The nature of the spirited part of the soul and its object

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In this chapter, I invite the reader to approach familiar questions about spirit by taking up an unfamiliar stance: the stance of the Demiurge, or of one of the lesser gods, engaged in psychogony.\(^1\) If you are designing a soul from scratch, why give it a part like the spirited part to begin with? After all, without spirit the world would be a less angry place. It would be a less competitive, aggressive, war-like place. If we can trust the city-soul analogy of the Republic, then it seems that without spirit, there would be no armies. If the Demiurge could have avoided all that simply by changing his blueprint for souls, why didn't he?

My answer in this chapter is that spirit is a necessary response to something worse than spirit, namely appetite. But more important to me than the particular answers I give is the method I propose, of trying to understand Platonic psychology from the Demiurgic stance. It does not address all of the interesting questions that there are to be asked about Platonic psychology, but I think it does put some of them in an enlightening frame, and raise some new ones as well.

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1 As cosmogony is to cosmology, so psychogony is to psychology. The word is not new in English (the OED s.v. cites Sidgwick and Cudworth); in Greek, it was fairly common among Platonists (Plutarch, Iamblichus, Porphyry, Proclus, Philoepus, etc.). In the majority of ancient cases, it refers directly to the creation of the soul by the Demiurge and lesser gods in the Timaeus.

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II Test case 1: the fevered city

This is signaled through the structure of the Republic by the fact that the auxiliaries, who represent spirit in the political allegory, are introduced into the city only after the healthy appetites of the City of Pigs\(^3\) have been replaced by the unhealthy, non-necessary appetites of the Fevered City.\(^5\) The City of Pigs is a depiction of a healthy appetitive soul, a picture

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2 On this passage see Raphael Woolf, Chapter 7.
3 I assume that this is the rationale against suicide; cf. Phaedo 62bc, Apology 28d–29a.
4 Republic 369–372. Alcibiades in Didaskalikos para. 34 calls it the "war-free" (upolemos) city.
5 372e–373a; cf. also 399c.
maintained balance, than by showing us a city going far out of balance due to appetite, and being brought back into balance through spirit.7

III Spirit's two roles

The next thing to understand is that spirit's roles divide sharply in two, corresponding to the fact that the rational soul is forced to confront appetitive souls in two venues: the appetitive souls in the bodies of other people that surround it, and the appetitive soul inside its own body.

It is the first fact, the existence of other appetites in other bodies, that creates the need for a soul that can negotiate with other appetites for the relatively scarce appetitive goods in the world. I need to know how much of these resources I can demand, what others will give me, how I can defend my share, who can I take from and who will take from me, what advantages can I get by cooperating with others, when can I get more in the long run by giving up some now. From all this arise the psychic capacities for competition, aggression, and self-defense, plus generosity, loyalty, solidarity, and self-sacrifice, plus the entire world of status, reputation, and sensitivity to honor, understood as a system for distributing appetitive goods to the members of a social group in accordance with their merit, where merit in turn is originally based on the ability to acquire and defend these same appetitive goods. This is the psychological repertory required of a social animal that hunts in packs, and is essentially the same in dogs and humans. It is also the

6 Barney (2002, 217, n. 12) usefully quotes Reeve (1988, 178) who notes that the City of Pigs "is stable only in a fantasy world in which people never pursue pleonastic satisfaction."

7 Barney (2002, 220) argues that Glaucos's role in rejecting the City of Pigs shows that spirit is another moving force behind the transformation, along with non-necessary appetites. The first city's lack of an army is a liability not only because appetite will remain unregulated, but because those humans whose souls are dominated by spirit or reason will be unable to perform their natural jobs within it. This is a plausible view. I believe, however, that Plato blames the fever on appetite, not spirit: Glaucos's "tone" may be spirited, but his actual demands are not for spirited goods. He does not complain that there are no contests or games in the city or that the weak receive as much honor as the strong. He does not clamor for war in which men gain the pride of valor. War comes only later (375d), as a means to satisfy excessive appetite.

The main difference between Barney's reading and my own, I think, is that she holds that even in the City of Pigs, human souls already have all three parts; that's what leads a spirited soul like Glaucos to find it incomplete. Because I am asking the psychocogic question, I treat the passage instead as an exploration of the question: what if humans only had one part? So there are no unsatisfied honor-lovers in the City of Pigs, because spirit has not yet been created. What we discover, instead, is that purely appetitive souls would be incapable of living an idyllic life of endogenous moderation. Appetite would naturally lead to excess, and this in turn creates the need for spirit.
psychic analogue of the army and defense-force in the political allegory, i.e., that group of people who defend the external borders of the state and interact with other sovereign states, defending the city from invasion and raiding.

The second fact, that there is an appetitive soul within the individual’s own body, is what gives rise to the internal, police-force functions of spirit. Here the source of trouble is not that other people and other appetites will try to deprive me of my necessary stock of appetitive goods. The problem is rather that it is in the nature of all appetite, and so my own appetitive soul in particular, to want ever greater amounts and varieties of appetitive goods, beyond any reasonable standard. I need my spirited soul to protect me from my own appetites.

This job does not directly create the world of reputation and honor, as the first job does, because there is no issue of status or competition between separate individuals. However, spirit is involved in the physical training that is an important component of keeping my own appetites in control. And spirit may also be involved in issues of self-esteem and sense of propriety that play a role in moderating my own appetites, without forming part of the shame and honor system that is created by the existence of other people. I will return to this point later.

First, though, let’s look at the evidence that Plato thinks that spirit has two distinct, interconnected jobs, one involving negotiation with other appetitive agents in the world, and one involving my own moderating of my internal appetites. The evidence, not surprisingly, comes largely from comments made through the political allegory. The auxiliaries, who are the political analogue of the spirited part of the soul, are always represented as having two jobs: an external, defense-force job, and an internal, police-force job; see 414b, 415d, Timaeus 17b. The psychic payoff is sometimes made explicit, though, as at 422a–b and Timaeus 70a. And the fact that we are meant to read all of this evidence together is guaranteed by the very strong overlap in phrasing.

Republic 414b: “Then isn’t it truly most correct to call these people complete guardians, since they will guard against external enemies and internal friends, so that the one will lack the power and the other the desire to harm the city?”

Republic 415d: “Let [the guardians] look for the best place in the city to have their camp, a site from which they can most easily control those within, if anyone is unwilling to obey the laws (katekhoien, etis me etheloi tois nomois peithesthai), or repel any outside enemy who comes like a wolf upon the flock.”

Republic 442ab: “[reason and spirit, working together in dual verforms] . . . will govern the appetitive part which is the largest part in each person’s soul and is by nature most insatiable for money. They’ll watch over it to see that it isn’t filled with the pleasures that are called ‘bodily,’ and that it doesn’t become so big and strong that it no longer does its own work but attempts to enslave and rule over the classes it isn’t fitted to rule, thereby overturning everyone’s whole life . . . Then wouldn’t these two parts do the best job of guarding against external enemies, too, protecting the entire soul and body?”

Timaeus 17d–18a: “We said that they alone should be the guardians of the city, if someone from outside or even someone from inside (ei te tis exobhen kai ton andothen) were to begin doing evil.”

Timaeus 70a–b: “[the gods located the spirited part of the soul in the heart] nearer the heart, between the diaphragm and the neck, so that it might listen to reason (ion logou katêkoon) and together with it control by force the part consisting of appetites, should the latter at any time refuse outright to obey (katekhoi . . . hopote mëdamëi peithesthai etheloi) the dictates of reason coming down from the acropolis . . . if spirit’s might should boil over at a report from reason that some wrongful act involving these members is taking place – something being done to them from outside or even something originating from the appetites within (exobhen kai tis apo ton andothen epithumion).”

IV Spirit’s first role: the creation of interpersonal diplomacy

Now I want to look more deeply into the first aspect of spirit, the one that is necessitated by the fact that there are many souls in many bodies. If the cosmos contained only one soul in one body, appetite would be needed to help it navigate through the world, to make it properly sensitive to appetitive goods and bads. Since there are many souls in many bodies, and appetitive goods are finitely available, there is competition for them. Spirit is needed to help negotiate the distribution of appetitive goods among multiple agents. Indeed, the system constituted by honor, and

8 Translations of Plato are from C.D.C. Reeve’s revision of Grube’s Republic and Donald Zeyl’s Timaeus in Cooper and Hutchinson (1997), with some modifications.

9 Aristotle may intentionally echo this description in EN 110b31 when he says that the higher part of the irrational soul shares in reason and is “katêkoon autou.” The adjective is a hapax in Aristotle, and quite rare in Plato.
spirit’s sensitivity to honor, is for the most part simply a complex system for the distribution of appetitive goods.

Here it is worth looking at the Homeric heroes. The quarrel between Agamemnon and Achilles is about honor, surely. And yet it is also about the distribution of various appetitive goods. The hero gets the choice cuts of meat at feast, and a choice of sexual chattels. The distribution system functions correctly, and is seen to function correctly, when it distributes appetitive goods preferentially to those members of the group who have a greater ability to provide appetitive goods to the group as a whole. The system becomes dysfunctional when it distributes goods contrary to this ability, or when judgments about ranking come into dispute (as with Achilles and Agamemnon in Iliad 1, or Odysseus and Ajax in the contest over Achilles’ arms). The determinant of correct distribution might seem to be goodness or nobility but this is routinely explicated in terms of success in the economic sphere. Achilles complains that he is the best fighter, that he has provided the greatest amount of plunder for the Achaians, and receives plunder disproportionate to his efforts. 10

It is also worth looking at dogs and wolves, because pack animals of this sort have a full psychology of honor and shame – I believe this myself, and I believe that Plato believed it. They are capable of conceiving of themselves as members of a social ordering, in which, once again, appetitive goods are distributed preferentially to those members of the group who have a greater ability to provide appetitive goods to the group as a whole. Alpha wolves lead the hunt, and get to eat first. The comparison of spirit to dogs is not an idle joke in the Republic: the psychology of dogs really does contain most of the psychology of the spirited part of the human soul.

Distribution in such systems is far from egalitarian. To begin with, it is supposed to occur kat’ axian, according to merit and desert. But merit is not shared by all persons alike, nor does any person have it merely in virtue of their being a person or a rational agent. Spirit’s own views about what merit consists in tend to focus on bravery. There could, of course, be people whose sense of honor tracked the presence of higher virtues – who knows, even people who thought that honor should be distributed according to intellectual virtues. But that judgment would be extrinsic to the cognitive resources and value orientation of spirit itself; the true breed identifies merit with martial bravery (the keynote virtue of spirit, after all).

10 Iliad 1.165, 9.316–36.
This is not the case with honor. If we take the perspective of psychogony, set about designing and creating mortal souls and fitting them out with all of the capacities they will need, then what we find is that there is no realm of facts about honor at large in the cosmos that needed to be attended to, prior to the creation of the souls themselves. It is the creation of multitudes of appetitive souls in proximity to each other, in a region where appetitive goods are moderately scarce, that in turn creates a situation in which there are facts about differential abilities to acquire and preserve those appetitive goods, plus possibilities for group sharing and distribution of appetitive goods, plus facts about the biological or ethnic kinship of various groups. There is not, in addition to all of this, some further set of facts about honor in place before spirited souls arrive on the landscape. Rather, it is the spirited souls’ sensitivity to these other facts that constitutes the landscape of honor, creates the institutions of reputation, renown, shame, and so on, as a sort of signaling system to encode and transmit these underlying facts. Plato, in other words, is a realist about goodness and something like a projectivist about honor.

Something of the same sort can be said about pleasure and pain, as well, I think. When we decide to put souls into bodies, and try to equip them for their arduous tasks, we need to make them sensitive to light and sound and smells and pressures; we need to make them capable of sensing when their bodies are being damaged or restored, and capable of assessing future actions for their potentials for damage or restoration. But we do not, in addition to all of this, need to make them sensitive to the locations of pleasures and pains in the environment around them. Pleasure and pain are posterior to the creation of appetitive souls, and function as internal signaling systems for processing information about damages and restorations and the real things that are really damaging or really restorative.

So there is certainly something right about saying that spirit pursues honor and appetite pursues pleasure just as reason pursues the good. But there is this deep difference between the three, that reason’s relation to the good is more purely perceptual, whereas the other two psychic parts actually constitute their apparent objects of pursuit. Not soul by soul, of course; it is no more up to Achilles alone whether running away is ignominious than it is up to him whether fire is painful. But the totality of spirited souls creates the world of ignominy and fame, the institutions of honor and reputation, out of raw materials that do not include them. Honor isn’t out there.

Two things make it look otherwise with Plato, I think, in addition to the misleading verbal parallel between the labels “good-loving” and “honor-loving.” First is the fact that in Plato’s view, some things are really honorable, truly honorable, whereas other things are not, even though they may be widely thought to be so. Entire cities, in Plato’s view, entire continents, can believe that this or that practice or behavior is honorable, sing the praises of those who do it, rebuke those who do not, organize their distribution of appetitive goods in line with those beliefs, and still be wrong about it. This may seem to contradict the claim that Plato is a projectivist about honor, and suggest that he thinks there are facts about the honor of location that go deeper than I am claiming.

We don’t need to say that, though. The additional truth-making anchor which makes it possible to say that one socially embedded custom really is honorable, where another equally embedded custom really is not honorable, will not be independent facts about reified honor, but rather facts about the good, and how institutions do and do not line up with it. “For it is foolish to think that anything besides the bad is ridiculous, or to take seriously any standard of what is fine and beautiful other than the good” (452d). When you try to hunt for honor as a metaphysical constituent of the world, you either wind up with mere opinion, or with a Form. But the Form you find is not the Form of honor, or of the honorable. It is the Form of the Good, perceived directly and accurately by reason, and through a glass darkly by spirit, in its pursuit of honor. If “noble” and “beautiful” name anything in Platonic cosmology, it is the Form of the agathon or the kalon. But spirit is constitutionally incapable of grasping such things. It is the constant dupe of culture, with no internal capacity to imagine that the noble is other than what its training and environment tell it to admire. Only in the Kallipolis will spirit’s opinions about the beautiful and the ridiculous be properly aligned with the real standard of the good, and that alignment will come by courtesy of reason, not spirit.

The second source of resistance to the idea that honor is posterior to and parasitic on the existence of appetites in bodies comes from the experience of those who ardently and zealously pursue honor and the honorable. When one strives for honor, when one aspires to do what is truly honorable (as one thinks), it does not feel as though one is striving for a greater share of appetitive goods. Quite the opposite; any such consideration seems tawdry, mercenary, ignoble: indeed, dishonorable. In his indignant wrath, which is the outraged protest of his spirit, Achilles cares nothing for food.
And yet this is not an objection to the picture outlined above, but an important part of it. Spirit has the role of regulating appetite, and governing the interactions of competing appetites; to play this role, it had to be designed with a degree of independence from appetite, an indifference to the allure of appetite. Spirit had to be given a value that it would value more highly than appetitive pleasures, so that it would be able to oversee and master the appetites. The world of spirit remains a reaction. A creature that could not feel physical pain would have no use for martial courage; a species that was not inclined to sensual excess would not need the particular sting and sanction of high-minded disgust to counteract appetite. Our reason is divine, and its value is intrinsic; spirit’s value is relational, and lies solely in opposing appetite.

V Test case 2: the fall of the Kallipolis

One of the reasons that I think it is important to insist that the institutions of honor are inextricably bound up with the distribution of appetitive goods is because I think it helps us to understand the nature of the decay from the Kallipolis into the first pathological city, the timocracy or timarchy.

We know that the beginning of the end of the Kallipolis arrives when the guardians entrust the rule of the city to an unworthy offspring who neglect philosophy and the Muses (546). This will lead to the inclusion within the ruling class of individuals of all psychic types, here represented by their metallic blazons, gold, silver, bronze, and iron. This happens in accordance with the geometrical number (12,960,000), so that part is pretty cut-and-dried. But other aspects are hard to understand.

The timarchic city will arise out of the stasis within that ruling class. The surprising detail is that the moving force behind this evolution is not the desire for honor.

In the later transformations from higher constitution to lower, Socrates makes it clear that the central value of the current constitution always contains the germ of the value that will overthrow it. The timocratic values honor, but since the shortest path to honor is the amassing of wealth, the timocracy turns into an oligarchy (550d). The oligarch’s central value is the disciplined and thrifty amassing of wealth, but since the shortest path to vast wealth is to make money on the non-necessary appetites of others, the thrifty oligarchy turns into a democracy in which non-necessary appetites run riot (555bc). The democrat values the individual’s freedom to satisfy any appetites they may have, but once freedom is a fetish the citizens want to be free of laws altogether, and the lawful democracy turns into a lawless tyranny (562b–c).

In these cases, we can see the later value – defiance of the law, riotous appetite, and miserly greed – playing some role in bringing about the city that enshrines them. That pattern is not found in the origins of the timocratic city. Where we might expect to find a nascent or covert love of honor pushing the Kallipolis into timarchy, what we actually find is a straightforward love of property. When stasis first breaks out in 547b, it is the bronze and iron types that are the agitators; the honor-lovers play no active role. And the appetitive agitators drag the city towards the making of money, and the possession of lands, houses, gold, and silver. They do not drag it towards the love of honor, and in fact the love of honor seems to play no more of a role than the honor-lovers themselves do in advancing the first transformation.

It’s not hard to imagine how Plato could have written it so that honor and honor-lovers did play this kind of active role. The guardians could have spent less time on philosophy in order to spend more time on athletic competitions, or on awards ceremonies. Instead of actually doing philosophy, they might have spent their time talking about which philosophers had the most prestigious positions. They might have even created an elaborate system of numerical rankings in order to track the prestige of various philosophers. This would have been a clear way for Plato to signal that philosophy was dying and that the love of wisdom was being replaced by the love of honor – perhaps the allegory would have been a bit heavy-handed, but no lighter report could be more clear.

The next thing that is notable about the story here is that the second change from timarchy to oligarchy happens very quickly, because the timocrats were already practically oligarchs (550c–552e). They were already storing up wealth in private treasuries, even during the timarchy; indeed, they were acting far more like money-lovers than like honor-lovers already. The only change that we are told about is that as wealth is honored more, virtue is honored less. But the amassing of wealth had already begun in the so-called timarchy, and was in fact the driving force behind the establishment of the timarchy.

It is noteworthy, in fact, how little of a role honor plays in the origins and nature of the timocratic city. After the fall of the Kallipolis there is a reference to the ruler’s being honored in the new city (timan tous arkhontas, 547d3), but this is actually cited as a conservative holdover from the wisdom-loving Kallipolis, not as a characteristic feature of the new city that exalts honor. In 548c the nature of the new city is summed
up by saying that “it is mixed, but because of the predominance of the spirited element in it, one thing alone is most manifest in it, namely the love of victory and the love of honor.” That may be true of the city, but it is certainly not true of what Plato has shown us so far. Prior to this summation, we have seen only two forces at work in the city, the conservative force of the gold and silver elements, dragging it towards virtue, and the revolutionary force of the bronze and iron elements dragging it towards money-loving, and property-owning. Those values really belong to the forces of oligarchy and appetite, not to the forces of timocracy and spirit.

My point here is not that Plato has bumbled his allegory; quite the opposite, I think he is saying what he should say here in light of how he thinks about spirit and honor. There are contexts in which honor needs to be mentioned in its own right, especially as an explanation of an individual’s behavior (e.g., he did this because of his love of honor). But there are other contexts in which it displays a kind of transparency or dispensability; at the level of an entire society, it is sometimes more accurate to say that it is the appetitive goods that are the driving force, rather than the honor involved in their distribution. The further we get from the psychology of the individual, and the closer we get to the perspective of the cosmos, the less work is done by mentioning honor.

The close resemblance between the timocrat and the oligarch is no accident. The fact that it is the love of money and property that is driving the decay of the constitutions, even as early as the timocracy, is no accident. Instead, it is a reflection of the honor-system’s nature as a system for the distribution of appetitive goods. As the ally of reason, spirit can indeed oppose the forces of appetite. And honor can sometimes, on some occasions, act as a value that is opposed to appetite, so that spirit can choose honor instead of pleasure, competition instead of leisure, and so on. But the honor system as a whole does not offer a source of value that is independent of appetitive goods. Spirit may be the natural ally of reason, but spirit’s object, honor, is the natural ally of appetite. Anyone who gets deeply involved in caring about honor will necessarily expose themselves to the risk of coming to care about appetitive goods, exactly because the distribution and regulation of appetitive goods is the very point and origin of the system of honor.

Viewed in this light, honor is a sort of medium of exchange, like money. Here too we can see why the step from timocracy to oligarchy is the shortest and simplest in the entire story of decay. Both the timocrat and the oligarch are hoarders, piling up exchange-tokens, and tokens that already implicate them in the value-system of appetite.

VI The oikeion

I mentioned earlier that the institution of honor is bound up with the cohesiveness of social groupings, with the sense of kinship, solidarity, and identification that goes under the name of the oikeion. You can see Plato drawing this connection in several places in the Republic, and the way that Plato discusses the oikeion gives us further insights into the spirited part of the soul.11

The oikeion appears on the scene almost as soon as spirit does: when Socrates first sketches out the nature of the future guardians in Book II, he notes that they should be spirited and brave, but that this spirit must be accompanied by mildness and gentleness towards their oikeioi, where this clearly means their fellow-citizens (375c). The thought is followed up in the pun about dogs: dogs are like this; they bark at strangers, but welcome the people that they know (375d). They divide the world into an in-group and an out-group, us and them, part of the pack and not part of the pack, oikeion and allotrion, and they are fierce towards the others, but gentle towards their own.

This is not a surprising endowment for a social animal to have. It might even be a necessary part of the psychology of any species that can develop and support the institutions of honor. For, first of all, the goods that honor apportion will be divided among a group. And the honors are given to begin with for accomplishments and abilities related to the ability to provide goods to the group.

But the fact that the spirited part of the soul cares about what is oikeion is an important part of Plato’s depiction of it. It’s part of why spirit is connected to virtues such as loyalty and teamwork. Unlike appetite, spirit can be motivated to act for the benefit of others, ignoring its own pain in order to help the group. The spirited individual is self-sacrificing, and can endure pain and even death in order to achieve something for the group.

This is also why spirit is conservative: the spirited part loves the things it was raised with, purely and simply because it was raised with them. They are familiar, they provide a sense of identity. The values that we are raised with have a kind of hold over us that is very resistant to change, whether that change would be good (e.g., rational criticism of our unreflecting prejudices) or bad (e.g., the erosion of our oligarchic work ethic by the blandishments of a permissive democratic society). At several junctures

11 I argued that the Republic influenced the Stoic theory of oikeiosis in Brennan (2005) 159–62.
in the stories of moral decay related in Books VIII and IX (560a1, 560c6, 572e3), Socrates imagines an individual torn between an older, better set of values and some newer, more degraded set of values. The older set are always advocated by the person’s father and oikeios, i.e., intimate household friends, people you were raised with, people you identify with.

It is also important that spirit, with its strong sense of the oikeion, has severe cognitive limitations. When faced with a dialectical challenge to the traditional values, spirit can cling tenaciously to the folk-ways that are familiar to it, but it cannot defend or justify them philosophically. “This is the way we do it,” “This is how we were taught to do it,” “Doing it this way is part of what makes us the group that we are” – those are as much justification as spirit can give. And if the sense of affiliation is undermined, the normative force disappears. That’s why the plight of someone raised with unreflective values who has them sapped by dialectical questioning is compared to someone who grows up feeling the ordinary allegiance to their family, but discovers he is really an adopted orphan (538b1, c2, c5). Once we feel that our values no longer have the authority of being oikeios, once they are no longer taken for granted as the familiar things we were raised with, they lose all their hold and we may drift into amoral hedonism.

The considerations that spirit can bring forward – it’s what our kind of people do, it’s traditional, and so on – are fatally insensitive to the actual goodness or badness of the customs in question. Plato indicates this, too, in the very first passage on spirit. He tells us that dogs base their reactions to people on whether they are familiar or strange, known or unknown, and that they love and welcome the people who are familiar, even if they have never received anything good from them, and hate and harass those who are unfamiliar, even if they have never received anything bad from them. It is a very striking way of making the point that spirit is not only incapable of understanding the good, but is incapable of even having thoughts about goodness that go beyond knee-jerk prejudices about what is familiar, what is customary and traditional, what our tribes do.

Now in the ideal case, rulers who do know what is good will bring it about that people are raised with customs that are in fact in line with the good. That way, spirit will feel its unreasoning sense of solidarity and identification with exactly the things that reason knows are really good. Having been raised with good customs and traditions, spirit can endorse as customary and traditional exactly the same things that reason endorses as good. This coincidence between unreasoning allegiance and rational confirmation is described at 402a. Socrates has been outlining the kind of early cultural immersion that the children of the guardians receive, and how this prepares their non-rational souls to work in alignment with their later rational understanding: “He’ll rightly object to what is shameful, hating it while he’s still young and unable to grasp the reason, but, having been educated in this way, he will welcome the reason when it comes and recognize it easily because of its kinship (oikeiotés) with himself.”

Our feelings of allegiance to what we know, our feelings of identification and solidarity with whatever customs and values we have been raised with, are very powerful determinants of human behavior, not reducible to other kinds of motivation. So powerful, in Plato’s opinion, that it is hopeless to expect a rational appreciation of the good to overcome them if they ever oppose one another in the individual’s soul (cf. 607c).

The only way to ensure that people will act in accordance with the good, is to guarantee that there will be an extensional coincidence between the good and what is familiar to those people. This way, their spirit, moved by what is oikeios, will support and not oppose their reason, when it strives for what is good.

This is the project of the second wave in Book V (457b–472a), i.e., to engineer a coincidence between what we feel a sense of allegiance to, and what is in fact the best. It happens in two stages in the second wave, which are figured in the allegory as the abolition of nuclear families and the institution of eugenic breeding lotteries. The point of having children and mates in common is to extend our sense of kinship and solidarity beyond our nuclear family to the entire city (and then later to the whole Greek world); we will feel the most intimate sense of family identity, solidarity, and loyalty with the entire population, calling them “father” and “mother” and so on, and treating them in accordance with these names. The point of the eugenic breeding, within the allegory of the city, is to bring it about that these people with whom we are being raised, with whom we will feel these deep irrational ties of solidarity and belonging, are in fact the best people. You may imagine, if you like, that Plato is also making a non-allegorical political proposal about eugenic breeding in the

12 There are also two other clear verbal reminiscences that tie this to the puppy passage: because the logos is oikeios, i.e., because he was raised with its presence in his life, it is familiar to him, and so he embraces it (402a3 aspazoët en auton genetatos = 376A6 hou d' aultron, aspazoëtai). He is acting just like the dog that welcomes what is familiar to it, only in this case what is familiar is also, independently, good. Contrast 409b6, where someone to whom vicus was oikeios from their youth up would never make a good judge.
city, but at the very least he is making an allegorical proposal about the soul, that we should make sure that we feel an irrational sense of solidarity and allegiance only to customs and values and beliefs that are in fact, on independent rational grounds, the best customs and values and beliefs. The second wave is shot through with the terminology of the oikeion and a few other phrases equivalent to it, especially the notion of me and mine, my own and our own.  

It's worth saying, by the way, that spirit's sensitivity to the oikeion is not in competition with its sensitivity to honor, but rather one of the preconditions of it. They function at different levels in the analysis. My sense of who my oikeion-group is (Americans, or Methodists, or Cubs fans, or what have you) will determine whether I take a particular event to be an honorable one or a shameful one; it will also determine the terms in which I assess honor and shame; and it will create the audience of people before whom I myself feel honored or ashamed. This event redounds to the honor of my group, not yours; this is the sort of thing that is considered honorable in my group, not yours; I am honored among the members of my group, not yours. "I would feel deep shame before the Trojans, and the Trojan women with trailing garments," as Hector says, "if like a coward I were to shrink aside from the fighting."14

All of these roles for spirit are the result of the fact that rational souls are dropped from the heavens, land in bodies, and then find themselves surrounded by other embodied souls, all striving for appetitive goods within various kinship groupings.

VII Spirit's second role: policing internal unrest

But the social aspect of spirit does not exhaust its roles. As I suggested earlier, the spirited part of the soul plays an internal role, apart from its role in society, which we can illuminate by asking a version of the desert-island question here: would Plato think that a single incarnate soul, living in isolation from all other incarnate souls, and provided with an abundance of appetitive goods, had any use for spirit? Ex hypothesi this soul would not need spirit to do the things described above, i.e., to distribute scarce appetitive goods to a number of competing consumers. But would there still be other roles for it to play in the psyche of the isolated individual?

I think the answer is "yes." We can give this affirmative answer in several ways, drawing on different Platonic presentations of his psychological theory.

From a purely psychological perspective, what we can say is that a sense of self-esteem plays a role in the virtuous regulation of appetite, even when a sense of social honor plays no role in regulating the distribution of appetitive goods. Even if my desert island offers me unlimited quantities of choice foods, my spirit ought to act to restrain my appetite from indulgence. Gross indulgence is vicious in a way that goes beyond public propriety and does not depend on the opinions of others. It is beneath me, absolutely, and not merely in relation to others.15

Here's another way to say that: the drama of the Phaedrus, in which the white horse helps the charioteer to restrain the black horse, could just as well have been played out for the case of food and hunger as for the case of sexual appetites. Spirit should still come to the assistance of reason in suppressing appetites that surpass the bounds of reason, even if there are no other persons in the picture, i.e., no members of a social oikeion-group (and indeed the other person in the Phaedrus myth figures less as a person than as an object of appetite in any case, at least in the eyes of the black horse).

Here's a third way of saying it which we noticed earlier: in the allegory of the Republic, separate persons are represented by separate sovereign cities, and the auxiliaries clearly have war-fighting, expeditionary, and overseas functions, i.e., interpersonal ones. But the auxiliaries also have domestic policing functions. They not only combat the appetites of rival cities, they also combat the appetites that are internal to the city, keeping the producers properly subservient to the philosopher-rulers.

I think it is also worth noticing that spirit's relation to anger is more general than its relation to the social nexus of insult, injury, and retaliation. Anger, like spirit, can be directed at perceived slights to reputation – the classic cases of the wrath of Achilles or the resentment of Odysseus. But it can also simply act as an enforcer, an executive expediter.

Anger can be a response to events that are not easily construed as affronts to honor. Anger can be a response to pain – when I accidentally bump my head I often feel a blind and unreasoned rage that does not seem to involve any thought that the door-jamb or tree-branch has treated me

13 Three times in 463a–c; four times in 470a–d.
15 The case of Leontius may illustrate this, but it is difficult to be certain. The role of other people (beyond the corpses, who have no lines) is not emphasized in the anecdote – he is not said, e.g., to be ashamed to be seen by others.
understand spirit now, if we cannot characterize it through its love of honor?
I'd like to approach this question on the bias, by asking why there are exactly three parts to the soul, and how we might show that the number of parts should be three and only three.

VIII An excursion: arguments for three-ness
We want a cardinality proof — a proof that there must be exactly $N$ things of kind $L$. How can proofs like this proceed? Some simply leverage off other cardinalities, e.g., there have to be exactly nine planets, because there are nine Muses. But these are obviously unsatisfying. If there had to be three psychic parts because there are three something elses (the three Graces, perhaps) then we'll still need a reason why there had to be three of those, as well as an argument for the equinumerosity of parts with Graces.

A slightly better sort of proof does some simple math, e.g., the four emotions in Stoicism arise as the Cartesian product of two values, good and bad, and two times of evaluation, present and future. That style of proof will of course be easier with a composite number like four, harder with a prime like three.

In David Reeve's book on the *Republic*, he argued that reason's desires are what he called "good dependent," that appetite's desires are good-independent, and that spirit's desires are what he calls "part-good-dependent." This view of the parts would give us a good argument

16 Rachel Barne has objected that I make Plato more certain than he is that the number of parts is three, citing 443d as evidence that Socrates countravenes the possibility of more than three parts to the soul. Some uncertainty at this stage in Socrates' exposition would not trouble me. The view in the later stages, whether in *Republic* IX or in the *Timeaus*, seems to me unambiguous: there are exactly three parts. At the same time, the fully developed view always allows that the lowest part of the soul is composed of a variety of subparts: appetite is a many-headed beast (588c, and see *Timeaus* 91a for the possibility that the genitals, like the brain, heart, and liver, are a locus of ensolement, realizing a subpart of appetite). My question remains: given the existence of reason on the one side and appetite on the other (multifarious as it may be), why do we need the third part, spirit? The reference in 443d to "any others that may be in between (καὶ ἂλλα ὅσα μεταξύ ταύτης ὀνταί)" need not refer to some fourth or fifth part. Socrates, developing a musical metaphor, has just referred to a "highest" (hupēstē) and "lowest" (nasion) part, as well as a middle one (meidē). If by "lowest" he had in mind the lowest of the many-headed appetitites, rather than appetite as a whole, then the others "in between" can refer to the various other appetitive subparts.

that there should be three and only three parts, because the three
ess would arise from the quantifier-trichotomy of "all/some/none." In fact I
don't think the notion of good-dependence here can work for other rea-
sons, but it shows us another way to prove threeess. Somewhat similar
to that is the proposal that appetite is entirely egocentric, that reason is
tirely impartial, and that spirit is concerned with an oikeion-group, i.e.,
the psychic part cares about no other agents, all others, or some others,
respectively. Again, I don't think it's right in detail, but it has the sort of
structure that could work.

Still another sort of proof is exemplified by Euclid 13.18, the proof that
there are exactly five Platonic solids. Here, there is no real role for the
number in the premises or the conclusion; fiveness, as it were, is not at
issue. The argument is simply that you can make a perfect solid this way
and this other way, but that way won't work, and you can make one this
way, this way, and this way, but after that you run out. One could fully
understand the proof, and the conclusion, without ever noting to oneself
that the number of existential quantifiers is in fact five. So with the soul,
we might find that there had to be a part like this, and a part like this,
and a part like this, and that there cannot be any other parts than those,
however many that was, i.e., there was no special work being done by the
number three, either in the premises or the conclusion.

I think that's actually not an uncommon way of reading the argument
in Book IV, i.e., that we start with a method of analysis, a method for
distinguishing parts by means of psychic conflict, and then apply it until
it stops producing new parts, and see how many we get. Or at least,
I have sometimes felt, and I think others have too, that this is the most
intellectually honest way for Plato to approach the question; just approach
it as an empirical question, with no antecedent views about how many
soul-parts there should turn out to be, start identifying them by means
of conflict, and see where the facts lead. We would no more expect the
argument to turn on an explicit invocation of threeess per se in this case
than of ninneness in the case of the planets; there are simply as many parts
as there are, and the way to find out is by looking.

IX. My answer: spirit as bond, medium, and middle term

But as attractive as that method might be for making Plato look like an
empirical psychologist, I think there is another line of thought that comes
closer to capturing his thinking on the matter. I find it in the Timaeus, in
a discussion of how to bind things together:

"But it isn't possible to combine two things well all by themselves, without
a third; there has to be some bond between the two that unites them.
Now the best bond is one that really and truly makes a unity of itself
likewise together with the things bonded by it, and this in the nature of things is
best accomplished by proportion. For whenever three numbers which
are either solids or squares the middle term between any two of them is
such that what the first term is to it, it is to the last, and conversely, what
the last term is to the middle, it is to the first, then since the middle term
turns out to be both first and last, and the last and first likewise both turn
out to be middle terms, they will all of necessity turn out to have the same
relationship to each other, and given this, will all be unified."

(Timaeus 31c)

With that principle in mind, let us once again set to the task of psy-
chogy. We begin with a rational soul, suited by its nature for inter-
course with the forms, but doomed for a certain term to walk the earth.
In response to being incorporated, the rational soul produces an appeti-
tive soul, whose nature it is to tend to and oversee a perishable mortal
body. Now we have two souls, holding sway over two spheres, of forms
and bodies. But how shall these two be combined so as to form a single,
unified thing? There has to be some bond between them. And this bond
should function as a kind of geometric mean: what the first is to it, it
should be to the last, and so on alternando.

Spirit, then, can be seen as the necessary bond between two things
that would otherwise lack unity. And for unity you may read causal
interaction; on this view, spirit is introduced in order to solve a sort
of interaction problem. Appetitive souls are completely deaf to reason;
they can be trained, habituated, rewarded, and punished, but they cannot
be reasoned with. And the rational soul is simply too feeble in its own
bulk - too small, in some quite mysterious psychodynamic sense (428de,
442c4) - to be able to apply this kind of training and punishment directly
to the appetite. And here spirit steps in, able to listen to reason as appetite
cannot, and able to apply force to the appetite as reason cannot. That's
why Timaeus places it between the brain and the liver, obedient to reason,
and forcing the appetite to obey in turn. It is the geometric mean between
reason and appetite; as spirit stands to reason, so appetite stands to spirit.
Spirit obeys reason, and appetite obeys spirit; spirit sees the truth less
clearly than reason, and appetite sees it even less clearly than spirit. And
this is what it does both in its social roles, and in its non-social, internal
enforcement roles, e.g., the ones in which it helps reason to keep appetite in
check, completely apart from any concerns about social standing, honor,
and reputation.
Spirit, in other words, is the bond between reason and appetite, created to overcome an interaction problem. And like other entities created to solve interaction problems, it really does not help much, since it merely relocates the problem of interaction. If it was unclear how reason and appetite can interact, then it will be unclear how one thing can interact with both; or, if it interacts with both because it has two aspects or sides, a reason-friendly side and an appetite-friendly side, then it will not be clear how those two halves are supposed to interact inside of spirit.

Still, even if we do not find the interpolation of a third thing as a bond very satisfactory, or worry that it will lead to regress, it is a move that Plato himself is fond of. You can see him rehearsing very nearly the same line of thought in the Symposium:

Every daimonion is intermediate between god and mortal. They are messengers who shuttle back and forth between the two, conveying prayer and sacrifice from men to gods, while to men they bring commands (epitaxeis) from the gods and gifts in return for sacrifice. Being in the middle of the two, they round out the whole and bind fast the all to all…Gods do not mix with men; they mingle and converse with us through daimonion instead.

(Symposium 202e–203a)

Once again we have the third thing, the intermediate, that acts as a bond to unify the two extremes that cannot interact directly. Indeed, if you consider how soul itself is introduced in the Timaeus, it seems to follow the same pattern, acting as a sort of causal intermediary for the cosmos. Consider how soul is constructed in Timaeus 35ff. as a blend of the Same and the Different so that it can interact with and form beliefs about both changeless Forms and changing bodies. Consider the view in the Phaedrus 246b and Laws 897 that soul looks after what does not have soul, viz., mere body, and is responsible for all the order and beauty in the world by causing bodies to participate in Forms. So it seems that when Plato is thinking about souls at the most abstract level (the World Soul of the Timaeus, or the “all soul” of the Phaedrus) he thinks of them as a tertium quid, distinct from Forms and bodies, that can interact with them both.\(^\text{19}\) But then when he comes to dividing up the soul in the Republic, he has one soul-part, the rational soul, that is especially suited to dealing with Forms and less able to deal with bodies, and another soul-part, the appetitive soul, that is especially suited for ministering to a body, but is unable to perceive Forms. And that is why he must introduce a third kind of soul, the spirited part, to mediate between the two. It’s as though we have reproduced the Form/body dichotomy within the soul itself, and so must reproduce an especially soul-like soul, an especially intermediary soul, as a geometrical mean between them.

X Which came first?

I want to close by asking about a different sort of internal divide within spirit – not the divide between its more rational, reason-receptive side and its more appetitive, brute-force sides, but rather the divide that Plato is very explicit about, between its role as an external, expeditionary force for dealing with other agents, and its role as an internal, constabulary force for dealing with appetitive urges. Both of them, of course, show spirit in its central role of enforcing the dictates of reason against the obstinate urges of appetite, whether in oneself or others. But it would be nice to be able to show some kind of connection between these two spheres of responsibility, in order to avoid the prospect of having spirit fall apart into two separate modules: the interpersonal, social module and the intrapsychic, bare mediation module. Is there a way of seeing these as somehow the same? If not, is there a way of showing one of them to be prior, and the other to be derivative?

In principle, one could imagine the priority running in either direction. Perhaps spirit’s original role is that of internal police force, but the police force can be pressed into service as an army. The original role is that of an internal appetite-suppressor, such as even the solitary person must have, but having the inner sense of decorum and propriety, I find myself offended by others’ impropriety, too. And once I’m equipped with an inner appetite suppressor, I find I can suppress other people’s appetites as well. Or we might have the reverse model, where the jostle of competing bodies requires me to have a sense of “fair,” “too little,” “greedy,” and the like, and then I deploy those same judgments against my own appetites, as though judging myself from outside. On this model, an army designed to repel external threats is redeployed domestically against internal elements that are redescribed as “enemies of the state.”

I think the second model is more likely to be true; even the bare mediation module seems to follow dynamics that are somehow implicitly social. By that I mean that it seems impossible to describe even the desert

\(^{18}\) Translation modified from Nehamas and Woodruff’s version in Cooper and Hutchinson (1997).

\(^{19}\) That soul stands as a tertium quid between Forms and bodies also seems to me the best way to understand the “resemblance argument” of the Phaedo (78b–80b).
island cases without saying that spirit feels the excesses of appetite as a matter for shame and indignation, as a trigger for reactive attitudes that seem to have other observers as part of their canonical felicity conditions.

So let’s go back to the drawing board and ask our design team this question: if you wanted to create a module that mediates between reason and appetite, why would you give it an endogenous motivational scheme whose currency was social? Suppose you have no interest in the social per se – suppose you intend never to make more than one incarnate soul in any case, and simply want to provide this unique soul with a part that can act as reason’s enforcer. Why would the ideal design for that job require a part structured as though it were part of a social system, as though it were one of many similar souls, all regulating their behavior with an eye to the others? Why would you structure a single individual in such a way that what keeps their gluttony in subservience to their reason is a cluster of feelings that look intrinsically social, the feelings that indulgence would be shameful, embarrassing, undignified, beneath them, and so on?

An answer of the right general shape (though I don’t know that it is the right answer in detail) would start from the proposal that only appetite can oppose appetite effectually, and reason cannot. The only thing that can forcefully oppose my gluttonous hunger is someone else’s gluttony in competition with it, or the threat of their competition. Or, failing the existence of a separately existing person as an owner of the rival appetite, what can effectively oppose my appetite must be a sort of inward representation of the appetitive agents, i.e., an internal representation of other possible appetitive demands and claims. If those demands and claims really had their locus in separate embodied souls, then the other agent would sometimes grab my food away, and we would then compete for it, and soon we would develop the entire apparatus of status, merit, desert, and distribution *kat' axian*. Think away those other persons, but allow reason to fabricate images of such agents, and of a structured hierarchy of such agents, as a method for confronting the appetites.

So the idea here is that reason cannot enforce its will against appetite directly, that nothing other than competing appetites can be the right sort of thing to keep an appetite in check, and so reason has to conjure up other virtual appetites to keep its own appetite in check. But by conjuring up these inward projections of a realm of competing appetites, reason has constituted, *ipsa facto*, a space of social reasons within this one soul, which provides it with all of the values and sensitivities that will constitute the social realm should it meet other souls so fashioned.

We started with the thought that reason wants to fashion an enforcer to deploy against appetite, and that only a competing appetite or the threat of a competitive appetite can oppose or affect the original appetite with which reason begins. So reason conjures up the image of a group. And yet in the course of creating this internalized projection of multiple virtual appetites, reason has managed to create something distinct from appetite, and something that can oppose appetite — and, in its final form as an independent psychic part, can oppose reason, too.

So what I want to be able to say — what it would be pleasing, from a structural perspective, to be able to say — is that the two aspects of spirit, the internal and external, the foreign and domestic, war-fighting and police-forcing aspects, are united because the only way to create the internal, police-force spirit, was by channeling the force of appetite against itself in a certain way, i.e., through representations of rival appetites; and that constructing these representations and the systems that integrate them created everything needful for the external, war-fighting aspects, i.e., spirit in its more familiar social and honor-loving role.

But of course souls were not made to live in isolation, and spirit was built into them for social as well as for solitary use. Once reason had created a set of psychic capacities that were adequate for negotiating a world of competing appetitive agents, where these capacities include not only competition and anger but an obsessive attention to status and its perquisites, as well as empathic abilities to imagine oneself and one’s status as viewed through the eyes of others — once reason had created modules for spirit in its social role, it had created a part that could enforce reason’s dictates against appetite through the internal projections of public opinion, even if there is no public.
CONTENTS

List of contributors  page vii
Acknowledgements  xi

Introduction  1
RACHEL BARNEY, TAD BRENNAN, CHARLES BRITTAI

PART I  Transitions to tripartition  7
1 From the Phaedo to the Republic: Plato’s tripartite soul and the possibility of non-philosophical virtue  9
IAKOVOS VASILIIOU

2 Enkrateia and the partition of the soul in the Gorgias  33
LOUIS-ANDRÉ DORION

3 The unity of the soul in Plato’s Republic  53
ERIC BROWN

PART II  Moral psychology in the Republic  75
4 Speaking with the same voice as reason: Personification in Plato’s psychology  77
RACHANA KAMTEKAR

5 The nature of the spirited part of the soul and its object  102
TAD BRENNAN

6 Curbing one’s appetites in Plato’s Republic  128
JAMES WILBERDING

7 How to see an unencrusted soul  150
RAPHAEL WOOLF