in respect to what it does for the fullness, where fullness is referred to by the term “representing contents” (*Repräsentanten*). It is thanks to being apprehended in a certain way that the representing contents can function as intuitive, or as signitive (i.e., empty). For example, a perceptual judgment may be accompanied by pictorial images, but they are not *apprehended* so as to render them capable of offering fulfillment to the judgment. One important development in later work, in TS and elsewhere, is the idea of the animating apprehension being articulated in terms of kinaesthetic sensations’ “motivating” the visual sensations, e.g., when I anticipate, in a very low-level fashion, that upon moving in a certain way, I will come to see something different. Thus, Husserl conceives the apprehension (*Auffassung*) of the spatial object as correlative to the kinaesthetic motivation, and likewise of the apprehension of a thing, “Apprehensions of things and thingly nexuses are “webs of motivation”: they are built through and through from intentional rays, which with their sense-content and their filled content, refer back and

<sup>6</sup> Husserl 1997: 39–40.

forth, and they let themselves be explicated in that the accomplishing subject can enter into these nexuses”<sup>7</sup>.

We find Husserl arguing that the ways of functioning, of the kinesthetic sensations and the visual images, in the respective series, are indeed quite different from each other. Husserl’s discussion in the following quotation concerns visual images  $f_a$ ,  $f_b$ ,  $f_c$ , and  $f_d$ , perspectives of a square obtained by fixation of gaze on the corners a, b, c, and d. (Husserl calls these images “pre-empirical figures.”)

Phenomenologically, we find that in this continuous transition,  $f_a$  “refers” [*hinweist*] to its continuous neighbors, and that therefore intentions penetrate the series  $f_a$  to  $f_d$  and are continually fulfilled in the elapsing of the series. We discover, founded in these moments, a thorough consciousness of unity. [...] It is quite different with the series of the K’s. They do not refer to each other; they elapse, but they are not bearers of intentions that penetrate them, intentions of the kind which the f’s possess. That is, they are not traversed by a consciousness of unity. [...] The consciousness of unity runs only through the f’s, not partially through the K’s partially through the f’s. On the other hand, they are not joined as a mere conglomeration but rather in such a way that if  $K_0$  passes over into  $K_1$ ,  $f_0$  passes over in expectation to  $f_1$ , referring to [*hinweisend*]—and being fulfilled in—each new phase.<sup>8</sup>

Thus, the f-series can be traversed by a consciousness of unity that is produced in a fusion of intention and fulfillment, but the K-series cannot. However, the K-series can be viewed as what provides the f-series with the unity, viz., by arousing expectations regarding the upcoming items in the f-series.

As I have explained, perceptual experience gives objects in various degrees of fullness. Husserl’s terms for fullness and emptiness in TS are “proper” (*eigentlich*) and “improper” (*uneigentlich*) appearance. Proper appearance is what is actually presented to us, e.g., the side of the house that is actually in view. Improper appearance is that which is not presented to us, as is the case with the sides that are not actually in view. Husserl accommodates this by rendering the perceptual intention complex. It consists of several partial intentions, full and empty. “Perception is [...] a complex of full and empty intentions (rays of apprehension).”<sup>9</sup> The multiplicity of partial intentions, as part of an account of the degrees of and increases in fulfillment, is also already there in the LI.

In TS, Husserl also makes a point of emphasizing that the notion of determinateness (*Bestimmtheit*), yielding degrees of determinacy, needs to be conceived in low-level terms. Thus, in clear air, on a sunny day, the color of the side of the house that is turned towards us appears to us in its determinateness.

<sup>7</sup> Husserl 1989: 236.

<sup>8</sup> Husserl 1997: 152.

<sup>9</sup> Husserl 1997: 48.

Seen in the dark or in fog, the color appears less determinately. Husserl emphasizes that our ability to see in varying degrees of determinacy is independent of “conceptual classification”<sup>10</sup>. Rather, these differences are rooted in the essential character of perception, and apprehension,

This character demonstrates its significance subsequently even in regard to identifications, fulfillments, and disappointments, for the possibilities of identification and differentiation receive an essential delimitation and orientation through the apprehensional modes of determinateness and indeterminateness in their various functions.<sup>11</sup>

It is the apprehension that is responsible for the different degrees of determinacy and indeterminacy with which the front side and the back side are given. And, given the points that I have already made, it should not be surprising to find Husserl expressly asserting that the determination in perceptual experience is not tantamount to sensuous determination. Even if the back side of the object is given completely emptily in a perceptual experience, it is never given completely indeterminately in that perceptual experience,

The differences between determinateness and indeterminateness, in their myriad gradations, play an especially visible role with respect to the moments of improper appearance. If I apprehend a box, from the very outset it has for the apprehension a back side and an interior, though for the most part these are very undetermined. For example, it remains an open question whether the box is full or empty, whether the back is polished or not, etc. On the other hand, empty intentions can also be determinate, as is the case when I have to do with an object precisely known by me in the relevant aspect. [...] Indeterminateness is never absolute or complete. Complete indeterminateness is nonsense [...].<sup>12</sup>

In sum, Husserl importantly distinguishes between the ideas of fullness and determinacy, and fulfillment and closer determination, and works all these ideas into his discussion of perceptual experience and its fulfillment. Also, in his discussion of P-fulfillment in perceptual experiences, series of kinaesthetic sensations perform an important role in arousing anticipations in regard to upcoming visual appearances, thereby investing the series of visual appearances with a unity.

Having thus explored the relation between the ideas of determinacy and fullness in the case of P-fulfillment, let us briefly discuss its counterpart, W-fulfillment. I have said that I regard the experience of wanting as furnishing the central case of such fulfillment. Here, I use “wanting,” rather than “willing,” as translation of the German “*wollen*,” so as to stay the more securely

<sup>10</sup> Husserl 1997: 49.

<sup>11</sup> Husserl 1997: 49.

<sup>12</sup> Husserl 1997: 49.



within the purview of ordinary English usage, while keeping at a distance the more philosophically loaded term “will.” Wants should be distinguished from wishes. In the LI, Husserl provides a discussion of wishes as a paradigmatic case of non-objectifying act. He regards such acts, and, similarly, their fulfillments, as founded upon objectifying acts and their fulfillments. Nevertheless, as we have already noted, he cautions us that the fulfillment of non-objectifying acts, such as wishes, cannot be assimilated to the fulfillment of objectifying acts, and remains drastically different from them<sup>13</sup>. In a later text, Husserl distinguishes wanting (or willing) from wishing<sup>14</sup>. According to him, a mere wishing contains, as yet, nothing of wanting, and cannot be considered a practical act. There can be wishing in situations where what is wished for is not regarded as in the least practically attainable, whether by one’s own actions or otherwise. Nor does Husserl, it seems to me, accept that a wanting (or willing) always involves a wishing or desiring (Husserl appears to be alternating between “wishing” and “desiring” as synonyms.). He notes that wishing is rational in a way that wanting is not: one wishes for what one deems worthy of wishing. Wishing, he also says, can be summed up by way of “Would that it were,” willing, “It must be.” In some cases, will is an acting will (*Handlungswille*), which is fulfilled in the action which carries it out, with the fulfillments giving rise to new stages or temporal moments of the will.

Against this backdrop, I would venture to argue that the fulfillment of one’s wants, too, normally requires that the wants be somewhat determinate. Just as there cannot be P-fulfillment without one’s perception being somewhat determinate, so there cannot be W-fulfillment without one’s wants being at least somewhat determinate. To be clear, Husserl does not speak of “determinacy” only in the sense of sensuous determinacy, but also determinacy of thought. Thus, a “yearning for food” (*Sehnsucht nach der Speise*) is determinate, whether or not the food be sensuously present or even just imagined—while a mere “yearning in hunger” is indeterminate (and thus instinctive)<sup>15</sup>. Having arrived at an appreciation of this point, we are now ready to consider Husserl’s later views concerning instincts.

### III

Our aim in this section is to motivate and pose the question whether certain Husserlian statements, in regard to the fulfillment of instincts, are to be interpreted in terms of P-fulfillment or W-fulfillment. However, by way of introduction to Husserl’s account of instincts, I will first sketch aspects of an introductory discussion in Lee 1993, a monograph that remains the most

<sup>13</sup> Husserl 1970: 216–218.

<sup>14</sup> Husserl 1988: 102–112.

<sup>15</sup> Husserl 2014: 86.

thorough treatment of the topic to date. I have just sketched Husserl's earlier account of perceptual intentionality, centered on the idea of the apprehension of sensuous data. Lee's introductory discussion should help us understand that we cannot simply assume that such earlier views survive intact in Husserl's later thought, or that they are guaranteed to furnish an apt framework for interpreting the later ideas. The earlier "static" phenomenology is later replaced by, or incorporated into, a "genetic" phenomenology, which contextualizes intentional experiences amid the development of the subject's experiential life, shaped by necessary laws of "motivation" and diachronic dependence relations. As a result of these developments, Lee cautions the reader, Husserlian "transcendental" phenomenology contains pervasive ambiguities concerning its various central notions<sup>16</sup>.

As for the notion of instinct, Husserl already discusses it in LI—so there do exist discussions of this notion from the static perspective. However, it only acquires a central role in Husserl's genetic phenomenology. In his characterization of instinct, Lee emphasizes the idea that, for Husserl, an instinct is primarily conceived in terms of instinctual intentionality, and not in terms of instinctive behavior, or an inborn propensity to more or less automatic behaviors,

In Husserl's transcendental phenomenology, which sees its task in disclosing the constitutive function of consciousness, an instinct primarily means an instinctual intention, [and] thus an intention that is performed without rational reflection. The Husserlian concept of instinct differs, in this respect, from the one that is oriented to instinctual deeds: the deeds that are performed unconsciously and nevertheless unerringly achieve the aim. [...] It is [...] entirely indifferent whether the instinctual intention finds its way to fulfillment by an instinctual deed or by a rational deed.<sup>17</sup>

It should be clear that this conception makes it possible for instincts to be a much more ubiquitous aspect of human life than if we simply regarded them in the sense of inborn and rigidly automatic behaviors.<sup>18</sup> While a "blind" and

<sup>16</sup> Lee 1993: 4–7.

<sup>17</sup> Lee 1993: 8. "Der Instinkt bedeutet in der transzendentalen Phänomenologie Husserls, die ihre Aufgabe darin sieht, die konstitutive Funktion des Bewußtseins zu enthüllen, primär die Instinktintention, also diejenige Intention, welche ohne vernünftige Überlegung vollzogen wird. Dadurch unterscheidet sich der Husserlsche Begriff des Instinktes von demjenigen, welcher sich an Instinkthandlungen orientiert, also an Handlungen, welche unbewußt vollzogen werden und trotzdem das Ziel ohne Verfehlen erreichen. [...] Es ist [...] völlig gleichgültig, ob die Instinktintention durch eine Instinkthandlung oder durch eine vernünftige Handlung den Weg zur Erfüllung findet." (Lee 1993: 8)

<sup>18</sup> In early phenomenology, we also find aspects of this view challenged in Max Scheler's discussion of instincts and animality (Scheler 1991: 17–36), where Scheler speaks of instincts as

indeterminate instinctive striving makes it possible for more complex forms of intentional life to emerge, it crucially also survives as an aspect of theirs, akin to a kind of instinctual undercurrent in the flow of our experiential life, driving kinds of thought and action that are both flexible and rational.

Having established that instinct is, first and foremost, a kind of intentionality, Lee notes various respects in which Husserl's conception of intentionality changes between the static and genetic phases. Intentionality as directed to objects comes to be viewed against a "horizon" or background of our awareness of the wider environment and world, and as dependent upon our experiential past. Also, while on the earlier view non-objectifying intentional "acts" (i.e., intentional experiences) are founded upon objectifying ones, this is not the case according to the later view<sup>19</sup>. Thus, on the earlier view, wishing for an apple is founded upon a representation (*Vorstellung*) of an apple, and an instinctive striving, if it is indeed intentional, is also conceived based on this model. The indeterminacy of instincts is thus rendered as the relative indeterminacy or generality of the underlying representation, e.g., not of a particular food item, or even a specific kind of dish, but of food as such<sup>20</sup>. On the later, genetic conception, non-objectifying "acts" are not founded in objectifying "acts." The dependence relation seems, rather, to have become inverted, with certain instinctive strivings regarded as genetically prior to objectification, and as condition of possibility thereof.

These Husserlian ideas seem by no means far-fetched. We have seen that, already in the static account of TS, Husserl regards the apprehension of the visual *hyle* (or sensuous matter) as dependent upon structured series of kinaesthetic sensations. Is it not plausible to regard these kinaesthetic series as instinct-driven (and not just in the sense of being underpinned by rigid behavioral automatisms)? Likewise, is it not somewhat plausible to regard as instinctual (rather than based on determinate drives) the basic perceptual interest that drives our engagement with perceptual objectivities, enabling us to experientially relate to them qua objectivities?

So, we cannot, in general, just assimilate Husserl's later views to his earlier views. However, neither should we just assume that everything has drastically changed, and that the earlier ideas may not, at least on occasion, provide interpretative clues that can help us understand the later position.

Let us take up the issue of the fulfillment of instincts. To remind the reader, fulfillment is an issue that goes to the heart of the Husserlian conception of intentionality, including instinctual intentionality, insofar as the Husserlian

"meaningful" (*sinnmässig*) and "amechanical" (Scheler 1991: 18–19). For a discussion of Maurice Merleau-Ponty's view of instincts as "embodied meaning," see Keeping 2006: 182–188.

<sup>19</sup> Lee 1993: 35–37.

<sup>20</sup> Lee 1993: 44.

conception is developed with a view to the fulfillments characteristic of different kinds of intentional experiences. Instead of making sense of intentional experiences primarily in terms of their truth conditions or accuracy conditions, we primarily conceive of them in terms of their fulfillment conditions, or what it takes to bring them to kinds and degrees of fullness. The paradigmatic Husserlian intentional experience, conceived in terms of P-fulfillments, is thus forward-looking, viz., in terms of ways of achieving peculiar kinds of justification, especially immediate, or non-inferential, justification, with regard to the pertinent intentional experience.<sup>21</sup>

I shall proceed to raise the central problem, with a view to certain Husserlian statements and expressions that interpreters of the Husserlian texts have highlighted as encapsulating the Husserlian view. Matt Bower highlights as such the following claim, “Instinct passes through various modes, it is fulfilled, and now the goal of attainment exists patently and as attained in its patent sense in a process [*Weg*] that has [also] become patent.”<sup>22</sup> Bower comments on this sentence, “[W]hen a pleasure-allure passes over into a pleasure-affection, a focused enjoyment, the instinct itself—its goal and the path, if there is a path involved, to the fulfillment of the goal—is revealed or disclosed. [ftn. 43]. With every fulfillment (*Erfüllung*) of an instinct, there is a disclosure (*Enthüllung*) of it as well”<sup>23</sup>. Bower makes these remarks in order to highlight the role of such disclosures in the development of instincts, in the sense of the emergence of determinate desires out of instincts, as well as the differentiation of the instincts themselves. This is indeed Husserl’s concern in the context of the relevant quotation: Husserl considers how the present disclosure may make a difference upon a recurrence of a similar situation in the future.<sup>24</sup>

In sum, we may note that Bower centrally draws our attention to a kind of conjunction of instinctual fulfillment and disclosure. The same idea is highlighted by Rochus Sowa, in his editorial introduction to Husserl 2014, “In one of the C-manuscripts, Husserl succinctly calls the disclosure of the aim of the drive, which takes place along with the fulfillment, [and] which can succeed in a sequence of steps or in one blow, ‘fulfillment-disclosure.’”<sup>25</sup>

<sup>21</sup> Yet, there are also kinds of intentional experience that seem to be, first and foremost, backward-, rather than forward-looking, e.g., the moral emotions of shame and guilt. For a discussion of these and other moral emotions, see Steinbock 2014.

<sup>22</sup> Husserl 2006: 253. Bower’s translation (Bower 2014: 146, endnote xx).

<sup>23</sup> Bower 2014: 141–142.

<sup>24</sup> Husserl 2006: 253.

<sup>25</sup> Husserl 2014: xlvi. “Die mit der Erfüllung sich vollziehende Enthüllung des Triebzieles, die in einer Stufenfolge oder mit einem Schläge erfolgen kann, nennt Husserl in einem der C-Manuskripte prägnant ‘Erfüllungsenthüllung’” (Husserl 2014: xlvi). Sowa cites Husserl 2006: 273, where Husserl uses the expression “fulfillment-disclosure” while considering the fact that, in the context of a kinaesthetic process, disclosures are also un-fulfillments, as when previously

The conjunctive juxtaposition of the ideas of fulfillment and disclosure is basically enough to motivate our question, viz., whether we would do well to regard instinctual fulfillment as P-fulfillment or W-fulfillment. The idea of P-fulfillment, as evidenced by our quotation, in Section 2, of Husserl's discussion of the example of the inside and the backside of a box<sup>26</sup>, presupposes at least somewhat determinate givenness (while allowing for a considerable measure of indeterminacy). Yet, according to the view under present consideration, the "aim" of the instinct, i.e., the object in which it is fulfilled, is disclosed by the instinct—without having previously been present *even* in an indeterminate fashion.<sup>27</sup> Since the above formulations in no way suggest that we are to regard such disclosure as occurring prior to the fulfillment of the instinct—if anything, one gets the opposite impression!—they may certainly make us wonder whether there is a need to look for a new conception of fulfillment.

*Prima facie*, the idea of P-fulfillment is still an option. The idea certainly cannot be dismissed by a mere appeal to the fact that Husserl, when he develops these ideas, has given up the view that instinctual intentionality (qua non-objectifying, or non-representational) is founded upon representations (*Vorstellungen*). Even if we accept this philosophical position, it is still open for us to argue that the idea of P-fulfillment, though importantly associated with representations, can be divorced from them and should be preserved by us, as a fruitful or even indispensable aspect of the earlier view. We will only be giving up a view according to which instinctual intentionality is divisible into a representational and non-representational intentional component, with a certain one-way dependence relation obtaining between them.

In more specific terms, continuing to explore the *prima facie* applicability of the idea of P-fulfillment, it might, e.g., be suggested that although, on the Husserlian conception, the fulfillment of instincts is juxtaposed with a kind of disclosure, it could, nevertheless, itself also be viewed as a kind of disclosure of what is already emptily anticipated. We might say that even though the object is not previously given, even emptily, there is something else that can be regarded as being emptily anticipated, viz., the satisfaction, in a kind of general way, in abstraction from this particular object, or this kind of object.

given perspectives of an object are lost from sight, but retained as aspect of the intentional experience.

<sup>26</sup> Husserl 1997: 49.

<sup>27</sup> Husserl makes this crucial point in Husserl 2014: 84, and it is highlighted by Sowa in his editorial introduction, when he contrasts instinctual drives with "acquired drives" like a compulsion to play the piano (Husserl 2014: xlvii). Husserl says that the direction of an instinctive action is *not* random, but is, under similar circumstances, always directed to "typically analogous" (*typisch gleichartig*) aims. However, he adds that these aims are delineated for the subject in an entirely "dark" and indeterminate manner (Husserl 2014: 84).

In this way, we could make sense of the instinctual fulfillment as a kind of P-fulfillment.

On the other hand, we can consider making sense of instinctual fulfillment as W-fulfillment. If we do so, we cannot construe “fulfillment-disclosure” along the lines of Husserl’s earlier view, viz., in terms of the instinct as a non-objectifying act (with its peculiar possibilities of “fulfillment”) as being founded upon an objectifying act (with its possibilities of “disclosure”). As Lee cautions us, such an account would not render Husserl’s later view adequately<sup>28</sup>. Let us therefore consider another idea. If we distinguish between the un-satisfied (or dissatisfied) and satisfied phases of an instinctual striving, we can, if we choose to, conceive of the direction of the striving as completely hidden from us, leaving us, at the conscious level, merely with a phenomenal contrast between the un-satisfied and the satisfied phases. In retrospect, the satisfied state will be experienced as having displaced the un-satisfied state, but earlier, before the arrival of satisfaction, my experience of the un-satisfied state was not an experience of future-directed anticipations of satisfaction. E.g., it might be suggested that when you itch, you instinctively scratch, and doing so will bring relief, but the itching and instinctual scratching may have proceeded without the anticipation of the relief. We can say that this account appeals to a kind of W-fulfillment—while, admittedly, stretching the idea—, insofar as the un-satisfied phase is a like a an experience of wanting: one lacks *something*; *something* is wanting.

In sum, we may say that, prima-facie, upon considering the above claims concerning the idea of a “fulfillment-disclosure“, we face the choice between two competing views of the fulfillment of instincts, viz., as P-fulfillment or W-fulfillment.

#### IV

I will proceed to show that certain problems arise for either of these two views of the fulfillment of instincts, and that our dilemma can be resolved if we take our cue from Husserl’s recently published discussions of the instinct for nourishment.

On the one hand, I have suggested that we can interpret the idea of the instinctual fulfillment-disclosure in terms of P-fulfillment, insofar as it is possible for the subject to harbor anticipations regarding the satisfaction of the instinct in abstraction from the object that provides the satisfaction, yielding the relevant phenomenal contrast between emptiness and fullness. However, on closer scrutiny this proposal appears problematic. The problem here is that,

<sup>28</sup> Lee 1993: 35–37.

unless we conceive of the anticipations in highly intellectualized terms, and as distinct judgmental intentional states in their own right, the anticipations would seem to require some temporal and spatial specification with regard to the fulfillment path, i.e., there would need to be a somewhat determinately projected fulfillment path. That, however, surely presupposes that we specify, to some extent, the object that functions as the aim of the instinctual striving. A comparison with our earlier discussion of visual, or visuo-kinaesthetic, anticipations, should be helpful here. They are not abstract conditional judgments, but, rather, they are “motivated” anticipations that arise and subside with the unfolding of the visual experience; they amount to a lively sense of what will happen next, that cannot be divorced from the specifics of the perceptual situation. If the instinctual anticipations are to be regarded as analogous to such perceptual anticipations, discussed by Husserl already as part of his earlier, “static” phenomenology, then it is very difficult to see how we can speak of P-fulfillment if the instinct is completely blind or indeterminate in regard to the object that will enable it to be satisfied, and that itself will only be disclosed at a subsequent stage.

On the other hand, I have also suggested that we could, alternatively, regard instinctual fulfillment-disclosure as W-fulfillment, involving an experience of a contrast between an earlier, un-satisfied state, and a subsequent, satisfied state, but without any need to conceive of the unsatisfied state as empty, viz., in terms of at least somewhat determinate anticipations of satisfaction. For this view, too, problems will arise. In general, this view makes instincts appear too much like a mindless automatism, difficult to integrate into our conscious lives. More specifically, if we opt for this view, it will be difficult to account for the disclosure of the object(s) for which the instinct aims. If an experiential process is one of P-fulfillment, then, in paradigmatic cases, the pertinent object is emptily anticipated and the anticipations then either fulfilled or disappointed, depending on what the experience discloses. However, here the idea would have to be that when satisfaction is attained, I, as it were, find myself in the presence of the object that I can take to be the source of the satisfaction. But the disclosure cannot work like this, due to the upshot that a sufficiently unsophisticated subject would be systematically misled in various core cases. Thus, it may be that the satisfaction is provided cumulatively by a group of objects, and the one in the presence of which I eventually find myself should be disclosed as member of that group, and not as sole source of the pleasure that I am experiencing. It may even be that the satisfaction of the instinctive striving involves the corruption, destruction, or consumption of objects. In the case of the instinct for nourishment, e.g., satiety is often achieved when the object has been entirely consumed—and there would seem to be nothing left to be disclosed. This suggests that the idea of W-fulfillment, too, is difficult to integrate with Husserl’s idea of instinctual fulfillment-disclosure.

Drawing inspiration from Husserl's discussions of the instinct for nourishment, I will next argue that we would do well to regard instinctual fulfillment as *sui generis*—an I-fulfillment, rather than a P- or a W-fulfillment. It is not my aim to establish that this is Husserl's ultimate, considered view of the instinct for nourishment or instincts generally. Claims to that effect would, of course, require a much more extensive and careful study of the relevant literature.

One relevant locus of Husserl's views of the instinct for nourishment is Husserl 2014, Nr. 6, § 1. In that text, Husserl advises the reader to consider the instinct of hunger in the context of other competing instincts, and as periodically interrupted, e.g., by sleep. Hunger is a "habituality," continuous, though at times actual and at other times in-actual. E.g., when the drive has attained fullness, it, in a sense, "terminates," while continuing to be a drive, viz., in the mode of fullness<sup>29</sup>. There follows a discussion of the fulfillment of hunger that is directly relevant to our purposes. What fulfills the drive, Husserl tells us, is the object, which itself is disclosed in the fulfillment. By "object," however, Husserl means a fulfilling "something," which gives rise to pleasure.<sup>30</sup>

The something, however, is on its part a constituted unity; that, which can be pre-given in some other way, but <so> distinguished that it announces and proves itself as the upon-which or against-which of the drive—in enjoyment. This announcing is already the beginning of the fulfillment. It belongs to the fulfillment process that I, the hungry one, when I catch sight of something pertinent to nourishment, am thereby precisely at nourishment, even if probably at its outset; this introduces satiety proper. I hurry into its vicinity, grab at it and perform what belongs to eating; therein I experience fulfillment proper: the enjoyment from this and this. The pleasure of enjoying (the specific enjoying) is a positive drive in the mode [of] "fulfillment," and it is the enjoyment from this and this or from that and that, which itself harbors differences and stages, and is therefore grounding of ambiguity: pleasure in eating the apple, pleasure in the apple in eating, in biting off [a piece], chewing, which gradually turns the apple into pulp.<sup>31</sup>

<sup>29</sup> Husserl 2014: 93.

<sup>30</sup> Husserl 2014: 94.

<sup>31</sup> Husserl 2014: 94. "Das Etwas ist aber seinerseits konstituierte Einheit, das, was vorgegeben sein mag sonstwie anders, aber <so> ausgezeichnet, dass es sich als das Worauf oder Woegen des Triebs ankündigt und bewährt – im Genuss. Dieses Ankündigen ist schon Anfang der Erfüllung. Das gehört zum Erfüllungsprozess, dass ich, der ich hungrig bin, irgendetwas Nahrungsmässiges in Sicht bekommend, eben damit, wenn auch vielleicht von vornherein, schon bei der Nahrung bin; das leitet die eigentliche Sättigung ein. Ich eile in seine Nähe, fasse zu und vollziehe das zum Essen Gehörige; darin erlebe ich die eigentliche Erfüllung: den Genuss von dem und dem. Die Lust des Geniessens (das spezifische Geniessen) ist positiver Trieb im Modus 'Erfüllung', und es ist Genuss von dem und dem oder durch das und das, was



As I see it, this quotation contains the core of the view that will solve our problems concerning instinctual fulfillment. Importantly, we learn that the object is disclosed, viz., as source of pleasure, at the *start* of the process of fulfillment, and not, e.g., at its end, when complete satiety has been attained. This enables us to regard the process of fulfillment in the context of the specificity of our engagements with the food that we consume, viz., in terms of the pleasures attendant to biting, chewing, swallowing, etc. On the very same page, Husserl asserts that the drive of hunger should indeed be regarded in a peculiar “generality”<sup>32</sup>. However, as we have just seen, this emphatically does not mean that we have to maintain a high level of generality or abstraction in our discussion of the fulfillment of instincts, because as soon as the process of fulfillment begins, the instinctual experience already targets specific pleasures that it can only find in certain specific objects.

To summarize the view, the span of the instinctual intentional experience is divisible into a phase prior to instinctual fulfillment, and a phase of instinctual fulfillment. The disclosure of an object as the source of pleasure already forms part of the instinctual fulfillment, viz., as its first stage. According to the view at hand, the disclosure could not occur prior to instinctual fulfillment—because the object, as Husserl says, discloses itself in pleasure as “the upon-which or against-which of the drive,” not as origin of some inspecific pleasure that is yet to be associated with an instinct. Yet, how are we to reconcile our conception of such a disclosure, viz., as part of instinctual fulfillment, with the idea that the instinct, prior to the disclosure, was completely “general” and thus not experienced in terms of somewhat determinate anticipations? Such anticipations are clearly present when one has somewhat discriminate desires for particular kinds of foods, but apparently not when one just has an inspecific, instinctive desire for nourishment. To solve this problem, I would advance a descriptive point. It seems to me that, subjectively, the pertinent experience of disclosure is not one of having come upon *a* thing. Rather, it is one of having come upon (*just*) *the thing*. Before, the instinctual experience may have been “blind,” but now the object, e.g., the apple, asserts itself as what one was really striving for all along, retroactively shaping and revealing our experience—and our engagement with it is next likely to shape into a discriminating pursuit of the various pleasures of eating, as illustrated in the above quotation.

In view of this, the anticipations involved in instinctual fulfillment do not need to be regarded as completely inspecific. On the contrary, when we talk about nourishment, we are not looking away from any of the little details or pleasures which accompany eating. Indeed, from the following text, viz., Husserl 2014, Nr. 7, we learn that Husserl regards the experience of eating in terms of kinaesthetic anticipations analogous to the ones we have encountered

selbst Unterschiede und Stadien hat und darum Vieldeutigkeitsbegründung: Lust am Essen des Apfels, Lust am Apfel im Essen, im Abbeissen, Kauen, das aus dem Apfel allmählich den Brei macht etc.” (*Ibid.*)

<sup>32</sup> Husserl 2014: 94.

in our consideration of his “static” perceptual phenomenology. Since he views taste as a special case of haptic perception<sup>33</sup>, we may call the pertinent anticipations gustatory-kinaesthetic or haptic-kinaesthetic.

We learn that Husserl explicitly regards the role of the kinaestheses in tasting (and eating) as broadly analogous to their role in the other modalities of sensuous perception,

More precisely construed, we distinguish, e.g., in the instinct for eating, for nourishment: a taste and a pleasure from taste, together with the kinaesthetic variations of what is pertinent to taste or feeling. [...] The hyletic-feelingful-kinaesthetic process, however, is, as instinctive, a process of striving, that is to say, in eating in the original mode of fulfillment. It is naturally so in every other case of instinct, and, above all, a “sensuous” instinct. Smelling—involuntary movements of deeper inhalation, of bodily turning towards etc. The same with visual data—eye movements, bodily movements.<sup>34</sup>

Indeed, as one would expect, given the parallels in terms of which Husserl elucidates the process of instinctually driven nourishment, anticipations play an important role in the process of eating.

Anticipated is, and «namely» as my practical capability, the action of going there and of actualizing the eating—thus, the eating itself, in its peculiar manner of a striving doing, is in any case co-anticipated; the original hyletic-kin-aesthetic striving in the anticipation lies therein as the manner of the instinct that is implicated in the original mode of the fulfillment.<sup>35</sup>

The instinctually driven process of nourishment is shot through with anticipations in regard to the progress of the striving, including, e.g., the speed at which the process unfolds<sup>36</sup>, and the pleasures and satisfactions to be attained.

Based on all this, what are we to make of the nature of instinctual fulfillment? Superficially, some strands in the Husserlian passages, especially to do

<sup>33</sup> Husserl 2014: 105.

<sup>34</sup> Husserl 2014: 105. “Genauer ausgelegt, unterscheiden wir z.B. beim Essens-, Nahrungsinstinkt: Geschmack und Geschmackslust, in eins mit der kinästhetischen Abwandlungen des Geschmacklich-Gefühlsmäßigen. [...] Der hyletisch-gefühlsmässig-kinästhetische Prozess ist aber als instinktiver ein Strebensprozess, und zwar im Essen im Urmodus der Erfüllung. So ist es natürlich in jedem anderen Fall des Instinkts, und zunächst eines „sinnlichen“ Instinkts. Das Riechen—unwillkürliche Bewegungen des tieferen Einatmens, des sich körperlichen Hinwendens etc. Ebenso visuelle Daten—Augenbewegungen, Körperbewegungen.” (Husserl 2014: 105)

<sup>35</sup> Husserl 2014: 106. “Antizipiert ist, und «zwar» als meine praktische Vermöglichkeit, die Handlung des Hingehens und des Verwirklichens des Essens – also jedenfalls mitantizipiert ist das Essen selbst in seiner eigenen Weise des strebenden Tuns; als Weise des Instinkts im Urmodus der Erfüllung impliziert, liegt darin ursprüngliches hyletisch-kinästhetisches Streben in der Antizipation.” (Husserl 2014: 106)

<sup>36</sup> Husserl 2014: 106.

with the role of anticipations, make instinctual fulfillment seem like P-fulfillment. However, we should not jump to conclusions in this regard. First, some kinds of anticipations tend to be involved also in practical intentionality, and our wants and actions—though not always our wishes, as we have learned—involve the anticipation that certain goals are practically realizable: “Since I want it, it will be”<sup>37</sup>. Cases of P- and W-fulfillment may not be distinguishable just with a view to whether anticipations are involved. Second, we must remember that instincts are *indeterminate* desires, and their indeterminacy does not sit comfortably with either the idea of P-fulfillment or W-fulfillment. We have solved this problem by invoking the device of a kind of retrospective disclosure, where indeterminacy gives way to an experience of *just the thing*. This kind of retrospective disclosure is not, strictly-speaking, something we encounter in P- or W-fulfillment.

To accommodate the latter point especially, I propose that we regard instinctual fulfillment not as P- or W-fulfillment but as *sui generis* I-fulfillment. Instinctual intentionality and fulfillment are so basic that phenomena such as doxic and practical intentionality, P- and W-fulfillment, and consciousness of “There will be” and “Let there be” have not quite come apart yet—enabling us to regard instinctual intentionality and fulfillment as source of our consciousness of the world, and of our goals. I would suggest that the expression “fulfillment-disclosure” be read not as a conjunction, but as a pointer towards such primal unity, which seems to foreshadow other kinds of intentionality and fulfillment, or contain them in embryonic form, amounting to a kind of proto-consciousness of a world which is there in the sense that it exerts a pull, correlate of instinctive striving. As with other forms of intentionality, instinctive intentionality is conceived with a view to a peculiar kind of fulfillment. The way I see it, it is a core aspect of such I-fulfillment that, instead of just revealing an object as present to me now, I-fulfillment effects a more far-reaching revelation of the present and the past, both in its subjective and objective dimensions, and that it gives rise to determinacy where previously there was none.

## V

In the present paper, I posed the question whether certain Husserlian claims concerning instinctual fulfillment-disclosure are best interpreted as P-fulfillment, familiar from Husserl’s discussions, e.g., of visual perceptual experiences in his earlier, “static” phenomenology, or as W-fulfillment, characteristic of experiences of wanting or willing something, or as *sui generis*.

<sup>37</sup> Husserl 1988: 107.

Based on certain Husserlian passages concerning the instinct for nourishment (the instinct of hunger), I proposed the answer that instinctual fulfillment is rightly understood as being *sui generis*, or I-fulfillment. The question was intended not as exegetic but as requiring an answer as to which position could be regarded as the philosophically superior, and the better able to deal with certain problems. However, while I have not committed to giving a correct rendition of Husserl's ultimate, considered "genetic" view of the matter, I have, in effect, answered the question by taking a closer look at certain recently published Husserlian texts, and finding out what Husserl may actually have thought about the issue at hand.

Our conclusion casts light on Husserl's project of genetic phenomenology, and not merely insofar as instincts are a central topic of genetic phenomenology, *viz.*, as being pervasive of all stages of our experiential lives, not just the early childhood. On the one hand, we can now point to topical parallels between static and genetic phenomenology. In static phenomenology, we are centrally concerned with P-fulfillments, and conditions thereof. Indeed, the Husserlian constitutive strata in can be regarded in terms of complexes of fulfillment conditions and the dependence relations among them. The present essay suggests that it is also possible to conceive of genetic phenomenology, or the exploration of dependence relations among aspects of different stages of our experiential lives, as being, at least in part, concerned with a peculiar kind of fulfillment, *viz.*, I-fulfillment. On the other hand, the present view may have implications for our understanding of genetic methodology. Several eminent phenomenologists have voiced concerns to the effect that Husserl's genetic phenomenology is methodically constructive, rather than descriptive.<sup>38</sup> While I will not take a stand as to whether such concerns are ultimately justified, it seems that I-fulfillment conduces at least somewhat to our ability to reflect upon and describe our past, *viz.*, as a kind of fulfillment that is not just revealing of what is present but also of what is past, determining the past as it reveals it—yet not in such a way as to be experienced as a wilful act of fabrication.<sup>39</sup>

**Kristjan Laasik**

Department of Philosophy, School of Humanities,  
Zhejiang University, 148 TianMuShan Rd.,  
Hangzhou, Zhejiang 310028, China  
klaasik@gmail.com

<sup>38</sup> See De Palma 2015: Section 3. De Palma disagrees with these phenomenologists' views.

<sup>39</sup> This research was supported by the Hundred Talents Program Research Funds, Humanities and the Social Sciences, Zhejiang University.

**Works Cited:**

- Bower, Matt E.M. 2014. Husserl's Theory of Instincts as a Theory of Affection. *The Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 45(2): 133–147.
- De Palma, Vittorio. 2015. Der Ursprung des Akts. Husserls Begriff der genetischen Phänomenologie und die Frage nach der Weltkonstitution. *Husserl Studies* 31(3): 189–212.
- Husserl, Edmund. 2008. *Die Lebenswelt: Auslegungen der vorgegebenen Welt und ihrer Konstitution, Texte aus dem Nachlass*. Husserliana. Edited by Rochus Sowa. Vol. XXXIX. Dordrecht: Springer.
- Husserl, Edmund. 2014. *Grenzprobleme der Phänomenologie: Analysen des Unbewusstseins und der Instinkte. Metaphysik. Späte Ethik (Texte aus dem Nachlass 1908 - 1937)*. Husserliana. Edited by Thomas Vongehr and Rochus Sowa. Vol. XLII. Dordrecht: Springer.
- Husserl, Edmund. 1989. *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. Second Book*. Edmund Husserl Collected Works. Translated by Richard Rojcewicz and Andre Schuwer. Vol. III. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- Husserl, Edmund. 1970. *Logical Investigations*. Edited by Ted Honderich. Translated by J.N. Findlay. Vols. I, II. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Husserl, Edmund. 2006. *Späte Texte über Zeitkonstitution (1929–1934): Die C-Manuskripte*. Husserliana. Edited by Dieter Lohmar. Vol. Materialien VIII. Dordrecht, Holland: Springer.
- Husserl, Edmund. 1997. *Thing and Space. Lectures of 1907*. Edmund Husserl Collected Works. Edited by Richard Rojcewicz. Translated by Richard Rojcewicz. Vol. VII. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- Husserl, Edmund. 1988. *Vorlesungen über Ethik und Wertlehre 1908–1914*. Husserliana. Edited by Samuel Ijsseling. Vol. Bd. XXVIII. Dordrecht, Holland: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- Keeping, J. 2006. How Does the Bird Build Its Nest? Instincts as Embodied Meaning. *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences* 5(2): 171–195.
- Lee, Nam-In. 1993. *Edmund Husserls Phänomenologie der Instinkte*. Phaenomenologica. Vol. 128. Dordrecht, Holland: Springer.
- Searle, John R. 1983. *Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Mensch, James R. 2010. *Husserl's Account of Our Consciousness of Time*. Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press.
- Scheler, Max. 1991. *Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos*. Bonn, Germany: Bouvier.