

Motion and Rest as Genuinely Greatest Kinds in the *Sophist*

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Non-formatted version. For citation, see published edition: *Ancient Philosophy* 35:2, 317-327

The blending of the greatest kinds ($\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\nu\eta$) or forms ($\epsilon\acute{\iota}\delta\eta$) is one of the central topics of Plato's *Sophist*. These greatest kinds, or *megista genē*, which seem to be either Platonic Forms or very similar to Platonic Forms, are Being, Motion, Rest, Sameness, and Otherness; I will take them to be properties that are predicated of other things, for reasons we will examine. Why these five kinds are greatest is not made explicit, but immediately before taking up his investigation, the Eleatic Visitor, the main speaker of the dialogue, says that some kinds are "all-pervading," such that nothing prohibits them from blending with every other kind, i.e., from being predicated of every other kind (254b10-c1).¹ One might think, then, that these five are examples of all-pervading kinds. Almost immediately, however, the Visitor and his interlocutor, Theaetetus, agree that Motion and Rest do *not* blend with each other, which seems to cut off this explanation of their greatness (252d9-11). For this reason, many commentators suggest that Motion and Rest are simply convenient examples of kinds, garnered from discussions earlier in the text, and only Being, Sameness, and Otherness are special, all-pervading kinds. On this reading, Hot and Cold, which are also examples from earlier in the text (243d6-244b4), would seem to do the job just as well as Motion and Rest, since both pairs are opposites that do not blend with each other but which *are* (by blending with Being), are self-identical (by blending with Sameness), and are distinct (by blending with Otherness).

I think this reading is incorrect; Motion and Rest are carefully selected as *megista genē*, greatest kinds, and are not just convenient examples.² In fact, I think the kinds are greatest because they are all-pervading; the Visitor intends us to question the agreement that Motion and Rest do not blend, as is suggested when Theaetetus agrees, later, that *if* Motion shared in Rest, there would be nothing strange about saying that Motion is at rest (255b6-8). Thus, I will argue, Motion and Rest can blend, i.e., they can be jointly predicated of one subject and can be predicated of each other, just as Sameness and Otherness can. While Sameness and Otherness are opposites, a single subject may be the same in one respect, namely, the same as itself, and other in another respect, namely, other than other things. Thus they can be predicated of a single subject, and they can be predicated of each other, as well, since Sameness is other than other things and Otherness is the same as itself. The same explanation applies to Motion and Rest, as I will demonstrate: a given subject may be in motion in one respect while being at rest in another respect. Although Plato obviously has the philosophical tools to make this distinction, since he makes it in the *Republic*, where a spinning top is in motion with respect to its circumference and at rest with respect to its axis (436d4-e5), I will show how the distinction is made in the passage of the *Sophist* that concerns the greatest kinds. Thus we should consider Motion and Rest greatest kinds on par with Being, Sameness, and Otherness, and we should think that each of these kinds pervades all other kinds.

¹ Unless otherwise indicated, references are to the new OCT text of the *Sophist*.

² Reeve 1985, 57, holds a similar position.

We will begin by going through the greatest kinds to see how they relate to one another. This investigation will require treatment of a very controversial passage, 255c14-d7; since volumes have been written on the passage, and I cannot devote the requisite time to a full treatment of it here, I will content myself with some brief remarks about how my interpretation compares and contrasts with prominent treatments. Getting clear on this passage and the important distinction it makes between kinds of predications, absolute and relative, will enable us to become clear about how the greatest kinds are predicated of one another and, finally, to solve the problem of how Motion and Rest may be predicated of each other and jointly of other kinds. At that point, we will have seen how all the greatest kinds are predicable of one another and, indeed, of all kinds, which is, it seems, ample reason for calling them some of the “greatest” of all kinds.

I

Theaetetus and the Visitor explicitly run through three of the *megista genē*, showing how each is predicable of the others and, in fact, every kind. Let us start with Being. We may say that, e.g., Motion shares in Being, as the Visitor points out right after he and Theaetetus agree that Motion is not identical to Rest: “But it *is*, at least, because it shares in Being” (256a1). We can, in fact, substitute any other kind for Motion, as the Visitor remarks at 256e3-4: since they all share in Being (*metechei tou ontos*), they *are* and *are beings* (*einai te kai onta*).³ Even Otherness, of which Not-Being is part (the part other than Being), also shares in Being and thus *is* (259a6-b1).

Sameness and Otherness are also predicable of each kind; Motion, for example, is the same as itself (cf. 256a7-8), and we can substitute any other kind for Motion, since every kind, even Otherness, is the same as itself. Likewise, Motion is other than Rest, so Otherness may be predicated of Motion in relation to Rest. As with Sameness, Otherness may be predicated of every kind, since each is other than the others (256d11-e3). Even Being is other than something, for example, than Otherness (259a8-b4), since it is not the same as (i.e., not identical to) Otherness. It thus turns out that Being is not, i.e., is other than, an indefinite number of things (257a4-6, 259b4-7), since it is not the same as an indefinite number of other kinds.

But now we come to the trouble-makers, Motion and Rest. How can these, which seem to be opposites (cf. 250a8-9, 255a4-b1), be conjointly predicated of anything at all, let alone of all kinds? To bring out the problem more clearly, let us take a moment to clarify what exactly Motion and Rest are. The terms I use, “Motion” and “Rest”, are traditional translations of the Greek terms *kinēsis*, which can mean change in general and motion (as a kind of change) in particular, and *stasis*, which is the opposite of *kinēsis* and is thus more akin, in the *Sophist*, to stability, i.e., being completely stationary and unchanging rather than merely staying in one place. Motion and Rest might, then, best be thought of as *mutability* and *immutability*, which are much more obviously opposites and seemingly not jointly predicable of anything at all.

The problem is clearer now: how can anything be both mutable *and* immutable? According to plausible Platonic assumptions, all kinds must be immutable, insofar as they are unchanging objects of knowledge, as the Visitor himself affirms (249b8-c9).⁴ Because of this, some commentators have suggested that Rest must be predicated of every kind.⁵ But if every kind is immutable, it seems impossible that any kind can have Motion predicated of it in any way, as would be necessary if the *megista genē* are in fact able to be predicated of all other kinds.

³ That they all “are and are beings” may also mean that each *is F* and thus is an *F* thing.

⁴ Cf. *Timaeus* 51d-52a; *Phaedo* 78d5-6; *Republic* 479a1-3, e7-8, 484b4; *Symposium* 210e-211b.

⁵ E.g., Reeve 1985, 59.

If we are to maintain that the greatest kinds are predicable of every kind, we must, it seems, be like the child the Visitor says wants it ‘both ways,’ such that Being and the other kinds admit, somehow, of rest *and* motion. What we need is a way to specify the respects in which a kind is mutable and in which it is immutable, so that we may truly have it ‘both ways’ (249d3-4).

Such a way is, it seems, offered by Reeve 1985, who also argues that the *megista genē* are predicable of every other kind. Reeve further contends that Motion and Rest must not be opposites, since opposites cannot be jointly predicable of anything.⁶ In this way he hopes to show that every kind is at rest *kath hautō* (which he takes to mean “in relation to itself”) and moving *pros allo* (“in relation to another,” specifically, on Reeve’s interpretation, in relation to time).⁷ Thus Reeve proposes using the *kath hautō* / *pros allo* distinction, which is explained at 255c9-d7, to solve the problem of blending Motion and Rest.

While I think Reeve’s interpretation is on the right track, there are two problems with it. First, if Plato really does hold that Motion and Rest are not opposites, it seems that he should call attention to this completely counterintuitive view. But I see no reason to attribute such a view to Plato; in fact, it is explicit in the text that Motion and Rest are “most opposite” to each other (250a8-9; cf. 255a10-b1 and 255e11-12). Plato does, in fact, have a means at his disposal for claiming that two opposite properties are predicable of one thing: the opposites must simply be predicated of it at different times or in different respects (cf. *Republic* 436c5-437a2).

This point leads to the second problem with Reeve’s solution, namely, to his use of *kath hautō*, which simply does not mean ‘in relation to itself.’ If something is at rest *kath hautō*, then it is at rest *by itself*, i.e., it *just is* at rest, simply and without any qualification. If every kind is at rest *kath hautō*, it is impossible to predicate Motion of any kind without contradiction, for it is impossible for a thing to be *completely* immutable and yet mutable *in some way*. Let us, then, take a brief look at the *kath hautō* / *pros allo* distinction, which can, I think, still be of some use in solving our problem, as long as we understand it as a non-exhaustive distinction.

II

In the passage that concerns us, the Stranger is distinguishing Being and Otherness as distinct *megista genē*. There have been many interpretations of the controversial passage, but I will loosely follow the “traditional” interpretation defended in Malcolm 2006, so that we do not become bogged down in the many controversies and interpretations that have arisen from the passage, many of which have been sufficiently treated elsewhere.⁸ Let us look at 255c9-d7:

... I suppose you agree that of things that are, some are said themselves by themselves (*auta kath hauta*), and some are always said in relation to others (*pros alla*).... Otherness is always said in relation to something other (*pros heteron*).... That would not be the case if Being and Otherness did not differ completely: if Otherness had a share of both kinds, as does Being, at some point one of the things that are other would be other not in relation to something other (*pros heteron*). As it is, though, it follows by necessity that whatever is other is what it


⁶ Reeve 1985, 57.

⁷ Reeve 1985, 59. Predicating Rest *kath hautō* of something would, then, import nothing but the subject (and, of course, Rest): If Being is at rest *kath hautō*, then it rests in relation to Being, i.e., in relation to itself. Predicating Rest (or Motion) *pros allo* would, in contrast, import something other than the subject (and Rest or Motion).

⁸ E.g., Crivelli 2012, 142-7; Gill 2012, 173-176; Leigh 2012, 3-11; Malcolm 2006, 276-87. In addition, Duncombe 2012 proposes an alternate manuscript reading of the passage, allegedly to provide a place for Sameness in the distinction. He does not, however, consider Malcolm’s treatment of Sameness, which adequately solves the puzzle about Sameness while retaining the standard text, as I discuss below.

is [i.e., other] in relation to something other.⁹

The Visitor gives us, Malcolm argues, a distinction between two types of predication: *kath hauto* and *pros allo*. The Visitor goes on to say that Otherness is always predicated in relation to something else, *pros allo*.¹⁰ Things that are other are always other than something: we must specify something from which they are different. We say that Socrates is other than Theaetetus, not just that Socrates is other, unless the comparison class is supplied by context. So Otherness is always said in relation to something; but Being “has a share of both kinds” of beings, since, the Visitor says, it can be predicated both in relation to something else and by itself. So far, then, our distinction is:



If *kath hauto* predicates need not be completed with anything else, and *pros allo* predicates require completion, then we should be able to assign any kind of predication into one category or the other. But we come to a problem with the first kind that the Visitor distinguishes from Being, namely Sameness. Sameness is not a relation to something else, so it is not *pros allo*, since then the other thing would not be *something else* but the very same thing as the first thing;¹¹ there would not be two things, but one (cf. 243e4-244a3). But it also is not *kath hauto*, because predications of Sameness must be completed: a thing is the same *as something*, not just ‘the same’ (cf. 255b11-c2). There is no need to fit Sameness in either category, though, since the Visitor clearly states at 256b1 that something shares in Sameness because it is the same *as itself*: it participates in Sameness *pros heauto*, in relation to itself. Thus the *kath hauto* / *pros allo* distinction is not exhaustive: *pros heauto* predication is a third type.


As Malcolm points out, these three types of predication fit into a wider distinction made by Plato’s successors, namely that things are said *kath hauto* or *pros ti*, in relation to something.¹² Since *pros ti* is a fairly common pairing with *kath hauto*, it is natural to take this distinction as background for 255c13-14. *Pros ti* predications thus include both *pros allo* and *pros heauto* predications. Plato need not mention the wider distinction in 255c13-14, since it is not necessary for his present purpose, i.e., to distinguish Being and Otherness, since Otherness can only be said *pros allo*, not *pros heauto*. We are left, then, with this scheme:

⁹ Ἄλλ’ οἶμαι σε συγχωρεῖν τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν αὐτὰ καθ’ αὐτά, τὰ δὲ πρὸς ἄλλα αἰεὶ λέγεσθαι.... Τὸ δὲ γ’ ἕτερον αἰεὶ πρὸς ἕτερον.... Οὐκ ἄν, εἴ γε τὸ ὄν καὶ τὸ θάτερον μὴ πάμπολυ διαφορεέτην· ἀλλ’ εἴπερ θάτερον ἀμφοῖν μετεῖχε τοῖν εἰδοῖν ὡς περ τὸ ὄν, ἦν ἄν ποτέ τι καὶ τῶν ἐτέρων ἕτερον οὐ πρὸς ἕτερον· νῦν δὲ ἀτεχνῶς ἡμῖν ὅτι περ ἄν ἕτερον ἦ, συμβέβηκεν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐτέρου τοῦτο ὅπερ ἐστὶν εἶναι.

¹⁰ The Visitor uses *allo* and *heteron*, which both mean “other,” interchangeably; cf. 255c14, d1.

¹¹ Crivelli 2012, 145-6, argues that *pros allo* means just ‘relative to something’ rather than ‘relative to something else.’ Though he does not mention here the problem of Sameness’ place in the distinction, he would presumably, by this reasoning, put it under *pros allo*. Cf. Leigh 2012, 23-6. For considerations against this approach, see Malcolm 2006, 282-3.

¹² Malcolm 2006, 282-4.



Thus we have a distinction between predicates: on the one hand, we have predicates that do not require completion (*kath hauto*), on the other hand, we have predicates that require completion (*pros ti*). Of the predicates that require completion, in turn, we have two kinds, one that requires a reference to the subject (*pros heauto*) and one that requires reference to something other than the subject (*pros allo*). At this point, I must diverge from Malcolm, who takes these distinctions to be purely grammatical. For Plato, predication is predicating one *thing* of another *thing*, i.e., the distinction among predicates reflects a real distinction in the world between that which is predicated and that of which it is predicated. Thus I take the distinction among predicates to imply a tripartite metaphysical distinction among properties.¹³ A property may require a relation between the subject and itself (*pros heauto*), it may require a relation between the subject and something else (*pros allo*), or it may require no such relations (*kath hauto*). We can now turn back to Motion and Rest to see how this new distinction helps us with our problem.

III

I have suggested that the *megista genē* are *megista* (greatest, or largest, or most important) because they are predicable of all the other kinds, since the Visitor says that some kinds are not prevented from combining with all other kinds (254b10-c1) right before he introduces the *megista genē* (254c1f). A Stephanus page earlier, the Visitor also says that the philosopher will know whether there are some forms that hold all the others together so that some of them can combine (253c1-3, cf. 253d5f). Thus it is likely that the *megista genē* are those kinds that stretch through all other kinds, and we can verify this by going through them again, this time using the *kath hauto / pros ti* and the *pros allo / pros heauto* distinctions.

Recall that the Visitor says of Motion that “it *is*, at least, because it shares in Being” (256a1). This statement appears to be a *kath hauto* predication of Being: Motion *is*—it either exists or *is* something, or both—without reference to anything else. The statement also has metaphysical ramifications: since Motion has the property of *being* without reference to something else, it is, by itself, a being. In other words, Motion requires no relation to anything else in order to share in Being. As we saw above, all the greatest kinds *are* and *are beings* (256e3-4). Thus Otherness, which can only be predicated of other things *pros allo*, itself shares in Being *kath hauto*, and so Being is predicated of Otherness *kath hauto*:

Being is predicated of Otherness *kath hauto*— Otherness *is*.¹⁴

¹³ Cf. Leigh 2012, 17-21, who also takes the ‘beings’ under discussion to be properties, although she goes on to interpret the passage differently than I do when she distinguishes between the intelligible and attribute modes of properties. If we pay attention to what we are predicating of what, I think we can do without Leigh’s distinction, at least when we recognize a distinction between *predicating a kind* and *predicating the nature of a kind*; e.g., “Otherness is other (than some *x*)” *versus* “Otherness is (what it is to be) other.”

¹⁴ Alternatively: “Otherness is F,” e.g., a relation, and *mutatis mutandis* for each of the following kinds.

Otherness is predicated of Being *pros alla* —Being is other than other things.

We can see, then, that the greatest kinds can be inter-predicated, so that sometimes they will function as predicates and other times as subjects. We can take Sameness as another example:

Being is predicated of Sameness *kath hauto* — Sameness *is*.

Sameness is predicated of Being *pros heauto*—Being is the same as itself.

The first line will generalize to any other kind, since every kind shares in Being *kath hauto*, but the second will be more difficult to generalize, as it is not yet apparent which other kinds can be predicated of Being besides Sameness and Otherness.

Similarly, Motion shares in Sameness *pros heauto*, since Motion is the same as itself (cf. 256a7-8); we can substitute any other kind for Motion, too, since every kind, even Otherness, is the same as itself. Thus Sameness may be predicated *pros heauto* of all the kinds. We should note a curious consequence before moving on: since Sameness is predicated *pros heauto*, Sameness—or identity—seems to be relational. Any given thing is self-identical because it shares in Sameness, even though it does that sharing in relation to itself. Something is not, then, self-identical *kath hauto*, by itself, but only in relation to the kind Sameness.

Continuing, Motion is other than Rest, so Otherness may be predicated of Motion in relation to Rest. As with Sameness, Otherness may be predicated of every kind *pros allo*, for each is other than the others (256d11-e3). Even Being is other than something, and so it turns out that Being is not, i.e., is other than, an indefinite number of things (257a4-6, 259b4-7), since it is not the same as an indefinite number of other kinds.

This leaves us with the last two *megista genē*, Motion and Rest. We saw that Reeve suggested that Rest is predicated of every kind *kath hauto*.¹⁵ But, as we saw above, if every kind is at rest *kath hauto*, it seems impossible that any kind can have Motion predicated of it in any way, as would be necessary if the *megista genē* are in fact able to be predicated of all other kinds. If Being shares in Rest *kath hauto*, then Being is completely immutable, and it would be absurd to think that it is also mutable in some respect. *Kath hauto* predications leave no room for specifying a respect. In addition, we learn at 250c6-7 that Being neither is at rest nor is moving according to its own nature (*kata tēn hautou phusin*), which seems to confirm our reasoning that Being is not at rest or moving *kath hauto*, by itself or, in other words, by its own nature. There must, instead, be a way to specify the respect in which Being (or any other kind) is mutable and the respect in which it is immutable.

We can do just that, I contend, by means of predication *pros heauto*. If every kind is at rest *pros heauto* and in motion *pros allo*, there is no contradiction, for it is in motion and at rest in different respects. Since both *pros heauto* and *pros allo* are relational, we need not say that any kind is at rest *simpliciter*, as we would if we predicated Rest *kath hauto*. Instead, it is at rest in one respect, namely, in respect to itself, and moving in another, namely, in respect to something other than itself.¹⁶ Thus a kind can change in relation to other things, such as when it gains a new relation to a knower; this is just to become different in relation to that knower, since it gains that new relation.¹⁷ A kind can, as well, rest in relation to itself, since it remains the same intrinsically through the extrinsic change of being known.¹⁸ We preserve Motion and Rest as opposites, and

¹⁵ E.g., Reeve 1985, 59.

¹⁶ Thus something is at rest *pros heauto* if it undergoes no intrinsic change, regardless of the extrinsic change it undergoes.

¹⁷ Cf. Silverman 2002, p. 295.

¹⁸ This solution to the problem of Motion and Rest may be applicable to a difficulty raised at 248d10-e5. Theaetetus and the Eleatic Visitor argue that if Being is known, it must be changed (given that knowing an object is

each is predicable of every kind. Every kind is at rest in itself, for each shares in Rest *pros heauto*, and each may still have Motion predicated of it *pros allo*.

One might object that I am using a distinction that is not actually in the text. Plato only gives us the *kath hauto / pros allo* distinction; he does not mention *pros heauto* in the immediate context of the distinction. But given the background *kath hauto / pros ti* distinction, which seems to have been in use among Plato's successors, it is reasonable to supplement the explicit textual distinction with the *pros heauto* relation. In fact, as I mentioned above, the Visitor does say that things are the same *pros heauto*, i.e., everything is the same as itself (256b1), even though he does not explicitly contrast *pros heauto* predications with *kath hauto* and *pros allo* predications. Again, he need not explicitly contrast them to make his point in the context of the distinction, since he has already distinguished Sameness and Being and need only distinguish Being and Otherness. The explicit remark that predications of Sameness are *pros heauto* suffices to put the distinction in the background of the entire passage.

There is another objection lurking in the background. It is obvious, one might say, that Sameness and Otherness are relational. Nothing can be said properly to be the same without being the same *as something*. Likewise, nothing can be said to be different without being other *than something*. Rest and Motion are not, however, so obviously relational. I can say that something moves *simpliciter*. I need not mention any other entity in relation to which it moves. Likewise I need not mention any entity in relation to which a thing changes. I can say that it changes *simpliciter*. So why should we think that Motion and Rest are relational?

In response, we should think a bit more about what it means to say that something changes or that it is at rest. Intuitively, to change is to become different, and to rest is to stay the same; in fact, the Visitor explicitly equates resting and remaining the same (249b12-c1). When something moves or changes, it either becomes other than itself (from one time to another) or it becomes other than other things (by moving in relation to them, for example). When something is at rest, it stays the same as it was before, or it stays the same in relation to the things around it. Since Sameness and Otherness are obviously relational, it is natural to think that Motion and Rest inherit their relational status from Sameness and Otherness. Changing is becoming other *than something*, and resting is staying the same *as something*. Things do not move *simpliciter* but in some context and in relation to something. Likewise, things do not rest *simpliciter* but in relation to something, either in relation to themselves (by remaining the same over time) or in relation to other things, as when a spinning top is at rest relative to its axis, since it is staying in the same place on a surface, but in motion relative to its circumference, since it is spinning (cf. *Rep.* 436d4-e5).

One might grant that Motion and Rest *could* be seen as relational but still maintain that Plato does not see them this way. Although Motion and Rest are explicitly introduced as opposites only at 250a8, the concepts have been in use throughout the *gigantomachia*, the battle of gods and giants that pits 'friends of the Forms' against the materialist giants, the latter initially defending a view whereby all that exists is material and hence subject to (physical) motion, and the former initially defending a view whereby all that exists is at rest. Thus Rest should be taken

an instance of affecting it and that the object known is thereby affected). But we know from elsewhere in the Platonic corpus that Being, as well as the other forms, must remain unchanged. This leaves us with a paradox: if Being is knowable, then it is mutable, and thus it cannot be an object of knowledge. And if Being cannot be known, then, of course, it is not an object of knowledge; either way, we have no access to true reality. Our distinction among predicates, however, gives us the means to solve this paradox: it is only Being's relations to other things—namely, knowers—that are changed when Being is known, while its relations to itself stay the same. Thus, Being is, in itself, immutable, but its extrinsic relations are mutable.

to be *completely* immutable, since the friends hold that the Forms are *akinēta*, never subject to change, and Motion should be taken as the opposite of this, i.e., subject to change in any way whatsoever (cf. 249d3-4). But if this is the case, there is no room for specifying a respect in which something is immutable, and so Plato must not see Motion and Rest as relational.¹⁹

I grant that Motion and Rest are thought of as unqualified when they are first employed, but that does not mean that they are so used throughout the discussion. At 250c6-7, as we have seen above, the Visitor points out that Being is not at rest or in motion *by its own nature* (*kata tēn hautou phusin*). At this point in the dialogue, i.e., in the *gigantomachia*, we have not yet made explicit that something can be characterized by one property in one respect and the opposite property in a different respect; these points are first made in the discussion of Sameness and Otherness (255c13-257a6, especially 256a10-b4). Thus we should take the “*kata tēn hautou phusin*” at 250c6 as equivalent to the *kath hautou* at 255c14 and following, and we should recognize that all three kinds, Being, Motion, and Rest, are being discussed by themselves, *kath hautou*, rather than as potentially relational. This leaves open the possibility, to which the Visitor hints at 256b6-8, that Motion and Rest may be predicated of each other in some respect, even if they cannot be predicated *kath hautou* of each other. At 256b6-8, the Visitor remarks that if Motion shared in Rest, there would be nothing strange about saying that Motion is at rest, and we can now see that there really is nothing odd about saying that Motion rests, as long as we realize that Motion, as a kind, is at rest *pros heauto*.

Given that Motion and Rest are predicable of each other and of every other kind, we can lay out how the five *megista genē* blend with all the other kinds:

Being: Every kind is *kath hautou* (i.e., it exists or is something).

Sameness: Every kind is the same *pros heauto* (i.e., as itself).

Otherness: Every kind is other *pros allo* (i.e. with respect to each other kind).

Rest: Every kind is immutable *pros heauto* (i.e., no kind undergoes intrinsic change).

Motion: Every kind is mutable *pros allo* (i.e., extrinsically).

It is not just particulars, then, that may have opposite properties predicated of them in different respects, but kinds—and Forms—too, since every Form is, is self-identical, is distinct from every other Form, is intrinsically immutable, and is extrinsically mutable, at least by being knowable and possibly in some additional way. We can see that there is no problem with kinds and Forms being both changeless and able to suffer change, for we are speaking of them in different respects, just as there is no problem with Motion being the same and not the same (256a10-11). Likewise, we can see that Motion and Rest are not merely convenient examples which could be interchanged with any other pair of opposites, e.g., Hot and Cold. Instead, Motion and Rest apply even to Forms, just as the other *megista genē* do; these kinds are indeed some of the greatest, since they are predicable of all other kinds.²⁰

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¹⁹ I thank Pauline Sabrier and Vasilis Politis for bringing this objection to my attention.

²⁰ My thanks to John Malcolm, Timothy Clarke, Thomas Chance, Adam Sennet, Christopher Healow, Vasilis Politis, Peter Larsen, Pauline Sabrier, and Ronald Polansky, as well as audiences at the Plato Centre, Trinity College Dublin, and the Dublin Postgraduate Philosophy Conference for valuable comments on drafts of this paper.

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