Review
Reviewed Work(s): Cicero on the Emotions: Tusculan Disputations 3 and 4 by Margaret Graver
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guish carefully between true and continuing cultural and local-political vitality, and actual geopolitical power.

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Margaret Graver (trans.), *Cicero on the Emotions: Tusculan Disputations 3 and 4* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 254 pp.

Those who know Margaret Graver's other work will not be surprised by the high quality of scholarship in this translation and commentary on *Tusculan Disputations* Books 3 and 4. Nonetheless the volume will be of interest and accessible to the uninitiated as well as the specialist, being suitable for use in upper-level undergraduate courses or graduate seminars on philosophical psychology.

Graver gives us a smooth translation that is close to the Latin, sometimes emending the Latin text printed by Pohlenz (see xli) or in the Loeb, and typically offering good reasons for doing so (see especially 181 on *Tusculans* 4.78). Her commentary, which constitutes the bulk of the book, regularly attends to technical Latin terms and their Greek equivalents, providing informed speculation or correction when the meaning of a term is questionably or inconsistently maintained by Cicero (see e.g. 153–4 on *proclivitas*, 135 on the *partes* of the soul, and 79, 149 and 157 on *morbus* and *aegrotatio*).

The volume has something for scholars in all fields associated with Classics—thus history and literature as well as philosophy and lexicology. Graver situates the *Tusculans* at the end of a development in Cicero's attitude toward emotions by comparison with *On the Orator* and the letters (xii, 168), and suggests social as well as intellectual reasons for his later taking the Stoic line (xii–xiii). She reconstructs the six months following his daughter Tullia's death so as to place both the *Tusculans* and the non-extant *Consolation* within Cicero's personal history (xiii–xiv, 187), and her attention to literary genre, style and figures of speech brings to light connections with the Greek philosophical, dramatic, and consolatory traditions (e.g. xv, xxvii–xxx, 142).

Much of the commentary is philosophical in orientation, and Graver is careful to elucidate the context by outlining the Peripatetic, Epicurean, and Stoic views as known to us from other sources. She thus provides interesting portions of the Stoic theory not reported by Cicero (such as the list of species-*eupatheiai*, 138, and the Stoic and Epicurean accounts of *erōs*, 174–6) as well as the breadth needed to evaluate Cicero's presentation of the Stoics (e.g. he does not represent the orthodox position when calling the object of an emotion 'fresh'; it is the belief which is regularly identified as such in Stoic definitions [119]). In addition to the Stoics' cognitivist account of emotions ('emotions are reducible to judgments'), important topics treated include Stoic epistemology, theory of action, position on value, and conception of nature. The generally clear presentation of these will be of particular use to students, though philosophers specializing in later periods should also find them helpful since, for example, the Stoic account of "starting points" or "seeds of the virtues" (*aphormai*; 77) is important background for Augustine's and Aquinas' theory of natural law (see e.g. ST I 79.12 obj. 3, citing Aug. *On Free Choice* 2.10), and the distinction between normative 'nature' and descriptive 'nature' (see Graver xvi, 73, 75) was developed by patristic philosophers into the theory of 'original nature' vs. 'fallen nature' (compare e.g. Au-

gustine, *Expositions of the Psalms* 30.2.13 and *Confessions* 8.9.21–22, 8.11.26 to Seneca *On Anger* 2.10.2, 2.10.6, 2.13.1).[1] Graver is also attentive to current philosophical presuppositions, and to analytic concerns generally. Thus she addresses the contemporary tendency to think that emotions simply are chemical or electrical changes of the body (rather than, as the Stoics had it, changes in the soul) (140), and raises objections to the Stoic account which Cicero himself did not raise (e.g. 172).

Nevertheless, there is one important area in which Graver's presentation could be stronger: the criterion of truth in Stoic theory. The fact is that the Stoics held a 'correspondence theory of truth': true beliefs are those that match up to reality, which is independent of our minds. These have as a supervenient property consonance with one another; since the universe is one harmonious whole, accurate propositions about reality are not contradictory. While Graver's account does sometimes acknowledge this twofold emphasis on soundness and validity (135, 136), she does not explain that the former is primary for the Stoics. More alarmingly, soundness often drops out of the picture entirely. Thus 'coherence' alone becomes the criterion. We hear, for instance, that "goodness is defined . . . with reference to the internal coherence of some system. . . . What is good ought to be that which fits into some pattern which is orderly and complete relative to that person" (xxi; see also 92, 154–5), that virtue or knowledge is simply "logical coherence among all one's beliefs" (87; cf. 86), that vice is lack of consistency within one's belief-set (148–9), and that Right Reason is the maintenance of order and consistency among the mind's judgments (141). Statements like these ring of Kant[2] or of post-Cartesian philosophy more generally; as such they are themselves strangely discordant notes in this piece of otherwise solid scholarship. She cites Diogenes Laertius 7.126, Sextus Empiricus *Adversus Mathematicos* 8.275–6, and Stobaeus *Eclogues* 2.7.5b5 in support (86, 87); these texts make reference to virtue as knowledge, to reason's capacity for logical sequence, and to the unity of the virtues, but they do not offer substantive support for her presentation of the criterion.

Only occasionally does this misinterpretation slightly color the translation; for 4.23's *pravarum opinionum conturbatio et ipsarum inter se repugnantia* Graver has "the confusion of crooked opinions and the conflict of one with another" in place of the Loeb's "corrupt beliefs warring against one another." While she is closer to the Latin in phraseology, her rendering of "*pravus*" as "crooked" can be faulted as overly literal, and suggestive of a merely formal problem with the beliefs (i.e. beliefs which merely clash with others one holds) rather than anything intrinsically wrong with their content. Here the Loeb seems preferable for its use of the extended sense, "corrupt."

Pace Tieleman, her discussion of possible sources for Cicero is far from superficial;[3] she demonstrates close familiarity with relevant texts and philosophical currents in the four appendices and in observations throughout the commentary. Graver is generally a sensitive reader with thorough knowledge of the historical periods; consequently we get interesting suggestions: a discrepancy between 4.21 and otherwise similar material in Diogenes Laer-

1. For other currents contributing to this development, see N. J. Torchia, *Plotinus*, Tolma, *and the Descent of Being*, American University Studies: Series V, Philosophy, 135 (New York: Peter Lang, 1993), 11–17.
2. Compare Graver 117 to Kant's justification for perfect duties to self at *Grounding of the Metaphysics of Morals* 422.
3. See T. Tieleman, *Chrysippus'* On Affections, Philosophia Antiqua 94 (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2003), 9 n. 20.

tius suggests an error by a copyist of the latter (147); comparison of the ps-Plutarchan *Consolation to Apollonius* with the *Tusculans* and with other Stoic texts indicates use of Crantor by not only Cicero and the author to Apollonius but also perhaps the early Stoics themselves (188–9); assessment of Cicero's list of species-passions in light of Stobaeus, Diogenes Laertius, and ps-Andronicus indicates that he is drawing on a compilation not used by the later Greeks, perhaps that of Sphaerus (144); and Aristotle and Cicero's Stoic source may have shared use of an earlier text (143). Her conclusion that Chrysippus is the direct source for much of Cicero's (and Posidonius') work echoes that of Dougan-Henry[4] (75–6, 112, Appendix C–D). In support of it, we are given at one point a detailed list of themes and attitudes found in Cicero which Galen and others associate specifically with Chrysippus (204ff). The list is discerning, if not entirely persuasive. One may still wonder, for instance, why Cicero frequently says that according to the Stoics, the intentional object of an emotion is a "great good or evil" (*magnum bonum/malum*, 3.24–5, 3.28, 3.61, 4.22), even though "great" does not occur in the passages she presents from Galen, Calcidius, and Diogenes Laertius representing Chrysippus; herein we find merely "goods" or "a fine thing." Nonetheless, Cicero does occasionally say the object is simply "a good" or "an evil" (3.24, 3.74).

The volume is also useful as a starting point for further research on topics treated therein. Each segment of the commentary provides page numbers to some of the relevant secondary work on the specific topics discussed, and Graver usually notes where her presentation agrees with or diverges from the authors she mentions. A few more references to other notable works would have been a nice addition here (or at least to the final bibliography), as these lists tend to repeat standard works and authors. One thinks, for instance, of the work of Rist on the question of Platonic 'parts' of the soul[5] or on Seneca and his sources,[6] and the studies on *propatheiai* by Stevens[7] and Layton.[8]

In sum, although not without some room for improvement, this volume is generally of very high quality, and ought to be lauded as a valuable contribution to philosophical psychology and classical studies.

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4. *M. Tulli Ciceronis Tusculanarum Disputationum Libri Quinque*, vols. I and II, edd. T. W. Dougan and R. M. Henry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1905 and 1934, repr. New York: Arno Press, 1979), II, xlii and xlvii, respectively.
5. J. Rist, "Plato Says That We Have Tripartite Souls . . . " in: *Sophiës Maiëtores. Chercheurs de Sagesse*, edd. M.-O. Goulet-Cazé et al. (Paris: Institut des Études Augustiniennes, 1992), 103–124.
6. J. Rist, "Seneca and Stoic Orthodoxy," *Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt/Rise and Decline of the Roman World (ANRW)* II 36.3, ed. W. Haase (Berlin-New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1989), 1993–2012.
7. J. Stevens, "Preliminary Impulse in Stoic Psychology," *Ancient Philosophy*, 20 (2000), 139–168.
8. R. Layton, "*Propatheia:* Origen and Didymus on the Origin of the Passions," *Vigiliae Christianae*, 54 (2000), 262–282. Other studies too recent for inclusion in Graver's book include S. Byers, "Augustine and the Cognitive Cause of Stoic 'Preliminary Passions' (*Propatheiai*)," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* XLI (2003), 433–448 and R. Layton "Fom 'Holy Passion' to Sinful Emotion: Jerome and the Doctrine of Propassio" in: *In Dominico Eloquio*, edd. P. Blower et al. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002), 280–93.