INGARDEN’S HUSSERL:
A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE 1915 REVIEW
OF THE LOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS

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This essay critically assesses Roman Ingarden's 1915 review of the second edition of Edmund Husserl's *Logical Investigations*. I elucidate and critique Ingarden's analysis of the differences between the 1901 first edition and the 1913 second edition. I specifically examine three tenets of Ingarden's interpretation. First, I demonstrate that Ingarden correctly denounces Husserl's claim that he only engages in an eidetic study of consciousness in 1913, as Husserl was already performing eidetic analyses in 1901. Second, I show that Ingarden is misguided, when he asserts that Husserl had fully transformed his philosophy into a transcendental idealism in the second edition. While Husserl does appear to adopt a transcendental phenomenology by asserting–in his programmatic claims–that the intentional content and object are now included in his domain of research, he does not alter his actual descriptions of the intentional relationship in any pertinent manner. Third, I show Ingarden correctly predicts many of the insights Husserl would arrive at about logic in his late philosophy. This analysis augments current readings of the evolution of Ingarden's philosophy, by more closely examining the development of his largely neglected early thought. I execute this critical assessment by drawing both from Husserl's later writings and from recent literature on the *Investigations*. By doing so, I hope to additionally demonstrate how research on the *Investigations* has matured in the one hundred years since the release of that text, while also presenting my own views concerning these difficult interpretative issues.

*Key words:* Ingarden, Husserl, phenomenology, *Logical Investigations*, transcendental reduction, logical grammar, essence, descriptive psychology.

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ГУССЕРЛЬ ИНГАРДЕНА: КРИТИЧЕСКАЯ ОЦЕНКА КОММЕНТАРИЯ НА «ЛОГИЧЕСКИЕ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЯ» 1915 ГОДА

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В статье дается критическая оценка написанной в 1915 году рецензии Романа Ингардена на второе издание «Логических исследований» Эдмунда Гуссерля. Я проясняю и критикую проведённый Ингарденом анализ различий между первым изданием 1901 года и вторым изданием 1913 года. Я отдельно останавливаюсь на трёх положениях его интерпретации. В первую очередь, я показываю, что Ингарден справедливо отвергает утверждение Гуссерля о том, что он начинает практиковать эйдетический подход к исследованию сознания только в 1913 году, поскольку Гуссерль уже проводил эйдетический анализ в 1901 году. Во-вторых, я показываю, что Ингарден заблуждается, полагая, что во втором издании Гуссерль полностью преобразовал собственную философию в трансцендентальный идеализм. В то время как Гуссерль, судя по всему, принимая трансцендентальную феноменологию и утверждая в своих программных заявлениях, что интенциональное содержание и объект отныне включены в область его исследования, фактически не изменяет описания интенциональных отношений соответствующим образом. В-третьих, я показываю, что Ингарден верно предсказывает ряд логических идей Гуссерля, свойственных его поздней философии. Этот анализ дополняет современные представления об эволюции философии Ингардена, более пристально акцентируя развитие его практически забытой ранней мысли. Моя критическая оценка опирается как на позднейшие труды Гуссерля, так и на новейшую литературу, посвященную «Исследованиям». Действуя таким образом, я надеюсь продемонстрировать то, как развивалось восприятие «Исследований» в течение ста лет после выхода этого текста, а также изложить свои собственные взгляды на эти затруднительные вопросы.

Ключевые слова: Ингарден, Гуссерль, феноменология, Логические исследования, трансцендентальная редукция, логическая грамматика, сущность, дескриптивная психология.

1. INTRODUCTION

During his studies in Göttingen, Roman Ingarden came to interpret Edmund Husserl’s Logical Investigations (Husserl, 1984; Hereafter, Investigations)1 as endorsing metaphysical realism, a view which Ingarden looked favorably upon. Ingarden took Husserl as claiming that there existed an objective reality behind the presented phenomena. Certainly, Ingarden was not alone in this reading of Husserl, as both his

1 I provide references to the corresponding English translation where available, following a slash after the page number of the text, in its original language.
contemporaries from the Göttingen school and many later phenomenologists have understood the early Husserl in this manner. Moreover, Husserl's courses, which Ingarden attended, also seem to suggest that this interpretation was correct. In the 1912/13 “Metaphysical and Scientific Exercises concerning Nature and Spirit,” Husserl certainly does follow his more realist tendencies.

For these reasons, Ingarden was most surprised with the contents of Ideas I (Husserl, 1977), which was published in 1913 and discussed in the 1913/14 Winter Course, “Phenomenological Exercises for the Advanced Student.” Reasonably, but incorrectly, Ingarden perceived Husserl as abandoning his realist project, instead adopting the opposite position of metaphysical idealism. Ingarden, as is well known, largely considered this to be a mistake on Husserl's part and was rather disturbed by

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2 For example, Emmanuel Levinas, in his study of Husserl's theory of intuition, interpreted Husserl as if his early descriptions of intentionality endorsed a metaphysically realist position (Levinas, 1978). For another case, Theodore De Boer unabashedly asserts that the Husserl of 1901 concluded that there is a world that exists behind the appearances of the phenomena (De Boer, 1978, 195–197). Finally, even J. N. Findlay, the English translator of the Investigations, argues that Husserl adopted a metaphysically realist position in his “breakthrough work” and that he had become a metaphysical idealist after the transcendental turn of 1907 (Findlay, 1972, 235–243).

3 It is surprising that this view has been so historically popular, because it is relatively clear, from many of Husserl's statements throughout the Investigations, that his 1901 philosophy took a metaphysically neutral stance towards the question of reality. In the Second Investigation, Husserl not only explicitly rejects metaphysical realism by denying that there is something that is independent of consciousness, but also affirms that all metaphysical definitions of reality need to be set aside during his analysis (Husserl, 1984, 129). Moreover, in the Fifth Investigation, he emphasizes that there is a fundamental distinction between metaphysical and phenomenological projects (Husserl, 1984, 401). Finally, in the Sixth Investigation, Husserl rebukes Kant for falling into a metaphysically polluted philosophy (Husserl, 1984, 729–732). At the same time, I also do not fully understand how Ingarden, prior to 1913, did not realize that Husserl had begun to formulate and adopt transcendental idealism. This seems curious to me, because Husserl, in his 1906–1907 lecture course—“Introduction to Logic and the Theory of Knowledge” (Husserl, 1985)—lays out his discovery of the three “paths” to the epoché and the transcendental reduction. Dan Zahavi explains that in those lectures, “Husserl argues that it is necessary to leave the project of a descriptive phenomenology behind in favor of a transcendental phenomenology if one wishes to truly clarify the relation between the act, the meaning, and the intended transcendent object” (Zahavi, 2002, 102). Even though Ingarden did not attend these lectures, it seems that he naturally would have at least been informed about their contents. Cf. (Plotka, 2017, 84).

4 Mitscherling elucidates Ingarden's views on the Husserl of 1901 and 1913, writing, "Ingarden maintains that Husserl clearly occupied a realist position at the time of the Logical Investigations but that from the time of the Ideas he headed in the direction of transcendental idealism. He further maintains that the arguments in support of Husserl's idealist position are either unsatisfactory or even quite wrong" (1997, 49). To be noted is that Ingarden did not only initially oppose this ostensible turn in Husserl's thought, but sought throughout his career to demonstrate why it was misguided. This tendency of Ingarden's philosophy culminated in his Controversy over the Existence of
this development\(^5\). It is just at this turning point in Ingarden's philosophical career, in 1915, that he wrote his first ever publication, which is a review of the second edition of the *Investigations* (Ingarden, 1915/1993; Hereafter, *Review*), which Husserl published in 1913.

Ingarden must have found himself in a difficult position when trying to review the new edition of *Investigations*. This is, in part, because Husserl sought, with his alterations, “to raise the old work entirely and truly to the level of the *Ideas*” (Husserl, 1975, 10). At the same time, Husserl believed that this process of modification and raising had to be gradual\(^6\), where the *Investigations* could only conform to the insights of *Ideas* at the end of the text, that is, once the new draft of the Sixth Investigation was composed and released\(^7\). However, Husserl never completed this task, as he cut off his modifications of the Sixth Investigation after attempting to rewrite the entire text from scratch\(^8\). Accordingly, when reading the second edition of the *Investigations*, while one can see that Husserl is striving to achieve a unity with *Ideas*, it becomes clear that the *Investigations* never actually reach that point. Furthermore, because the revisions were only partially finished, further complications arise, where the insights of the First through Fifth *Investigations* seem to be not wholly consistent with those from the Sixth. As Ingarden had largely accepted Husserl's descriptive psychology

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\(^5\) At that time, it was not only Ingarden who saw Husserl's shift in perspective problematic. Rather, many of Husserl's other students — especially his older pupils from the Göttingen circle — found Husserl's new position upsetting. Ingarden recalls that in the seminars that followed the publication of the *Ideas*, “Quickly, there developed a very lively discussion, as many of Husserl's older students raised objections against the idealistic tendency with regards to the sense and operation of the transcendental reduction from *Ideas* I […]. A series of claims from *Ideas* I created a certain confusion among the circle of Husserl's students from Göttingen, and thus there were many active confrontations between individual participants of the seminar and Husserl, who strived, above all else, to clarify the correct sense of his expositions in the *Ideas* and also to defend his standpoint from a series of questions […]. During the course of the discussion of Husserl's seminar from 1913/15, there began to arise continually more sharp differences between Husserl's standpoint and the standpoint of his students from the Göttingen school” (Ingarden, 1968, 113). For further discussion of this controversy, cf. (Plotka, 2020a, 2020b).

\(^6\) Husserl writes that he wished, “To lift the reader gradually, in the course of discussion, to a relatively raised total level of insight” (1975, 11/1970, 5).

\(^7\) Husserl writes that the reader should, “in a conscious way be raised, and truly so, such that, in the final Investigation, in essence, the level of the *Ideas* is reached” (1975, 11/1970, 5).

\(^8\) For more information on Husserl's incomplete revisions to the Sixth Investigation, now published as Husserliana XX-1/2 (2005, 2005), see (Bernet, 1988; Byrne, 2020a, 2020b; Melle, 1998, 2002).
from 1901 and rejected his transcendental idealism from the 1913 *Ideas*, he must have been split about how to review the second edition, which is a strange mixture of both. Despite the fact that Ingarden’s *Review* was composed at this unmooring point in his career, where he was beginning to formulate his opposition to Husserl’s new theory, and even though it was published at this turning point in phenomenology as a whole, little attention has been paid to it. Scholars have instead chosen to focus more on Ingarden’s later work, where he presents his mature theory and his robust critique of Husserl in more detail. This essay seeks to remedy this gap in the literature: *The paper critically engages with Ingarden’s Review of the second edition of the Investigations.* This analysis augments current readings of the evolution of Ingarden’s philosophy, by more closely examining the development of his largely neglected early thought. I execute this critical assessment by drawing both from Husserl’s later writings and from recent literature on Husserl’s *Investigations*. In doing so, I hope to additionally demonstrate how continental research on the *Investigations* has evolved and matured in the over one hundred years since the publication of that text, while also taking my own stance on these controversial interpretative issues.

Throughout my critical engagement with Ingarden’s *Review*, I not only seek to point out the elements of his discussion of Husserl that are not fully justified, but also the fragments that seem to be adequate. Concerning the former, with the hindsight of over a century of secondary literature behind us and with the continued publication of the Husserliana Editions, it is naturally possible to recognize where Ingarden did not interpret Husserl entirely correctly. More interesting; however, is that Ingarden’s *Review* is much more accurate than one would expect. Husserl’s designation of Ingarden as his “most serious and gifted” student (Schuhmann, 1977, 178), was certainly right, as his *Review* demonstrates that he had a better understanding of Husserl’s philosophy than even many scholars today. The precision of Ingarden’s *Review* is, in large part, due to his methodological approach. Perhaps because Ingarden was torn about how to interpret the second edition—as it mixes transcendental phenomenology with...

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9 Indeed, as Husserl says, in the new edition, he was struggling “to work the old and the new into one.” For more information on Husserl’s process of synthesis, see (Panzer, 1984, XVI–XVII).

10 Cf. (Bielawka, 2011; Bostar, 1994; Galarowicz, 1982; Kroński, 1933; Tischner, 1972; Wallner, 1987).

11 Zahavi writes, “I think it is virtually impossible to appraise the phenomenological project in *Logical Investigations* without taking a stand on its relation to Husserl’s later works” (Zahavi, 2002, 102).

12 In this sense, the goals of the current work stand in contrast to much of the contemporary literature. As Mitscherling writes, “Much of the most recent scholarship has attempted both to discredit Ingarden’s criticisms of Husserl and to establish that Husserl was not in fact an idealist at all” (Mitscherling, 1997, 44).
descriptive psychology—there is, strictly speaking, not a single direct critical remark about Husserl's changes. While Ingarden's Review is certainly not neutral, he still states and explores some of the alterations Husserl made in a matter of fact way. Because of Ingarden's straightforward examination of the second edition, his Review is not tinged with the bias one would expect. Instead, Ingarden's Review is rigorous and fair.

While Ingarden claims that his text addresses four tenets of Husserl's theory, I find it more appropriate to execute the critical assessment of his Review by examining three of Ingarden's insights. In section two, I look at Ingarden's discussion of Husserl's views on eidetics in the first and second edition. In section three, I examine Ingarden's conclusions about the importance of Husserl's "discovery" of the transcendental reduction for the second edition. In section four, I explore Ingarden's assessment of Husserl's changes to his pure logical grammar. Finally, in section five, I briefly mention how further study of Review could augment contemporary scholarship on the evolution of Ingarden's thought. Concerning methodology, in each section of the body of the text, I first discuss Ingarden's straightforward elucidation of Husserl's theory in 1901 and 1913. I then lay out Ingarden's assessment or critique of Husserl's understanding of the changes from the first to the second edition. Finally, I examine whether Ingarden is correct in his appraisal of Husserl.

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13 I would contend, in contrast to Szylewicz, that Ingarden did not publish his Review in Polish so as to be “non-confrontational” (Ingarden, 1993, 2–3) with Husserl, as there simply is no confrontation to speak of in the essay at all. Rather Ingarden likely released his Review in Polish to evangelize on behalf of phenomenology, as that school of thought was not well known by the Polish philosophical community at the time. This attempt was; however, ultimately less than successful. As Mitscherling writes, “It should be mentioned here that Ingarden remained in a sense ‘philosophically isolated’ for the better part of his career, for phenomenology never came to be widely accepted as legitimate philosophy in Poland” (Mitscherling, 1997, 17).

14 Ingarden asserts that, in his Review, he will address (1) the kinds of objects Husserl's philosophy investigates, (2) the scope of Husserl's analysis, (3) Husserl's methods, and (4) the epistemic value of Husserl's philosophy (Ingarden, 1915, 306/1993, 4).

15 For those further interested in historical details, Ingarden discusses some of the events that led up to his composition of the review of the second edition in his “My Memories of Edmund Husserl” (Ingarden, 1968), as can be found on pages, 57–58.

16 To be clear, in this essay I only discuss that which Ingarden says about the Investigations and do not criticize him for not addressing other transformations Husserl made to his philosophy in 1913. To rebuke Ingarden, because he did not explore each and every one of Husserl's changes would certainly be unfair to Ingarden, especially because he asserts— at the start of his text—that he will only examine “substantive changes in the solutions of problems” and “amplifications supported by new analyses” in his very short Review (Ingarden, 1915, 305/1993, 4).
2. EIDETIC REDUCTION

Ingarden begins his Review by analyzing Husserl’s dubious claim, found both in the foreword to and in the body of the second edition, that a primary difference between the first and second editions is that, in the latter, but not in the former, he executes the eidetic reduction. According to Husserl, this results in a situation where the objects studied, the methods of investigation, and the nature of the discoveries of the two editions are fundamentally different.

In the first edition, because—as Husserl claims—he had not performed the eidetic reduction, he believes that he was only looking to describe real experiences and was—ostensibly—not seeking to uncover the essences of those experiences. His descriptive psychology supposedly was studying the real events of the existing psycho-physical subject in the world. Summarizing Husserl’s view, Ingarden writes, “the objects of [the 1901] descriptive psychology are the real experiences of mind endowed individuals—hence, facts belonging to the real” (Ingarden, 1915, 306/1993, 4). Methodologically, to study these real experiences of the subject, the descriptive psychologist simply executes an inner perception to examine their ongoing mental processes. To further explain this point, Husserl writes in the foreword to the second edition that in the first edition, “the psychological description performed in inner experience are put on a level with description of the external events in nature performed in external description” (Husserl, 1975, 13). Finally, Husserl asserts that, because of its objects and method, the results of (descriptive) psychology are relative. As they are discovered via induction, they are “merely probable,” and contingent upon the factual nature of consciousness (Ingarden, 1915, 306/1993, 5).

In the second edition; however, Ingarden writes that, “Husserl adds extensive remarks concerning the phenomenological method, placing particular emphasis on reductions, which […] make it possible to adopt a stance oriented toward the pure essences of the items under investigation” (Ingarden, 1915, 305/1993, 5). By taking into account the eidetic goal of his philosophy in the second edition, Husserl can focus on the essence of different experiences, rather than on merely describing the real

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17 In his recent article, Płotka expertly discusses Ingarden’s conception of psychology. Cf. (Płotka, 2020b, 154–157).
18 Ingarden explains Husserl’s point by asserting, “The objects of descriptive psychology, on the other hand, are accessible to knowledge in an act of inner experience, an experience that serves as the sole possible means for establishing their real existence” (Ingarden, 1915, 305/1993, 4).
19 Husserl makes one exception to this conclusion. As Ingarden states, “this does not, of course, apply to rational psychology, i.e., the pure ontology of mental states” (Ingarden, 1915, 305/1993, 5).
experiences of real persons. Husserl writes, in 1913, that, “The descriptions of phe-
omenology are said to deal neither with lived experiences of empirical persons. […] Phenomenology knows nothing of persons: it raises no questions in regard to such matters” (Husserl, 1975, 13). Ingarden interprets this claim to mean that, for Husserl, the objects studied in the new edition are, “the essences of Experiences and the inter-
connections between them.” As a result of the eidetic reduction, the laws revealed by phenomenology are thus laws that “are valid irrespective of whether or not individual objects falling under a given ‘Species’ do exist in the mode of reality” (Ingarden, 1915, 305/1993, 5). Accordingly, Husserl also can claim that the discoveries of phenomenology obtain a priori and are not relative in the way that the results of descriptive psychology are.

After outlining Husserl’s conclusions about his own work, we find several state-
ments by Ingarden, which, while not straightforwardly critical, do indicate Ingarden's recognition of the fact that Husserl is not entirely accurate in his later assessment of the first edition. As Heidegger would later note in 1919, Husserl’s understanding of his project in the Investigations was deficient and that it is necessary to differentiate between and separately analyze Husserl’s meta-reflections about his own works and the actual analyses found in Husserl’s texts (Cf. Heidegger, 2010, 120). For Ingarden's part, he claims that Husserl was incorrect in his 1913 interpretation that his 1901 text was—because of its methodology—unconcerned with essences. Instead, Ingarden as-
serts that Husserl was already studying essences in the 1901 work. Speaking of the first edition, Ingarden writes that, “as a matter of fact, already at that time the bulk of the analyses had the form of an a priori cognition of the essence of consciousness” (Ingarden, 1915, 306, n. 1/1993, 11, n. 26). At another point, Ingarden claims that, even though Husserl wants to say that there are these important differences between the first and second edition, “for the most part, it is in this spirit,” that is, in the spirit of the eidetic reduction, “that the logical investigations were carried out” in the first edition (Ingarden, 1915, 307/1993, 5).

The important questions for current purposes are: Are these interpretative claims made by Ingarden correct? Is Ingarden right in his indirect criticism of Hus-
serl’s own reading of his 1901 and 1913 views on eidetics? While the answer is messy (as almost any conclusion about the relationship between the first and second edition is), one can say that Ingarden is mostly right in his assessment20.

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20 Ingarden’s conclusions are not only correct in themselves, but they also correspond with his later findings. In both his essay On the Aims of Phenomenologists (Ingarden, 1919) and in his „Über die Gefahr einer Petioi Principii in der Erkenntnistheorie“ (Ingarden, 1921), Ingarden holds that the eidetic approach is fundamental for phenomenology, even if one does not call this level of analysis
On the one hand, Husserl himself admits, in his “Draft of a Preface to the Logical Investigations” (Husserl, 2002)\(^\text{21}\), that he had already, albeit inchoately, developed his philosophy as an eidetics in the first edition. He there writes that, “De facto, the analyses [of the first edition] were executed as analyses of essence” (Husserl, 2002, 312)\(^\text{22}\). On the other hand, as just stated, we cannot trust Husserl’s own interpretation of his work. Indeed, as we find that Husserl presents conflicting readings of the first edition around the same time (in the foreword to the second edition and in “Draft of a Preface”), we have a clear example of why his own understanding of the first edition is particularly troublesome, to say the least.

Even though Husserl’s own words do not provide us with sufficient evidence, Ingarden’s interpretation can be recognized as correct, when it is noted that, in the 100 years since the publication of the Investigations, scholars have consistently claimed and convincingly demonstrated that Husserl does formulate his 1901 theory as an immature eidetics. For some examples of such interpretations, Miguel Garcia-Baro’s 1991 article is partially dedicated to arguing that, “In actuality, Husserl presented, already in the First Edition of his Logical Investigations, a very precise and elaborate theory of essence, one which he incorporated as a major constituent in his ‘Elements of a Phenomenological Elucidation of Knowledge’ (Sixth Investigation)” (Garcia-Baro, 1991, 233). Moreover, Robert Sokolowski, in his 1971 text, shows clearly that a core goal of the first edition is “to bring the essence out in such a process […] which Husserl calls eidetic intuition” (Sokolowski, 1971, 337). For one final example, Dieter Lohmar grounds his analysis of the Investigations on the fact that, in the first edition, “Husserl’s method is a descriptive analysis of acts of consciousness. It seeks not only to be an empirical–psychological investigation of factual consciousness but to determine the essential, necessary structures of consciousness” (Lohmar, 2019, 110)\(^\text{23}\).

\(\text{‘eidetic reduction.’ Accordingly, it could be said that the Review of the second edition inspires or perhaps is in continuity with Ingarden’s later thought in this regard.}\)

\(\text{21 While written in 1913, the text was only published in 1939. Ingarden, to my knowledge, was not acquainted with the Draft, as only Fink, Langrebe, and Stein worked on these relevant manuscripts to prepare them for publication. For more information on the history of “Draft of a Preface,” see (Bosser & Peters, 1975, XVII–XX).}\)

\(\text{22 Moreover, Husserl goes so far as to correctly state that, if he were simply studying the factual experiences of consciousness in the first edition, his analysis would have fallen back into psychologism. He writes in “Draft of a Preface” that, “The entire refutation of psychologism rests on the fact that the analysis, especially that of the Sixth [Investigation], but also the other Investigations, were taken as analyses of essences” (Husserl, 2002, 312).}\)

\(\text{23 For other examples of prominent scholars who maintain this interpretation, see (Heffernan, 2013; Fisette, 2009; Kersten, 1975).}\)
At the same time, Ingarden is right to state that Husserl did not have a properly mature understanding of his philosophical project as an examination of the essences of experience. Ingarden correctly notes that the eidetic nature of phenomenology only became strongly emphasized in the second edition of *Investigations*. Ursula Panzer, in agreement with Ingarden’s interpretation, writes, “The pure eidetic orientation of phenomenology was stressed by Husserl in numerous editions and changes of the second edition” (Panzer, 1984, XXXII). Husserl also acknowledges this point in “Draft of a Preface,” stating that, even though he was performing eidetic studies, “they were not executed in an entirely clear reflective consciousness” (Husserl, 2002, 312). In particular, Husserl had not made evident what exact role the investigated examples of experience played in the uncovering of essences. It is only in the second edition that Husserl explicitly states that they are exemplary singular cases, on the basis of which, ideation can be performed (Husserl, 1975, 412).

3. TRANSCENDENTAL REDUCTION

While Ingarden claims that Husserl’s first and second edition are similar to each other as both study essences, he concludes that the second edition still “stresses a current conception of phenomenology that is somewhat different” (Ingarden, 1915, 307/1993, 5). This change to Husserl’s project, which Ingarden notes, is that Husserl is now seeking to describe transcendental consciousness. Stated in more explicit terms, according to Ingarden, Husserl transforms his philosophy from a metaphysically realist eidetic psychology into an idealist transcendental phenomenology. He writes that, this novel conception of the second edition, “is bound up with Husserl’s efforts to resolve the problem pertaining to [the notion of] pure transcendental consciousness” (Ingarden, 1915, 307/1993, 5).

Concretely, this means, according to Ingarden, that Husserl has altered how he conceives of consciousness. Husserl, in 1901, distinguished between phenomenological and intentional contents of consciousness, claiming that only the latter can be studied by his descriptive psychology. Husserl—in his programmatic claims—asserts that the intentional content and object are excluded from his domain of research (Husserl, 1984, 352–375)\(^{24}\). These phenomenological contents are understood, in 1901, as the “reell phenomenological unity of the I-experience” (Husserl, 1984, 411). Husserl described phenomenological consciousness as the *reell Bestand* of the intention, including the *Inhalt* (sensations or sensory phantasms), apprehension, and quality of

\(^{24}\) As a result of this choice, as Zahavi writes, “All that is left to phenomenology seems to be noetic analyses” (Zahavi, 2002, 101).
the act (Husserl, 1984, 624–625). Ingarden summarizes this point by writing, “The domain of study was [in the first edition] pure consciousness as the totality of all ‘Experiences’ [...] one should note that in the First Edition ‘Experience’ signified all moments which really are consciousness (reelle Momente des Aktes)” (Ingarden, 1915, 307/1993, 6). The importance of this conclusion for Ingarden, which goes unstated in the Review itself, is that Husserl's descriptions ostensibly make no explicit claims about the existence of the intentional object of consciousness, such that he can be read as the metaphysical realist, which Ingarden took him to be.

In the second edition; however, Husserl alters his notion of and terminology regarding consciousness. He states that the phenomenological contents, which are examined by his philosophy, include not only the reell contents, but also the intentional contents and object (Husserl, 1984, 335, 391–393). Ingarden writes, “Currently, in addition to those ‘reelle Momente (Inhalt) des Akte,’ (today) the subject matter of phenomenology includes not only the ‘noesis,’ but also the ‘noema’ of the intentional Experiences, which, as connected into a stream of consciousness, and as acts belonging to a ‘pure Ego,’ make up transcendental consciousness” (Ingarden, 1915, 307/1993, 6). Both the reel and intentional contents are now taken to be moments within the whole intentional correlation, where both must be studied always together. Importantly, Ingarden takes this to mean that Husserl has transformed the Investigations into a transcendental project. The object cannot be said to exist out there in what Ingarden takes to be the “real” world, but rather, “can only exist just as it constitutes itself in a strictly circumscribed manifold of pure acts, as the necessary correlate of those acts, acts from which it draws its very ‘sense’ and ‘existence’ ” (Ingarden, 1915, 307/1993, 6). Ingarden believes that, as a result of this change, the fundamental goals of Husserl's phenomenology have shifted. While Husserl's philosophy was, on Ingarden's account, previously conceived of as a preliminary epistemological investigation into the foundation of sciences, it is now taken to be, “the ultimate and absolute elucidation of the sense of all objects” (Ingarden, 1915, 307/1993, 6).

Ingarden justifies this interpretation by turning to Husserl's analysis of sensations and the objects, which they can intuitively represent. Ingarden summarizes Husserl's view by writing, “The sensations present, in corresponding perceptions of the material object, objective characteristics of those objects, and they do so by means of apprehensions that confer sense and categorial form on [sensations]” (Ingarden, 1915, 308/1993, 7). From this, Ingarden concludes that, in the new edition, Husserl accepts the fundamentally transcendental conclusion that, “Nature is the necessary correlate of a certain determinate structure of a group of transcendental acts” (Ingarden, 1915, 308/1993, 7).
Is Ingarden correct in his interpretation concerning the importance of the transcendental reduction for the new formulation of the second edition? While Ingarden is not entirely off the mark, his assertions are certainly less than accurate. On the one hand, Ingarden is correct to see that Husserl is attempting to raise his project of the second edition of *Investigations* to a transcendental idealism. On the other hand, the exact details of how successful Husserl is in this attempt are seemingly lost to Ingarden.

The first inadequate view of Ingarden's reading of these ideas, which needs to be discussed, does not concern the changes Husserl made in the second edition, but rather his understanding of the first edition. These issues need to be raised, because it is on the basis of this misreading that Ingarden commits his misinterpretation of the second edition. Straightforwardly asserted, Ingarden is incorrect when he states that Husserl made no claims about the objects of intentions in 1901, but that he was only looking at the *real* content of consciousness. Because Ingarden had read Husserl's 1901 *Investigations* as endorsing a metaphysical realism, he believed that Husserl's descriptive psychology would not come close to suggesting that the object is constituted by consciousness. Yet, it is evident that Husserl does make many statements about the intentional object in the first edition. Despite Husserl's methodological claims to the contrary, his descriptive psychology was never limited to an analysis of the *real* content. Even in the introduction to the *Investigations*, where Husserl emphasizes that his project will examine the *real*, Husserl writes that the intention possesses both the *real* content and the ideal intentional content and that the intentional object is a descriptive trait of the intention (Hussrl, 1984, 5–23). Zahavi explains how Husserl's descriptions of the intentional object become even more explicit in the Fifth Investigation, writing:

> Husserl's last comment is confirmed in the Fifth Investigation, with its focus on intentionality. A careful study of this Investigation immediately reveals that Husserl constantly makes references to both the intentional object and the intentional content in his analysis. Not only does his investigation disclose that the act is *composed* of an immanent content, it also *instantiates* an intentional content, and *constitutes* an intentional object. (Zahavi, 2002, 101)

This first inadequate view leads directly to Ingarden's misreading of the changes Husserl makes in the second edition. Namely, Ingarden is misguided when he asserts

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25 On this point, see (Byrne, 2017a, 2017b).

26 While I largely agree with Zahavi, I would push back against his claim that Husserl asserts that consciousness constitutes the object in the first edition.
that Husserl’s terminological alterations fundamentally shift the substance of his analyses to be an examination of transcendental consciousness and its constitutive powers. Even though Husserl claims that the phenomenological contents are now to be understood as the *reell and* the intentional contents, this does not materially change how Husserl executes his study. He does not, as he does in *Ideas*, execute a robust descriptive analysis of the noema. Rather, his previous descriptions concerning the act and (to a lesser extent) the intentional object, stand in largely the same form as they appeared in the first edition. Ursula Panzer, in her introduction to the Husserlhana edition, emphasizes this point in even more explicit terms, writing, “Irrespective of these changes in terminology, in the reworking of the Fifth Investigation, there is no indication of the fact that Husserl pursued this ‘methodological suggestion’ […] The original limitation of phenomenological analysis to the *reel* contents of experience was thus not [fully] repealed” (1975, LIV-LV).

Furthermore, a close examination of the second edition reveals that Ingarden’s justification for his interpretative claims also falls flat. In contrast to Ingarden’s conclusions, in the first and second editions, Husserl’s descriptions of the apprehension of sensations are almost identical. That is, during his discussion of apprehension, Husserl does not add any conclusions about the transcendental nature of consciousness, nor does he make any explicit metaphysical claims about the existence of the intended object (Cf. Drummond, 2003; Urban, 2010). From this, one can also conclude that the overall goals of the text do not shift as substantially as Ingarden asserts.

4. LOGIC

The final particularly noteworthy tenet of Ingarden’s reading of Husserl’s second edition, which should be briefly touched upon, is his interpretation of Husserl’s new conception of logic. Indeed, Ingarden dedicates an exceptional number of words to this topic, as the Fourth Investigation was reworked extensively in Husserl’s new edition.

Forgoing further introductory comments, I note that Ingarden states that, while composing the second edition, Husserl became clear on the relationship between formal logic and epistemology. Ingarden’s 1901 Husserl concludes that formal logic investigates meanings in their unities so as to establish a “deductive system of logical propositions” (Ingarden, 1915, 309/1993, 7). In contrast, Husserl would conclude, in 1913, that in order to attain philosophical knowledge of logical truths, so Ingarden states, “we must bring to philosophical clarity the basic logical concepts and laws” (Ingarden, 1915, 309/1993, 8). That is, we have to execute the pertinent acts of meaning
in an intuitive manner, so as to evidently perceive their validity. Moreover, Ingarden claims that these conclusions stand in contrast to those of the first edition, because they differentiate, in no uncertain terms, the orientation of epistemology and logic. While logic is concerned with the meanings of acts and their intuited meant objects, “the objects of epistemology are the essences of the very acts of cognitive consciousness, and its ultimate aim is self-evident insight into the essence of cognition and its variants” (Ingarden, 1915, 309/1993, 8). Importantly, on this basis, Ingarden claims that Husserl also shifts his understanding of the interrelationship between logic and phenomenology. He states that Husserl now conceives of phenomenology as providing the foundation for logic, writing, “Having gained clarity concerning the essence of phenomenology, Husserl abandoned his earlier defense against the reproach of a ‘relapse into psychologism’ and replaced it with an argument to the effect that philosophical logic has its foundations in pure phenomenology” (Ingarden, 1915, 309/1993, 7).

To be finally noted is that Ingarden believes that Husserl also changes his account of the three levels of pure logical grammar — and specifically the second, which is meant as a safeguard against Widersinn. In contrast to the first edition, Ingarden claims,

inconsistency of sense (Widersinn), which is determined by logical laws of validity is now conceived […] as the impossibility (or, in the case of consistency of sense, as the possibility) of the existence of the objects expressed by the meaning, insofar as the objects are conditioned by meanings’ own peculiar essence. (Ingarden, 1915, 309/1993, 8)

For Ingarden, this new theory of Widersinn is critical to determining the logical sphere of meaning and to describing the objects meant by the meaning.

One final time, we must ask, are Ingarden’s interpretative claims correct? Straightforwardly stated, Ingarden not only accurately outlines most of Husserl’s conclusions, but also predicts many of the later developments of Husserl’s thought.

Concerning Ingarden’s reading of Husserl’s reconception of the relationship between logic and epistemology, he is by and large right. While Husserl’s understanding of that relationship, in 1901, was more precise than Ingarden gives him credit for\(^2\), it is still the case that Husserl does more maturely distinguish between logic and epis-\(^2\) Rinofner-Kreidl writes, that for the Husserl of 1901, “the task of descriptive psychology [is] to determine the relationship between psychology and logic with the help of an investigation of intentional experiences and their contents. Descriptive psychology is to deliver a description of the origin of the fundamental logical concepts in determinate types of acts and to explicate a doctrine of the intentionality of consciousness that clarifies how a consciousness must be constituted such that an objective relation to objects [objektive Gegenstandsbeziehung] is possible for it” (Rinofner-Kreidl, 2019, 27). Cf. (Byrne, 2017c, 2018, 2019).
temology in the new edition in many of the ways that Ingarden outlines. At the same
time, Ingarden exaggerates the evolution of Husserl's understanding of phenomenol-
ogy and logic. Husserl had not yet, in the 1913 edition, recognized that he would
have to “abandon” his attack of psychologism, to instead defend his philosophy by
grounding logic in transcendental phenomenology. In fact, this insight would only
occur to Husserl much later in his career; namely, in his *Formal and Transcendental
Logic* (Husserl, 1977). Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl summarizes this turn in the late Husserl
well, when she writes,

In *Formal and Transcendental Logic* […] Husserl now sees the reason for the failure
of a scientific logic up to this time in the objectivistic attitude of logical investigations,
which separates the logical objects from every relation to subjective acts of thinking. A
transformation in phenomenology's conception of science underlies this turn against
objectivism: Pure logic, as 'objectivistic' universal doctrine of science, is not the funda-
mental science, but rather pure phenomenology, whose object is the intentional relation
(conceived in abstraction from existence). (Rinofner-Kreidl, 2019, 38)

Finally, it can be said that Husserl also did not completely reform his under-
standing of *Widersinn*, by claiming that such counter-sense could be recognized via an
intuition of the impossibility of the meaning. Instead, Husserl retained his insight that
counter-sense could only be discovered by intuiting analytic or synthetic inconsistency.
It should be noted, as it is of importance to the evolution of Husserl's *oeuvre*, that
his theory of possibility and impossibility would undergo a radical transformation in
his unpublished 1913/14 Revisions to the Sixth *Logical Investigation* (Hua XX-1/2).
There, Husserl, via an extensive analysis, does shift his views in ways that are crucial
for his understanding of the logical sphere and for his conception of the overarching
nature of his transcendental idealism (Husserl, 2002, 171–217). As I cannot go into
the details of Husserl's new and complex theory of possibility and impossibility from
the 1913/14 Revisions here, I direct the reader to Bernet's expert 2004 article on that
transformation

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28 Bernet writes that, when developing this new account of possibility, “Husserl is never moved to
cast doubt upon the intentional correlation between the act and the object […] Making headway
in this direction, Husserl is not only brought to distinguish between a broad verses a strict sense of
phenomenological idealism, but will also show that the transcendental consciousness that assures
us of the actual reality of the world must be a consciousness that is once both embodied and inter-
subjective” (Bernet, 2004, 4).
5. CONCLUSION

In this essay, I explored and critically assessed Ingarden’s interpretation of the second edition of Husserl’s *Logical Investigations*. Despite the fact that Ingarden composed his text at a tumultuous time in his philosophical career—as the publication of *Ideas I* shook his understanding of Husserl’s theory—and even though the phenomenological movement was in its infancy, Ingarden was able to paint a surprisingly accurate picture of Husserl’s changes to his “breakthrough” work. While Ingarden was not able to provide a fully accurate account of the role of the transcendental reduction in the second edition, he was able to clearly identify the similarities between the eidi- tics of the first and second editions and he even anticipated some of the conclusions, which Husserl would arrive at in his future works on formal and transcendental logic. Moreover, by executing this analysis, I have shown how research on the *Investigations* has matured in the one hundred years since the release of that work, while also presenting my own views concerning these difficult interpretative issues.

It is my hope that by executing the goals of this paper, other scholars will be inspired to draw not only from Ingarden’s later writings, as has often been the case, but also to produce research on his early texts, including this 1915 *Review*. On this point, I should mention that, while I have touched upon some of the important tenets of Ingarden’s assessment, he develops many other insights about Husserl’s work throughout the *Review*, which are worthy of study, as those conclusions are not only fascinating in themselves, but also because they help to shape Ingarden’s later thought. These include Ingarden’s analyses of Husserl’s transformation of his descriptions of the ego and Husserl’s new insights about independent and non-independent objects, Husserl’s novel conception of the relationship between psychology and the natural sciences, and finally, Husserl’s different approach to his confrontation with Hume and Locke in the second edition. A more comprehensive investigation into these other interpretative claims and how they relate to and motivate Ingarden’s thinking about Husserl, transcendental philosophy, and ontology would; however, be the task of a much larger project. It was rather the more modest goal of this paper to present a critical assessment of Ingarden’s 1915 *Review*, so as to shed new light on his early thought and on the inception of the communal project of phenomenology.
REFERENCES


