

14 Quietism, Dialetheism, and the Three Moments of Hegel's Logic

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14.1 Introduction

The history of philosophy can present us with false friends and false foes. We can overestimate a historical figure's ability to answer our questions by citing their use of concepts or methods that seem familiar to us, yet whose meaning and purpose differ across epochs. We thereby miss an opportunity to learn to what extent we have moved away from our philosophical past.¹ We can also underestimate a historical figure's ability to answer our questions by citing their use of concepts or methods that are marked by controversy or disrepute, as if controversy or disrepute may not signal resistance to relinquishing perhaps still dominant prejudices. We thereby miss an opportunity to learn in what way we perpetuate our philosophical past. The history of philosophy thus risks a kind of self-opacity whereby we fail to acknowledge either our remoteness from or our proximity to prior modes of thinking.

The risk associated with the history of philosophy is relevant to an assessment of Hegel's appropriation by John McDowell and Graham Priest. McDowell enlists Hegel for a quietist answer to a problem stemming from the dualistic assumption that concepts and reality belong to different orders, viz. the problem of how concepts are answerable to the world. If we accept Hegel's absolute idealist view that the conceptual is boundless, this dualism and its resultant problem are said to dissolve. Priest enlists Hegel for a dialetheist answer to a problem stemming from the dualistic assumption that truth and falsity are mutually exclusive, viz. the problem of how certain sentences are both true and false. If we accept Hegel's dialectical view that certain contradictions are necessary, this dualism and its resultant problem are said to dissolve. For both McDowell and Priest, then, contemporary philosophy finds a true friend in Hegel.

I will argue that McDowell's and Priest's appropriations of Hegel exhibit the historical self-opacity of overestimating Hegel's affinity with quietism and dialetheism, respectively. On the one hand, McDowell reads

DOI: 10.4324/9781003187561-15

Hegel as a quietist who silences sceptical questions that threaten common sense, yet he cannot account for Hegel's adaptation of ancient scepticism for use against common sense. On the other hand, Priest reads Hegel as a dialetheist who subordinates formal logic to dialectical logic by affirming the truth of certain contradictions, yet he cannot account for Hegel's commitment to resolving contradictions for the sake of truth as a whole. I will diagnose their misreadings in terms of what Hegel regards as the three moments of logic and argue that while McDowell jumps prematurely to its third moment, Priest stalls needlessly at its second moment.

Hegel concludes the Preliminary Conception in the *Encyclopaedia Logic* (1830) with 'descriptive anticipations' of the main structure of the text, according to which logic, i.e., the science of intelligibility, is said to have three 'moments'. The first is the abstractive moment of the understanding, which 'stops short' at fixed categories. The second is the negative moment of dialectic, which discovers the 'genuine nature' of the categories, viz. that each 'passes over, of itself, into its opposite'. The third is the positive moment of speculation, which grasps the 'unity' of categories through the 'dissolution' of their inner opposition. Hegel warns that if these moments are 'kept separate from each other ... then they are not considered in their truth' (Hegel GW 19: §§79–82).² In other words, the truth of the three moments of logic lies in their unity, just as the truth of the stages of a plant lies in their unity. Any appropriation of Hegel should accordingly be measured against the standard of truth to which he holds the moments of logic.

I will present the three moments of logic in Section 14.2 in order to show that quietist and dialetheist readings of Hegel fail to consider these moments 'in their truth'. On the one hand, in his quietist critique of metaphysics, McDowell enlists Hegel to dissolve problems stemming from the assumption of the duality of concept and reality. But, as I will show in Section 14.3, McDowell helps himself directly to the third moment of logic, where the boundlessness of the conceptual would be fully articulated. Since he arrives at the third moment prematurely, ignoring its prior moments, he obscures its truth. On the other hand, in his dialetheist critique of formal logic, Priest enlists Hegel to dissolve problems stemming from the assumption of the duality of truth and falsity. But, as I will show in Section 14.4, Priest restricts himself gratuitously to the second moment of logic, where contradictions within the categories are not yet resolved. Since he stalls at the second moment, severed from its final moment, he obscures its truth. We can extricate Hegel from quietist and dialetheist misreadings only if we see that the truth of the moments of logic lies in their unity.

Admittedly, McDowell and Priest offer minority readings of Hegel. Nevertheless, they appropriate Hegel in order to advance relatively influential positions, according to which, following McDowell, the philosophical questions that we ask are pseudo-questions that require a therapeutic

response (McDowell 1996: 95) and, following Priest, the concepts that we use are useful yet mostly logically inconsistent (Priest 2006: 4). If Hegel endorses neither quietism nor dialetheism, it is crucial to retrieve his metaphysics from recruitment to such positions. I will consequently treat these misreadings of Hegel as a ladder to discard once we rise to a more adequate reading.

14.2 The Three Moments of Logic

For Hegel, logic has three moments, which he calls '*moments of everything logically real*'; i.e., of every concept or of everything true in general' (Hegel GW 19: §79). In the first moment of logic, the understanding posits the categories as abstract concepts, i.e., as universals that are 'held onto in firm opposition' to particulars. Furthermore, the understanding judges according to the 'principle of identity', applying the categories so that a thing may be 'grasped in its full precision' in contrast to other things and, hence, so that 'nothing should remain vague and indeterminate' in the 'domains either of theory or of practice' (Hegel GW 19: §80). Bringing an object or an action under a category in a judgement preserves the identity and thus the determinacy of that object or action to the exclusion of other objects or actions.

In the second moment of logic, dialectic discovers that the categories do not actually preserve the identity of what is judged because a category's own 'nature' is dialectical in that it 'passes over, of itself, into its opposite'. Dialectic discovers the '*immanent transcending*' whereby a category's 'one-sidedness and restrictedness ... displays itself as what it is', viz. its 'negation'. We see this when, despite its apparent 'one-sidedness', being, since it is undifferentiated and indeterminate, negates itself by collapsing into nothing and vice versa, producing a contradiction. Evoking a distinction that we will observe in Section 14.3, Hegel claims that dialectic is 'high ancient scepticism', for it consists in 'complete despair about everything that the understanding holds to be firm' regarding the categories. Dialectic therefore 'must not be confused' with 'modern' scepticism, which denies knowledge of the 'supersensible' yet dogmatically 'hold[s] onto' knowledge of the 'sensible'. By exposing the process whereby a category '*immanent[ly]* transcend[s]' itself for its own opposite, dialectic reveals itself to be '[s]cepticism proper' (Hegel GW 19: §81).³

Hegel notes that dialectic is not merely negative, but also positive, for while it is the nature of a category to sunder itself into contradictory claims, the 'dissolution' of these claims and their 'transition' towards 'unity' in a successor category equally belong to a category's nature. This is why, towards the end of his description of the second moment of logic, Hegel calls dialectic 'the principle through which alone *immanent coherence and*

necessity enter into the content of science' (Hegel GW 19: §81). First, the development of logic as the science of intelligibility, i.e., the development of truth as a systematic whole, would be interrupted if a category negated itself into claims that remained in contradiction, for such claims would lack coherence.⁴ Second, Hegel says shortly after that '*necessity*' consists in thinking's '*drive* to find' a 'stable meaning' for the opposing claims in a category (Hegel GW 19: §87). This is to say that a category's opposing claims would lack necessity unless their contradiction were resolved by the unity of a successor category. As Hegel says at the end of his description of the second moment, while 'philosophy ... contains the sceptical as a moment within itself – specifically as the dialectical moment', it 'does not stop at the merely negative result of the dialectic', i.e., at contradiction. This is because dialectic 'mistakes its result' if it 'holds fast' to contradiction, which thwarts the scientific goals of '*coherence and necessity*'. Instead, the negative result of dialectic must be 'sublated' into a 'positive' result, which occurs in the third, '*speculative*' moment of logic (Hegel GW 19: §81).⁵

In the third moment of logic, then, the '*positive* result' of dialectic is the speculative unity of the opposing claims in a category. This, Hegel says, is 'not *simple, formal* unity, but a *unity of distinct determinations*' (Hegel GW 19: §82), for it contains, not just the sameness, but also the distinctness of these claims. In other words, a speculative unity contains the identity and difference of a category's opposing claims. Were this unity strictly an identity of opposing claims, it would merely repeat the contradiction with which dialectic negatively results. As Hegel says in Section One, Chapter Two, of the Doctrine of Being in the *Science of Logic* (1812/16), affirming the identity or '*equal[ity]*' of the opposing claims in a category is only 'another shape of the still abiding contradiction'. Resolving this contradiction requires grasping opposing claims in their '*ideality*', i.e., as moments of a unity that maintains the difference of these claims (Hegel GW 21: 139). Thus, being and nothing are ideal moments of becoming because in it they are '*the same*', since they have 'passed over into' each other, and '*not the same*', since each is distinguished by its 'distinct' vanishing into the other, viz. and respectively, as 'coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be' (Hegel GW 21: 69–70, 94–95).

In the next section, I will articulate the shortcoming of McDowell's appropriation of Hegel by tracing the ancient sceptical character of logic's second moment to Hegel's early adaptation of an ancient sceptical method.

14.3 Quietism and the Third Moment of Logic

In *Mind and World*, McDowell diagnoses an antinomy whose resolution he regards as Hegelian in spirit. The antinomy ensnares two theses about how concepts are answerable to the world such that our beliefs can count

as knowledge: the empirical world both must and cannot stand as a tribunal over our use of concepts. It must, according to the first thesis, if our concepts are to be guided by sensible interaction with the world, and cannot, according to the second thesis, if our concepts are to be guided, not only by sensibility, but also by our normative and therefore spontaneous capacity to make warranted judgements about the world (McDowell 1996: xii, 67, 69). However, *contra* the first thesis, unless we are normatively capable of judging what is sensibly given, what is given cannot figure in warranted judgement and so cannot be appealed to as anything but a 'myth'. And, *contra* the second thesis, if the relations among warranted judgements are justificatory, such relations are confined to the 'space of reasons' and so, however coherent, fail to grasp the world (McDowell 1996: 5–9, 14).

The theses in the antinomy share the idea that sensibility is a receptive capacity that, in its use, is distinct from the spontaneous capacity for judgement. This idea expresses the dualistic assumption that whereas concepts are actively grasped by judgement in thought, reality is passively received by sensibility in experience, i.e., the dualistic assumption that concepts and reality belong or at least cannot be ruled out as belonging to different orders. McDowell resolves the antinomy by rejecting its spoiling idea. He argues that sensibility is inseparable from judgement because, in its use, it 'draws' on our normative capacity for judging (McDowell 1996: 13). In other words, the empirical world is always a matter for judgement and, hence, empirical content is always implicitly conceptual content. To judge that something empirically given has some property is always to sense it in such a way as to be capable of grasping the concept of that property.⁶

McDowell's resolution of the antinomy is inspired by Kant's claim that 'intuition without thought' falls outside the unity of consciousness and so is 'nothing for us' (Kant A111).⁷ However, Kant holds that our forms of intuition condition how the world appears to us and thereby exclude the world as it is in itself. This leaves intact the duality of concept and reality insofar as it permits the coincidence of concept use strictly with empirical reality, not with transcendental reality. In order to avoid Kant's transcendental idealist view of an unknowable world beyond the empirical world, McDowell invokes Hegel's 'Absolute idealis[t]' view that the 'conceptual realm', i.e., the realm whose empirical content is always implicitly conceptual content, has no 'outer boundary' (McDowell 1996: 44).⁸ We dislodge the dualistic assumption that concepts and reality belong to different orders only if we acknowledge that a reality beyond one's concept use neither entails nor requires a reality beyond what is empirically conceivable.⁹ In other words, we eliminate the duality of concept and reality only if we distinguish 'the *act* of thinking' from '*thinkable contents*' and recognise that such contents are not bounded by an unknowable world (McDowell

1996: 28).¹⁰ We thereby follow Hegel in grasping the sense in which concepts and reality constitute a single order.¹¹

The Hegelian view that the conceptual is boundless accordingly serves to resolve the antinomy. But why does McDowell regard this view as quietistic?

McDowell's aim is to silence such sceptical questions as whether 'we are open to facts' or whether 'states of affairs' are 'directly manifest' to us, questions that ask after the unity of concepts and reality precisely because they begin by assuming their duality. We silence such questions if, following Hegel, we recognise that concepts and reality constitute a single order. However, for McDowell, this recognition must be therapeutic, not constructive. He argues that 'constructive philosophy' has 'no prospect of answering' sceptical questions because it guarantees their return by leaving their dualistic assumption intact. We must instead 'exorcise' such questions (McDowell 1996: xxiii-iv).¹² As he says: 'The aim here is not to answer sceptical questions, but to begin to see how it might be intellectually respectable to ignore them, to treat them as unreal, in the way that common sense has always wanted to' (McDowell 1996: 113). McDowell's quietistic goal is to ignore scepticism and to restore our sense of being at home in the world.¹³ On his reading, the Hegelian view achieves this goal by dislodging scepticism's dualistic assumption and the sceptical questions that it provokes. Hegel's awareness that there is 'no ontological gap' between thought and being, i.e., that thought and being are of the same 'sort', silences questions that are 'threatening to common sense' (McDowell 1996: 27–8, 83). In "Hegel's Idealism as Radicalization of Kant", McDowell puts this point by saying that, by discarding the transcendental idealist 'frame' whereby Kant retains the duality of concept and reality, Hegel's 'authentic idealism' provides assurance for 'common-sense realism' (McDowell 2009: 81).

While McDowell regards Hegel as entitled to a quietistic expression of the claim that 'thinking does not stop short of the facts' (McDowell 1996: 33), he acknowledges that his interpretive strategy is to 'domesticate the rhetoric' of absolute idealism (McDowell 1996: 44). In "Hegel's Idealism", he describes *Mind and World* as taking a 'simple' path towards absolute idealism, Hegel's own path to which he says is 'more complex' (McDowell 2009: 89). And in "Responses", a reply to his readers, McDowell describes his thinking as Hegelian 'in spirit', if not in letter, because his anti-sceptical 'exorcisms' provide 'ways of entering into Hegel's work', whereas Hegel himself struggles to make absolute idealism 'inviting to people who find it alien' (McDowell 2006: 269, 277).¹⁴

It is difficult to reconcile McDowell's quietism with his appropriation of Hegel. In the Preface to the *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807), Hegel says that philosophy's attainment of scientific form is 'the prize at the end of

a complicated, tortuous path'. In the Introduction, he describes this path as a 'pathway of *doubt*', one that involves not the irresolute scepticism of 'shillyshallying about this or that presumed truth, followed by a return to that truth again', but rather the 'thoroughgoing scepticism' that is 'directed against the whole range of phenomenal consciousness', specifically, consciousness' 'so-called natural ideas' about truth. Irresolute scepticism is exhibited precisely by what McDowell regards as the hopeless movement of dogmatically assuming the duality of concepts and reality, asking after their unity, and constructing an answer that leaves their duality intact and that thereby secures merely a 'return' to a 'presumed truth'. By contrast, thoroughgoing scepticism 'brings about a state of despair' in consciousness' ideas or categories of truth by discovering contradictions within them and 'bring[ing] to pass the *completion* of the series' of their negations (Hegel W 3: 19, 72–73). Hegel's focus is therefore not the same variety of scepticism that McDowell aims to exorcise.

As Michael Forster shows, Hegel adapts an ancient sceptical method of setting opposing arguments against each other in order to produce equipollence, suspend judgement, and achieve tranquillity. For Hegel, we discover opposing claims of equal force within individual categories, fall into the despair of being forced to affirm the contradiction that is produced by these opposing claims, resolve this contradiction by sublating these opposing claims into a successor category, and ultimately attain a kind of repose by dialectically exhausting the totality of such contradictions and arriving at a stable set, i.e., a system, of categories.¹⁵ Crucially, this adapted ancient method assumes no specific beliefs in order to achieve its goal. By contrast, modern scepticism is beset by disquiet precisely because it begins with dogmatically assumed beliefs, e.g., the assumption of the duality of concepts and reality (Forster 1989: 10–12). We can see, then, that whereas McDowell aims to silence and exorcise the irresolute scepticism of modernity, Hegel aims to harness and repurpose the thoroughgoing scepticism of antiquity.¹⁶

Still, perhaps Hegel's adaptation of ancient scepticism is consistent with McDowell's quietist method of ignoring modern scepticism insofar as Hegel might be said to arrive at McDowell's quietist destination by taking a path that differs merely in degree of complexity.

This prospect fades when we consult Hegel's review of G.E. Schulze's *Critique of Theoretical Philosophy* (1801) in "On the Relationship of Scepticism to Philosophy" (1802). Hegel claims that Schulze 'is only acquainted with sceptical and dogmatic philosophizing' because he fails to recognise that, 'apart from scepticism and dogmatism, there was still a third possibility, to wit, a philosophy' (Hegel 2000: 316, 325).¹⁷ Schulze dogmatically assumes the duality of concept and reality, first, by asserting that 'what is given within the compass of our consciousness has

undeniable certainty’ and, second, by defining theoretical philosophy as the science of the ‘*unconditioned cause of all conditioned things*’, a cause that he locates ‘outside and above our consciousness’. This duality makes it both necessary and impossible that ‘*existence*’ is ‘*discoverable*’ by means of ‘*concepts*’, for, on the one hand, theoretical philosophy seeks to comprehend the existence of an unconditioned cause and yet, on the other, it can find ‘*certainty*’ only ‘within the compass of our consciousness’. Since no ‘bridge’ can be built from our concepts to existence, Schulze sceptically resigns himself to ‘a *philosophy which does not go beyond consciousness*’ (Hegel 2000: 317–318).

Schulze’s sceptical conclusion is unavoidable given the dogmatic premise on which it rests, viz. the duality of concept and reality. This is why Hegel says that ‘Schulzian scepticism integrates the crudest dogmatism into itself’. Moreover, we saw that dogmatic assumption defines the irresolute scepticism of modernity insofar as this variety of scepticism is helplessly tethered to a ‘presumed truth’. This is why Hegel regards modern scepticism as having ‘sunk so far in company with dogmatism’ through a ‘communal degeneration of philosophy’ (Hegel 2000: 330).

McDowell might appear to echo Hegel’s critique of Schulze, given that McDowell quietistically ignores sceptical questions in an apparent attempt to avoid the ‘integrat[ion]’ of scepticism and dogmatism. However, McDowell’s alliance with common sense betrays the Schulzian character of his quietism. As Hegel says:

[M]odern scepticism lacks the noblest side of scepticism, its orientation against the dogmatism of ordinary consciousness ... For the most recent scepticism ... the ordinary consciousness with its whole infinite range of facts has an indubitable certainty ... Furthermore, according to this latest scepticism, our physics and astronomy, and analytical thought, bid defiance to all rational doubtfulness; and thus it lacks also the noblest side of the later ancient scepticism, i.e., its orientation against limited cognition, against finite knowledge.

(Hegel 2000: 339)

McDowell’s aim is to ignore sceptical questions on behalf of common sense. However, by deferring to the ‘indubitable certainty’ of common or ‘ordinary consciousness’, even against the duality of concept and reality, McDowell lacks what Hegel regards as the ‘noblest side of scepticism’, viz. an ancient sceptical ‘orientation against the dogmatism of ordinary consciousness’. Ordinary consciousness consists of ‘finite knowledge’ whereby the understanding offers bare assurances about truth in the ‘phenomenal world’, i.e., the truth of ‘the given, the fact, the finite (whether this finite is called “appearance” or “concept”)’ (Hegel 2000: 331–332). Ordinary

consciousness exhibits dogmatism because the finitude of its knowledge entails its opposition to contrary finite knowledge, i.e., to contrary bare assurances about the truth. As Hegel says, it is the 'essence of dogmatism' to posit as 'absolute' something that is merely relative, viz. 'something finite, something burdened with an opposition' (Hegel 2000: 335). We cannot resolve the opposition within the finite knowledge of ordinary consciousness on the basis of still more finite knowledge on pain of regress. This is why Hegel says that 'sundering' the 'absolute identity of thought and being' into 'finite cognition' constitutes a 'dogmatic scepticism' (Hegel 2000: 354, 357). Resolving the opposition within finite knowledge instead requires adapting an ancient sceptical method of producing equipollence between opposing arguments, which Hegel does by dialectically exhausting the totality of inner oppositions in the categories. We see, then, that McDowell repeats rather than avoids Schulze's integration of scepticism and dogmatism.¹⁸ Despite ignoring the questions of modern scepticism, McDowell perpetuates its indulgence of ordinary consciousness, whose dogmatic endorsement of endlessly opposable finite knowledge, including the bare assurance of the identity of concept and reality, demands a solution that derives from antiquity.

For Hegel, modern scepticism has a dogmatic shadow that we cannot outrun by simply ignoring its questions. We must instead pursue 'a third possibility, to wit, a philosophy'. While Hegel regards this philosophy as 'neither scepticism nor dogmatism', he also regards it as 'both at once', for he acknowledges a variety of scepticism that is 'in its inmost heart at one with every true philosophy', viz. a scepticism that is adapted from an ancient method. First, this scepticism observes the inner opposition of, not a mere concept, but rather a dogmatic claim about truth. Second, it observes the self-destruction to which this claim's inner opposition leads. Third, it observes the successor claim that resolves this inner opposition. The adapted ancient sceptical method thereby teaches us how 'philosophy may possibly be something other than the dogmatism' with which modern scepticism is exclusively acquainted (Hegel 2000: 322–323). Crucially, Hegel's early adaptation of this three-step ancient sceptical method prefigures the movement of his subsequent logic through its three moments of understanding, dialectic, and speculation. However, as we saw, these moments only have their truth together, i.e., as a unity. We therefore cannot, like McDowell, help ourselves directly to the third moment, as if the speculative insight into the articulated identity of concept and reality could be won simply by an appeal to common sense and hence by means other than philosophy, i.e., by means that are unqualifiedly anti-sceptical.

The pathway of doubt cannot be evaded on pain of dogmatism. McDowell's quietistic refusal to take this path and his deference to common sense abandons the spirit of Hegelianism because it abandons what Hegel

regards as the sceptical essence of ‘every true philosophy’ and what he eventually regards as the second, dialectical moment of logic. McDowell’s premature speculation about the goal of Hegel’s philosophy accordingly violates the unity of its logical moments.¹⁹ Indeed, McDowell risks what in the Preface to the *Phenomenology* Hegel calls ‘the rapturous enthusiasm which, like a shot from a pistol, begins straight away with absolute knowledge, and makes short work of other standpoints’ – including scepticism – ‘by declaring that it takes no notice of them’ (Hegel W 3: 31). Hegel is aware that such a ‘royal road to Science’ will find ‘no more easy-going way than to rely on sound common sense’. However, given the inherent dogmatism of common sense, he concludes that the ‘scientific insight’ of philosophy is ‘only to be won through the labour of the Concept’ (Hegel W 3: 65).

14.4 Dialetheism and the Second Moment of Logic

Just before he charges Schulze with ignoring the philosophical alternative to modern scepticism and dogmatism, Hegel invokes a principle that he says is ‘*explicit*’ in Plato’s *Parmenides* yet is ‘*implicit*’ in every genuine philosophical system’, viz. ‘the principle of scepticism’, which states that ‘*panti logōi logos isos antikeitai* [against every argument there is an equal one on the other side]’. Applying this principle yields contradictions insofar as we are forced to affirm opposing claims of equal force within individual categories. However, Hegel denies that these contradictions are unacceptable violations of the ‘principle of [non-]contradiction’ on the grounds that ‘every proposition of reason must, in respect of concepts, contain a violation of [the principle of non-contradiction]’. Unlike propositions of the understanding, which prohibit contradiction, propositions of reason are those whose component ‘concepts’, ‘assertions’, or claims ‘contradict themselves’, e.g. the proposition “being is and is not nothing”. According to Hegel, propositions of reason must violate the principle of non-contradiction because ‘every genuine philosophy’ has as its ‘negative side’ that it ‘sublates’ this principle (Hegel 2000: 324–325).²⁰ As the first thesis of his habilitation (1801) states: ‘*contradictio est regula veri, non contradictio falsi* [contradiction is the rule of truth, non-contradiction that of falsity]’ (Hegel W 2, 533).

An apparent dilemma arises according to which we must either reject Hegel’s critique of the principle of non-contradiction or reject his philosophy.²¹ On the one hand, as John McTaggart argues, we must reject Hegel’s critique of the principle of non-contradiction because, ‘far from denying’ this principle, his philosophy is ‘based on it’, for, were it not, it would ‘reduce itself to an absurdity’ (McTaggart 2000: 15).²² In other words, the comprehensibility of Hegel’s philosophy is inconsistent with his critique

of the principle. On the other hand, as Karl Popper argues, we must instead reject Hegel's philosophy because if philosophy affirms violations of the principle of non-contradiction, then there is 'no rational motive for changing our theories' and thus no 'critique' and 'no intellectual progress' (Popper 1965: 316).²³ In other words, the critical value of Hegel's philosophy is inconsistent with his critique of the principle. Priest affords a solution to this dilemma by arguing that we can accept both Hegel's philosophy and his critique of the principle of non-contradiction so long as we read him as a dialetheist.

Dialetheism is the view that there are true contradictions or 'dialetheias'.²⁴ Priest states that the 'main claim' of his book *In Contradiction* is that 'Hegel was right' to hold that our concepts 'produce dialetheias' (Priest 2006: 4). In "Dialectic and Dialetheic", he claims that Hegel's philosophy is 'based on dialetheism' because it affirms that dialetheias 'occur in reality', specifically, in what moves and what lives, a view that Priest endorses (Priest 1989/90: 388–391). As Hegel says in Section One, Chapter Two, of the Doctrine of Essence in the *Science of Logic*:

[A]s regards the claim that *there is* no contradiction ... experience itself testifies that *there do exist* at least a *great many* contradictory things ... Something moves, not because now it is here and there at another now, but because in one and the same now it is here and not here ... Self-movement ... is likewise nothing else than that something is, *in itself*, itself and the lack of itself (*the negative*), in one and the same respect ... Something is alive, therefore, only to the extent that it contains contradiction within itself.

(Hegel GW 11: 287).²⁵

At any given moment, something moving is both arriving at and leaving a location in space and hence both is and is not so located. Likewise, at any given moment, something living is both arriving at and leaving a stage of its self-organisation and hence both is and is not so self-organised. These, for Hegel, are true contradictions, i.e., dialetheias. According to Priest, Hegel's critique of the principle of non-contradiction follows from his affirmation of the existence of dialetheias. Given this affirmation, Priest regards Hegel's dialectical logic as a species of dialetheic logic, whose general form consists in assigning to sentences either or both truth values (Priest 1989/90, 395).

Priest remarks that since dialetheic logic permits dialetheias as well as non-contradictions, thereby avoiding trivialism, it governs a 'more general' domain than formal logic, which permits only non-contradictions. The wider scope of dialetheic logic allows it to accommodate the contradiction that he agrees with Hegel is essential to all 'change', without

which contradiction everything would always have a ‘consistent’ identity and thus be permanently ‘static’. Priest’s remark about dialethic logic is intended to apply to its dialectical species. This, he says, poses a ‘stretch’ to the letter, but not to the spirit, of the passage above from the *Science of Logic* (Priest 1989/90, 395).²⁶ To be sure, just prior to that passage, Hegel says:

It is ... one of the basic prejudices of previous logic and of ordinary thought that contradiction is not as essential and immanent a determination as identity. But in fact, if order of precedence were an issue, and the two determinations were to be held separate, it would be the principle of contradiction that should be taken as the more profound and the more essential. For in contrast to it, identity is only the determination of simple immediacy, of inert being, whereas contradiction is the root of all movement and life; it is only insofar as something has a contradiction within it that it moves, is possessed of instinct and activity.

(Hegel GW 11: 286–287)

If a thing’s ‘essential and immanent determination’ were its identity, it would always be consistent and so would involve no intrinsic contradiction. In that case, Hegel says shortly after, any apparent contradiction in a thing would be ‘an accident, an abnormality as it were, a momentary fit of sickness’ (Hegel GW 11: 287). However, such a thing would be ‘inert’, for, as we saw, ‘contradiction is the root of all movement and life’. Hegel accordingly infers that contradiction is a thing’s ‘more profound’ and ‘more essential’ determination, i.e., its true ‘principle’. On Priest’s dialetheist reading of Hegel, then, we can accept both Hegel’s philosophy and his critique of the principle of non-contradiction and thereby avoid an apparent dilemma.²⁷

More recently, Priest claims that dialetheism sheds light on Hegel’s criticism of Kant’s resolution to the antinomies. In **The Antinomy of Pure Reason** in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant shows that cosmology yields justified yet opposing inferences about the ‘unconditioned unity of objective conditions in appearances’, i.e., about the world. These inferences use the categories to ascribe contradictory properties to the world, e.g. that it is spatiotemporally finite and infinite. According to Kant, the resulting ‘self-contradictory concept’ of the world stems from reason indulging the ‘illusion’ that the categories apply to the world as ‘a whole existing in itself’, when in fact they apply only to the world as ‘the sum total of all appearances’ (Kant A340/B398, A406/B433, A506–507/B534–535). Kant thus resolves the antinomies by showing that their contradictory concept of the world refers only to how reason behaves, not to what exists.²⁸

Hegel credits Kant with recognising the ‘*necessity of the contradiction*’ in the ‘*operation of reason*’ (Hegel GW 21, 40). However, in Section Two, Chapter Two, of the Doctrine of Being, he charges that Kant’s resolution exhibits ‘an excessive tenderness for the world to keep contradiction away from it, to transfer it to spirit instead, to reason, and to leave it there unresolved’. We saw that the world, by containing movement and life, cannot be shielded from contradiction. As Hegel says, ‘nowhere ... does it escape contradiction’ (Hegel GW 21: 232).²⁹ In “Kant’s Excessive Tenderness for Things in the World and Hegel’s Dialetheism”, Priest claims that Hegel’s criticism of Kant’s resolution to the antinomies rests precisely on the dialetheist view that the world contains dialetheias. Indeed, it is because Hegel observes dialetheias in the world that Priest regards him as the ‘zenith of dialetheic thinking’ since antiquity (Priest 2019: 67–71).³⁰

In a recent rebuttal of Priest’s dialetheist reading of Hegel, Michela Bordignon makes four important observations. First, unlike Priest, Hegel endorses a developmental conception of truth according to which contradiction is the means by which truth develops into a systematic whole (Bordignon 2019: 2).³¹ Second, whereas Priest divides logical space into true and false regions on which dialetheias are said to overlap, Hegel regards logical space as the singular region of truth, understood as a self-developing systematic whole (Bordignon 2019: 12).³² Third, unlike Priest, Hegel holds that the contradictory claims that compose a proposition of reason must be resolved (Bordignon 2019: 13). As Hegel says in the Doctrine of Being, the ‘resolution’ of the contradictory claims in the proposition “the finite is and is not the infinite” consists in,

not the acknowledgment of the *equal correctness*, and of the equal incorrectness, of both claims – this would only be another shape of the still abiding contradiction – but the *ideality* of both, in the sense that in their distinction, as reciprocal negations, they are only moments ... Here we have ... the nature of speculative thought displayed in its determining feature: it consists solely in grasping the opposed moments in their unity.

(Hegel GW 21: 139)

Fourth, whereas Priest acknowledges isolated instances of the coincidence of truth and falsity yet leaves the regional duality of truth and falsity otherwise intact, Hegel regards instances of the coincidence of truth and falsity as progressive determinations of the singular region of truth (Bordignon 2019: 14). These observations demonstrate the extent to which Priest’s dialetheist reading of Hegel poses a stretch to the spirit, not just to the letter, of Hegel’s philosophy.

While I am in broad agreement with Bordignon's four observations,³³ she does not offer a diagnosis of the root cause of Priest's abandonment of the spirit of Hegelianism. I will suggest that the root cause of Priest's abandonment is a misreading of Hegel, one that stalls needlessly at the second moment of logic.

Recall that, for Hegel, the three moments of logic cannot be 'kept separate' if we are to grasp them 'in their truth'. We saw that McDowell distorts their truth by helping himself directly to the third moment, as if speculative insight into the articulated identity of concept and reality could be secured by quietistically circumventing what Hegel regards as scepticism proper, which alone affords a path to speculative unity. We can see that Priest also distorts the truth of the moments of logic, viz. by restricting himself gratuitously to the second moment, as if science were possible on the basis of contradiction alone and hence in the absence of what we saw in Section 14.2 are the scientific goals of '*coherence and necessity*'. By holding fast to contradiction, Priest's dialetheist reading of Hegel stalls needlessly at philosophy's sceptical moment, satisfying itself with dialectic's negative result while forgoing its positive result, viz. the resolution of contradiction. Without the speculative unity of a category's opposing claims, that category's contradiction remains unresolved, halting the progression of science. Indeed, when Priest says that contradiction alone 'produce[s] a train of conceptual development' (Priest 2006: 4), he starves this production of its speculative purpose, without which there is no resolution of contradiction, no determination of successor categories, and thus no development of truth as a whole.³⁴

Priest rightly notes that post-Kantians like Hegel regard reason as producing necessary contradictions (Priest 1989/90: 399). However, he neglects their commitment to systematically resolving such contradictions. As Fichte argues in *Foundations of the Entire Wissenschaftslehre* (1794/95), the contradiction of the I and the not-I threatens to 'eliminate' the unity of consciousness, which imposes the 'task' of 'discover[ing] some X' at which this contradiction is not 'further extended', but rather is 'completely resolved' (Fichte SW I: 107, 143). For Hegel, resolution involves sublating contradiction into unity. In Section One, Chapter Two, of the *Doctrine of Being*, he calls 'sublation' 'one of the most important concepts in philosophy', for it has the 'speculative meaning' that it signifies both 'to "preserve"' and 'to cause to cease'. This co-signification is exhibited by becoming, in which being and nothing are preserved as '*moments*' yet cease insofar as they come to 'possess a different determination' in this unity, viz. 'coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be' (Hegel GW 21: 94–95). Being and nothing are sublated into becoming like nourishment is incorporated into a body, their present form dissolving while being absorbed into a higher form. As Hegel says: 'it is contradiction that moves the world, and

it is ridiculous to say that contradiction cannot be thought. What is correct in this assertion is just that contradiction is not all there is to it, and that contradiction sublates itself by its own doing' (Hegel GW 19: §119).³⁵ As we have seen, whereas the second moment of logic is a dialectical unity of the opposing claims in the first moment, which yields the negative result of a necessary contradiction, the third moment is a sublated unity of the opposing claims in the second moment, which yields the positive result of a resolved contradiction.

This is not to say that logic simply rids itself of contradiction. Just as the plant no more rids itself of the bud when flowering than rids itself of the flower when fruiting, these being 'reciprocally necessary moments' of the plant's growth (Hegel W 3, 12), so too logic is such that dialectic no more rids itself of abstraction – whose fixed claims dialectic unifies into contradiction – than speculation rids itself of dialectic – whose contradictory claims speculation unifies into successor categories and, ultimately, into the absolute idea – these being reciprocally necessary moments of logic's truth. Moreover, although becoming provisionally resolves the contradiction of being and nothing, it does not thereby annul movement or life. As Hegel says, '*becoming*' is 'not just the *unity* of being and nothing, but it is inward *unrest* – a unity which in its self-relation is not simply motionless, but which, in virtue of the diversity of being and nothing which it contains, is inwardly turned against itself'. Becoming is precisely the movement of coming to be and ceasing to be, one in which being and nothing are 'undivided' determinations (Hegel GW 19: §88). Movement thus persists as logic discovers ever-more determinate categories and thereby reveals the coherence and necessity of truth as a whole.³⁶

Thus, when he claims that dialetheism is what explains Hegel's charge against Kant of an excessive tenderness for things, Priest betrays an excessive tenderness for contradiction. To be sure, Hegel regards the antinomies as exhibiting the '*dogmatism*' of 'adhering to one-sided determinations of the understanding while excluding their opposites', which compels the understanding to hold, e.g. that 'the world is *either* finite *or* infinite, but *not both*'. Understanding's dogmatic aversion to contradiction provokes a 'struggle of reason' to instead affirm contradictions and thereby 'overcom[e] what the understanding has made rigid', viz. categories that are 'opposed' and 'separated' as if 'by an infinite abyss'. Nevertheless, Hegel is clear that reason's struggle consists in the 'speculative' task of sublating contradictory properties, e.g. finitude and infinitude, and affirming that the world is '*both* the one *and* the other, and hence *neither* the one *nor* the other' (Hegel GW 19: §32).³⁷ In other words, reason's struggle is not merely to override the understanding by preserving contradictory properties in a conjunction, i.e., '*both ... and*', but rather to sublata these properties into a speculative unity in which they acquire 'a different

determination' than they have in their mere contradiction, i.e., '*neither ... nor*'.³⁸ It is this struggle that facilitates reason's scientific movement toward coherence and necessity. However, if, as Priest asserts, reason does 'not produce consistency, but rather inconsistencies', such that '[e]verything', including 'the Absolute', is 'inconsistent' (Priest 2006: 5),³⁹ it must abandon these scientific goals. But then such reason is not Hegelian.

The scientific goals of coherence and necessity reflect what Hegel regards as spirit's need to be 'at home with itself, and thereby free'. 'In the Logic', he says, the 'content' of thinking 'is brought forth by thinking' rather than being imposed by an external source. Moreover, whereas the 'ordinary' meaning of truth is 'the agreement of an object with our representation of it', the 'philosophical' meaning of truth is 'the agreement of a content with itself'. But then since the content of logical thinking derives from thinking alone, philosophical truth must be none other than thinking's agreement with itself, which is to say, spirit's being at home with itself and being free (Hegel GW 19: §24).⁴⁰ Of course, Hegel recognises that logical thinking 'gets entangled in contradictions' in a 'conscious loss of its being at home with itself', viz. when it posits categories that contain contradictory claims. However, he insists that 'thinking will not give up, but remains faithful to itself', viz. through 'the resolution of its own contradictions'. If thinking 'despairs of being able to bring about, *from its own resources*, the resolution of the contradiction in which it has put itself, then it returns to the solutions and appeasements in which the spirit has participated in its other modes and forms'. But Hegel denies that spirit's momentary despair will 'degenerate into *misology*' (Hegel GW 19: §11).⁴¹ This is because 'spirit is the one which is strong enough that it can endure contradiction' and 'knows how to resolve it' (Hegel GW 21: 232). As he says in the *Phenomenology*, 'the life of Spirit is not the life that shrinks from death and keeps itself untouched by devastation, but rather the life that endures it and maintains itself in it. It wins its truth only when, in utter dismemberment, it finds itself' (Hegel W 3: 36).

Quietist and dialetheist readings of Hegel obscure the truth of the three moments of logic. They thereby exhibit a kind of self-opacity to which the history of philosophy is vulnerable. We cannot enlist Hegel to prove such theses as **that concepts are answerable to the world or that certain sentences are both true and false if such theses make assumptions that conflict with his conception of logic.** This is both to overestimate his affinity for present concerns and to neglect the extent to which we may have moved away from our philosophical past. Of course, we might have good reason to move on from Hegel. However, knowing this too requires a kind of historical self-knowledge.⁴²

Notes

- 1 Cf. Lewis 1961: 13: 'The dominant sense of any word lies uppermost in our minds. Wherever we meet the word, our natural impulse will be to give it that sense. When this operation results in nonsense, of course, we see our mistake and try over again. But if it makes tolerable sense our tendency is to go merrily on. We are often deceived. In an old author the word may mean something different. I call such senses dangerous senses because they lure us into misreadings'.
- 2 Cf.: 'the *logical* has three sides: (α) *the side of abstraction or of the understanding*, (β) *the dialectical or negatively rational side*, [and] (γ) *the speculative or positively rational one*' (§79).
- 3 Crucially, whereas the opposing arguments that concern ancient scepticism exclude each other, Hegel's adapted ancient skeptical method concerns the opposing claims that are internal to a category. This signals a shift of logical focus from mere contradiction to self-contradiction. On the difference between the classical principle of non-contradiction and the speculative principle of self-contradiction, see de Boer 2010.
- 4 See Bordignon (forthcoming) on intermediate categories of the logic as illegitimate totalities.
- 5 Cf.: 'The *second* negative at which we have arrived, the negative of the negative, is this sublation of contradiction' (GW 12: 246). Cf. Hegel's 1820s lectures on the history of philosophy: 'the operations of skepticism are undoubtedly directed against the finite. But however much force these moments of its negative dialectic may have against the properly speaking dogmatic knowledge of the understanding, its attacks against the true infinite of the speculative idea are most feeble and unsatisfactory' (Hegel 1995: 367).
- 6 Cf. Boyle's gloss on McDowell: 'what is needed is not just any sort of constraint on the subject's judging; what is needed is something intelligible as a constraint *from the subject's own point of view* – something she could see as a *reason* for judging the world to be thus-and-so, if she were to reflect on the question "Why should I believe that P?"' (Boyle 2016: 534).
- 7 See McDowell 1996: 4, 87.
- 8 Cf.: 'the effect of [Kant's] philosophy is to slight the independence of the reality to which our senses give us access. What is responsible for this is precisely the aspect of Kant's philosophy that struck some of his successors as a betrayal of idealism: namely the fact that he recognizes a reality outside the sphere of the conceptual. Those successors urged that we must discard the supersensible in order to achieve a consistent idealism' (McDowell 1996: 44).
- 9 See Sedgwick 1997.
- 10 Cf. Hegel's distinction between 'thoughts' and 'thought-determinations' (GW 19: §24).
- 11 See Hegel: 'the Logical is to be sought in a system of thought-determinations in which the antithesis between subjective and objective (in its usual meaning) disappears. This meaning of thinking and of its determinations is more precisely expressed by the Ancients when they say that *nous* governs the world, or by our own saying that there is reason in the world, by which we mean that reason is the soul of the world, inhabits it, and is immanent in it, as its own, innermost nature, its universal' (GW 19: §24).
- 12 McDowell acknowledges that exorcism is constructive 'in another sense' (xxiv) that is left implicit, but that presumably involves dislodging the spoiling idea that produces the antinomy and reorienting those who indulge its component theses.

- 13 Terry Pinkard (2018: 19) suggests that McDowell's quietism is non-classical because it treats sceptical questions as genuine rather than pseudo-questions. But this neglects McDowell's view that quietism is meant to restore common sense, for which such questions are precisely not genuine. It also neglects his claim that the 'vertigo' that results from sceptical questions should not be felt 'in the first place' (McDowell 1998: 63).
- 14 Some of McDowell's readers doubt whether his quietism is Hegelian even in spirit. Robert Stern (1999: 260–263) grants that Hegel is not a sceptic, but notes that he demands more than the repose of common sense, viz. a metaphysics that can transform the ossified categories of ordinary understanding into self-developing categories of reason. As Hegel says in the *Science of Logic*, common sense and modern science work 'hand in hand to cause the downfall of metaphysics' and to produce 'a cultivated people without metaphysics – like a temple richly ornamented in other respects but without a holy of holies' (GW 21: 6). Stephen Houlgate (2006: 251–255) argues that whereas McDowell seeks to show how experience grounds judgement, Hegel seeks to show how judgement grounds experience, a reversal that reflects Hegel's view of judgement as constrained, not externally by the world, but internally by the categories. Sebastian Rödl (2007) denies that McDowell refutes Kant's idea that the forms of intuition are imposed on the unity of consciousness on the grounds that this requires not the simple path of quietism but rather the complex path of absolute idealism, whereby the categories are derived through a deduction that is at once metaphysical and transcendental. (On the metaphysical and transcendental character of Fichte's genetic deduction of the categories, which simultaneously answers the question *quid facti* and the question *quid juris*, see Bruno 2018.) Finally, Sebastian Gardner (2013: 135–136) holds that, even granting that quietism is non-dualistic, McDowell's preference for quietism over constructive philosophy is simply dogmatic.
- 15 See Hegel W 3: 'the exposition of the untrue consciousness in its untruth is not a merely *negative* procedure. ... [I]n the negation the transition is made through which the progress through the complete series of forms comes about of itself' (74).
- 16 Cf. Hegel: 'Ancient scepticism must be differentiated from the *modern* form; we are only dealing with the former, for it alone is of a true, profound nature' (W 19: 360). On the role of Agrippan, Pyrrhonian, and Platonic scepticism in Hegel's Jena period, as well as the connection between Agrippan scepticism and nihilism, see Franks 2008.
- 17 Cf. Hegel's 1820s lectures on the history of philosophy, in which he charges Schulze with the error of 'recogniz[ing] nothing but dogmatism and [modern] scepticism, and not the third philosophy' (W 19: 400).
- 18 For a related comparison of McDowell and Jacobi, see Bruno 2020.
- 19 See Hegel 1977a: 99: 'Common sense cannot understand speculation; and what is more, it must come to hate speculation when it has experience of it'. Cf. Hegel 2000a: 283: '[philosophy] only is philosophy in virtue of being directly opposed to the understanding and hence even more opposed to healthy common sense, under which label we understand the limitedness in space and time of a race of men; in its relationship to common sense the world of philosophy is in and for itself an inverted world'.
- 20 For a Hegelian critique of the presupposition of the principle of non-contradiction by Aristotle, Sextus Empiricus, and Kant, and how this presupposition does not secure, but rather impedes, the determinacy of both being and meaning, see Winfield 2018.

- 21 See Ficara 2012.
- 22 Cf. Brandom 2002: 170. For a criticism of Brandom, see Bordignon 2012.
- 23 According to Redding (2007: 213–215), for Hegel, not only can the principle of non-contradiction not be assumed as mythically given, but also its significance shifts depending on whether contradictions apply to terms or to propositions. Moss (2020: 241–242) argues that since, for Hegel, presupposing the principle of non-contradiction relativises truth to that presupposition, he must hold the dialetheist view according to which the absolute exists only as a true contradiction.
- 24 Priest and Robert Routley coin ‘dialetheism’ and ‘dialetheia’ in 1981 (Priest et al. 1989: xx).
- 25 Cf. Hegel GW 19: §81. For an account of contradiction in the Doctrine of Essence, see Pippin 1996 and de Boer 2010.
- 26 One worry is that Priest’s remark imposes a scientific dualism onto Hegel, according to which dialetheic and formal logic are self-standing, mutually external sciences of thought that simply coincide in cases of non-contradictions. On formal logic, see Hegel GW 19: §§115, 160, 182. Bowman (2013: 255.n33) argues that dialectical logic is not comparable to non-classical logic, including dialetheic logic.
- 27 On the difference between the static logic of the understanding (*Verstandeslogik*) and the revisable logic of reason (*Vernunftlogik*), and for a comparison of Hegel’s threefold division between institutional logic, natural logic, and logical form and Priest’s threefold division between taught logic, used logic, and logical facts, see Ficara 2020.
- 28 Once reason critiques itself, however, it is no longer afflicted by contradiction. See Kant: ‘It is worrisome and depressing that there should be an antithetic of pure reason at all, and that pure reason, though it represents the supreme court of justice for all disputes, should still come into conflict with itself. We had such an apparent antithetic of reason before us above [viz. in “The Antinomy of Pure Reason”], to be sure, but it turned out that it rested on a misunderstanding, namely that of taking, in accord with common prejudice, appearances for things in themselves, and then demanding an absolute completeness in their synthesis, in one or another way (which were both equally impossible), which could hardly be expected in the case of appearances. There was thus in that case no real **contradiction of reason** with itself in the propositions “The series of appearances **given in themselves** has an absolutely first beginning” and “This series is absolutely and **in itself** without any beginning”; for both propositions are quite compatible, since **appearances**, as regards their existence (as appearances) **in themselves** are nothing at all, i.e., something contradictory, and thus their presupposition must naturally be followed by contradictory consequences’ (A740/B768).
- 29 Cf. GW 19: §48, W 20: 358–359. See Žižek 2013: 395.
- 30 See Hegel GW 19: ‘antinomy is found not only in the four particular objects taken from cosmology, but rather in *all* objects of all kinds, in *all* representations, concepts, and ideas. To know this, and to be cognizant of this property of objects, belongs to what is essential in philosophical study’ (§48).
- 31 See Hegel: ‘The true shape in which truth exists can only be the scientific system of such truth’ (W 3: 14).
- 32 See Hegel: ‘The more conventional opinion gets fixated on the antithesis of truth and falsity, the more it tends to expect a given philosophical system to be either accepted or contradicted; and hence it finds only acceptance or rejection. It does not comprehend the diversity of philosophical systems as the progressive unfolding of truth, but rather sees in it simple disagreements. The

bud disappears in the bursting-forth of the blossom, and one might say that the former is refuted by the latter; similarly, when the fruit appears, the blossom is shown up in its turn as a false manifestation of the plant, and the fruit now emerges as the truth of it instead. These forms are not just distinguished from one another, they also supplant one another as mutually incompatible. Yet at the same time their fluid nature makes them moments of an organic unity in which they not only do not conflict, but in which each is as necessary as the other; and this mutual necessity alone constitutes the life of the whole' (W 3: 12).

- 33 A fifth observation of Bordignon's is that whereas Hegel regards reality as the bearer of contradictions, Priest states in *In Contradiction* that he is concerned with sentences as bearers of contradictions (Bordignon 2019: 8; see Priest 2006: 54). However, in "Dialectic and Dialetheic", Priest is clear that he follows Hegel when he opposes 'non-literal' interpretations of contradictions on the grounds that contradictions 'occur in reality' (Priest 1989/90: 390–391; cf. 2009: 71).
- 34 See Kreis 2015: 335–336.
- 35 Cf.: '*Speculative thought* consists only in this, in holding firm to contradiction and to itself in the contradiction, but not in the sense that, as it happens in ordinary thought, it would let itself be ruled by it and allow it to dissolve its determinations into just other determinations or into nothing' (GW 11: 287–288). See Heidegger 1988: 28: 'sublating or *Aufhebung* must, of course, be conceived, as always in Hegel, in terms of the resonance of its threefold meaning: *tollere*, removing and eliminating the mere, initial illusion; *conservare*, preserving and including in the experience; but as an *elevare*, a lifting up to a higher level of knowing itself and its known'.
- 36 Moreover, Hegel states in his 1820s lectures on aesthetics that life always resolves its own contradiction: 'to say that opposites are to be identical is precisely contradiction itself. Yet whoever claims that nothing exists which carries in itself a contradiction in the form of an identity of opposites is at the same time requiring that nothing living shall exist. For the power of life, and still more the might of the spirit, consists precisely in positing contradiction in itself, enduring it, and overcoming it. This positing and resolving of the contradiction between the ideal unity and the real separatedness of the members constitutes the constant process of life, and life *is* only by being a *process*' (Hegel 1975: 120).
- 37 On Hegel's distinction between understanding and reason and its role in resolving Kant's antinomies, see Winegar 2016.
- 38 See de Boer 2010: 368: 'According to the speculative meaning of the principle of contradiction, a conceptual determination such as indivisibility only *contradicts* its ultimate principle – the concept as such – insofar as it *opposes* its contrary, that is, insofar as it does not establish the unity of indivisibility and divisibility'.
- 39 Moss (2020: 278) argues that the contradiction between being and nothing remains both true and false on the grounds that the atemporal character of Hegel's logic entails that neither a contradiction's truth nor its falsity passes away. This suggests a subtle difference between Moss' and Priest's dialetheist readings of Hegel regarding the third moment of logic. See Moss (forthcoming).
- 40 See Stang (manuscript). See Werner 2020 for an account of why Hegel's logic is not modelled on the theoretical cognition of what is given.

- 41 Cf. Kant on sceptical despair and misology, on which see Bruno 2018a and Callanan 2019.
- 42 Thanks to Michela Bordignon, Charlie Cooper-Simpson, Robb Dunphy, James Kreines, Toby Lovat, Gregory S. Moss, Sebastian Stein, David Suarez, Andrew Werner, and audiences at University College Dublin, the Federal University ABC, and the Chinese Hong Kong University for helpful comments on this chapter.

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