

10

Projectivism and Phenomenal Presence

Derek H. Brown

1. Preliminaries

I regard projectivism as a thesis about a kind of phenomenal presence, namely that we project subjective aspects of perception into what we experience as the world outside ourselves. It is minimally familiar from various phantom pains, afterimages, and hallucinations. Views like sense-datum theory arguably assert a more global, Strong Projectivism: all perceptual experiences involve and only involve direct awareness of projected elements. Strong Projectivism is an unpopular and I argue underappreciated variety of intentionalism. It straightforwardly explains the transparency of experience (section 2), and phenomena qualia theorists offer to avoid intentionalism, including blurry vision and spectrum inversion (section 3). Finally, projectivism illuminates residual qualia-friendly cases involving imagination and emotion (section 4). Although some cases may provide instances of non-projected, non-intentional aspects of experience, most do not. Thus, the notion of phenomenal presence drawn from projectivism does justice to a great many of the forces at play in debates surrounding qualia and intentionalism. We should bound toward Strong Projectivism.

I begin by sketching the relevant, somewhat complicated intellectual landscape.¹ This includes teasing out the relevant sense of intentionalism (section 2), identifying some dimensions on which projectivists can vary (section 3), and articulating two relevant senses of ‘qualia’ (section 4). The upshot is that phenomenal projectivism is a qualia view in that it posits awareness of subjective features in perception, but it is an intentionalist view in that these subjective features are experienced as features of perceptual objects. Importantly, it departs from influential versions of qualia theory and intentionalism because of this combination of commitments. Spelling this out is the aim of this section. Subsequent sections are focused on the many merits of holding

¹ The core idea of this chapter is inspired by Brown (2010), though the present work has a much broader scope.

both of these commitments, particularly in comparison with the more influential qualia and intentionalist views. More hurried readers may move straight to section 2. To manage length I presuppose some familiarity with the literature and at times simply stipulate definitions on the presumption that their worth will emerge through their applications in sections 2–4. Note that I am primarily concerned with perception, and only derivatively with bodily sensation, imagination, pure thought, et cetera. As such, my terminology is not intended to implicitly generalize across these domains (see esp. section 4).

1.1 *Intentionality*

Intentionality, most broadly the capacity for mental states to be about something, is central to our discussion. Unfortunately, as is well-known, there is no agreed account of the notion, despite its importance to the theory of mind. One can build a conception of intentionality around semantic notions like satisfaction, metaphysical notions like causal-covariation, and so on. I will not wade into these waters. Ours is a discussion about the relation between perceptual intentionality and perceptual experience or phenomenology. As such, what is most important is that the conception of intentionality I presuppose bears direct connections to perceptual experience. Here is how I understand the idea:

Perceptual intentionality: Intentional elements² of perceptual experience are either objects of experience, experienced features of those objects, or features or objects that are preanalytically experienced as outside the self.

I hope the reader grants that this characterization of intentionality has adequate intuitive appeal to work with. Some remarks are in order. What counts as an object of a perceptual experience is notoriously difficult to settle, and hence so too are what count as features of those objects. Our reaction should not be to jettison talk of objects of experience and their features, it should be to tread carefully. I seek to do so.³

By hypothesis perception facilitates knowledge of the environment outside the self—the external world. Characterizations of perceptual intentionality should make reference to this fact, and when such a characterization is specifically formulated to connect to experience, as ours is, the result is that intentionality involves features or objects that are experienced as outside the self. More specifically, I utilize *preanalytically experienced* to indicate that (a) there is reasonable agreement within common sense about what is experienced as outside oneself, but (b) when theoreticians enter the discussion to determine what *is* outside the self, agreement dissipates. Thus, experienced features that common sense roughly regards as outside the self are intentional

² I will generally use the term ‘elements’ to cover objects, properties, facts, etc.

³ At some points readers may wish me incorporate the distinction between direct or immediate perceptual experience and indirect or mediate experience into the discussion. Unless otherwise stated, when I speak of experienced features and objects in perception I intend directly or immediately experienced features and objects. Those who wish to avoid the distinction can do so at will. I will return to this theme at a few points, but wish to broadly keep it in the background.

features, in some legitimate sense of the term. Whether, post-analysis, these features are regarded as outside the self is another matter. Colours are a fine example of such features. They are reasonably regarded as intentional because they are experienced, preanalytically, as features of perceptual objects and as in the world outside ourselves. It does not follow that colours are in the objective world or are features instantiated by any objects. For example, should they turn out to be mental properties (narrowly construed) or to not be instantiated by anything they do not thereby stop being intentional features of perceptual experience in the above sense. Instead, our conception of perceptual intentionality should accommodate this possible outcome. I appreciate that some readers will diverge from me on this point. For the present work, I rest content with making this commitment explicit. I revisit this issue directly in section 2 and implicitly throughout.

I take perceptual intentionality to be in theory achievable via representation or acquaintance (i.e. presentation). I take both notions to be legitimate, and see no need to take a stand on the issue.⁴ As a result my characterization of intentionality makes no essential appeal to a notion like *content*. Instead, what is of interest is the broad relation between intentionality and perceptual phenomenology, and in particular:

Intentionalism: The phenomenal aspects of perception are identical to the intentional elements of perception or at least to a subset of them.⁵

⁴ For the unfamiliar reader, the distinction between representation and acquaintance is most fundamentally about the distinction between two forms of intentionality or means by which something like a mind can be in a state that is *about* something. For simplicity consider perceptions of our world. For an agent *S* to be in a perceptual state that is about some object *a* in our world by virtue of *representation*, *S*'s state must have truth- or accuracy-conditions regarding *a*. A familiar means of explicating this is to say that *S*'s state expresses a *content* (e.g. proposition) that says something about *a*, where what it says is accurate of *a* to some degree or other. Perceptual acquaintance is designed to be more basic than this in that no appeal to contents about *a* (or accuracy-conditions generally) is made. Thus, for *S* to be acquainted with *a* is for *S* to be in a state that is about *a simpliciter*. The intentional state is constituted by *S*'s awareness of *a*. There is thus no conceptual space for this form of intentional state to deviate from its object, no space for the state to be accurate, to some degree or other, of *a*. Instead, what contents about *a* (if any) are licensed by virtue of being acquainted with *a* is left open for discussion, but any that are licensed are formulated by representing *a*, and hence by appeal to a distinct intentional mechanism. In this sense, Russell (1912), Campbell (2002), Brewer (2011), and Gupta (2012) among others take some form of acquaintance to be the core of, if not definitive of, perceptual intentionality. By contrast Dretske (1995), Tye (1995, 2000), Byrne (2001), Stoljar (2004), Hill (2009), and Siegel (2010) among others take some form of representation to be central to perceptual intentionality. With regard to the latter group, in some cases these authors believe that there isn't a significant distinction to be made between representation and acquaintance/presentation in this context. Thus, for example, Stoljar (2004: 356, n.17) regards 'presentation' as a "stylistic alternative" to 'representation', Byrne (2001) regards 'acquaintance' as a form of 'representation', and Siegel (2010) argues that all presentational theories of intentionality are representational. I respectfully disagree. However, I will speak throughout of *intentionality* and intend to remain mute on whether that involves representation, acquaintance, or some combination of the two. For the record, my personal leanings are toward a dual-component view that recognizes both acquaintance and represented contents in perceptual experience (see, e.g. Price 1932; Brown 2012; Schellenberg 2014).

⁵ Some (e.g. Byrne 2001) have argued that to characterize Intentionalism we should hold that phenomenology *supervenes* on intentional elements, a much weaker claim. Some disagree (e.g. Pautz 2009). I side with the latter, though these issues are largely tangential to this discussion.

In theory intentional elements can bear various relations to the mind. They can be mind-independent or *objective*, that is, exist (or be instantiated) regardless of the presence of minds. They can be *mental*, that is, require for their existence only that a mind is in an appropriate state. They can be mind&world-dependent, that is, require for their existence both that a mind and some extra-mental objective factor be in an appropriate state. I stipulate that *subjective* items are mental or mind&world-dependent, and *qualia* are subjective experienced features. That said, our primary focus will be on the contrast between mental and objective elements. For simplicity, the role of mind&world-dependent ones will be left in the background.

Many contemporary Intentionalists are interested in defending the objectivity of intentional elements (see, e.g. the cited works by Dretske, Tye, Byrne, Hill, etc.). This is primarily what I have in mind when I speak of Harman–Tye representationalism in what follows.⁶ Historically, sense-datum theory (SDT) is arguably the most well-known view that combines the intentionality of perceptual phenomenology with subjective intentional elements. For simplicity, I suppose sense-data are mental objects. According to SDT, phenomenal features are features of sense-data and sense-data are by definition the primary objects of perceptual experience. Thus, phenomenal features are intentional features, despite them being mental. That SDT is in this sense an Intentionalist view is, I presume, not a novel point.

1.2 Projectivism

I also suppose that sense-data are, in general, preanalytically experienced as outside oneself. Sense-datum theorists arguably hold that when I open my eyes some familiar objects and properties are presented to me, in what I take to be the world outside myself. Unfortunately, these objects and properties, while they exist and are instantiated, are not outside myself. They are instead mental. Sense-data, the primary objects of perception, are perceived things we have been preanalytically supposing to be outside ourselves in the extra-mental world that surrounds us. Thus a pervasive, systematic error is contained in our common-sense or preanalytic conception of the nature of perception.⁷

One general way of characterizing this defect is via a notion of *projection*, a hypothesized capacity of perceivers (or perceptual minds) to project (or place or locate) perceptual elements into where we typically regard the extra-mental world to be, despite those specific elements not being in the extra-mental world. Defeasible evidence for such a capacity can for example be drawn from afterimages that are experienced as on the wall before one, phantom limb pains/itches experienced as where one's

⁶ In addition Harman–Tye representationalism is characterized by a commitment to intentionality being achieved via representation, and typically to experiential error being explained by a notion of *unsatisfied contents*. These issues must be largely set aside (see below for a brief commentary). We connect the view to the transparency of experience in sections 2 and 3.

⁷ There is a substantive question about whether this error is learned, innate, can be overcome, etc. I suspect that if SDT is true, the error is learned early and can be overcome but only with considerable effort. I regretfully cannot discuss the matter here.

arm used to be, auditory hallucinations experienced as coming from the next room, flickering dots on the Hermann grid that are experienced as on the (non-focal) grid intersections, and so on. These kinds of cases—i.e. familiar instances of perceptual illusions and hallucinations in which subjects experience elements to be in the extra-mental world that are not in that world—are widespread and demand that our perceptual theories contain some kind of projective mechanism. Our debate should thus be over what kind of projectivism we should endorse.

There is a fairly innocuous sense of ‘projection’ that can be employed whenever epistemic agents take things to be ways they are in fact not. In such circumstances subjects can be said to *project* into the world their own constructions of features, objects, and facts. ‘Projection’ in this sense is roughly synonymous with ‘error’. Importantly, this sense of ‘projection’ places no obvious constraints on phenomenology in general or on perceptual phenomenology. Thus when an eliminativist about some class of properties (e.g. secondary qualities) says that in perception we mistakenly project them into the world, nothing has as yet been said about how this projection might be experienced by subjects.

Egan (2010) argues for a sense of ‘projection’ that roughly means ‘self-involving’ and is drawn from the logic and metaphysics of centred-worlds. It occurs for example when one represents an object as one metre in front of oneself, where reference to at least one’s location relative to that object is presumed essential to characterizing that representational content. This sense of ‘projection’ obviously does not entail error. Further, its constraints are directly on perceptual content, and only indirectly on perceptual phenomenology.⁸

By contrast to the error and self-involving senses of ‘projection’, the topic of this collection demands a focus precisely on how to understand projection in terms of phenomenology. Thus, if in perception one projects some property into the world, in what way, if at all, is this manifest or present in the phenomenology of her perception? In what way does this connect to phenomenal presence? I propose the following:

Phenomenal projection: if in perception one projects some element (i.e. property, object, etc.) into the world, one preanalytically experiences that element as being outside oneself despite it not being there.

This is what I will mean by ‘projection’ in what follows. For simplicity I presume the following, noting that there is plenty of room for debate. Projected elements, when

⁸ Let me briefly explain. When Egan applies this notion to fine-grained colour representation, he proposes that when a subject perceptually represents chip 17 to be unique blue or simply *B*, that representation “determines a self-locating correctness condition: the set *S* including all and only those predicaments whose inhabitants are disposed to get *B* sensations from chip 17 in normal viewing conditions” (2010: 88). This is a sophisticated way of characterizing the content that (perhaps) we should ascribe to such perceptual states when, for example, we are concerned with how a subject’s “behavioral and cognitive effects are best modeled” (94). The impact on colour phenomenology requires describing how subjects who “get *B* sensations from chip 17” experience those *B* sensations, and in particular experience them with regard to chip 17. Nothing about this issue immediately follows from Egan’s proposal.

present, are at least a subset of the phenomenal elements present to one in perception. Projected elements are constructed or produced by oneself (e.g. one's perceptual system), the objective world having at most a causal role in the occurrence of perceptual states that perform these constructions. It is mandated that preanalytic descriptions of projected elements as being 'outside oneself' are erroneous; descriptions formed following a successful analysis of projected experiences will remedy this. This is the *only* sense in which error is essential to projectivism as I construe it. I assume that by virtue of being preanalytically experienced as outside oneself, projected elements are experienced as objective or mind-independent, though they may in addition be experienced as bearing some relation to oneself (e.g. being in front of one). I also assume that projected elements are preanalytically experienced as actual: the phantom itch is, preanalytically, *there* or *real*, as are the Hermann grid dots. It follows by definition that projection is intentional. I take this to be a positive, intuitively plausible outcome.

This notion of projection arguably captures an idea that motivates traditional projectivists like Hume, when they provocatively claim that a mind "has a great propensity to spread itself on external objects" (1740: I.iii.XIV) or that we are actively "gilding and staining all natural objects with the colours..." (1751: 88).

Note that to this point nothing has been said about the scope or the metaphysical nature of projected elements, or the mechanisms that achieve projection. These factors yield dimensions along which one can locate varieties of projectivism.⁹

Regarding scope, a projectivist minimally believes that there are at least some projected elements in perceptual experience. A *Strong Projectivist* holds that all experienced elements in perception are projected.¹⁰ This is how I presume 'projectivism' is standardly understood. Those committed to some projected and some non-projected elements are *Weak Projectivists*. Since it is fairly compelling that projection occurs during at least some perceptual experiences (see above examples), Weak Projectivism is the lower bar in this discussion. Our debate concerns the extent to which we should move toward Strong Projectivism, and, if not, the extent to which we should not and what types of non-projective experiences fill this space.

To say that an experienced perceptual element is not projected can mean either that it is not experienced as outside oneself, or that it is experienced as outside oneself not because of projection but because it actually is in the objective world (and is experienced). The former kind of non-projected elements are non-intentional (by both definition¹¹ and I hope intuitive appeal), while the latter are intentional. This yields *Anti-Intentionalist Weak Projectivists* and *Intentionalist Weak Projectivists*, respectively.

⁹ An additional dimension concerns the relations between the phenomenally projected elements that are our focus and the more semantically driven ones of interest to Egan. This is a complicated matter that will be mostly untreated in what follows.

¹⁰ This is one place in which it is apt to incorporate the distinction between direct and indirect perception, and claim that the relevant projected elements are precisely the directly perceived elements.

¹¹ Technically, to be anti-intentionalist on my definition there must be experienced elements that are not experienced as outside the self and that are not experienced as perceptual objects or their features. For simplicity, I set this qualification aside.

For example, if one explains illusory and hallucinatory perceptions by reference to projected experiences, and takes veridical perceptions to only involve experiences of the objective world, then one would be an Intentionalist Weak Projectivist. In sections 2–4, I will argue that the overall best explanatory model is one that bounds toward Strong Projectivism.

Projectivism can be further divided into *literal* and *figurative* varieties (Shoemaker 1990, 1994). *Literal Projectivism* asserts that projected elements are literally or actually mental. For example, projected properties are not instantiated by external objects but are instantiated by our minds or mental objects (e.g. sense-data). *Figurative Projectivism* denies that projected elements are actual. For example, projected properties are not instantiated by any currently experienced objects in our world (setting aside, e.g. veridical hallucinations). Thus the literalist takes the projective error to be one of attributing to the *external* world something that is *internal*, and the figurativist takes the error to be one of attributing to some part of our *world* something that is not there.

The final issue for projectivism concerns how it is that projection is facilitated, the nature of the mechanisms that yield projective experience. Proposals will vary for example depending on where one falls on the other dimensions. I can only briefly comment on the matter here.

The above taxonomy yields a wealth of possible views. Of these I will select three for mention. First, SDT is a Literal Strong Projectivism. In this case the mechanism that achieves projection might consist of the capacity to construct a subjective experiential space and to construct sense-data and their properties in that space.

Second, Harman–Tye Representationalism is of course a kind of Intentionalism: all aspects of perceptual experiences consist of awareness of perceptual objects and their features (whether currently instantiated or not). Beyond this there is value in thinking of the view as a Figurative Weak Projectivism. While this view does not postulate projection during veridical perceptions, during non-veridical perceptions one can experience features to be in the external world that are not there (e.g. hallucinate a blue ball on the floor in front of one). This is most plausibly explained by reference to a subjective projective capacity. Since this capacity need not be active during veridical perceptions, the view is only committed to Weak Projectivism. The view is Figurative because the projected elements are explained by appeal to uninstantiated universals, nonexistent objects, and so on.¹²

The mechanism Harman–Tye Representationalism postulates to explain experience in all cases is *representation*, at times naturalized to some form of causal covariation (e.g. Tye 2000) or teleological function (e.g. Dretske 1995). It is worth emphasizing the tremendous work representation must perform to achieve an adequate explanation of figurative projective states, if only because of how quickly Literal Projectivism

¹² E.g. Tye (2014) reasserts his commitment to using uninstantiated universals to explain hallucinations.

is often banished in these discussions.¹³ Suppose for illustration that I hallucinate a very realistic looking blue round object next to my dog. (1) Representation must generate my perceptual experience of uninstantiated blueness and roundness, mysterious items which are not located in space and time, or are in Plato's heaven, or whatever. (2) Representation must prompt me to perceptually experience these universals as belonging to the same nonexistent object. Finally, (3) representation must prompt me to experience that object as persisting in objective space next to my dog. The Figurative Projectivist is not committed to the actual construction of projected elements, but there is nonetheless a considerably complex projective experiential state that must be explained. I remain unconvinced that a naturalized notion of representation, combined with appeal to uninstantiated universals, nonexistent objects, and the like, has to this point yielded an adequate explanation of the relevant phenomena. These concerns, however, are not my focus.

Third, on one reading Chalmers' (2006) Edenic view is a Figurative Strong Projectivism. According to Chalmers' two-stage view, "experiences have two layers of content, an Edenic content that reflects their phenomenology and a Fregean content that determines their veridicality" (93). Given our focus on phenomenology, the former is relevant. Edenic contents represent the world to contain *perfect* properties (e.g. colours) that are not actually instantiated in our world, but would be instantiated in a perfect world like Eden. Why think of this as a Figurative Strong Projectivism? Strong: perceptual experience is imbued with the Edenic layer of perceptual content, for example Edenic colours are ubiquitous in our visual lives. Figurative: Edenic colours are instantiated by things on Eden, but uninstantiated in our world. Projection: experienced Edenic colours are preanalytically experienced as in the world outside me, belonging to what I regard as Earthly objects—our experience is as if perfect Edenic colours are in our environment. Thus for our purposes the chief difference between the Edenic view and SDT concerns a disagreement about the Literal/Figurative dimension.

1.3 *Qualia realism*

We can, most broadly, think of qualia realists as believing that *qualia* (i.e. mental properties) are real (i.e. instantiated by our minds), and that this fact is revealed to us in our experiential lives, perhaps via some reflection. There are many forms of qualia realism, including a broad one that includes SDT. For example, Stoljar defines qualia views generally as views satisfying what he calls intrinsicness and directness (2004: 344). The former is the ontological requirement that these phenomenal features be mental or psychological features that are "intrinsic to experiences" and thus mental in my terminology (2004: 344). Directness is an epistemic requirement such that "if one's experience has it, one is in a position to apprehend this directly by introspection"

¹³ E.g. Tye dismisses both Strong Literal Projectivism (what he calls "projectivism") and SDT abruptly and with no substantive argument (2014: 50).

(2004: 344, italics removed). Although one could quibble over whether or not sense-data are apprehended through introspection (as opposed to perception), SDT arguably satisfies directness. And although one could quibble about what it means for features to be psychological, and ‘intrinsic to experiences,’ features of sense-data arguably satisfy at least the spirit of intrinsicness. In this rough sense SDT is a qualia view.

By contrast, sometimes qualia views are described as ‘non-intentional’ or ‘non-representational’ (e.g. Block 2003). This description creates a tension in the current work, for SDT emerges as non-intentional by virtue of being a qualia view, and intentional in the sense in which I have been using the term. The tension is resolvable by identifying two relevant explications of ‘(non-)intentional’. According to one explication, intentional experienced features are instantiated by objective perceived things whenever they are instantiated; non-intentional features are instantiated by mental things whenever they are instantiated. A SDT on which sense-data have (say) phenomenal colours and the objective world has nothing like these colours is non-intentionalist in this sense, and Harman–Tye representationalism and Chalmers’ Edenic view remain intentionalist in this sense.

Though this explication is legitimate and in many ways helpful, it is tangential to our purposes, for it ignores the respect in which projectivism and SDT are intentionalist views by breaking the link between intentionality and phenomenal presence that serves to focus this chapter.

The second explication of ‘intentional’ is the one with which we have been working and will continue to employ. This sense is wide enough to include not only the intentionality of Harman–Tye representationalism, but also of SDT and projectivism. It is to be contrasted with what Stoljar believes is the “dominant” contemporary form of qualia realism, what he calls the “Shoemaker-Block view” and I will simply call *Stoljar’s view* (2004: 351; see also Speaks 2014 for a more recent discussion). This view is committed to non-intentional aspects of perceptual experience that go beyond the resources made available by Projectivism and SDT (Stoljar 2004: 347, 349, respectively). What ‘non-intentional’ means here—the “crucial fact”—is that these experienced features “are not themselves properties of the objects that one is related to in having the experience” (351). It is fairly straightforward that this way of characterizing ‘non-intentional’ is at odds with the SDT and projectivist approaches to experience.

By being contrasted with SDT and projectivism, Stoljar’s anti-intentionalist view is committed to qualia impacting perceptual phenomenology differently than they do within SDT or projectivism. As a guiding thought, consider how the projectivist conceives of qualia, namely as features of mental states that are experienced as being outside oneself, for example as the phenomenal grey experienced on a filing cabinet (see Stoljar 2004: 347). Stoljar’s non-intentional qualia are not experienced in such a way. Thus, once the phenomenology of what is experienced as being outside the self is fixed, Stoljar’s non-intentional qualia remain unspecified, lest his view collapse into projectivism. Phenomenologically, non-intentional qualia must somehow outstrip what is fixed by settling what a perceiver experiences as being outside herself in the external world.

Where are these features experienced to be, and what relation do they experientially bear to perceptual objects and their features? Perhaps they are experienced as being inside oneself, and as disconnected from perceptual objects and their features. I aim to clarify the matter somewhat in sections 3–4.

In what follows qualia views that are committed to the existence of at least some non-intentional experienced features will (as above) be deemed Anti-Intentionalist Weak Projectivist views. While one might argue that this is a departure from Stoljar's view, which on one reading asserts the stronger thesis that all qualia are non-intentional, it is on reflection unlikely that Stoljar intends to deny that projection occurs. What he denies—and I maintain—is that projection plays a substantive role in explaining the phenomena that motivate qualia views. Thus Stoljar's view will be treated as an Anti-intentionalist Weak Projectivist view. Are the projected experienced elements of this view construed as actual or hypothetical? I think qualia advocates can remain mute on the matter. However, as I understand the motives behind non-intentional qualia views of Stoljar's sort, the non-intentional experienced features are *not* hypothetical but are instantiated by our perceptual experience (however that is characterized)—advocates are *realists* about *these* qualia.

* * *

With these many preliminaries in hand, I proceed to the meat of the chapter. The overarching aim is to explain why Strong Projectivism not only explains the transparency of experience (section 2) and core objections that have been made to Harman–Tye representationalism (section 3), but in addition that the same mechanism—projection—grounds these explanations. I finally (section 4) search for motive to favour Anti-Intentionalist Weak Projectivism over Strong Projectivism, and find little. I conclude that there may be some reasons to be an anti-intentionalist, but if not all then *most* of what qualia theorists find objectionable about Harman–Tye representationalism is best explained by appeal to an intentional notion like projection. As a result, qualia theorists should by default be projectivists of some sort, and should bound toward being Strong Projectivists.

2. Transparency

The transparency of experience is often introduced through instructions asking the reader to engage in a mundane perception, describe what she experiences, and a prediction as to what she'll find.¹⁴ Here are two influential examples:

Look at a tree and try to turn your attention to intrinsic features of your visual experience. I predict you will find that the only features there to turn your attention to will be features of the presented tree. (Harman 1990/1997: 667)

¹⁴ The instructions work far better for sight and audition than for touch, taste, and smell, a significant caveat we will not treat. Note that although introspection is sometimes used in this context it will be avoided here. I believe focus on introspection here creates more difficulties than it solves. We instead focus on *attention* to what one is *aware* of, and presume an intuitive characterization of each notion.

When looking at a blue square:

one's awareness seems always to slip through the experience to blueness and squareness, as instantiated together in an external object. In turning one's mind inward to attend to the experience, one seems to end up concentrating on what is outside again, on external features or properties. (Tye 1995: 30)¹⁵

There are numerous ways to state what the lesson from this procedure is *supposed* to be. One might suggest that it is that experienced features are *not* features of one's experience (negative lesson), but features of what is represented by one's experience (positive lesson). I will not characterize the lesson in this way. The transparency of experience doesn't obviously favour representational accounts of intentionality over acquaintance accounts. Indeed Martin (2002) argues that the reverse is true. I intend to stay clear of this dispute and thus demand a different positive lesson. There is furthermore an ambiguity in 'features of one's experience' in the proposed negative lesson. Is the thought that the experienced features are not features of one's experience, or are not *experienced as* features of one's experience? The former may be the lesson one wishes to draw from the above quotations, but only the latter receives direct support from them. I will characterize the supposed lesson from observations of the sort exemplified in the above quotations in the following way.

When I look at and listen to ordinary parts of the world in ordinary ways, and try, using my attention, to delineate what I am aware of through doing so, by far the most plausible candidates are objects and properties I experience as being out there in the extra-mental world. This includes the greens and blues I experience, they are over there, on the surfaces of those things I call 'trees' and 'flowers'. Stated more generally, when asked to pronounce on what one experiences in mundane perceptions, one's natural answer is that one experiences features of objects, all of which are experienced as outside oneself (positive lesson). Features that are inside the self are absent (negative lesson). This is what I will mean by the *transparency of experience* or simply *Transparency*.

In accordance with ideas in section 1, in saying that these features are experienced as features of objects and as outside the self I mean that this *description* of what we experience is at least pretheoretically adequate, it is in-line with how we typically think about or describe our mundane experiences. Although it is tempting to make the stronger claim that such descriptions are mandated by these experiences, or given to us in experience, or capture the nature of these experiences, I do not wish to make any such commitments. One reason is because the connection between experiences and propositions that adequately describe them is a subtle matter (see, e.g. Gupta 2006) that is best left to one side. Another reason is because the fallibility of the transparency of experience is central to our discussion, and in my mind this is most tractable by centring our understanding of transparency on the pretheoretical adequacy of these descriptions. Thus, I will often speak of us 'experiencing the green to be outside ourselves, on the surfaces of the leaves' and intend that, strictly speaking, this is shorthand for the

¹⁵ See also Moore (1903) and Reid (1764/1970: 45).

claim that such a description is pretheoretically endorsed by us. The challenge is to move from here to a theoretical description of what is most likely the case, and to use this description to explain and if possible preserve the pretheoretical description.

The core theoretical notions in this discussion are *phenomenology* (or *phenomenal elements*) and *intentionality*. Here is a direct means of connecting them to the positive lesson from Transparency. Transparency concerns features one is aware of in mundane perceptions that are well-described as being in the world outside oneself, and of the objects one is perceiving. Thus they are plausibly intentional features in the sense stipulated above. The features include experienced features of trees (Harman), blue and squareness (Tye), et cetera. By virtue of them being features we perceptually experience they by hypothesis meet a reasonable construal of ‘phenomenal features.’ In what follows my primary example will be colour. The idea is that in these mundane perceptions phenomenal blue, phenomenal green, and so on, are features we experience as being on things outside the self, on what we call ‘trees’ and ‘flowers.’ The negative lesson from Transparency is that once these features have been tallied and recognized to be intentional, there is nothing more that we are aware of by virtue of engaging in these mundane perceptions—there is no inner layer of perceptual phenomenology that remains unaccounted for. That is, Transparency provides evidence for Intentionalism. I will henceforth presume the adequacy of this characterization of Transparency.

It is plausible that both Harman–Tye representationalism and Strong Projectivism not only accommodate but provide workable explanations of Transparency, confined as Transparency is to preanalytic descriptions of mundane perceptual experiences.¹⁶ Tye (e.g. 2000, 2002, 2014) has been using this base to justify his global representationalism for some time. (Given that our interest is in projectivism, Tye’s arguments for his view are broadly tangential to this work.) And, as Martin says, “the central proponents of sense-datum accounts were well aware of this kind of phenomenological observation” (2002: 378). It would as a result be remarkable if SDT did not contain a workable explanation of it. My claim is that that explanation stems from projection.

Here is roughly how I see the dialectic. Given Transparency *alone*, Strong Projectivism is consistent with the data but radical. However, given a host of other perceptual phenomena (e.g. illusions, hallucinations, and so on—see sections 1, 3, and 4) *and* Transparency, Strong Projectivism provides a powerful, unified means of accommodating both the intentional and non-objective pressures placed on our account of phenomenal presence. By contrast, because Stoljar’s view demands that most or all qualia are non-intentional it must deny Transparency and provide hitherto unknown explanations of a host of other phenomena. I hope to show that this is not defensible. Thus, if familiar anti-Harman/Tye pressures make one favour some form of qualia view, Strong Projectivism is attractive precisely because it treats qualia as intentional features.

¹⁶ Though see again Martin (2002).

3. From Transparency to Projectivism

In this section I first fix the phenomenal features to be discussed (i.e. phenomenal colours), then discuss three challenges to Intentionalism that apply to the mundane scenarios that ground Transparency: blurry vision, unique hue variations, and spectrum inversion. The point is to argue that *if* you believe that these challenges undermine Harman–Tye representationalism, as many qualia theorists do, then you should not infer that they undermine Strong Projectivism or the form of Intentionalism articulated in section 1. On the contrary, the examples provide further evidence for these latter views. I typically use SDT as our token Strong Projectivism, and generally leave to the reader the task of generalizing the discussion to Figurative or other Literal Strong Projectivisms.

3.1 *Fixing phenomenal colours*

Let me focus on colour qualities and intend a phenomenal sense, intend to denote *phenomenal blue*, *phenomenal green*, et cetera. When considered broadly, we have devised various descriptors to try to get at what the intended denotation is: we can speak of the variety of perceptual relativities, that is, of the ways apparent colour changes as environmental (e.g. illuminant) and personal (e.g. sensory system) variables are altered; we can postulate the possibility of spectrum inversions in colour; we can appeal to afterimages; and so on. With regard to Transparency the key point is that, in mundane perceptions, to the extent that one is aware of phenomenal green when one perceives a spruce tree, one is aware of a quality that one experiences as or takes to be over there on the needles of the tree. Someone who takes colour phenomenology very seriously, but is trying to not suppose some view or other, will admit—by hypothesis—that if, during a mundane perception of a tree, she were to pronounce on the location of the phenomenal green she is aware of she will reflexively put it, not in herself, nor between herself and the tree, nor behind herself nor anywhere but *on the tree's surface*. ‘The green quality is over there on the needles’, she might attest.¹⁷

As discussed above, the fact that the phenomenal green is experienced as or interpreted to be a feature of that thing that I take to be a tree, where both that green and that thing are experienced as being outside myself, provides evidence for it being an intentional feature. The evidence is defeasible, but it is evidence nonetheless, and if reason to reject it emerges the residual challenge of explaining why we are tempted toward the wrong view must be addressed. Importantly, the evidence is derived from mundane perceptions and thus on its own doesn't ground the categorical claim that phenomenal elements are intentional. Further, the evidence does not entail that additional phenomenological analysis of these mundane perceptions won't yield additional phenomenal features that are not intentional in some sense (see Kind 2003

¹⁷ One may go further and suggest that this phenomenal green *is green*. While this identity claim has considerable force there is little to be gained from pushing it in this context.

on these points). In my view what Transparency instead does is fixate us on a core set of features in perceptual experience (what I have designated for colour by ‘phenomenal colours’) and fixate us on the positive relation they seem to bare to intentionality in mundane perceptions. From here studies can further analyse mundane perceptions in an attempt to uncover non-intentional phenomenal features, and can extend this analysis to less mundane perceptions and to bodily sensations. But such studies would begin with the presumption that *these* phenomenal features are intentional ones, they would use these phenomenal features and their purported intentionality as a location from which conduct further research. This, I submit, is how we should proceed.

3.2 *Blurry vision*

Giving a satisfactory account of the phenomenology of blurry vision is exceedingly difficult, and hence I only aim to offer a satisfactory one. Instead, I first state what the objection from blurry vision to Intentionalism is, raise some questions for it, and provide responses on behalf of both Strong Projectivism and Harman–Tye representationalism.

Here is a rendering of the objection. By hypothesis Transparency teaches us that in mundane perceptions phenomenal features are intentional features, that is, features of perceptual objects and experienced as outside the self. Blurry vision is as normal as nonblurry vision and thus is prevalent in mundane perceptions. However, the blurriness of blurry perceptions is present in phenomenology, and it is not experienced as a feature of the perceived objects or as outside the self, but instead as a feature of perceptual state/system itself. The blurriness is therefore by hypothesis a non-intentional phenomenal feature. This formulation of the argument is general enough to target both Harman–Tye representationalism and Strong Projectivism.

Suppose the conclusion is true. One must now enquire about the relation between phenomenal blurriness and phenomenal colours. For example, is it the case that the phenomenal colours are still intentional but on top of this there is a non-intentional phenomenal layer for the blurriness? Alternatively, are the phenomenal colours and blurriness fused together, thus making the phenomenal colours non-intentional as well? Having thought through a few rounds of discussion for and against each, efforts I will not rehearse, it is not clear to me which of these or a few other options is superior. Rejecting Transparency does not yet yield a positive view, and an adequate positive view is mandated. Setting this worry aside, consider two responses.

To my mind the Strong Projectivist advocate can respond in two ways, both of which reject the conclusion that the blurriness is a non-intentional feature. Using SDT as our guide, she can claim that the sense-data have fuzzy boundaries matching the experienced blurriness. As is well-known, features of sense-data do not have to match features of the indirectly perceived objective world, thus fuzziness on sense-data and crispness in the objective world is not only possible but no doubt one of the possibilities for which SDT was constructed. Alternatively, the SDT advocate can postulate layered sense-data, perceptual layering being something that I have defended—independently of SDT—to explain colour constancy (Brown 2014). Generally, seeing something

through something else (e.g. seeing a tree through a window) is consistent with both things being intentional elements of one's experience. The idea here would be that there is a transparent but blurry layer of sense-data behind which is an opaque and not blurry layer of sense-data. The proposal seems excessive in this context, but is worth noting nonetheless. In either case, blurriness is a feature of sense-data and thus of the objects of perception, in agreement with Intentionalism. Generalizing this strategy to Figurative Projectivism is left to the reader. Blurry vision is arguably something that impacts many if not most mundane perceptions. Thus our solution to it—Intentionalism—has default status going forward.

Tye's well-known response (see, e.g. Tye 2002) holds that the blurriness is a level of indeterminacy or coarse-granularity in representation. For example, one represents the borders of some object to be within some range r . Experiencing that object's borders to be within r is experiencing the content of one's perceptual state. Such contents are *intentional* contents, hence blurriness is intentional. I will not assess this response.

I therefore see no compelling reason to doubt the intentionality of phenomenology because of blurry vision, and submit that the Strong Projectivist options are as tenable as Tye's solution. By contrast the next two cases strongly favour the former over the latter.

3.3 *Unique hue variations*

There has been a flurry of philosophical interest in recent data regarding variations in unique hue assignments among normal perceivers.¹⁸ Unique (or pure) hues are colours that are not mixtures of other colours, for example a blue that has no redness or greenness, a green that has no blueness or yellowness, et cetera. For trichromats there are four unique chromatic hues: blue, red, yellow, and green. Although this issue has not been central to discussion about Intentionalism, its relevance is straightforward and worth considering.

In brief, the results can be appreciated via two steps. Normal trichromatic subjects are first trained to recognize unique hues. For example, a subject looks at a monitor with a colour that can be adjusted via dials over which she has control. She is asked to adjust the dials until she sees a unique colour: thus, if she sees yellow on the monitor her task is to adjust the dials until she sees a yellow that has neither redness nor greenness. Apparently subjects do not have much difficulty in learning to recognize unique hues. One can of course doubt whether or not trained subjects are in fact reliable at recognizing unique hues, but set these worries aside. Trained subjects are then presented with various stimuli and asked to identify the ones (if any) that have unique hues. For example a subject might be presented with a series of lights and asked to identify any unique hues, then a series of colour chips and asked again, then a series of commercial objects (e.g. toys) and asked again, and so on. The responses are collected and compared across subjects and the result is that there is considerable variation

¹⁸ See, e.g. Hardin (1988), Block (1999), Tye (2006), and the several *Analysis* articles that followed. Kuehni (2014) provides a recent summary of the empirical research.

across subjects as to which stimuli are identified as having unique hues. While this might be surprising to persons outside colour theory, I think it is fair to say that many of us within the field would be surprised if the results were any different.

Suppose the results are legitimate. The rough challenge to Harman–Tye representationalism is immediate: the intentional objects (i.e. lights, colour chips, toys, etc.) are the same across subjects yet the experienced colours—the phenomenal colours—are different. Their intentionalism, according to which all phenomenal features are instantiated and only instantiated by objective things, is threatened. The broad reply Tye (2006) has given seeks to preserve both colour objectivism and his preferred form of intentionalism. Thus, he asserts that these intentional objects each have a specific fine-grained objective colour, and the perceptual variation across subjects implies that most subjects are misrepresenting these objective colours. Since we cannot distinguish between those perceptions that are accurate and those that are erroneous, we cannot determine what the true fine-grained colours of these objects are. Objective colours are preserved at the cost of our having knowledge of them.

I do not find this reply remotely compelling. There must be some point after which colour objectivism stops bearing theoretical fruit, and admitting that most normal people in mundane perceptions misperceive colours, do not know that they are doing so, and that we cannot determine which if any of us are correctly perceiving colours, to my mind exceeds that point. In addition, Harman–Tye representationalists now face an additional challenge to their theory of experience. Grounding colour phenomenology in awareness of the objective colours of things has explanatory purchase if our colour experiences are at least often veridical. But conceding that our colour experiences are mostly not veridical undermines this purchase: how can we explain colour experience by reference to the objective colours of things in our world if we mostly don't experience those colours? It is exceedingly unlikely that a naturalized causal-correlational or functional notion of representation can close this gap.

However, my primary aim in this chapter is *not* to undermine Harman–Tye representationalism or colour objectivism. It is to argue that projectivism is the preferred solution for qualia theorists. Suppose, therefore, that in response to this data one rejects Harman–Tye representationalism. Here is why as a result we have evidence not for Anti-Intentionalism but for Projectivism.

The crucial point is that, presumably, the colours each subject identifies as unique or mixed are colours she experiences as *on the objects before her*. If a subject is doing a test for unique green and is presented with a tree she will experience the green to be where Harman says it is—on the surface of the leaves. The phenomenal green, be it unique or otherwise, is pretheoretically described as being on that thing in the world outside herself she calls a 'tree'. It is not as if we ask her to look at the colour she sees on the tree/computer screen/Munsell chip/et cetera, then set that aside and focus on some *other* phenomenal colour and assess whether or not *it* is a unique colour. The task is to focus on the colour experienced on the tree/computer screen/et cetera and assess whether or not *that* experienced or phenomenal colour is unique. The experienced colours

that vary across subjects are the colours experienced as features of objects and as outside the self. Transparency remains as credible as it has to this point, and so does Intentionalism. The difficulty is that, given the variation in unique hue responses, the objectivity of these experienced colours is not credible. The question is how best to accommodate the needed shift. How should we marry this evidence in favour of these phenomenal colours being intentional with this evidence against colour objectivism?

To see why Strong Projectivism recovers the data points, consider the Strong Literal Projectivist SDT. The view accepts that phenomenal colours are experienced as features of objects and as features in the objective world. The former aspect of our experience is correct because they are features of sense-data, the primary perceptual objects. The latter is not, but is explained as arising because these subjective sense-data are projected before us into what we pretheoretically regard as the world outside ourselves. Phenomenal colours are therefore still robustly intentional, they just aren't objective, and projection resolves the tension between the two. The reason one should favour not merely Weak but Strong Projectivism arises from reflecting on the plausible scope of unique hue variations. In this case the phenomenal elements we are studying, phenomenal colours, are being studied in mundane, everyday contexts (and some controlled laboratory settings) and the perceptual variation that projection is being invoked to help explain is by hypothesis occurring throughout these contexts. Unique hue variation is arguably not a strange phenomenon arising only in odd experimental settings, it is a phenomenon that infects every part of our colour perceptual lives. Thus this case provides burden-of-proof evidence in favour of Strong as opposed to Weak Projectivism. It is not difficult to extend this analysis to Strong Figurative Projectivism (e.g. Edenic views), and I leave these details to the reader.

Any qualia theorist (e.g. Stoljar) that rejects projectivism is therefore obliged to put forth a credible alternative. She or he may at the outset assert that there are non-intentional (e.g. non-projected) qualia, and such qualia may be useful for explaining some phenomenon or other. But non-intentional qualia have no explanatory import in this case. The Strong Projectivist thus has the upper-hand.

3.4 *Spectrum inversion*

Loosely put, the spectrum inversion hypothesis for colour states that the phenomenal colour one person experiences when she looks at something we call 'green', say some broccoli, might be the same as the phenomenal colour another person experiences when she looks at something we call 'red', say a radish, and vice versa. It is presumed that both perceptions can occur in mundane or normal circumstances and involve normal human colour perceivers. Thus the persons have differing colour experiences when looking at the same things, and the difference consists of an inversion that prevents them from detecting it via any direct means. Some believe that there is good inductive evidence for actual cases (Nida-Rümelin 1996).

Advocates of Harman–Tye representationalism typically deny this possibility (see, e.g. Harman 1990/1997). The worry is straightforward. If the hypothesis is a genuine

possibility, regardless of whether or not an inversion actually obtains at present, then the intentional objects of perceptual states (the broccoli and radishes) do not line-up with colour phenomenology, and the goal of Harman–Tye representationalism is to tie colour phenomenology to the hypothesized objective colours of things. In this case there seems no reason to say that one of these person's experiences is more veridical than the other's, and thus no reason to hold that colour experiences represent any objective properties. Hence phenomenal colours are not intentional in their sense. I do not know of a plausible means of incorporating this possibility into a Harman–Tye type of view.¹⁹

Strong Projectivism is at home with spectrum inversion hypotheses in much the way it is at home with unique hue data. The phenomenal colour of the sense-datum (or expressed by the Edenic content) caused in me by looking at broccoli can be the same as the phenomenal colour of the sense-datum (or expressed by the Edenic content) caused in you by looking at radishes, and vice versa. Neither phenomenal colour intrinsically represents the purported colour of broccoli any more than it does the purported colour of radishes, and neither perception is more veridical than the other. What makes Strong Projectivism a particularly powerful view is not merely its ability to accommodate this possibility, it is its ability to do so in a way that recovers Transparency and Intentionalism. Let me explain.

The phenomenal colours that might be inverted between you and me are the very ones that each of us experiences (i.e. pretheoretically describes) as being on the surfaces of things outside ourselves (Brown 2010). Consider the colours you now experience on this broccoli and this radish. Perhaps what you see on the first—the phenomenal colour—is what I experience on the second, so that in some sense what you call 'green' I call 'red'. What else could colour spectrum inversion involve but aspects of the items experienced as outside of oneself? When explaining the spectrum inversion hypothesis to students I would never ask them to look at the colours they see on this broccoli and this radish and then set those aside and consider some other qualities of their colour experience and wonder if those might be inverted with respect to their neighbour. *That* possibility is formulable within some views, but it is not a useful means of understanding the spectrum inversion hypothesis. Spectrum inversion concerns the possible inversion of the very colour qualities (or phenomenal colours) perceivers experience on this broccoli and this radish.

Thus, as with unique hue data, the hypothesized inverted phenomenal colours are experienced as features of objects and as outside the self, as Intentionalism maintains. The tension between Intentionalism and inversion is resolved by appeal to projection. Given that our everyday lives could be imbued with this kind of inversion, projection is needed not merely for hallucinations and illusions, but for basic colour experience. Hence Strong Projectivism becomes a default view. Non-intentional qualia, if they

¹⁹ A possible exception is work by Shoemaker (1994, 2002) in which he defends the existence of a class of properties he calls 'colour appearances' that can be inverted between subjects but that nonetheless are not merely mental. They are at least relational between subject and the objective world.

exist and are needed for some explanatory purpose, must enter via another avenue. The same argument can be applied to Block's (1990) Earth inversion.

* * *

To this point we have adequate reason to provisionally accept the Strong Projectivist means of accommodating both the insights of Transparency and the insights of some powerful objections to Harman–Tye representationalism drawn from data and possibilities applying to the mundane perceptions on which Transparency is focused. Let me set aside Harman–Tye representationalism in its entirety and consider further means of distancing ourselves from Strong Projectivism.

4. The Quest for the Non-Intentional

Widespread projection is needed to explain the previous cases, thus making Strong Projectivism the provisional default view. I here consider three ways in which the account of phenomenal presence of Strong Projectivism might be challenged: one via imagination, another via perceptual feelings, a third that combines the two.²⁰ The fundamental way to test this aspect of Strong Projectivism is to challenge the adequacy of the idea that once one has identified the projected elements one is perceptually experiencing and captured the respect in which they are projected, one has settled the perceptual phenomenology of one's experience. Any alteration to perceptual phenomenology must show up as an alteration to these projected elements. Thus, if one can show that there are phenomenal aspects of perceptual experiences that cannot be explained as features of projected elements, it would follow that this account is at least incomplete and some form of Non-Intentional Weak Projectivism is appropriate. Only the third case was constructed to specifically target Projectivism. The others were offered as challenges to something like Harman–Tye representationalism. However, the cases can in theory be equally damaging to the Strong Projectivist form of Intentionalism, and so should be addressed. I will continue to utilize SDT as a default Strong Projectivism, and leave to the reader the task of generalizing the discussion to Figurative or other Literal Strong Projectivisms.

4.1 *Imagination*

In a recent paper on qualia and the transparency of experience, Kind suggests the following:

Look at a tree, and then close your eyes and image the tree. Focus in on the greenness on your imaged experience. Now reopen your eyes...I predict that you *will* find features there, other than features of the presented tree, on which to train your attention. In particular, you can continue to attend to the greenness that you were attending to while your eyes were closed.

(2008: 295–6)

²⁰ Additional challenges might for example be drawn from other arguments against Harman–Tye representationalism, perhaps from arguments centring on perceptual ambiguity (e.g. Macpherson 2006) or attention (e.g. Block 2010). Discussion of such challenges has been omitted due to length constraints.

Imagination is central to the case. Kind claims that the mental image has greenness, the presented tree has greenness, and that one can shift attention to each instance of greenness during a mental episode. Suppose this is true. Her aim is described by the article's title, 'How to believe in qualia.' It is not specifically to deride Strong Projectivism, it is to argue against anti-qualia views like Harman–Tye representation-alism. However, we can reflect on how Strong Projectivism fares with the case. With regard to SDT, the challenge arises because according to SDT the only greenness one is aware of by virtue of having a perceptual experience is the greenness of presented sense-data. If there is more to perceptual colour phenomenology than that, in particular if there is another layer of colour phenomenology that is, as it were, operating "behind the scenes", then the SDT account is incomplete.

I see two replies the SDT advocate can make on behalf of Strong Projectivism. First, she might deny the case, claiming that there is no greenness on imaged experiences in the manner in which there is greenness on the presented tree. The idea is that the respondent comprehends quite well what it is like for her to think about a green tree and imagine a green tree and perceptually experience a green tree, and only in the last case is greenness *present* in her phenomenology in any tractable sense. This at best yields a stalemate. However, perhaps the respondent should be open to the possibility that others' imaginative experiences are not like this, but are instead more like Kind's (and Kind should be open to the converse). In this case the response only explains one kind of perceptual imaginative experience, and something else is needed to accommodate Kind's experience.

The second reply concedes that there is greenness on the imaged tree, but denies that this is cause for alarm: that greenness is not experienced because of one's perceptual state, it is instead experienced because of one's imaginative state.²¹ Thus, the greenness of the image is an instance of phenomenal green that is not supposed to be explained by the SDT or projectivist account of *perceptual* phenomenology, it is supposed to be explained by the SDT or projectivist account of *imaginative* phenomenology, whatever that is. Here are two issues that arise in the ensuing discussion.

Consider first the greenness itself. Is the green of the imaged tree qualitatively the same as the green of the perceived tree? A crucial factor here might be vivacity, and, following Hume, the SDT advocate can postulate that the green of the imaged tree is a faint copy of the green of the perceived tree. I see no reason for her to be dissuaded from thinking that the SDT framework is able to accommodate this or other differences between the greennesses experienced during imaginings and perceptions. Setting aside the greenness itself, consider now experienced location. Where is the green of the imaged tree experienced to be relative to the green of the perceived tree? Presumably the latter is experienced as before one in the external environment, as

²¹ The relationship between perception and imagination is highly controversial. For our purposes we presume a simplified view that distinguishes between the two enough to recover Kind's description. Relevant literature includes, e.g. Kind (2001), Nanay (2010), Briscoe (2011), Macpherson (2012), and Brown (2018).

projectivism predicts. What of the former? I just now imaged the green tree in my yard, and insofar as I experienced an image it was above my head. Is this image projected? If not then Strong Projectivism about imagination seems problematic. But experiencing an image as though it was above my head suggests projection *is* operative. This imaginative projection is seemingly distinct from perceptual projection, but it is projection nonetheless.

I suggest first that this is not a challenge to Strong Projectivism about perception, but at best to Strong Projectivism about imagination, and second that projection for imagination plausibly exists. Assessing the nature and scope of imaginative projection unfortunately falls outside the scope of this work.

4.2 *Perceptual feelings*

Suppose that every time I experience phenomenal blue I feel some way inside, perhaps a cool, welcoming calmness. That feeling certainly has a phenomenal dimension, say that it consists of my being aware of phenomenal calmness. Fixing the blueness of my sense-datum does not yet fix this phenomenal calmness—they are distinct. By hypothesis, whereas the blueness is experienced as on a perceptual object (e.g. a cup-shaped sense-datum), the calmness is experienced as somewhere else, as at some vague, perhaps dispersed location inside myself. The Strong Projectivist account therefore seems inadequate.

The second reply to the imagination case can be adapted to suit this scenario. Suppose the description is accurate: when I experience blue I also experience calmness, and that whereas the former is experienced as being on the presented cup, the latter is experienced as being somewhere inside myself. Rather than this being a challenge for the Strong Projectivist account of perceptual phenomenology, it is instead an observation that perceptual phenomenology and emotional/mood phenomenology can bear correlations to one another, and perhaps even causal relations. For example, the SDT advocate may postulate sense-data to explain the emotion/mood phenomenology for independent reasons, and, whatever means by which she explains it, she is not committed to her account of perceptual phenomenology doing that work. It would instead be surprising if it did.

Will the account of these feelings be projectivist? We here arrive at the same difficulty just considered: our model for ‘projection’ in the perceptual case is not supposed to straightforwardly extend to non-perceptual cases. For example, with regard to bodily sensations, the relevant sense of ‘projection’ is arguably ‘experienced at some bodily location.’ Many bodily sensations meet this constraint, and notably, phenomena like phantom pains effectively mandate the existence of projection within this experiential domain. Perhaps a general malaise, with no apparent location or object, is a genuine example of a non-intentional quale. The important point is that the Strong Projectivist account of *perceptual* phenomenology is not threatened by these considerations, and a projectivist account of the phenomenology of bodily sensations is apt for at least most cases in this domain. Counter-examples are uncommon and in response to them qualia theorists should,

instead of being strict Strong Projectivists, *bound toward* being Strong Projectivists, introducing non-intentional qualia only when needed to address such rarities.

4.3 *Imagination and feelings*

Stoljar's argument against projectivism and SDT invokes both imagination and feelings and hence it is worth examining directly. Recall that according to him projectivism and SDT adhere to what he calls the "relational thesis", the thesis that "the phenomenal character of an experience is wholly determined by the objects that one is related to in having the experience (2004: 349). However, he argues:

consider ... the situation in which I am under the visual impression that *p* and the situation in which I visually imagine that *p*. The relational thesis implies that the phenomenal characters of these two experiences are then identical ... But in this case, there is surely a strong sense in which the phenomenal characters here are *not* identical ... in the visual-impression case I am going to feel inclined to be [*sic*] believe that *p*. In the imagination case, on the other hand, I am not going to feel inclined to believe that *p*. However, since these inclinations are surely part of the phenomenal character of imagination and perception ... the relational thesis is false. (386)

This argument is not compelling. To begin, the assertion that "these inclinations are surely part of the phenomenal character of imagination and perception" is question-begging. Most directly, it is not credible to simply assert that in "the imagination case ... I am not going to feel inclined to believe that *p*". Imaginings often tempt people to believe things portrayed in those imaginings. When at night I imagine someone preparing to break into my house I may well be inclined to believe that someone is breaking into my house. If we suppose that hallucinations are imaginings, they are well-known for leading subjects to form beliefs that reflect a given hallucination's contents. And so on.

More generally, it is easy to demonstrate how Projectivism, via SDT, can reject the claim that "these inclinations are surely part of the phenomenal character of imagination and perception". For example, the SDT advocate can assert that one's perceptual state consists of being acquainted with perceptual sense-data $\{p\}$, and that this state is correlated with or causes you to be in an emotional state, say fear, that consists of being acquainted with emotional sense-data $\{q\}$, which is correlated with or causes you to believe that *p*, a cognitive state that consists of being acquainted with the proposition *P*, which is itself a structured set of universals. However these details are worked out, the SDT advocate and the Strong Projectivist more generally are under no obligation to regard these feelings or inclinations as part of perceptual phenomenology or imaginative phenomenology.

Beyond this, Stoljar claims that undergoing visual impressions and imaginings of the same thing conjoined with "the relational thesis implies that the phenomenal characters of these two experiences are then identical". This is false. As noted in section 4.1 the SDT advocate in general is *not* committed to holding that visual impressions (i.e. perceptions) and visual imaginings of, say, a green tree consist of being related

to the same sense-datum. Imaginative and perceptual sense-data may qualitatively differ with regard to features like vivacity, and their experienced locations may differ, even if they are about the same objective thing. At minimum, identity in phenomenology arises from being acquainted with identical sense-data in identical experienced locations, not from being acquainted with distinct sense-data that in some context refer to the same objective thing. The conflict Stoljar claims to hold between SDT and the relational thesis only arises by missing this point, namely by taking the objective thing instead of the sense-data to be relevant for defining perceptual phenomenology, something SDT and Projectivism more generally are by their design opposed to.

* * *

To the extent that the above challenges provide difficulties for intentionalism of the Harman–Tye sort, they do not provide widespread difficulties for our Intentionalism, precisely because projection is available to explain aspects of perceptual phenomenology that are both intentional and not explainable solely by reference to our objective world. Worry arises for states that have no experienced location and object. These may exist in emotional states of general happiness or sadness, or perhaps in some unspecified imaginative states. To the extent that these obtain we should be Weak Anti-Intentionalist Projectivists. I emphasize, however, that non-intentional qualia should be introduced only when needed to address these kinds of cases, and submit that they are rarities and not the typical focus of qualia debates. Broadly speaking, we should *bound toward* being Strong Projectivists, of either the Literal or Figurative sort.

5. Conclusion

In everyday perceptual experience I am aware of phenomenal features, notably phenomenal blues, greens, and so on—and am aware of them in a particular way: I experience them as features of perceptual objects, and experience them and those objects as in the world outside myself. This is the lesson we should draw from the transparency of experience: that is, we should provisionally accept a form of Intentionalism. The evidence against these phenomenal features being explainable solely by reference to our objective world is too great to overcome, hence we should pursue other options. The challenge is to formulate a version of intentionalism that preserves both conclusions. I suggest that projectivism, literal or figurative, provides a powerful resolution. That resolution is rooted in its account of *phenomenal presence*, a hypothesized capacity of perceivers (or perceptual minds) to project (or place or locate) perceptual elements into where we preanalytically regard the extra-mental world to be, despite those specific elements not being in the extra-mental world. The existence of this capacity for projection is difficult to deny, given the phenomenology of various afterimages, hallucinations, illusions, et cetera. Our question has been the extent to which we should regard it as active. I conclude that, perhaps, it is active throughout our perceptual lives, and potentially throughout our experiential lives more generally.

Views committed to the widespread use of projection in our mental lives are qualia views, in one sense of the term. However, some qualia theorists seek a non-intentional alternative that excludes this option. I used Stoljar (2004) as an example, noting that he takes this latter alternative to be the dominant qualia view. I fail to see any substantive evidence for it. To be sure, the existence of non-intentional experiential states is a genuine possibility, and possibly instantiated by emotional states of general, undirected happiness or sadness. But so far as I can tell these are exceptional cases. I know of no straightforward instances in perceptual phenomenology, and the overwhelming majority of phenomenological states involving bodily sensation and imagination are not of this sort. Therefore, strictly speaking, qualia theorists should consider Weak Anti-Intentionalist Projectivism as a live option. But broadly speaking our view should bound toward Strong Projectivism, and it is critical that we emphasize the considerable explanatory work projection is needed to perform.

Throughout I used sense-datum theory as a sample Strong Projectivist view. It is a Literal Projectivism, as opposed to a Figurative one like (in my judgement) Chalmers' Edenic view. I hope to have illustrated that the mechanism of projection is doing the heavy-lifting in the cases I have discussed, not for example the literal component of sense-datum theory. In this regard, for all I have said, one is free to favour either a literalist or figurativist form of projectivism.

This may tempt readers to automatically prefer Figurative Projectivism, and I admit to feeling some pull in this direction. It does, for example, have a smaller ontology for our world. My own view, however, is that the debate between Literal and Figurative Projectivism is an immensely important and difficult one to undertake. For starters, qualia theorists are typically qualia *realists*, meaning that qualia are instantiated by things in our world, namely our own mental states (or mental objects). In what sense is a Figurative Projectivist a *realist* about projected elements? Furthermore, continuing with our case study of colour, on the figurativist view the phenomenal colours with which every visual experience is imbued if not defined in terms of, the phenomenal colours that give us as much visual experiential insight into property instantiation as we arguably have, these are not instantiated in our world—none of them—but are instantiated in some never experienced, cosmically unknown, effectively fictional world. The link between experience and our actual world is tenuous. By contrast for the Literal Projectivist that link is quite secure, only it is a link between experience and one's actual subjective world, not between experience and an actual objective world. I submit that, all else being equal, as crazy as the Literal Projectivist seems, she can't be blamed for finding Figurative Projectivism less attractive still.

Finally, both Literal and Figurative Projectivism are views that place the infamous *veil* between the perceiver and the objective world. The fact that for the figurativist the veil is composed of uninstantiated properties (and potentially nonexistent objects), as opposed to the literalist's actual objects and their properties, does not make it a veil that is any easier for perceivers to epistemically get through to the objective world. This

outcome is arguably one of the outcomes Harman, Tye, Stoljar, and others are unanimous in trying to avoid. I do not see how they have done so.

References

- Block, Ned (1990). 'Inverted Earth', *Philosophical Perspectives* 4: 53–79.
- Block, Ned (1999). 'Sexism, racism, ageism and the nature of consciousness', *Philosophical Topics* 26: 39–70.
- Block, Ned (2003). 'Mental paint', in Martin Hahn and Bjørn Ramberg (eds.), *Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 165–200.
- Block, Ned (2010). 'Attention and mental paint', *Philosophical Issues* 20: 23–63.
- Brewer, Bill (2011). *Perception and its Objects*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Briscoe, Robert (2011). 'Mental imagery and the varieties of amodal perception', *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 92: 153–73.
- Brown, Derek H. (2010). 'Locating projectivism in intentionalism debates', *Philosophical Studies* 148: 69–78.
- Brown, Derek H. (2012). 'Losing grip on the world: from illusion to sense-data', in Athanassios Raftopoulos and Peter Machamer (eds.), *Perception, Realism, and the Problem of Reference*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 68–95.
- Brown, Derek H. (2014). 'Colour constancy and colour layering', *Philosophers' Imprint* 14: 1–31.
- Brown, Derek H. (2018). 'Infusing perception with imagination', in Fiona Macpherson and Fabian Dorsch (eds.), *Perceptual Imagination and Perceptual Memory*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Byrne, Alex (2001). 'Intentionalism defended', *Philosophical Review* 110: 49–90.
- Campbell, John (2002). *Reference and Consciousness*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Chalmers, David J. (2006). 'Perception and the fall from Eden', in Tamar S. Gendler and John Hawthorne (eds.), *Perceptual Experience*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 49–125.
- Dretske, Fred (1995). *Naturalizing the Mind*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Egan, Andy (2010). 'Projectivism without error', in Bence Nanay (ed.), *Perceiving the World*. New York: Oxford University Press, 68–98.
- Gupta, Anil (2006). *Empiricism and Experience*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Gupta, Anil (2012). 'An account of conscious experience', *Analytic Philosophy* 53: 1–29.
- Hardin, C. L. (1988). *Color for Philosophers*. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett.
- Harman, Gilbert (1990/1997). 'The intrinsic quality of experience', in J. Tomberlin (ed.), *Philosophical Perspectives*, vol. 4. Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing, 31–52. Reprinted in Ned Block, Owen Flanagan, and Güven Güzeldere (eds.), *The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997, 663–75. [Page references are to the latter.]
- Hill, Christopher S. (2009). *Consciousness*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Hume, David (1740/1978). *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. R. Selby-Bigge and P. Nidditch. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Hume, David (1751/1998). *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*, ed. T. L. Beauchamp. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kind, Amy (2001). 'Putting the image back in imagination', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 62: 85–109.

- Kind, Amy (2003). 'What's so transparent about transparency?', *Philosophical Studies* 115: 225–44.
- Kind, Amy (2008). 'How to believe in qualia', in Edmond Wright (ed.), *The Case for Qualia*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 285–98.
- Kuehni, Rolf G. (2014). 'Unique hues and their stimuli—state of the art', *Color Research and Application* 39: 279–87.
- Macpherson, Fiona (2006). 'Ambiguous figures and the content of experience', *Noûs* 40: 82–117.
- Macpherson, Fiona (2012). 'Cognitive penetration of colour experience: rethinking the issue in light of an indirect mechanism', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 84: 24–62.
- Martin, Michael G. F. (2002). 'The transparency of experience', *Mind & Language* 17: 376–425.
- Moore, G. E. (1903). 'The refutation of idealism', *Mind* 12: 433–53.
- Nanay, Bence (2010). 'Perception and imagination: amodal perception as mental imagery', *Philosophical Studies* 150: 239–54.
- Nida-Rümelin, Martine (1996). 'Pseudonormal vision: An actual case of qualia inversion?', *Philosophical Studies* 82: 145–57.
- Pautz, Adam (2009). 'What are the contents of experience?', *Philosophical Quarterly* 59: 483–507.
- Price, H. H. (1932). *Perception*. London: Methuen.
- Reid, Thomas (1764/1970). *An Inquiry into the Human Mind*, ed. Timothy Duggan. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Russell, Bertrand (1912). *Problems of Philosophy*. London: Williams and Norgate.
- Schellenberg, Susanna (2014). 'The relational and representational character of perceptual experience', in Berit Brogaard (ed.), *Does Perception Have Content?* New York: Oxford University Press, 199–219.
- Shoemaker, Sydney (1990). 'Qualities and qualia: what's in the mind?', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 50: 109–31. Reprinted in *The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, 97–120.
- Shoemaker, Sydney (1994). 'Phenomenal character', *Noûs* 28: 21–38.
- Shoemaker, Sydney (2002). 'Introspection and phenomenal character', in David Chalmers (ed.), *Philosophy of Mind*. New York: Oxford University Press, 457–72.
- Siegel, Susanna (2010). *The Contents of Visual Experience*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Speaks, Jeff (2014). 'What are debates about qualia really about?', *Philosophical Studies* 170: 59–84.
- Stoljar, Daniel (2004). 'The argument from diaphanousness', in M. Ezcúrdia, R. Stainton, and C. Viger (eds.), *New Essays in the Philosophy of Language and Mind: Special Issue of the Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, 341–90.
- Tye, Michael (1995). *Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Tye, Michael (2000). *Colour, Content, and Consciousness*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Tye, Michael (2002). 'Representationalism and the transparency of experience', *Noûs* 36: 137–51.
- Tye, Michael (2006). 'The puzzle of true blue', *Analysis* 66: 173–8.
- Tye, Michael (2014). 'Transparency, qualia realism and representationalism', *Philosophical Studies* 170: 39–57.