The naturalized epistemology approach to evidence
forthcoming in Dahlman, Stein, and Tuzet, eds., Philosophical Foundations of Evidence Law (OUP 2021)

Gabriel Broughton
*Princeton University*

Brian Leiter
*University of Chicago*

**Abstract** Studying evidence law as part of naturalized epistemology means using the tools and results of the sciences to evaluate evidence rules based on the accuracy of the verdicts they are likely to produce. In this brief chapter, we introduce the approach and address skeptical concerns about the value of systematic empirical research for evidence scholarship, focusing, in particular, on worries about the external validity of jury simulation studies. Finally, turning to applications, we consider possible reforms regarding eyewitness identifications and character evidence.

1 **Introduction**

At the core of epistemology, as the philosophical study of knowledge, is the critical examination of our methods of inquiry. The epistemologist wants to know how we should manage our beliefs about the world. What counts as good evidence for a conclusion? What can we reasonably infer from a given body of information? On a traditional view, these questions must be answered *a priori*—by the light of pure reason, as it were—without appeal to any supposed empirical knowledge. Naturalism rejects this view. A good method of inquiry must be *reliable*, in the sense that it consistently leads to the truth. But whether any given method is reliable depends on facts about the world that we can’t discover from the armchair. Accordingly, naturalists insist that
epistemology must be an *a posteriori* discipline, continuous with and dependent upon empirical science.

Naturalized epistemology has an individual and a social part. Individual epistemology concerns the intellectual practices of particular agents considered in isolation. Social epistemology takes up the social practices that inculcate belief. More specifically, it evaluates those practices instrumentally, in terms of how likely they are to yield true beliefs on important questions. Call this *veritistic evaluation* (Goldman 1999). Since the effects of any given practice on the beliefs of relevant agents is an empirical question, amenable in principle to scientific investigation, naturalized social epistemology draws on the sciences. Still, its ultimate conclusions are *normative*. When the social epistemologist finds that a practice is more likely to lead to true beliefs than the alternatives, she identifies a reason to implement it. But practices that rate well on the veritistic dimension may perform so poorly on others that, all things considered, they should not be implemented. The social epistemologist focuses on the veritistic reasons without necessarily taking a stand on how they stack up against the rest.

In this chapter, we consider the law of evidence from the perspective of naturalized social epistemology (cf. Allen and Leiter 2001), provisionally setting aside the other values implicated by rules of evidence and focusing on the promotion of accurate fact-finding. Of course, there are good reasons, all else being equal, to prefer accurate verdicts to inaccurate ones. For instance, a criminal prohibition’s deterrence value depends on how reliably violators are convicted (Kaplow 1994). Indeed, many of the key aims of primary legal rules—from corrective justice to economic efficiency—can only be performed if the disputes arising under them are generally decided accurately. And there are other reasons too, having to do with justice in the individual case, with rule of law values, and with the perceived legitimacy of the law and its institutions.

The law of evidence matters to naturalized epistemology because it affects the accuracy of adjudication. But accurate adjudication depends on more than evidence law. It depends, for example, on civil and criminal procedure. It depends on the funding allocated to prosecutors and public defenders, on the contents of law school curricula, and on much else besides. The study of evidence law thus falls into place as one component of the broader project of studying *adjudication* as part of naturalized epistemology. This turns out to be important. For in the epistemological study of
evidence law one sometimes identifies a persistent fact-finding error that evidence law seems helpless to address. In such cases, one must remember that there may be other ways, outside of evidence law, to fix the problem.

2 Prospects

Studying evidence law as part of naturalized epistemology means (i) evaluating evidence law veritistically (ii) using the tools and results of the sciences. Start with (i). Rules of evidence can be evaluated along many dimensions. Do they produce outcomes that are generally accepted as fair or legitimate? Do they express respect for the parties? Do they keep administrative costs down? Studying evidence law as part of naturalized social epistemology means evaluating it in terms of the accuracy of the verdicts that it can be expected to produce. And this brings us to (ii). Rather than appeal to armchair intuition or the authority of tradition, naturalized epistemology examines evidence law with the help of empirical science.

How much can the sciences tell us about the veritistic value of different rules of evidence? Not all that much, according to some commentators (e.g., Redmayne 2003, p. 866; Friedman 2001, p. 2034). These skeptics point out that we generally lack the sort of independent access to the facts of legal disputes that would allow us to reliably determine whether a given verdict is correct. And there are obvious practical, legal, and moral impediments to running actual legal trials under “experimental” rules of evidence. But how, then, are we supposed to empirically assess the reliability of alternative rules of evidence?

Many psychologists and social scientists interested in legal decision making have focused on conducting controlled experiments known as jury simulations. These are studies in which participants acting as mock jurors observe a “trial” and then render a “verdict” or answer questions about the case. Typically, jury simulations involve randomly assigning participants to view different versions of the trial—one version might include an eyewitness or an expert, say, that another omits—in order to measure the effects of these differences. Critics claim that jury simulations tell us nothing about
real juries (e.g., Nunez et al. 2011). They argue that simulation studies are unrealistic—they lack ecological validity—because (i) they use college students as mock jurors rather than drawing on a more representative sample; (ii) they use brief written case summaries instead of live testimony and real evidence presented over days or weeks; (iii) they omit jury deliberations and focus on the “verdicts” of individual jurors; and (iv) they use mock jurors who know that their decisions will have no real consequences. As a result, simulation studies don’t generalize. And, the critics reason, since jury simulations are the best that social science—and, so, naturalized epistemology—can do, this means that naturalized epistemology has little to offer evidence law.

We think this overstates the case, for four reasons.

(i) Simulation studies don’t exhaust the naturalized epistemology of evidence law. When a rule of evidence excludes relevant information, the rationale is often that, while the evidence has some probative value, the jury may significantly misconstrue that value (or misuse the evidence in some other way). So the rule is based on two distinct claims, one about the actual value of the evidence and another about the value the jury will attribute to it. Jury studies address the second claim, but other empirical findings bear on the first. Consider, for instance, the reliability of various (so-called) forensic sciences. We don’t need jury studies to find the error rates associated with spectographic voice identification, microscopic hair comparison, or bite mark analysis. This suggests that even if the sciences had nothing to tell us about juries, they would still have something to contribute to the veritistic evaluation of evidence law.

But even when it comes to jury psychology, we are not limited to simulations. We also have (a) surveys, (b) archival analyses, and (c) field experiments (see Bornstein 2017). While none of these methodologies has been as popular among social scientists as simulations, each has contributed to our understanding of juries. Start with surveys. Many surveys in this area involve contacting jurors after a trial and asking why they decided as they did. But other sorts of surveys can also be useful. For example, courts have frequently insisted that jurors understand the factors affecting the reliability of eyewitness identifications. A properly conducted survey can put this empirical claim to the test.² Archival analyses use large datasets to discern relationships between case

---

¹See also Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 172 (1986).
²More on this in the following section.
characteristics and outcomes. Such analyses can be used to study, for instance, whether juries are more likely to convict a defendant if she has a criminal record, or whether experienced jurors are more likely than inexperienced ones to find civil defendants liable. Field experiments involve randomly assigning actual juries to different procedural conditions and then measuring differences between experimental groups on various dependent variables. While understandably rare, field experiments have been used to study the effects of permitting juror discussion during civil trials (Diamond et al. 2003), among other procedural innovations.

(ii) Low ecological validity is probably not as worrisome as the objection suggests, since what really counts is external validity. An experiment’s ecological validity is the extent to which it mimics salient surface features of a real-world target setting. Its external validity is the extent to which its results generalize. There is, of course, a relationship between the two. Increasing ecological validity sometimes increases external validity by eliminating differences between the experimental and the target context that affect important dependent variables. But sometimes there is no payoff in external validity, because the eliminated differences are causally irrelevant. The question is whether the differences between simulations and trials really matter.

Suppose that we are interested in the effects of admitting a certain kind of “bad character” evidence against criminal defendants. We might run a jury simulation experiment that sacrifices some level of ecological validity by using college students as mock jurors. And suppose that we find that the admission of the character evidence causes a rise in convictions. Now, what kind of differences between student jurors and realistic jurors, as we’ll call them, should we be worried about? One possibility is that realistic jurors are simply more (or less) likely to convict than student jurors. In fact, this would not limit our ability to generalize the effect observed in our simulation, because it would involve student jurors and realistic jurors reacting to the character evidence similarly, qualitatively and quantitatively, even if they differ in other ways. The simulation’s external validity would only be limited if there were some interaction between juror type and character evidence, for instance if admission had no effect on realistic jurors. Of course, whether student jurors and realistic jurors differ in these ways is an empirical question.

Bornstein (1999) analyzed 26 experiments comparing the verdicts of student jurors
and realistic jurors. These studies, involving a variety of civil and criminal cases, manipulated numerous independent variables beyond juror type, thus facilitating consideration of both main effects and interaction effects. In fact, both were rare. Main effects of juror type were observed in five of the 26 studies, while interactions effects were observed in just two. Accordingly, Bornstein concluded, “interactions are the exception rather than the norm” (Bornstein 1999, p. 80). Subsequent research confirms this result (Penrod et al. 2011, p. 205). Similar studies suggest that concerns about the medium in which trials are presented to mock jurors as well as the presence or absence of deliberation may be somewhat overblown (e.g., Kerr and Bray 2005).

(iii) Jury simulation studies are becoming increasingly realistic. Even skeptics about the preceding can take solace in the fact that ecological validity in jury studies is improving. Critics conjure an image of college sophomores scanning a brief case summary and declaring a personal verdict, but this is no longer how most jury simulations are done. To examine the types of studies being conducted today, Bornstein (2017) examined each jury simulation reported over two recent years in *Law and Human Behavior*. He found that the majority did not use student jurors or written case summaries. Instead they used a more representative sample of community members and, in the usual case, a video presentation of a mock trial performed by professional actors. And while most of the studies still bypassed jury deliberation, a substantial minority (about 20%) did not.

(iv) Triangulation and conceptual replication can help address reasonable concerns about external validity. Even more realistic simulation studies differ from trials, of course. While a two-hour video is certainly better than a two-paragraph summary, it is still a far cry from two weeks or even two days in a courtroom. More important, none of these improvements in ecological validity addresses the problem of consequentiality (Bornstein and McCabe 2005). No matter how representative the sample or how realistic the trial presentation, mock jurors still know that they are not real jurors. They still know that their decisions do not have real consequences. A handful of experimental studies have attempted to determine whether this difference limits the external validity of jury simulations. For instance, Diamond and Zeisel (1974) arranged for two separate juries, one actual and one experimental, to hear a number of criminal cases. The mock jury consisted of a random sample of potential jurors from the
pool who were not selected or questioned by the attorneys. For each trial, the mock jury, like the actual one, was present in the courtroom during the proceedings and eventually deliberated in private before rendering a verdict. A few additional studies have attempted to test the effects of consequentiality in other ways (e.g., Kaplan and Krupa 1986; Suggs and Berman 1979). Unfortunately, these isolated studies point in different directions, so that no firm conclusion can be drawn. This is clearly an area where further research would be useful.

Ultimately, though, no single methodology can give us everything that we want in a study. Simulations offer the benefit of internal validity. In a laboratory setting, because we can randomly assign mock jurors to trial conditions distinguished only by some particular variable of interest, we can be confident that any differences in juror behavior between conditions is the result of the experimental manipulation. The disadvantage of simulations is that we have no a priori guarantee of external validity. Laboratories and courtrooms are different, and it's always possible that an effect observed in one will not be observed in the other. Archival analyses and other field studies, by examining the behavior of actual juries deciding actual cases, offer stronger assurances of external validity. Unfortunately, they do so at the expense of internal validity. Outside the laboratory, cases that differ in one way are liable to differ in many others as well. As a result, we can seldom draw causal conclusions with any confidence based on field studies alone. Every study is imperfect in some way.

The proper response is not to wash our hands of the investigation. It is to (i) replicate our simulation results in a variety of contexts, and (ii) triangulate those results with evidence from the field (Saks 1997, p. 5). Suppose, for instance, that the admission of a certain kind of statistical testimony in a simulated products liability trial causes a massive increase in jurors' liability judgments. To establish the external validity of this result, we would next want to replicate it in another simulation using deliberating juries rather than individual jurors, or using a different products liability trial. We might also conduct an archival analysis to test for a correlation between such testimony and plaintiff judgments. If we continue to observe the same effects in many different simulation studies, and we find converging evidence from outside the laboratory, then we can be reasonably confident in generalizing our findings to actual trials.
3 Applications

For naturalized epistemology, the proof is in the pudding. Accordingly, we turn, in the remainder of this chapter, to two applications of the approach: eyewitness testimony and, more briefly, character evidence.

A Eyewitness testimony

An eyewitness identification likely represents the principal evidence in upwards of 100,000 criminal prosecutions in the United States each year (see Goldstein et al. 1989). And the law generally takes eyewitness identifications to be very good evidence, as appellate courts have consistently sustained guilty verdicts based on the testimony of a single eyewitness, even where that testimony is undermined by other evidence. Yet eyewitnesses are often wrong. Mistaken eyewitness identifications contributed to at least 258 of the 375 wrongful convictions (69%) in the U.S. that have so far been overturned based on DNA evidence (Innocence Project 2020). These exonerations suggest that mistaken eyewitness identification is the single leading cause of wrongful convictions in our criminal justice system today.

This raises, but does not settle, the question of the reliability of identification evidence. The science of eyewitness memory, developed over the last 40 years, helps to provide an answer. Research psychologists most often study eyewitness memory by conducting laboratory experiments in which participants view a simulated crime and later attempt to pick the culprit out of a lineup. In one study, for example, participants signed up for an experiment on “complex information processing.” In fact, Lindsay (1986) had arranged for someone to interrupt each session by bursting into the lab and stealing an expensive piece of electronic equipment. Having become eyewitnesses to a crime, the participants were later shown either a target-present or a target-absent lineup and asked to identify the thief. Eyewitnesses perform surprisingly poorly in such studies. In a review of 94 experiments, Clark et al. (2008) found that among subjects shown target-present lineups, just 46% correctly identified the culprit, while 21% incorrectly identified a filler. (The remainder declined to make an identification.) Among subjects shown target-absent lineups, 48% incorrectly identified an innocent person. Experiments conducted outside the laboratory suggest that these results gen-
eralize (see, e.g., Pigott et al. 1990, in which 47 unwitting bank tellers were confronted by, and later asked to identify, a man trying to cash a crudely forged money order).

These results converge with the findings of field studies of lineups conducted in actual police investigations. Unlike in the experimental context, researchers observing eyewitness identifications at a police station don't know who actually committed the crime. The lineup consists of a suspect and several fillers known to be innocent. If an eyewitness identifies the suspect, then she may or may not have identified the actual culprit. We simply don't know whether her identification is accurate. If she identifies a filler, however, then we know that she has made a mistake. The published field studies include data from 6,734 lineups conducted in a variety of jurisdictions (Wells et al. 2020). All told, eyewitnesses identified the suspect 2,746 times (40.8%), identified a known-innocent filler 1,599 times (23.7%), and declined to make an identification 2,389 times (35.5%). Thus, nearly one in every four eyewitnesses (23.7%) identified someone known to be innocent. Setting aside the cases in which no identification was made, 36.8% of the choosers pointed to someone known to be innocent. Since some suspect identifications were surely mistaken as to the actual culprit, the true rate of mistaken identification is even higher.

Of course, eyewitnesses perform better in some circumstances than others. In the research literature, factors related to eyewitness accuracy are divided into system variables and estimator variables (Wells 1978). A system variable is a variable that is potentially under the control of the criminal justice system, such as the size of the lineup shown to an eyewitness. An estimator variable is one that is outside the system's control, such as the age of the eyewitness. Some research on estimator variables has produced predictable results, for instance that eyewitness accuracy falls when the culprit is seen only briefly, or only in the dark, or only from a great distance. But the literature includes some startling findings as well. For instance, eyewitness accuracy falls when the culprit's race differs from the eyewitness's (Meissner and Brigham 2001), when the eyewitness only sees the culprit under highly stressful conditions (Deffenbacher et al. 2004), and when the culprit openly displays a weapon (Steblay 1992), among other conditions.

Concerning system variables, we note three significant findings. First, research shows that accuracy is significantly affected by whether the eyewitness has been warned
that the culprit might or might not be in the lineup. Pre-lineup instructions that lack this warning—what are called biased instructions—produce a negligible increase in correct identifications and a massive increase in false positives as compared to unbiased instructions (Steblay 1997). Second, research shows that filler selection is extremely important. In particular, using fillers that make the suspect stand out—for instance, by failing to match eyewitness descriptions of the culprit—severely undermines the reliability of an identification (Fitzgerald et al. 2013). Third, if the lineup administrator knows who the suspect is, then she can influence the identification, and undermine its reliability, in a variety of ways (e.g., Greathouse and Kovera 2009).

In fact, an unblinded lineup administrator can cause problems even after an identification has been made. For instance, she can raise the confidence a mistaken eyewitness has in her identification by providing positive feedback. Research has repeatedly shown that even modest encouragement (“Good, you picked out the suspect”) significantly inflates both the eyewitness’s confidence that her identification was correct and the confidence that she recalls having when she originally made the identification (Semmler et al. 2004; Wells and Bradfield 1998).

The courts have often touted eyewitness confidence as an important index of accuracy. Are they right about this? Are confident eyewitnesses reliable? We need to distinguish between (i) an eyewitness’s confidence in her identification at the time she makes it, (ii) her confidence at the time of trial, and (iii) her belief at the time of trial about her confidence at the time of identification. It is quite clear that because of the malleability of eyewitness confidence and retrospective assessments of confidence, neither (ii) nor (iii) is a remotely reliable index of accuracy (Bradfield et al. 2002; Wells et al. 1981). The real question is whether initial eyewitness confidence, if accurately recorded by a blinded administrator, reliably tracks accuracy.

A consensus has emerged that, under certain conditions, it does (e.g., Wixted and Wells 2017; Palmer et al. 2013). But the boundary conditions of this phenomenon are not yet clear. Wixted and Wells (2017) argue that initial confidence reliably predicts accuracy so long as the testing conditions are pristine—so long, that is, as (i) the lineup includes only one suspect; (ii) the lineup is fair, in the sense that the suspect does not stand out; (iii) the pre-lineup instructions are unbiased; and (iv) the lineup administrator

---

does not know who the suspect is (i.e., double-blind administration). Others argue, with some empirical support, that pristine testing conditions are not good enough (e.g., Lockamyeir et al. 2020). In addition, they claim, the *witnessing conditions* must be favorable: the eyewitness must have a relatively long look at the culprit’s face, from a relatively close distance, in relatively good light, and so on. This remains an open question. Even if pristine testing conditions turned out to be sufficient to ensure a strong confidence-accuracy relationship, however, the problem would remain that, although the situation is improving, most eyewitness identifications in the U.S. are not conducted under pristine conditions (see, e.g., McNabb et al. 2017; Greene and Evelo 2015; Police Executive Research Forum 2013).

Even if eyewitness identifications are not especially reliable, an identification will typically still be relevant. It will typically still make the defendant’s guilt more probable than it otherwise would have been. The research goes to the probative value of eyewitness identifications, and we only have a problem if juries take them to be more or less probative than they actually are. Unfortunately, the evidence suggests that jurors do indeed *overbelieve* eyewitnesses. Consider an experiment by Lindsay et al. (1981), in which they manipulated a number of factors in a staged crime to yield low (33%), moderate (50%), or high (74%) proportions of correct eyewitness identifications. Jurors then watched as defense counsel cross-examined an eyewitness drawn from one of these conditions. Under every condition, jurors’ belief rates were higher than witnesses’ accuracy rates. The disparity was especially severe when witnessing conditions were poor. Under those conditions—in which only 33% of eyewitnesses were accurate—jurors believed eyewitnesses 62% of the time.⁴

A number of U.S. courts have suggested that jurors are at least sensitive to the factors affecting eyewitness accuracy.⁵ They insist that the results just canvassed are simply common sense, perfectly familiar to the average juror. Survey research shows that this is wrong. Benton et al. (2006) asked jury-eligible adults to judge the truth or falsity of 30 statements concerning various issues affecting eyewitness accuracy (e.g., “The presence of a weapon impairs an eyewitness’s ability to accurately identify

⁴These results were replicated in Wells et al. (1980). See also Brigham and Bothwell (1983).
the perpetrator’s face”). They then compared these responses to those of research psychologists in the field. The results showed that jurors generally agreed with the experts on just four out of the 30 statements. For instance, while 98% of experts said that police instructions can affect an eyewitness’s willingness to make an identification, just 40% of jurors agreed. And while 90% of experts said that eyewitnesses are more accurate when identifying members of their own race, just 50% of jurors agreed.

These data converge with the results of experimental investigations of the factors that actually influence verdicts. For instance, Cutler et al. (1988) showed mock jurors video of an armed robbery trial in which an eyewitness identification was the key prosecution evidence. Ten factors relevant to eyewitness accuracy were systematically manipulated, including culprit disguise, weapon visibility, instruction bias, and lineup fairness. The only factor that significantly affected verdicts was eyewitness confidence at the time of trial, which, as we saw, is effectively worthless. The remaining factors had at most trivial effects, often in the wrong direction. This basic result—that jurors are highly sensitive to eyewitness confidence at trial but insensitive to important factors bearing on eyewitness accuracy—has been replicated repeatedly (e.g., Jones et al. 2020; 2008).

A variety of possible reforms could improve the accuracy of the system. These reforms fall into three distinct categories. The first involves attempts to improve the reliability of the eyewitness identification evidence that law enforcement collects along the lines discussed above. If law enforcement agencies were forced to use best practices, the resulting identifications would be more reliable, and more in line with jurors’ expectations.6 This might be accomplished through legislation requiring their use or, indirectly, through a rule of evidence excluding identification evidence resulting from dubious procedures. (Such a rule of evidence might itself be adopted by legislation or by judicial interpretation of constitutional due process. The U.S. Supreme Court has rejected this approach,7 but a number of states have adopted something like it.8)

---

6For an extended discussion of best practices, see Wells et al. (2020).
The second category of reforms involves using the existing rules of evidence to exclude the least reliable eyewitness identification evidence. This could overlap with the previous reforms in jurisdictions that use evidence law to deter shoddy identification procedures, but courts should also exclude some identification evidence whose unreliability is not due to procedural defects. For instance, an eyewitness should not be allowed to testify at trial (or in pretrial hearings) about her confidence that the defendant (i.e., the person she has identified) is in fact the culprit. We have seen that eyewitness confidence can be inflated by dubious procedures. But a variety of additional variables have also been shown to inflate eyewitness confidence even in the absence of procedural defects (e.g., Odinot et al. 2009; Shaw 1996; Wells et al. 1981). As a result, an eyewitness’s confidence at trial is liable to reflect factors unrelated to memory strength. In many cases, eyewitness confidence at trial may actually be strictly irrelevant, but even if not, given its likely influence on the jury, courts should exclude it as “prejudicial” or “confusing” under FRE 403 or the state equivalent. Other plausible candidates for exclusion include evidence from eyewitnesses whose initial confidence in an identification was low (see Wixted and Wells 2017), as well as courthouse identifications generally (see Garrett 2012).

The final category of possible reforms involves trying to improve jurors’ ability to evaluate the eyewitness identification evidence that they do see. If jurors fail to appropriately evaluate identification evidence because their knowledge of the factors affecting identification accuracy is limited, perhaps their performance would improve if this information were provided to them. This might be done, for instance, through expert testimony from a qualified research psychologist.\(^9\) Historically, eyewitness expert testimony was excluded as invading the province of the jury.\(^10\) Under FRE 702, it’s admissible if (i) it is based on reliable scientific knowledge, and (ii) it will help the jury evaluate the eyewitness testimony at issue. While courts generally allow that eyewitness expert testimony is based on reliable scientific knowledge, many still routinely exclude it as unhelpful, claiming that eyewitness psychology is just common

---

\(^9\)Alternatively, it might be done through jury instructions. We ignore jury instructions for reasons of space.

sense for the average juror. As we have seen, this is false.

The question remains, though, whether expert testimony will actually improve jurors’ evaluations of identification evidence. If it has any effects at all, it might produce (i) confusion, leading to perverse evaluations of eyewitness identifications; (ii) skepticism, leading to fewer guilty verdicts regardless of the strength of the evidence; or (iii) sensitivity, leading to verdicts that track the strength of the evidence (Cutler et al. 1989). Given that jurors tend to overbelieve eyewitnesses, some form of skepticism effect would arguably be salutary. But accuracy would hardly recommend that jurors be led to dismiss identifications made quickly and confidently in pristine testing conditions based on memories formed in ideal witnessing conditions. Such identifications remain, by all accounts, very strong evidence. Thus, sensitivity is ultimately the more desirable result.

Research shows that expert testimony can improve juror sensitivity to the factors that affect eyewitness accuracy (e.g., Wise and Kehn 2020; Cutler et al. 1989). The more common result, however, has been increased skepticism of eyewitness testimony in general (e.g., Jones et al. 2017; Lindsay 1994). This, at least, is the more common result when discrimination is measured at the level of verdicts. Interestingly, though, in many cases where expert testimony does not produce verdicts that are sensitive to the quality of the identification, it nevertheless improves jurors’ general understanding of eyewitness factors. The problem, in other words, seems to be that of applying this knowledge to the particular case. Recent experiments with expert testimony modeled on the interview-identification-eyewitness (I-I-Eye) teaching aid (Pawlenko et al. 2013) suggest that this problem can be solved (Wise and Kehn 2020).

B Character

FRE 404(a) prohibits the use of evidence of someone’s “character”—evidence that she is careless, or that she is aggressive—to prove that she acted accordingly on a particular occasion (subject to some exceptions). This basic prohibition extends to evidence of previous actions when offered to show character in order to prove action in accordance. Yet FRE 404(b) permits evidence of past actions to be used for other purposes, for

See, e.g., State v. Young, 35 So.3d 1042, 1050 (La. 2010).
instance to show motive, or opportunity, or absence of mistake. When specific acts
evidence is admitted under 404(b), the court may instruct the jury to consider it only
for a specified permitted purpose and not as the basis for the prohibited character
inference. FRE 404(a) does contemplate an exception for impeachment in accordance
with FRE 608, which permits evidence of a dishonest character to impeach a witness.

There is a large social psychology literature examining the explanatory power of
the notion of character. Do people act in keeping with stable personality traits across a
diverse range of situations? Or is behavior so situation-specific that personality traits
lack predictive value? Situationism holds that, in fact, people’s actions are primarily the
result of situational factors—often factors operating outside conscious awareness—
rather than reflecting stable dispositions constitutive of character. Thus, situationism
repudiates the core premise underlying the most obvious use of character evidence—
namely, that character can be used to predict behavior on a particular occasion. As
Ross and Nisbett (1991) note, “standard correlation coefficients determined in well-
controlled research settings” show that “personality traits” lack substantial “explanatory
and predictive power” (p. 91). If situationism is correct, then the FRE 404(a) bar on
character evidence is sound.

But consider the FRE 608 exception for impeachment by evidence of dishonest
character. If “manipulations of the immediate social situation can overwhelm in
importance the type of individual differences in personal traits or dispositions that
people normally think of as being determinative of social behavior” (Ross and Nisbett
1991, p. xiv), then why think a witness’s dishonest behavior at work or in her personal
life bears on her truth-telling in court, under oath, before a judge, under threat of perjury?
The situation giving rise to the impeachment evidence and the situation in which the
witness testifies are usually nothing alike.

Many also worry that permitting evidence of past actions under FRE 404(b) will
lead juries to draw officially forbidden inferences about the “bad character” of crim-
inal defendants. In fact, there is substantial experimental evidence to suggest that
any limiting instruction associated with the admission of such evidence is likely to
be ineffective (e.g., Lieberman and Arndt 2000). Given situationism, the danger of
“unfair prejudice” under FRE 403 appears substantial: if the jury draws (forbidden)
inferences from putative traits of character, the jury will be misled and prejudiced,
since situationism teaches that character traits have relatively little predictive power. Should such evidence generally be excluded?

Caution is required here. Consider the famous situationist study of Good Samaritan behavior (Darley and Batson 1973), which found that “[i]f the subjects were in a hurry... only about 10 percent helped [the person needing assistance]. By contrast, if they were not in a hurry... about 63 percent of them helped” (Ross and Nisbett 1991, p. 4). But what about that 10%? Would it not be reasonable to invoke their good character in explaining their behavior, unlike the majority? Indeed, other researchers have argued that character traits can have quite large impacts on behavior. Suppose we want to know whether a trait of “honesty” can be used to predict the degree to which children will engage in a broad array of related behaviors. If we try to predict just one such behavior on the basis of one other behavior, we obtain a correlation that explains only 5% of the behavioral variance. However, if we look at the overall honesty that a child shows across a whole battery of tests and then try to predict the honesty that the same child will show in another battery of tests, we obtain a much higher correlation—this time, explaining a full 81% of the variance (Hartshorne and May 1928). This suggests that it is the quality of the evidence that matters: we need better proof of character.

Existing rules, however, permit rather weak evidence of character: the opinion of those who know the person or her reputation, or evidence that she committed a serious crime, or committed any crime involving dishonesty. Moreover, at trial, we are concerned with a single instance of conduct—Did the defendant act in accordance with character on the occasion that resulted in charges? Did the witness tell the truth today?—which is precisely where situationism counsels skepticism about the predictive value of character evidence. In this context, the case for excluding evidence that supports inferences about character deserves more serious consideration from courts, although sometimes the probative value of prior bad acts for permissible purposes will outweigh the danger of unfair prejudice.
References


