Normative Ethics

Jameson Brennan

Definitions

D1: Ethics exist as judgment in determining the effects of nature, ethics in virtue is corresponding with an outcome juxtaposed to the outcome of evil.

D2: Perception of externally provided justice is malleable in the wake of perspective and conditions.

D3: Ethical prowess is preliminary rather than conceived by thought, in other terms ethical understanding is formed on a basis of observation and filtered information rather than self-conceived understanding (comparative to Book I “IP7: *Beings are not self-deterministic.”).*

Axioms

IA3: The knowledge of an effect depends on, and involves, the knowledge of its cause.

IA5: A thought is a construct built on understanding of previously entailed information, it cannot be proposed out of nothing.

A1: Ethics provide a constitution for justice in terms of what is sanctioned in action according to both internal and external conditions, providing a sense of what is morally right and wrong.

A2: Ethics are in accordance with justice; furthermore justice is a provisional form of upholding ethics.

A3: Principles derived from mind are in ultimate effect the sustenance of influence. (comparative to IP7)

A4: Understanding of morals may be derived in part from examination of oneself in contrast with perception of external thought.

IP1: *The qualitative nature of a substance may be examined distinctly through the influence of a variety of other substances.*

IP2: *The conceptualization of thoughts, ideas and resulting actions are a result of internal reasoning which considers all factors including both rationality and emotion.*

IP3: *Information, or distinctive ideas and thoughts are built on understanding of the external and its supporting influences.*

IP7: *Beings are not self-deterministic.*

IP10: *The construction of the psyche is preliminary in accordance with the predetermined internal mind and its interaction with the external.*

P1: *Guilt is the most basic form of justice, however built upon preliminary ideals rather than morality as an ultimatum.*

Dem.: In enforcement of ethical prowess, repercussions, or in other terms the measures of justice, are demonstrated through negative inflictions against the mind or body. Justice is enforced through universal systems of psyche supposedly present in all people capable of feeling. In exclusion to externally enforced guilt, such as that of an executive government, the most basic form of justice is present in self inflicted guilt. Self inflicted guilt provides a basis for internal repercussion based on an action interpreted as having a negative moral implication. Morality in this case not serving as a preliminary ultimatum which is demographically agreed upon but rather from an internal mode of ethical interpretation. In extension, self-inflicted guilt coincides with moral prerequisites which are present in the internal mind, meaning that guilt is not universally distributed but rather specific in interpretation to its provider.

Schol.: Drawn from IP3 however, (*Information, or distinctive ideas and thoughts are built on understanding of the external and its supporting influences)* we may deduce that self-inflicted guilt is in alignment with external factors, derived from a perspective of specific entailments which may or may not enforce certain ethical factors.

P2: *Internal guilt is not universally interpreted.*

Dem.: In accordance with a previously encountered proclamation by IP3 (*Information, or distinctive ideas and thoughts are built on understanding of the external and its supporting influences)*, in addition to provisions that in which self-determinism is not in effect towards the extent of ethical understanding (by IP7), we may conclude that because all understanding are derived from external influence, which is not universally provided, internal guilt is not ubiquitous to all peoples. Internal-guilt as a measure of justice furthermore is an extension of personal understanding rather than a universally inflicted ideal. In demonstration, a peoples which interprets ethical prowess in examination of one partiality of morals may have a different basis of internal guilt than that of the latter.

Schol.: Effectively, based on the premise in P2 as interpretations of morals are not ubiquitous throughout all peoples, it may be stated that any measure of justice based on a universal proposition of ethics may be incoherent as it is not respective of individual perspectives. Moral sanction furthermore may be threatened on the basis of justice being that morality is not a concept which is universally identical in all peoples. Implications of such a proposition may be imperative not only towards those who are mistreated categorically but also those with skewed perspectives towards ethical law.

P3: *Morality is in the abstract, proposed on a basis of derivative rather than inherent ethical standards.*

Dem.: Moral righteousness, in the essence of true ethical nature of right over wrong, is in all respects a system of perspective inception (by IP3). In relation to IP3 morality is the result of qualitative understanding all of which is perceived externally, this external perception in alignment with IP3 is the substance which determines internal ethical standards. Morality in extension is conditional in the respects that it is ascertained from a variety of surrounding influences which gives it a substance of understanding, an understanding which may be perceived as a postulate but is rather something entirely conditional. Morality in extension is an abstract as it is proposed by the perception of conditional humanity. In regards to ethics it may be said that morals are not something which is absolute as all regards to ethical morality are based on conditional external influence (in extension of IP3). It may be derived from said notion that the effects of morality as an absolute concept is not constructive but rather a systematic law; morals are ultimately definite and only prescribe to ordained human need for construction on relish of control and order. In a broader concept however morality is of the abstract and therefore does not provide a definite understanding of ethics apart from that of its perception.

Schol.: In the extension of righteousness, propositional ethics provide a standard of guilt in the measure of internal justice (by P1). In accordance with P1, through the notion that internal guilt provides a medium of justice which is ordained from external influence, it may be stated that condition impositions of ethical prowess are unjust in implicating a false form of ethical understanding. In the realm of ethical morality it may be stated that externally imposed guilt through a system of perception is unjust; all which is implied by the external through perception (once again in extension of IP3), is an interposition of true ethical prowess, which must be provided internally.

P4: *Morality in ethics derived from propositional externalities are an unjust derivative of understanding morals.*

Dem.: Morals in the regard of supposed human construct provide an account of ethics which is predominantly fictitious, built on the judgment based on externally biased understanding and thought. Evidently, all ethical propositions from a human intellectual standpoint aren’t based on inherent factors of morals but rather externally prescribed influences (in accordance with IP3). Furthermore, any qualitative understanding of ethics based on surrounding influences may be reduced to a systematic production of beliefs rather than that based on actual substance. In accordance to morals as a definition as proposed by D1 (D1: Ethics exist as judgment in determining the effects of nature, ethics in virtue is corresponding with an outcome juxtaposed to the outcome of evil.) we may determine morality to not be the justices of human perception but rather that of righteousness, which–as proposed by P3–is conditional and does not provide an evident demonstration of morality.

P5: *Distinctive ethics account for all internal morals rather than moral prejudice.*

Dem.: Ethics, as a basis of upholding morals in the realm of justice (by A2) may be examined not only through physical or external reprimand but also through internal processes of guilt. It may be stated through P3 and P4 that ethical justice based on external prejudice, or in other words the effects of surrounding influences (by IP3), that any form of ethical understanding which is conditional in the expanse of external determinism may be ultimately fictitious and therefore serves as an improper standard of regarding ethical prowess. Ethics in short may be derived ultimately through internal modes of justice and perspective, similar to the propositions of Immanuel Kant’s “categorical imperative,” as displayed in his ‘*Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals.’*

Schol.: In extension of the proposition that all prejudice ethics are unjust on account of their dissimilar determinate factors, it may be proposed that ethics, in a utopian society may be upheld through internalized punishment in the sense of guilt and ignominious culpability rather than a processes which is derived from a predetermined construct. An ideal form of ethical standards may be one based on internal perspective in the space of self-awareness and individual idealism, in contrast, the interpretation of morals through a system which is not ubiquitous through all peoples is unjust as it examines ethics in a system which is effectively unconditional and prejudiced. In extension of Kant’s “categorical imperative,” in which Kant states, “Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will it should become a universal law.”, through the extension of Kants’ philosophy we may propose that in understanding categorical law in morals, we may induce internal justice through guilt rather than through prejudice understanding of artificial moral law. In extension it may be ascertained that moral ethics have no sanction in the enforcement of blame unless distinctly preserved from oneself.

P6: *Condemnation in the face of an obstruction of normative ethics is necessary in preserving moral thought.*

Dem.: In discussion of condemnation or reprimand there applies to all obstruction in ethical law, this ethical law denoted from an external or cumulative understanding, notwithstanding it provides structure for enforcement of repetitive environmental feedback. Condemnation in the wake of obstruction of perceived ethics is provided especially at a developing age as an innate necessity in order to form constructive order and distinctive moral guidance into the development of youth as it dictates societal order.

Schol.: This proposition may be understood as a postulate because of its incorporation (by IP7) of deterministic principles, or lack of thereafter.

-(this principle of P6 is provided by both internal and external punishment)

P7: *By association empirical values of guilt may be described as immoral.*

Dem.: Normative ethics (by P4 and A4) are an unjust form of moral enforcement (by D3) through determinist concepts which prove that all forms of moral judgment based on externally wrought determinism are improper mediums of understanding. In alignment with providing moral guidance, condemnation however is considered to be necessary in the development of ethical principles (by P6).

Schol.: Normative ethics through external determinism generate the proposition that all externally based understanding of morals are wrought on an improper medium of understanding and do not provide any relevant preservation of morals as they are derived from fallacious external notations (in the providence of deterministic principles by IP3) and therefore are an unjust measurement of morals. It may be proposed through the categorical imperative that any distribution of guilt based on purely empirical values may be categorized as ethical because they are the by-product of an internalized source rather than a prejudiced external, however these measures are based on internalized accounts of guilt which be demonstration are not indeterministic to oneself. By extension it may be proposed that because that which is deterministically provided in the groundwork of ethics as unjust, in provision with any internalization with such unjust externally derived morals (by P4) is an improper promotion of normative ethics and does not quantify any form of empirical moral sanction. Because all concepts of empirical feeling are associated with prior acquisitions of ethics which were externally based, it may be proven that they are ultimately an unjust medium for providing reprimand either in the form of guilt or any other internal degradation. It must be provided that as all forms of reprimand may be rescinded as unjust as they are not indeterminate (by P4), an abstract law of ethics come into hand as morality by definition is not in fact a provided metaphysical law rather than a false construction of human ideals. These ideals in extension are unclear in their provision of ethical law as they are based on external principles which are provided rather than ascertained from authentic, derivative understanding. Because all external law is not regarded as conditional it may be proposed that any influence projected on both the external and internal psyche is unjust and does not account for any realistic measure of ethical standard.

P8: *Normative ethics are a fallacy.*

Dem.: Through an accumulation of proofs (P4 and P5) we may ascertain the statement that normative ethics and any application they may have toward epistemology are a complete fallacy. A fallacy being a falsely generated claim which does not hold any practical application of authenticity but is rather an inherent construction of misconstrued ideals. The statement that normative ethics are false may not prove that they have any destructive qualities, however do present the notion that ethics themselves are a construct which is not generated inherently through indeterminism but rather are a product of generalized human construction and preliminary notions not derived from any form of truth or authenticity. The state or regard of morals in the human perspective is not evident of any realism through predetermined metaphysics and therefore does not hold any weight or respective quality.

Schol.: Proving this proposition may be a derivative of proofs P4 and P5; starting with P5, which states that the realism of any prevalent ethics is derived from all that is internal or the feeling of empirical values. P5 accentuates the matter of relative morality in comparison of externally based ethics, or morally prejudiced predetermined values with the feeling of internal guilt which provides for justice based on feeling or understanding internalized ethical norms. The proof generated in P5 may create an understanding or normative ethics which is based on internal reflection, which because it is based on a system of internalized feeling rather than external ethical law (which is prejudice), it may be moral. However through proving a system of determinism in internal moral law (this aspect may be enunciated/proven through P7), we may prove that all internal morals are in fact a basis of external law as that is the influence in which they must be derived (on account of epistemological determinism). In extension we may ascertain that all ethical law in the form of either internal justice or external justice may be derived from that of what is external. Finally through the incorporation of P4 (*Morality in ethics derived from propositional externalities are an unjust derivative of understanding morals.)*, we may ultimately decide that all ethics which are not indeterminate may be described as a fallacy.

The incorporation of this proposition may be upheld in determining the state of ethics as a whole however must not be a basis of denouncing them in society. It may be said that all incorporations of ethics are immoral as they are not contributed evenly in distinction of conditionalism (by P2 in accordance with P7) however they do provide some relative understanding of order and ultimately a system not dissimilar to Kant’s categorical imperative.

P9: *Constructions of normative ethics are a byproduct of fear.*

Dem.: It is evident that fear causes a form of judgment which presumes the necessity of safety, in other terms fear and safety are dissimilar as they are the effects of each other. Fear and safety may be the product of dire consequences but may also be an extension of other materialistic values such as emotion towards others in attachment or systems of politics or belief. Fear through indefinite extension of human epistemology is the compass of our outlying activity; the only exception of this rule being that of pleasure, however pleasure is not a considerable variable in this proposition. It is further evident from P8 that all the concept of normative ethics on a basis of the categorical imperative, or the standard that we all must conceive our own actions based on the interpretations of a reflection of ourselves, is not correct as it is proven by P8 to be a fallacy. Although the propositions of the categorical imperative may be described as internalized justification (empirical rather than external condemnation), because it is built on the system of determinate and thus false views: it is a fallacy(this statement has already been proven through the propositions of P8). It being a fallacy also means it is conditional and so it may not be the origins of indeterminate ethics. It may be proposed however that fear, by generating an effect of the mind which demands safety, may be the origins of normative ethics.

Schol.: Fear has always been extensively prevalent in determining the effects of human actions, the fear of loss or danger may presume a need for safety in avoidance of all that is unwanted. In continuation normative ethics are an associative description which may protect people from such fear; ethics provide a reasonable preventative of unguided or immoral actions through promoting rationality and thought over desire, these ethics however are based on internal morality or in other terms are an extension of the categorical imperative. Externally based ethics may still be a mode generated by fear but are however presenting irrational measures of moral sanction as they are built of universal structure rather than conditionalism, they may not be a result of rational fear but rather a construction of imposition rather than something which is reasonable or fluid.

It may further be determined that the system of our government is not that built of rational thought and conditionalism but rather a construct which provides a dissertation of innate, internalized fear. Our government in addition to the imposing ethical standards of our modern world. It may be a decisive measure that the consumption of ethical values in this day in age may be an extension of inherent fearfulness shared in this day in age. This fearfulness is not a presentation of safety for one's life but rather that of one's emotive quality, beliefs, personal sanctum, ect. This new distinctive quality of living in oppressive normative ethics may be the product of two different factors, the first being that there is more to be afraid of, and the second being that one’s sensitivity to fear has grown. The answer to this question is a definite perspective and may not be discussed by me in order to not generate invalid truths.

P10: *Fear may be observed ubiquitously through all which is unwanted.*

Dem.: In discussing the application of P9, in which normative ethics are derived from some form of fear, the identification of fearfulness or determinate discomfort may be identified. In fear the more applicable notion of understanding is not which is physically dangerous but any application toward dislike or discomfort, fear presented in this term may provide a larger scope of understanding and application towards the essence of P9. It may be observed that fear of loss, change, negative assertion of one’s thoughts and beliefs may be identified as a catalyst of fear.

Schol.: In contemporary ethical standards we may observe the influence of fear upon one’s eagerness to control, in order to control fear in a preventative basis humans generate a means of moral law. This moral law creates a definite understanding of what is acceptable in terms of ethical prowess, as a result, all terms of normative ethics serve as a preventative of fear (fear in accordance with the definition of P10). This phenomena may be distinctly observed through many realms of discomfort in either emotional distinction of that of physical or material. In order to prevent that which is unwanted, ethics provide a stature for normalizing emotional distinction, with applications ubiquitous of all moral or human feelings.

P11: *Normative ethics and morals are not analogous.*

Dem.: By drawing through statements proposed in P9 and P10, which provide that fear is the catalyst to which normative ethics are substantiated, in distinction of moral attributes, or otherwise a comparative form of righteousness, we may substantiate that normative ethics and morals are not comparative or analogous in any way. The proposition demonstrated by P9 and P10 draws upon the conceptualization of ethics produced by human motifs not associated with any form of virtue, instead a product of fear induced (by P10) avoidance of bilateral dislike. In extension we may propose that ethics are not the basis of human morality or any indeterminate righteousness but rather a construct formed out of necessity for normative sanctum and order. In comparison to the concept of morality in righteousness, a proposed precept which is indeterminate and built off the faith of regularity or perhaps systems of Kantian ethics; we may create a distinction between normative ethics and an indeterminate moral righteousness.

Schol.: It may be regarded that given a distinction between normative ethics and morality we may propose that the system of justice on a basis of righteousness is built on a different concept than that of morality (this prefecture may also be derived from P4). In application, provision of justice is not the upholding of moral standards but instead a system to enforce order, otherwise it may be stated that any enforcement of justice is a deed of righteous ability, which would be contradictory to the propositions of P4 and P9. Ultimately justice in the form of either ethical law or normative ethics are a construction intent against consternation with the goal of distinguishing order in a disruptive society.

Appendix

When accounting for the distinction of normative ethics and their interaction with our perception of life, the consideration of augmented belief and justice may be determined notwithstanding. Justification of moral prowess on the basis of morals, through propositions presented in *Normative Ethics,* present a conjecture which discourages inherent moral law and ultimately presents the stature of inherently based ethics as a mirage. Normative ethics in certainty, are provided on a basis of constructed ideals, which, not being indeterminate are effectively nil in the provision of moral standards. As provided (in addition to that of the works of *Determinism in Epistemology,* “Book I”) in the proceedings of propositions 1 through 4, that all effective morals which are based on a definite standard of determinism are invalid: that being that deterministic principles may not be derived from any inherent justice or understanding but are rather a construction, evidently they are not formidable in provision. This presentation may also implicate theology as presented in the later propositions, that morality and normative ethics are in-fact separate projections and do not share any ubiquitous or uniformal concurrencies. When observing this phenomena in application it may be distinctive that all moral acquisitions are an effect of perception and not inherent justice. Justice in further terms is an elusive quality, that along with all other initial perceptions of prevalent morals; demonstration of moral falsity in ethics may substantiate the effects that all standards of conduct in demonstration of good and bad are falsifications and do not hold any realistic individual merit.

This presentation of formal ideas may be a hindrance to any widespread consideration of Kantian values; Kantian values being stature of action or thought based on omnipresent ideals, such as the categorical imperative. “Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.” (Immanuel Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals,* pg.30). An examination of such a proposal, universally accepted, explains an ideology widely present throughout human history in the span of religious ethics, perhaps first officially presented by the Buddha, the categorical imperative provides a means in which morals are drawn to a threshold of human understanding. It may be sovereignly interpreted that through the feebleness of deterministic principles in the application of the categorical imperative, that any formation of ethical standards or beliefs were drawn not from an ultimatum of inherent self-righteousness but rather a piety which considers a resulting fear, a method of protection in establishing human conduct. ‘Treat others how you want to be treated,’ most nearly is an enumeration that you should act as fear is universally bound, a resulting providence of illusory moral understanding.

Contents

Proposition 1: *Guilt is the most basic form of justice, however built upon preliminary ideals rather than morality as an ultimatum.*

Proposition 2: *Internal guilt is not universally interpreted.*

Proposition 3: *Morality is in the abstract, proposed on a basis of derivative rather than inherent ethical standards.*

Proposition 4: *Morality in ethics derived from propositional externalities are an unjust derivative of understanding morals.*

Proposotion 5: *Distinctive ethics account for all internal morals rather than moral prejudice.*

Proposition 6: *Condemnation in the face of an obstruction of normative ethics is necessary in preserving moral thought.*

Proposition 7: *By association empirical values of guilt may be described as immoral.*

Proposition 8: *Normative ethics are a fallacy.*

Proposition 9: *Constructions of normative ethics are a byproduct of fear.*

Proposition 10: *Fear may be observed ubiquitously through all which is unwanted.*

Proposition 11: *Normative ethics and morals are not analogous.*

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