Marita Brčić Kuljiš   Toni Popović   Renata Relja   Anita Lunić

BORDERS

THE ATTITUDES OF STUDENTS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF SPLIT
ON IMMIGRATION, IMMIGRANTS, AND REFUGEES

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The attitudes of students at the University of Split on immigration, immigrants, and refugees

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CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION

Migration has, in recent years, been one of the most current topics both in Croatia and worldwide. We have witnessed increased emigration (i.e. out-migration) of Croatian citizens, as well as attempts to cross the Croatian state border by citizens of other countries. This book focuses on migration in the context of the so-called *migrant* and *refugee crisis*, which is considered from a philosophical and sociological perspective. Any gender-specific terms, irrespective of the gender in which they are used here, refer equally to both men and women. The book came into being as part of a study conducted by the authors in 2019 among students at the University of Split. This was one of the activities carried out within the project entitled *Creating welcoming communities*, which was coordinated by the Association "MI" – Split, with the support of the UNHCR's (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) Representation in Croatia. The main objective of the project was to improve the conditions for better integration of asylum seekers at the local and regional level, with a special emphasis on local stakeholders and the community. The objective and activities of the project reflect and anticipate relocation policies and work towards analysing, valorising, and developing recommendations for the preparation of the local community and self-government to provide support. In this regard, we can say that the aim of the project is a contribution of sorts to creating a welcoming atmosphere and better conditions for integration through cooperation with institutions, and especially with the academic community. The project activities were intended to include relevant scientific findings that would enable the interested public to gain a more

systematic understanding of the current social situation as well as to promote the idea of the possibilities of achieving a higher integration standard.

In reaching the objectives set, the project team used different approaches. A part of the activities was carried out through a newly established information and networking online platform (<*www.irh.hr*>). The platform offers relevant information, news and other content related to the integration process in Croatia. Many stakeholders are involved through activities organized in cooperation with the University of Split, the University of Zagreb, the University of Rijeka and the University of Osijek. Topics from the field of migration were presented within certain courses at the universities involved. At the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences of the University of Split they were presented as part of the courses *Basic Sociological Concepts* (Undergraduate Level), *Introduction to the Philosophy of Multiculturalism* (Undergraduate Level) and *Philosophy of Politics* (Graduate Level). The primary aim was to raise awareness and allow students to participate in discussions on migration and integration. Secondly, however, the Association "MI" as the project coordinator and the research team were interested to see what attitudes students had on immigration and to what extent the formation of these attitudes was influenced by their cultural identities. To this end, a questionnaire was created, and a survey was conducted among students. The results of the conducted study will be used in preparing other materials that would make the topics related to migration and integration more comprehensible for students and allow them to reflect on the impact of their identity characteristics on their attitudes towards refugees and immigrants. This gives an added value to

the project in line with adapting the approach to end-users i.e. project beneficiaries. Based on the preliminary results of the study, a cycle of lectures and seminars was organised in the autumn of 2019 at the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Split. Within the scope of topics on the politics, ethics and methodology of migration research, students were introduced to the preliminary results of the conducted study and made familiar with analyses of normative discussions on (i)migration as well as with argumentation frameworks used in discussions on migration related to the conducted research.

The distinction between the concepts of 'immigrant' and 'refugee' is discussed later on, in a separate section of the paper. For the time being, it will suffice to point out that immigrants represent a more general category that includes all immigrants, with diverse reasons for migration. Refugees, on the other hand, are persons who are granted asylum (refuge) in a country for fear of persecution within the country of their origin, under the condition of not having been "persecuted for non-political crimes or acts contrary to the fundamental principles of international law" (Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, 2014, Art. 33). Asylum -seeking is a human right that guarantees everyone the right to enter another country and seek asylum.[1] This has been a point of contention in numerous public debates dealing with the topic of the so-called *migrant* and *refugee crisis*, concerning the actual justification of asylum applications on reasonable grounds. For this reason, the terms 'immigrant' and 'refugee' were used separately within the study, to investigate differences in the

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[1] See more at *<https://www.irh.hr/rasprave/38-razlika>* (accessed on 8 April 2020)

respondents' attitudes. The results showed discrepancies in the responses obtained, depending on whether a particular question concerned refugees or immigrants.

The term migration comes from the Latin word *migratio* and denotes movement or travel that is most often voluntary. The concept of migration includes migrants (emigrants, immigrants), but also refugees and asylum seekers. Individuals or groups of people move for various reasons, the most important of which are economic, political, and social reasons, but also circumstances such as severe weather conditions or war as an extraordinary socio-political situation of organised conflict (Mandić, 2016). If an individual or group of people enters a country intending to settle there, we are talking about immigration. If an individual or group of people leaves a country, either voluntarily or when forced to do so – then we are talking about emigration. The distinction between 'voluntary' and 'forced' migration will be explained and analysed further on in the text, as meta-analysis has shown that all migrations are forced in a way. The only difference is that in some cases this force is much stronger and more visible than in others.

In the complex social circumstances of today, which require understanding and adaptation, in addition to adequate access to accurate information, it is also crucial to ensure and facilitate the forming of inter-sectoral networks that would respond more readily to existing challenges. This primarily requires knowledge exchange, but also cooperation between different stakeholders such as public institutions, local and state government, civil society organisations, the academic community, media, etc. All these stakeholders play an equally important role in establishing

a support network for a multitude of beneficiaries within the integration process.

The establishment of a support network for the reception and integration of asylum seekers depends on the support of the local population in the broadest sense. One of the aims of the study was to analyse the relationship between the respondents' identity features and their attitudes on accepting immigrants and refugees. The structure of the survey is based on the following objectives within which we sought to identify:

1) students' attitudes on immigration, immigrants, and refugees,
2) the perceived sociodemographic profiles of immigrants and refugees,
3) the eventual presence of social distance towards immigrants and refugees.

For the sake of clarity and better presentation, the second and third research objectives are analytically separated from the first one, although, in fact, a connection exists between them. How students perceive migration, immigrants, and refugees plays a role in shaping their attitudes towards them, as well as in potential behaviours reflected in the degree of social distance. From the sociological perspective, identity is seen as the way we perceive ourselves and others, as well as the way we are perceived by others. It involves sameness, similarity and difference concerning various groups of individuals (Abercrombie, Hill & Turner, 2006:190). Identity is associated with the meanings individuals and groups attach to their social reality, resulting in different forms of action. As such, it becomes one of the central political, scientific, and social topics in general.

The book is structured in six chapters. Following the introduction, the first chapter presents the theoretical framework on which the conducted research is based. It goes on to elaborate on the concepts significant for a better understanding of the covered topic, in particular the concept of identity, the differences between the concepts of immigrant and refugee, as well as the frameworks of philosophical reflection on migration (the philosophy of politics and ethics). As confirmed both by our study and by numerous others, the discussion on the topic of identity represents an important element in understanding modern migrations. The third and fourth chapters lay out the research methodology, followed by the results and their interpretation. Chapter 5 provides conclusions and recommendations for further research and the establishment of a support network for the reception and integration of asylum seekers. The final chapter includes references to the literature used.

All authors participated equally in all stages of the conducted research. The research was approved by the Ethics Committee of the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences in Split. Prior to the onset of the research, all participants were informed on the objectives of the study and on confidentiality, and their informed consent was obtained for anonymous participation. The obtained data and research results that are not presented in this book are kept in the researchers' private records alone.

2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Individual and collective migrations have existed since the beginning of time, and are spurred by existential reasons (war, poverty, etc.) or by desire for new and different experiences and knowledge. Unlike in the animal world, where migrations are time-related and animals instinctively move and most commonly return to the starting point of the migration process, people are less likely to permanently return to their initial location. Although they long for the place they abandoned, they rarely return.

A significant migration factor is the process of population displacement or relocation. People have always migrated, and migration is clearly not a product of the 20th century (Castles & Miller, 1998). Early humans were in fact nomads who considered migration a natural process, up until the conditions for staying in one place were developed (through agriculture and land cultivation). The history of the world has also seen periods of widespread migration by peoples (Slavs, Avars, Huns), and some countries (Canada, USA, Australia) are characterized primarily as immigration countries. It is a common fact that "the United States is a nation of immigrants" (McNeill, 1978:8). However, with the formation of the state, and especially of the nation state, the concept of migration takes on a whole new meaning. According to Kordić (2010), national identity is based on the assumption of an individual's identification with a group to which he belongs naturally or by birth. This is the case with ethnically homogenous states, but states with civic nationhood are characterized by a heterogeneity of cultures and ethnic

groups. Thus, identity is constructed in a different manner (Kordić, 2010:23). However, with respect to its rootedness, we mostly still talk about ethnicity, nationality, and religion as sources of personal identity. Identities constructed on such foundations are more likely to develop a sense of intolerance towards other identities built on the same types of social markers (Gutmann, 2003:30).

Manuel Castells points out that identity includes processes of construction of meaning based on a cultural attribute or a related set of cultural attributes that are given priority over other sources of meaning. All identities are constructed, and we can distinguish between three models of identity building: legitimizing identity represented by the dominant group of a society; resistance identity represented by discriminated groups of a society; project identity represented by the reforming construction of a new identity (Castells, 2002:17). "The construction of identities uses building materials from history, from geography, from biology, from productive and reproductive institutions, from collective memory and from personal fantasies, from power apparatuses and religious revelations. But individuals, groups, and societies process all these materials, and rearrange their meaning according to social determinations and cultural projects that are rooted in their social structure, and in their space/time framework." (Castells, 2002:17). Identity as a phenomenon is a relatively stable element of social reality that emerges from the dialectic between individual and society, and identity theories are always embedded into some symbolic universe, some more general interpretation of reality and its theoretical legitimation (Berger & Luckmann, 1992:202).

Unlike identities in traditional (pre-industrial) societies, which were relatively static and stable, contemporary identities are variable and more fluid (Abercrombie, Hill & Turner, 2006: 190). One of their key features is their transformation and expansion. The transformation of the traditional concept of cultural identity corresponds with the emergence of new forms of "cultural identity, new cultural practices, new definitions of human self-perception and physicality, as well as gender identities, etc." (Labus, 2014:16). In this context, identity is understood more as a process that takes place through interactions, relationships, and encounters with other and different identities. If globalisation is viewed as a process of transcending all kinds of boundaries (state, ethnic, national, religious, cultural, etc.), we can assume that man will transcend himself, i.e. his own traditional placement within a particular culture, nation, religion (Labus, 2014:31). The dissolving of national identity also dissolves a form of (traditional) cultural identity, and opens up space for new types of identities rooted in interculturality, multiculturalism, transculturality, etc. (Labus, 2014:31). These types of identities are part of a reflexive project of the self in which each person is responsible for oneself. Such a new concept of identity is closely linked to the ideas of liberal democracy. According to Gutmann (2003:30), liberal democracy requires dynamic, rather than static identity. "Thus, it is no longer defined merely as a choice (from a set of given options), but rather as a creative quest (along with others) for a new cultural identity. It is a dynamic, creative concept as an agent of testing and freedom." (Labus, 2014:32).

Due to the changeability and fragmentation of identity, the matter of the social consequences of its construction has become one

of the major issues in contemporary academic discussions (Tomić-Koludrović & Knežević, 2004). Identity issues are explored in a number of different but often related contexts (Abercrombie, Hill & Turner, 2006:190). Previous studies of Croatian society point to identity characteristics as important predictors of attitudes on immigrants, refugees, and the refugee crisis, but also of social distance. Cifrić and Trako Poljak (2011) identified the impact of ethnic, political, and religious orientation on attitudes towards other peoples. Kumpes (2018) in turn puts emphasis on the influence of religiosity on attitudes towards immigrants, whereas Medlobi and Čepo (2018) point out the impact of political orientation and frequency of contacts on the readiness to help refugees and asylum seekers. Bulat (1995), on the other hand, demonstrated the impact of sociodemographic features and the frequency of contacts on social distance towards refugees.

According to general European attitudes on immigration, presented in the publication *Public attitudes on migration: rethinking how people perceive migration* (2018:16), the attitudes of 80% of respondents are affected by nationality, whereas 75% point out language, 70% work competences and the level of education, while less than 25% find Christian religious affiliation important for a positive attitude on immigrants and less than 15% see race as significant in this respect. As for the impact of immigration on European societies and states, some 45% believe that it results in increased crime rates. However, most respondents find that its impact on culture will be more positive than negative. The results of the survey actually indicate that the main concerns of European citizens are their own safety and the problem of rapid sociodemographic change (2018:16-17). Therefore, as

attitudes towards immigrants vary from positive to negative, Cantle (2015:5) proposes the so-called *contact theory* offering options for people to learn to live with 'differences' in societies where these differences are redefined over and over again (Cantle, 2015:3). Contact is necessary if we want to get to know each other, to reconcile and recognize our differences, etc. It is precisely getting to know others, recognizing and appreciating them as different from ourselves, and finding common interests with them that is one of the fundamental goals of our project.

Castles (2010) states that the term 'migration', as thought to imply permanent (or long term) movement from one nation-state to another, is typical primarily of the 19th and 20th centuries. The 21st century, on the other hand, is expected to be more an era of temporary migrations and mobility spurred by lifestyle, study, and professional advancement purposes, etc. However, only a slight percentage of people currently have the political rights, or the economic resources needed for this type of mobility (Castles, 2010). "The post-modern utopia of a borderless world of mobility has not yet dawned, so that it still seems appropriate to focus on the analysis of migration as a process based on inequality and discrimination and controlled and limited by states." (Castles, 2010:2). People migrate as labour workers, highly qualified workers, entrepreneurs, refugees, or family members of previously arrived immigrants. Even in cases of initial temporary migration, immigrants mostly remain in the receiving state (Castles & Miller, 1998:20).

When analysing the causes of migration, their diversity is taken into account. Migration has become more common due to a number of circumstances: increasing economic disparities

between North and South (East and West), environmental, political and demographic reasons, growing political and ethnic conflicts, free market and labour needs (Castles & Miller, 1998: 20). According to Castles & Miller (1998), we can rest assured that all countries of the world will at some point be or already are affected by migration – either as receiving or as sending countries. Until the early 1970s, people moving to rich Northern and Western countries migrated because they belonged either to the class of 'wanted and welcome' ones (cold war political refugees and highly qualified specialists) or to the class of 'wanted but unwelcome' ones (labour workers i.e. *Gastarbeiter*) (Bader 2007:1–2). When it comes to Europe, the pattern of migration has changed greatly since then. Except for a small number of welcome professionals and businessmen (and a tolerated group of 'wanted' illegal workers), most of those who manage to enter belong either to the group of so-called 'unwanted but legally acceptable' ones (due to legally binding family reunification or as recognized refugees) or, on the other hand, the group of so-called 'unwanted and unwelcome' illegal refugees (Castles & Miller, 1998; Bader, 2007:1–2).

Daily migrations occurring as a result of the open market and freedom of movement do not pose (too great) a challenge for receiving countries, given the implementation of various modes of regulation. In addition, more developed countries also implement a number of integration mechanisms (Mikac & Dragović, 2017:132). Much more challenging is the uncontrolled occurrence of mass migrations that result in situations which are complex and often extremely difficult both for the receiving countries (the problematic reception of large numbers of immigrants) and immigrants themselves (in danger of becoming

victims of human trafficking, smuggling, violence, etc.). Over time, as a result of gross violations of civil and political rights, (civil) wars and ethnic cleansing, environmental disasters and severe poverty, the number of people forced to move around the globe rapidly increases (Gurr, 1993). National and transnational institutions and mechanisms have yet to find an adequate migration management model (Bader, 2007:2).

Today, there are more than two hundred and fifty (250) million people on the move worldwide, and the share of female migrants in the international migrant stock is some 48%, while their average age is 39.[2] As Hannah Arendt (2015) prophetically wrote, the 21st century would be a century of refugees and migration and the end of the *nation-state* concept. Migration can lead to changes in demographic, economic and social structures, and bring about new cultural diversity, which can in turn pose a threat to national identity (Castles, 1998:20). Today, as we face increasing migration flows to Europe, i.e. the European Union, which has to a certain point already transcended the nation-state model, there is an ongoing renationalization, i.e. a renewal of identity features associated with the nation state and traditional forms of identity (ethnicity, religion, etc.).

This chapter analyses the distinction between the concepts of *migrant* and *refugee*, as well as philosophical perspectives on the politics and ethics of migration. The given theoretical framework seeks to understand how (cultural) identity characteristics impact the formation of attitudes on immigration.

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[2] https://migrationdataportal.org/ (accessed on 5 April 2020)

2.1. Migrants and refugees

The basic legal definition of the term 'refugee' is found in the 1951 *Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees*, according to which it applies to "any person who: 1. has been considered a refugee under the Arrangements of 12 May 1926 and 30 June 1928 or under the Conventions of 28 October 1933 and 10 February 1938, the Protocol of 14 September 1939 or the *Constitution of the International Refugee Organization*; 2. as a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; 3. or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it" (Article 1, Paragraph A).

Given the lasting relevance of the problem of protection of persons whose rights are threatened in their home countries, the Convention was supplemented by the 1967 *Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees* (Article 1, paragraph 1-3) which removed the previous limitation of the refugee status merely to persons displaced by events occurring before 1951. From this point on, the refugee status applies regardless of temporal and geographic circumstances to all persons meeting two conditions: (1) having been displaced outside the borders of one's home country; and (2) the existence of a well-founded fear of persecution in the home country. The countries that are signatories of these two documents are required to recognise refugee status to all

persons who prove to meet the criteria concerned. At this moment, there are one hundred and forty-six (146) signatories to the *Convention*, and one hundred and forty-seven (147) signatories to the *Protocol*.

Unlike refugee, the description and meaning of the term *migrant* is not covered by a single internationally accepted legal definition. The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) defines a migrant as any person who is moving or has moved across an international border or within a state away from his/her habitual place of residence, regardless of the person's legal status, of whether the movement is voluntary, the causes of movement or the length of stay in a particular place (IOM, 2019:130-131). In this regard, the term migrant is an umbrella term covering all 'people on the move'. Given the wide range of persons who meet the condition of belonging to the specified category, we can make a distinction between several subgroups of migrants. Considering the aims of our study, we find the most significant distinction to be the one between *internal* and *external* migration. When speaking about external migrations, we bear in mind the international migrants. Alternatively, the terms *immigrant* and *emigrant* are also used. Both terms refer to people displaced outside their country of birth. The difference is in the point of view: if we observe them in relation to their country of origin – they are emigrants (cf. Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 2020; Macmillan Dictionary, 2020). If, however, we look at them in relation to the receiving country – they are immigrants. Sometimes the intention of taking up permanent residence in the receiving country is also emphasized (Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 2020). It is clear from the given definitions that in the case of migrants our primary focus is on determining their

movement, without necessarily pointing out the circumstances leading to it, which could affect the eligibility assessment of their immigration requests. Theoretically speaking, the term immigrant is, therefore, much broader than the term refugee. Refugees are, namely, also immigrants (persons outside the borders of their home country) but characterized by special (life-threatening) circumstances. To further highlight the difference between the notion of immigrant and refugee, the term economic immigrant is frequently used. It emphasizes the socioeconomic motivation of the immigrants' movement, which is in no way related to life-threatening circumstances. Generally speaking, refugeeism is, on the one hand, predominantly associated with vulnerability, while the immigrant status is, on the other hand, associated with a desire for a better life.

Aware of the underrepresentation and importance of research on differences in attitudes toward immigrant groups, Murray and Marx conducted a study on the attitudes of the student population within the U.S. toward unauthorized or illegal immigrants and authorized or legal immigrants and refugees. The results consistently showed greater prejudice against illegal immigrants, who are perceived as a greater real threat (Murray & Marx, 2013). Similar attitudes were also established in a general population survey conducted in Croatia (Medlobi and Čepo, 2018).

Verkuyten, Mepham and Kros (2017) point out that attitudes on immigrants are strongly influenced by the perception of the (in)voluntary nature of their movement. Migration perceived as forced or involuntary evokes empathy. Migration perceived as voluntary, in contrast, spurs more anger and less support. Taking

into account the fact that the movement of refugees is necessarily forced or involuntary (in terms of leaving one's home country to protect one's own life), we can argue that our study confirms the introduction of the distinction concerned as justified in investigating the attitudes of the (general) population.

The impact of group i.e. category labels on the perception of a particular social group has been confirmed by a number of studies dealing with the representation of refugees and migrants in the media (O'Doherty & Lecouteur, 2011; Esses, Medianu & Lawson, 2013; Breen, Haynes & Devereux, 2016; Lawlor & Tolley, 2017; Smets & Bozdağ, 2018; D'Haenens, Joris & Heinderyckx, 2019). Labelling individuals on the move either as immigrants (a) or as refugees (b) impacts how they are perceived by society, so using either of these terms respectively may both influence and indicate different perceptions by respondents. This has also been confirmed by the results of our study.

2.2. The philosophy of politics: a contribution to the context of the conducted study

The migration debate should by all means take into account the complexity and interdisciplinarity of the topic. In this case, interdisciplinarity implies the involvement of scientific disciplines such as geography, demography (migration as one of the three components of population dynamics, along with fertility and mortality), anthropology, economics (economic consequences of migration), political science (political aspects of migration), sociology (social aspects of migration) and philosophy (political philosophy and ethics of migration).

Allsopp (2015) elaborates on the complexity of the migration phenomenon, i.e. the complexity of philosophical perspectives on migration. In this research, we considered certain assumptions which can, to an extent, be explained through the prism of ethics and politics of migration, and which will help us to better understand the relationship between (cultural) identity features and attitudes on immigration in the light of the so-called migrant and refugee crisis.

We have already defined identity as the way we perceive ourselves and others, as a set of different cultural attributes that, when interrelated, serve to define us with respect to others. We have also seen that all identities are built using different materials (e.g., historical, biological, geographical, institutional, intellectual, religious, etc.), which individuals, social groups and societies process and rearrange in shaping their individual and collective identity (Castells, 2002:17). The former implies a sense of one's own or individual personality, whereas the latter refers to characteristics shared by social groups. In liberal democracies, identities are fluid and changeable, they are created and dissolved (Gutmann, 2003). Identity, especially individual identity, is not understood as a static phenomenon, but rather as a developing and interaction-seeking process which is strongly influenced by the culture one was born into, but also by the culture one encounters.

The rootedness of identity, whether individual or collective, largely derives from ethnic, national, or religious affiliation. Gutmann (2003) states that such rootedness gives identity a certain distinctness and separability from other identities. Research shows that it is precisely these identity characteristics

that can largely define our attitudes on immigration, immigrants, and refugees, but also on specific phenomena such as social distance (Bulat 1995; Kumpes, 2018; Medlobi & Čepo, 2018; Ajduković et al., 2019).

A nation state is defined by three constituent elements: territory, government, and the people. While the people represent a community of people living in a particular territory, communicating in the same language and sharing the same traditions and customs, the nation (state) represents a "community of destiny" shared by a particular a people (Bauer, 1983:101). The nation is seen as a fixed construct, an entity that shares a common origin and destiny in the past, that is, a historical constant that has existed in the form of a people or ethnos since ancient times (Kordić, 2010:225). Gellner (1997) similarly notes that in the world of nation states a man must have a nationality as he must have a nose and two ears. According to Stolcke, Gellner here refers to national identity as a subjective sense of belonging rather than to nationality as a prerequisite for acquiring state membership (Stolcke, 1997:64). In addition to the ethnic nation, we can also talk about the civic nation, also described as a constructivist nation. Thus, we can distinguish between two ideal-type models of establishing a nation state: the primordial and the constructivist model. The former presupposes the existence of ethnicity as a "community of blood and origin" before the very foundation of a state (Connor, 1970:93). In this case we are referring to ethnic nations that are neither open to other and different cultures nor to assimilation processes, as their concept of nationality is based on deeper and more fluid elements that cannot be regulated by law (Habermas, 1991:140). According to Habermas, what we have here is nationality by

birth. The constructivist model, on the other hand, brings forth the notion of a civic or republican nation that discovers its identity in the practices and activism of citizens who exercise their democratic rights, rather than in shared ethnic or cultural background (Habermas, 1991:139). Such a political community achieves homogeneity by granting equal political rights and by defining the status of citizens. Civic nationalism thus encourages the creation of a civic identity that entails the support of and commitment to the values of liberal democracy or the so-called political values around which an overlapping consensus of all citizens is achieved (Rawls, 2000). Such a concept of identity is associated with the identification and definition of individuals as the political subjects, regardless of their ethnicity. Or, put in simpler terms, the French first determined what it means to be French, and then became French (Brčić Kuljiš, 2020). It is precisely through these ideal-type distinctions between ethnic and civic nationalism that we gain a clearer understanding of the extent to which a social identity will be more open and flexible or more closed and relatively fixed.

Ethnic nationalism is based on the idea of community / people (*Gemeinschaft*), and civic on the idea of society (*Gesellschaft*) (Eagleton, 2002:77). Individuals belong to the same nation if they share the same culture (a common system of ideas, signs, modes of behaviour and communication) or, as Gellner (1977) puts it, nations are the artefacts of men's convictions and loyalties and solidarities. According to Gellner, the essential element of a nation is a common (shared) culture which serves as the basic social bond (1997:3).

In this sense, it is the nation state that is the equivalent of the

concept of the modern state. The political community created by the modern state is the nation and, consequently, the nation is a synonym of the modern political community. It should be noted in this regard that in addition to denoting one's legal status, citizenship also represents an identity characteristic, i.e. an expression of one's membership in a political community (Stanković Pejnović, 2010:138). But who / what has primacy, the individual man or the state?

In his *Politics*, Aristotle points out that "the notion of a city naturally precedes that of a family or an individual, for the whole must necessarily be prior to the parts. (…) That a city then precedes an individual is plain" (1988:5). Starting from the principles of Christianity (all people are created equal and free), up to natural rights theorists, the individual, rather than the state, becomes the holder of rights. These natural or inherent rights of man form the basis and prerequisite of civil rights. Civil rights include the right to security, the right to a fair trial, the right to equality before the law, freedom of conscience and religion, freedom of speech, the right to vote and to be elected (political rights) and the right to social security and health care (social rights). A citizen may exercise his or her rights and responsibilities either on the basis of having these rights by birth or having been granted these rights by the state on the basis of a personal request.[3] Consequently, the status of a citizen as a holder of rights and obligations can be achieved in two ways. The first is known as the *ius soli* principle or the 'right of soil' because citizenship is determined by the place of birth. The second is

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[3] https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/citizen (accessed on 15 March 2020)

referred to as *ius sanguinis* or the 'right of blood' i.e. the 'principle of descent', under which citizenship is transferred to children whose parents (or at least one of them) are themselves citizens of a given state. The relationship between man / citizen and the state has changed from the time of Aristotle to the present day, because today, unlike in ancient times, it is no longer the state but rather man himself who is the holder of rights. The state functions as a legal system enabling the exercise of human rights which it guarantees to its own citizens in the form of civil rights. This was embodied in the 1948 *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* based on the 1789 *Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen*. However, there is a constant tension between human and civil rights in terms of competence and responsibility for their protection. "In the system of the nation-state, the so-called sacred and inalienable rights of man show themselves to lack every protection and reality at the moment in which they can no longer take the form of rights belonging to citizens of a state. If one considers the matter, this is in fact implicit in the ambiguity of the very title of the French *Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen* (…) [where] it is not clear whether the two terms (…) name two autonomous beings or instead form a unitary system in which the first is always already included in the second" (Agamben, 2006:23). In order to articulate and mitigate this conflict to a certain extent, we need to investigate the foundation of human rights.

Human rights are, as we have already stated, the basis and prerequisite of civil rights. How do we understand them? Human right, understood as a natural right (lat. *ius naturale*), is acquired by birth and belongs to man by his nature. Such a view can already be found in Aristotle, who speaks of natural justice that

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is valid everywhere and for all (Aristotle, 1988), in Cicero who associates law in the proper sense with right reason which is in harmony with nature, as well as in St. Thomas Aquinas who distinguishes between three kinds of law: the divine, the natural and the human law. Natural law acquires full significance in social contract theories such as those by Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Kant. Hobbes defines the right of nature (*jus naturale*) as the right of each man for self-preservation, of both his own nature and his own of life (Hobbes, 2013). "[The right of nature] is the liberty each man hath to use his own power as he will himself for the preservation of his own nature; that is to say, of his own life; and consequently, of doing anything which, in his own judgement and reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto" (Hobbes, 2013:94). Therein lies the fundamental human right – the right to life. In his *Two Treatises of Government*, Locke explains that people are born equal because they are born with reason, and through the idea of political freedom the natural equality of all men can be preserved (Locke, 1979:37). Kant takes a similar approach when talking about an innate moral law that unites rationality and freedom and thus ensures moral equality of people, but also their entitlement to equal rights (Kant, 1999). In Kant's opinion, the highest ideal of human self-determination is to think of oneself in accordance with the laws of the global civil society, because it is only in such a social order that the attainment of all human rights in the fullest sense shall be ensured (Brčić Kuljiš, 2006). Rousseau, on the other hand, derives equality from sentiments rather than reason. Humans in their natural state differ from one another in terms of abilities, strengths, and weaknesses, but they are equal in nature because they are free (Rousseau, 1978). Social contract theorists thus laid the groundwork for the conception of human

rights based on human nature: the right to freedom, the right to equality, the right to life (Hobbes), the right to property (Locke).

In addition to the aforementioned classical theorists of social contract, more contemporary authors have tried to find additional arguments for the foundation of human rights. Thus John Finnis (1991) develops a human rights theory based on the good of human self-development. Robert Nozick (2003) speaks of an ultra-minimal state that only serves to protect people's natural rights and ensure justice but must not interfere with inalienable (negative) rights such as freedom, the right to life and the right to property (Brčić Kuljiš, 2016). These are rights that man is entitled to even before becoming a member of a political community. Ronald Dworkin bases his entire theory on the concept of equality or the right to equality. According to him, the right to equality includes 'the right to equal treatment' (to an equal distribution of resources and opportunities that others have or have been granted) and 'the right to treatment as an equal' (the right to be treated with the same respect and concern in political decisions concerning the distribution of resources and opportunities) (Dworkin, 1977:227; Brčić Kuljiš, 2016).

The modern world from the 18th century onwards, or more precisely since the French Revolution of 1789, assumes that the rights of man, man's moral or natural rights, are fundamental values that all human beings have in relation to state authorities, whether these are recognized by them or not. The idea of human rights and their incorporation into civil rights, as presented in the 1789 *Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen*, are the cornerstones of modern nation states which began to arise following the historical events known as the 'springtime of the

peoples'. Consequently, they are a presumption of sovereign authority of the state that has an obligation to protect and guarantee the realisation of human rights by promoting and upholding them within its borders as civil rights. Therefore, Dworkin (1989:43) argues that any contractualist theory requires a deeper theory beneath it that is based on the concept of natural rights and grants legitimacy to the established social contract. In this way, he directs criticism against John Rawls and his contractual theory, in the scope of which the author presents his concept of justice as fairness. In an attempt to free himself from any metaphysical connotations, which he sees as lying at the core of natural law theories, Rawls finds the foundation of rights in the original position, behind a veil of ignorance, but assuming the existence of a sharing political culture that will direct us towards establishing (civil) rights aimed at protecting both our liberties and equalities (Brčić Kuljiš, 2016).

Social contract theories aim to explain the establishment of the state and civil society and the incorporation of metaphysical assumptions on inherent rights in the formal legislation i.e. the constitutional law that each state is obligated to protect and enforce. By the very idea of a contract, contractual theorists assume an underlying idea of democracy or liberalism, which requires that all rights transferred to the sovereign serve as a control mechanism of the sovereign's authority. Through the transition from the state of nature to the civil society, every individual who has obtained citizen status is also guaranteed civil rights, and thus a security mechanism for the realisation of one's human rights.

In the essay *What is Enlightenment?*, Kant (2000) advocates

man's liberation from any external authority and his moral and thus political coming of age. Arendt, quite ironically, states that it was the *Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen* that finally indicated man's emancipation advocated by Kant (Arendt, 2015:284). According to Arendt, rights were now proclaimed as inalienable, as belonging to man who was both their source and their ultimate goal (Arendt, 2015:284). Ironically, we say, because it was unfortunately Hannah Arendt's own life experience during World War II when she was left stateless, and therefore without a basis for the realisation of her own human rights, that enabled Hannah Arendt to grasp the very impotence of human rights in terms of their articulation and exercise at a time when they were most needed. "Nobody had been aware that mankind, for so long a time considered under the image of a family of nations, had reached the stage where whoever was thrown out of one of these tightly organized closed communities found himself throw out of the family of nations altogether" (Arendt, 2015:286-287). The right to citizenship or civil status, as well as all the rights it entails (Arendt, 2015), became the exclusive privilege of those who were recognized as nationals of a particular state (Stolcke 1997:61). In her philosophy, Arendt devoted special attention precisely to the group of people who, due to various historical circumstances (the collapse of states and empires after World War I, the Nazi Nuremberg Laws before and during World War II), had been left stateless or displaced. "Once they had left their homeland they remained homeless, once they had left their state they became stateless; once they had been deprived of their human rights they were rightless, the scum of the earth" (Arendt, 2015:261). From this perspective, Arendt expresses her criticism of human rights based upon history and human nature (as it was already the *Declaration on*

the Rights of Man and the Citizen that rejected the historical foundation of rights, along with all the privileges that certain groups and individuals had been granted throughout history).

If human rights are indeed founded in human nature, it means that they should remain valid even if a human being is expelled from the human community (Arendt, 2015:290). However, it turned out that a man loses the possibility of realising these rights as soon as one loses his status as a citizen. All political theories, starting from Plato to the modern age, see only the citizen, and not man, as a subject of law. The problem at the core of human rights is that they reckon with an abstract human being who actually exists nowhere, since man as a human being has always lived in some kind of a community (Arendt, 2015:284).

In an attempt to provide a foundation for human rights, Arendt develops the concept of 'the right to have rights' consisting of two parts: the right to have rights (a life in which one is judged by one's beliefs and actions) and the right to belong to some kind of organised community. According to Arendt (2015), a man has a right to all rights one is entitled to as a man, and the fundamental right that guarantees him the exercise of these rights is the right to belong to a political community. As we have seen Gellner (1997) note, a man must have a nationality as he must have a nose and two ears. Arendt notes on the importance of belonging to the community: "Even slaves, though completely disenfranchised, still belonged to a community. A man cannot belong to nothing and no one. It is this very indifference of belonging to no one that is actually the greatest danger" (2006:111). Man is always a being of community or of a political community as a human construct within which man actualises himself as man through

(political) action (Arendt, 1991).

Arendt does not advocate the possibility of human rights being guaranteed by humanity since even humanity itself could at some point decide that for humanity as a whole it would be better to liquidate some of its parts (Arendt, 2015). She finds the assumption of human rights to rest in the reciprocal obligation arising from the recognition and acknowledgement of the other or others as equal, in terms of capacity for freedom of action. According to Arendt, man is an equal and free human being only if this is made possible by a political community. Equality is therefore not a pre-political idea, but purely a political one: "We are not born equal; we become equal as members of a group on the strength of our decision to guarantee ourselves mutually equal rights" (Arendt, 2015). The right to have rights can thus be realised only within a political community in which we build our social world along with equal and, as Arendt would emphasise, only with equal others. Arendt therefore speaks of two kinds of birth: the biological birth (at which we are born as humans) and the political birth (at which we are born as citizens) (Arendt, 1991). Through political birth a legal entity is created that guarantees all rights an individual enjoys as a member of a particular political community. As such rights create a reciprocal obligation between their holders, they are referred to as civil or political rights (Benhabib, 2000:57). According to Arendt, once a man is deprived of membership in a political community, he is deprived not only of his status as a citizen, but also of his status as man: "The fundamental deprivation of human rights is manifested first and above all in the deprivation of a place in the world which makes opinions significant and actions effective (…) [people are deprived] not of the right to think whatever they

please, but of the right to opinion" (Arendt, 2015:289). It is on the same note that Agamben (2006) warns of the relationship between a sovereign who holds all the power and 'bare' human life (*homo sacer*). Such bare life is protected by no rights precisely because it is banished from the community and is under no jurisdiction of the law.

When it comes to immigration, debates mostly revolve around immigrants' efforts to move to a particular country and the greater or lesser resistance to such a possibility from the local population. Thus, in addition to relevant legislation presented in the form of immigration laws that, more or less restrictively, allow the state to control its own borders i.e. who enters its territory, there is another aspect of the story concerning the readiness (or willingness) of members of a political community to receive a new member.

2.3. The ethics of migration: a contribution to the context of the conducted study

The world is divided into states that are defined by borders. Borders limit the sphere of influence (of sovereign powers) and regulate (i.e. prevent, restrict) entry and exit from the territory within the borders. We have already noted that the idea of a nation state includes territory, government, and the people. According to Weber's definition, the state represents the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory defined by borders that are, most often, internationally recognised (Weber, 1999:162). Understanding state legitimacy has been a crucial point in debates concerning the ethics of immigration. Such debates cannot disregard the philosophy of politics (human

rights theory), or political practices in the creation of refugee and immigration policies. Related literature generally takes one of two positions concerning the right to immigration: (1) the position emphasizing the primary relevance of sovereignty, and (2) the position emphasizing the primary relevance of human rights protection. All further arguments on the right of movement are derived from either of these starting points. In this context, focus is put not only on vulnerable groups as defined by international humanitarian law (refugees), but on all immigrants regardless of the circumstances of their migration.

According to the first position, a legitimate political authority (i.e. the state) has the right to pass immigration laws and decide on immigration policies independently, regardless of the potential interests of immigrants. This, of course, should in no way infringe on the right of refugees to protection, which most states have accepted by signing the *Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees* and the 1967 *Protocol*. The right of a state to restrict the entry of interested nationals of other states is derived from the state's sovereignty. In this light, the emergence of so-called sovereignist political parties comes as no surprise amid the ongoing debates over immigrant rights and the consequences of immigration policies. In theoretical discussions on the law and ethics of migration, such a view, known as the conventional approach to immigration, is advocated by Christopher Heath Wellman (2011) and David Miller (2015). Their emphasis on the state's right to decide on its own immigration policies leads to certain conclusions regarding the status of the right to migration. Thus Miller (2015) clearly states that this cannot be considered a human right since by making such an assumption we would jeopardize the general right to self-determination. The position

is presented most clearly in the classic conclusion reached by Wellman:

1) legitimate states have a right to political self-determination;
2) freedom of association is a constitutive part of self-determination;
3) freedom of association implies freedom not to associate with others not of one's choosing (2011: 13).

In clarifying this argument parallels are often drawn between the personal freedom of association (e.g., in marriage) and the state's right to control immigration by appealing to its own freedom of association (i.e. by restricting admission to its own territory). Critics have highlighted several problems concerning the self-determination argument, from the justification of confronting the state's right to self-determination with an individual's right, to raising the question of the source of legitimacy of states which, according to Miller and Wellman, this right could be invoked by. Finally, critics have also pointed to the questionable nature of drawing parallels between the exercise of an individual's right of association and the equivalent right of the state.

In addition to self-determination of the state, other arguments have also been voiced in support of immigration restrictions, most notably by authors who start from the protection of citizens' safety and the protection of cultural and civilizational values. If the arguments underlying such opposing attitudes were to be accepted, it should be noted that when it comes to liberal democracies, according to the basic principles of such political systems, immigration control must not be based on discriminatory elements (Brčić Kuljiš, 2020).

An opposite approach to migration is advocated by both Phillip Cole and Joseph Carens. The former argues that the state has no moral right to ban people from crossing borders (Wellman & Cole, 2011). The latter takes a similar position. In his work *The Ethics of Immigration*, Carens (2013) seeks to show that the moral claims of illegal immigrants to the observance of their human rights make quite a strong case, even under the presumption of the state's right to deportation. General human rights are owed to all individuals, and every state is obliged to ensure the exercise of such rights to all those within its territory, regardless of whether they are citizens of that state or not (Carens, 2013: 94). For Carens, the normative point of departure is the need to ensure the fulfilment of the fundamental human interest one achieves through membership in a society, which is reflected in how democratic states treat the question of citizenship. From this position, Carens articulates a request to grant immigrants a full set of legal rights, and ultimately full citizenship. In other words, their interest ought to be met as it commonly is both on the basis of descent from citizen parents (*ius sanguinis*) and on the basis of birth on the state's territory (*ius soli*). In making his point, he stresses that granting equal rights or a wider range of rights to immigrants is based, on the one hand, on the moral right of immigrants and, on the other hand, on the moral commitment of states to guarantee a democratic society that supports human rights. From Carens' point of view, there is no justification for exclusion from citizenship and denying the rights of persons who are already members of a society which they enter through of a whole range of social interactions regardless of their own status (refugees, illegal/irregular and legal migrants, temporary migrants, etc.).

In addition to the moral relevance of the relationship between the state and immigrants within its territory, Carens (1987) also reflects on the commitments of states to persons outside their borders. As a well-known advocate of open borders, he points out that developed countries are currently not doing enough in this respect, and that there is no moral justification for such practices.

Carens' starting point lies in the belief in the same level of rights owed to all people, regardless of origin. However, he also realises that the country of origin deeply affects our individual capacity for self-determination i.e. self-actualisation. For example, if we were to grant equal rights to a child born in one of Africa's poorest communities and to those born in elite parts of the capitals of the most developed countries, the exercise of rights would differ substantially in these cases. While a child born in one of the poorest communities would, from its very birth, probably be exposed to life-threatening conditions due to a lack of basic resources such as food and drinking water, children born in far better circumstances would, during their lives, probably fulfil all their rights – and desires. According to Carens, there is a certain injustice to this that allows us to draw a comparison between modern-world disparities and the disparities we witnessed in earlier periods of history. In this sense, he speaks of being born into a rich community as a birthright privilege of sorts. The question is, of course, whether a person born in worse circumstances should be allowed the same degree of development? Given the assumption of equal rights, the answer is yes. This, obviously, leads us to the claim for open borders. Open borders are recognised as a necessary mechanism for exercising the right of free movement through which our

individual autonomy and moral equality is affirmed. It is precisely freedom of movement that guarantees the realisation of equal opportunities and distributive justice. The author attempts to prove his point by referring to the importance attributed to freedom of movement within the borders of a particular political community. Despite a long-established conception in political theory of political community as the guarantor and the space for the exercise of this right, Carens counters such a view and seeks to extend the understood importance of freedom of movement to movement beyond the borders of one's home country. The argument for open borders, which draws on individual human rights (in this case, the right of movement), is alternatively shaped as an argument arising from the right to freely dispose of one's property. It takes into account the right of persons within borders, which competes with the state's aspiration to regulate cross-border movements.

Critics of such views point to other possible ways to fulfil the obligations of distributive justice towards the poor, while at the same time acknowledging cultural differences, national identity, and the right of association. Furthermore, they emphasize that such practices can have a negative impact on the future development of already less developed areas by facilitating so-called brain drain (Hudson, 1984; Higgins, 2015). Finally, they contend that abandoning the framework of the state, as the actual space for the exercise of human rights, would be impractical, harmful, and generally unacceptable.

The cited authors are by no means the only ones participating in debates on the ethics of migration. They are only intended to provide us with a framework within which to proceed. In addition

to the already mentioned question of open borders, the topic of migration raises a number of other issues concerning the moral basis and relevance of current migration policies. Special attention is given to the question of justification of admission criteria and, ultimately, of assimilation with the native population in terms of equal legal treatment (the issue of citizenship) (Isbister, 1996; Bader, 1997; Ruhs and Chang, 2004; MacKay, 2016; Sager, 2017). Is it justified to grant priority to children over adults? Is it necessary to grant priority to women over men? Finally, is it justified to grant priority based on the economic interests of the receiving state and the immigrants' level of education? These issues are gaining increasing importance in the creation of migration policies and have become a major focus of interest for researchers in the field.

By examining individual attitudes on immigration, this study aims to explore some of the mentioned arguments that have laid the foundation for current and / or proposed migration policies. The broad array of ideas, ranging from the right to immigrate being a basic human right to the argument on sovereignty as the source of the right to restrict immigration, sheds significant light on the respondents' views.

3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

In line with the objectives of the project *Creating welcoming communities*, a survey was conducted in the period from May to July 2019. The sample included four hundred and seventy (470) students at the University of Split from programmes in various fields of study. According to the methodology of the project, the area of Split was selected as one of the possible environments for the reception and integration of asylum seekers. The results of the research served as a basis for a series of (in)formal courses intended for students at the University of Split (in the winter semester of the academic year 2019 / 2020). The research collected data on the topic of immigration and integration and opened up channels for communication and presentation of attitudes on the investigated topic in the public space. The conducted research and the series of (in)formal lectures represent a contribution to knowledge exchange and towards establishing a support network for beneficiaries within the integration process.

In addition to the overall sample, results were analysed across selected identity characteristics in order to determine any potential statistically significant differences in:

1) students' attitudes on immigration, immigrants, and refugees;
2) the perceived sociodemographic profiles of immigrants and refugees;
3) the social distance towards them.

In the first group of variables, we were interested in students'

attitudes on the desirable criteria for the integration of immigrants and refugees, on measures to be taken, the impact on the Croatian society, barbed wire as a solution to illegal immigration, the need to improve the quality of life of immigrants and refugees during their stay in Croatia and the reasons for their integration. Furthermore, we were interested in how students perceive the profiles of these groups (the areas where they come from, their reasons for migration, gender, and age) and whether their perceptions correspond to official statistics. Since one of the objectives of the project is to create more realistic perceptions within the public space, this was an important topic in determining the concept of the (in)formal courses. Finally, we analysed the social distance towards immigrants and refugees. This concept may be defined as the amount of desirable contact, determined by a lesser or greater degree of closeness (Tomašić Humer & Milić, 2017:72). Within the survey, the following indicators of social distance were used: one's family members attending school and / or other education with immigrants and refugees (the lowest degree of closeness), willingness to help these people, and willingness to invite them into one's home (the highest degree of closeness).

In examining the relationship between identity characteristics and attitudes on immigration in the context of the so-called migrant and refugee crisis, based on results of previous research we took into account the sociodemographic characteristics of gender, age, professional qualifications (the field of study), political orientation and religiosity. In addition, the impact of the students' previous interactions with immigrants and refugees was observed. The research concept scheme is presented under Figure 1.

Figure 1 *Research concept*

The observed identity differences were pointed out in the course of the (in)formal lectures based on recent research and insights in the fields of philosophy, sociology and political science (ethics and theory of justice, multiculturalism, interculturalism, political antagonism, xenophobia, Islamophobia, (in)formal qualifications and the international labour market, etc.) (Duvenger, 2001; Haralambos & Holborn, 2002; Mesić, 2006; Jung, 2011; Brčić Kuljiš, 2016; Milardović, 2017; Popović, Relja & Gutović, 2017; Brčić Kuljiš, 2019).

The study was based on a convenience sample. This type of sample was selected due to the limited time frame of the project activity (from May to August 2019) and limited financial resources for the inclusion of a representative sample of students at the University of Split. Rapid data collection was achieved by

combining internet and pen-and-paper surveys (see: Češković, 2005; Petrović, Kovačević & Ćurić, 2013). The research included constituents of the University of Split which expressed their willingness to participate, as well as students who attended the lectures at the time when the survey was conducted or who visited and completed the online questionnaire on their faculties' official websites. Although the survey did not include respondents from programs in all scientific and artistic fields of study according to the Ordinance (Official Gazette 34/2016), the size (N=470) and structural features of the sample indicate its heterogeneity (see Figure 2 to 7). The interpretations of the results and conclusions drawn from the sample were broadened by statistical significance analyses of identity characteristics, which provides a basis for plausible reasoning (with limited generalizability given the sample type) as well as a basis for further research.

The starting point of the research was formed by the following hypothesis framework:

H_1: the attitudes of respondents concerning immigration, immigrants, and refugees are mostly divided across the sample, with identity characteristics being an important indicator of statistically significant differences.

H_2: respondents believe that immigrants and refugees are younger males who migrate due to war and economic reasons, with identity characteristics generally not being indicative of statistically significant differences.

H_3: respondents show a higher degree of social distance towards immigrants and refugees with the increase in the closeness of

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potential interactions, with identity characteristics being an important indicator of statistically significant differences.

4. RESULTS

4.1. Sociodemographic (identity) characteristics of respondents

The majority of the sample are female respondents (67.7%), i.e. three hundred and eighteen (318) female students compared to one hundred and fifty-two (152) male students (32.3%). When interpreting the gender distribution, we should bear in mind that the largest share of the survey respondents are students at the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences in Split, along with a significant share of those studying at the Faculty of Economics in Split (see Figure 2 and 3).


Figure 2 *Gender* (%)

A similar gender distribution is displayed in the results of a survey conducted by Jokić and Ristić Dedić and presented in the study *Becoming a Student in Croatia* (2014). According to the mentioned authors, 56.7% of the students enrolled in university

programmes in the academic year 2010/2011 were female. The share of female students was higher both in part-time and regular study programmes, undergraduate and integrated undergraduate and graduate study programmes delivered by public universities. A higher share of male students was present only in programmes delivered by private higher education institutions, as well as in a part of programmes delivered by public polytechnics and colleges (see Table 1). It is only in programmes in the field of technical sciences that the men make up the majority of students enrolled. In other scientific and artistic fields of study, the majority are women. Similar results apply to the sample in our study. Male students are predominant only in the field of technical sciences, so a statistically significant difference has been established in terms of relationship between gender and the choice of study programme (see Table 2).

	Gender structure		Education structure		
	male	female	gymnasium	vocational	other
STUDY PROGRAMME FORM					
Regular	43.98	56.02	45.28	40.69	14.03
Part-time	37.80	62.20	15.16	55.04	29.80
STUDY PROGRAMME TYPE					
Integrated undergraduate and graduate university study	40.76	59.24	70.64	17.79	11.57
Undergraduate university study	45.51	54.49	48.47	35.68	15.85
Professional study	44.63	55.37	16.35	65.72	17.93
TYPE OF DELIVERING INSTITUTION					
Public universities	41.40	58.60	47.63	36.21	16.16
Public polytechnics and colleges	49.67	50.33	14.19	71.02	14.79
Private higher education institutions	52.96	47.04	28.18	56.44	15.38
TYPE OF INSTITUTION X FORM/TYPE OF STUDY PROGRAMME					
PU + regular university	42.93	57.07	55.05	30.78	14.17
PU + regular professional	37.77	62.23	17.57	65.29	17.14
PU + part-time university	38.22	61.78	22.41	51.75	25.84
PU + part-time professional	24.67	75.33	11.11	47.04	41.84
PPC + regular professional	51.60	48.40	15.93	72.73	11.34
PPC + part-time professional	42.95	57.05	8.13	65.1	26.78
PHEI + regular university	41.46	58.54	60.98	19.51	19.51
PHEI + regular professional	51.18	48.72	29.74	57.14	13.11
PHEI + part-time professional	64.97	35.03	12.36	61.24	26.40

Table 1 *Gender and education structure of students enrolled in the academic year 2010/2011*

Source: Jokić & Ristić Dedić (2014:74)

Field of study Gender	Social Sciences	Humanities	Technical Sciences	Biomedicine and health	TOTAL
Male	58	34	52	9	153
Female	138	120	24	35	317
TOTAL	196	154	76	44	470

x^2=56,268; df=3; p=0,012

Table 2 *Relationship between gender and choice of study programme*

According to Jokić and Ristic Dedić (2014), there are distinct gender differences in regular university programmes of different scientific and artistic fields of study. Men are predominant in engineering, electrical engineering, information technology and shipbuilding programmes (80% and above). The complete predominance of men is present in aeronautics, rocket and space technology (100%). Two-thirds of students enrolled in traffic and transportation engineering and kinesiology programmes are male. On the other hand, women are predominant (with 80% and more) in logopedics programmes, education and rehabilitation sciences, pedagogy (including early childhood and preschool teacher education), psychology, history of art, Croatian language and literature, philology, pharmacy, biotechnology and food technology. A similar share of female students is found in the fields of biology, dental medicine and textile technology (75% and more). Two-thirds of students enrolled in study programmes of law, sociology, mathematics and basic medical sciences are female. In economics, the field of study with the highest number of students enrolled, women still prevail (63%). On the other hand, both genders are equally represented in the scientific fields of history, information and communication sciences and architecture and urbanism (Jokić & Ristić Dedić, 2014:72–81).

In line with the results of our research, it is no surprise that the

largest share of our survey respondents study at the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences (see Figure 3). Next in number are students at the Faculty of Electrical Engineering, Mechanical Engineering and Naval Architecture (FESB), followed by students at the Faculty of Economics, Faculty of Law, Faculty of Medicine, Faculty of Kinesiology and the University Department of Professional Studies. In analysing the relationship between identity features and attitudes towards immigration, the Faculty of Economics, Faculty of Law, Faculty of Kinesiology and the University Department of Professional Studies formed the category of social sciences in which women are also predominant, as is also true in the national student population (Jokić & Ristić Dedić, 2014). In the study entitled *Sociological portrait of Croatian students* (Ilišin, 2014), conducted on a representative sample, students of social sciences (38%) and biomedicine and health (7%), account for a similar share as students of the same study programmes in our sample, while the share of students in technical sciences was slightly higher (27%).

	Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences	Faculty of Law	Faculty of Economics	University Department of Professional Studies	Faculty of Kinesiology	FESB	Faculty of Medicine
■ Faculty	33,6	10,4	14,5	7	9,1	16	9,4

Figure 3 *Faculties* (%)

Since the respondents are part of the student population, the highest share of them, which corresponded to 70.2% or three hundred and forty (340) students, was in the expected age group from eighteen to twenty-two years (18 – 22). The share of respondents in the age group from twenty-three to twenty-seven years (23 – 27) is 25.7% i.e. one hundred and twenty-one (121) respondents, while nineteen (19) respondents are in the age group of twenty-eight and above (28 and above) (see Figure 4). The latter are presumably students of professional studies and part-time students at the university constituents offering such programmes. Such an age distribution is also the result of the Bologna process, which, among other things, defined and limited the possibilities and length of study and facilitated mobility from undergraduate to graduate levels of study.

	18-22	23-27	28 and above
Age	70,3	25,7	4

Figure 4 *Age* (%)

The largest number of respondents perceive themselves as apolitical, or more exactly one hundred and thirty-four (134) or 28.5% of them (see Figure 5). Such a result comes as no surprise

since numerous studies have shown increased apoliticality of youth. In the book *Generation of Disillusioned Youth in Croatia at the Beginning of the 21st Century* (2017), Ilišin and Spajić Vrkaš present the results of a study conducted on this population. Fieldwork was carried out in 2013, among other things for the purpose of drafting the *National Youth Programme 2014 – 2017*. In the text *Young people and Politics: The Trends of (Dis)continuity*, Ilišin analyses the political aspect of the youth population. The results show 45.2% of young people as having no party preference (similar to the percentage in our survey, if we include both those who identified themselves as apolitical and those who could not state their political orientation – 55.5%). The study further reveals that 54.3% of youth express no interest in politics, 57.7% are either completely or largely dissatisfied with democracy in Croatia, while 37.5% consider strong leaders to be a solution for the difficult functioning of democracy. It also shows a rise in distrust of the EU from 13.9% to 28.9% as well as a low level of trust in institutions. Pointing out the evident cynicism of today's youth, Ilišin concludes that new circumstances are directing young people towards individual and more pragmatic interests.

	Far-right	Right	Centre	Left	Far-left	Apolitical	Don't know
■ Orientation	0,4	20,2	13,4	9,8	0,7	28,5	27

Figure 5 *Political orientation* (%)

|	In line with the teachings of their religious community	In their own way	Don't know	No
■ Religiosity	39,6	34,7	6	19,7

Figure 6 *Religiosity* (%)

When identifying their religiosity, the largest number of students find it to be in line with the teachings of their religious community (39.6%). In addition, 163 or 34.7% interpret religiosity "in their own way", which would correspond to an individual approach to religious sentiments and experience. Out of the total number of survey participants, 28 or 6% do not know how to express and describe their religiosity, while 93 or 19.7% are not religious (see Figure 6).

When explaining the research results relating to the dimension of religiosity, it is necessary to distinguish the definition of religion as an external, public, objectively established, and rational phenomenon, and religiosity which, on the other hand, has characteristics of the internal, private, subjective and emotional (Marinović Bobinac, 1995). The increase in the intensity of religiosity is accompanied by intensity of religious experience of God, although religious experience of God is not necessarily associated with religious self-identification (Marinović Bobinac, 2000; 2005).

In this sense, the results of a research conducted by Nikodem and Jurlina in 2017 on a convenience sample of students at the University of Zagreb and the Croatian Catholic University (N =1270), aimed at presenting and analysing the religiosity of Zagreb students based on two studies conducted in 2005 and the aforementioned 2017, are indicative. The initial assumption was to investigate the existence of conformity of religious changes in a part of the student population with those in the general population of Croatia. This would mean both a high level of religious self-identification and a relative stability of institutional religious practice, accompanied by a somewhat

declining belief in basic religious tenets, as well as a relatively stable presence of individualized religiosity and 'alternative religiosity'. According to the authors, there is an evident decline in belief in some of the basic tenets of Christianity, which is in line with religious changes in the overall population (Črpić & Zrinščak as cited in Nikodem & Jurlina, 2018:275). Furthermore, there is a notable presence of certain elements of so-called 'alternative religiosity', which, as understood in this study, includes elements of superstition and non-Christian spirituality. According to the results of the study, the students surveyed showed a lower level of religious self-identification than the general population (especially in terms of institutionalised religiosity). The authors conclude that in the observed period between 2005 and 2017 there was a very clear decline in belief in some of the basic religious tenets of Christianity among the surveyed students of Zagreb. The paper refers to a comparative analysis of results for the general population from 1999 to 2008, which show a similar trend (although the level of belief in the basic tenets of Christianity is higher in the general population than among the students surveyed). According to the authors, all this suggests that the process of declining Christian belief in the Croatian society will continue. It is, however, quite difficult to give a clear answer to the question whether this also marks the beginning of a process of declining religiosity in Croatian society in the general sense. On the other hand, the results obtained point to a clear relationship between religiosity and political orientation, which is also true of our research conducted among students at the University of Split. A statistically significant relationship was established between political orientation and religiosity of Split students (χ^2=85.233; df=12; p=0.001). Students of right-wing political orientation are mostly religious in line with the

teachings of their religious community (53) or in their own way (28), while only five are not religious and three could not say. Students of left-wing political orientation are rarely religious in line with the teachings of their religious community (6). Some of them are religious in their own way (12), while most are not religious or could not say (28). Of the 113 apolitical students, as many as 50 are religious in their own way while the rest are relatively equally distributed within the sample either as those who are religious in line with the teachings of their religious community or those who are not religious. Similar ratios apply to students who chose centre as their political orientation. Students who could not say what their political orientation was (107) are slightly more religious in line with the teachings of their religious community (51) than in their own way (34), while about a fifth are not religious or could not say. Based on the insights by Nikodem and Jurlina (2018), such results can be seen not only as a consequence of ideological conflicts and 'cultural wars' in the Croatian society over the last five to six years, but also of a '1990s reflex' of sorts, when the intermingling of national and religious sentiment was an important framework of identity construction, at least in public discourse.

In the newspaper article *Sociologists on Religion: Is Croatia a "nation of believers"?[4]*, a number of Croatian sociologists of religion analyse the phenomenon of religiosity. According to Marinović Jerolimov, "one must not ignore the fact that religiosity is an individual phenomenon and cannot be interpreted in a reductionist manner, in the context of society and social

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[4] https://dnevnik.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/hrvatska-zemlja-visoke-razine-religioznosti-trecina-sam-svoj-vjernik---465884.html (accessed on 4 April 2020)

change alone... religiosity is not a homogeneous phenomenon. The simplest way to put it is that there are different types of believers — from those who mostly conform to what their churches prescribe, to those who develop the so-called individual type of religiosity that deviates from it." The article mentions a study on religiosity of students at the University of Rijeka, conducted in March 2015 by Željko Boneta on a sample of 635 respondents. The results show that religiosity among young people is at a lower level compared to surveys and results from the 1990s. According to the results at the time, youth religiosity was at the same level as religiosity among adults. With respect to all indicators of current religiosity, Rijeka's students are less religious than the youth average, who are again less religious than the general population average. According to Boneta, the youth, especially students within the youth population, are again the least religious group in the Croatian society with respect to all indicators of institutional religiosity i.e. religious worship. The author suggests that the "inconsistency of identification, behaviour and belief" indicates the persistence of 'a la carté' religion, which includes quite random connections with church as an institution. Reflecting on these results, sociologist of religion Siniša Zrinščak points out that although they are "interesting and provide important insight, two things should be kept in mind. The first is that they concern students, and students are not the total population of youth, and youth are not the total population of Croatia. The second thing is that they concern students of Rijeka, i.e. students from the Croatian Littoral and Istria region, where a lower level of religiosity is recorded as it is." Zrinščak draws attention to a survey conducted by him and Gordan Črpić, which indicated a stabilisation of religiosity, with youth being similar to the overall population.

This was, as Zrinščak states, a "study over a wider time span". According to Marinović Jerolimov, their research confirms that differences in religiosity among young people in Croatia are primarily conditioned by ambient factors and socialisation. The former means that religiosity is the least widespread in the most developed parts of Croatia – in Istria, the Croatian Littoral and the Zagreb region, while it is most widespread in Eastern Slavonia, for example. According to the author, this is associated in part with modernisation effects, but also has to do with other historical and cultural issues, such as the presence of a single or of different religious traditions. The socialisation element, on the other hand, shows that it is the youngest part of the youth population, i.e. those still dependent on their families, who are at the same time the most religious. According to Ivan Markešić, institutional religiosity of youth is the same as that of their parents because they did not choose it themselves. The Croatian society has transitioned from institutional, primarily educational, state-led atheisation of society, which was carried out until the end of the 1980s, to institutional, primarily educational theisation of society. According to Markešić, it is, therefore, the Croatian state that remains the primary guarantor of the high institutional religiosity of its citizens.

In operationalising our survey research, social interactions with immigrants and refugees were not treated as part of the respondents' identity, as we did not analyse their frequency or qualitative determinants. Nevertheless, we present them in this part of the book in support of our considerations as to the existence of statistically significant differences with respect to our research objectives between those who had engaged in such contacts and those had not. We find the relationships obtained

to provide a good impetus for further research. According to the results, 23.8% of respondents had interacted with immigrants and refugees as opposed to 76.2% of those who had engaged in no social contacts with them (see Figure 7)[5]. The question was posed under the assumption that interactions with the group of people concerned would be a predictor of behaviour that reflected a higher level of their acceptance. Contact and acquaintance can, in fact, significantly contribute to reducing social distance and overcoming stereotypes and prejudices, especially when it comes to individuals who do not belong to our everyday sociocultural context. Interestingly enough, a statistically significant difference with respect to previous contacts with immigrants and refugees was established only in relation to the respondents' political orientation (χ^2=14.091; df=4; p=0.007). A third of left-wing and centre-left respondents had engaged in such contacts, while the share is only slightly lower in right-wing and apolitical survey participants (a quarter). In this sense, social interactions may represent an important indicator of orientation of the respondents' attitudes.

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[5] A nationwide study (Ajduković et al., 2019) shows half of the population to have had contacts with asylum seekers, most of which were rare in frequency and were on average assessed as neutral (neither positive nor negative).

Figure 7 *Contact with immigrants and refugees* (%)

The presented shares of sociodemographic (identity) features partly correspond with the nationwide data on the student population. Despite certain particularities of our sample, we consider the results indicative, of course taking into account the differences which would occur in case of a representative sample. The statistical tests carried out clarify the relationship between individual identity characteristics with regard to the topic, which we consider an important starting point for further research, comparison of results, as well as identification of possible trends concerning the student population's attitudes on immigration in the context of the so-called migrant and refugee crisis.

4.2. Immigration, immigrants, and refugees: a student perspective

This part of the book addresses the aspects of integration and providing help in general when it comes to asylum seekers and immigrants in Croatian society. The way students perceive the processes in question is influenced by their attitudes on the social impact of these groups and the dominant characteristics they associate with their profiles.

Concerning the criteria within the integration process, respondents were asked to assess several criteria which we assumed to correspond to a greater or lesser degree of agreement. Taking into account the existing studies on ideological divisions in Croatian society and the re-traditionalization that has been taking place over the last decades, as well as the fear of uncontrolled immigration reflected in the attitudes of Europeans in general (Županov, 2002; Malenica, 2007; Tomić-Koludrović, 2015; Dennison & Dražanová, 2018; Nikodem & Jurlina, 2018), we assumed that the respondents would be divided with respect to the presented attitudes.

We offered certain sociocultural similarities as a choice in the questionnaire, estimating that some respondents would lean towards assimilation as a model of social integration meaning the immigrants abandon their original customs and practices, moulding their behaviour to the values and norms of the majority (Giddens, 2007:256). A 5-point Likert scale measuring levels of agreement included the following indicators: political culture (democratic), knowledge of the same language, same religious affiliation and similar cultural characteristics in

general. We assumed that a part of the respondents would be open to differences and closer to the integration model of cultural pluralism in which differences are accepted as distinct but equal (Giddens, 2007:257). Rejecting the offered factors as desirable in the process of integration may mean that a part of the respondents did not want these groups in Croatian society at all and were therefore not interested in any factors, or perceived them as irrelevant. In this regard, attitudes on desirable factors were compared with attitudes on the treatment of immigrants and refugees who are found on Croatian territory (e.g. integration, placement in reception centres, deportation, etc.).

The results confirmed our assumptions (see Figure 8). There are marked differences among the students with respect to all the criteria offered within the sample. Around 40% point out a democratic political culture and similar culture in general as desirable, while language understood by the majority is seen as desirable by 55.1% of the students surveyed. A slightly smaller percentage of respondents consider the same religion as an important factor of integration (33.8%). For all the criteria offered, a quarter or a fifth of students opted for the "I neither agree nor disagree" answer, while others expressed disagreement.

|	I disagree	I mostly disagree	I neither agree nor disagree	I mostly agree	I agree	No answer
■ Political culture (democratic)	19,8	8,9	27	23	20,9	0,4
■ Language understood by the majority	14,3	10,4	19,8	35,1	20	0,4
□ Same religion	30,5	14	21,7	20,6	13,2	
■ Culture similar to ours	21,1	13	25,7	20,4	19,4	0,4

Figure 8 *Desirable integration criteria of immigrants and refugees on the territory of Croatia* (%)

The differences between the terms immigrant and refugee have already been clarified within the theoretical part of the study. As pointed out, the term immigrant implies a broader category

that applies to migrants arriving for various reasons, while the latter are people fleeing persecution in their home countries. We assumed that respondents would be more likely to emphasize the need of helping refugees, as confirmed by the findings of previous studies. Drawing on a sample of 574 social network users in Croatia (Facebook, Twitter), Medlobi and Čepo (2018) show that a third are not ready to help immigrants, a quarter would not help asylum seekers, and a sixth would not provide help to refugees (Medlobi & Čepo, 2018:51). Based on a stratified sample of 1 272 inhabitants of the Republic of Croatia (spatial stratified sampling – according to region, county and local self-government unit), Ajduković et al. (2019:40) demonstrate the support of asylum seekers' rights. Only 11.6% explicitly do not support their rights, while 27.9% express strong support. Foreign studies yield similar results, with more support being shown towards refugees as compared to immigrants (Murray & Marx, 2013; Dempster & Hargrave, 2017). However, reports of sporadic attacks on citizens of the European Union reinforce the sense of perceived threat, primarily towards immigrants (Botić, 2018; Dennison and Dražanová, 2018), but also towards refugees (Meidert and Rapp, 2019).

Similar to the findings of the mentioned studies, most students find it necessary to help refugees (83.9%), while just under half (46.4%) believe the same for immigrants. Only a tenth say we should help no one (12%) (see Figure 9).

Who to help?	Refugees	Refugees and immigrants	Immigrants	No one
Who to help?	41,3	42,6	3,8	12,3

Figure 9 *Immigrants and refugees – who should we help?* (%)

The greatest share of students points out that both groups should be socialized and assisted in their adaptation the new environment (see Figure 10). A somewhat higher percentage support the socialisation (integration) of refugees or their placement in reception centres until another solution is found. About a tenth do not know what should be done, while a quarter believe that immigrants should be deported back to their country of origin and a sixth state that the same should be done with refugees.

A similar result is recorded concerning possible modes of assistance to refugees as for the previous question (at least in terms of temporary solutions such as centres). What can also be observed here is a greater willingness to help immigrants, which is a result of more specific indicators offering the aforementioned temporary solution. Such solutions do not necessarily have a long-term impact on society and culture. It is possible that students take it as read that someone else should ultimately assume responsibility for vulnerable groups. The results of

previous studies as well as the attitudes of students in our research, who generally take a slightly more favourable view concerning the status of refugees as compared to immigrants, support the previously presented assumption.

Furthermore, the question arises as to how respondents perceive integration in circumstances under which they support it. In this regard, 40.2% of respondents support integration in the case of refugees, and 35.5% feel the same when it comes to immigrants. According to the analysis of cross-frequency tables, a significant proportion of students reject the integration criteria presented in Figure 8. Out of the total of 189 respondents expressing the need for socialisation of refugees, 87 do not see a similar political culture as a desirable factor, while 105 feel the same about language understood by the majority, 59 about the same religion and 82 about similar cultural characteristics in general. Also, a significant share of the total of 166 respondents who state the need for integration of immigrants do not consider the mentioned criteria appropriate (political culture – N=76, language understood by the majority – N=104, same religion – N=54, similar cultural characteristics in general – N=60). Overall, division exists even among respondents who express affirmative attitudes on integration.

However, these frequencies also indicate a significant percentage of respondents who support integration models but show a low level or even a total lack of sensitivity for cultural specificities. What is symptomatic is that between a third and half of respondents who opt for integration view most of the offered criteria as desirable. Furthermore, respondents regard religion as the most important source of threat related to immigrant

behaviour in general and their future integration. The results also suggest that Croatian society is characterized by the presence of both ethnic and civic nationalism, which is reflected in the deep ideological divisions of its population. These divisions are also reflected in the correlations between the respondents' identity characteristics and their attitudes on immigration, as demonstrated in section 4.5.

|	Deportation to their country of origin	Socialisation/social integration, including assistance in their adaptation to the new environment	Placement in refugee centres until another solution is found	I don't know	Other	No answer
Immigrants	24,3	35,5	23,2	14,7	2,1	0,2
Refugees	16,2	40,2	29,8	12,6	0,6	0,6

Figure 10 *Modes of behaviour / action towards immigrants and refugees* (%)

Students assess that the arrival of immigrants and refugees has an evident impact on Croatian society (see Figure 11). The distribution on the Likert scale measuring its form and intensity (1 – negative; 5 – positive) shows that 57.6% of the sample rate the impact as negative. On the other hand, no more than 7.8% consider it positive. A statistically significant difference was found between the respondents (χ^2=140.069; df=14; p=0.003), reflecting a slightly more neutral attitude among those who find it necessary to help both immigrants and refugees. On the other hand, as many as 49 out of 57 respondents who feel that we should help no one, see the impact as negative. The results presented provide clarification as to why a large number of respondents who support integration see the assimilation model as a solution.

|	Negative	Mostly negative	Neither positive nor negative	Mostly positive	Positive
▪ Impact	21	36,6	34,6	5,2	2,6

Figure 11 *Impact of immigrants and refugees on Croatian society* (%)

Similar largely negative results are related to associating immigrants and refugees with a safety threat to Croatian citizens. Half of the respondents agree or mostly agree with the previously mentioned claim (48.8%). A third neither agree nor

disagree, while a fifth disagree (see Figure 12). The slightly more favourable results as compared to the assessment of the immigrants' and refugees' impact may be a reflection of a certain level of trust in the activities of the government and its authorities concerning the immigration issue, regardless of Croatia's actual immigration policy. The issue of trust in the context of the migrant crisis should be explored further in view of numerous studies indicating a low level of trust among citizens regarding institutions of the state in general (Baloban & Rimac, 1998; Malenica 2007; Črpić & Migles, 2011; Majetić, Rajter & Dević, 2017). Furthermore, the mentioned results may be influenced by reports on the movement of migrants along the Croatian border and within its territory. While we are often informed on operational challenges of "protecting borders" and their permeability, but also on controversies over the treatment of immigrants by the state's repressive apparatus, the fact is that no significant incidents have been reported so far between local citizens and the groups in question. These assumptions may lead to the relative division of respondents, as also shown in the study conducted by Ajduković et al. (2019:47), according to which a quarter of those surveyed perceive asylum seekers as a realistic threat. More accurately, "survey participants in the region of Dalmatia perceive the highest level of threat, which is statistically higher than the level perceived by inhabitants of eastern and central Croatia and the northern Croatian Littoral, among which no significant differences are recorded". A relatively high level of threat through the spread of Islamic culture is also shown in the study by Medlobi and Čepo (2018: 52), according to which almost 40% of respondents do not perceive this process as harmless. Such findings provide additional insight as to the common attitudes of students at the

University of Split, who are more in favour of assimilation even if they do consider it necessary to help immigrants and refugees.

	I disagree	I mostly disagree	I neither agree nor disagree	I mostly agree	I agree	No answer
■ Level of agreement	7	14,3	29,6	21,9	26,8	0,4

Figure 12 *Immigrants and refugees as a safety threat* (%)

Most students, however, do not see putting up barbed wire fences as a solution to illegal migration (53.4%) (see Figure 13). As with most other issues, a significant number of participants (a fifth) have no clear position on this issue. High percentages of undecided respondents within the survey, as well as the high percentage of those who see the barbed wire as a solution (26%), testify to the need for more systematic education on the complex issues that represent the topic of this book (the issue of the 'right to move' as a human right, the sovereignty of the state, the issue of seeking asylum, etc.).

A statistically significant difference was found between those who feel it is necessary to help only refugees, those who feel that we should help no one, and students who consider helping both immigrants and refugees necessary (χ^2=75.354; df=12; p=0.001). The first two groups account for the largest share of

those who agree with the measure of putting up barbed wire fences as a solution (75%). Respondents therefore see the entry of immigrants as more problematic for Croatian society, while integration is seen as challenge regardless of whether refugees or immigrants in general are concerned.

	I disagree	I mostly disagree	I neither agree nor disagree	I mostly agree	I agree	No answer
■ Level of agreement	37,7	15,7	20,2	11,5	14,5	0,4

Figure 13 *Barbed wire fences as a solution to illegal migration* (%)

It is controversial to decide who "deserves to enter" on the basis of barbed wire fences, especially in situations of mass immigration when states and regions are faced with multitudes of immigrants arriving from various areas with different or even no sources of identification. Regardless of the existence of such documents, fleeing persecution may still be the case. Controversies also arise around who to receive due to different approaches to human rights and migration ethics on which immigration policies are based. As a response to such doubts, it is recommended to avoid terms such as 'illegal migration' and 'illegal immigrants', which may have a pejorative connotation. Instead, the term 'undocumented immigrant' is highlighted as acceptable. It is also acceptable to use the term foreign nationals, but using a

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reference of nationality is recommended when possible.

When the need to raise the quality of life of immigrants and refugees during their stay in Croatia is concerned, almost 44% of students believe that better accommodation, food, hygiene, health care, etc. should be ensured (see Figure 14). Quite a worrying is that a third of the respondents have no clear position on the matter. Another reason of concern is the fact that 37% of students disagree with the need to raise the quality of life. Based on a research conducted among asylum system stakeholders and asylum seekers at the Kutina Reception Centre for Asylum Seekers, Pandek and Župarić-Iljić (2018:217) "suggest that there are challenges concerning the minimum standards of reception quality, service provision and future integration, resulting in reduced integration chances and significant secondary movements of these migrants to other EU countries".

|	I disagree	I mostly disagree	I neither agree nor disagre	I mostly agree	I agree	No answer
Level of agreement	16	11,1	28,9	23,4	20,4	0,2

Figure 14 *Need to raise the quality of life of immigrants and refugees during their stay in Croatia* (%)

Students mostly do not recognize the integration process as

something positive that could possibly represent a solution for some of the burning issues (see Figure 15). This comes as no surprise when brought into context with previous responses, especially those concerning the impact of immigrants and refugees on Croatian society. In this regard, participants find no sense in integration, for example on account of low birth rates and the poor demographic picture of Croatia, which it could change. According to most, integration is not even seen as an appropriate way of addressing labour shortages, although reports suggest a shortage of thousands of workers on the Croatian part of the Adriatic during the tourist season, which the country's tourist development strategy actually aims to prolong and improve through a better and more diversified offer. Respondents for the most part disagree with the statement that immigrants and refugees enrich the Croatian society, although the responses to this claim are slightly more neutral. However, 35.6% agree that integration is necessary because it is morally right. At the same time, an almost identical percentage hold quite the opposite view. This reaffirms the need for education on immigration, and more specifically on different theoretical approaches to the international labour market, the nation, the topic of multi- and interculturalism, the models of demographic renewal and migration ethics. The overall results show that respondents are more willing to help immigrants and refugees than they actually want their integration into society (cf. Figure 9, 10 and 15). When it comes to reasons for integration, students are more focused on moral grounds than on possible benefits to society, as they largely find it to be more morally right than useful.

	I disagree	I mostly disagree	I neither agree nor disagree	I mostly agree	I agree	No answer
■ Morally right	24,3	12,3	27,2	23,5	12,1	0,6
■ Enrich our society	44	14,2	28,7	10,4	2,5	0,2
▨ Labour shortages	52,8	16,6	20	6,6	3,8	0,2
■ Low birth rates	61,7	12,6	19,8	3,6	1,7	0,6

**Figure 15.** *Reasons for integration of immigrants and refugees into Croatian society* (%)

As part of our study objectives, we were interested to find out what respondents think about immigration in general, i.e. human rights and actions in the context of immigration. Significant differences have been observed in the responses regarding general statements on this topic as well as those that can be viewed in

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the context of the so-called migrant and refugee crisis, along with a certain inconsistency in the responses. This reaffirms the importance of the activities carried out within the project *Creating welcoming communities*, and in particular of the education of students on the topic of immigration. In view of the answers obtained and the importance of the mentioned topic, the need for a more systematic integration of this issue in higher education curricula is evident, first off in activities directly or indirectly related to immigrant issues.

	YES	NO
Every person should be guaranteed fundamental human rights.	96.8	3.2
Every person should have an equal right to happiness.	95.5	4.5
Being born in a poor country instead of a rich one is no one's fault.	94.9	5.1
The right to immigration is a human right.	83.3	16.7
Everyone should have the right to live where they want.	78.8	21.2
No one has the right to enter my home without permission. Thus, ho one has the right to enter our country without permission.	78.2	21.8
If someone is denied fundamental human rights in their home country, we must admit and protect them.	61.1	38.9
We have no moral duty to accept migrants. This is a matter of politics or economy.	60.2	39.8
It is not our fault that someone lives in a poor country. We have no duty to accept them, although we may sympathize with them.	58.8	41.2
Open borders would be better for everyone. More harm is done by closing them.	27.7	72.3

Table 3 *Respondents' attitudes on human rights and actions in the context of immigration* (%)

For the most part, students believe that all people should be guaranteed fundamental human rights. They see the right to immigration as a part of these rights and assert that everyone should have an equal right to happiness and to live where they want. However, when it comes to immigration that could impact their lives, there is a marked shift from the responses offered to more general statements. Thus, a vast majority of respondents consider accepting immigrants to be primarily an economic and

political issue. They do not see it as their moral duty to receive those living in poverty, nor do they consider it desirable to open borders (see Table 3). A significant share (38.9%) state that we do not have to admit and protect those who are denied fundamental human rights in their home country. Although, judging by such responses, a greater level of empathy is again shown towards refugees, it is safe to say that this empathy often involves mere protection and assistance, rather than the idea of systematic integration into Croatian society.

4.3. Students' assessment of sociodemographic profiles of immigrants and refugees

The average immigrant or refugee profile is a significant topic, and insight into the students' perception of those profiles can significantly deepen our understanding of the attitudes expressed within our study. Generally speaking, the students' assessments in regard to this issue are quite realistic, as confirmed by official sources (UNHCR, 2015; EUROSTAT, 2017; FRONTEX, 2018, etc.).

When it comes to the area which immigrants and refugees arrive from, students generally consider it to be the Middle East (73.6%). Far below in second place are the North of Africa and the Far East. Some respond that it is the EU or other European countries, while some opt for Central or South Africa (see Figure 16). The wide representation and coverage of these processes in the media certainly influences the informed judgement of respondents in this regard. Since they were asked to choose only one answer, it is no surprise that students generally opted for the Middle East as the main source of migratory flows. We

assume that the percentages would be higher for the areas of Africa and the Far East if choosing more than one answer had been possible.


	EU or other European countries	North of Africa	Middle East	Far East	Central or South Africa	Other
■ Area	2,1	8,9	73,6	5,5	1,3	8,6

Figure 16 *Area which immigrants and refugees arrive from* (%)

Judgements as to the cause of the migration are also expected. Respondents consider war, i.e. political instability, to be the main reasons. They also recognize the unfavourable economic situation and the need for a better quality of life in general as crucial (see Figure 17). They assess the cultural characteristics and environmental reasons in the countries which immigrants and refugees arrive from as the least important factors of migration. Such a distribution of results provides additional insight into the complexity of the integration process of immigrants and refugees within the Croatian society. This can significantly impact the development of attitudes reflecting a fear of Islamization as a symbolic threat or pointing out an unfavourable impact of immigrants and refugees on Croatian society and the pressure on the economy of Europe in general (as 48% of students emphasizes), etc.

■Reasons	Economic reasons	Quality of life	Environmental reasons	War or political instability	Culture
Reasons	25,7	17,9	0,4	54,3	1,7

Figure 17 *Reasons for migration* (%)

For the most part, students estimate that immigrants and refugees are men (59.1%). They see the proportion of women as three times lower (see Figure 18). This is quite a realistic assessment given the fact that men are predominant in this group according to Eurostat data as well.[6] It is safe to assume that such an assessment is partly also owed to the media. Data indicative of the situation in this regard is also presented in the 2015 *Annual Report on Migration and Asylum Policy*, according to which 54% of those accommodated in the transit centre in Slavonski Brod were men, 29% were children, while only 17% were women (Pesek, 2018:28). On the other hand, 40% of respondents in our survey did not list men in their responses as the predominant gender group, which once again indicates the need to increase the level of informedness on the topic of immigration in general (23% listed no one).

[6] https://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/ (accessed on 11 April 2020)

**Figure 18** *Gender of immigrants and refugees* (%)

Figure 19 *Age of immigrants and refugees* (%)

The age of immigrants and refugees was also realistically assessed, with 90% of respondents considering them to be in the younger and mature age group (see Figure 19). Eurostat data also show these groups as predominant when it comes to

asylum seekers[7]. However, the number of children and those above forty years of age is higher according to official statistics as compared to the estimates of our respondents, which we attribute to the methodology of the survey asking them to opt for the most common groups of people arriving to the Croatian border. The findings of our research, which predominantly point to the perception of immigrants and refugees as men of younger and mature age, appear to reinforce doubts as to their intentions, as well as to the possibility of their integration. With respect to age, statistical tests were not conducted due to the dominant distribution of responses in favour of two relatively related categories (18–29 and 30–39 years). However, statistically significant gender differences are indicative, as they show that respondents pointing out the need for deportation more often see men both as immigrants (χ^2=88.004; df=20; p=0.001) and as refugees (χ^2=40.178; df=12; p=0.047).

4.4. Social distance towards immigrants and refugees

The *Creating welcoming communities* project sees the wider area of Split as one of the potential environments for the reception and integration of asylum seekers. For this reason, we consider the students' social distance towards immigrants and refugees to be an important issue. We assumed that there was a distance towards this group of individuals, especially relative to the increasing degree of closeness of the contact. A similar conclusion can also be drawn from the results of the survey

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[7] https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=File:Figure_4_Distribution_by_age_of_(non-EU)_first-time_asylum_applicants,_2019_(%25)_v3.png (accessed on 15 April 2019)

conducted by Medlobi and Čepo (2018:54), according to which the intensity of distance increases within the range of social roles from work colleague, neighbour, close friend to spouse or partner. Their findings are corroborated by Ajduković et al. (2019:43), who emphasize the presence of a statistically significant difference between the Dalmatian region and the rest of the country. Dalmatians show the lowest level of desirable closeness of social contact with asylum seekers. In addition to the already mentioned results of our research which partly explain such opinions, it is important to investigate the impact of students' identity characteristics as well as of their previous contacts with immigrants and refugees on the degree of social distance.

	1	2	3	4	5	M	SD
I wouldn't mind a member of my family attending the same class with a refugee child.	7.5	3.4	22.9	25.1	41.1	3.89	1.2
I wouldn't mind a member of my family attending the same class with an immigrant child.	7.9	4.5	24.8	24.6	38.2	3.81	1.22
I would help refugees if I were in a position to.	8.6	6	28.2	36.1	21.1	3.55	1.14
I would help immigrants if I were in a position to.	12.9	10.3	31.6	28.6	16.6	3.26	1.23
I wouldn't mind inviting refugees into my home to socialize.	30.9	14.6	29.8	14.4	10.3	2.59	1.33
I wouldn't mind inviting immigrants into my home to socialize.	34.7	15.9	27.6	12.6	9.2	2.46	1.32

Table 4 *Indicators of social distance towards immigrants and refugees (%)*

The results of the survey are relatively favourable when it comes to family members attending the same class with an immigrant or refugee child. All indicators of social distance were measured by using a 5-point Likert scale (1 – complete disagreement; 5 –

complete agreement), and the obtained arithmetic mean value for this particular indicator approaches the highest levels of the scale. With an increase in the degree of closeness of potential interactions, a decline in the arithmetic mean value is recorded. The arithmetic mean is still relatively high when it comes to willingness to help refugees, whereas this is no longer the case with immigrants (M<3,5). As expected, the minimum level of willingness was expressed by respondents with regard to inviting immigrants and refugees into their home, suggesting the presence of a high degree of mistrust. According to results of previous research, which are corroborated by our own, respondents express a greater willingness towards establishing institutionally regulated contacts than those involving their own engagement and private sphere.

4.5. Relationship between students' attitudes and identity characteristics

The concept of identity is a rather complex research topic. It encompasses numerous dimensions based on which the individual and society define themselves in relation to others, as well as numerous dimensions based on which others perceive and define us. Identity defines individuals in the social sense, placing them in different structured and more or less permanent sets of relationships. The presumption of belonging to a particular category at the same time implies certain meanings and associated expectations (Vryan, 2007:2216). In more contemporary approaches, identity is observed as a process rather than a finished product, and as such, it is dynamic and subject to constant historical and cultural impacts. Its construction and formation are both active and contextual (Coupland, 2007:2212).

In this regard, while identity is understood as a reflection of structured sets of relationships, social actors actually negotiate their identities. They can create and strengthen existing social relationships, but also change them (Vryan, 2007:2216).

In our research, we start from the notion of identity as a relationship between individuals. Within the broader social structure, and thus directly overcoming the conceptual limitations of attitude theory (Stets & Biga, 2003), a series of studies have been conducted in which identity characteristics i.e. components of self-identity were analysed in relation to behaviour (Mannetti, Peirro & Livi, 2004). For example, Stets and Biga (2003:401) define identity as "a set of meanings attached to the self that serves as a standard or reference that guides behaviour in situations." Furthermore, Stryker and Burke (2000) point out that individuals have as many identities as there are social networks of relationships and the associated roles they play within particular social structures. Therefore, identity theory can be considered a more general theory of behaviour than attitude theory. It has the potential of explaining a broader array of behaviours in the context of a particular situation.

This part of the book examines the relationship between identity characteristics discussed in Chapter 3 and attitudes on immigration, immigrants, and refugees. In doing so, it also addresses the issues of perception of the average profile of groups of individuals involved and social distance towards them as mutually interconnected factors. In addition to providing an interpretation of the results, we present the hypothesis framework which this research followed in accordance with the set objectives.

We considered identity characteristics to be a potentially important indicator of the attitudes of particular groups of respondents. Data presented by Ajduković et al. (2019:10) shows that the region of Dalmatia is characterised by the greatest level of perceived realistic and symbolic threat by asylum seekers, as well as by the highest expectations of negative change. The population of this area is more likely to view assimilation as the desired model of integration compared to other parts of Croatia. Willingness to engage in close contacts and to provide personal help are at the lowest levels. While residents of Central Croatia and the Northern Croatian Littoral are more likely to leave the number of asylum seekers unchanged in the future, residents of Eastern Croatia and the Dalmatia region tend to reduce it. The results of our research are similar to those obtained in the mentioned study, with differences established among our respondents concerning a number of attitudes – on who to help, how, under which criteria, and for which reasons. Also, certain differences have been recorded with respect to social distance indicators (see Table 4).

Previous research has pointed to seeing identity as an indicator of attitudes on immigration in the context of the so-called migrant and refugee crisis. An important role in this context is played by traditional sources of identity such as ethnicity, religion, and political orientation, which Gutmann (2003:30) highlights as more likely to develop a sense of intolerance towards other identities built on the same types of social markers. Medlobi and Čepo (2018) corroborate this claim with their own findings in the context of Croatian society: the stronger the sense of national pride, the lower the level of

agreement on the need for equal legal treatment of asylum seekers and the local population. The willingness to help also decreases with growing national pride, while the sense of threat is greater. On a sample of 1,200 Croatian citizens, Kumpes (2018:275) shows that "religious respondents and those who practice religion are more likely to exhibit greater social distance towards immigrants and to perceive them as a threat". Ajduković et al. (2019) also state that slightly more negative attitudes towards asylum seekers are expressed by practicing believers, as well as by those on the right side of the political spectrum. Their expectations of negative changes are higher, as well as their perceptions of threat. Other sociodemographic variables are generally not significant, except for gender, with women being readier to help asylum seekers. "It can generally be said that the political affiliation variable represents a more significant determinant of attitudes than religiosity, i.e. is associated with a greater number of key attitudes" (Ajduković et al., 2019:58).

The central questions within our analysis were whether identity characteristics would show a similar direction as in previous studies, as well as whether social contact with immigrants and refugees could play an affirmative role. The answers to these questions represented the basis of the concept of (in)formal courses conducted as part of the activities within the *Creating Welcoming Communities* project, aimed at promoting the idea of the possibility of achieving a higher integration standard within the local community. Institutional and normative support is not enough for integration. What is crucial is the readiness of the population to participate in this process (Čačić-Kumpes, Gregurović & Kumpes, 2012:330). Successful integration of

immigrants and refugees into Croatian society is conditioned by positive and affirmative attitudes of citizens (Medlobi & Čepo, 2018:45).

In this light, our starting point was to examine the relationship between the identity characteristic of gender and the chosen attitudes on immigrants and refugees (see Table 5). This variable is often found to be statistically significant. Overall, women have more affirmative attitudes and more frequently express the need to help both refugees and immigrants – half of them as compared to a third of men. Male respondents are more prone to help only refugees or point out that we should help no one (half of them in case of the former, a fifth in case of the latter). On the other hand, only 10% of women do not support helping these groups.

Approximately 40% of women point out that immigrants and refugees should be socialized and assisted in their adaptation (integration), while a third of men state the same. No gender-related differences were found concerning integration criteria. The previous section shows a division among the respondents with regard to direction (assimilation or pluralism). It is quite possible that gender plays no significant role here because the differences between respondents are not significant when it comes to assessing the impact of immigrants and refugees on Croatian society. Although women are almost exclusively the ones who rate such an impact as positive, we have seen how low this percentage is (7.6%). This can lead to gender undividedness regarding issues of assimilation and pluralism as a form of integration.

Female respondents more often tend to express disagreement with immigrants and refugees representing a threat or hold a neutral view on the matter – 55% of them as compared to 42% of men. However, a large share equally sees these groups as a threat to Croatian citizens' safety. When it comes to measures involving barbed wire fencing and the need to raise immigrants' and refugees' quality of life, women are quite more affirmative. A majority (65%) do not support barbed wire fencing as a solution. The share is much lower for men – no more than 29%. Similarly, 50.5% of women point out the need to raise the quality of life of these groups, as compared to 31% of men.

	x^2	df	p
Who should we help?	17.475	3	0.001
Measures towards refugees	20.805	4	0.001
Measures towards immigrants	33.042	4	0.001
Integration criterion (refugees) – political culture (democratic)	12.573	4	0.064
Integration criterion (refugees) – same language	9.366	4	0.053
Integration criterion (refugees) – same religion	1.71	4	0.789
Integration criterion (refugees) – similar cultural characteristics in general	5.963	4	0.202
Integration criterion (immigrants) – political culture (democratic)	10.669	4	0.051
Integration criterion (immigrants) – same language	6.09	4	0.193
Integration criterion (immigrants) – same religion	0.728	4	0.948
Integration criterion (immigrants) – similar cultural characteristics in general	3.898	4	0.42
Impact of immigrants and refugees on Croatian society	19.833	5	0.001
Immigrants and refugees as a safety threat to Croatian citizens	14.932	4	0.005
Barbed wire fences as a solution to illegal immigration	60.145	4	0.002
Raising immigrants' and refugees' quality of life during their stay in Croatia	26.296	4	0.012

Table 5 *Relationship between gender and chosen attitudes on immigrants and refugees*

Although women are generally more affirmative when it comes to the attitudes considered, most are, in fact, not in favour of

the integration solution, but rather opt for temporary solutions. Also, a significant number suggest the assimilation solution. Although they mostly believe it is necessary to help, a large percentage would still limit migrations by putting up barbed wire (16.6%) or not raising the immigrants' and refugees' reception standard (20.8%).

The next criterion we considered in the context of the attitudes offered (see Table 6) is age. A correlation analysis was conducted for most variables, except for questions on whom we should help and how, where the Chi-square test was used. As assumed, no statistically significant correlations were established with respect to age. The population included in the survey are young people of similar age groups and their particular age should therefore not be a factor which is significantly correlated with their attitudes. The Chi-square test, nevertheless, showed two significant relationships – concerning measures towards refugees (χ^2=15.692; df=8; p=0.047) and those towards immigrants (χ^2=32.355; df=8; p=0.011). Younger respondents were slightly more likely not to know what to do about refugees and immigrants. When it comes to the first category, this was the response given by 46 subjects aged 18–22 years (N=284), as well as 9 subjects aged 23–27 (N=118). The situation is similar with immigrants. As many as 60 students aged 18–22 did not know what to do, which was the case with only 5 students aged 23 to 27. Such results should provide an additional impetus for reflections on the importance of a more systematic introduction of students to the topic of immigration, especially at the level of undergraduate studies as the basic stage of higher education

attended by the largest number of students.[8]

	r	p
Integration criterion (refugees) – political culture (democratic)	0.071	0.368
Integration criterion (refugees) – same language	0.079	0.315
Integration criterion (refugees) – same religion	0.013	0.873
Integration criterion (refugees) – similar cultural characteristics in general	0.019	0.812
Integration criterion (immigrants) – political culture (democratic)	0.114	0.166
Integration criterion (immigrants) – same language	0.115	0.16
Integration criterion (immigrants) – same religion	0.056	0.496
Integration criterion (immigrants) – similar cultural characteristics in general	0.081	0.322
Impact of immigrants and refugees on Croatian society	-0.03	0.516
Immigrants and refugees as a safety threat to Croatian citizens	0.021	0.656
Barbed wire fences as a solution to illegal immigration	0.016	0.729
Raising immigrants' and refugees' quality of life during their stay in Croatia	0.009	0.971

Table 6 *Relationship between age and chosen attitudes on immigrants and refugees*

Several statistically significant differences were found with respect to the field of study (see Table 7). Certain differences exist in regard to the perception of immigrants and refugees as a safety threat. Students of humanities and social sciences less often see them as no threat (a sixth in each group) compared to students of technical sciences and biomedicine and health care (a third in each group). Respondents from the first two fields of study are more likely to opt for a neutral response (I neither agree nor disagree). However, as with the overall sample, the largest number of respondents agree that immigration processes pose a threat in the context of the so-called migrant and refugee crisis.

Barbed wire fences as a solution are supported by only a few

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[8] https://www.srednja.hr/faks/znate-li-koliko-studenata-hrvatskoj-evo detaljne-statistike-upisanima-akademsku-2018-2019/ (accessed on 4. April 2019)

students within the field of biomedicine and health (5 out of 44). We assume that this has to do with the ethics of their profession which directly involves saving people's lives and makes the respondents sceptical about such solutions. On the other hand, almost half of the students of technical sciences hold the opposite view. Percentages among students of social sciences and humanities reflect those across the overall sample – half of the respondents reject the aforementioned solution, whereas between a third and a quarter hold the opposite view. Generally speaking, differences between faculties are mostly not pronounced. It is therefore no surprise that the criteria related to the integration of immigrants and refugees show no statistically significant differences even with respect to the field of study (assimilation versus pluralism).

	x^2	df	p
Who should we help?	7.049	9	0.632
Measures towards refugees	15.698	12	0.193
Measures towards immigrants	30.168	12	0.003
Integration criterion (refugees) – political culture (democratic)	15.457	12	0.217
Integration criterion (refugees) – same language	17.188	12	0.143
Integration criterion (refugees) – same religion	9.818	12	0.632
Integration criterion (refugees) – similar cultural characteristics in general	12.405	12	0.414
Integration criterion (immigrants) – political culture (democratic)	21.198	12	0.058
Integration criterion (immigrants) – same language	10.077	12	0.609
Integration criterion (immigrants) – same religion	12.642	12	0.396
Integration criterion (immigrants) – similar cultural characteristics in general	16.981	12	0.15
Impact of immigrants and refugees on Croatian society	18.442	15	0.24
Immigrants and refugees as a safety threat to Croatian citizens	22.038	12	0.037
Barbed wire fences as a solution to illegal immigration	29.840	12	0.003
Raising immigrants' and refugees' quality of life during their stay in Croatia	24.642	12	0.057

Table 7 *Relationship between the field of study and chosen attitudes on immigrants and refugees*

Political orientation is shown to be the most relevant identity

characteristic when it comes to the attitudes offered (see Table 8). Out of as many as fifteen statements, statistically significant differences were found in thirteen of them. Such results are strongly influenced by the differences between respondents on the right side of the political spectrum and those on the left, who significantly deviate from others. For example, as many as 60% of the former believe that we should help only refugees, while a quarter would help no one. By contrast, the latter overwhelmingly consider it necessary to help both refugees and immigrants. None of them state that we should help no one. The centre, the apolitical ones and those who could not state their political orientation are relatively evenly distributed. Fewer than a tenth believe that we should help no one, and about half feel that both refugees and immigrants should be helped. The rest opt for helping only refugees.

Almost 75% of those on the left side of the political spectrum see the integration of refugees as a solution, as opposed to a third of right-wing respondents who are more likely to opt for temporary solutions. The centre, the apolitical ones and those who could not state their political orientation again show smaller differences, much closer to the distribution across the overall sample. Differences are also pronounced when it comes to the integration of immigrants, which is supported by a fifth of the right-wing respondents, as opposed to 65% of those on the left side of the political spectrum. Other political orientations again show only minor differences in attitudes.

Integration models follow the direction of the results presented. Right-wing respondents lean more towards assimilation and the left-wing towards pluralism. However, the differences are less

pronounced here, especially concerning the criteria of religion and similar cultural characteristics in general. The almost general consensus regarding the impact of immigrants and refugees which the respondents do not consider positive, evidently testifies to no clear support of the pluralistic model of integration, at least among students of certain political preferences.

The differences are more prominent concerning the estimated intensity of negative impact of these groups on Croatian society. A majority of those on the right side of the political spectrum consider it negative (70%), while other political orientations are divided between such a response and the neutral one (I neither agree nor disagree). Patterns from the previous responses are repeated when it comes to barbed wire fences as a solution to illegal migration and rejecting the need to raise the groups' quality of life. Between 40% and 50% of right-wing respondents agree with these statements, as compared to only a few respondents on the left side of the political spectrum. In both cases, the centre is closer to the right option, whereas the apolitical ones and those who could not state their political orientation lean more to the left.

Political orientation has undoubtedly proven to be an important factor in differentiating attitudes. However, based on the results obtained, these differences are not decisive after all. Namely, the left- and right-wing respondents showing the greatest deviations are not predominant in the sample. The student population in general shows a considerable lack of interest in politics, as indicated by numerous studies (Ilišin, 2013; Ilišin 2017, etc.). On the other hand, left-wing respondents who express more affirmative attitudes than others also often "give in" to the idea

of assimilation as the preferred model of integration.

	x^2	df	p
Who should we help?	36.06	12	0.001
Measures towards refugees	54.224	16	0.001
Measures towards immigrants	51.309	16	0.001
Integration criterion (refugees) – political culture (democratic)	54.224	16	0.001
Integration criterion (refugees) – same language	51.309	16	0.001
Integration criterion (refugees) – same religion	27.277	16	0.039
Integration criterion (refugees) – similar cultural characteristics in general	27.101	16	0.04
Integration criterion (immigrants) – political culture (democratic)	34.419	16	0.005
Integration criterion (immigrants) – same language	27.142	16	0.04
Integration criterion (immigrants) – same religion	22.227	16	0.134
Integration criterion (immigrants) – similar cultural characteristics in general	20.901	16	0.182
Impact of immigrants and refugees on Croatian society	47.702	20	0.001
Immigrants and refugees as a safety threat to Croatian citizens	71.149	16	0.001
Barbed wire fences as a solution to illegal immigration	73.845	16	0.001
Raising immigrants' and refugees' quality of life during their stay in Croatia	39.968	16	0.001

Table 8 *Relationship between political orientation and chosen attitudes on immigrants and refugees*

A statistically significant relationship between the respondents' religiosity and chosen attitudes was established in several relations (see Table 9). Non-religious respondents, as well as those who could not say if they were religious or not, express a slightly greater need for the socialisation of immigrants and refugees (half of them as compared to a third and a quarter of those who are religious in line with the teachings of their religious community or in their own way, respectively). When it comes to refugees, the first two groups also express a slightly greater disagreement with the assimilation conditions of integration. Finally, non-religious respondents also see immigrants and refugees as less of a threat (a third do not see them as a threat at all as compared to an eighth of those who are religious in line with the teachings of their religious community and a quarter

of those religious in their own way). Generally speaking, the results mainly corroborate the findings of the research conducted by Ajduković et al. (2019). Although certain differences have been established with regard to religiosity, these are, however, not particularly important. Divisions in attitudes remain significant within every indicator of religiosity.

	x^2	df	p
Who should we help?	11.771	9	0.227
Measures towards refugees	25.189	12	0.014
Measures towards immigrants	32.078	12	0.001
Integration criterion (refugees) – political culture (democratic)	18.502	12	0.101
Integration criterion (refugees) – same language	29.459	12	0.07
Integration criterion (refugees) – same religion	16.186	12	0.186
Integration criterion (refugees) – similar cultural characteristics in general	21.7	12	0.041
Integration criterion (immigrants) – political culture (democratic)	20.122	12	0.065
Integration criterion (immigrants) – same language	25.189	12	0.051
Integration criterion (immigrants) – same religion	16.124	12	0.186
Integration criterion (immigrants) – similar cultural characteristics in general	12.049	12	0.442
Impact of immigrants and refugees on Croatian society	19.654	15	0.186
Immigrants and refugees as a safety threat to Croatian citizens	25.154	12	0.014
Barbed wire fences as a solution to illegal immigration	6.891	12	0.865
Raising immigrants' and refugees' quality of life during their stay in Croatia	10.946	12	0.534

Table 9 *Relationship between religiosity and chosen attitudes on immigrants and refugees*

Following the interpretation of relationships between identity characteristics and chosen attitudes, we investigated the presence of statistically significant relations concerning interactions with immigrants and asylum seekers. They were found to exist for almost half of the statements concerned (see Table 10). Thus, respondents who had engaged in such contacts (N=110) were more likely to point out either the need for socialisation or deportation to their country of origin. Temporary solutions or indecisiveness concerning the question of what to do about them

were less common in this group. They were also slightly more likely to reject the assimilation model of integration (based on similar cultural characteristics in general) when it comes to refugees. Such results may be rooted in the more common view that immigrants and refugees pose no threat to the population (expressed by a third of respondents in this group as compared to a sixth of those who had not engaged in such contacts). Finally, minor differences were found with respect to the need to raise the quality of life of these groups. Respondents who had engaged in contacts with them were more likely to point out the need of increasing it.

While the results do not differ significantly, they nevertheless indicate that engaging in contacts with immigrants and refugees can have an affirmative impact on respondents' attitudes. The level of support in the future will depend on the effectiveness of the normative and institutional framework of the Republic of Croatia, the level of preparedness of the local population, as well as on the behaviour of immigrants and refugees. Some who had engaged in contacts with them pointed out the need for deportation. The behaviour of these groups, however, probably largely depends on the existing integration standard, which therefore needs to be improved both at the institutional and the social level.

	x2	df	p
Who should we help?	7.835	3	0.04
Measures towards refugees	9.952	4	0.041
Measures towards immigrants	21.116	4	0.001
Integration criterion (refugees) – political culture (democratic)	12.727	4	0.013
Integration criterion (refugees) – same language	4.351	4	0.361
Integration criterion (refugees) – same religion	2.801	4	0.592
Integration criterion (refugees) – similar cultural characteristics in general	12.52	4	0.014
Integration criterion (immigrants) – political culture (democratic)	7.519	4	0.111
Integration criterion (immigrants) – same language	6.097	4	0.192
Integration criterion (immigrants) – same religion	2.868	4	0.58
Integration criterion (immigrants) – similar cultural characteristics in general	6.735	4	0.151
Impact of immigrants and refugees on Croatian society	8.014	5	0.155
Immigrants and refugees as a safety threat to Croatian citizens	23.347	4	0.001
Barbed wire fences as a solution to illegal immigration	6.698	5	0.153
Raising immigrants' and refugees' quality of life during their stay in Croatia	9.718	4	0.044

Table 10 *Relationship between previous interactions and chosen attitudes on immigrants and refugees*

Following the interpretation of the chosen attitudes, **the first research hypothesis is partly accepted**. The respondents within the sample were mostly divided on the topic in general. Significant differences were found with respect to gender, as well as some related to age, the field of study and religiosity. Stark divisions are evident along the lines of political orientation, primarily due to differences between right- and left-wing respondents who actually make up a smaller part of the sample due to youth's increasing indifference towards politics.

When observing the relationship between identity characteristics and the perception of the average profile of immigrants and refugees, statistically significant differences were mostly not identified (see Table 11). This corresponds with the overall results according to which no unexpected divisions are encountered among the respondents.

		x2	df	p
Emigration area	Gender	17.659	6	0.071
	Age	15.964	12	0.193
	Faculty	24.524	14	0.139
	Political orientation	48.614	16	0.273
	Religiosity	15.95	18	0.596
Reason of migration	Gender	11.204	5	0.047
	Age	14.879	10	0.137
	Faculty	18.84	15	0.221
	Political orientation	30.403	20	0.064
	Religiosity	14.524	15	0.486
Gender	Gender	21.95	5	0.81
	Age	28.394	10	0.05
	Faculty	27.261	15	0.037
	Political orientation	50.587	17	0.061
	Religiosity	24.49	15	0.057
Age	Gender	6.603	5	0.304
	Age	11.348	10	0.331
	Faculty	18.371	15	0.244
	Political orientation	15.655	13	0.738
	Religiosity	11.126	15	0.774

Table 11 *Relationship between identity characteristics and perceived immigrant profiles*

The results indicate **the acceptance of the second research hypothesis**. According to the respondents, immigrants and refugees are mostly younger men who migrate due to war and economic reasons. For the most part, identity characteristics are not an indicator of statistically significant differences. Ideological reasons (culture) are highlighted by practically none of the respondents. Overall, such attitudes probably reinforce the sense of threat and the association of these groups of people with potentially negative impacts on Croatian society in the future.

Social distance is in relation with most identity characteristics, especially gender (all indicators) and political orientation (all indicators). Also, a relationship to previous contacts with immigrants and refugees can be observed with regard to this

issue. Certain relationships have been established with respect to the faculty (i.e. field of study) and religiosity of the respondents, while no relationship has been found concerning their age. Table 12 shows the statistically significant relationships with social distance indicators.

		x^2	df	p
Gender	Attending class with a refugee child	20.624	4	0.001
	Attending class with an immigrant child	16.116	4	0.003
	Helping a refugee	34.671	4	0.001
	Helping an immigrant	39.028	4	0.001
	Inviting a refugee to one's home	12.916	4	0.012
	Inviting an immigrant to one's home	15.995	4	0.003
Political orientation	Attending class with a refugee child	20.624	4	0.001
	Attending class with an immigrant child	42.979	16	0.001
	Helping a refugee	54.202	16	0.001
	Helping an immigrant	26.119	16	0.042
	Inviting a refugee to one's home	49.09	16	0.001
	Inviting an immigrant to one's home	71.393	16	0.001
Social interactions	Attending class with a refugee child	22.882	4	0.001
	Attending class with an immigrant child	21.807	4	0.001
	Helping a refugee	15.597	4	0.004
	Helping an immigrant	12.402	4	0.015
	Inviting a refugee to one's home	37.43	4	0.001
	Inviting an immigrant to one's home	21.274	4	0.001
Faculty	Inviting a refugee to one's home	30.605	12	0.002
	Inviting an immigrant to one's home	33.227	12	0.001
Religiosity	Attending class with an immigrant child	27.118	12	0.007
	Inviting an immigrant to one's home	35.151	12	0.001

Table 12 *Relationship between identity characteristics, previous interactions with and social distance towards immigrants and refugees*

Women show less distance than men within all the dimensions offered. For example, they are more comfortable with their family members attending the same class with immigrant or refugee children, which 70% women agree with, as compared to 53% of men. The ratio is similar regarding the willingness to provide help, although frequencies are generally slightly lower.

However, the differences are less pronounced when it comes to inviting refugees or immigrants to one's home, which a quarter of female respondents and a fifth of male respondent would be willing to do.

The relationship to political orientation is also understandable given the previous results. Respondents on the left side of the political spectrum generally do not see a problem with attending education together (80%), while right-wing respondents see this as acceptable in 40 to 50% of cases, depending on whether an immigrant or refugee child is concerned. The centre, the apolitical ones and those who could not state their political orientation lie in between the values recorded in these two groups. While all political orientations lie quite close together when it comes to willingness to help refugees (about half, 70% of left-wing respondents), differences are more pronounced concerning immigrants. Willingness to help them is expressed by 67% of left- and 25% right-wing respondents, while others participate with about 50%. These shares decrease when it comes to inviting people to one's home. In the case of both refugees and immigrants, 56% of left-wing respondents would do this, as compared to between 10% and 15% of those on the right side of the political spectrum. About one in four respondents who state themselves as apolitical or centre would welcome these people into their own home, as well as a slightly lower percentage of those who could not state their own political orientation.

Respondents who had engaged in contacts with immigrants and refugees are again less indecisive. A third of those who had never engaged in such contacts are distributed with neutral responses (I neither agree nor disagree) across all indicators of social

distance. The same response was recorded in a fifth of those who had had some immediate experiences with these people. Some 30 to 50% of them are willing to welcome immigrants and refugees into their home, as opposed to around 15% of those who had engaged in no contacts with them. This is where Cantle's (2015:5) contact theory comes into play again, which involves getting to know these people in order to learn and be able to live with the differences. As Županov points out (2011: 162), it is through living together that prejudices die. While creating new values and unlocking the future is necessary, it is crucial to build a structure that will serve as a normative framework for harmonious coexistence and bridging the gap of possible value differences. In other words, the process of immigrant integration depends as much on institutions as it does on local communities.

The findings indicate **partial acceptance of the third research hypothesis**. Social distance is more pronounced across the sample with an increase in the degree of closeness of potential interactions. The impact of identity characteristics is visible, as in the case of attitudes on immigration, immigrants, and refugees, but again is not pronounced. The interpretation of social distance shows contacts with immigrants and refugees as an evident indicator, with a potential to become an important identity catalyst within those communities that persist in improving the integration standard.

5. CONCLUSION

The starting point of our research was the hypothesis framework on:
- differences in attitudes on immigration, immigrants, and refugees (H_1)
- the existence of perceived profiles of these groups (H_2)
- differences in the degree of social distance towards them with the increase in the closeness of potential interactions (H_3).

Each of the three baseline hypotheses considered the impact of identity characteristics on the respondents' answers. Most of the students surveyed show a difference in attitudes towards refugees and immigrants, thus confirming the introduction of these categories as justified. For example, a majority find it necessary to help refugees (83.9%), while just under half of the respondents believe the same for immigrants (46.4%). The differences are also confirmed when it comes to attitudes indicating socialisation and acceptability of integration, as well as other measures intended for the indicated groups (see Figure 10). A part of the answers (e.g., on accommodation of immigrants and refugees) points to the need for more comprehensive informing with a view to achieving a better understanding of the legal status of refugees and immigrants.

The desirability of the same religion, similar language, similar political culture, and culture in general points to the potential foundations of the respondents' views, as well as to the need of educating them on the ideas of cultural exchange and pluralism.

This is particularly the case since most potential immigrants and refugees (see Figures 16-19 and accompanying elaborations) largely do not participate in these processes.

A special focus is put on the perception of the impact of refugees and immigrants on the local community. A significant share of respondents sees it as negative, which certainly affects their degree of openness towards integration models.

Attitudes on the need to increase the quality of life of immigrants and refugees during their stay on the territory of Croatia (see Figure 14) indicate a certain level of distrust when it comes to providing help. Although 44% of respondents do not question the need for better living conditions, the reason for concern lies with the majority who either lack a clear position or oppose improving the quality of life of the groups in question. Future research should examine the potential relationship between such attitudes and discourses confronting the interests of immigrants and refugees on the one hand with those of the local population on the other.

According to previously presented findings, the integration process is largely not recognised as a way of addressing the problems faced by the local resident population. The respondents do not recognise the potential relevance of integration in improving the country's demographic picture or ensuring the much-needed labour force. However, 35.6% of them agree that integration is necessary because it is morally right. In general, we can argue that students are more inclined to support integration for reasons of moral duty (cf. Figure 9, 10 and 15). Such an attitude is particularly significant from the perspective of the

ethics of migration.

The respondents' attitudes indicate that there is a significant degree of awareness on the need to protect human rights, as expressed in the arguments concerning the theory of human rights and migration theory. Thus, almost all respondents (94.9 – 96.8%) agree that all people should be guaranteed fundamental human rights, an equal right to happiness and that being born in a poor country is no one's fault. More than 83% of respondents also point out that the right to immigration is a fundamental right, and approximately 78% agree that everyone has the right to live where they want. However, what can also be observed is an exceedingly high degree of agreement with the claims that no one has the right to enter the Republic of Croatia without permission or that we have no duty to receive those who, although not through their own fault, were born in poverty. Therefore, it is no surprise that only slightly less than a third of respondents see open borders as a solution. In general, students show a greater inclination towards a conventional approach to migration theory, but also an exceptionally high tendency for principled, if not practical, recognition and protection of human rights.

The third part of the study, involving an analysis of social distance, showed an (expected) increase in distance proportionally to the increase in the closeness of interactions. The results of the survey are relatively favourable when it comes to one's family members attending a class together with an immigrant and/or refugee child, i.e. when it comes to institutionally regulated interactions. In the case of relationships and interactions within the private sphere, a greater level of distance is observed.

In conclusion, the study partially confirmed the first and third research hypotheses, while the second was confirmed completely (see Chapter 4.5). This created the basis for the design and preparation of educational materials and practices focusing on integration policies as well as on the theory and ethics of migration. The results of the research indicated the existence of differences in attitudes concerning immigrants and refugees, which will, accordingly, be included in future theoretical and methodological reflections aimed at bridging existing gaps and overcoming misunderstandings, i.e. the lack of knowledge. The research indicated the need for further systematic consideration of social distance as a key concept / phenomenon / relation / process, especially since the city of Split has been recognized as a potential area of reception and integration of refugees.

Integration is never a one-way process, but rather requires the readiness of both hosts and immigrants to openness, cooperation, and reciprocity. Accordingly, greater engagement of different stakeholders, such as public institutions, local and state government, civil society organisations, the academic community, media, etc., is needed in establishing a support network for the reception and integration of refugees. Such a network largely depends on the support of the local population in the broadest sense. It is therefore necessary for local self-government units to systematically work on promoting positive and affirmative attitudes towards others and those different from us, in this case towards refugees. The most appropriate way to achieve this is through the education system. The process should include models of intercultural education from the youngest age on. Intercultural education is aimed at introducing us to other and

different people and cultures in order to make them become more familiar, more understandable and more acceptable. Interculturalism can thus become the backbone of successful integration as it promotes encounter, interrelation, acceptance and understanding of differences.

The study conducted among students at the University of Split shows that there is an immediate need for continuous intercultural education, i.e. education for understanding others and those different from us. This approach can be a good platform for other educational activities at institutions of higher education, but also for other interested stakeholders in a broader social context, all with the aim of achieving wider public support in the reception and integration of refugees.

This study was conducted as part of the project of *Creating Welcoming Communities* and the results obtained contribute to a more purpose-oriented and efficient design of local integration models and activities, that can as such serve as the basis for similar future research on the mentioned topic.

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From reviews

The scientific perspective of this study is pluralistic and critical. It is an engaged piece of social research attempting to observe the immigrant issue from the other side of the 'us-them' identity rift, through an approach that questions the perspectives of integration, opening up, recognition. In my judgment, such a research concept represents an important contribution to understanding the immigrant issue, as it introduces into academic and public discourse – as John Dewey would put it – 'different ways of speaking' with a potential to undermine the rule of ideologemes that make up the security discourse of the modern European polis.

Prof. Asim Mujkić, Ph.D., full professor at the Faculty of Political Sciences
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The book *'Borders. The attitudes of students at the University of Split on immigration, immigrants, and refugees'* includes an interdisciplinary approach that critically addresses the current and interesting topic which has for a long time occupied the minds of an array of scientists across various fields of study. This piece of scientific work approaches the analysis of immigration from this side of the 'border', attempting to unravel how personal identity elements impact the formation of attitudes towards immigrants. What is at play here is the classical *native-foreigner* relationship and dichotomy. The study, which is designed in such a way that it first conducts an empirical research and then supports it with theoretical arguments, contributes to a better understanding of these classical relations, especially since, as evident from the results, most of the respondents had no direct encounters with immigrants, and there is already a certain relation and distinction determined by their identity characteristics.

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