HOW CHATTON CHANGED OCKHAM’S MIND: WILLIAM OCKHAM AND WALTER CHATTON ON OBJECTS AND ACTS OF JUDGMENT

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Recent scholarship has begun to uncover the nature and extent of the reciprocal—and typically adversarial—relationship between William Ockham (d. 1347) and Walter Chatton (d. 1343). We now know, for example, that Chatton, a slightly younger contemporary of Ockham, is both enormously influenced by and, at the same time, highly critical of his older colleague; he often takes up precisely those questions Ockham treats (and likewise the terminology and conceptual framework in which he expresses them) only to reject Ockham’s conclusions. We also know that Chatton’s criticisms leave their mark on Ockham. Ockham frequently rehearses and responds to Chatton’s objections, occasionally refining or even altogether revising his views in light of them. Perhaps the best-documented case of such influence concerns Ockham’s developing views of concepts, where, in direct response to Chatton’s criticisms, Ockham famously abandons his early “fictum” theory of concepts in favor of Chatton’s own “mental-act” account. Although this may be the best-document case, it is by no means the only example of such influence—a handful of others have been discussed in the literature. In this paper, I hope to extend our current understanding of the relationship between these two Franciscan thinkers by looking in some detail at a debate between them over the objects of judgment.

The broad outlines of Ockham’s place in the development of the later medieval debate about judgment are fairly well drawn. Scholars have traced

1 For a general introduction to Chatton’s philosophy see Keele 2006. A number of studies have been made of Chatton’s reaction to (and, typically, criticism of) Ockham’s views. See, for example, Keele 2007(a), Cova 1985, Maurer 1984, Kelly 1981, Fitzpatrick 1971, Gál 1967, and O’Callaghan 1955.

2 For a fuller discussion of Chatton’s criticisms of Ockham and his role in Ockham’s eventual change of mind see Gál 1967, Kelly 1981 and Tachau 1988, ch.7.

3 Joseph Wey (1980, 39* n.8) provides a list of places in Ockham’s Quodlibetal Questions in which Ockham explicitly rehearses arguments or objections offered by Chatton. In addition to these, Wey also finds some 68 other textual parallels between Ockham’s Quodlibeta and Chatton’s writings. See Wey 1980, 27*. Stephen Brown (1985) presents evidence that Ockham draws on Chatton’s Lectura in the course of his discussion of Aristotle’s physics. See also, Keele 2006, § 3.3; Keele 2002, ch. 8; Keele 2007(a).
the discussion and controversy generated by Ockham’s account among a host of fourteenth-century thinkers at both Oxford and Paris. It is well established, moreover, that Chatton is among the earliest and most vehement critics of Ockham’s account of objects of judgment. What has gone overlooked in the literature, however, is the fact that Chatton’s criticisms of Ockham have an important influence on Ockham himself. Not only has this gone unnoticed, scholars have at times thought that Chatton so misunderstood Ockham’s position that, in the end, his objections to it fail even to apply. In what follows, I argue that Chatton’s criticisms not only find their target in Ockham, but that they were felt by Ockham himself to be sufficiently forceful as to lead him to radically modify his views. Indeed, Ockham’s most mature treatment of judgment contains revisions that not only resolve the problems Chatton identifies, but that also bring his final account of objects of judgment fairly close to Chatton’s own.

My discussion in what follows divides into three parts. In the first, I provide the background necessary for understanding Chatton’s criticisms—namely, a description of Ockham’s early theory of judgment. I then turn in the second part to sketch Chatton’s central objections to that theory and the role these objections play in shaping Ockham’s mature views. Here, I argue, first, that Ockham initially does defend a view susceptible of Chatton’s criticisms and, second, that he is eventually persuaded by these criticisms to abandon it. Although the changes Ockham introduces into his final theory of judgment significantly reduce the distance between him and Chatton, important differences remain. In the third and final section, I consider these differences, arguing that they are important both to our understanding of Ockham and Chatton’s respective theories of judgment, and to our understanding of the subsequent development of the debate about judgment.

1. BACKGROUND: OCKHAM’S EARLY THEORY OF JUDGMENT

In order to appreciate Chatton’s objections and the developments in Ockham’s account to which they give rise, it is necessary to begin with a

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6 In what follows, citations of Ockham’s Latin texts are to Ockham 1967-88. I use the following abbreviations in referring to particular volumes: Ord. (= Ordinatio. Scriptum in Librum Primum Sententiarum); Expos.Praedic. (=Expositio in Liburn Praedicamentorum Aristotelis); Expos.Perih. (= Expositio in Librum Perihermenias Aristotelis); Quodl. (= Quodlibeta Septem); SL (= Summa Logicae). Translations are my own.
brief overview of Ockham’s early theory of judgment and certain features of Chatton’s interpretation of it.\footnote{Ockham’s earliest account of judgment is developed in his \textit{Ordinatio} commentary—primarily in q.1 of the prologue to it. It is this text that Chatton relies on for his interpretation of Ockham. In setting out Ockham’s initial theory of judgment, therefore, I will be drawing primarily from his account in this work. I have discussed Ockham’s early theory of judgment in more detail elsewhere. See Brower-Toland, 2007.}

Ockham’s views about judgment are framed in terms of a much broader theory about the nature of human cognition—a theory that Chatton himself largely shares. According to this theory, all thought (that is, intellective cognition) forms a kind of mental language—one structured in much the way natural language is. Thus, like spoken and written language, the language of thought is compositional: it is comprised of simple or atomic units (namely, “concepts”), which, via the mental operation of “composition,” can be combined in various ways to form complex, propositional expressions.\footnote{According to Ockham: “whatever the intellect can apprehend in a simple act of thinking, it can combine (\textit{componere}) with another thing by saying ‘this is that’.” \textit{Ord. Prol.}, q. 1 (\textit{OTh} II, 49).} Accordingly, Ockham divides mental expressions into two broad categories: sentential or propositional expressions, and the non-sentential terms or units—i.e., subject, predicate, and copula expressions—that comprise them.\footnote{\textit{Expos.Praedic.} Cap. 4, § 1 (\textit{OPh} II, 148). Ockham argues that while Aristotle was speaking primarily about spoken language in the passage from which this distinction is taken, he, nevertheless, intended it to apply to mental language as well.} Ockham thinks this division maps Aristotle’s distinction in the \textit{Categories} between expressions that are “said in combination” (\textit{dicuntur cum complexione}), and those “said without combination” (\textit{dicuntur sine complexione}). Propositional expressions (\textit{complexa}, \textit{propositiones}) are those produced by the operation of composition and so are appropriately characterized as expressions only “said in combination”; by contrast “simple terms” (\textit{simplex termini}, \textit{incomplexa}) are semantic units that precede and are used in the operation of composition.

On Ockham’s view, the intellect’s formation of a judgment involves not only its formulating or “composing” a propositional thought (that is, a mental sentence), but also its adopting some stance or attitude with regard to it. In order to accommodate this aspect of judgment, Ockham distinguishes between two different psychological modes, or types of mental act associated with the intellect’s formation of a mental sentence, namely, apprehension and judgment. Acts of apprehension are, on his view,
acts or states in which the intellect merely considers or entertains a given content—whether non-propositional (as when the intellect forms or possesses an individual concept) or propositional (as when it entertains a mental sentence). Acts of judgment, by contrast, arise only in connection with the intellect’s formation of a mental sentence; these are acts or states in which the intellect not merely entertains a given content, but takes some positive stance with respect to its truth. As Ockham puts it, judgment is an act “by which the intellect not only apprehends its object, but also gives its assent or dissent.”\(^{10}\) Thus, in keeping with the interpretation of thought as an inner, mental language, we can perhaps think of judicative acts as mental assertions—that is, acts involving a kind of assertoric force.

Broadly speaking, acts of judgment fall into one of two categories: assent or dissent. Acts of assent and dissent, however, can be further subdivided into particular propositional—or, we might say, ‘judicative’—attitudes, namely, belief, knowledge, doubt, opinion, faith, etc. Thus, when one takes something as true (say, by believing, knowing, or opining) she is said to assent; when she takes it to be false (say, by disbelieving, or doubting) she is said to dissent. Accordingly, a given judicative act may be an act of knowledge, belief, doubt and so on depending on the grounds for and causes of that act or state. For this reason, Ockham (and Chatton, who adopts his terminology and conceptual framework) will often move freely between terms like “judgment”, “act of assent”, “act knowledge/belief.”

In addition to distinguishing between apprehension and judgment, Ockham also develops a certain picture of the logical and causal ordering among such acts. In particular, he holds that acts of judgment presuppose the occurrence of several (logically) prior acts of apprehension.\(^{11}\) For our purposes, we need only focus on one part of this account, namely, Ockham’s claim that every act of judging presupposes a (logically) prior act of apprehending the object judged. As he explains, “an act of judgment with respect to a mental sentence presupposes an act of apprehension relating to the same thing.”\(^{12}\) The motivation for this claim is just the intuition that one does not form a judgment with respect to something without first having apprehended or considered that same thing. Indeed, on Ockham’s view, the prior act of apprehension is itself partly causally responsible for the occurrence of the subsequent judicative act. For, as he sees it, part of what explains one’s coming to assent (or dissent) to something is one’s prior

\(^{10}\) Ord. Prol., q. 1 (OTH I, 16).

\(^{11}\) See, Ockham’s Ord. Prol., q. 1 (OTH I, 17-21).

\(^{12}\) Ord. Prol., q. 1 (OTH I, 17).
consideration or “apprehension” of it. Since, as we shall see, Chatton draws heavily on this particular feature of Ockham’s account, it will be useful to set it out explicitly as follows:

**Ordering Principle:** Every act of judgment is always preceded and caused by an act of apprehension relating to the same object (at least in the natural order, apart from supernatural intervention).

Now, with this much of Ockham’s theory of judgment Chatton is in perfect agreement. He shares Ockham’s conception of thought as occurring in a type of mental language, and he accepts Ockham’s account of the distinction between, and ordering among, acts of apprehension and judgment. What he objects to, and what he wants to reject, is Ockham’s account of the objects of judgment. Ockham claims that all acts of judgment—that is, all acts of believing, knowing, opining, etc.—take mental sentences as their object. This claim about objects of judgment is at the heart of Ockham’s early theory of judgment; indeed, Ockham’s first argument for it comes in the very passage in which he introduces judgment as a species of act distinct from apprehension.

The second type of act may be called an act of **judgment**. It is that act by which the intellect not only apprehends its object, but also gives its assent or dissent to it. This act is only in relation to a mental sentence (*complexi*). For our intellect does not assent to anything unless we consider it to be true and it does not dissent from anything unless we judge it to be false. 13

Because this claim about objects of judgment is so central to Ockham’s early theory of judgment and to Chatton’s criticisms of it, it will be useful to pause briefly to consider the motivation behind it.

Ockham’s commitment to the view that mental sentences are objects of judgment has a two-fold source: one rooted in his nominalism, the other in his understanding of Aristotelian demonstrative science. As the foregoing passage makes clear, Ockham thinks that judicative acts or attitudes pertain only to what is truth-evaluable, that is, only to what is capable of being true or false. But since Ockham’s ontology has no place for abstract propositional entities such as sentence types, propositions, or states of affair, he holds that only sentence tokens—and, in the first place, mental sentence tokens—are the bearers of truth.

13 *Ord. Prol.*, q. 1 (*OTh* I, 16).
or falsity. Indeed, he is committed to what we would nowadays think of as a nominalist account of truth bearers. As he says, “nothing is true except a sentence [token].” This, together with understanding of acts of assent as relating to what is true (and dissent to what is false), entails that judicative attitudes such as belief and knowledge must relate to mental sentences as object.

The other motivation for Ockham’s views about the nature of objects of judgment comes from his understanding of the nature of demonstrative science (what he refers to as ‘knowledge properly so called’ (scientia propria dicta)). Following Aristotle’s account of demonstrative knowledge in the Posterior Analytics, Ockham holds that what is known or assented to in demonstration is not only something that is true, but also something that is necessary and universal. For this same reason, he concludes that the (immediate) objects for all demonstrative knowledge (that is, of all scientia) must be mental entities since, on his view, there is nothing in extramental reality that is universal and, likewise, nothing there (besides God) that is a necessary being. Mental sentences, however, can possess universal concepts (that is, concepts which can be predicated of numerically distinct things) as constituent terms, and can be true necessarily (which, on his view, is just to be true whenever formed); thus, they alone are the only sort of entity suitable to function as objects for demonstrative scientia. Accordingly, Ockham’s entire theory of demonstration is predicated on the assumption that the terms, the premises, and the objects of Aristotelian scientia are mental entities—namely, concepts and mental sentences. As he insists: “every science (scientia) whatsoever—whether it is real or rational—concerns only mental sentences. For it concerns those things which are known (scita) and

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14 Ockham is, of course, well known for his nominalism. In general, he appears willing to allow only concrete, particular things (res) falling in the category of substance and quality. Thus, he denies the reality not only of universals, but also of abstracta including propositions (as they are nowadays conceived) and states of affairs. For an overview of Ockham’s ontology see Adams 1987, chs. 1-9. See also Spade 1999 and Normore 1999.

15 *Quodl.* III.8 (*OpI* IX, 236). Sentences in natural language are also truth-bearers, but their truth-value (and, truth conditions) is wholly derivative on that of the corresponding sentence in the language of thought.

16 Serene 1982, 513.

17 As Ockham explains: “In one way something is called ‘necessary’…because it can begin and cease to exist by no power; in such a way God alone is necessary…. In another way, a sentence called ‘necessary’…which is such that it cannot be false—namely, which is true in such a way that, if it is formed it is not false but only true. And in this sense demonstration is of necessities…that is, of sentences which cannot be false but only true.” SL III-2, 5 (*OpI* I, 512).
only mental sentences are known (scitur).”\textsuperscript{18} For convenience, in what follows, I refer to Ockham’s position on objects of judgment simply as ‘Ockham’s position’ where this is shorthand for his view that every act of judgment—every act of believing, opining, knowing, demonstrating, etc.—relates to a mental sentence as its immediate object.

Now, it is precisely this position that Chatton wants to reject. Chatton denies not only that the objects of demonstrative science are mental sentences, but also, and more generally, the view that objects of all propositional attitudes are mental entities. Although Chatton is, as we shall see, willing to grant that in some special cases mental entities can be said to serve as objects of judgment, he insists that, in the normal course of things, the objects for judicative attitudes are extramental things (\textit{res}). In order to appreciate the details of Chatton’s criticisms, however, it is important to see that, throughout his discussion, he is presupposing a commitment on Ockham’s part to a very specific conception of the metaphysical structure of mental language—and, so, to a very specific conception of the nature of the entities that serve as objects of belief and knowledge. To see what this assumption amounts to, I need to say just a word or two about the developments in Ockham’s account of concepts.

When Ockham originally formulates his theory of judgment, he is operating with what we might think of as a kind of act-object analysis of mental language. According to this analysis, mental sentences (and the concepts from which they are composed) are taken to be mind-dependent entities—what Ockham refers to as “\textit{ficta}”, where these are taken to be inner thought-objects distinct from and dependent on mental acts directed at them.\textsuperscript{19} As is well known, however, Ockham eventually rejects the act-object account of mental language—in no small part because of Chatton’s criticisms of it. In its place, he adopts Chatton’s own, adverbial (or ‘mental act’) analysis of mental language. On this view, concepts and mental sentences are not understood as intentional \textit{objects} of acts of thinking, but

\textsuperscript{18} \textit{Ord.} d.2, q.4 (\textit{OTh} II, 135).

\textsuperscript{19} Ockham frequently refers to the mental entities that serve as objects of thought as ‘\textit{ficta}.’ On his early theory of concepts and mental language, concepts or \textit{ficta} are construed as entities that have a special (mind-dependent) mode of existence—they are, as Ockham describes them, ‘objectively existing’ beings. Because, on his early view, concepts are characterized as ‘\textit{ficta}’ and as ‘objectively existing’ his early theory of mental language is sometimes referred to in the literature as the “\textit{fictum-theory}” or as “objective-existence theory.”
are rather identified with acts of awareness themselves. Thus, on Ockham’s mature view, mental sentences are no longer understood as complex or structured thought-objects, but rather as complex or structured mental acts—what both Ockham and Chatton refer to as “complexa apprehensiones,” and which we might call ‘propositional apprehensions.’

Obviously, such a shift in Ockham’s conception of mental language required some amendment to his account of objects of judgment, since it entails, at very least, a change in his views about the nature of the mental sentences that serve as objects of judgment. Chatton simply assumes that Ockham means to hold fixed all the central elements of his early theory of judgment—and, in particular, the conclusion regarding mental sentences serving as objects of judgment—while merely replacing his early account of mental sentences with an adverbial, or “mental-act,” analysis of them. Thus, on Chatton’s interpretation, Ockham’s considered view is that objects of judgment are mental acts, namely, complex or propositional acts of apprehension. And it this account of objects of judgment that is the target for his criticisms. Indeed, we can think of Chatton’s objections to Ockham’s position as an attempt to demonstrate why Ockham’s early views regarding objects of judgment cannot be conjoined with an adverbial analysis of mental language.

2. Chatton’s Criticisms and Chatton’s Influence

Chatton takes up the question of objects of judgment in the first article of the first question of his Sentences Prologue (hereafter, q.1, a.1). Although he is clearly interested in the objects of judgment generally, the focus of his discussion in this context is a question about the objects of belief—or, more precisely, of faith. (This focus on the nature of the objects of faith is not surprising given the broader context of the discussion: not only does it occur in a commentary on a theological textbook, but the specific issue with which Chatton is concerned in this part of the commentary has to do with the evidentness (evidentia) of the articles of

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20 Hence, Ockham’s later theory of concepts is sometimes referred to as the ‘mental-act’ theory.
21 As Chatton explicitly says at one point in his discussion: “I am supposing that a mental sentence is a propositional apprehension.” Rep. I, Prol. q.1, a.1, 41.
22 Although commentators have generally recognized that Ockham is forced to modify his early theory of judgment in light of his changing theory of concepts, there is disagreement as to what these modifications involve. See Brower-Toland, 2007.
23 References to q. 1, a.1 are to Chatton 1989. Wey 1989 provides a brief introduction to the prologue of Chatton’s Sentence commentary.
The bulk of his discussion in this context is devoted to criticizing Ockham’s position. Chatton opens his discussion with a lengthy quotation from Ockham’s early account of apprehension and judgment and proceeds thereafter to list the (many) places in which Ockham explicitly claims that mental sentences are objects for judicative acts. Having done this, he goes on to develop a series of arguments, all of which are designed to establish not only the falsity of Ockham’s position but also truth of his own, namely, that “the act of believing (and the act of knowing and opining…) has an external thing and not a mental sentence for its object.”

In what follows, I want to focus on three lines of criticism that emerge over the course of Chatton’s discussion. In each of these, Chatton attempts to show that Ockham’s own views regarding the nature of acts of judgment and apprehension entail the falsity of his (i.e. Ockham’s) position regarding the nature of the objects of such acts.

2.1 Chatton’s Criticisms: The first two lines of criticism take Ockham’s ordering principle as their starting point. As I noted earlier, Chatton wholly accepts this principle; hence, he accepts Ockham’s account of the logical and causal ordering among acts of judgment and apprehension—as he says: “I concede that every act of assent naturally presupposes an apprehension of its object”. But, as we shall see, he also thinks that acceptance of Ockham’s ordering principle provides an important first step in proving Ockham’s account of judicative objects to be false (and his own to be true).

To see why this should be the case, let us turn to the first line of argument. The argument takes the form of a reductio. Chatton concedes Ockham’s ordering principle only to argue that its conjunction with Ockham’s position on objects of judgment entails something obviously false: namely, that every act of judgment requires higher-order awareness (what Chatton himself refers to as “reflexive” apprehension) of one’s own mental states. Since Chatton accepts the ordering principle, he thinks the result tells against Ockham’s position.

That the conjunction of the ordering principle and Ockham’s position regarding object of judgment has this untoward consequence follows from the fact that, on Ockham’s view, the mental sentence that serves as object for a given act of judgment is itself a mental act (namely, a

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24 Prol. q.1, a.1, 18-20. Chatton draws exclusively from Ockham’s *Ordinatio* discussion of judgment.
25 Prol. q.1, a.1, 20.
26 Prol. q.1, a.1, 42.
propositional apprehension). But, given Ockham’s ordering principle, it follows that

one does not assent to some mental sentence unless he first apprehends it…This is because, as he [namely, Ockham] proves, the apprehension of a mental sentence is the cause of the [judgment] by which the intellect assents to the sentence. 27

Clearly, if the sentences that serve as objects for judgment are propositional apprehensions, and if every judgment presupposes an apprehension of the object judged, it follows that every act of judgment—that is, any act of believing, knowing, opining, etc.—involves some kind of higher-order awareness of lower-order acts. But this, as Chatton goes on to argue, is implausible insofar as it conflicts with our experience of the phenomenology of judging. As Chatton repeatedly points out, we it seems clear that we form judgments all the time without any second-order awareness of our mental states. Given this, it is likewise clear that mental sentences cannot be said to be the object for every act of judgment.

To illustrate the point, Chatton takes as an example a case in which someone forms the belief (i.e. comes to assent) that God is three and one. The formation of this belief or judgment begins with an act of (propositional) apprehension—that is, with the formation of the thought or mental sentence ‘God is three and one.’ This is followed by an act of judgment; in this case, a there is an assent in which the subject affirms or accepts the sentence as true. Now, as Chatton points out,

when the intellect, in forming this mental sentence ‘God is three and one’, assents with an act of belief, that act [of believing] does not presuppose an apprehension of the mental sentence ‘God is three and one.’ … This is because the assent requires on the part of the intellect only that the mental sentence be formed in the intellect. It does not require that any mental sentence be apprehended. 28

If, as Ockham claims, it were true that a mental sentence were the object of the belief that God is three and one, it would follow (given Ockham’s ordering principle) that to form such a belief one would not only have to formulate the thought ‘God is three and one’, but would also have to have a higher-order awareness of that thought. But this is implausible. As Chatton insists, it seems we could form such a belief without any reflexive awareness of our own thoughts. Of course, if this is right, Ockham’s

27 Prol. q.1, a.1, 17.
28 Prol. q.1, a.1, 39.
position is mistaken: not every judgment has a mental sentence as its object. Indeed, on Chatton’s view, in most cases they do not.

So much for Chatton’s first line of criticism. If we turn now to the second, we can see that, like the first, it takes Ockham’s ordering principle as its point of departure. This time, however, Chatton argues not merely against Ockham’s position, but for a positive claim of his own: “assent has for its object an extramental thing or things (res)” (where by ‘things’ Chatton has in mind individual substances and/or their attributes). To see how Chatton arrives at this positive claim using Ockham’s ordering principle, consider, once again, his account of the formation of the belief that God is three and one. As we’ve just seen, to believe or judge that God is three and one is just a matter of one’s forming the mental sentence ‘God is three and one’ followed by a subsequent act of assent. What Ockham’s ordering principle tell us, however, is that the object of the assent is the object of the act of apprehension that precedes and causes it. It follows, therefore, that whatever serves as the object of the propositional apprehension ‘God is three and one’ is the object of the assent in question.

Chatton then proceeds to argue that since “the mental sentence is an apprehension of God,” we are led by Ockham’s own ordering principle to conclude that God (and not a mental sentence) is the object of the belief that God is three and one.

Chatton holds, in general, that what is cognized in a given act of propositional cognition is some extra-mental object (res)—specifically, substances and, perhaps, some property of them. As he sees it, the object (or, as he often characterizes it, the “significate”) of sentences in the language of thought is just the entity (or entities) that is cognized by its constituent terms. And, on his view, what is cognized by each of the terms of a mental sentence is some extramental object. As he explains:

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29 As Chatton puts it elsewhere: “Supposing that a mental sentence [is present] in the intellect, and ruling out any apprehension of the mental sentence (omni apprehesione complexi circumscripta), the intellect is inclined to assent. But, having ruled out any apprehension of the mental sentence, [it is clear that] the intellect does not assent to the sentence. … [This is clear] since according to [Ockham] (and according to the truth of the matter) the intellect does not assent without a cognition or apprehension [of that to which it assents]. Therefore, if the mental sentence is not apprehended, the intellect does not assent to it.” Prol. q.1, a.1, 21.
a mental sentence is a certain propositional cognition. Thus, it is a cognition of just that which is cognized through the subject, or the predicate or the copula [of that mental sentence]. For its being a cognition accrues to it through its parts—but its parts are cognitions of an extra-mental thing.\(^{30}\)

What is more, Chatton can see no reason why Ockham would disagree with this claim about the objects of propositional cognitions given his acceptance of Chatton’s own adverbial analysis of mental sentences and of the concepts that comprise them.

Of course, if this is right and the object of the complex or propositional apprehension that precedes and causes a given act of assent (or dissent) is an extramental entity it follows that the object of the judgment is likewise something extramental. As Chatton insists,

if we suppose that the intellect forms a sentence that signifies an external thing, and suppose further that it does not apprehend that sentence (which assumption is plausible since the parts of that sentence are not apprehensions of the whole sentence), then (assuming all of this), I claim that this mental sentence is suited to cause an assent, but that it does not cause an assent that relates to that sentence [as its object]. For by assumption, the sentence is not what is apprehended. Therefore, the assent has for its object the external thing (or things) that are signified by that sentence.\(^{31}\)

In the end, therefore, Chatton contends that Ockham’s account of the relations which obtain between apprehension and judgment tell not only against his own conclusion about the objects of judgment but also in favor of Chatton’s alternative account. “On the basis of [Ockham’s] own claims,” he says, “I have my principle point in this question—namely, that the assent

\(^{30}\) As Chatton proceeds to explain: “An external thing (res) is cognized through the subject, and the predicate and the copula since those terms are cognitions of an external thing. Throughout the whole time in which the sentence signifying an external thing is formed in the mind, the external thing is cognized—sometimes by the subject of the sentence, sometimes by the copula, sometimes by the predicate.” ProL q.1, a.1, 24. That Chatton does indeed think that what is apprehended by a mental sentence is a thing (i.e. an individual substance or attribute) one has only to consider his own examples. For instance when considering what is signified by the mental sentence ‘God is three and one,’ he claims that it is just God. “This is because that assent [viz. to the mental sentence God is three and one] requires on the part of the intellect only that that mental sentence be formed in the intellect. It does not require that any mental sentence is apprehended, because each part of that sentence is an apprehension of God and not of any accident in the mind” ProL q.1, a.1, 39. God is the object for a number of other theological articles: ‘God is incarnate,’ ‘God is God,’ etc.

\(^{31}\) ProL q.1, a.1, 26.
that the intellect has when it forms a mental sentence signifying an extramental thing has that thing (and not the mental sentence) for its immediate object.\(^\text{32}\)

All of this leaves open the possibility that there are, nevertheless, some cases in which we do direct attention toward our own mental states and even go on to form second-order thoughts or judgments about them. Chatton is perfectly willing to acknowledge this possibility. Indeed, he explicitly allows that sometimes judgments do have mental sentences as their object. Cases in which an act of judgment relates to a mental sentence as its object are, on Chatton’s view, cases in which one apprehends a given mental sentence and then goes on to make some judgment regarding its truth. Thus, for example, an act of assent that is directed at a mental sentence as its object will be an act in which one judges (believes, knows, etc.) that the sentence is true. Such judgments are, thus, not about or principally directed at some thing in extramental reality, but are rather directed at or about one’s own mental acts.

In order to accommodate this possibility, Chatton thinks it is necessary to draw a distinction, already anticipated above, between two kinds of judgment or assent: those that are about extramental things (\textit{res}) and so require no awareness or apprehension of one’s own mental acts or states, and those which are about one’s own mental acts or states (i.e. about sentences in one’s language of thought) and so do require some sort of higher-order or reflexive awareness of them. Accordingly, Chatton explicitly distinguishes between

\[\text{[1] the assent which the intellect has when it forms a mental sentence that immediately signifies an external thing—such as when one forms the sentence ‘God is three and one’—and [2] the assent the intellect has when it forms a mental sentence that immediately signifies another mental sentence—such as when one forms this mental sentence ‘the article of faith [e.g., ‘God is three and one’] is true.’}\]

As Chatton points out, one sort of assent (call it a ‘non-reflexive’ assent) is caused or prompted by the intellect’s formation of a first-order mental sentence regarding some extramental thing (e.g. ‘God is three and one’), and, so, has that thing (e.g., God) as object. The other sort of assent, which Chatton labels ‘reflexive’ assent, is caused by the intellect’s formation of a second-order or meta-linguistic mental sentence (e.g. ‘God is three and

\(^{32}\text{Prol. q.1, a.1, 38.}\)

\(^{33}\text{Prol.q.1, a.1, 38.}\)
one’ is true’), and has (the first-order) mental sentence (e.g. ‘God is three and one’) as object.

Obviously, the introduction of this distinction involves conceding to Ockham that some judgments do have mental sentences as objects. Chatton draws on this concession, however, to bolster his own position regarding objects of judgment. This brings us to the third line of criticism he pursues against Ockham. Here, after conceding that in some cases mental sentences do serve as objects of judgment, Chatton goes on to insist that the very possibility of such reflexive judgments presupposes the truth of his own view about the objects of non-reflexive judgments. This is because, Chatton maintains, every occurrence of a reflexive judgment directed at a mental sentence as object, requires the (logically) prior occurrence of a non-reflexive act of judgment that has an extramental thing as its object. As he explains:

Assent to a mental sentence necessarily presupposes [a prior act of] assent to the thing (res) signified by that sentence. This is the case because assenting that it is the case in reality (as the sentence signifies it to be) is prior to assenting that the sentence itself is true.34

On Chatton’s view one cannot judge that a thought or mental sentence is true unless one has first formed a belief or judgment about how things stand in reality. To judge a sentence (mental or otherwise) to be true is to judge that it corresponds to reality. Hence, if one assents to a mental sentence—that is, if one believes or judges that one’s thoughts (or apprehensions) are true, this must be because one has already formed a belief or judgment about things in the extramental world. Thus, the formation of a judgment directed at a mental sentence presupposes a prior judgment that is not directed at a mental sentence—indeed, it presupposes a prior judgment about things in extramental reality. Hence, the concession that is possible for a judgment to have a mental sentences as object by itself, entails the falsity of Ockham’s position because it entails that not every act of judgment has mental sentences as object.35

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34 Prol. q.1, a.1, 27.
35 Thus, as Chatton explains, at one point, even if one apprehends and assents that the article ‘God is three and one is true’, this “does not entail that he first assents that the article is true. Rather it is the reverse. Assenting that an article is true requires that one [first] assent that something is the case in reality. And then, with the assent that relates to the external thing remaining in place, by virtue of that assent it then appears evident [to the person] that the article is true.” Prol. q.1, a.1, 42.
Although Chatton raises a number of other objections for Ockham’s account, what we’ve seen already will be sufficient for establishing his influence on the subsequent development of Ockham’s views.

2.2 Chatton’s Influence: Chatton’s criticisms, as we’ve seen, are predicated on the assumption that Ockham continues to defend his early conclusion about mental sentences serving as objects of judgment even when his views about the nature of mental language itself began to evolve. Some commentators have questioned the accuracy of this assumption, however.\(^{36}\) There is evidence to suggest that once Ockham comes to accept the adverbial analysis of concepts and mental sentences, he also abandons his early claim that mental sentences serve as objects for every act of judgment.\(^{37}\) In the *Quodlibetal Questions*—a work which contains Ockham’s most mature treatment of judgment and which also reflects his full acceptance of the adverbial analysis of mental language—Ockham explicitly claims that “an act of assent by which something is known to be such-and-such or known not to be such-and-such…does not have a mental sentence (*complexum*) as its object.”\(^{38}\) In fact, Ockham’s treatment of judgment throughout his *Quodlibetal Questions* reflects a consistent and wholesale rejection of his early contention that mental sentences are the

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\(^{36}\) This was, in fact, my own view for a time. See also Karger (1995, 183) who contends that Chatton’s arguments against Ockham are “misleadingly presented” and, in general characterizes Chatton’s criticisms of Ockham in terms of their “unfairness” to Ockham. Apparently, Adam Wodeham—a contemporary of both Ockham and Chatton—seems to have shared much the same view. He too denounces Chatton as being unfair to Ockham on this score. See Karger 1995, n. 46.

\(^{37}\) Ockham’s transition from the act/object or ‘fictum’ theory of concepts to the adverbial or ‘mental-act’ theory proceeds in three stages: in the earliest stage he advances the *fictum* theory, in the middle stage he defends both the *fictum* and the mental act theory as equally plausible views, and in the final stage he wholly endorses the mental-act theory. The earliest drafts of his *Sentences* commentary—that is, his *Reportatio* commentary and the early draft of his *Ordinatio*—belong to the early period. To the middle period belong his later additions to the *Ordinatio* commentary and his commentary on the *Perihermenias*. The *Quodlibetal Questions*, the *Questions on the Physics*, and the *Summa Logicae* all belong to the last period. For relative dating of these texts, see Boehner 1946 and 1951 and Leff 1975, ch. 2. I have argued at length elsewhere (Brower-Toland, 2007) that Ockham’s views about judgment also undergo a three-stage development—one corresponding to each of the three phases in the development of his theory of concepts. The view Chatton is attacking corresponds to the view that Ockham endorses during the second phase of his thinking about judgment. Thus, on my analysis, Chatton plays a role in Ockham’s move from the second to the third and final theory of judgment.

\(^{38}\) *Quodl*. III, q. 8 (*OTh* IX, 233-234).
objects for all acts of judgment. But, if this is right—and Ockham never attempted to combine an adverbial analysis of mental language with his early theory of judgment—it follows that Chatton either misrepresents the views of his colleague (and, so, unfairly criticizes them) or is simply mistaken about the way they develop.

In point of fact, however, Chatton’s criticisms clearly do find a target in Ockham’s developing views about judgment. To see this, we need only consider some of Ockham’s remarks in his commentary on Aristotle’s De Interpretatione—a work written just a few years before his Quodlibetal Questions were completed. In this work, Ockham defends precisely the view that Chatton criticizes. What is more, it looks as if Ockham comes to abandon this theory precisely in response to Chatton’s criticisms. Thus, if Ockham does eventually develop a view immune to Chatton’s criticisms, this does not owe to any misunderstanding or unfairness on Chatton’s part; rather, it owes to the fact that Ockham himself fully appreciated the force of Chatton’s objections and revised his view precisely in response to them.

The nature and extent of Chatton’s influence can best be seen if we begin by looking briefly at Ockham’s remarks about judgment in the prologue to his De Interpretatione commentary. Ockham’s discussion in this context represents his earliest attempt to modify his initial account of the objects of judgment in order to accommodate the adverbial model of mental language. In the prologue of the commentary, Ockham surveys a variety of views about the nature of concepts and of mental language, turning specifically in Section 6 to a discussion, and a limited defense, of the adverbial model of mental language. Over the course of his discussion, Ockham specifically addresses a question about what, on this way of

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39 Although Chatton does not actually cite this work when criticizing Ockham’s account of judgment, it is a work which dates to roughly the same period as the redaction of the Ordinatio commentary (on which Chatton does rely). What is more, there is good reason to think that Chatton knew of—perhaps was even present at—Ockham’s lectures on De Interpretatione. This is because Ockham delivered his lectures on the ‘old logic’ in 1321-22 while staying at the Franciscan studium in London and it is widely supposed that Chatton was at the London studium during this same time. For discussion of the issue of Chatton’s presence in London, see Gál 1967, 53*-56* and Courtenay 1990.

40 As noted earlier, at this stage in his thinking, Ockham has not wholly abandoned his early ‘fictum’ theory of concepts, he is simply now willing to entertain the mental-act account alongside it. In this particular section of the prologue to the De Interpretatione, he is attempting to develop an account of judgment that would accommodate the mental act account of concepts, but does so without wholly endorsing the mental-act account of concepts.
thinking about mental language, serves as object for judgment. His response is clear: objects of judgment are mental sentences—where these are understood as acts of propositional apprehension. As he explains:

> To apprehend a mental sentence is nothing other than to form a mental sentence. … But, if we speak of an act of knowing some mental sentence, then it can be said that this act is an act that is distinct from the act [of apprehension] that is the mental sentence. And, therefore, when some mental sentence is known, there are two acts of the intellect occurring simultaneously, namely, the act that is the sentence and the other act by means of which the mental sentence is known. Nor does one ever find Aristotle denying that two acts of the intellect can exist at the same time in the intellect, especially when it comes to acts ordered in the way these are: mental sentence and act of knowing it.  

What this passage shows is that, when Ockham first begins to entertain the adverbial model of mental language, he clearly does continue to hold fixed his earlier views about mental sentences serving as objects of judgment. He is, at least at this stage in his thinking, willing to accept both that mental sentences can be taken as acts or modes of propositional apprehension, and that mental sentences, so understood, function as objects of judgment. Indeed, as the foregoing passage makes clear, Ockham initially sees nothing untoward in conjunction of the adverbial analysis of mental language and his earlier claim about objects of judgment.

When we turn to his most mature treatment of judgment in the *Quodlibetal Questions*, however, it becomes evident that the objections Chatton raises against this account have had their impact. In fact, the revisions Ockham makes in his account of objects of judgment appear to be a direct response to Chatton’s discussion in q.1, a.1, and to take a great deal from Chatton’s discussion in that context.  

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42 The dates assigned to Ockham’s Quodlibetal disputations are 1322-1324. Although Ockham’s discussion of judgment in the *Quodlibetal Questions* makes perfectly clear that he is not only aware of Chatton’s objections, but even drawing material directly from Chatton’s discussion in q.1, a.1, the precise means by which he had access to this material is a bit difficult to pin down. This is because the only extant version of Chatton’s q.1, a.1 comes from the *Lectura* version of his *Sentences* prologue and the dates for the completion of the *Lectura* range from 1324-1330. It is not unreasonable, however, to suppose that Chatton was already revising the prologue for the *Lectura* even as he was still giving his *Reportatio* lectures—namely during the years of 1321-23. And since Ockham and Chatton were likely together at the London studium during these years, it may be that Chatton was composing the *Lectura* version of the prologue at roughly the same time Ockham was.
Consider, for example, what Ockham says when, in his *Quodlibetal Questions*, he returns once again to the question about the objects of judgment. As noted earlier, he responds here by rejecting the claim that judicative acts always take mental sentences as their object. Significantly, however, he gives precisely Chatton’s reasons for doing so: he claims that acceptance of such a view would entail something implausible, namely, that judgments would involve some kind of higher-order, reflexive awareness of one’s own mental states. Thus, in *Quodlibet III.8* Ockham says that, in the ordinary case, an act of judgment

does not have a mental sentence (*complexum*) as its object because such an act is able to exist through the mere formulation of a mental sentence and without any apprehension of a mental sentence. For this reason, it cannot be an act of assenting to a mental sentence. Furthermore, when an ordinary person knows *that a rock is not a donkey*, he is not thinking about a mental sentence at all, and as a result he is not assenting to a mental sentence.  

These remarks make perfectly clear that Ockham is both aware of and accepts as decisive Chatton’s argument against his earlier theory. For he explicitly acknowledges that to claim that a judgment relates to a mental sentences as object requires that such a judgment involves reflexive awareness of one’s own mental states and, likewise, acknowledges that in the normal course of things we form judgments without any consciousness of our own thoughts or mental acts. He concludes with Chatton, therefore, that mental sentences cannot, in general, serve as objects of judgment.  

What is more, Ockham is now even willing to allow that there is a sense (albeit, a qualified or restricted one) in which we can say that things (*res*)—namely, substances and accidents—in extramental reality are objects of judgment. After all, in many cases, when we form a judgment we are aware

engaged in his *Quodlibetal disputations* and, therefore, that Ockham had access to the material during the period he was presiding over these disputations. Or, it may be that Ockham incorporated material from Chatton’s prologue into his *Quodlibets* some time after the disputations themselves were completed. After all, Ockham is thought to have revised and completed his *Quodlibetal Questions* some years after the disputations themselves were held—perhaps during 1324-1326 while he was in Avignon. Or, finally, it is even possible that Ockham had access only to the earlier *Reportatio* version of Chatton’s Q.1, a. 1, but that the *Lectura* version is a simply a close parallel of the *Reportatio* discussion. For a discussion of the respective dating of Ockham’s *Quodlibeta Septem* and Chatton’s *Reportatio* and *Lectura*, see Wey 1967, 53*-56*; Wey 1980, 36*-38; Keele 2006, § 1; Keele, 2007(b).  

43 *Quodl. III.8 (OTh IX, 233-234).*
of and judging about external things and, in this sense, the things themselves can be said to be the objects of judgment. Consider, for example, what Ockham says in connection with the previous example of judging *that a rock is not a donkey*:

> Although it is by means of a mental sentence formulated in the intellect that one affirms and knows that things are such and such in reality or that things are not such and such in reality, one nonetheless does not perceive this [mental sentence]. Instead, the act of assenting has as its object things outside the mind, namely, a rock and a donkey.

Here Ockham concedes not only that this judgment involves no apprehension of the mental sentence that precedes and causes it, but also that since the judgment does clearly involve some awareness or apprehension of extramental things—namely, rocks and donkeys—these things can be said to be its objects. As he proceeds to explain: “by means of an assent of this sort I apprehend things (res) outside the mind, since every assent is an apprehension but not vice versa.” Thus, to the extent that objects of judgment are those entities that are apprehended in the judgment—or in one or more of the acts leading up to the formation of the judgment—Ockham is willing to grant Chatton’s view that extramental entities—that is, things such as rocks and donkeys—can serve as objects of judgment. Thus, a bit later in this same discussion, when considering the question of objects of faith or belief, Ockham explicitly concedes Chatton’s own conclusion about the object of the belief that God is three and one. As Ockham puts it: “by such an act it is believed that God is three persons; and the object of that act (in the sense in which it has an object) is God.”

Although Ockham holds that substances or accidents can be called objects of judgment only in a restricted or qualified sense, the extent of Chatton’s influence is evident, nonetheless. Not only does Ockham now reject his earlier conclusion about mental sentences serving as objects for all acts of judgment while also granting the view that things can serve (in some sense at least) as objects, but he also appropriates Chatton’s distinction between the two different types of judgment, that is the distinction between non-reflexive and reflexive assent.

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44 Ibid. (*OTh* IX, 234).
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid. (*OTh* IX, 236).
47 The distinction that Ockham, following Chatton, draws here between two acts of judgment is one that he comes to apply to other mental acts as well. Indeed, in a number of
Indeed, one of the most distinctive features of Ockham’s treatment of judgment in the *Quodlibetal Questions* is the appearance of this distinction—it shows up only in his most mature treatment of judgment and it matches exactly the distinction Chatton draws between acts of assent that require no awareness or apprehension of one’s own mental acts or states (and so do not have mental sentences as objects) and those which do. In fact, at every point in the *Quodlibetal Questions* at which Ockham treats questions about judgment he begins his discussion by marking this very distinction. Consider, for example, his remarks at the outset of *Quodlibet* IV.16:

I claim, as was explained in another Quodlibet, that acts of assenting are of two sorts. One sort is an act by which I assent that some thing is or is not such-and-such in the way that I assent to its being the case that God exists, and to its being the case that God is three and one, and to its being the case that God is not the devil. … The second sort of assent is an act by which I assent to something, with the result that the act of assenting does bear a relation to something, in the way that I assent to or dissent from a mental sentence (*complexum*). For example, I assent to the mental sentence ‘a human being is an animal’, since I consider it to be true.

Although there is a great deal going on in this passage, one thing that emerges perfectly clearly is that Ockham has adopted Chatton’s distinction between non-reflexive and reflexive assent, and does so in order to make just the same point Chatton did—namely, that mental sentences can be the objects only of reflexive acts of assent. Indeed, like Chatton, Ockham now wants to distinguish between cases in which one apprehends and forms thoughts and judgments about *things* in extramental reality—for instance, about God and the devil, *that the one is not the other*, say—and cases in which one apprehends and forms (higher-order) thoughts and judgments about one’s own (lower-order) thoughts—for example, about the mental places throughout his *Quodlibetal Questions* Ockham marks a distinction between what he calls “direct” and “reflexive” mental acts, claiming that “an act by which we understand an object outside the mind is called a *direct act*, and an act by which a direct act itself is understood is called a *reflexive act*.” (*Quodl. II.12 (OTH IX, 165)*) What Ockham here refers to as ‘direct’ mental acts are just *first-order* acts involving an awareness only of items in the extra-mental world; reflexive acts, by contrast, are *second-order* as they involve awareness of other, first-order mental acts. Although Ockham does not restrict this distinction to acts of judgment, and while he never uses the terms “direct” and “reflexive” in the context of his treatments of judgment, it is clear, nevertheless, that the distinction between two types of assent corresponds to his distinction between direct and reflexive mental acts.

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48 OTh IX, 376-377
sentence ‘a human being is an animal’, \textit{that that sentence is true}, say. Since cases of the former sort are about \textit{things} in extramental reality and not about sentences in one’s head, they clearly require no reflexive awareness of such sentences. As Ockham goes on to explain:

\begin{quote}
without exception it is never the case that the first sort of assent necessarily presupposes an apprehension of a mental sentence, since this sort of assent is not an assent relating to a mental sentence as object. Rather this assent presupposes apprehension of singular \textit{thing}, though the intellect does not assent to singular things. By contrast, the second sort of assent, speaking naturally, does necessarily presuppose apprehension of a mental sentence… and the reason is that this sort of assent has a mental sentence for its object.\footnote{Ibid.} \\
\end{quote}

Thus, insofar as it is only reflexive judgments that are about mental sentences, it is also only reflexive judgments that have mental sentences as object. Here again, Chatton’s influence on Ockham is unmistakable.\footnote{Not only can Chatton’s influence be seen in the changes Ockham introduces to his final theory of judgment, it can also be seen in the structure the discussion itself. For example, in Quodlibet III.8, the three points Ockham considers in connection with the first of the objection he discusses turn out to be precisely the first, second, and seventh principle objections raised by Chatton in q.1, a.1 (pp. 21-22, 27, 29-30). Likewise, all three objections Ockham treats in Quodlibet IV.16 are points raised by Chatton. In Quodlibet V.6, a number of arguments Ockham adduces in favor of each of his two theses have a close parallel in Chatton’s discussion. For instance, the argument Ockham offers in favor of the conclusion that reflexive acts of judgment must be distinct from reflexive acts of apprehension is roughly the same argument Chatton offers in response to the first objection brought against his position (Prol. q.1, a.1, 33ff.). There, however, he’s using the argument to argue for a distinction among non-reflexive apprehensions and judgments.}

3. Chatton and Ockham on the Objects and Structure of Judgment

To this point, I have been emphasizing the similarities between Ockham’s final treatment of judgment and Chatton’s discussion in q.1, a.1 in order to call attention to Chatton’s influence on Ockham. What we have seen is, I think, sufficient to establish not only that Ockham does, at one point, advance precisely the view Chatton criticizes, but also that he is moved by these criticisms to revise this view—taking much from Chatton’s own account in the course of doing so. Yet, while such revisions do bring Ockham’s account much closer to Chatton’s, the remaining disagreements between them should not be overlooked. Indeed, as I now want to show,
there are still a number of important differences between Chatton and Ockham’s views about both objects and acts of judgment.

3.1 Objects of Judgment: As we’ve seen, Ockham concedes Chatton’s point that in cases of first-order, non-reflexive acts of judging what is apprehended is not a mental sentence, but rather one or more extramental things. And insofar as extramental entities are what is cognized or apprehended in such judgments Ockham allows that such things can be said to be the ‘objects’ of judgment. Where he diverges from Chatton, however, is in his insistence that extramental things are not objects of judgment in the more strict sense of being “that which known” (or believed) or, more generally, that to which assent or dissent is given. Consider his remarks in a passage cited just above from Quodlibet IV.16 where he discussing the objects of first-order acts of faith:

by [this sort of act] I assent that some thing is or is not such-and-such—in the way that I assent to its being the case that God exists, and to its being the case that God is three and one, and to its being the case that God is not the devil. I do not, however, assent to God or to the devil; rather I assent to its being the case that God is not the devil. Hence, strictly speaking, I assent to nothing through this act even though I apprehend God and the devil through this act. (Italics added.)

Drawing on Chatton’s own example of the belief that God is three and one, Ockham argues that although what is apprehended is God (and not a mental sentence about God), nevertheless, one does not “assent to God”. Indeed, Ockham thinks that, strictly speaking, in cases of first-order judgments there is “nothing”—that is, no entity or object—to which the act of judging relates as what is assented to. Although this may seem an odd claim, it is, nevertheless, one Ockham returns to a number of times. In fact, he makes much the same point in Quodlibet III.8 when talking about the first-order judgment ‘A rock is not a donkey.’ As we’ve seen, Ockham grants that “this act of assent has as its object things outside the mind, namely, a rock and a donkey,” yet, he also insists that “it is not, nevertheless, the case that a rock is known or that a donkey is known... Indeed, if you ask whether there is something known by this act, I reply that, properly speaking, it should not be said that something is known by this act.”51 Ockham’s point here is not that the act in question is empty or devoid of content; rather his point is simply that the relation in which it stands to extramental things (in this case,

51 OTh IX, 234.
rocks and donkeys) is not the relation of “being known” (or believed) or “being assented to.”

Thus, while Ockham is willing to grant Chatton’s point that things such as rocks and donkeys (or God and the devil) can be called objects of judgments in the sense they are the objects toward which one’s attention is directed in judgment (or, in Chatton’s terms, what is “apprehended”), he also wants to resist saying that such entities are objects which can be judged or to which assent (or dissent) can be given. Indeed, as he says at one point, “there is no such thing as assent with respect to a thing (res), since it makes no sense to say that I assent to a rock or to a cow.”\textsuperscript{52} The emphasis Ockham’s puts on this point is clearly an attempt to distance himself from Chatton’s own account of objects of judgment. Chatton, as we’ve seen, is not only perfectly comfortable with the claim that, in cases of non-reflexive judgments, the intellect “assents to a thing,” but he goes further to insist that this what one must say. After all, he argues, if “the intellect does not [in such cases] assent to a mental sentence, it therefore assents to a thing (or to things) signified by the sentence.”\textsuperscript{53} And, to his mind, there is nothing particularly worrisome about this. For, as he explains, it is “no more absurd [to say] that assent has for its immediate object one thing (or many things) than [to say] that the thing (or things) are signified simultaneously by the sentence that the intellect forms in assenting.”\textsuperscript{54}

This difference between what Chatton and Ockham are each willing to count as “objects” of judgment owes, ultimately, to the fact that each thinker approaches the question about objects of judgment with a different set of interests and aims in mind. For Chatton, the question about objects of judgment is, ultimately, a question about the broadly intentional or semantic features of mental language. On his view, therefore, the objects of judgment are whatever is apprehended or “signified” by the mental sentence that precedes and causes it. Thus, for him, the question about objects of judgment is, fundamentally, a question about the nature of the entities that serves as the referent or ‘significate’ for sentential expressions (namely, mental sentences). And, as we’ve seen, he thinks that mental sentences refer just to the thing (or things) to which their subject and predicate expressions

\textsuperscript{52} Quodl., IV.16 (OTh IX, 380)
\textsuperscript{53} Prol. q.1, a.1, 21.
\textsuperscript{54} Prol. q.1, a.1, 30.
refer—where these include substances and/or their attributes. Hence, these are objects of judgment.  

Ockham approaches the question about objects of judgment from a rather different set of concerns. From the start, he is thinking of objects of judgment in terms of truth and, in particular, in terms of truth-bearers. Thus, on his view, properly or “strictly” speaking, only what is true can be an object of assent—since only what is true is said to be “known” (scitum), “believed” (creditum), or, in general, an object for assent (or dissent). And since, mental sentences are, even on his mature view, the primary bearers of truth and falsity he is resistant to the notion that ordinary things (res) are objects of assent in any strict sense. Indeed, Ockham goes so far as to insist that it is only second-order judgments that can be said to have objects properly speaking; and this is because only these sorts of act relate to something in such a way that it is appropriate to say of the relatum that it is known, or believed, or assented to. After all, only second-order judgments relate to something true (i.e. truth-bearing). As he explains, “the second [namely, reflexive] sort of [judgment] is an act of assenting by which I assent to something in such a way that the act of assenting does bear a relation to something—as it does when I assent to or dissent from a mental sentence.”

Thus, for Ockham the question about objects of judgment is closely tied to questions about the nature of truth-bearers; only

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55 To some extent, therefore, my reading of Chatton diverges from that offered by Rondo Keele (2003), who claims that while “Chatton does sometimes drift over to talking about the signification of [mental] propositions …it would be wrong to view Chatton’s goal in q.1, a.1 as establishing or defending a res-theory as an answer to [this] question…” (48) Indeed, according to Keele, Chatton “has a small theoretical contribution on [the] question [about the significates of mental sentences] primarily because his interest in [that] question …was quite low.” (40) Although, I would concur with Keele’s contention that (a) we must look beyond q.1, a.1 for a complete understanding of Chatton’s account and (b) the complete account will ultimately show that Chatton takes ‘res’—namely, individual substances and attributes—to function as truth-makers for sentences, nevertheless, none of this undermines the fact that, for Chatton, the question about the “significates” of mental sentences was of central importance. As I read him, Chatton holds that the significate of a mental sentence (and of the corresponding act of assent) is precisely that thing(s) that functions as its truthmaker. (Indeed, it is precisely the claim that his younger colleague Adam Wodeham attacks. See Brower-Toland, 2006.) I discuss Chatton’s views on things (res) as truthmakers in more detail in my (as yet unpublished) paper “Can God Know More? Late Medieval Theories of Propositions”.

56 As we noted earlier, his initial definition of judgment and assent is in terms of truth: “our intellect does not assent to anything unless we consider it to be true and does not dissent from anything unless we judge it to be false.”

57 Quodl. III.8 (OTH IX, 233).
what is true can, strictly or properly speaking, be said to be an object of judgment.

Because Ockham and Chatton approach the question about objects of judgment with different interests and aims they arrive at different conclusions about what sorts of things count as ‘objects’ of judgment. This same divergence in starting points also lies behind a second, and much more substantial disagreement between them—one having to do with the nature of objects of demonstration. As we’ve already noted, Ockham’s general approach to the issue of objects of judgment is tied to particular concerns he has about objects of scientia—that is, demonstrative knowledge or science. As we’ve seen, in order to accommodate the standard definition of demonstrative knowledge (namely, as knowledge of what is not only true, but also necessary and universal) Ockham argues that all acts (and habits) of assent produced by a demonstrative syllogism relate to mental sentences as object. Despite all the other changes he makes to his early theory of judgment, this is a claim he retains. Thus, even in his most mature writings, Ockham insists that “the science (scientia) of nature is not about corruptible and generable things or about natural substances… rather, properly speaking, natural science is about intentions in the mind which are common to [external] things and which stand precisely for such things…” What this means for his mature theory of judgment is that demonstrative knowledge turns out to be a type of reflexive judgment—as Ockham himself explicitly points out:

speaking about the second [namely, a reflexive] sort of knowing or assenting, I claim that such an act is a propositional act that properly speaking has a mental sentence as its object. … And it is this sort of act that philosophers are commonly speaking of. For they claim that the effect of a demonstration is a habit that relates to a conclusion. Consequently, the act corresponding to that habit is an act that relates to a conclusion as its object. Philosophers also claim that nothing is known except what is true, and they are speaking of a mental sentence. They also claim that a demonstrative science is based on first and true principles. Therefore, only what is true is an object of a science.59

Here Ockham draws on his new distinction between reflexive and non-reflexive judgments (which, as we’ve seen, he takes from Chatton) in order to defend his early view about objects of demonstration. For, by restricting demonstration to reflexive acts of judgment, he is able to retain his original

59 Quodl. III. 8 (OTh IX, 234).
claim that demonstrative knowledge relates to mental sentences as object and in this way accommodate the strictures of demonstrative science within his nominalist ontology.

Ockham’s final position on objects of demonstration stands in stark contrast to Chatton’s. For, throughout his discussion in q.1, a.1 Chatton makes clear that acts of demonstration can be non-reflexive in nature. For, as he sees it,

> it suffices for an act of knowing that the intellect demonstrates. And, as a result, even if neither the demonstration nor any of its parts is apprehended through a reflexive act, still that demonstration would exist, and would no less cause an act of assenting.\(^60\)

Although demonstrative knowledge is the result of the formation in the intellect of a demonstrative syllogism, Chatton does not think demonstrative knowledge requires any second-order awareness of the syllogism—its premises or its conclusions. Indeed, on his view, it is perfectly possible for us to syllogize non-reflexively and so perfectly possible for us to have acts of scientific knowledge that relate to things in extramental reality. As he explains, “when someone demonstrates, that is, forms a demonstration that does not signify things in the mind, but rather things outside the mind … the external thing (whether one or many) which is signified by the conclusion is the object of the assent.” As opposed to Ockham, therefore, Chatton holds that demonstrative knowledge can be a first order act and, therefore, like any other act of judgment, can have some extramental thing as its object.

These various points of disagreement between Ockham and Chatton regarding objects of judgment are significant not only because they mark the differences in their own positions, but also because they serve as starting point for subsequent debates about objects of judgment. Indeed, the differences that remain between Ockham and Chatton provide a good deal of fodder for later discussions. This is perhaps nowhere more evident than in the writings of Ockham and Chatton’s immediate contemporaries and successors at Oxford. For thinkers such as Adam Wodeham, William Crathom, Robert Holcot the positions marked out by Ockham and Chatton provide the main dialectical alternatives in terms of which the debate as a whole is framed—such authors either explicitly side with one or the other or else present themselves as attempt to develop some middle ground between

\(^60\) Prol., q.1, a.1, 21.
the two.\textsuperscript{61} And even beyond this immediate sphere of influence, the debate between Ockham and Chatton has a role in shaping the direction of the debate. As the debate about objects of judicative attitudes unfolds in the mid and latter half of the fourteenth century, the two issues which come to occupy the center of the discussion are precisely those which come to the fore in the debate between Ockham and Chatton: namely, the question of the nature of the objects of Aristotelian demonstrative knowledge, and the question about the nature of the entities “signified” by propositional expressions.\textsuperscript{62} Although Ockham and Chatton are not the first to consider these issues, their treatment of them seems to lend new momentum to the discussion.

3.2 Acts of Judgment: I want to call attention to one further difference between Ockham and Chatton’s respective accounts of judgment. Here, the difference has to do not with their views about \textit{objects} of judgment, but rather with they way in which each conceives of the \textit{act} of judging itself. As

\textsuperscript{61} Thus, for example, Wodeham who commences his \textit{Lectura Secunda} (D.1, q.1, a.1) with a question about the nature of objects of \textit{scientia}, opens his discussion with the following question: “I ask first whether the act of knowledge (\textit{scientia}) has as its immediate object things (\textit{res}) or signs (\textit{signum})—that is, whether it has a sentence in the mind [as object] or the things signified by the sentence.” (Wodeham 1990, 180) Although he doesn’t name Chatton and Ockham explicitly here, he does mention them later on in the discussion. Similarly, Robert Holcot (d. 1349) opens his \textit{Quodlibet I.6}, which focuses on a question about objects of God’s knowledge, by rehearsing Ockham and Chatton’s views on the question of objects of knowledge generally. “There is,” he says, “uncertainty regarding what should be said to be known as object. One view, namely, Ockham’s, is that only a mental sentence is known. Another view, namely, Chatton’s, is that the object of an act of knowing or believing is not a sentence but the thing signified by the sentence.” See, Holcot 1971, 3. Crathorn too frames his discussion on objects of \textit{scientia} as a question about whether such objects are sentences (\textit{complexa}) or things (\textit{res}). See Crathorn 1988, 269-306. For further discussion of these figures see Tachau 1987; Nuchelmans 1973, chs. 12-13; Grassi 1990; Zupko 1994; Karger 1995; Brower-Toland 2002, chs. 4-5; and Brower-Toland, 2006).

\textsuperscript{62} Wodeham, for example, considers both issues in a single question—he argues that the object of demonstrative \textit{scientia} is something that is only “\textit{complexe significabile}” (that is, something that can only be signified by a complex, sentential expression). A number of thinkers after Wodeham take an interest specifically in questions about the nature of the entities that are \textit{complexe significabile} (i.e. signified by sentences). This debate clearly has its roots in the debate between Ockham and Chatton—in particular, in Chatton’s focus on questions about the significate of mental sentences. For discussion of the development of the later fourteenth-century discussion of objects of \textit{scientia} and of \textit{complexe significabilia} see Kretzmann 1970; Nuchelmans 1973, chs. 14-16; Nuchelmans 1980 ch. 4; Zupko, 1994, Cesalli 2002; Gaskin 2003; and Conti 2004.
will become clear, the disagreement between them on this issue is far less conspicuous; neither Ockham nor Chatton ever explicitly remark on it, and perhaps didn’t even clearly recognize it. Nonetheless, I think we can detect a difference in way in which each conceives of, and so characterizes, the intentionality associated with acts of judgment.

Recall that both Ockham and Chatton assume that every judgment is caused by a (logically) prior apprehension. Despite their shared commitment to this assumption, Ockham allows that it would be possible for God act directly on the intellect to produce an act of judgment—without any prior act of apprehension. For, as he explains,

one should not deny of any absolute thing that it can exist by divine power apart from another absolute thing, which is really distinct from it unless some evident contradiction arises. But there appears to be no evident contradiction in thinking that the judgment that follows an apprehension could exist even though the apprehension does not.63

Interestingly, however, Ockham goes on immediately after this to argue that while an act of judgment can occur in the absence of a distinct act of apprehension, it is, nevertheless, impossible for a judgment to occur without any apprehension whatsoever. As he says: “it is not a contradiction for an intellect to assent to a mental sentence without apprehending it by an act of apprehension really distinct from that assent; nevertheless, it can be conceded that assenting without apprehension of any sort does involve a contradiction.”64 This is because, as he immediately goes on to add, “assent is itself a certain sort of apprehension.”65 His point, I take it, is that acts of judging, just like acts of apprehending, are fully representational states. That is to say, they are intellective acts or states that are of or about something—states in which something is thought or “apprehended.” Thus, it is impossible for there to be an act of assent without apprehension at all.

63 Ord. Prol. Q.1 (OTh I, 59).
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid. Although the texts on which I’m relying here are early, there is no indication that Ockham changes his mind about this. Indeed, in his discussion of judgment in the Quodlibetal Questions, Ockham explicitly re-iterates his early claim that “every act of assenting is an act of apprehension” at a couple of points. (See, OTh IX, 234, 311) And, in his mature account of the ordering among acts of judgment vis-à-vis apprehension (namely, in Quodlibet IV.16), Ockham continues to emphasize that acts of judging presuppose the prior occurrence only “naturally speaking”—that is, only in cases where God’s influence is not under consideration.
since, on his view, this would be tantamount to saying that an act of judgment can be devoid of intentionality.

For Ockham, therefore, judgment is a type of apprehension insofar as it is itself a fully representational act or state. An act of judgment is propositional in content in just the way propositional apprehensions (i.e. mental sentences) are. In fact, at one point, Ockham explicitly refers to acts of assent as “propositional” (complex) acts—much in the way he characterizes those propositional acts of apprehension with which he identifies mental sentences. It would appear, therefore, that the only difference between apprehension and judgment, on his view, has to do with the force associated with each: acts of judgment carry a kind of assertoric force not present in acts that are merely apprehensive. As Ockham expresses it, in judgment “the intellect not only apprehends its object, but also gives its assent or dissent with respect to it.” On his view, therefore, acts of apprehension and judgment are acts belonging to the same genus—for they are each cognitive or intentional states. Indeed, as he says, if “one asks how these acts [namely, apprehension and judgment] differ, I say they are distinct in species; nor is it unfitting for there to be acts of distinct species in the same power with respect to the same object.”

Chatton, by contrast, seems to presuppose a different view about the nature of judgment. Not only does he nowhere indicate that acts of judging are a type of apprehension, capable of existing apart from the apprehensions that cause them, his remarks imply a rather different view of the nature of the relation between apprehension and judgment. It appears that, for Chatton, acts of judgment are not merely causally dependent on prior acts of apprehension, but are also dependent on them for their representationality—that is, for their representational content. In fact, some of his remarks in other contexts suggest that he takes acts of assent (and dissent) to be more akin to non-cognitive acts such as willing (and refusing) than to acts of apprehension. Indeed, at one point, he explicitly characterizes

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66 See Quodlibet III. 8 (OTh IX, 234). There is some complication here, however, for in Quodlibet V.6 he characterizes acts of knowing and believing as ‘simple’. It’s not clear what to make of this claim, however. In any case, it’s not at all clear that his calling such acts ‘simple’ counts against the interpretation I’m offering. For according to Ockham, a simple or “incomplex” mental act is just an act which is such that no part of it is itself an intellectual act (I take this definition from Panaccio 2004, 32). According to this definition, however, even mental sentences can be simple acts. Indeed, Ockham himself explicitly acknowledges this possibility. See, Expos.Perih. Prol., sec. 6 (OPh II, 355-357) and Expos.Perih. I.4 (OPh II, 395).

67 Ord. Prol. Q.1 (OTh I, 60)
acts of will as a type of assent or dissent and, later on in the same discussion, describes intellective assent and dissent as analogous to acts of appetite insofar as “what is affirmation and negation in the intellect is attraction and repulsion in the appetite.”

In the context of his discussion in q.1, a.1, Chatton’s most explicit remarks about the difference between acts of apprehension and judgment come in a passage in which he is explaining how, in the case in which one comes to believe an article of the faith, the act in which assent is given differs from that in which one merely entertains (i.e. “apprehends”) the article in question. His account here suggests that he takes the act of apprehending the article and the act of assenting to it to be not merely distinct numerically, but also distinct in kind. For, he says,

the act of believing is a simple act, whereas the act of forming the article [i.e., forming a mental sentence stating an article of faith] occurs successively over time. Therefore, these acts are distinct. … The first premise is clear since if it were not a simple act (one that does not include many acts) there would be no single instant at which it could be posited. After all, a mental sentence (which does include many acts) is usually formed by a wayfarer in succession—in that order in which it is formed in spoken words (or at least it can be so formed). And so [if the two acts were not distinct] there would be no one instant at which the faithful person believes.

As Chatton emphasizes here, on his view, a propositional apprehension—that is, a mental sentence—is an aggregate of mental acts: one act serving as the subject term, another as the predicate term, and a third as the copula. By contrast, the act of believing or assenting is “simple.” Thus, unlike the propositional act of apprehension that precedes and causes it, assent does not “include many acts” but, rather, in some sense attaches to or accompanies the existing aggregate this is the already formed mental sentence. As Chatton goes on to explain, however, “although an act of knowing or believing is a simple act of the intellect” and, so, not a “complex” or propositional act, he wants to insist that “it remains the case that it is a truth-evaluable (veridicus) act—as it is caused by means of composition [and division] and is such that it is not had prior to composition

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68 Earlier in the same discussion, Chatton compares acts of willing and judging in this way: “Every act of the will is willing or resisting since it is no less the case here than in other respects that any act of the intellect following deliberation is assenting or dissenting. For it is clear from the Philosopher that in the intellect there is affirmation and negation and here there is attraction and repulsion.” (Rep. I, D. 1, q.2, a.2, 40)

69 Prol. q.1, a.1, 34.
and division.” Indeed, on his view, the act is “simple” in as much as it “does not include a plurality of acts intrinsically.” Unlike other simple or non-propositional acts, however, an act assent is such that it can exist only in connection with a complex or propositional apprehension and so will relate to that which is represented (or apprehended) by that apprehension. As Chatton is thinking of it, therefore, the act by which the intellect assents or judges is not, as it is for Ockham, a species of apprehension; it is, rather, an act that in some sense attaches to or follows on apprehension and adds a kind of judicative force to it.

In light of the foregoing, we might summarize the difference between Ockham and Chatton in terms of their respective ways of accounting for the force and content associated with any given judgment. For Ockham, judgment is a single act—one that possesses both propositional content as well as a kind of assertoric force. Chatton, by contrast, seems to analyze the force and content involved in judgment into distinct types of act, one of which is a content bearing act, with the other functioning as the mental equivalent of a judgment stroke. Thus, for Chatton, a single judgment is comprised of two distinct types of act: a complex or propositional apprehension and a separate act of assent “by virtue of which the intellect takes (asserit) the propositional apprehension (complexum) to be true.”

Here again, the difference between Ockham and Chatton is significant for understanding later medieval developments. Indeed, we can find in thinkers such Adam Wodeham—an immediate successor and student of both Ockham and Chatton—evidence of this disagreement and some indication of how it came to shape later discussions. Since Wodeham’s treatment of this issue not only appears to corroborate my reading of the difference between Ockham and Chatton, but also illustrates how such different conceptions of judgment made their way into subsequent discussions, it is worth considering briefly.

Wodeham’s discussion of this issue occurs in the context of a discussion about God’s ability to directly cause an “evident” act of judgment. At one point in this discussion, he pauses briefly to summarize what he takes to be two different ways of thinking about the nature of judicative acts

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70 Cf. Reportatio super Sententias III, d. 23, q. un, a. 3-4. Here Chatton is more explicit about the simplicity of the act of assenting and its relation to a mental sentence. In this context he explains that the formation of the mental sentence causes the act of assent, which assent has for its object that which is signified by the mental sentence which causes it.

71 Prol., q.1, a.1, 43.
themselves. The first of these bears a remarkable resemblance to the view I have attributed to Chatton, whereas the second looks to be Ockham’s. Thus, on the first model, as Wodeham describes it, “no judgment…is an apprehension” but

rather, judgment is only a certain nod by which the mind grants that it is the case as the mental sentence (or sentences) signifies. But for the fact that there is this nodding there would be [just] some apprehension concerning its being such and such. Thus, [judgment] is a certain mental concession or refusal that, according to nature, always presupposes and also co-occurs with a propositional apprehension, which when posited, one can grant or not grant as if mentally saying ‘yes’ or ‘no’ or by hesitating. And according to this, such an act might be a certain act of the soul that conforms more to acts of the appetite than to acts of apprehension … Thus, if God were to cause such an act in us without apprehension, we would, inwardly, assess nothing by it since it is not a perceptive act. Rather we would remain totally blind.72

On this analysis, judgment is not an intentional or representational state, but is rather more like a mental “nod” that, as Wodeham explains, “always co-occurs” with a propositional apprehension. Indeed, if it were to somehow occur without being accompanied by an act of apprehension it would be, as he puts it a “blind” mental nod for the intellect would be assenting or dissenting (giving a mental nod, or shake) but not to anything. Thus, as Wodeham nicely puts it, on this view “no single mental act would be knowing [or believing or judging], rather it would be as much an aggregate of multiple acts.”72

On the second of Wodeham’s two models, however, an act of judgment “is itself a certain… apprehension.” Indeed, as Wodeham goes on to explain, on this analysis

it may be said that this sort of judgment is a single act that is simple in being, but in representing [it represents] just as much as the propositional and the non-propositional acts that are necessary (naturally speaking) for causing and conserving it—although perhaps it represents and signifies in a less perfectly manner than these. … For the two representative natures are of a different species—that is, the two acts belong to representations of their own species.73

Here, judgment is conceived as a type or species of apprehension; it is, as Wodeham says, an act that “represents and signifies” things in much the way as acts of apprehension do. On this view, therefore, judging is not a

72 Lectura Secunda, Prol., q.6 (I, 173).
73 Ibid. (I, 174).
composite mental state, but rather a single act in which one both represents or entertains a certain content and intellectively assents (or dissents) to it.

Although Wodeham does not mention Ockham or Chatton by name in connection with either of these views, the resemblance to each seems clear. What is more, Wodeham’s discussion not only provides a nice way of summarizing the differences between them, but also shows how the dispute between Ockham and Chatton on judgment may well have been responsible for initiating a wide-ranging debate about both the nature of objects of judgment and the nature and intentional structure of acts of judgment. Indeed, in the latter part of the fourteenth century, questions and debate about the nature of judicative acts comes to the fore alongside questions about objects of judgment.

4. CONCLUSION

In this paper, I have argued that Chatton’s criticisms of Ockham find a target in Ockham’s developing views about judgment and that they play an important role in shaping the outcome of that development. I have also attempted to show that while Ockham’s final theory of judgment is clearly influenced by Chatton, significant differences between them remain—differences in the sorts of philosophical interests that motivate their respective accounts, differences in the conclusions they draw about the nature of objects of judgment, and, finally, differences in the way each conceives of the nature and structure of judicative states themselves. These points of disagreement serve to highlight the nature of the formative relationship between the two. For here, as in so many other cases, the exchange between them provides an occasion for each to refine and sharpen his views—and, by so doing, to further the philosophical debate itself. Indeed, as we’ve seen, understanding the differences between Chatton and Ockham sheds new light not only on what is distinctive in each, but also on the development of the later medieval debate about judgment as a whole.

74 What is more, this issue arises in the context of a broader question in which he is addressing and adjudicating the differences between Ockham and Chatton’s views on cognition—in particular, what sort of acts are required in order for the intellect to form an evident judgment. It is, therefore, not unlikely that in rehearsing (and ultimately deciding between) these two ways of thinking about judgment Wodeham means to be addressing yet one more difference between Ockham and Chatton.

75 See Nuchelmans 1980, 90-102.

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