ROMAN INGARDEN
AND HIS TIMES

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Abstract

This project begins with the selective sensory experience suggested by Ingarden followed by an insensitivity he insinuates to digestive processes. This is juxtaposed with an oenological explanation of phenomenal sedimentation offered by Jean-Luc Marion. It compares the dynamics of time in the former with the those of wine in the latter. Emphasis is given to Ingarden’s insinuation of time as fluid, liquid, or aquatic. It revisits Ingarden’s physiological explanations of partially-open systems by way of the bilateral excretion and absorption of semi-permeable cellular membranes. The importance he eventually grants to inner secretion is considered alongside perspiration and salivation collateral to skin and membranes. It suggests that Ingarden’s interest in thermoregulation, partial permeation, and secretion invites alternative conceptions of temporal consciousness in physiological experiences beyond sequential and linear clock-time and/or Kantian intuition. Temporality experienced as temperance becomes discernible at a permeable point in which the sedimentation of Husserl, the maturation of Marion, and the fluidity and secretion of Ingarden mix and mingle into the taste of time.

Keywords: sensation, biochemistry, wine, temperance, systems theory

1 This study is a part of the research project “Christianity after Christendom: Paradoxes of Theological Turns in Contemporary Culture,” Univerzita Karlova, Praha, PRIMUS/ HUM/23.
All of one nature, of one substance bred,  
Did lately meet in the intestine shock [...]  
~ Henry IV, Pt. 1

[...] a persistent object remains as identically the same in the incessantly new instants of time for as long as it exists. If we find something new in it in the newly incipient instants of time, it is either processes that are existentially interconnected with it, which sometimes — as we say — play *oue* in its innards [Innern][...]

~ Ingarden

**Gustative Allusions**

Burrowed within a startling digression on physiology, Ingarden draws attention to delimited human experience and optical selectivity.

[O]nly a quite restricted part of the spectrum of electromagnetic waves (or photons) can set off photochemical reactions in the eye which are accompanied by the phenomena of light and color, whereas no such phenomena occur outside of this region of waves. Perhaps there are corresponding *chemical processes* of the eye also for other wavelengths. But they are somehow mute or blind, and therefore procure for us no information. One could say that the eye is structured in such a way that it is isolated or shielded from the outside world in this respect.

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2 Act 1, Sc. 1, lines 11-12.

3 Roman Ingarden, *Controversy Over the Existence of the World*, vol. 1, trans. Arthur Szylewicz (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2013), 252. This essay endeavors to attend not only to the innards of any presumed persistent object but also to the innards of any "we" that might "find something new in it."

The sensory lifeform “has only a certain definite selection of sensations”5 shielded from “a tumult of data.”6 Data would otherwise overwhelm and debilitate. There’s an almost automatic attunement. The human “possesses only a very limited number of variously attuned sense organs that are not adapted to all the modalities of the processes which are continually impinging on, and perhaps even penetrating, [one’s] body.”7

[T]he human body feels [its] body from within, and thereby feels […] this way or that […]. A new, noteworthy, selection is thereby carried out […] a selection from all the possible data which could reach us, but do not in fact do so. Of the ‘normal’ processes of our body [in unserem Leibe], we (luckily) experience nothing at all, for example, of the diverse chemical digestive processes [über die mannigfachen chemischen Verdauungsprozesse (gucklicherweise) gar nichts.]8

A happy fate of natural selection is gustatory adumbration. Its sensory information is shielded from digestive processes. Luckily, experience is spared digestive disgust. The word ‘taste’ is not mentioned. Neither gustation nor disgust is explicit. Yet the enthymematic punchline would be something akin to: thank god we don’t taste digestion. Luckily, we don’t chemically experience digestion.9 We happily don’t taste with our intestines.

5 Idem, Man and Value, 93.
6 Ibid., 94; italics added.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid., 95; idem Über die Verantwortung: Ihre ontischen Fundamente (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1970), 87; italics added. (Such sensory selectivity is not limited only to human lifeforms.)
9 Colloquially, digestion is often considered to begin once acid-chyme enters the duodenum into the stomach. But the nearly instantaneous sweetness tasted upon placing starch or bread in the mouth is also the result of digestive enzymes (e.g., maltase or amylase) secreted by and within the oral cavity in the presence of complex carbohydrates. These are broken down into simpler sugars prior even to being swallowed. It is worth considering that gustation necessarily entails some such experiential valence of ‘digestion,’ as such. There is perhaps no gustative experience exclusively distinct from such “chemical digestive processes.” One might amend Ingarden’s happy/lucky [glücklicher] physiology with a counter-joke: Luckily, we experience diverse chemical digestive processes otherwise gustation might experience nothing at all.
This is a witty employment of comic repugnance to stimulate a snickering sigh of relief. If wit is at play, Freud would draw attention to what remains unspoken: [b] the "the repressed element" to which it only alludes, which he insists is entangled in [a] the motive for telling it. This paper endeavors to consider the possible experiential and phenomenological relationships between the two.

The excluded element is explicit: [b] gustatory experience. In the ethical scope from which it is excluded, one possible motive for Ingarden is [a] to radically reconsider the experience of time, necessary for critical understandings of freedom and responsibility: "There is no duration of that which belongs to the now, and in fact, there is no 'duration' (at all) [...]". "Strangely enough, the succession of past, present, and future would not be meticulously correct, no matter how inclined one would be to so order [...] factual matters." 11

Mary Roach states what Ingarden leaves unstated about the untasted. Gustatory receptors do persist throughout the intestinal lining. She further attests to the luck of selective gustation: "It may seem odd to think of tasting without any perceptive experience, but you may be doing it right now. Humans have taste receptor cells in the gut [...] but only the tongue's receptors report to the brain [...] otherwise you'd be tasting things like bile and pancreatic enzymes." 13 Such tastes of bile Ingarden suggests we are lucky to be spared. Roach encroaches upon time, too. This "odd" imperceptive "tasting" is simultaneously associated with an experience of "right now."

10 "Anyone would laugh if we were to suggest that one do" something likely impossible, e.g., if instructed to turn one's attention exclusively to conscious experience or psychic states, while reading or spectating the performance of a literary work. Ingarden can only laugh at such unrealistic control of "inner perception" [Innewerken], Idem, Work of Art, 336.

11 "The idea occurring [...] must be in the nature of an allusion to the repressed element, like a representation of it in indirect speech [...] analogous [...] to the technique of making jokes [...] a remark which seems at first sight strangely inappropriate and irrelevant, but which we recognize a moment later as an allusion [...] and as a perfect substitute for it. We [...] must stress the identity of the motive for the joke and for the idea," Sigmund Freud, Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, trans. James Strachey (New York: W.W Norton & Company, 1965), 48-9, "Lecture 3."

12 Ingarden, Man and Value, 107, 109; italics added.

Regarding the alleged motive [a], in §5 of “Man and Time” (1937, in Polish), Ingarden makes a derivative break with Kantian temporality.

[Time] is a derivative phenomenon, dependent on the behavior of the human person and, more generally, of what exists [...] [Time] would then certainly not be, as Kant, for example, would have it, a pure form of experience, but a certain real force [...] within the realm of what is actual [...]. It would not and could not be something separate, alongside of what exists in the actual world; it would be something which settles over what exists [co osadza się na tym], [...] and which at the same time comprehends it in some peculiar way so that what exists is in time.14

Already in the late 1930s, Ingarden approaches behavior ethics as he encroaches on misshapen time-consciousness. The matter is far from settled and continues to develop with and in his ethical writings. Time depends on us in more than one way (and not only us). First, it derives itself from us as a locale or medium over or on which to settle itself. Second, existence and its existents are parts of the matter from which time derives its sediment by which to settle, at all. What exists is in time because time settles over it. Time settles. Humans are settled-over. Time persists by be-settling over existents/existence.

The root of to settle [osadzać] is osad(a), the Polish noun for settlement and sediment. It invokes Husserl’s pejorative usage of “sedimentation” as entrapment of human being/thinking in the natural, empirical, or scientific attitude. But sedimentation is not always negative in Husserl. The term is ambivalent (further attesting to Derrida’s critique of Husserl’s “serene usage of [...] concepts”).15 “At first glance, [it is] dealt with by Husserl as a largely negative phenomenon [...] [but] sedimentation could also be taken as a positive image [...] [it] makes communication possible.”16

14 Ingarden, Man and Value, 50; idem, Książeczka o człowieku (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1987), 67; italics of “settles over what exists” added, all other italics Ingarden’s.
Sedimentary promise—beyond its negative usage—perhaps comes about as the settling of Ingarden is compared with the sediment of Jean-Luc Marion (and vice versa). In Chapter 2 of *God Without Being*, Marion explains the difference between ontic encounters of idols and ontological experiences with icons. When humanity experiences the world under the delimitations of Kantian epistemology, it is restricted to a 'world' of mere objects and things. This freezes one's gaze, fixes one's position, and petrifies experience (i.e., negative Husserlian sedimentation). Stranded in a realm of objectivity, humans also are constituted as mere things, just another idol in an inclemency of idols.

On this level of thinghood, time is misconceived and not experienced at all. Marion describes it through oenological phenomenality.

As the *sediment in a wine* indicates *maturation* and a fact that no further change is possible, so the idol constitutes only a *sedimentation* of the aim of the invisible [i.e., seeing beyond the intuition of ontic optics], hence [ontic sediment is all that] remains once the aim is stopped.

As sediment, time is an "epoch," for Marion. He further suggests such 'maturation' may yet incite us to evoke for ourselves the experience of which it remains the sediment.19

This is an oenological reiteration of Ingarden's selective digestion. "Sediment" performs in Marion as undigested acid-chyme during digestion, from which experience is shielded by selective sensation. "Wine" functions in the former as "time" functions in the latter. Over time, the *ontological distinction* maturates into *oenological discernment*. What Marion calls "maturation" is another name for what, in Ingarden, "settles over" existence.

Without the possibilities of gustation, the phenomena of time, maturation, and the experiences under discussion would remain incomprehensible. Humans are to epochal time and thinghood as wine is to its sediment. Any human experience beyond sedimentation can only be discerned in the differ-

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17 As such it is not a 'world' at all.
19 Ibid., 28.
ence between wine and its sediment. It seems that only gustatory experience could discern the crucial difference between the two. Faint hints of taste are tacitly alluded to be at play in possible experiences beyond sedimentation.

Supplementary to static sediment and inactive sedimentation, Ingarden suggests an ecstatic and active settling. He writes not of sediment but of a mode of settling. Any sediment to be found in Ingarden would still be derivative. Only a derived sediment may then settle over that from which it derived. Time sediments itself by deriving its sediment from existence, making possible a strange comprehensibility of time as existence in time. Prior to identifying its settling-over, time was perhaps fixed and static (in Marion’s sense) and therefore incomprehensible. The sediment (time), the settled-over (us/existence), and the settling (humans in time) become conceivable. To misconceive them as separated or indemnified from each other is overcome by some degree of discernment. (This would be an experience of permeation, further discerned as Ingarden describes the physiology of semi-permeable membranes, below).

Awash in Water

Marion’s discussion turns from wine into water. He describes the move beyond sedimentation in aquatic terms. “The fact that [sedimentation] registers, as a low water-mark signals a rise in the water level, a certain advance of the aim [i.e., phenomenological experience].”

Ingarden is also adrift in a cryptic clepsydra. Liquid flow and water are tropes for defective conceptions of time. Aquatic time (time as water) is not yet derivative. It remains separated from (or merely alongside) human existence. As water, it remains neutral, ineffective, and non-derivative. Such metaphysical idealization of water as pure or neutral is an almost indiscernible leitmotif firmly embedded in the history of philosophy, whose tributaries through the tradition trace back at least to Aristotle attributing an experiential zero-degree to water as tasteless (achumos).
In “Man and Time,” Ingarden describes time as a gushing flow of some ideal unnamed liquid: “it can do nothing to me myself; it washes over me, as it were, leaves me undisturbed.” Time washing over oneself is a phantasmal time incapable of derivation. “It is as if all changes wash over [the world], as if there were no time, as if it were some phantom [...] Furthermore: I apprehend myself and my environment to be such.” This low water-mark of my environment marks the emergence of an under-developed Umwelt into defective and non-derivative experiences of time. The misconception of one tangentially contaminates a misconception of the other. The washing-over of non-derivative time all but drowns one in a non-experiential environment un-worlding the world. He flows on: “I also live in an almost constant orientation toward the future. I continually somehow plunge into it.”

It becomes properly aquatic, by name, in §5: “time, despite all the changes which it evokes in me, can do nothing to me, is powerless [...] runs over me like water.” Aquatic time running over me remains as separated, impermeable, and non-derivative as his previous description of its washing over me. In §9, responsibility requires that we transcend purity: “we have to insist that in determining the conditions for the possibility of responsibility we transcend the sphere of pure consciousness and of the pure ego [...]”

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22 Ingarden, *Man and Value*, 35; italics of “washes over” added.

23 Ibid., 36.


25 Ingarden, *Man and Value*, 57; italics added.

26 Ibid., 48; italics added.
All theories which reduce the person to manifolds of pure experiences are insufficient [...]". This would apply no less to ego or consciousness than the aquatic water in which it finds itself awash and sedimented.

Non-derivative time can only function as purified water. A misunderstanding of water supports, misleads, and even determines a misunderstanding of time. Pure and impermeable water leads thinking astray into idealist (perhaps idolatrous, in Marion) misapprehensions of oneself as pure ego, pure consciousness, and pure experience. The very foundation of such purity is an antiquated adherence to an impenetrable metaphysics sedimented upon an impermeable law of identity.

**Physiology of Partially-Open Systems**

The key to ethics is physiology. If phenomenology is to address ethical responsibility, it must become physiological. Phenomena experienced are ever received as physio-phenomena. Ingarden is driven to discern something that "has not been discerned." He returns to sensational shielding to introduce his complex understanding of partially-open systems:

"... the acting person (a whole which together with the body [Leib] forms a unity) must [...] consist of a relatively isolated system, and indeed of a very special kind of system. [...] The task of exactly working out the general form of such a system [...] has not been discerned thus far, and it has also not been surmised that here lies the key to the solution of the so-called problem of freedom."

It cannot of course be denied that many concrete factual states have been empirically discovered and investigated [...] but for various reasons this still did not lead to an understanding of the gradually evolving problem.

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27 Ibid., 84; italics added.
28 Ibid., 85.
29 Ibid., 85-6.
[...] But the general concept of a relatively (partially) open, and likewise shielded, isolated, system was not arrived at even on the basis of these countless, practically realized cases. So the organism, and subsequently the human being, could also not be conceived and considered under this aspect.\(^{30}\)

Selective sensation becomes an insensitivity through protective endeavors in which one must "be open and receptive [...] and at the same time protected and insensitive [...]".\(^{31}\)

He begins sweating as he discerns water, suggesting a derivative experience of water no longer "separated" from 'doing anything to me myself.' "Small quantities of water," he writes, "are also allowed to pass through the skin into the interior [innards] of the body, although for the most part it is kept out. On the other hand, perspiration gets out through orifices of the skin. Water and various chemical substances leave the organism through the skin with perspiration."\(^{32}\) Though he does not mention the word, he is describing the physico-chemical process of osmosis (perhaps, absorption) to further explain its contrary physiological process as perspiration.

This process of "selective migration [...] of chemical substances" is specifically discernible in the "digestive system, especially the stomach and intestines," "blood flow," "fat and muscle," and the body's "thermal isolation from outside temperatures."\(^{33}\) Ingarden has temperance\(^{34}\) on his mind, not only because of this engagement with "temperatures."

More importantly, this whole line of inquiry was initiated by grappling with temporality. This is a physiological conception of time. After Ingarden, perhaps temp-orality is temp-orality (as "Der Ab-grund ist der Ab-grund," for Heidegger).\(^{35}\)

\(^{30}\) Ibid., 86; idem, Über die Verantwortung, 68-70; italics added.

\(^{31}\) Ibid., Man and Value, 85.

\(^{32}\) Ibid., 91; italics added.

\(^{33}\) Ibid.; italics added.

\(^{34}\) Cf. Serres, Five Senses, 159.

At the same time each of these [physiological] systems is distinguished by being located in some sack, in some covering [...] which segregates it from other systems and which simultaneously exercises the same function in every system: on the one hand it protects the system from certain strictly defined influences [...] however, it permits [...] outside influences to encroach into the interior of the system, and it allows certain processes taking place in its interior to pass outside into certain other systems of the body. At the same time, the covering allows certain select substances to penetrate into the system, as well as allowing these or other substances to leave the system. The covering is like a sieve [Sieb] which is differently permeable in one direction than another [...] there occurs everywhere a definite selection of influences affecting the system or of substances getting into it, as well as a selection of forces and substances leaving the system.

This is a masterpiece of writing unable to cover up the very performance of its own struggles. Simultaneity keeps encroaching.

The bilateral is collateral. "All of this is made possible only because [...] these systems are not closed off from each other, but are partially open and partially shielded." Ingarden describes the same bilateral permeation process three times in succession (if 'succession' is still thinkable, at all). Each intrusion makes possible an expulsion. Just as the idealistic misconception of separation is complicit in the misconception of time, so is any system of protection utterly assumed indemnified from exterior influences.

**Insubordination & Inner Secretion**

Ingarden gives a "systematic structure of some higher organism," primarily the overall 'sustenance system,' composed of and ordered into four essential systems (motor-skeletal, material exchange, regulatory, and infor-
mation), which are further subdivided into the "partial systems" of each. He emphasizes that ordering is important: "each of these systems [...] is superordinate with respect to the lower systems which work together and make possible the function of the immediately higher systems." In the most subordinate of these four systems (information), is found the partial system of the empirical "external senses." The most subordinate of these five is where one finds what is perhaps Ingarden's only direct gesture and attention to gustation, referred to as the "Geschmacksystem," translated as "gustatory system." Amidst the lowest of the low - within a descending order of relevance - the most subordinate of the empirical senses (themselves merely part of the most subordinate system of the overall sustenance system), placement is given to gustation.

But a few pages later he has second thoughts. Considering the "mutual equilibrium" of the systems maintained by a supposedly superordinate circulatory system - focused specifically on "blood circulation" - Ingarden momentarily reconsiders that, "it may be a point of contention as to which of [the systems] is subordinate to the other." In a flash, he suggests, "perhaps the entire system of glands of inner secretion [...] play[s] a superordinate role with respect to the other systems." Inner secretion disturbs the system. A microcosmic glandular system secretes over the entire sustenance system that is the living-body (not unlike a macrocosmic time settles over all existence).

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39 Ibid., 90.
40 Ibid., 89; idem, Über die Verantwortung, 76. Translating Geschmack as "gustatory" is somewhat tendentious. It is not the German verb, schmecken, that derives from the Greco-Latin, gustus or gusto, but rather the more idiomatic kosten.
42 Cf. Ingarden, Work of Art, 283.
43 Idem, Man and Value, 92; italics added.
44 Cf. Novalis: “THEORY OF HUMAN RELATIONS. As we are still currently a foreign stimulus for Nature, our contact with her is also only temporal. She gradually secretes us again – Perhaps it is a reciprocal secretion.” Novalis, Notes for a Romantic Encyclopedia: Das Allgemeine Brouillon, trans. David W. Wood (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007), 12.
By all indications, Ingarden considers this insubordinate “system of inner secretion” to be the pituitary and adrenal glands. But there are two other noteworthy glandular secretion systems lurking within the overall system that arguably already superordinate it. The one which receives most of Ingarden’s attention belongs to “the excretory system” that we have already encountered: “perspiratory glands in the skin [Schweißdrüsen in der Haut; gruczoły potowe w skórze].”

This vestigial addendum, “in the skin” to the “perspiratory system” draws attention. He adds no such rejoinder that would correspond to the second glandular secretion system at play in the regulatory system, i.e., salivation. As the gamma [γ] subsystem of the “oral cavity [Mundhöle],” supposedly superordinated by the “palate [Gaumen]” and teeth, Ingarden innocuously lists it as “salivary glands, etc. [Speicheldrüsen usw.; ślinczki itd.].”

The perspiratory system may well be an inner glandular system of secretion (“in” the skin). But it mainly excretes (and absorbs only minute traces of water within). It does not seem to be what Ingarden categorizes as a glandular system of inner secretion. Salivary glands are different. Ingarden initially categorizes them within the partial “system of nourishment.” The oral cavity, of which it is part, is followed by the esophagus, stomach, and intestinal system. It is listed merely as an entry port on its way to the colloquial digestive system (which Ingarden astutely distinguishes as the “intestinal system”). Whereas he initially explained the partial, yet still bilateral, sieve-like function of perspiration in terms of skin, he transitions to digestion to further develop sieve-like skin in terms of a “membrane” [Zverchfelle].

Note his stepwise order of progression. He makes use of a lifeless and worldless sieve (90) to move on to explaining skin. He makes use of skin (considerably, but not completely, lifeless) to move on to explaining membranes. He makes use of membranes, specifically their partial permeability.

45 Ingarden, Man and Value, 88-9; idem, Über die Verantwortung, 75; idem, Księżecka, 130; emphasis added.

46 Idem, Man and Value, 88; idem, Über die Verantwortung, 75; idem, Księżecka, 129; emphasis added.

47 Idem, Man and Value, 91 [top].
at play in digestion,\textsuperscript{48} to move on to explaining neuroscience, consciousness, and even reevaluating "the entire system of glands of inner secretion" as the insubordinate subsystem that subverts the system itself.\textsuperscript{49} Perspiration is merely a propaedeutic for digestion as skin is simply a propaedeutic for membranes. In membranes, permeation becomes more permeable than skin seems to allow. Once the function of membranes is introduced in digestion, he will invoke them even in his explanation of neurology and the nervous system: "the entire nerve apparatus [...] is highly [...] shielded from the remaining parts of the body by membranes [...]".\textsuperscript{50}

\textbf{Mucosal Membranes}

The secret of secretion is membrane permeation, the partial permeability of organic membranes. Ingarden suggests them even in the mysterious deep sensation \textit{[Empfindungen]}: "Although they are shielded by membranes, they are subject to various affectations such as electromagnetic waves [...]".\textsuperscript{51} By this point, "something entirely heterogenous appears" (smacking of Husserlian \textit{Leiblichkeit}), "a cognizance \textit{[Wissen]} of this 'sensation'"\textsuperscript{52} that he describes as "the threshold of consciousness \textit{[Bewu\ss{t}seinpforte]}".\textsuperscript{53}

Perspiration is exceptional in the living supersystem in more ways than one. Ingarden initially identifies the selective bilateral permeability in the perspiratory glands. He accordingly lists them \textit{twice} amongst the partial subsystems of the overall composite "super-system" of living sustenance. Though several overlapping functions of the subsystems may be inferred (correctly so), \textit{only} the "perspiratory glands" are listed twice in two of the four distinct super-ordinate systems of sustenance (i.e., both 'material exchange' and 'regulatory' systems). Sweating excretes in the former and

\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., 91 [bottom].
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., 92.
\textsuperscript{50} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., 93.
\textsuperscript{52} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{53} Ibid., 95.
regulates temperature in the latter. These two placements are symptomatic of the two selective and bilateral movements of excretion (out) and absorption (in). It is because they perform partial or relative separation that they find themselves listed separately in separation from their two functions. (Before the development of perspiratory glands, animals simply licked themselves to cool off. Salivation is — or was — proto-perspiration acclimated to clemency, temperance, and temperature.)

Instead of perspiration, one might expect salivation to be listed twice in the system. This arguably does occur (though not by name) at a place of indistinction between the salivary glands and the gustatory system. That place is the tongue (both its exterior and its interior).

Gustation and salivation function in cooperation. Neither occurs without the other. Gustation is a complex inversion of perspiration. Whereas perspiration primarily secretes and excretes, gustation primarily absorbs. Gustatory experience is perhaps nothing but the dissolution and absorption of tastants. But as much as gustation absorbs, its equi-ordinate and simultaneous salivation also primarily secretes a myriad of fluids.

Once gustation is considered inseparable from salivation, determining if it/they take part in Ingarden’s “system of inner secretion” becomes more discernible. Salivation is found to participate in inner secretion55

54 Ibid., 88-9.
55 A study published in 2010 suggests that (in addition to saliva—which already contains digestive enzymes—secreted into the oral cavity during the process of gustation, the taste buds, themselves, produce and secrete endocrine hormones; namely cholecystokinin (CCK), neuropeptide-Y (NPY), and glucagen-like peptide-1 (GLP-1). All three, the study claims, “are also produced locally in the taste buds […] are present or are known to have effects within the gustatory system [playing] roles […] in taste signaling” (Yu-Kwong Shin, and Josephine M. Egan, “Roles of Hormones in Taste Signaling,” in Sensory and Metabolic Control of Energy Balance, eds. Wolfgang Meyerhof, Ulrike Beisiegel, and Hans Georg Joost (Berlin: Springer, 2010), 115, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-14426-4_10). All three of these hormones play a role in digestion. CCK and GLP-1 are primarily secreted by the intestinal system (CCK in the duodenum). NYP is secreted by the pancreas during metabolism. But NYP is very diffusive and is perhaps a perfect testament to Ingarden’s superordinate inner secretion. The highest concentration of it in the human body is synthesized by the hypothalamus “in the brain,” at the threshold of Ingarden’s “threshold-of-consciousness-system.” It is also secreted by the nervous and “sympathetic systems” not only to regulate appetite, but further stimulates synthesis of substances within the
(even if perspiration does not). Hormones secreted in gustation not only embody Ingarden’s conception of partially-open systems, they collaterally confirm his suspicion of the superordination of inner secretion. Salivation permeates our understanding of gustation, just as gustation permeates our experience of time (and vice versa). It is difficult to imagine a better embodiment of a partially-open permeable membrane than the mucosal lining of the tongue. The phenomenology of inner secretion discerns the very physiology of time-consciousness... that Ingarden can only evoke and discern, but cannot name. It is but a hair’s breadth away from what Meister Eckhart once called “a taste of time.”

**Bibliography**


Virgil W. Brower began teaching ethics to off-duty police officers at the Chicago Police Academy. He became a Full-Time Lecturer of Philosophy at Chicago State University where he taught logic, critical thinking, philosophy of law, comparative religion, and political science for over a decade. During his last years there he served as an administrator of the Honors College in which he taught humanities and the philosophy of science while coordinating their social outreach volunteer program. He holds two PhDs, the first in Comparative Literary Studies from Northwestern University and another in Theology & Ethics from the Chicago Theological Seminary. Based in the Department of Philosophy for the former, his research concentrated on practical ethics, philosophy of religion, modern philosophy, and phenomenology. In seminary he taught constructive theology, specializing in literary theory, liberation theologies, psychoanalysis, and political theology. Virgil is currently a Post-Doctoral Research Fellow of Theology & Contemporary Culture in the Faculty of Protestant Theology at Charles University in Prague and serves as coordinating Speaker of the Arbeitsgruppe Medienphilosophie at the Gesellschaft für Medienwissenschaft (GfM).
The papers collected in this volume vividly reflect the strikingly wide range of interests characterizing current research in phenomenology inspired by Roman Ingarden. One of Husserl’s closest and most devoted students, and at the same time one of his earliest and sharpest critics, Ingarden himself explored numerous fields of philosophy in considerable depth. While he remains best known for his groundbreaking work in aesthetics, ontology, and metaphysics, he also dealt extensively in ethics, epistemology, philosophical anthropology, and cognitive science, and his work was characterized throughout by a deep and abiding interest in the sciences and an unwavering respect for painstakingly thorough logical investigation. Issues from all of these areas of study provide the topics dealt with by the authors contributing to this volume. Several authors focus explicitly on historical matters, often casting surprising new light on the development of early phenomenology in general and of Ingarden’s own ‘realist’ phenomenology in particular. Other authors have concentrated instead on specific areas or particular topics of long-standing interest, such as the aesthetic experience, the philosophy of music, and artistic creation, while others have explored the relevance of Ingarden’s ontological and anthropological analyses to current research into everything from the interpretation of texts to the study of technological posthumanization. With contributions from both established experts and young scholars, this collection brings together three generations of researchers who share the same basic philosophical goals and methodology, yet exhibit noticeably distinct styles, making this collection not only accessible and topical but also unusually lively.