

# VARIETIES OF TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM: KANT AND HEIDEGGER THINKING BEYOND LIFE

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*Abstract:* In recent work, William Blattner claims that Heidegger is an empirical realist, but not a transcendental idealist. Blattner argues that, unlike Kant, Heidegger holds that thinking beyond human life warrants no judgment about nature's existence. This poses two problems. One is interpretive: Blattner misreads Kant's conception of the beyond-life as yielding the judgment that nature does not exist, for Kant shares Heidegger's view that such a judgment must lack sense. Another is programmatic: Blattner overstates the gap between Kant's and Heidegger's positions, for both are ontological, not ontic. I solve these problems by showing that Heidegger's analysis of Dasein contains the core of Kant's argument for transcendental idealism: the apriority of space and time. I conclude that Heidegger exemplifies Kant's view that empirical realism just is transcendental idealism.

The relation between transcendental idealism and phenomenology is more than merely historical. Phenomenology does not follow a series of post-Kantian projects that just happens to include German idealism and neo-Kantianism. It consciously addresses such philosophical questions as how to weigh the insights of Kant's philosophy, what constitutes a faithful reception of these insights, and to what extent their transformation is acceptable or even necessary for a proper account of consciousness. It is in the context of these questions that we should assess the work of Heidegger.

William Blattner's work on Heidegger is sensitive to the questions that contextualize the phenomenological analysis in *Being and Time*. His awareness of the philosophical link between transcendental idealism and phenomenology allows him to show that both projects affirm the dependence of the temporal structure of things on the human standpoint. In several works, Blattner claims that Heidegger is an empirical realist—one who accepts the mind-independence of objects—but not a transcendental idealist—one who denies the *absolute* mind-independence of objects.<sup>1</sup> He infers this from his argument that Heidegger differs from Kant in holding that abstracting from the human standpoint warrants no judgments about nature's existence.

I want to resist this argument. In §§1–2, I argue that it poses two problems. The first is interpretive: Blattner misreads Kant's conception of the beyond-life as yielding the judgment that nature does not exist, for he shares Heidegger's

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claim that such a judgment must lack sense. The second is programmatic: Blattner overstates the gap between Kant's and Heidegger's positions, for both are ontological, not ontic. In §§3–4, I solve these problems by arguing that the core of Kant's argument for transcendental idealism is the apriority of space and time and that Heidegger's analysis of Dasein contains this core. I conclude that transcendental idealism is the essence of Heidegger's empirical realism, guided by Kant's identity claim that "the transcendental idealist is an empirical realist."<sup>2</sup> In §5, I consider a potential obstacle to my conclusion: Heidegger's criticism of Kant's idea of the thing in itself. I compare this idea with Heidegger's idea of death, arguing that each functions as a boundary concept that delimits a purposive activity. My goal, then, is a textually grounded reading of Kant's conception of the beyond-life that reflects its philosophical relation to Heidegger's conception of the same.

### *§1. The Interpretive Problem*

In "Heidegger's Kantian Idealism Revisited," Blattner claims that, when thinking away our existence, Kant infers that nature does not exist, whereas Heidegger infers that nature neither does nor does not exist. His textual evidence for the first claim comes from the Transcendental Aesthetic in the *Critique of Pure Reason*: "We can accordingly speak of space, extended being, and so on, only from the human standpoint. If we depart from the subjective condition under which alone we can acquire outer intuition, namely that through which we may be affected by objects, then the representation of space signifies nothing at all."<sup>3</sup> Blattner reads this passage as stating that "if we 'remove' the subjective constitution of our senses, nature 'vanishes'" and that "nature cannot exist."<sup>4</sup> Kant apparently holds that if we think beyond human life, bracketing the forms of sensibility that condition our experience, nature ceases to exist, i.e., nature's existence depends on our existence as sensing entities. If he holds this, he surely disagrees with Heidegger, whom Blattner quotes from *Being and Time* to support his second claim: "If Dasein does not exist, then 'independence' 'is' not either, nor 'is' the 'in itself.' Such a thing is then neither understandable nor not understandable. Then also intraworldly entities neither are discoverable, nor can they lie in hiddenness. Then it can be said neither that entities are, nor that they are not."<sup>5</sup> Whereas Kant seems to judge that nature does not exist when we think away our own existence, Heidegger is clear that nothing can be judged of nature when thinking this. This is because such a thought removes any sense from the question of nature's existence since it removes our being as *care*. As Dasein, ours is a perspective of concern for the existence of things.<sup>6</sup> Suspending this concern by bracketing our perspective undermines any judgment we might make about things, let alone about their totality as nature.

If this disagreement is real, Heidegger can plausibly reject Kant's idealism as misguided. But I want to argue that Blattner misreads Kant's conception of the beyond-life as yielding the judgment that nature does not exist.

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In several Critical-era *Reflexionen*, Kant distinguishes two kinds of possibility.<sup>7</sup> Logical possibility is constrained by the principle of non-contradiction, in accord with general logic's concern for inferential validity and consistency. Real possibility is constrained by the *a priori* conditions of experience as determined by transcendental logic: space, time, the categories and the ideas of reason. To determine what is logically possible, general logic abstracts from the content of judgment and isolates valid judgmental form. Transcendental logic, by contrast, is concerned with how we can stand in relations to objects of experience and so must investigate how the content of judgment relates to real or, we might say, experiential possibility. It is real possibility that sets the parameter within which we can experience what is actual, which Kant describes as "opposed to the impossible and also to the merely possible."<sup>8</sup> Actuality is more than merely logically possible because it is what, given the stricter demands of real possibility, can be given in experience.

The distinction between logical and real possibility yields a constraint on judgments of existence. Existence, Kant says, "does not belong at all to the idea of a thing."<sup>9</sup> Rather, what actually exists "is at the same time its connection with perception." That is, "the possibility of a thing can never be proved merely through the non-contradictoriness of a concept of it, but only by vouching for it with an intuition corresponding to this concept."<sup>10</sup> For Kant, intuition within the bounds of real possibility constrains any judgment of existence. It follows that no judgment can be made about nature when thinking beyond human life: in the absence of the conditions of experience, judgments of existence *lack sense*. But then Kant cannot infer from the absence of our application of these conditions that nature does not exist. This would locate actuality outside real possibility. Indeed, it would violate Kant's insight that existence is not a predicate. Against defenders of the ontological argument for God's existence, he asks:

Is the proposition, This or that (which I have conceded to you as possible, whatever it may be) exists—is this proposition, I say, an analytic or a synthetic proposition? If it is the former, then with existence you add nothing to your thought of the thing; but then either the thought that is in you must be the thing itself, or else you have presupposed an existence as belonging to possibility, and then inferred that existence on this pretext from its inner possibility, which is nothing but a miserable tautology. The word 'reality,' which sounds different from 'existence' in the concept of the predicate, does not settle it. For if you call all positing (leaving indeterminate what you posit) 'reality,' then you have already posited the thing with all its predicates in the concept of the subject and assumed it to be actual, and you only repeat that in the predicate. . . . Being is obviously not a real predicate, i.e., a concept of something that could add to the concept of a thing.<sup>11</sup>

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Existence is not analyzable from the mere concept of a thing because the parameter of actuality is set by real, not logical, possibility. Judging existence is confined to this parameter, within which the concept of a thing must be synthesized with a sensible intuition. Notice that the necessity of synthesis explains why the mere word ‘reality’ cannot settle a question of existence. Real possibility only sets the parameter of actuality, for example, through a deduction of the categories. For the latter to yield judgments of existence, they must be synthesized with sensible intuitions. Notice also that the synthetic constraint applies to judgments of not only God’s existence, but the existence of anything, “whatever it may be.” We think away our ability to meet this constraint if we think beyond life. In so doing, we suspend all judgments of existence.

This is why, when thinking away space as our form of outer sense, Kant does *not* infer, as Blattner says, that nature “vanishes” or “cannot exist.” This is not even implied by Kant’s actual inference, which is that the idea of spatial representation “signifies nothing at all.” If spatial representation signifies nothing, we cannot apply a concept to anything and be said to judge its existence. Removing outer sense bars us from actuality and hence from judgments of existence.<sup>12</sup>

Kant extends this inference to the ideas of reason in ‘The Architectonic of Pure Reason’:

Under the government of reason our cognitions cannot at all constitute a rhapsody but must constitute a system, in which alone they can support and advance its essential ends. I understand by a system, however, the unity of the manifold cognitions under one idea. This is the rational concept of the form of a whole, insofar as through this the domain of the manifold as well as the position of the parts with respect to each other is determined *a priori*. The scientific rational concept thus contains the end and the form of the whole that is congruent with it. The unity of the end, to which all parts are related and in the idea of which they are also related to each other, allows the absence of any part to be noticed in our knowledge of the rest. . . . The whole is therefore articulated (*articulatio*) and not heaped together (*coacervatio*); it can, to be sure, grow internally (*per intus susceptionem*) but not externally (*per appositionem*), like an animal body, whose growth does not add a limb but rather makes each limb stronger and fitter for its end without any alteration of proportion.<sup>13</sup>

It is a rational ideal that we should unify cognition under the idea of a system. Kant says this idea “contains the end and the form” of cognition. We can interpret “form” and “end” along Aristotelian lines as the *formal* and *final causes* of cognition: a system is both the defining structure into which our cognitions figure and the ultimate purpose for which we so organize them. Judgments that contribute to our comprehension of nature must serve this purpose by articulating this structure. Hence, we may say that the idea

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of a system defines the parameter within which any judgment of existence whatsoever can occur.

Kant's organic analogy serves to clarify this point. An organism grows "internally," organizing itself in accord with its form and function. We grasp this organization through the idea of the organism's life-form. However that organism exists—whether average, mature or defective—is determined by this idea, in the absence of which such modes of existence lack sense. No judgment about the purported features of a bobcat, say, is possible without the idea of a bobcat as a unified whole. Following Kant's analogy, we can say that no judgment about the existence of anything in nature, or of nature itself, is possible without the idea of nature as a unified whole. We think away this idea when we think beyond human life.

We see, then, that Kant grounds judgments of existence on our activity of applying the forms of cognition. Like Heidegger, he does not think we can make judgments about nature if we think away our existence, for doing so divests judgments of their grounding activity. Existence is only judgeable from the standpoint of our activity as cognizers. Kant is therefore entitled to the following claim, which Blattner reserves for Heidegger: "if the understanding sets the terms upon which entities do *or* do not exist, then when the understanding does not exist, entities neither are nor are not."<sup>14</sup> Blattner's thesis that Heidegger is not a transcendental idealist is accordingly weakened since it relies on an argument for a disagreement with Kant about judging nature's existence when thinking away our own, a disagreement that does not exist.

### §2. *The Programmatic Problem*

In defending his thesis, Blattner casts the empirical standpoint as one in which we take the *a priori* conditions of experience for granted and the transcendental standpoint as one in which we remove such conditions.<sup>15</sup> He says the latter is adopted at a distance from the former, from which the transcendental idealist asks "how things are, independently of the *a priori* conditions," and answers: "the objects represented in our ordinary and scientific understanding of the world cannot exist."<sup>16</sup> However, we saw that Kant shares Heidegger's view of the senselessness of judging nature's existence when bracketing our own. Does Blattner misconstrue the transcendental standpoint?

Consider Kant's articulation of this standpoint in the Introduction to the first *Critique*: "I call all cognition transcendental that is occupied not so much with objects but rather with our mode of cognition of objects insofar as this is to be possible *a priori*."<sup>17</sup> Empirical cognition concerns objects encountered in experience, while transcendental cognition examines the *a priori* conditions of so encountering them. Blattner's gloss of the empirical standpoint agrees with this articulation, for if these conditions make the empirical standpoint possible, the latter surely takes them for granted. But his gloss of the transcendental standpoint obscures the function definitive of its

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adoption, namely, investigating such conditions for the purpose of showing how experience is possible. Far from removing the conditions of experience, the transcendental standpoint aims rather to establish them.

My reading of the transcendental standpoint relies on the first *Critique's* Introduction. Blattner's is perhaps guided by a footnote in the Preface, which states that transcendental method considers objects "from two different sides, on the one side as objects of the senses and the understanding for experience, and on the other side as objects that are merely thought at most for isolated reason striving beyond the bounds of experience."<sup>18</sup> Transcendental method undeniably looks beyond experience, specifically, when it considers the ideas of reason. No sense experience is adequate to the ideas, which therefore lack cognitive content. However, insofar as they signify rational ideals, they hold *systematic value*. They cannot be attributed to a method that removes the conditions of experience, then, for it is only for experience that they can hold this value. Thus, the ideas of reason number among the conditions that Blattner alleges are removed in the transcendental standpoint.

Blattner will insist that Kant's and Heidegger's positions diverge methodologically, pointing to the distinction between beings and being to support his claim. Beings are entities. Being is that my understanding of which discloses beings as beings. Hence, ontic inquiry concerns facts about beings, whereas ontological inquiry concerns the meaning of being as such. Now, some beings, like planets, do not ontically depend on subjects. Others, like memories, do. Blattner calls the view that a class of beings does not ontically depend on subjects "ontic realism" and the view that a class of beings does ontically depend on subjects "ontic idealism."<sup>19</sup> He then asserts that Kant's empirical standpoint is *ontically realist* and that his transcendental standpoint is *ontically idealist*. If Blattner's assertions are correct, i.e., if Kant's project is exclusively ontic, then Kant certainly differs methodologically from Heidegger, whose distinction between beings and being serves a distinctly ontological project.

Blattner's first assertion is correct, but his second is not. Ontic idealism is a view about relations of dependence among beings. The transcendental standpoint does not concern beings, however. Rather, it concerns the dependence of the possibility of beings—specifically, the possibility of objects of experience—on certain *a priori* conditions. This is to say that it concerns the dependence of the being of beings on such conditions, in the absence of which, being, for us, lacks sense. Since neither being nor these conditions are themselves beings, we cannot interpret the transcendental standpoint as ontically idealist.<sup>20</sup> Such a reading in fact captures the empirical idealist position that Kant explicitly rejects.<sup>21</sup>

It is better to describe the dependence relevant to the transcendental standpoint as an ontological relation between being and the understanding of being.<sup>22</sup> Since this is a relation by which it is possible that beings appear,

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the view in question is not one for which a class of beings ontically depends on subjects, but one for which being as such depends on the activity of understanding. Thus, Kant's transcendental standpoint properly counts as *ontologically idealist*.<sup>23</sup> But this is precisely the term that Blattner reserves for Heidegger's phenomenological standpoint, which he says studies "the transcendental constraints that make up our understanding of being."<sup>24</sup> Blattner accordingly misconstrues Kant's transcendental standpoint and, in doing so, overstates its methodological divergence from Heidegger's phenomenological standpoint.

I have diagnosed two problems with Blattner's view that, in thinking beyond life, Kant and Heidegger disagree regarding nature's existence. Blattner misreads Kant, neglecting his distinction between logical and real possibility and its role in supporting the claim that existence is not a predicate, and underestimates the affinity between transcendental and phenomenological method. I will now propose solutions to these problems by comparing the accounts of space and time that found Kant's and Heidegger's respective projects, revealing the latter's commitment to a variety of transcendental idealism.

### §3. *The Apriority of Space and Time in Kant*

If a consequence of transcendental idealism is that we cannot judge nature's existence when thinking beyond life, we might suspect that Heidegger is not only the empirical realist Blattner says he is, but also a kind of transcendental idealist. This is mere suspicion if we only examine what follows from transcendental idealism, for this consequence could follow from a non-idealist position. To confirm my suspicion, I will now investigate the foundations of transcendental idealism, showing in §4 how they figure in Heidegger's analysis of *Dasein*. I will do so in light of Karl Ameriks' reconstruction of the so-called 'long argument' for transcendental idealism, the core of which defends the apriority of space and time. It will turn out that the long argument not only yields the above consequence: it shows, in keeping with Kant's identity claim in the Paralogisms, that transcendental idealism is the *essence* of empirical realism.

It is well known that Kant restricts empirical cognition to what appears to our subjective constitution, proscribing cognition of things in themselves. He does so, not by stipulating that appearances can be represented and things in themselves cannot, but by developing *the very idea* of appearance from an analysis of a specific form of representation: human sensibility. If Kant were to define appearances as representable and things in themselves as unrepresentable, the latter would be, not only unknowable, but unthinkable. This would be a weak foundation for transcendental idealism, for it treats representation univocally and simply identifies the absence of representation with the thing in itself. The unknowability of the thing in itself would trivially follow because its unthinkability would. As Ameriks shows, we

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misread Kant by supposing that he founds transcendental idealism on this “short argument.”<sup>25</sup> It is a misreading first given by Reinhold, one of Kant’s earliest commentators and the first German idealist.<sup>26</sup>

The foundation for transcendental idealism is rather a long argument that begins with an analysis of space and time as the forms of human sensibility. Kant gives this analysis in the Transcendental Aesthetic, arguing that space and time are *a priori* and intuitional, as opposed to *a posteriori* and conceptual. Reviewing Kant’s apriority argument will serve to show how it relates to his conception of the beyond-life. In §4, I will compare Kant’s apriority argument with the account of space and time in Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein. On the basis of this comparison, I will conclude that a variety of transcendental idealism informs Heidegger’s empirical realism.

In the Metaphysical Exposition, Kant argues in two steps against *a posteriori* derivations of space, an argument he repeats for time. First, he says that space “is not an empirical concept that has been drawn from outer experience . . . [since] in order for me to represent [objects] as outside one another, thus not merely as different but as in different places, the representation of space must already be their ground.”<sup>27</sup> This passage charges *a posteriori* derivations of space (and time) with *circularity*. To rely on my experience of the spatial and temporal form of objects appearing to me in order to derive the concepts of space and time is to rely on the very concepts I aim to derive since, to do so, I need first to have conceived these forms *as* spatial and temporal. I must therefore already have some representation of space and time.

Notice that the circle in which an *a posteriori* derivation moves signifies the dialectic that the first *Critique* aims to avoid between transcendental realism and empirical idealism. In this dialectic, I begin as a transcendental realist with the assumption that space and time are “given in themselves,” i.e., that appearances are “things in themselves, which would exist independently of . . . [my] sensibility.”<sup>28</sup> Here, I consider my representations of the spatial and temporal forms of objects to be representations of forms existing independent of the human standpoint. But I veer toward empirical idealism when I find that it is only by first conceiving these forms as spatial and temporal that I could have represented objects as extended in space and enduring through time, for I am thereby forced to refer to a feature of my own mind in order to cognize what purportedly exists absolutely independently of my mind. As Kant says in the Paralogisms, it is the “transcendental realist who afterwards plays the empirical idealist; and after he has falsely presupposed about objects of the senses that if they are to exist they must have their existence in themselves even apart from sense, he finds that from this point of view all our representations of sense are insufficient to make their reality certain.”<sup>29</sup> But my turn inward does not simply give in to empirical idealism. My persisting assumption that appearances are things in themselves compels me to assert something beyond my representation of space and time, something true

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absolutely independent of myself, and so I veer back toward transcendental realism. Kant's first step in rejecting *a posteriori* derivations of space and time, then, indicates an oscillation between two unstable positions.

In a second step, Kant says that one "can never represent that there is no space, although one can very well think that there are no objects to be encountered in it. It is therefore to be regarded as the condition of the possibility of appearances, not as a determination dependent on them, and is an *a priori* representation that necessarily grounds outer appearances."<sup>30</sup> This passage charges *a posteriori* derivations with denying a kind of *necessity*: space and time cannot be removed from appearances because nothing can appear to us outside of space or time, which is to say that space and time are necessary conditions of the possibility of appearances. Notice that the necessity of such an *a priori* condition is not merely logical. General logic abstracts from the content of judgment and so cannot raise the question of how this content relates to objects. It is only in response to this question that we can grasp the necessity of an *a priori* condition. The latter's necessity, then, is not logical, but transcendental.<sup>31</sup>

We saw that the circularity of an *a posteriori* derivation of space and time symbolizes the oscillating dialectic between transcendental realism and empirical idealism. By contrast, if we grasp the sort of necessity lost on such a derivation, we display the identity that the first *Critique* seeks to establish between transcendental idealism and empirical realism. It is precisely because the transcendental idealist registers the distinctive necessity of an *a priori* condition of experience that, Kant says, he "can be an empirical realist." An empirical realist takes for granted that objects are spatio-temporal. But his is a *stable* assumption insofar as he grasps the necessity of space and time for objects of possible experience. It is on this basis that he

can concede the existence of matter without going beyond mere self-consciousness and assuming something more than the certainty of representations in [himself]. . . . Matter for him is only a species of representations (intuition), which are called external, not as if they related to objects that are external in themselves, but because they relate perceptions to space, where all things are external to one another, but that space itself is in us.<sup>32</sup>

The empirical realist's assumption is stable, in other words, *because he is a transcendental idealist*. We will see that Heidegger's empirical realism makes the same stable assumption.

First, however, it is worth considering Heidegger's interpretation of Kant's analysis of space and time. Recall that this analysis grounds Kant's claim that we cognize only what appears to us since it yields, not the trivial distinction between the thinkable and the unthinkable, but the non-trivial distinction between the sensible and the non-sensible.<sup>33</sup> Heidegger registers the founda-

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tional role of this analysis for Kant's project in his 1928 lectures, published as the *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*:

The transcendental aesthetic has a foundational function in the whole of the *Critique* that is equal to that of the transcendental logic. What the transcendental aesthetic deals with is not simply turned off in the transcendental logic—which *does* actually happen to transcendental logic in the transcendental aesthetic. Rather, the transcendental logic takes up what the transcendental aesthetic deals with as necessary foundation and a central clue.<sup>34</sup>

An analysis of sensibility is insufficient for establishing transcendental idealism, for, without the Transcendental Logic, Kant's project lacks an account of the pure concepts that further define the parameter of real possibility. And yet, as Heidegger recognizes, this analysis provides logic's "foundation." Transcendental logic concerns our relation to objects, which, as we saw, requires the synthesis of concepts with sensible intuitions of what is actual. This is why Kant opens the Transcendental Aesthetic thus: "through whatever means a cognition may relate to objects, that through which it relates immediately to them, and at which all thought as a means is directed as an end, is intuition."<sup>35</sup> Intuition is the *telos* of "a cognition" because it represents actuality. Heidegger grasps intuition's teleological role when he calls the Transcendental Aesthetic "a central clue" for the Transcendental Logic.

Intuition, however, is a *subordinate telos* within Kant's broader project. In §1, I briefly discussed Kant's idea of a system. This idea contains the form and the end of cognition—the structure into which the totality of cognitions figure and the purpose for which we organize them. Whereas intuition is the "end" that guides "a cognition," the totality of cognitions is in turn guided by the *superior telos* of a system of cognition. While a detailed reconstruction exceeds the limits of this paper, Kant argues in Chapter III of the Transcendental Dialectic that the idea of the thing in itself represents just this *telos*.<sup>36</sup> On this argument, the thing in itself is not *merely* unknowable: it is unknowable *in the way that a system of cognition is*, namely, as that which is nevertheless rationally desirable. It is important to see that the thing in itself bears this systematic value only in light of what the Transcendental Aesthetic establishes: if our forms of sensibility did not restrict what is knowable, the thinkable case in which they do not obtain—in which things in themselves are knowable—could not play the foil to the human standpoint that Kant intends it to play. It is because the forms of sensibility condition possible experience that conceiving this scenario bears the value of a rational, though regulative, ideal for our finite understanding.

This broader teleological framework allows us, finally, to grasp the positive role that is played by Kant's conception of the beyond-life. First, the analysis of human sensibility yields a non-trivial distinction between appearances and things in themselves, which *begins* the argument for transcendental idealism.

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Second, this analysis ultimately relies on the teleological role of the idea of the thing in itself, which *guides* the argument. Third, the idea of the thing in itself best captures Kant's conception of the beyond-life because it represents what *transcends* the bounds of sense, which is to say, the bounds of human life.<sup>37</sup> We can therefore conclude that Kant's conception of the beyond-life is no idle thought, but is central to his account of transcendental idealism.

We have seen that the argument for transcendental idealism rests on the apriority of space and time. We can now turn to see why Heidegger's view shares this foundation.

### §4. *The Apriority of Space and Time in Heidegger*

Let us review. In §1, I argued that Blattner misreads Kant, who rejects as senseless any judgment about nature's existence when thinking beyond human life on the basis of a distinction between logical and real possibility, according to which existential judgments require a synthesis of concepts and intuitions. In §2, I argued that Blattner overstates the methodological gap between Kant and Heidegger, neither of whom can be read as ontic idealists. In §3, I examined Kant's argument for transcendental idealism, the core of which defends the apriority of space and time and thereby illustrates his identity claim that empirical realism and transcendental idealism are two sides of a single, stable position. We can now refute Blattner's thesis—that Heidegger is an empirical realist, not a transcendental idealist—by seeing how the core of Kant's argument figures in Heidegger's analysis of Dasein's spatiality and temporality.

Blattner correctly observes an analogy between Kant's Transcendental Aesthetic and Heidegger's analysis of temporality, detecting a parallel between their respective views that the temporal structure of objects depends on the human standpoint.<sup>38</sup> But he does not develop the analogy in terms of *apriority*. This is crucial because, as we will see, Heidegger's analysis contains *both* of Kant's charges against *a posteriori* derivations of *both* space and time.

Recall that Kant charges such derivations with circularity and with neglecting transcendental necessity. In *Introduction to Metaphysics*, Heidegger says:

There was a time when there were no human beings. But strictly speaking, we cannot say there was a time when there were no human beings. At every *time*, there were and are and will be human beings, because time temporalizes itself only as long as there are human beings. There is no time in which there were no human beings, not because there are human beings from all eternity and for all eternity, but because *time is not eternity*, and time always temporalizes itself only at one time, as human, historical Dasein.<sup>39</sup>

To see how this yields Kant's two charges, we must first comprehend Heidegger's claim that time "temporalizes itself."

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If this claim is true, its contradiction—that something else temporalizes time—is false. But what does it mean to temporalize? Given that phenomenology investigates how things manifest themselves to consciousness, we may say that to temporalize something is to bring its temporal structure to bear on consciousness. Thus, a melody temporalizes itself by manifesting its temporal features to the listening ear, such as its time signature or tempo. Why, then, is it false to say that melodies temporalize time? Heidegger suggests an answer in a 1925 lecture course published as *History of the Concept of Time*: “Time is not something which is found outside somewhere as a framework for world events. Time is even less something which whirs away inside in consciousness. It is rather that which makes possible the being-ahead-of-itself-already-being-involved-in, that is, which makes possible the being of care.”<sup>40</sup> In §1, I noted that Dasein’s existence is constituted by care, that is, by its unavoidable concern for things. But if Dasein is constituted by care and if time “makes possible the being of care,” then time is an *a priori* condition of Dasein’s existence. This is why Heidegger denies that time can be “found outside” Dasein. Time cannot be discovered *a posteriori*, like the temporal features of a melody, because it makes possible our very activity of discovery, which is always a function of care. We see, then, why time temporalizes itself: it brings its own structure to bear on consciousness because it is an *a priori* condition of Dasein as care.

Kant’s two charges against *a posteriori* derivations of time follow from this claim. First, I pursue ends in virtue of my constitution as care. Since time is an *a priori* condition of myself as care, any pursuit of mine, then, is always already temporal. An *a posteriori* derivation of time would therefore be circular. Second, time’s necessity as an *a priori* condition is not logical, for it is no concern of general logic what conditions my constitution as care. Rather, time is transcendently necessary, a condition for the possibility of myself as care.<sup>41</sup> No *a posteriori* derivation can grasp this sort of necessity.

That Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein’s temporality yields Kant’s charges against *a posteriori* derivations of time supports Blattner’s reading of Heidegger as a *temporal idealist*—one who holds that “time depends upon human beings” and that, without our temporal form of being, “there would be no other modes of time.”<sup>42</sup> For my purposes, it is important to see that this shows that Heidegger’s analysis contains the temporal core of Kant’s argument for transcendental idealism.<sup>43</sup> But it does not show that his analysis contains the spatial core. That requires reading Heidegger as a *spatial idealist*—one who holds that space depends on human beings and that, without our spatial form of being, there would be no other modes of space.

Blattner denies that we can read Heidegger as a spatial idealist. However, he restricts his focus to the spaces that Dasein discloses when orienting itself toward objects of concern.<sup>44</sup> Heidegger in fact argues there is an *originary space* that makes this orientation possible: the spatiality of the world. I will

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now reconstruct parallel arguments to this conclusion from *History of the Concept of Time* and *Being and Time*.

Without saying ‘space spatializes itself,’ Heidegger holds that space is an *a priori* condition of Dasein as care. We can trace an indirect proof for this thesis, one that repeats Kant’s charges against *a posteriori* derivations of the concept of space. While the concept of space that Heidegger derives differs in important respects from Kant’s,<sup>45</sup> that his analysis contains the spatial core of the argument for transcendental idealism will be sufficient to refute Blattner.

Heidegger states his thesis in *History of the Concept of Time* and in *Being and Time*:

Space and spatiality as a basic constitution of the world are to be explicated only upon the world itself in compliance with the task of phenomenological analysis. This means that spatiality is to be exhibited phenomenally in the world of everyday Dasein and made manifest in the world as enviring world. *That [the] world is [an] enviring world is due to the specific worldhood of space.* It is incumbent on us to see this worldhood of space, to see primary spatiality, and to understand the space of the enviring world and its structural correlation with Dasein.<sup>46</sup>

World is always already predisposed for circumspect heedfulness together with the accessibility of innerworldly beings at hand. Thus, it is something ‘in which’ Dasein as a being always already *was*, that to which it can always only come back whenever it explicitly moves toward something in some way. According to our foregoing interpretation, being-in-the-world signifies the unthematic, circumspect absorption in the references constitutive for the handiness of the totality of useful things. Taking care of things always already occurs on the basis of a familiarity with the world.<sup>47</sup>

The first passage claims that space is the “basic constitution” of the world grasped in its “worldhood,” namely, as “enviring.” This is the world of “everyday Dasein”—a dwelling rather than a container. Hence, it is in reference to we who dwell that the world in its worldhood bears what Heidegger calls “primary spatiality.” The second passage claims that Dasein is “always already” absorbed in a world familiar to it. This is a world grasped as an environment for our use, not a place for our confinement. The world, then, is that space whose “familiarity” forms “the basis” of the use that we make of things.

Clearly, both passages characterize the world in terms of *a priori* spatiality. One way to prove this thesis is to refute *a posteriori* derivations of space as circular and as neglectful of necessity, following Kant. Both texts supply this twofold refutation, as I will now show.

Regarding circularity, Heidegger says in *History of the Concept of Time* that we cannot grasp the world’s worldhood if we “run through the sum-total of all the things in the world,” for, in such an inventory, “we always

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think of the world-thing in advance already as a *world-thing*.”<sup>48</sup> Recall that, in its worldhood, the world has the spatiality of a dwelling. It is the space in which Dasein is an inhabitant among useful things. Were I to take stock of such things in order to derive the concept of this space, I would rely on the concept I aim to derive, for I would need to have conceived these things as useful, which would presuppose their background as a dwelling. Thus, I must already have a representation of the primary spatiality of the world in its worldhood. This representation precedes any *a posteriori* derivation of space, reducing the latter to circularity.

Heidegger argues similarly in *Being and Time*. Attempting to derive the concept of space *a posteriori* treats our capacity to stand in spatial relations to objects of experience as a contingent empirical fact. But this capacity is not something that “Dasein sometimes has and sometimes does not have, *without* which it could *be*. . . . Dasein is never ‘initially’ a sort of a being which is free from being-in, but which at times is in the mood to take up a ‘relation’ to the world. This taking up of relations to the world is possible only *because*, as being-in-the-world, Dasein is as it is.”<sup>49</sup> Once again, *going out* to derive the concept of space *a posteriori* assumes the concept to be derived, in virtue of which it is so much as possible to go out.

Regarding necessity, notice that I cannot represent that there is no enviro-ning world, although I can think there is nothing useful in it. The world can be inhospitable to me or conspire against my aims, but this is only salient against my background familiarity with the world as enviro-ning. Just as I may represent empty space, but not the absence of space, so I may find nothing useful, but not the absence of a world. Inhabitable spatiality is necessary as an *a priori* condition of finding, i.e., of myself as care. No *a posteriori* derivation can explain why space is necessary in this way. Hence, Heidegger says in *History of the Concept of Time* that space has a structure “it is important from the start *not* to miss,” for it is the “original”<sup>50</sup> structure of a habitation that makes it possible for me to seek. Similar claims to the necessity of space occur in *Being and Time*, as when Heidegger says Dasein must be “understood *a priori* as grounded upon the constitution of being which we call *being-in-the-world*.” In the phrase “*being-in-the-world*,” ‘being-in’ denotes the existence of one who dwells, not the containment of one object in another, while ‘the-world’ denotes a space in which “users live,”<sup>51</sup> not one in which bodies are extended. I am “grounded upon” being-in-the-world because the spatiality of the world in which I dwell conditions the possibility of myself as care.

Like Kant, Heidegger holds that the apriority of space is transcendently necessary. By asking “in what way ‘is there’ a world?,”<sup>52</sup> Heidegger seeks the conditions of the possibility of experience, locating one such in the spatiality whereby Dasein inhabits a world of useful objects. *A posteriori* derivations

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fail to ask this question and therefore cannot conceive the necessity of the spatiality of Dasein's world.

It is clear, given his argument that objects fundamentally depend on this originary space, that Heidegger espouses both spatial and temporal idealism. Indeed, Division One of *Being and Time* begins with the task of "analyz[ing] a fundamental structure of Dasein: Being-in-the-world." This structure is obviously spatial. It is also "a" structure of Dasein, not *the* structure, which implies that it is co-fundamental with time. Although Heidegger gives pride of place to time as his analysis proceeds, he is committed to Dasein's *a priori* spatiality, in keeping with the spatial core of a long argument for transcendental idealism. To be sure, there are Kantian commitments absent from Heidegger's espousal of the apriority of space: he ascribes space to our kind of being, not to sensibility; he conceives space in terms of habitation, not mathematization; and he uses space to structure experience as a primarily concerned, not cognitive, enterprise. Nevertheless, Heidegger's espousal of the apriority of space and time is sufficient to show that he adopts the core of a long argument for transcendental idealism. It is in virtue of this espousal that, as an empirical realist, he is able to take for granted the spatio-temporality of beings.

### §5. *Boundary Concepts*

We should not be surprised to find that empirical realism and transcendental idealism are two aspects of one view. We saw that the unstable relation between transcendental realism and empirical idealism results from a failure to grasp the apriority of space and time. By contrast, empirical realism and transcendental idealism are fused by their respectively implicit and explicit grasp of the same. As an empirical realist, I have an implicit conviction in the necessity of space and time, which allows me to treat my intuitions as of real objects rather than illusions. As a transcendental idealist, I make this necessity explicit through philosophical reflection. For Heidegger, I suggest, 'empirical realism' signifies Dasein's *everyday trust* in the presence and usefulness of worldly beings, while 'transcendental idealism' signifies Dasein's *ontological mindfulness* in asking the question of the meaning of being, the site of whose interrogation is Dasein's own existence.<sup>53</sup>

To be sure, Heidegger's instantiation of transcendental idealism differs from Kant's. But this only shows that the position is not homogeneous, but admits of variations.<sup>54</sup> It is important to bear this in mind when assessing Heidegger's criticism of Kant's the idea of the thing in itself. In order to dispatch this criticism and thereby defend my idealist portrayal of Heidegger, I will argue that Kant's idea of the thing in itself and Heidegger's idea of death play structurally analogous roles in their respective projects, namely, as *boundary concepts*.

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In Heidegger's phenomenological interpretation of the Transcendental Aesthetic, he cautions against misreading Kant's conception of appearances: "appearances are not mere illusions, nor are they some kind of free-floating emissions from things. Rather appearances are objects themselves, or things. Furthermore, appearances are also not other things next to or prior to the things themselves. Rather appearances are just those things themselves *that* we encounter and discover as extant within the world."<sup>55</sup> Here, Heidegger grasps two Kantian thoughts. First, appearances are objects because they conform to the conditions of the possibility of experience. Second, they are not illusory because there is no judgeable and veridical existence with which they contrast. These thoughts, according to Heidegger, yield Kant's distinction between two intuitions: "*finite* intuition," which "lets something already existing be encountered," and "*infinite* intuition," which "freely produces things."<sup>56</sup> Our intuition is finite because we cannot freely produce things—from nothing—but must first encounter them in sensation.

Heidegger praises Kant for drawing attention to this distinction. Grasping the finitude of our intuition, we can reject cognition of things in themselves. In doing so,

one does not deny that [things] are extant and that we encounter them every day. Rather one denies only that these things are, in addition, objects for a *deus faber*, for a demiorgos—one denies the philosophical legitimacy and usefulness of such an assumption, which not only does not contribute to our enlightenment but also confuses, as it becomes clear in Kant. The denial of things in themselves in the conception of Kant by the Marburg School comes from a misunderstanding of what Kant understood by the thing in itself.<sup>57</sup>

Heidegger sees that the idea of the thing in itself is a foil for human knowledge. It refers to the object of an intuition that we grasp by contrast to what is distinctive of our peculiar form of intuition. Blattner therefore misreads Heidegger as being of the view that "the very concept of the thing in itself is bankrupt." This view, he says, is the "anti-transcendental-idealist conclusion" to Heidegger's reading of Kant.<sup>58</sup> But we saw that Heidegger's empirical realism expresses a variety of transcendental idealism. Moreover, his criticism is not that Kant's idea is bankrupt, but that Kant "hesitated in interpreting what is to be understood by 'thing in itself' and in interpreting if and how much it is absolutely necessary to proceed from the thing in itself."<sup>59</sup> Heidegger does not clarify his criticism.<sup>60</sup> We can dispatch it by drawing an analogy between Kant's idea of the thing in itself and Heidegger's idea of death.

I have argued in detail for this analogy elsewhere<sup>61</sup> and will only sketch it here. Recall that the thing in itself is unknowable in the way that a system of cognition is: as that which is rationally desirable. Its idea denotes the highest *telos* of human understanding, which, since it cannot be achieved, is a regulative ideal. This idea acts as a boundary concept, which serves "to

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limit the pretension of sensibility”<sup>62</sup> to transcend the parameter of real possibility and, by enforcing this limitation, to delineate the understanding as a purposive activity.

Heidegger also relies on a boundary concept, namely, the idea of death. To authentically grasp my death is to be aware that I am, in a sense, dying. From this perspective, death confronts me, not as the perishing of my body or the demise of my biography, but as a singular possibility for me. Neither perishing nor demise captures the existential significance of a possibility that is irrevocably mine. Living resolutely toward such a possibility consists in ascribing it to myself as my “ownmost.”<sup>63</sup> My resolute awareness that my death is an inevitable possibility toward which I am uniquely headed is thus a “*way of being*,”<sup>64</sup> which Heidegger calls ‘being-toward-death.’ I live resolutely *as* the one who will die.

Death’s existential significance lies in delimiting a purposive activity, for it demarcates the distinct responsibility that is my life, thereby blocking the common temptation to evade this responsibility. We can say that the idea of death sets the parameter for my real possibilities of being, signifying the regulative ideal of *having lived a completely responsible or authentic life*. The boundary this idea draws is therefore structurally analogous to that drawn by the idea of the thing in itself. Whereas the latter delimits the purposive activity of the understanding, the former delimits the purposive activity of Dasein as care.

It is worth noting the humbling effect of a boundary concept. Such a concept thematizes a finite activity—understanding or care—and contrasts this activity with its ideal—infinite intuition or complete authenticity—in order to resist pretension—dogmatism or inauthenticity. A central feature of transcendental idealism, then, is that, whatever form it takes, its distinctive boundary concept represents an ideal it is our peculiar fate to desire yet never achieve.

In objecting to Blattner’s thesis that Heidegger is an empirical realist and not a transcendental idealist, I have been guided by Kant’s insight that to be one is to be the other. According to this insight, empirical realism and transcendental idealism are mutually dependent: the latter supplies reflections in virtue of which the former can legitimately take appearances for granted, while the former supplies the attitude whose legitimacy the latter must serve. In bringing Kant’s insight to bear on Blattner’s thesis, I have aimed to illuminate the different forms that transcendental idealism can take, given a founding argument for the apriority of space and time, and to warn against supposing that empirical realism and transcendental idealism are more than notionally distinct.

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## Notes

1. Blattner 1994: 186–187, and Blattner 2004: 326.
2. Kant, AA A371.
3. Kant, AA KrV, A26–27/B42–43.
4. Blattner 2004: 322.
5. Heidegger 1996: 212.
6. See Heidegger 1996: 42–43.
7. Kant, AA R5184. Compare KrV, A56–59/B81–83.
8. Kant, AA R5556.
9. Kant, AA R5772.
10. Kant, AA A235n/B287n, A252/B308.
11. Kant, AA KrV, A597–598/B625–26.
12. To be sure, Kant does say, in the Transcendental Deduction, that “without the understanding there would not be any nature at all” (AA KrV, A126). However, bearing in mind that he defines ‘nature’ in *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics* as “the *existence* of things, insofar as that existence is determined according to universal laws” (AA P, 4:294), we can see that, when bracketing the activity of the understanding, nature’s disappearance amounts to the absence of a rule-bound domain and, hence, to the absence of any significance whatsoever, for it is only within such a domain that a judgment of existence can have sense in the first place.
13. Kant, AA KrV, A832–833/B860–861.
14. Blattner 2004: 335.
15. See Blattner 2004: “From the empirical standpoint, which takes the subjective constitution of the senses for granted, we can distinguish between objectivities and illusions, and nature is the very paradigm of an objectivity. From the transcendental standpoint, which ‘removes’ or thinks away the subjective constitution of the senses, we can distinguish between ‘appearances’ and ‘things in themselves,’ and nature here falls into the category of appearance” (322); and Blattner 1994: “What one can also call the ‘transcendental standpoint’ (because its possibility only arises through the discovery of the conditions of sensibility) does not accept the conditions of sensibility as rules governing our answers. It wants to know what things are like independent of the conditions of human sensibility” (195).
16. Blattner 2004: 323–325.
17. Kant, AA KrV, A11–12/B25.
18. Kant, AA KrV, Bxviii.
19. See Blattner 2004: 329.
20. Heidegger (1996) agrees: “If the term idealism amounts to an understanding of the fact that being is never explicable by beings, but is always already the ‘transcendental’ for every being, then the sole correct possibility of a philosophical problematic lies in idealism. Then Aristotle was no less of an idealist than Kant. If idealism means the

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reduction of all beings to a subject or a consciousness which are only distinguished by the fact that they remain *undetermined* in their being and are characterized at best negatively as ‘unthinglike,’ then this idealism is methodologically no less naïve than the grossest realism.” While Heidegger denies Kant is an ontic idealist, that the Kantian subject is “*indefinite* in its Being” (208) is reason, he thinks, to suspect that Kant’s idealism lacks a robust understanding of its own methodology.

21. See Kant, AA A491/B519–520.

22. On this, Heidegger concurs: “As a characteristic mark of knowledge ‘transcendental’ does not mean simply *a priori* knowledge—for example, geometry is also *a priori* knowledge—but means *that a priori* knowledge whose theme is the possibility of an *a priori* knowledge with *factual content*. . . . *Transcendental knowledge is ontological knowledge*, i.e., *a priori* knowledge of the ontological constitution of beings. Because transcendental knowledge is ontological knowledge, Kant can equate transcendental philosophy with ontology” (Heidegger 1997: 186).

23. Blattner thinks Kant fails to grasp the distinction between being and beings (Blattner 1994: 198). Heidegger does not: “Synthetic knowledge *a priori* is that knowledge which is already in each case necessarily presupposed by all knowledge of beings as the ground which enables the experience of beings as well as empirical knowledge. Every knowledge of beings or ontic knowledge already contains a certain knowledge of the ontological constitution, a pre-ontological understanding of being. The problem for Kant is the possibility *of this knowledge of ontological constitution*” (Heidegger 1997: 81).

24. Blattner 2004: 330. Compare Blattner 1994: 198 and Blattner 1999: 245.

25. Ameriks 2000: 128–129.

26. See Ameriks 2000: chap. 3.

27. Kant, AA KrV, A23/B38. Compare this reasoning with regard to time (A30/B46).

28. Kant, AA KrV, A369.

29. Kant, AA KrV, A369. Compare: “transcendental realism necessarily falls into embarrassment, and finds itself required to give way to empirical idealism, because it regards the objects of outer sense as something different from the senses themselves and regards mere appearances as self-sufficient beings that are found external to us; for here, even with our best consciousness of our representation of these things, it is obviously far from certain that if the representation exists, then the object corresponding to it would also exist” (A371).

30. Kant, AA KrV, A24/B38–39. Compare this reasoning with regard to time (A31/B46).

31. Compare Cavell on Wittgenstein: “His philosophy provides, one might say, an anthropological, or even anthropomorphic, view of necessity; and that can be disappointing; as if it is not really *necessity* which he has given an anthropological view of” (Cavell 1999: 118–119).

32. Kant, AA KrV, A370.

33. See Kant, AA KrV: “Since we cannot make the special conditions of sensibility into conditions of the possibility of things, but only of their appearances, we can well say

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that space comprehends all things that may appear to us externally, but not all things in themselves, whether they be intuited or not, or by whatever subject they may be intuited” (A27/B43).

34. Heidegger 1997: 79.

35. Kant, AA KrV, A19/B33.

36. See Kant, AA KrV, A571–576/B599–604. See also Franks 2005: chap. 1 and Bruno 2014.

37. See Bruno 2014.

38. See Blattner 1994: 191–192 and Blattner 1999: 245–246.

39. Heidegger 2000: 64; italics mine.

40. Heidegger 1985: 441–442.

41. Compare Heidegger: “Every disclosure of being as the *transcendens* is *transcendental* knowledge. *Phenomenological truth (disclosedness of being) is veritas transcendentalis*” (Heidegger 1996: 38).

42. Blattner 1999: 229.

43. See Heidegger: “Dasein does not exist as the sum of the momentary realities of experiences that succeed each other and disappear. Nor does this succession gradually fill up a framework. For how should that framework be objectively present, when it is always only the experience that one is having ‘right now’ that is ‘real,’ and when the boundaries of the framework—birth that is past and death that is yet to come—are lacking reality. At bottom, even the vulgar interpretation of the ‘connectedness of life’ does not think of a framework spanned ‘outside’ of Dasein and embracing it, but correctly looks for it in Dasein itself. When, however, one tacitly regards this being ontologically as something objectively present ‘in time,’ an attempt at any ontological characterization of the being ‘between’ birth and death gets stranded” (Heidegger 1996: 374).

44. Blattner 1999: 178–181.

45. Unlike Kant, Heidegger is explicit that space is fundamentally not a mathematizable coordinate system lacking the existential value of the proximity and remoteness of useful things. As he says, the world is not spatial “if spatiality is defined in terms of the dimensionality of metric space, the space of geometry” (Heidegger 1985: 230). Heidegger takes himself to diverge from a tradition—which he traces to Descartes and in which he includes Kant—that casts space primarily as measurable extension. See Heidegger 1985: 238–247 and Heidegger 1996: 66. He perhaps has the benefit of hindsight, having learned from the German idealist project that to avoid nihilism—the threat that freedom is incoherent because individuality is determined by an absolute spatial, causal or logical coordinate system—the space Dasein inhabits must ultimately be one of care and only derivatively one we might measure mathematically.

46. Heidegger 1985: 224.

47. Heidegger 1996: 76.

48. Heidegger 1985: 228.

49. Heidegger 1996: 57.

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50. Heidegger 1985: 230.

51. Heidegger 1996: 53–54.

52. Heidegger 1996: 72.

53. See Heidegger 1996: “what completely separates [the existential assertion of the world] from realism is the lack of ontological comprehension in realism. After all, [realism] tries to explain reality ontically by real connections of interaction between real things” (Heidegger 1996: 207).

54. See Putnam’s defence of internal realism as a “*human* realism, a belief that there is a fact of the matter as to what is rightly assertable for us, as opposed to what is rightly assertable from the God’s eye view so dear to the metaphysical realist” (Putnam 1983: xviii). He describes it as “an approach which claims that there *is* a ‘transcendental’ reality in Kant’s sense, one absolutely independent of our minds, that the regulative ideal of knowledge *is* to copy it, *but* (and this is what makes it ‘natural’ metaphysics) we need no *intellektuelle Anschauung* to do this: the ‘scientific method’ will do the job for us: ‘Metaphysics within the bounds of science alone’ might be its slogan” (Putnam 1983: 226). Earlier, Putnam says objects “do not exist independently of conceptual schemes. *We* cut up the world into objects when we introduce one or another scheme of description. Since the objects *and* the signs are alike *internal* to the scheme of description, it is possible to say what matches what. . . . The very fact that we speak of our different conceptions of *rationality* posits a *Grenzbegriff*, a limit-concept of the ideal truth” (Putnam 1981: 52, 216). Later, he maintains that if objects are “theory-dependent, the whole idea of truth’s being defined or explained in terms of a ‘correspondence’ between items in a language and items in a fixed theory-independent reality has to be given up. The picture I propose instead is not the picture of Kant’s transcendental idealism, but it is certainly related to it. It is the picture that truth comes to no more than idealized rational acceptability” (Putnam 1990: 41).

55. Heidegger 1997: 98.

56. Heidegger 1997: 98.

57. Heidegger 1997: 99.

58. Blattner 2004: 322.

59. Heidegger 1997: 100.

60. In *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, Heidegger says this much: “The concept of the thing-in-itself . . . can only be removed if one can show that the presupposition of an absolute understanding is not philosophically necessary” (Heidegger 1984: 209).

61. See Bruno 2014.

62. Kant, AA KrV, A255/B311.

63. Heidegger 1996: 263.

64. Heidegger 1996: 247.

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