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Cognitive Sciences

CellPress

Letter

To test the boundaries of consciousness, study animals

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How can we validate tests for consciousness beyond healthy adult humans? Bayne and colleagues propose the 'iterative natural kind strategy' (INKS) [1]. INKS begins by taking seriously all tests with at least some face validity rather than restricting our attention to a small subset of tests that antecedently pass stringent requirements of validation. We then look for clustering among our tests (and mechanisms explaining such patterns), using these findings to refine our battery of tests. Subsequently, we apply the same process to the new battery.

The strategy raises the question: where to start? Bayne *et al.* make a controversial proposal. They suggest that cases can be sorted into 'levels' according to 'distance' from healthy adult humans, and they propose starting with the 'closest' cases first. They note that this raises the issue of 'how populations should be assigned to levels' (p. 462): what is the right concept of 'distance'? Are coma patients 'nearer' or 'further' from healthy human consciousness than non-human animals? Does language render large language models 'closer' to us than octopuses – or is language trumped by having a biological brain?

We propose that, given INKS, there are strong reasons for the first phase to include a wide range of non-human animals. Diverse tests have at least some face validity when applied to animals. Furthermore, they can be applied to many different species at different life stages (e.g., juvenile, adult). These features greatly facilitate attempts to study clustering.

Figure 2 of Bayne *et al.* [1] gives the opposite impression: that non-human animals (especially invertebrates) are among the most 'distant' populations, with most tests deemed easier to apply and interpret in humans undergoing disordered states of consciousness, or even in artificial intelligence (AI). This implies that we should start by investigating AI and coma patients before eventually turning our attention to other active, mobile animals. That would be a massive misstep.

The rationales for the claims in Figure 2 are not discussed, and some of these claims seem dubious. For example, why is the perturbation complexity index (PCI) deemed potentially applicable to xenobots and AI, but not to birds? Why are the prospects of the covert command-following test stronger for AI than for monkeys? An excessively skeptical attitude toward consciousness in non-human animals is implicit here.

Strikingly, the paper omits virtually all tests currently used in the animal consciousness literature. Moreover, the one test the authors do include – unlimited associative learning (UAL) – is not a single test. UAL hypothesizes, in short, that a package of advanced learning abilities are enabled by a shared underlying mechanism that suffices for at least a minimal form of consciousness. It is a theory positing a natural kind, not one test.

In reality, the animal consciousness literature is a rich source of tests with at least some face validity [2,3]. Current tests can be grouped for convenience as follows (although, importantly, each group contains numerous distinct tests that may ultimately cluster differently [4]): (i) putatively consciousness-linked forms of learning, such as trace conditioning and goal-directed learning; (ii) integration of affective and other information in the service of decision-making; (iii) signs of mental simulation (e.g., vicarious trial and error, model-based reasoning, and tests related to episodic-like memory and planning); (iv) metacognitive and report-like behavior; and (v) indicators of rapid eye movement (REM)-like sleep and dream-like states, including measures related to eye movements and (in octopuses) skin coloration [5,6]. Many of these tests can be combined with paradigms that induce dissociations suggestive of distinct conscious and unconscious pathways, with significant differences in performance on tasks due to procedures such as masking and blindsight-related manipulations [7–10].

A version of Bayne and colleagues' table giving all these animal tests their due would look very different (Figure 1).

A critic might reply: rather than for consciousness itself, these may be testing for other abilities, such as integration, learning, or metacognition. However, a parallel concern applies to tests designed for use in clinical settings, such as the PCI: are they really tracking conscious experience *per se* or functional states such as coma, sleep, and wakefulness that could occur with or without conscious experience?

INKS, to its credit, urges a pragmatic approach to such questions: do not abandon a test because we cannot be sure from the outset that it tracks consciousness. Instead, iteratively improve our understanding of which tests are tracking consciousness by actively investigating how and why results of our tests cluster. Crucially, this strategy applies equally to clinical tests in humans and to the profusion of tests in other animals. Rather than hastily assuming markers are not relevant, let us study them and use the clustering patterns we find to guide iterative theory development.

		Learning-related tests	Integrative decision-making	Mental simulation	Metacognitive & report-like behavior	REM-like sleep & dream-like states
(Adult) non-human animals	Monkeys	+	+	+	+	+
	Rodents	+	+	+	+	+
	Birds	+	+	+	+	+
	Teleost fish	+	+	+	+?	+
	Insects	+	+	?	+?	+
	Decapod crustaceans	+	+	?	?	+
	Cephalopods	+	+	+?	?	+
Altered states	Sedation	—	?	—	—	+
	Epileptic seizure	—	?	?	?	—
Unclear capacity for consciousness	Disorders of consciousness	—	?	?	—	+
	Babies	?	—	?	—	+
	Fetuses	—	—	—	—	+
Artificial systems	Neural organoids	?	?	—	—	—
	Xenobots	?	?	?	—	—
	AI	?	?	?	?	—

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Figure 1. Impact of considering a wider range of tests. Revised version of Figure 2 from Bayne *et al.* [1], illustrating the impact of emphasizing different tests, and with animals categorized according to biologically meaningful taxa. +, test can be administered to the population (possibly with some modifications), with enough face validity to be studied within the iterative natural kind strategy (INKS) (+ does not imply a test has already been validated); –, test is either inapplicable or not meaningfully interpretable for the population; ?, more development is needed; +?, applicable but with unclear interpretation. Each 'test' column corresponds to multiple tests, grouped for convenience. For details and key references, see [4]. Abbreviations: AI, artificial intelligence; REM, rapid eye movement.

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Declaration of interests

The authors declare no competing interests.

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