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THEORETICAL / PHILOSOPHICAL PAPER

Husserl's Phenomenology of Wishing

Thomas Byrne[1]

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Abstract
This essay accomplishes two goals. First, contra accepted interpretations, I reveal that the early Husserl executed valuable and extensive investigations of wishes—specifically in manuscripts from *Studies concerning the Structures of Consciousness*. In these manuscripts, Husserl examines two 'kinds' of wishes. He describes wish *drives* as feelings of lack. He also dissects wish *intentions* to uncover previously obscured partial acts, including nullifying consciousness, an existentially oriented act, and a preferring. Second, I reveal how these insights from *Studies* partially prefigure Husserl's mature genetic phenomenology of drives and wish intentions. The mature Husserl develops his previous observation, that *drives* are experiences of lack, by describing these drives as having two moments: impulse and movement. Husserl also comes to new insights about wish acts, when he juxtaposes these intentions—as pure feelings that have no power to reach a telos—to drives, which he now conceives of as volitional doings.

Keywords Volition · Axiology · Desire · Genetic phenomenology · Logical investigations · Preference

Introduction: Correcting the Myopic View

While Edmund Husserl's theory of feelings has perhaps become the most discussed element of his thought today, his philosophy of wishes has largely been ignored by continental thinkers over the course of the last century. There is not a single German or English article that is entirely dedicated to exploring his theory of wishes.[1]

[1] This is naturally not to deny that there are a few essays, which do touch upon Husserl's theory of wishing. For example, Rudolf Bernet, Ullrich Melle, and Andrea Staiti have succinctly examined how Husserl conceived of the genetic relationship between drives and wishes (Bernet, 2006: 44; Melle, 1997: 178–180; 2012: 55, 65–67; Staiti, 2019: 13–15). Bernet has also addressed wishes in his new book, although he does not draw from Husserl, but instead develops a psychoanalysis through Freud and Lacan (Bernet, 2020). Further, Celia Cabrera and Verónica Kretsche, as well as Christian Lotz and Thomas Nenon

✉ Thomas Byrne
ThByrne@Illinois.edu; T.Byrne3@Gmail.com

[1] CSL, Department of Philosophy, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, 1308 W Main Street MC 228, Urbana, IL 61801, USA

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Admittedly, there are some good reasons for this lack. Up until recently, there were no publicly available texts wherein Husserl extensively studied the experience of wishes. Husserl accordingly did not appear to identify any unique or important aspects of the structure of wishes.

In contrast to this long-standing interpretative trend, in this paper, I show that the recent publication of *Studies Concerning the Structures of Consciousness* (Hua = Husserliana XLIII; hereafter *Studien*)[2] necessitates a new and deeper exploration of Husserl's descriptions of wishes. Simply stated, this essay hopes to serve as a corrective to the currently accepted, but myopic understanding of Husserl's philosophy of wishes; The goal of this paper is to unearth part of Husserl's robust philosophy of wishes in two ways.

First, in sections two and three, I demonstrate that Husserl presents an original and nuanced yet entirely overlooked—account of wishes in two 1910 manuscripts from the second volume of *Studien*: "Drive-Feeling, Feeling of Lack, Desire, and Wish" (Hua XLIII/2: 482–490. Hereafter TGBW), and, "Wish and Desire. The Founding Act of the Wish" (Hua XLIII/2: 491–505. Hereafter WB).[3] As I discuss, in these two manuscripts, Husserl assumes some basic conclusions about wishes from his 1901 *Logical Investigations* (Hua XIX/1970; hereafter LU); he works from LU as a minimal foundation. In section two, I engage with Husserl's study of wish *intentions* and in section three, I discuss his analysis of wish *drives*.[4]

Second, in section four, I reveal how Husserl's insights from these manuscripts influenced the trajectory of his phenomenology. I show that Husserl's 1910 descriptions of wish intentions and wish drives respectively anticipate his mature sketch

Footnote 1 (continued)
have investigated how Husserl contrasts wishing and willing (Cabrera & Kretschel, 2021: 69; Lotz, 2006: 128f.; Nenon, 1990: 302). I am particularly indebted to Bernet and Melle's insights.

[2] For Husserliana volumes, I provide references to the corresponding English translations where available, following a slash after the German pagination. All quotations from the *Logical Investigations* come from the First Edition.

[3] WB and TGBW were likely first written respectively in 1900 and 1901. On and around January 20, 1910, WB was copied and reworked. There is no exact dating for the revision of TGBW, but it was certainly reconceived sometime in 1910. I thank Thomas Vongehr for his help with determining this timeline.

[4] Husserl's analyses of wishes from these two 1910 manuscripts in *Studien* are of particular importance for understanding his overarching theory of feelings. Many of Husserl's published *descriptive* analyses of feelings are concerned with outlining how feeling acts can be verified in a similar manner to how objectifying intentions are verified. In some passages from *Lectures on Ethics and Value Theory* (Hua XXVIII) and *Studien*, Husserl accordingly attempts to describe wishes as undergoing satisfaction via a structural mechanism directly analogical to the structural mechanism of fulfillment for objectifying acts. Just as empty objectifying acts are fulfilled via synthesis with an objectifying intuition, Husserl claims that wishes are satisfied via synthesis with a satisfying intention, namely a joy (Hua XXVIII: 328–341; Hua XLIII/2: 287–293, 421–422, 491–505; Melle, 2002: 233f.). Yet, as I have argued elsewhere (Byrne, 2022b, 2024), this method—of describing feeling acts as analogical to objectifying intentions—leads Husserl to conclusions that are often not accurate; Husserl is trying to violently force feeling intentions into the mold of objectifying intentions. In contrast, in these two 1910 manuscripts from *Studien*, Husserl *does* respect the phenomena of wishing and describes wishing as it manifests itself without any attempt to reshape wishes into objectifying intentions. The 1910 manuscripts are worthy of study for this reason alone; Husserl here presents his unalloyed picture of a feeling intention (and a drive).

of wish acts and his genetic phenomenology of drives. I outline the development of Husserl's mature theory of wishes by analyzing texts from: Hua XLIII/3, Hua XXXIX, Hua XLII, Mat = Materialien VIII, and Husserl, 1939/1975. I conclude in section five with a summary of results.[5]

In sum, this paper functions as a therapeutic to the limited understanding of Husserl's philosophy of wishes. Via an investigation of previously unavailable manuscripts, I show that the evolution of Husserl's philosophy of wishes is more interesting and complicated than the scholarship assumes.

Before broaching the body of this paper, I must highlight that—while these two recently published manuscripts do comprise Husserl's most extensive and important discussions of wishing—Husserl does make other brief comments about wishes throughout his *Nachlass*. In other words, this essay studies the most substantial tenets and shifts in Husserl's phenomenology of wishing but is certainly not an exhaustive account. I do not investigate all of Husserl's observations about wishing in this work. For example, I do not analyze several manuscripts from Husserl's middle period wherein he attempts to describe wishes as directly structurally analogical to objectifying intentions (See note four). For another case, I do not investigate how Husserl—in some of his later writings—shifts his account of drives, by locating some drives on the hyletic level. The drives of this class—so Husserl claims—are 'responses' to hyletic data.[6] For one last example, I do not examine how Husserl reconceives of wishes in his final works, when he transforms his overarching phenomenology of feelings, by adopting an axiology that is grounded in the concepts of vocation and love (Hart, 2006: 228–234; Melle, 2002: 241–244). This paper, therefore, focuses primarily on the key aspects and developments within Husserl's phenomenology of wishing as found in his most comprehensive manuscripts, while acknowledging that further exploration into his scattered remarks across other works remains a fertile area for future scholarship.

[5] It is worthwhile to trace how Husserl's theory of wishing would be worked out by the phenomenologists and existentialists who followed him, as this can provide helpful context for this paper. In particular, I discuss three ways that Husserl's successors focus and expertly unpack one element of wishing, which was only mentioned or entirely lacking in Husserl's account. First, while Husserl only points out that wishing is an essentially embodied experience in his mature works, (see section four), in *Phenomenology of Perception*, Maurice Merleau-Ponty focuses his investigation of desires on the body. He demonstrates how desires and wishes are rooted in the body and perception. For Merleau-Ponty, wishing and desiring are bodily and perceptual phenomena that reflect our embodied experience (Merleau-Ponty, 1962). Second, while Husserl had pointed out that we can freely wish for whatever we want (within certain limits, such as being unable to wish for square circles), Jean-Paul Sartre, in *Being and Nothingness*, extensively analyzes how desires and wishes are manifestations of our freedom. He discusses how wishes are also choices for which we are fully responsible (Sartre, 1993, 43, 60, 70, 483). Finally, to my knowledge, Husserl never closely examined how wishing shapes (our experience of) the intersubjective community in his *Nachlass*. In contrast, in *The Ethics of Ambiguity*, Simone de Beauvoir explores the impacts of our desires and wishes on others (de Beauvoir, 2015: 23, 75, 137).

[6] More specifically, Husserl takes these drives or instincts to be responses to—as Mensch calls them—the values of sensations—the pleasure or displeasure of hyle (Mensch, 1998: 221). When the ego is moved by the pleasure of a sensation, it can turn to that sensation. This turning is a striving and this striving is a drive—here, the drive of curiosity (Husserl, 2006: 325; Byrne 2023; Bower, 2014: 138; Mensch, 1998: 223).

Unearthing the nuances of Wish Intentions: Insights from Husserl's 1910 Manuscripts

In this section, I outline how Husserl develops his original theory of wish intentions in 1910, by working beyond his account of wish acts from the 1901 LU. In what follows, I first introduce the two insights from LU, which Husserl presupposes when developing his novel theory. I then show how Husserl augments this account by working through four novel observations, which 'introduce' new partial intentions to the whole wishing act.

As just stated, Husserl begins his analysis of wish intentions in 1910, by presupposing two conclusions, which he first presented in LU. These two ideas, so to speak, serve as the scaffolding, within which Husserl presents his original observations; He greatly revises and complicates these 1901 insights via his later examinations of wishes. The first presumed idea is that objectifying acts—such as perceptions, imaginations, and judgments—are composed of two moments, namely, an apprehension and a doxic position-taking (doxic quality). The apprehension refers to its object in and with its particular theoretical determinations (Hua XIX: 610/1970, 235, see Hua XLIII/2: 2–3). Doxic position-taking is concerned with the existence of the object. During objectification, I can take the doxic stance that the object exists—as I do during perception—or I can take no position towards its existence—as I do in imagination (Hua XIX: 657–661/1970: 165–167; see also Mat II: 173, 178–179, 181). In 1901, Husserl asserts that I take no stance towards the object that I wish for.[7] The second assumed conclusion is that an act is a wish when there is the 'addition' of an axiological position-taking—that is, a valuation.[8] As such, Husserl defines wishing in 1901, as the experience where I take the additional axiological stance that the presented object is something that should be (See the important footnote eight! Hua XIX: 583–584/1970, 216–217).

In 1910, Husserl—to some measure—accepts these 1901 general conclusions about the structures of objectifying and axiological consciousness. Yet, he recognizes that he must augment his earlier observations if a correct picture of wishing is to emerge. Specifically, Husserl's theory of wish intentions from WB and TGBW is original and distinct from LU, as *he 'discovers' that there are many more and different partial intentions of the full wish act*, than just the three moments of apprehension, doxic position-taking, and axiological position-taking. His recognition of these

[7] Husserl writes, "Then there is a law, that the wish-quality is founded in a presentation, that is, an objectifying act, and more precisely, a 'mere' presentation" (Hua XIX: 583/1970, 216).

[8] *Important*: Because of the language used here, it must be emphasized that Husserl's 1901 description of this founding relationship does not establish a building-block theory of consciousness, as if a feeling-layer of consciousness would be placed on top of a distinct objectifying layer. While the founding relationship between feeling and objectification is described as one-sided, the 'two' intentions are bound together and mutually determine each other. They are unified in a similar way to how other complex wholes are unified. Just as a text is a unity of the scribbles on the page and its meaning, and just as a person is a unity of body and consciousness, so also, evaluative experience is the unity of the objectification and the evaluative position-taking, which mutually determine each other and interpenetrate one another. Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl outlines these important ideas in Rinofner-Kreidl (2013: 60–64).

other partial intentions is based on four novel insights, which I individually explore in what follows.

First, Husserl abandons his idea from LU, that a wish only comprises one valuation, that is, one axiological position-taking. In 1901, Husserl described the wish position-taking as the only and single evaluative position-taking of the whole wish intention. He believed the whole wish act had no other essential feeling or evaluative component than the wish position-taking itself. In contrast, one of Husserl's novel 1910 insights is that a wish has more than one valuation. An object—for example, my friend's arrival—cannot be wished for if it is simply objectively presented, that is, if I have not already valued it. I do not wish for something that stands there as valueless, as indifferent. Rather, that object can only be wished for, if it has 'already' undergone another 'prior' evaluation, that is, another axiological position-taking. A condition of the possibility of wishing is that the object must be—via a (partial) feeling act—positively valued, such that it "must stand there as something 'beautiful'" (Hua XLIII/2: 496). The object must appear to me as something good, valuable, or beautiful for it to be possible for me to wish for it.

Husserl spends many pages emphasizing that this 'prior' positive valuation is not (and does not contain) the full act of joy I would *then* experience *if* my friend were to arrive. Certainly, it could be the case that I would feel a separate act of joy if my friend did arrive. But this joy intention is not a part of the positive valuation or the wish itself. That joy intention is rather only implied by the wish. The wish for the arrival implies that I would then experience another intention of joy if the arrival occurred. Concerning this hypothetical intention, Husserl writes, "Such hypotheticals are entirely superficial and certainly do not belong to the composition of the wish" (Hua XLIII/2: 496; see Hua XLIII/2: 491–492).

Second, Husserl augments his theory from LU, by pointing out that I cannot wish for something in a vacuum. In 1901, Husserl may (or may not) have recognized the situational nature of wishes, but *he never directly mentioned this*. By explicitly describing—in these later manuscripts—how I wish in the context of my current situation here and now, Husserl presents a more complete, *if not a more accurate* theory of wishes. He specifically highlights that, when wishing, I am also aware of my circumstances and I am aware of them as existent. I am also (objectively) intending my environment and I take the positive doxic position that my environment is real (Hua XLIII/2: 497–498). It is from within this context—where I am aware of and considering my existent situation—that I can wish. This leads Husserl to conclude that, "Wishes are existentially oriented emotional acts" (Hua XLIII/2: 490).

Furthermore, just as is the case for the wished-for object, these intended existent circumstances are not given to me as valueless or as indifferent. Instead, in order to wish, I must also be taking an axiological position, which evaluates my obtaining situation as positive or negative. Husserl writes that, during my wish, I intend, "the current state of happy affairs, which is actually given to us at the moment of wishing, and that means, is given in value-consciousness (*Wertbewusstsein*)" (Hua XLIII/2: 499). Husserl summarizes these points by writing that—during the wish—I execute "a valuation directed to the given state G, as well as a valuation directed to the [wished-for] goal Z" (Hua XLIII/2: 500).

Husserl's third insight, which is not found anywhere in LU, is that I can only wish for something when I experience it as better or more beautiful than my actual situation. I naturally would not wish for something that I experience as worse than my current existent circumstances. Husserl writes, "The question is … if the existence of [the wished-for object] A is something more beautiful, than what is actual in my current valuable or joyed state of affairs" (Hua XLIII/2: 498). Husserl claims that I experience another situation as better than my current circumstances, via the execution of a preferring intention. He writes that "The wish is founded in the consciousness of the preferring of the regrettably non-existent, which is presented over the current valuable state of affairs" (Hua XLIII/2: 498). And a few lines later, he expresses, "A preferring … of the non-existent joyed state of affairs, over the existent joyed state of affairs, is necessarily present in each wish" (Hua XLIII/2: 498). Simply stated, I can wish for my friend's arrival if I—on the basis of a complex of situational and personal motivations—prefer her future arrival to her current absence.

Husserl works out his understanding of the preferring inherent to wishes in an important way. He does so by distinguishing between two kinds of preferring. On the one hand, there is the experience that we commonly call preferring. This 'standard' preferring occurs on the basis of an *explicit* comparing. Here, I attend to two thematic objects and explicitly compare their values to each other. Once I have executed this explicit comparison of their values, I can then perform a preferring of this one object over the other (Hua XLIII/2: 501–502). Husserl writes that this preferring, "can be understood as a synthetic thematic emotional consciousness" (Hua XLIII/2: 501). Simply, this 'standard' preferring is the thematic apprehension of one object as preferable on the basis of a judicative explicit comparing. On the other hand, the preferring *inherent to wishes* is most often a preferring that is executed without any explicit comparison of the values of the objects. During this 'non-standard' preferring, "I execute no comparison of value, no comparing valuation, no preferring in an authentic sense" (Hua XLIII/2: 501). Rather, "I can look at G and then at Z and then, without further ado, 'give preference' to Z" (Hua XLIII/2: 501). Although there is no explicit comparison of the value of the one to the value of the other, I still experience Z as preferable to G. Husserl states that "even though there is no thematic comparing, the relevant objects appear incrementally different" (Hua XLIII/2: 501). To be clear, even though there is no thematic or explicit comparing of the values of the object during a non-standard preferring, there is still the thematic apprehension of the one object as preferable to the other. There is a thematic apprehension of Z as preferable even though there is no judicative, that is, explicitly comparative work being done.

To properly understand Husserl's further claims about preferring and wishing, the reader should note that he makes a terminological distinction between the characteristics, which standard and non-standard preferrings give to their referents. A preferring, which occurs on the basis of explicit comparison, marks its object with a "relative" character. Husserl writes that "in our case, we say, 'relatively unvaluable' and 'relatively valuable'" (Hua XLIII/2: 501). The object of a preferring, which has no explicit comparison, instead "is marked with a contrast-predicate, not

a relational-predicate, that is, a contrast character and not a relative object-determination" (Hua XLIII/2: 502).

Husserl's fourth critical insight is a substantial revision of a conclusion presented in LU. In 1901, Husserl asserted that a wish is founded in a neutral doxic position-taking. As quoted, Husserl writes, "Then there is a law, that the wish-quality is founded in a presentation, that is, an objectifying act, and more precisely, a 'mere' presentation" (Hua XIX: 583/1970, 216). In 1910, In contrast, Husserl states that when I wish for an object, I not only take a neutral doxic stance towards it. Instead, I intend that presented object as something that is *not existent*. During the wish, I not only perform, "a presentation of A, and this is the quasi-being of A". Rather, I also execute a "consciousness of nullity (*Nichtigkeitsbewusstsein*)" (Hua XLIII/2: 497). Husserl clarifies this point by describing the example of a grieving mother, who wishes, "that her child, who was taken from her, be back in her arms" (Hua XLIII/2: 496). The mother intends her living son not only as something that is valuable and preferable to her current situation of her son being dead. Rather, via the nullifying act, the mother also intends her son-as-alive as not currently existent.[9]

Husserl further claims that this nullifying intention not only nullifies the presented but also its positive value. With this nullity-consciousness, "the actual joyfulness is overthrown" (Hua XLIII/2: 497). While the mother would feel a positive feeling (a positive valuation) if she *merely* presented her son as alive, because—during the wish—she is intending him as null, so also her joy (her positive feeling) is nullified.[10] Husserl asserts that it is this nullified joy that grounds a negative feeling. At first, he concludes that the awareness of the nullity of the preferred object grounds the negative feeling of regret (*Bedauern*) (see Hua XLIII/2: 497–498). He writes, "The mother, living in the presentation of her existing child, feels positive happiness. It is a great joy, a positive feeling condition. To the consciousness of the non-existence of the positive happy event, there belongs a priori regret in the non-existence. As soon as a state of joy stands there as non-existent, this standing there, this consciousness, gives rise to regret" (Hua XLIII/2: 497). Yet, near the end of the manuscript, Husserl changes his mind to assert that, "Under these circumstances, it is not the case that regret is necessarily founded … but rather the [act of] missing (*Vermissen*)" (Hua XLIII/2: 503). Husserl explicitly states that missing is a feeling act, writing that my intending of the preferred object as null, "motivates an actual feeling, that of missing; the contrast-good is 'missed'" (Hua XLIII/2: 502).

Finally, it is this missed object, which I can wish for. I can take the axiological stance that the missed object is something that should be. I wish for it; I intend it as a *seinsollende* Object (Hua XLIII/2: 495–496; see also Hua XLIII/2: 9–15). In other words, I can take a wishing axiological stance towards (that is, I can wish for) the object, which I intend as a good, as preferable to my current circumstances, as

[9] The nullifying act can also nullify other doxic modifications. I can nullify the probably-existing, the potentially-existing, and so on (Hua XLIII/2: 494).

[10] The mother's 'joy,' which is nullified, is not the joy that the mother would experience if her son were truly alive. As stated, *that* joy is only implied by the wish but is not a part of it. Instead, the joy, which is nullified, is the joy in the mere (neutral) presentation of her son, which she actually does experience during the wish.

something that is null, and as missed. When I wish for my friend's arrival, I am taking the position that her (good, preferable, non-existent, and missed) arrival should occur. In contrast to a passive preferring, a wish intention is active and is directed at a thematic object. The wish is an ego act—it is the intention that I live in.

Exploring the Dynamic of Wish Drives in Husserl's 1910 Work

In addition to active wishes, in WB and TGBW, Husserl discusses a second kind of wishing, which is never explicitly mentioned in LU, namely wish drives. He sees that I can experience a passive wish, which has "the character of a drive-feeling" (Hua XLIII/2: 504; see Lee 1993: 44). By studying Husserl's analyses of wish drives in what follows, this essay further reveals that the early Husserl had a much richer and more robust philosophy of wishes than has otherwise been known. This exploration corrects the myopic view of Husserl's theory of wishing; I show that he developed a seemingly anachronistic and surprisingly detailed *genetic* account of wish drives in 1910!

Methodologically considered, Husserl begins his descriptions of wish drives by juxtaposing them to active wish intentions in three ways; he compares them, he contrasts them, and finally, he shows how they are genetically related to each other. In what follows, I explore each of these three methods individually.

Husserl first describes passive wishes as analogous to active wishes. This method of analogizing is a recurring trend in Husserl's thought. He often concludes that active intentions have a passive parallel and that the latter can be understood via analogy with the former (See Melle, 2012: 69f.; Byrne, 2018, 2021, 2022a). Specifically, Husserl affirms that passive wishing is similar to active wishing because passive wishing also involves a displeasurable feeling of missing, of lack. An active wish contains a missing (missing is one partial feeling intention of the whole act), while the wish drive is itself the displeasurable missing (missing is not part of the whole drive, but is the whole drive). Husserl writes that the passive wishing is the "'I am unsatisfied,' because 'I am missing something'" (Hua XLIII/2: 482). The passive wish is "displeasure that has the feeling of lack" (Hua XLIII/2: 483).

Second, Husserl highlights two differences between active and passive wishes. He begins by pointing out that there is a distinction between the objects (or lack thereof), which the two kinds of wishes refer to. An active wish refers to a thematically presented object. Wish drives, in contrast, do *not* refer to any object. Husserl concludes here in 1910 that a passive wish is only a drive feeling of lack and it is not (and is not founded in) an objectifying presentation of that which could meet or satisfy that lack! Husserl observes[11] that during a passive wish, I experience, "The feeling of lack, and really originally, (also originally in psychical development), which implies nothing of the conscious reference to the non-existent object" (Hua XLIII/2: 482–483). At another point, he states, "The feeling of displeasure, which I described

[11] To properly understand many of the following quotes, one should remember that the *actively* wished-for object is intended as non-existent. It is the referent of a nullifying intention.

as an original, blind, and drive-like (*triebartiger*) lack … has no reference to a non-being … I have called a drive-feeling" (Hua XLIII/2: 485).

To clarify these insights, Husserl compares the active wish (active desire) to eat with the passive wish of hunger. While these two are analogical, because, in both, I experience a negative (displeasurable) feeling of lack, they are yet different with regards to their objects. When actively wishing, I wish for an object, which could provide me with nourishment, such as a piece of meat. The passive wish, in contrast, just *is* a displeasurable missing of nutrition, which has no object. Husserl writes that "We can cut off the relation to the non-existent [that is, nullified] nourishment and take the feeling as it can be given without entanglement with this presentation" (Hua XLIII/2: 483). And again, he writes, "The Hunger … it is originally not bound with however vague of a presentation of that which could satisfy my hunger" (Hua XLIII/2: 485). Simply stated, this drive for hunger is "a feeling of lack without any consciousness of the non-existent" (Hua XLIII/2: 483).[12]

The other important difference, which Husserl highlights between active and passive wishes concerns the participation of the subject. As can be gleaned from Husserl's terminology, active wishes require the active participation of the subject. The subject herself executes the active wish intention. She is the protagonist of her desire, taking up both responsibility and agency (see Staiti, 2019: 15f.). In contrast, a passive wish is something that the subject undergoes. The subject experiences the hunger, the lack, without any particular active participation (Hua XLIII/2: 486–489; compare Hua XLII: 93–94; see Byrne 2022b, 2023).

The third task of Husserl's study of passive wishes is to show how they are genetically related to active wishes. His discussion of this connection is relatively straightforward. The passive wish—the wish drive, the 'missing'—can serve as the origin of the active wish—the wish intention, the desire in an authentic sense. The active wish can emerge from the passive wish when the passive wish drive is 'met' with a presentation of an object that can satisfy the wish. When the wish drive attains an accompanying objectifying presentation of that which could satisfy the wish, it becomes a wish intention. The wish drive 'gains' an object via the presentation and thereby develops or unfolds into an active wish. Husserl writes, "If there occurs with a [passive] wish (as a missing, as a drive feeling), the presentation of a corresponding object which could fulfill the wish, then there arises a new [active] wish. … this is not merely a new [passive] missing, but rather an [active] desire, longing" (Hua XLIII/2: 483; see Hua XLIII/2: 504).

For the case of hunger, Husserl writes that, when the hunger wish drive develops into a wish intention, "That which is new is just the specificity of the desire, the longing towards the presented. In the example of hunger, the longing towards that

[12] This conclusion, that a wish drive has no object is certainly one of Husserl's more questionable claims. It seems to me that, from day one of their existence, humans learn to associate the feeling of hunger with food intake, and it should be the absolute exception to remain in a blind state of hunger. In other words: hunger seems to be always object-related, however unthematic it may be. There are several contemporary phenomenologists who do address and seek to rectify this point (and others) in Husserl's theory of drives. For example, see Lee (1993) and Mensch (1998). See note 14 for discussion of Husserl's mature views concerning the objects of drives or lack thereof.

which could satisfy my hunger" (Hua XLIII/2: 486). All of this is to say that Husserl understood drives as the potential origin of feelings. Drives can be structurally prior to feeling intentions; The passive wish can be the seed of the feeling act (Wehrle, 2015: 48; Williams 2021).[13]

Tracing the Evolution of Husserl's Phenomenology of Wishes

In this penultimate section, I present a distinct picture of the trajectory of Husserl's philosophy. On the basis of the above study, I show how Husserl's insights from WB and TGBW prefigure or anticipate his mature phenomenology of first, *drives,* and second, *wishes*.

With regards to Husserl's mature theory of *drives*, to begin at the most general level, Husserl revises his 1910 insight, that drives do not have objects. Instead—according to many scholars—the late Husserl concludes that most (if not all) drives have objects,[14] which are highly indeterminate. The precise understanding of how Husserl conceptualizes the indeterminacy of these drive-objects remains the subject of intense scholarly debate, specifically because Husserl's descriptions of drive-objects are frequently ambiguous.[15] Fortunately, it is not necessary to examine the complex details of Husserl's evolving theory of drive-objects here. For the reader to grasp the below discussion, it suffices to simply be aware that the mature Husserl

[13] To be highlighted: An active wish *can* emerge from a passive wish, but does not necessarily have to. Instead, as Husserl mentions, I can actively wish for or desire a certain flavor, even when I have not and am not undergoing passive hunger (ompare Hua XLII: 86). As Staiti writes, "The biological underpinnings of the need for nourishment cannot be at the origin of such desires" (Staiti, 2019: 15).

[14] To be sure, the question of whether the mature Husserl definitively concludes that all drives have objects is still contested in the literature. On the one hand, there are scholars like James Mensch, who—while conceding that the later Husserl does believe that *some* drives have objects—assert that the mature Husserl continued to believe that there are some drives, which do not have objects. Mensch claims that the mature Husserl identifies, "basic non-objectifying instincts" (Mensch, 2010: 240; see also Mensch, 2010: 231–235, 260f.; Lee, 1993: 168f., 175–180). For another case, Bernet writes that "The distinction between drives and wishes for Husserl is essentially related to the fact that, the wish—in contrast to the drive—originally and essentially is directed to an object (or a state of affairs) and thus that it is founded in an intentional presentation" (Bernet, 2006: 43f.). On the other hand, scholars such as Matt Bower argue that, for the mature Husserl, all drives involve both non-objectifying and objectifying components. Bower writes that a drive, "is both non-objectifying, as a blind preference that the ego is not aware of, and it is objectifying, as a preference that specifies certain thematic episodes of experience precisely as fulfillments of the instinct" (Bower 214: 140). In this essay, I adopt Bower's reading, because I find his textual support to be more convincing.

[15] For one prominent and very early example of this ambiguity, in the Fifth Logical Investigation, Husserl ambiguously introduces two distinct ways to think about the same drive experience. He descriptively examines the case where an experienced desire seemingly does not have "conscious reference to what is desired," or, "we are moved by obscure drives or pressures towards unrepresented goals" (Husserl, 1970: 111/1984, 409). On the one hand, Husserl states that I could here be experiencing feeling sensations, which are simply un-apprehended and thus entirely lacking in intentional reference. They persist, as Lee writes, "as a mere state of sensations, that is, as a non-intentional experience" (Lee, 1993: 43). On the other hand, I may here be experiencing apprehended feeling sensations, whose presentation, however, lacks a determinate objective direction (Husserl, 1970: 111/1984, 410f.; see Lee, 1993: 43–45).

overturns his 1910 perspective, by asserting that at least some drives can have objects.

Husserl not only changes his views concerning the object of the drive (or the lack thereof) but also fundamentally revises his understanding of the drive itself. Husserl's major revisions to his phenomenology of the drive itself are executed on the basis of his new insight, that a drive is composed of two moments; the drive-impulse and the drive-movement. By investigating Husserl's new descriptions of these two moments, (part of) the complex relationship between Husserl's early observations and his mature phenomenology of drives can be sketched.

Concerning the drive-impulse, Husserl first describes it in very similar terms to how he discussed the wish drive in 1910. *He defines the drive-impulse as the experience of lack or need, which he had identified as the wish drive in 1910* (Hua XLIII/3: 133. Bernet, 2006: 41; Lee, 1993: 43). His account is still novel because Husserl now explicitly adds that the drive-impulse—as a moment of the drive and as the experience of *Mangel*—is that which 'motivates' and 'inspires' the drive(-movement). He writes, the "drive impulse, is that which sets the stage for my action" (Hua XLIII/3: 417). And he states that "The impulse is that which goes ahead of my action at each step of the way" (Hua XLIII/3: 417). My drive-impulse for nourishment, for example, precedes and impels my drive-movement to eat. Husserl further improves his descriptive account of the experience of this lack, by observing that the drive-impulse is specifically the experience of a lack *in the body*. The drive comes from the organic body as a stimulus (although it can be activated by some external object as well) (Hua Mat VIII: 326f.. Bower, 2014: 142–144; Mensch, 1997: 220, 2010: 232). Bernet writes, "Just as Freud, the possible origin of the drive tension is considered by Husserl to be a bodily need, experienced as a *'Not'* or as a *'Mangel'*" (Bernet, 2006: 41; see Hua XLIII/3: 411–416, 420, 467–468. In comparison, see Hua XXXIX: 585).

When descriptively examining the second moment of a drive—the drive-impulse—Husserl arrives at a thoroughly novel conclusion concerning the nature of drives. Specifically, he recognizes that *drives are volitional, not axiological*. Drives are a doing and not an evaluation. As I discuss in more detail near the end of this section, this idea has an important ramification, namely that there can be no *wish* drives. Simply, a wish cannot be a drive, because a wish is axiological, whereas a drive is volitional. In contrast to Husserl's conclusions from 1910, there are only wish acts, but no wish drives.

To further develop the new idea—that drives are volitional—*Husserl once again employs the method of analogizing,* but does so in a new way. Because Husserl understood passive wishes as axiological in 1910, he analogized them to active wishes. In contrast, as the later Husserl now observes that drives are volitional, he analogizes them to active volitional intentions. Husserl's use of this methodology by no means implies that drives are full-blown acts of the will, as they are instead passive experiences. He states this explicitly, writing that "the drive-movement [is] no 'authentic activity of the will'. With it, there is 'no power of volitional consciousness'" (Hua XLIII/3: 245). During the drive-movement, I am not purposefully moving as a free agent, as I am, for example, when I deliver a lecture or write this sentence. *At the same time however—and this is a critical insight—drives really are*

volitional.[16] Drive-movements are doings; drive-movements are activities. Bernet writes, "Husserl's most important contribution to the philosophical problematic of drives, appears to me to be, that he generally determines drives as a kind of willing, as a kind of doing" (Bernet, 2006: 39; see Lee, 1993: 58, 93). For clarity, Husserl provides several examples of these drive-movements, which are largely mechanical or ideomotor (Hua XLIII/3: 245–250, 467– 472; Lee, 1993: 58, 93: Melle, 1997: 189). He writes, "A drive action: Tired and thirsty, the hiker comes to a spring; without further ado, he goes there as a result of the drive and drinks. Ideomotor: Dancing according to the beat, writing according to dictation, etc., playing the piano" (Hua XLIII/3: 245).

In contrast to his new account of drives, which consists of significant edits to previous observations, Husserl's theory of wish *intentions* is only sharpened in his mature works. Specifically, by comparing and contrasting axiological wish acts to volitional drives, Husserl more clearly pinpoints what essentially defines the former. He sees that wish acts, drives, and volitional intentions are all oriented toward a telos. On the one hand, drives and volitional intentions *are* themselves steps taken toward a goal. The drive-movement really is an advance or action taken towards the objective (which is progressively revealed via satisfaction). And the volitional act is also obviously an effort to some end. On the other hand, Husserl recognizes that *wish acts do not themselves have the power or energy to achieve their goals* (Hua XXVIII: 69; Bernet, 2006: 44; Staiti, 2019: 14–16). In contrast to drives and the will, the wish intention is not a step, process, or activity towards the telos. A wish act—as an evaluative and affective position-taking—can motivate or set up the condition for a volitional intention, but the wish act is never itself a movement to a goal (Hua XLIII/2: 14–15). This is simply to say that what defines a wish act in contrast to these other seemingly similar experiences, is that *wishes are feelings that are evaluative and never volitional*.[17]

Conclusion: Implications and Further Directions in Phenomenological Research

This discussion suffices to provide a sketch of Husserl's descriptions of wishes, which can serve as a corrective to currently limited interpretations. I have shown that, in 1910, Husserl presents a nuanced account of wish intentions and wish drives, which stands in contrast to his minimal comments from LU. In WB and TGBW, Husserl develops his novel philosophy of wish *acts* by uncovering and describing

[16] This conclusion—that drives are volitional—also has ramifications for active consciousness. When Husserl conceived of drives as axiological, he concluded that they could serve as the origin of active axiological feelings—that is, of wish intentions. Now observing that drives are volitional, he correspondingly asserts that they can be the source of volitional acts (Hua XLIII/3: 126–127; Ales-Berro, 2000: 250; Wehrle, 2015: 47). In other words, Husserl concludes that even intentions of *fiat* (Hua XLIII/3: 264–268; Melle, 1997: 183–186) are not without genetic origin—they are not without their own anterior.

[17] Bernet emphasizes the fact that wishes are evaluative feelings when he states that they are the "affective anticipation (*gefühlsmäßige Antizipation*)" of the wished-for state of affairs (Bernet, 2006: 44).

the many partial objectifying and evaluative intentions that comprise a whole wish act. He also describes wish *drives* as passive feelings of lack. He states that wish drives are not only analogous to active wish feeling intentions but can also serve as the genetic origin of those latter acts. These 1910 insights prefigure subsequent developments of Husserl's theory of wishes and drives. While the mature Husserl asserts that drives are volitional, he still concludes that drives are passive experiences of lack. He again describes a drive as analogical to and as the potential origin of an active intention—now a volitional act. By juxtaposing wish acts to drives, Husserl also recognizes a key feature of the former; A wish can only motivate or set the stage for action, but has no power to reach a wished-for telos.

Declarations

Conflict of interest On behalf of all authors, the corresponding author confirms that there is no conflict of interest.

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