along with close observation, guided discussion, and perceptive interpretation can enhance students' appreciation of themes related to death and dying.

The greatest strength and primary goal of this book is its heuristic value as an aid to instruction. For those teachers who are comfortable using images to supplement as well as lead into philosophical discussion, this handbook is a valuable tool. Because the images are suggestive rather than discursive, some readers may feel a need for more expository text or argument. Bertman's commentary is helpful and perceptive, but, in the spirit of her book, interpretative without being definitive. The reader of her text and viewer of the images may find other clues to unravel and other paths to follow. Thus her handbook is more of a sampler than a set of rules, an invitation to explore ways of seeing, sensing and feeling rather than prescriptions about what one ought to experience. At the same time, she rightly believes that certain recurrent themes will emerge from diverse images. In particular she asserts "[t]hat death, like birth, is an archetypically communal experience with universal shared emotions, fears, hopes, and pains—an event that ironically has not changed despite advanced technology and sophisticated medical care" (167).

The book contains some material that is addressed specifically to health professionals or counselors that will be of tangential interest to teachers of philosophy. But this material does not detract from the handbook's value as a tool for teaching. The book contains abundant references in the text for the sources of the images and a useful, though not comprehensive, bibliography. On the whole the handbook successfully achieves its heuristic goal.

William J. Winslade, Ph.D., J.D., James Wade Rockwell Professor of Philosophy in Medicine, Institute for the Medical Humanities, University of Texas Medical Branch, Galveston, Texas 77550, and Cullen Professor of Law, University of Houston Health Law and Policy Institute, Houston, Texas 77204-6381, USA


EDMUND F. BYRNE

Thompson's book is about as good as they come in its genre, and this is meant as a compliment. But the compliment is qualified by context.

Philosophical attention to technology antedates the twentieth century; but its organization into a special subject (under which precursors can be subsumed) is of recent origin. It arose out of the reality-driven realization that technology, not to mention science, cannot be reduced to a system of ideas or formulae. But with few exceptions professional philosophers were not early advocates of a less hierarchical version of the instrumentality of progress. This culture lag resulted, to a large extent, from mainstream philosophers' having looked to "pure" science as the best if not only fulfillment of traditional philosophical aspirations. Impressed by the modernist pretensions of scientists, philosophers of science and their epistemological co-conspirators have for many decades kept the upstart philosophy of technology on the fringes of disciplinary respectability, along with other alternative discourses condescendingly
labeled "applied philosophy." These institutional obstacles notwithstanding, philosophy of technology now has a foothold in curricula via courses such as "Technology and Human Values" that provide a disciplinary counterpart to the interdisciplinary offerings of Science, Technology, and Society (STS) programs. Progress along these lines is, however, little more than glacial, as members of the decade-old Society for Philosophy and Technology struggle to add a philosophical complement to the work of the Society for the History of Technology, the Society for the Social Study of Science, and comparable organizations abroad. (Biomedical, business, engineering, computer, and environmental ethics, each of which deals with certain aspects of technology, have for the most part maintained separate organizational identities.)

These being factors that enter into a choice of material for a philosophy of technology course, such a course will almost inevitably include material from outside the discipline of philosophy. An upper division philosophy course might study a major author, perhaps but not necessarily a philosopher. An introductory philosophy of technology course is more likely to draw upon a wide range of material from different sources. And a text flexibly designed for use in either this or an STS course will assuredly adopt this strategy. Thompson's text is an extreme example of the latter; very few of his selections were written by philosophers (those by Hans Jonas, Thomas Simon, and Karl Marx, being, I believe, the only exceptions out of thirty-three contributions).

Thompson's choice of theme—the case for or against the autonomous technology thesis—is accessible to the less sophisticated student, especially if one avoids, as he does, the more esoteric connections between this theme and the metaethical problem of determinism. The latter, however, arises out of concerns about responsibility; and responsibility for the consequences of technology is central to the autonomous technology debate. As this debate has progressed since World War II, the protagonist has come to be identified ever more closely with government; and this seems to be where Thompson wants to direct the student's attention. For, as is argued by various contributors, technology will be appropriately controlled only if people learn to rejuvenate and participate in democratic institutions. Yet he disregards technology assessment; and he leaves economic factors mostly to tangential remarks (the Marx selection is focused on the concept of alienation).

The selections are arranged thematically from the more metaphysical to the more pragmatic views about the autonomous technology thesis. This arrangement happens to be partially chronological; but it is the complexification of ideas that drives the book's organization. Parts 2-6, which focus on the neutrality-or-not of technology, constitute the most tightly interconnected set of readings. Part 1, a single statement by Jonathan Schell, is not well connected to what follows because it focuses on science and its uses, and Thompson's text is silent on the philosophically important question of the relationship between science and technology. Part 7, concerning alienated labor, is relevant to a study of the consequences of technology; but the student is not given enough guidance to understand this relevance. Part 8 samples views about appropriate technology; and Part
9 brings the text to closure with suggestions, some (ironically, in retrospect) by Mikhail Gorbachev, on how to redeem the future.

If one is willing to grant (as I am not) that philosophy of technology need not involve philosophers, Thompson's selections are certainly representative; and many merit anthologistic immortality. Most are accessible to knowledgeable beginners, especially eight selections that originally appeared in general interest and two in general academic publications. Thompson's generally commendable effort to provide editorial continuity is flawed on occasion by a tendency to paint a contribution into a corner, only to rescue it retrospectively (e.g., 425). The misleading reduction of Ellul's position to one work would benefit from attention to his other writings, including The Technological System and "theological" statements (see his In Season Out of Season [1982], Intro. to American ed.); a longitudinal perspective would obviate the inconsistent characterization of Jonas's position (82-83); an awareness of third-world objections to the pseudo-neutral abstractions of Limits to Growth (367) would be helpful; and passing references to writers not included in the text (146, 194) might better have been simply omitted. The principal drawback to this text (as, for that matter, to the genre it exemplifies) is, however, what it leaves out.

As implied with regard to the Limits to Growth controversy, authors included in this text represent only the perspectives and concerns of developed countries—indeed, with few exceptions, only those of the United States. Philosophers are so under-represented as to convey the misleading impression that philosophy of technology is a non-philosophical enterprise. Even within the constraints imposed by the autonomous technology theme, one might have included John Dewey, Herbert Marcuse, and Martin Heidegger from the past, and such contemporaries as Hubert Dreyfus, Bernard Gendron, Don Ihde, and Kristin Shrader-Fechete.

If the latter's work in particular were represented, there would then have been one woman philosopher along with the two female social scientists who are included. Another great leap forward would have been to include serious consideration (not just a passing reference, 44) of such currently crucial control-of-technology issues as those concerning reproductive technologies, regarding which there is no shortage of gender-sensitive philosophical literature. As Thompson's selections as well as his and most contributor's reliance on masculine pronouns illustrate, however, philosophy of technology has from its origins been a very macho enterprise. In fact, citations to women are so rare in this text as to be noteworthy (e.g., 32, 118); and the only contributors who suggest that women might have a different perspective that matters are Arnold Pacey and perhaps Emmanuel Mesthene (169, 176, 386 and esp. 459).

In respect to male-centeredness, I know no other general text for philosophy of technology that is significantly different. There are, however, alternative texts that recognize philosophers as important practitioners of the subject. Larry A. Hickman's Technology as a Human Affair (1990) is the best of the lot in this respect and in most others as well. For more theoretical analyses of technology, the ground-breaking anthology edited by Carl Mitcham and Robert Mackey, Philosophy and Technology (1972), is still valuable. Any of the following anthologies, in descending
order of philosophical interest, would supplement a "for men only" text, but they include only two contributions by philosophers in all: Joan Rothschchild, ed., *Machina ex Dea* (1983); Jan Zimmerman, ed., *The Technological Woman* (1983); and Wendy Faulkner and Erik Arnold, eds., *Smothered by Invention* (1985).

*Edmund F. Byrne, Philosophy, Indiana University, Indianapolis, Indiana 46202, USA*

---

**John Locke. A Letter Concerning Toleration.**
John Horton and Susan Mendus, eds.

**JOHN W. YOLTON**

The editors of this edition of Locke's *Letter* reprint the first English translation by William Popple of the original Latin *Epistola de tolerantia ad Clarissimum Virum* of 1689, together with the editors' introduction and three essays on Locke published between 1973 and 1988 by J. W. Gough, Maurice Cranston, and Susan Mendus, two others written for this volume by Jeremy Waldron and Peter Nicholson, and another by P. J. Kelly taken from his M. A. thesis of 1983-4. These six essays range from historical to conceptual analyses, providing some helpful material for the readers of Locke's *Letter*. The editors' introduction has other and more recent references to writings on this topic, and the bibliography directs the reader to further readings. There is also an index which, based on few sample runs, looks to be useful.

Toleration was a topic that interested Locke throughout his life, toleration by governments of religious practices and beliefs, toleration between religious sects for differences of beliefs and differing interpretations of Scripture. Locke had in fact little tolerance for intolerance, especially for those Christian prelates and church officials who tried to impose doctrines and dogmas which were not found in the Bible. He was strongly opposed to the use of force as a means of bringing people to the 'true religion.' True religion, he insists "is not instituted in order to the erecting an external pomp, nor to the obtaining of ecclesiastical dominion, nor to the exercising of compulsive force; but to the regulating of men's lives according to the rules of virtue and piety" (p. 14 of this edition).

The subject of religious toleration was much discussed and debated in the 1680s and 1690s, especially in Holland. Locke lived for five years there between 1683 and 1688, most of that time in disguise and in hiding from what was believed by the English king to be subversive activity while he was secretary to Shaftesbury. He may even have been suspected of aiding dissident groups in Holland, prior to William and Mary's taking the English throne. Political, not religious persecution was what Locke feared for himself. Holland had been the scene much earlier of religious clashes and persecution. Anyone writing on religious toleration in that country in the latter part of the seventeenth century would do so against that historical background. By the 1680s, Holland was in fact a refuge for many who fled religious intolerance in other countries. Holland was also the