how proper causes produce effects, such explanations actually show that those very proper causes "are not, after all, proper causes, but something else" (208) and [2] the modern causation debate is still a live debate because although "the early participants in the debate lost explanatory power by insisting upon a set of metaphysical conditions that effectively precluded the usual candidates for causes from being proper causes, . . . [t]he latter participants . . . lost explanatory power by eliminating so many metaphysical conditions that too many things qualify as proper causes" (210). The debate effectively went from one extreme to another—from stinginess (concerning proper causes) to over-generosity.

My one concern with Clatterbaugh's text (perhaps this is an inherent problem with attempting to take on such an enormous project) is that he sometimes sacrifices a certain amount of depth in his discussions of individual philosophers. The clearest example, to my mind, is his treatment of Spinoza. His suggestions that [1] Spinoza's philosophy builds on a deductive method (129), and [2] "his [Spinoza's] overall view is thoroughly mechanistic" (139) both slant Spinoza's thinking too quickly towards a Cartesian bias (i.e., they are in need of further explication). Furthermore, the lack of discussion concerning the difference between second-order and third-order knowing in Spinoza's thought (which challenges the very status of causation as an adequate way of perceiving nature) obscures a crucial moment in Spinoza that suggests his radical resistance to the modern 'direction' of mechanism.

In sum, I find Clatterbaugh's text to be insightful, provocative, and worthy of recommendation as a thematic commentary for survey classes having to do with the modern periods of philosophy and science.

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Religion and Human Rights: Competing Claims?
Carrie Gustafson and Peter Juvelier, eds.
$23.95 pbk 0-7656-0262-8

EDMUND F. BYRNE

The articles in this collection address a variety of topics that concern the intersection of religion and human rights. The authors write from diverse perspectives, including feminism, usually as regards some specific problem or program. None is a philosopher. Their areas of expertise include law, political science, history, and religious ethics.
They share a commitment to advancing human rights in the world, assume that human rights are universal in principle and ought to be so in fact, and thus question religion's role as what coeditor Peter Juveler calls "an ambiguous force for both progress and reaction" (3). Some articles are more insightful and informative than others, but taken together they provide a good introduction to a complex social and political issue that philosophers seldom address. This in itself should recommend the book to philosophers, not as a text but perhaps as a beacon inviting them to expand the horizons of both their research interests and their course syllabi.

The contributors to this book examine many instances of religion/human rights conflicts from quite diverse perspectives, and thereby they help the reader appreciate the issues raised. Taken together, however, their individual efforts lead to no consistent view of how such conflicts should be criticized and possibly transcended. Most take one religious institution as a starting point from which to assess how far it has helped advance recognition of human rights. They differ markedly, though, in their assessment of how much an organized religion should be expected to yield for the sake of achieving such an ideal.

Christian theologian Max Stackhouse's approach to human rights, for all his sincerity, will not win the hearts and minds of philosophers. For he thinks only theology (not philosophy) can justify human rights claims because it alone can ground the requisite moral principles, thereby serving as an antidote to, say, Rawls's pseudo-neutral secularism. This civic activity he calls "public theology," without pausing to address the inherent paradox this expression involves. Instead, he disposes of such obvious counterindications as apartheid South Africa and Iran under the ayatollahs by blaming their excesses on religion rather than theology. (Legal scholar Louis Henkin's notes in response to the inadequacy of this distinction.) Other contributors recognize that a supportive theological position is only one of many factors involved in advancing human rights, and so tend to be more pragmatic in their search for solutions.

The best article in the book is Arati Rao's brilliant analysis of the ways in which a politicized Hinduism is undermining the rights of women and minorities in India. "Speaking/Seeking a Common Language: Women, the Hindu Right, and Human Rights in India." A research associate at the Centre for Feminist Legal Research in New Delhi, Rao argues convincingly that an unholy alliance of religion and politics is compromising gender equality in India. In the process, she unmasksthe religious underpinnings of a purportedly secular government, thereby inviting reflection on the potential for abuse that is inherent in any abstract model of political neutrality.
In her analysis of the Catholic Church in Latin America, historian Margaret E. Crahan provides a nicely balanced analysis of factors that support or constrain reform, including policies, strategies, and priorities. For the most part, however, she avoids identifying what basic rights should be the objective of reform. Respondent James F. Joyce, a Catholic priest, accentuates the political negative with examples of right-wing opposition within the Church to change-oriented social movements. Legal activist Carrie Gustafson (a coeditor) contends that efforts to establish international criminal courts (ICCs) will cause rather than prevent violence. Her guiding Gandhian premise is that violence begets violence. She focuses, however, on official punishment and not on the crimes perpetrated. Respondent legal scholar Kenneth Anderson supports her opposition to ICCs by noting troublesome similarities between the presumptuousness of modern capitalist globalism and that of earlier Christian apocalyptic ideals.

The articles by social ethicist Larry Rasmussen and Jewish feminist Blu Greenberg are at opposite extremes with respect to human rights. Greenberg sees human rights as a worthy ideal, especially for women, but not if their attainment would undermine Orthodox Judaism. So she catalogues subtle changes in Orthodox prayers, language, and rules that improve the status of women without endangering tradition as the embodiment of revelation. She endorses without hesitation a woman’s right to a divorce without her husband’s approval, but on most other matters she seems willing to accept incremental change. (Respondent Alan Segal, a historian of religion, warns that Orthodox Judaism, though not necessarily as reactionary as religious fundamentalism, is leaning in that direction, even using violence to advance its causes.) Rasmussen, by contrast, disparages the human rights ideal as far too individualistic to save our planet from environmental disaster. As concerns the “biotic rights” of the environment, he contends, few religious or secular arguments are very helpful. Respondent Patricia Daly, a promoter of socially responsible investing, sees religious institutions in particular as ambivalent with respect to the environment.

For philosophers, presumably, the overarching set of issues is what human rights are, what arguments can be offered in their defense, and what social and political arrangements are most conducive to their being respected. Except for the latter, these are barely touched on in this book—thus its inadequacy as a stand-alone text for a philosophy course. The literatures on human rights and on the connection between religion and violence are quite extensive, though, so it could be supplemented by any of a number of other works. But few of these are philosophical.

Source books on human rights include Ian Brownlie, ed., Basic Documents on Human Rights, 3d ed. (Oxford University Press, 1992);


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_Providence and the Problem of Evil_

Richard Swinburne


WINFRIED CORDUAN

Postmodernism is coming! Well, perhaps, but modernity is alive and thriving in the writings of Richard Swinburne. As in his many previous works, the Oxford professor is once again subjecting an aspect