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# Aesthetic Internalism and two normative puzzles

### 1. *Introduction: Cognitivism, Non-Cognitivism, and Internalism*

In metaethics, there is a long and persistent debate about the nature of judgments about what is morally right or wrong<sup>1</sup>. According to Moral Cognitivism, a moral judgment consists in a belief or proposition, whereas according to Moral Non-Cognitivism it consists in a non-cognitive state, such as an emotion or a desire. The debate is essential to our understanding of the nature of morality in that it concerns whether moral judgments purport to say something *about* the world – that actions have moral properties which can make these judgments true or false — or report our attitudes *towards* these actions<sup>2</sup>.

In metaaesthetics — the analogue to metaethics — there is a corresponding tradition of debating the nature of judgments about what is aesthetically good or bad<sup>3</sup>. This debate is often pursued from a more historical perspective than what cus-

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<sup>1</sup> I will refer to these judgments as “moral judgments”.

<sup>2</sup> For an overview of the debate between Moral Cognitivism and Non-Cognitivism, see e.g. Miller 2013. In metaethics, it is often presumed that if Non-Cognitivism is correct about morality, the same applies to aesthetics. See Ayer 1952: 103 for an early expression of this assumption. For criticism, see Kivy 1980: 351-65.

<sup>3</sup> I will refer to these judgments as “aesthetic judgments” and use “valuable” as synonymous for “good”. For an overview of theories about aesthetic value, see Dickie 1984.

tomarily is the case in metaethics<sup>4</sup>. However, recently a less historically oriented discussion about the plausibility of Cognitivism and Non-Cognitivism with regard to aesthetic judgments has commenced.

According to both Aesthetic Cognitivism and Non-Cognitivism, a sentence of the type “*Parsifal* is aesthetically valuable” expresses, by virtue of its semantic meaning, an aesthetic judgment. However, they differ as to what such a judgment consists in. On Cognitivism, it consists in an ordinary proposition or belief according to which the object in question has the property of being aesthetically valuable, with the result that the judgment can be true or false. On Non-Cognitivism, it consists in a non-cognitive state with regard to the work in question, with the consequence that it cannot be true or false<sup>5</sup>. Like the debate in metaethics, the conflict concerns whether aesthetic judgments aim to say something *about* the world —

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<sup>4</sup> Especially, much of the discussion is concerned with response-dependent models with origin in Hume. Needless to say, this tradition is very rich and displays a variety of highly diverse views. See e.g. Budd 1995: Ch. 1; Goldman 1995: esp. Ch. 2; Taliaferro 1990: 1-13; Levinson 2002: 227-38; Ross 2008: 20-8. Cf. Pettit 1983: 18-38. For two important but widely different non-reductionist alternatives, see McDowell 1983: 1-16, and Railton 1998: 59-105. For forceful criticism of this type of model, see Schellekens 2006: 163-77, and Kieran 2008: 278-94. For a defence of aesthetic realism, see Zemach 1997.

<sup>5</sup> Recently, some authors have considered the plausibility of Aesthetic Non-Cognitivism; see Hopkins 2001: 166-89; Todd 2004: 277-96. For criticism, see McGonigal 2006: 331-48. Thus far, the scope of the discussion has been rather narrow. First, it concerns the plausibility of a particular version of Aesthetic Non-Cognitivism inspired by Simon Blackburn’s metaethical quasi-realism (see e.g. Blackburn 1993). Second, it concerns whether this view can explain the autonomy of aesthetic judgments and, in relation to this, the nature of disagreement about aesthetic evaluations. For more general discussions about Aesthetic Cognitivism and Non-Cognitivism, see e.g. Pettit 1983: 18; Strandberg 2011b: 51-67, and Archer 2013: 67-84. For a general criticism of Aesthetic Non-Cognitivism, see Zemach 1997: Ch. 1.

whether art works and other objects have aesthetic value properties that make these judgments true or false — or whether they merely constitute our attitudes *towards* these objects. Similarly, which view turns out to be correct has significant implications as regards the nature of aesthetics: whether there are any aesthetic value properties; whether we can attain aesthetic knowledge; whether aesthetics is “objective” or “subjective”, whether it is “absolute” or “relative”, etc.

The most significant argument against Moral Cognitivism and for Moral Non-Cognitivism is founded on Moral Internalism, which states that there is a conceptually necessary connection between moral judgments and motivation. It is therefore pertinent to investigate whether Aesthetic Internalism, which makes the corresponding claim about aesthetic judgments, is plausible. In this paper, I develop two lines of arguments. First, I argue that it is difficult to identify any viable version of Aesthetic Internalism. As a result, the prime argument against Aesthetic Cognitivism, and for Aesthetic Non-Cognitivism, is flawed and the latter view probably incorrect. Second, I argue that considerations about Aesthetic Internalism give rise to two normative puzzles concerning the connection between aesthetic judgments, normative judgments, rationality and motivation. It is suggested that in order to solve these two puzzles, we are forced to revise the established view about normative judgments. Thus, surprisingly, it turns out that considerations in metaaesthetics have significant implications for the normative domain in general. Finally, the solution to the two puzzles suggests a novel externalist account of aesthetic judgments.

## 2. *Generic Aesthetic Internalism*

Consider the following moral case.

*Case 1.* You are involved in a conversation with a couple of Americans about people's moral responsibilities as citizens. The discussion concerns which candidate it would be morally right or wrong to vote for in the presidential election in the U.S. One of them utters "Voting for Hillary Clinton is what is morally right. That's what one absolutely should do". However, she has no motivation whatsoever to vote for Clinton. Indeed, later it turns out that she votes for Donald Trump.

Employing our linguistic intuitions, we are likely to find the person's utterance puzzling in view of her lacking motivation. If a person utters a moral sentence, we strongly presume that she is accordingly motivated. In case she is not, we look for an explanation. We might come to suspect that she is not sincere or perhaps that she uses "wrong" in another way than we do. Indeed, it might even be suggested that we would not ascribe a moral judgment to her since she lacks the relevant motivation. Cases of this type are assumed to give support to "Moral Internalism"<sup>6</sup>. A generic version of this view can be formulated thus as follows.

*Generic Moral Internalism:* there is some conceptually necessary, non-trivial, connection between a person's moral judgment and her motivation to act<sup>7</sup>.

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<sup>6</sup>I use "Moral Internalism" and "Aesthetic Internalism" when not referring to any particular version of these views.

<sup>7</sup>All occurrences of "necessary" in this paper refer to conceptual necessity. An overview of various version of Moral Internalism can be found in Björnsson et al 2014: 1-20.

Now, consider the following aesthetic case.

*Case 2.* You are involved in a conversation with a group of people about classical music. The discussion concerns the aesthetic value of different operas. One of them utters “Wagner’s *Parsifal* is absolutely amazing. His best I would say”. However, it turns out that she has no motivation whatsoever to listen to *Parsifal* or even a single part of this opera. Indeed, later it turns out that she prefers musicals like *The Lion King*.

It appears that our linguistic intuitions support a corresponding characterization of this case. We would presumably be puzzled by the person’s utterance considering her lacking motivation. If a person utters that an object is aesthetically valuable, we strongly presume that she is motivated to see it, listen to it, read it, etc. In case she is not, we want an explanation (Archer 2013: 71; King unpublished). We might even come to suspect that she is not sincere or does not use the relevant term in the same way we do in an aesthetic context. It might even be suggested that we do not ascribe an aesthetic judgment to a person unless she has the relevant motivation. This line of thought might be taken to provide support for “Aesthetic Internalism”<sup>8</sup>. A generic version of this view is the following.

*Generic Aesthetics Internalism:* there is some conceptually necessary, non-trivial, connection between a person’s aesthetic judgment and her motivation to act.

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<sup>8</sup> Aesthetic Internalism is underdiscussed in the literature, but see Sinnott-Armstrong 2010: 71-86; Strandberg 2011b: 51-67; Archer 2013: 67-84, and King unpublished.

The rejection of either form of Internalism might be called “Moral Externalism” and “Aesthetic Externalism”, respectively.

### 3. *Strong Aesthetic Internalism*

The strongest version of Moral Internalism proposed in the literature can be formulated as follows. *Strong Moral Internalism*: necessarily, if a person S judges that it is morally right that she performs an action, then she is at least somewhat motivated to perform it.

This view finds support in thought experiments like Case 1. As noted above, a possible response to this case is that the person who utters “Voting for Hillary Clinton is what is morally right”, without being motivated at all to do so, does not really think that it *is* right to vote for Clinton. This version of Internalism in conjunction with the so-called Humean theory of motivation is thought to entail that Cognitivism is false and to provide an argument for Non-Cognitivism:

(1) *Strong Moral Internalism*: necessarily, if a person S judges that it is morally right that she performs an action, then she is at least somewhat motivated to perform it.

(2) *Humean Theory of Motivation*: a person S having a belief is not sufficient for her to be motivated. In order to be motivated, she needs to have a non-cognitive state in the form of a desire.

(C) Moral Cognitivism is false: a person S’s moral judgment does not consist in a belief. A moral judgment at least partly consists in a non-cognitive state.

The explanation why (C) follows from (1) and (2) is assumed to be the following: (1) entails that a person making a moral

judgment is sufficient for her to be motivated. However, (2) entails that entertaining a belief is not sufficient to be motivated, but that a non-cognitive state is needed. It follows in (C) that a moral judgment does not consist in a belief, and that it, at least partly, consists in a non-cognitive state. Hence, the argument is thought to entail that Cognitivism is false and provide an argument for Non-Cognitivism.

It might now be inquired whether it is possible to construe a corresponding argument with regard to aesthetic judgments. The strongest version of Aesthetic Internalism with any initial plausibility would be the following.

*Strong Aesthetic Internalism*: necessarily, if a person S judges that an object is aesthetically valuable, then she is at least somewhat motivated to acquaint herself with it<sup>9</sup>.

Strong Aesthetic Internalism finds support in our response to thought experiments like Case 2. A possible response to this case is, as we noted, that someone who utters “Wagner’s *Par-sifal* is absolutely amazing”, while at the same lacking any motivation to listen to it, actually does not think that the opera *is* valuable. We can then formulate the following argument:

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<sup>9</sup> In what follows, “object” refers to works in literature, visual arts, music, and dance, as well as other artefacts which are targets of aesthetic judgments. We might also want to include natural objects, such as natural sceneries. I use “acquaint” to refer to different ways of getting to know these objects by reading, looking, listening, and touching, etc. For an alternative manner of formulating a strong version of Aesthetic Internalism, see King unpublished. See also Archer 2013: 71. For a related suggestion as regards taste judgments, see Eriksson 2016: 775-94.

(1') *Strong Aesthetic Internalism*: necessarily, if a person S judges that an object is aesthetically valuable, then she is at least somewhat motivated to acquaint herself with it.

(2) *Humean Theory of Motivation*: a person S having a belief is not sufficient for her to be motivated. In order to be motivated, she needs to have a non-cognitive state in the form of a desire.

(C') *Aesthetic Cognitivism is false*: a person S's aesthetic judgment does not consist in a belief. An aesthetic judgment at least partly consists in a non-cognitive state.

By the same type of reasoning as that employed with regard to moral judgments, it might be thought to follow that an aesthetic judgment does not consist in a belief and that it at least partly consists in a non-cognitive state. Hence, it might be thought that it entails that Aesthetic Cognitivism is false and provides an argument for Aesthetic Non-Cognitivism.

However, despite what might seem to be the case, the conclusion does not follow from the premises in either of these arguments. To see this, consider the aesthetic argument (1')-(C')<sup>10</sup>. Strong Aesthetic Internalism claims that it is conceptually necessary that *if* a person makes an aesthetic judgment, *then* it follows that she is motivated accordingly. Now, there might be different explanations of why this is the case. According to one alternative, it is conceptually necessary that an aesthetic judgment partly or wholly consists in a motivational state. In the literature, this view is often captured by saying that motivation is "internal" or "intrinsic" to a judgment. According to another alternative, we *classify* a person's

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<sup>10</sup> The same considerations apply to Moral Internalism. See Tresan 2006: 143-65, and Strandberg 2011a: 244.

judgment as an “*aesthetic judgment*” only if she is motivated accordingly. This alternative is compatible with the judgment itself not playing any part at all in the explanation of why she is motivated. It is, in other words, compatible with motivation begin “external” or “extrinsic” to the judgment. In the literature, it is standardly presumed that Internalism should be understood in accordance with the first alternative, and it is only recently that it has been noticed that it is compatible with the second alternative.

What is important to observe is the following. First, scenarios like Case 2 only provide support to the second alternative but not to the first alternative. In considering such cases, we might perhaps respond by doubting that the person in question actually makes any aesthetic judgment. However, this does not provide any support for the view that it either wholly or partly consists in a motivational state. Second, in order for (C') to follow from (1') and (2), the first alternative needs to be true. It is only if Strong Aesthetic Internalism is understood to entail that an aesthetic judgment wholly or partly consists in a motivational state that it, together with a Humean theory of motivation, entails that Aesthetic Cognitivism is false and provides support to Aesthetic Non-Cognitivism. This does not mean, of course, that the two strong versions of Internalism are false. It does mean, though, that they cannot have the dialectical role they initially might be presumed to have in the debate between Cognitivism and Non-Cognitivism about moral and aesthetic judgments.

The discussion so far might be taken to indicate that Moral and Aesthetic Internalism are on equal footing. There are

grounds to think, however, that the support for the latter view is weaker than that for the former<sup>11</sup>.

There is a principal argument for this contention: moral judgments and aesthetic judgments appear to be fundamentally different types of judgments in that the former are *action-focused* whereas the latter are *object-focused*<sup>12</sup>. Moral judgments are normative judgments that concern the moral rightness and wrongness of actions. This means in turn that they make reference to persons, since it is persons that act. A moral judgment to the effect that an action is morally right entails that it is right for someone to perform the action, where “someone” might be a single person, all persons, or a subset of all persons. The moral judgment referred to in Strong Moral Internalism is a person’s judgment that it is morally right that *she* performs a certain action, since it is only a moral judgment of this type that can have any necessary connection to *her* motivation to act. By contrast, aesthetic judgments are evaluative judgments that concern the aesthetic value, or lack thereof, belonging to objects. This might in turn be taken to indicate that they need not involve any reference to actions and, hence, not to persons. The aesthetic judgment referred to in this claim is a person’s judgment that an object is aesthetically valuable. It is not obvious that her judgment entails anything

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<sup>11</sup> In my view, there are powerful arguments against Moral Internalism and for Moral Externalism (see e.g. Strandberg 2011a, and 2013). Indeed, I think that the line of argument I pursue in this paper as regards Aesthetic Internalism is applicable, *mutatis mutandis*, to Moral Internalism. However, I still think the support for Aesthetic Internalism is weaker than that for Moral Internalism.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Kivy 1980: 358-60, Sinnott-Armstrong 2010: 65, and Strandberg 2010b: 51-67. For responses to this difference, see Archer 2013: 80, and King unpublished.

with relevance for *her* motivation to act in any manner whatsoever.

This difference between moral and aesthetic judgments provides a *prima facie* reason to think that Internalism is more plausible as regards the former view than the latter. However, it should not make us draw the conclusion that Aesthetic Internalism is incorrect. Rather, it means that *if* there is a viable version of this claim, it needs to forge a significant connection between aesthetic judgments and actions. I will return to this possibility in the next section.

What is more, standard arguments against Strong Moral Internalism apply at least as forcefully against its aesthetic counterpart. A common argument against Strong Moral Internalism is that it appears possible to imagine an *amoralist*: a person who judges that an action is morally right, but who is not the least motivated to perform it. The argument is that since it appears possible to conceive of an amoralist, there cannot be a conceptually necessary connection between moral judgments and motivation<sup>13</sup>. Moreover, it has been argued that a person might make a moral judgment without being accordingly motivated in case she suffers from a mental condition such as apathy, exhaustion, or depression<sup>14</sup>.

In a similar manner, it appears possible to imagine what might be called an *amaesthete*: a person who judges that an object is aesthetically valuable, but who is not in the least mo-

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<sup>13</sup> In the literature, internalists have tried to explain away this impression in various manners. For example, R.M. Hare famously argues that apparent amoralists use moral sentences in “inverted commas” (see Hare 1952: 124-5). For another explanation, see Smith 1994: 67-71.

<sup>14</sup> For example, it seems possible to imagine a mother who judges that it is right for her to help her son to get rid of his drug problems, but is not at all motivated to do so because she is severely depressed.

tivated to acquaint herself with it<sup>15</sup>. Indeed, in view of the indicated difference between the two types of value judgments, it is presumably even easier to imagine an amaesthete than an amoralist: as it is not obvious that an aesthetic judgment has any significant connection to actions, it seems easier to conceive of a person making such a judgment without being accordingly motivated.

Furthermore, as is the case with moral judgments, it also seems plausible that a person can make an aesthetic judgment without being accordingly motivated if she suffers from a psychological condition such as apathy, exhaustion, or depression, etc. Consider the following case.

*Case 3.* Cecilia thinks that Wagner's *Parsifal* is aesthetically valuable. The opera is her absolute favorite music piece. However, she suffers from a deep depression which makes her incapable to enjoy the music. Indeed, listening to it makes her remember happier days and only increases her depression. She is not motivated at all to listen to it.

It is a commonsensical observation that our psychological conditions can influence to what extent we are motivated to, say, listen a piece of music or read a novel. Accordingly, it is plausible to think that these conditions can influence us in such a way that we are not motivated at all to involve in these activities, in spite of our high esteem of the work in question.

To sum up, Strong Aesthetic Internalism cannot function as a premise in an argument against Aesthetic Cognitivism and for Aesthetic Non-Cognitivism, and there are grounds to be-

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<sup>15</sup> Cf. Archer 2013: 72-4, King unpublished. I avoid using "anaesthete" since it has a meaning quite different from the one I intend.

lieve that this version of Aesthetic Internalism is mistaken. This means two things. First, Strong Aesthetic Internalism cannot be employed in an argument against Aesthetic Cognitivism and for Aesthetic Non-Cognitivism. Second, there are grounds to believe that Aesthetic Non-Cognitivism is incorrect. I can merely outline the structure of this argument here. Assume that Aesthetic Non-Cognitivism is correct and that aesthetic judgments consist in some type of non-cognitive states. Now, it is generally accepted that what characterizes non-cognitive states is that they motivate to action. It is then plausible to assume that if a person judges that an object is aesthetically valuable, she is motivated to acquaint herself with it. However, as Strong Aesthetic Internalism is mistaken, this is not the case. Hence, there are grounds to think that Aesthetic Non-Cognitivism is incorrect<sup>16</sup>. Moreover, non-cognitivist views in general are vulnerable to a number of difficulties, most importantly the renowned Frege-Geach problem. As indicated, internalist considerations are the primary argument for non-cognitivist positions. Thus, since Strong Aesthetic Internalism

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<sup>16</sup> It might be objected that Aesthetic Non-Cognitivism is needed to explain disagreements in aesthetic judgments, at least given that relativism is initially plausible with regard to such judgments. A related argument has been suggested concerning disagreements in taste judgments (cf. e.g. Huvenes 2012: 167-81, and Eriksson 2016: 775-94). This consideration gives rise to a number of issues that I cannot address in the present paper. However, it might be suggested that, if relativism is found attractive, disagreement in aesthetic judgments can be explained in terms of their being connected to conflicting attitudes. According to a cognitivist account, utterances of a sentence stating that an object is aesthetically valuable standardly pragmatically implicate attitudes, and the utterances of different speakers might implicate conflicting attitudes. See Marques forthcoming, and the proposal in Section 8 below.

does not provide any support for Aesthetic Non-Cognitivism, there are grounds to believe that the latter view is incorrect<sup>17</sup>.

The fact that Strong Aesthetic Internalism is mistaken does not mean, however, that there are no versions of Aesthetic Internalism that are significant. First, there are weaker versions of this view that, although they do not have the same implications as Strong Aesthetic Internalism, put important constraints on the content of aesthetic judgments. Second, as we shall see, they also raise two normative puzzles with implications for the normative domain in general.

#### 4. *Rationalist Aesthetic Internalism*

In the last section, I mentioned that Strong Moral Internalism is vulnerable to the difficulty that a person's moral judgment does not need to be accompanied by motivation if she suffers from a certain psychological condition. This has made a number of metaethicists employ a weaker version of Internalism, as follows.

*Conditional Moral Internalism*: necessarily, if a person S judges that it is morally right that she performs an action, then she is at least somewhat motivated to perform it, *given that she fulfills condition C*.

This claim represents merely a type of Internalism in which "condition C" needs to be specified<sup>18</sup>. It has turned out to be difficult to do so in a way that does not make the resulting version of Internalism trivial. The most promising alternative

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<sup>17</sup> For an overview of the debate about the Frege-Geach problem, see Schroeder 2010.

<sup>18</sup> For various ways of understanding "condition C", see Björnsson et al. 2014: 1-20.

appears to be to understand it as “*given that she is practically rational*”. The psychological conditions that are assumed to explain why a person who makes a moral judgment is not accordingly motivated can be seen as indicating failure in rationality. The resulting claim might be called “Moral Rationalist Internalism”.

This claim requires explanation. What would be the reasons for thinking that a person who judges that an action is right necessarily is motivated to perform it only if she is rational? To my understanding, it rests on three claims which entail it<sup>19</sup>:

(1) necessarily, if a person S judges that it is morally right that she performs an action, then she judges that she has a moral reason to perform it.

(2) Moral reasons consist in normative reasons: necessarily, if a person S has a moral reason to perform an action, then she has a normative reason to perform the action.

(3) *Normative Internalism*: necessarily, if a person S judges that she has a normative reason to perform an action, then she is at least somewhat motivated to perform that action, given that she is practically rational.

(C) *Moral Rationalist Internalism*: necessarily, if a person S judges that it is morally right that she performs an action, then she is at least somewhat motivated to perform it, *given that she is practically rational*.

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<sup>19</sup> See e.g. Smith 1994: Ch. 3 and 4. For discussion, see e.g. Strandberg 2013: 25-51. For an interesting argument against various version of Moral Internalism, see Archer 2013: 74-7, and Archer forthcoming.

As far as I understand, claim (1) is uncontroversial. If a person judges that it is morally right for her to perform a certain action, she judges that, from the perspective of morality, there is something that speaks in favour of her performing it. That is, her judgment entails that she has a moral reason to perform the action. This claim does not entail any particular notion about what moral reasons consist in, and is thus compatible with various views in this respect. Claim (2) is also fairly uncontroversial. It is generally acknowledged that moral reasons are “real reasons” rather than conventional reasons like etiquette reasons which solely rest on arbitrary conventions. Lastly, claim (3) is often considered as a platitude in metaethics. If a person judges that she has a normative reason to perform a certain action, it might seem that she is not fully rational in her own lights unless she has at least some motivation to perform it<sup>20</sup>.

In view of what was said at the end of the previous section, we should consider a corresponding version of Aesthetic Internalism.

*Conditional Aesthetic Internalism:* necessarily, if a person S judges that an object is aesthetically valuable, then she is at least somewhat motivated to acquaint herself with it, *given that she fulfills condition C*.

As is the case with its moral analogue, it is difficult to explicate this claim in a way that provides a non-trivial interpretation of it. For example, it would risk to trivialize it by spelling out “condition C” as “aesthetically sensitive”, as it appears difficult

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<sup>20</sup> See e.g. Smith 1994: Ch. 5. See also e.g. Korsgaard 1986: 5-25, and Wedgwood 2007: Ch. 1.

to explain this notion in a way that does not make reference to a person having “correct responses” – such as being “appropriately motivated” – in relation to her aesthetic judgments.

In light of what was said in the last section, we should consider understanding “condition C” as “*given that she is practically rational*”. We might refer to the resulting view as “Rationalist Aesthetic Internalism”. Again, this view requires explanation. However, it is possible to construe a novel argument, corresponding to (1)-(3) above, which entails it:

(1') necessarily, if a person S judges that an object is aesthetically valuable, then she judges that she has an aesthetic reason to acquaint herself with it.

(2') Aesthetic reasons consist in normative reasons: necessarily, if a person S has an aesthetic reason to acquaint herself with an object, then she has a normative reason to do so.

(3) *Normative Internalism*: necessarily, if a person S judges that she has a normative reason to perform an action, then she is at least somewhat motivated to perform that action, given that she is practically rational.

(C') *Rationalist Aesthetic Internalism*: necessarily, if a person S judges that an object is aesthetically valuable, then she is at least somewhat motivated to acquaint herself with it, *given that she is practically rational*.

According to claim (1'), a person's judgments that an object is aesthetically valuable entails that, from an aesthetic perspective, it has some feature that talks in favour of her acquainting herself with it. That is, her aesthetic judgment entails that she has an aesthetic reason to acquaint herself with the object. The term “aesthetic reason” might sound unfamil-

iar, but the phenomenon is common and commonsensical. As I use the term, it refers to a certain type of reason to get acquainted with an object by reading it, looking at it, listening to it, touching it, etc., whatever constitutes such a reason. Thus, my usage is neutral as regards what provides with aesthetic reasons, and is consequently compatible with various views in this respect. There are two basic rationales for this usage. First, it seems implausible to ascribe to people making aesthetic judgments a particular view about what constitute aesthetic reasons. What provides an aesthetic reason is thus not a conceptual, but rather a substantial matter<sup>21</sup>. Second, taking a stand on this issue would risk ruling out a number of distinguished views in aesthetics on merely conceptual grounds. It would be implausible to contend that a number of renowned philosophers are simply conceptually confused when arguing for a certain view about what provides with aesthetic reasons<sup>22</sup>.

It is reasonable to think that a person has an aesthetic reason to acquaint herself with an object insofar as it provides her with an “aesthetic experience”. It seems further plausible to assume that such an experience involves a certain pleasurable experience or enjoyment. However, it is implausible to pre-

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<sup>21</sup> In this context, it is crucial that I am concerned with judgments about aesthetic *value* rather than judgments about aesthetic *beauty*. It might be that the latter judgment does have a conceptual connection to enjoyment. Cf. Railton 1998: 91.

<sup>22</sup> To get a sense of the great variety as regards what might provide aesthetic reasons, consider the numerous theories about aesthetic experiences discussed in Collinson 1992: 111-78. For example, aesthetic experience has been understood in terms of contemplation, will-lessness, disinterestedness, significant form, psychical distance, and a particular type of complex pleasure corresponding to the object’s aesthetic properties. And so on. For further illustration, see e.g. Kieran 2001: 292-305.

sume that this would be a matter of conceptual necessity. First, this would run the risk of ruling out the possibility that certain aesthetic experiences can be quite demanding and even unpleasant. Second, it is controversial whether “aesthetic experience” refers to an experience which has a certain type of internal feature, e.g. being pleasurable in a particular manner, or merely to an experience which is about an object’s external features of a certain type<sup>23</sup>. Third, it suffers from the same type of problems as indicated above: It is farfetched to ascribe to a person who makes an aesthetic judgment a particular view about aesthetic reasons and experiences, and it would mean that a number of prominent views about aesthetic reasons and experiences proposed by esteemed philosophers are conceptually erroneous<sup>24</sup>.

According to claim (2’), aesthetic reasons consist in normative reasons, which means that they constitute “real” norma-

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<sup>23</sup> For an overview of the debate between “internalism” and “externalism” about aesthetic experiences, see Shelley 2013.

<sup>24</sup> According to a response-dependence analysis of aesthetic judgments, a judgment to the effect that an object is aesthetically valuable entails that the object would elicit a certain response in an aesthetically ideal observer. The notion of aesthetic reasons above is compatible with this view. First, it appears implausible to think that the relevant response consists in a pleasurable experience, since this would make the analysis too narrow. Second, an aesthetic reason should not be understood as the fact that an observer has a certain response, but rather what would elicit such a response. Third, I think the response-dependent analysis is best understood as an analysis of aesthetic value rather than aesthetic judgments. There is a further objection against the line of argument above. According to monism about value bearers, it is only states of affairs that are valuable, whereas objects are not. It might then be suggested that aesthetic value should be understood in terms of the value of a person having a certain pleasurable experience. First, I think this might be correct, but it would not be a conceptual, but a substantial, truth. Second, it is plausible to deny the monist view that states of affairs are the only value bearers (see e.g. Rønnow-Rasmussen 2011: Ch. 10).

tive reasons rather than merely conventional reasons whose existence depends on arbitrary conventions, like etiquette reasons or reasons to follow a rule in a certain game<sup>25</sup>. We are already familiar with claim (3).

Interestingly, there are grounds to think that claims (1')-(3), and the resulting Rationalist Aesthetic Internalism, are able to elucidate some of the difficulties troubling its predecessor. First, in the last section we distinguished between two alternative ways of understanding Strong Aesthetic Internalism. According to the first alternative, a person's aesthetic judgment wholly or partly consists in a motivational state, while we according to the second alternative classify her judgment as an "aesthetic judgment" only if it is accompanied by motivation. As regards Rationalist Aesthetic Internalism, things are more complicated. On the one hand, it means that an aesthetic judgment neither partly nor wholly consist in a motivational state<sup>26</sup>. On the other hand, it suggests that there must be something about an aesthetic judgment which explains the necessary connection between aesthetic judgments and motivation. It is reasonable to maintain that the fact that we classify a person's judgment as an aesthetic judgment only if she is accordingly motivated does not need to be explained by anything about the judgment itself. By contrast, it is much less plausible to contend that the fact that we classify a person's judgment as an aesthetic judgment only if she is accordingly motivated *on condition she is rational* would have nothing to do with the judgment itself. The judgment needs to have some

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<sup>25</sup> Cf. King unpublished. I follow the received view that the notion of normative reasons is conceptually connected to the notion of rationality.

<sup>26</sup> If it did, a person's aesthetic judgment would be sufficient by itself for her to be motivated, irrespective of her being rational or not.

feature which explains that someone who makes an aesthetic judgment is guaranteed to be accordingly motivated only if she is rational, whereas a person who makes such a judgment without being fully rational is not guaranteed to be thus motivated. An explanation can be found in claims (1')-(3), which describe the connection between aesthetic judgments, reasons, rationality, and motivation. Second, we noticed that, in contrast to moral judgments, there is no obvious connection between aesthetic judgments and actions. Consequently, Strong Aesthetic Internalism has weaker support and is more vulnerable to counterexamples than its moral counterpart. By contrast, Rationalist Aesthetic Internalism does forge a significant connection between aesthetic judgments and actions. The way it does so is also described in (1')-(3). In particular, there are conceptual links between aesthetic judgments, judgments about aesthetic reasons, aesthetic reasons and normative reasons, and judgments about normative reasons and motivation, on the assumption of rationality. This fact makes the resulting version of Aesthetic Internalism less open to counterexamples than its predecessor. Third, according to Rationalist Aesthetic Internalism someone who makes an aesthetic judgment needs to be accordingly motivated only if she is rational. It is thus able to account for scenarios like Case 3.

However, it is plausible to suspect that Rationalist Aesthetic Internalism is weaker than its moral counterpart. Especially, there are grounds to think that the first view is vulnerable to various types of counterexamples the second view is not. Consider the following case.

*Case 4.* Cecilia thinks that Wagner's *Parsifal* is aesthetically valuable. The opera is her absolute favorite music piece and she has listened

to it hundreds of times. Indeed, as she has listened to it so many times, she has become tired of doing so, and it does not give her any enjoyment. She is not motivated at all to listen to it.

It seems plausible to think that such a case is conceivable. The fact that a person who judges that an object is aesthetically valuable lacks motivation to acquaint herself with it might be due to the mere fact that she has acquainted herself with it so many times that she does not get any enjoyment of doing so anymore. Moreover, her lack of motivation needs hardly to be a matter of irrationality. On the contrary, it can be regarded as a reasonable response to her lack of enjoyment. Consider further the following case.

*Case 5.* Cecilia thinks that Wagner's *Parsifal* is aesthetically valuable. Indeed, from reading about the history of classical music and over-hearing her opera loving friends talking about operas, she has come to think that it is one of the greatest pieces of music ever written. However, she has very little knowledge of classical music or experience of listening to it, and does not get any enjoyment from attending opera performances or listening to recordings of operas. She is not motivated at all to listen to *Parsifal*.

Again, it seems plausible to think that such a case is conceivable. The fact that a person who judges that an object is aesthetically valuable is not motivated to acquaint herself with it might be due to the mere fact that she is aware that she would not get any enjoyment from doing so, since she lacks relevant knowledge and experience. Moreover, her not being

motivated to acquaint herself with the object does not seem to be a matter of irrationality<sup>27</sup>.

### 5. *First normative puzzle*

Thus far, we have not found any version of Aesthetic Internalism that is not vulnerable to serious difficulties. It is now time to observe that considerations about this view also give rise to an intriguing puzzle whose relevance goes far beyond the aesthetic area. As we have seen, there appear to fairly uncontroversial counterexamples to Rationalist Aesthetic Internalism. At the same time, claims (1')-(3) that entail this view have initial plausibility. Thus, we have to give up at least one of these claims. However, none of the available alternatives seems immediately attractive. In brief: If we reject (1'), we are forced to accept that a person's judgment that something is valuable does not need to have any implication whatsoever for her rea-

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<sup>27</sup> In relation to Case 3, it might be responded that there is a modified version of Strong Aesthetic Internalism, as follows.

*Modified Strong Aesthetic Internalism*: necessarily, if a person S judges that an object is aesthetically valuable, then she is at least somewhat motivated to acquaint herself with it *or* with an object which, in her view, is similar to it, given that she is practically rational (cf. Strandberg 2011b: 53. For criticism, see Archer 2013: 71).

However, I think this claim has important shortcomings. First, it refers to "similar" which makes it vague. Second, it is vulnerable to the following type of cases.

*Case 6*. Cecilia thinks that Wagner's *Parsifal* is aesthetically valuable. The opera is her absolute favorite music piece and she has listened to it and works similar to it – other works by Wagner, operas by Strauss, Korngold, Humperdinck, etc. – hundreds of times. Indeed, as she has listened to *Parsifal*, and works that resemble it, so many times, she has become tired of listening to that type of music. She is not motivated at all to listen to *Parsifal* or any opera that resembles it.

Although Case 6 is more controversial than Case 5, I think we should accept that it describes a conceivable scenario.

sons about what to do. If we reject (2'), we are forced to accept that aesthetic reasons are not real normative reasons. If we reject (3), we are forced to give up a claim that widely is considered as a platitude in metaethics. Consequently, whichever claim is rejected we will need to revise our conceptions about the normative domain.

In my view, there are strong grounds to retain claim (2'). In view of the tremendously important role aesthetic considerations play in our lives, aesthetic reasons should be acknowledged to constitute genuine normative reasons. Aesthetic reasons — reasons to read thought provoking books, listen to thrilling music, or look at breathtaking paintings — cannot plausibly be seen to constitute merely conventional reasons, like etiquette reasons to eat with the fork in your left hand and the knife in your right, or say “Bless!” when someone has sneezed.

With regard to claim (1'), I am more hesitant. On the one hand, there are grounds to reject (1'). It might be granted that a person's judgment that an object is aesthetically valuable entails that there is a reason to get acquainted with it which *someone* has, but that *she* does not need to have it. In particular, her judgment entails that those have a reason to acquaint themselves with the object who will receive enjoyment from doing so. However, since she realizes that *she* will not get any enjoyment from such activities, it does not entail that *she* has any reason to acquaint herself with the object. Consider Cases 4-6. On the present view, Cecilia's judgment that *Parsifal* is valuable entails that one has reason to listen to it if one will enjoy doing so, but since she realizes that this does not apply to her, it does not entail that *she* has any such reason.

On the other hand, there are grounds to retain (1'). First, it seems generally to be the case that a person's judgment that

something is valuable entails that, from a particular perspective, it has a feature that provides her with at least *some* reason to act in a certain manner. Especially, it seems generally to be the case that a person's judgment that something is valuable entails that she has reason to perform a certain action *given that it is available to her*. To illustrate, consider a value judgment that at first might appear to have no implications whatsoever for your reasons to act: you judge that it is excellent that a new rocket will be sent to outer space to investigate the likelihood of extraterrestrial life. However, *if* you had been in a position to send out such a rocket, it seems that your value judgment entails that you have a reason to do so. So, denying (1') appears to suggest that aesthetic judgments need to differ from other value judgments in a way that would require special explanation. It appears that we would be committed to saying that, as regards this particular type of value judgments, a person's value judgment does not have any implications whatsoever for what she has reason to do *even if she is in the position to perform the action in question*. Second, if a person forcibly maintains that she does not have *any* reason whatsoever to acquaint herself with an object, we might hesitate to ascribe to her the judgment that the object is aesthetically valuable. For example, if Cecilia in Cases 4-6 maintains that she has no reason at all to listen to *Parsifal*, we might hesitate to ascribe to her the judgment that the opera is valuable. This observation can be taken to confirm the view that aesthetic judgments do function like other value judgments in the indicated respect.

It might further be suggested that (1') can explain why it might *seem* that a person's aesthetic judgment does not entail that she has any aesthetic reason to acquaint herself with the

object in question. As noticed, there are grounds to use “aesthetic reason” in a way that is neutral as regards what provides such reasons. For instance, it should not be used in a way entailing that a person has an aesthetic reason to acquaint herself with an object only if it would give her a pleasurable experience. Consider Cases 4 and 6. Cecilia’s judgment that *Parsifal* is aesthetically valuable entails that she has an aesthetic reason to listening to it. However, this reason is, in her view, outweighed by another reason. In particular, the fact that she has listened to it so many times that it does not give her any enjoyment outweighs her reason to do so. It might then mistakenly appear that her judgment does not have any implications for her reasons to act. Moreover, in view of the fact that Cecilia thinks that *Parsifal* is of extraordinarily high aesthetic value, and she has received much enjoyment from listening to it in the past, it seems farfetched to ascribe to her the view that she now does not have *any* reason do so. As a result of her lacking enjoyment to listening to the music, she is not accordingly motivated. Consider Case 5. It might be suggested that Cecilia’s aesthetic judgment entails that she has a reason to listen to *Parsifal*, but that this reason, in her view, is outweighed by a reason not to do so because she would not enjoy it, due to lack of experience and knowledge. Again, this means that she is not accordingly motivated<sup>28</sup>. Thus, I am in-

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<sup>28</sup> It might be objected that this alternative is vulnerable to the following type of case.

*Case 7.* Cecilia thinks that Wagner’s *Parsifal* is aesthetically valuable. Indeed, from reading about the history of classical music and overhearing her opera loving friends talking about operas, she has come to think that it is one of the greatest pieces of music ever written. However, she thinks that she does not have any aesthetic reason to listen to it because it would not give her any aesthetic experience to do so, due to her lack of knowledge and experiences of classical music.

clined to retain (1') although the issue needs more discussion that I can provide in the present paper.

However, I do think there are grounds to doubt claim (3): Normative Internalism. This claim entails that it is conceptually necessary that for *each* reason a person judges she has, it needs to be correlated with at least some motivation, in order for her to be rational. It might be worried that this claim forges a too strong connection between normative judgments and motivation. As (3) does not concern aesthetics in particular, the argument against it can be quite general by appealing to other types of considerations. There are in particular three types of problems with this claim<sup>29</sup>.

First, it is the problem of differing strengths of normative judgments. Assume that a person judges she has a very strong reason to perform a certain action and a very weak reason to perform a certain other action. Assume further that she judges that the actions in question are practically incompatible, i.e. that she cannot perform both. For example, suppose she knows that giving a certain medicine to her son is the only way to save his life. However, suppose further that she also knows that if she gives him the medicine, she will not have time to buy herself a new outfit in the chic boutique before it closes. Suppose that she therefore judges that she has an extremely strong reason to get her son the medicine but an extremely

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It might first be responded that if Cecilia judges that she does not have any aesthetic reason to listen to *Parsifal*, she would not consider it valuable in the first place. It might perhaps appear that she judges it is aesthetically valuable because she thinks it is valuable in some *other* respect, e.g. instrumentally valuable by giving her opportunity to meet her good friends. Second, it was argued above that whether aesthetic reasons are provided by aesthetic experiences is a substantial matter.

<sup>29</sup> For the first two difficulties, see Strandberg 2013: 31-7.

weak reason not to do so. It seems farfetched to conclude that she needs to be irrational if she lacks motivation to not getting her son the medicine. We might accept that she might be rational even if she is motivated not to give her son the medicine. But it seems implausible to maintain that she *needs* to be motivated in that manner *in order to* be fully rational<sup>30</sup>.

Second, it is the problem of competing normative judgments of equal strengths. Assume that a person judges that she has a reason of a certain strength to perform a certain action and a reason of exactly the same strength to perform another action. Assume again that she judges that the actions are practically incompatible. For example, suppose she judges that she has a reason to have an ice cream and a reason to have a brownie, and that these reasons are exactly as strong, but that she cannot have both since she cannot afford it. We are free to accept that she might be motivated to have both even if she is rational. However, once again it seems implausible to maintain that she *needs* to be motivated in that manner *in order to* be rational.

Third, it is the problem of instrumental overdetermination. Assume that a person has a certain end and that she thinks that there are a number of different means that would fulfil that end equally well. For example, imagine a person who has moved to a new place and has as an end to get to know her neighbors. She thinks that there are a number of different means that would satisfy this end just as well: she might invite them for coffee, throw a garden party for them, or help them babysitting, etc. Let us assume that she thinks that for each of these means

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<sup>30</sup> A related argument has been directed against Michael Smith whose defence of Rationalist Moral Internalism rests on Normative Internalism. See Copp 1997: 45-6; Wallace 2006: 187-8; Gert 2008: 16-7, and Schroeder 2007: 166-7.

she has a corresponding reason. In the example, she thinks that she has a reason to invite her neighbors for coffee, a reason to throw a garden party, a reason to help them babysitting, etc. It is very plausible to think that, in order for her to be rational, she needs to be motivated to perform an action corresponding to at least one such means. However, we would presumably not maintain that she is irrational if she is not motivated to perform an action corresponding to *each* such means. Thus, she is not irrational if she is not motivated to invite her neighbors for lunch *and* throw a garden party *and* help them babysitting, etc.

Thus, I suggest that in claims (1')-(3) we deny claim (3), Normative Internalism. It might then be queried what the connection is between normative judgments and motivation under rationality. The natural suggestion is the following.

(3') *Weak Normative Internalism*: necessarily, if a person S judges that she has a normative reason to perform an action, then she is at least somewhat motivated to perform that action, given that (i) she is practically rational *and* (ii) she does not judge that she has a stronger, or at least as strong, normative reason to perform another action which is practically incompatible with the former action<sup>31</sup>.

As easily can be seen, this claim is not affected by the first two problems mentioned above. It is another matter whether it avoids the third problem, which I will return to below.

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<sup>31</sup> Cf. Wedgwood 2007: 25; Archer 2013: 78, and Ridge 2015: 135-49.

### 6. *Weak Rationalist Aesthetic Internalism*

It might now be maintained that the reasoning in the last section means that there actually is a plausible version of Aesthetic Internalism. More precisely, claims (1')-(3') entail

*Weak Rationalist Aesthetic Internalism*: necessarily, if a person S judges that an object is aesthetically valuable, then she is at least somewhat motivated to acquaint herself with it, given that (i) she is practically rational *and* (ii) she does not judge that she has a stronger, or at least as strong, normative reason to perform another action which is practically incompatible with the former action.

This view is considerably weaker than the version of Aesthetic Internalism we started discussing. It fulfils however our initial description of such a view: it means that there is a necessary, non-trivial, connection between a person's aesthetic judgment and her motivation to act.

However, I think it can be argued that also this version of Aesthetic Internalism faces difficulties. One problem is that it is lacking in explanatory value. To see this, return to the type of scenario that motivated this type of view in the first place: Case 2. Strong Aesthetic Internalism appears able to explain why we find the person's utterance puzzling. However, we have now ended up with a version of Aesthetic Internalism which is so convoluted that it fails to do so<sup>32</sup>.

First, Weak Rationalist Aesthetic Internalism is not sufficient to explain why we find the person's utterance puzzling in Case 2. This view includes two conditions, (i) and (ii). It means that it can explain why we would find it puzzling that someone

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<sup>32</sup> For a similar argument with regard Moral Internalism, see Strandberg 2013a: 38-9. For a similar point, see Archer 2013: 82.

utters a sentence like “Wagner’s *Parsifal* is absolutely amazing” without being accordingly motivated only granted that we can assume that both these conditions are fulfilled. It seems plausible to suspect, however, that we would find her utterance puzzling even if we do not have any view as to whether (ii) is fulfilled. In other words, if a person utters a sentence saying that an object is aesthetically valuable, but is not motivated to acquaint herself with it, we would find this puzzling even if we do not have any opinion whatsoever as to whether she thinks she has a stronger, or at least as strong, reason to do something else. Second, Weak Rationalist Aesthetic Internalism is not necessary to explain why we find her utterance puzzling. Assume that a person utters a sentence like “Wagner’s *Parsifal* is absolutely amazing” without being accordingly motivated. Assume further that we know she thinks she has a reason to do something else and that this reason is stronger than her reason to listen to the opera. However, we would still find her utterance puzzling. We would presumably wonder why she *utters* this sentence when she is not motivated to listen to the music in question. The version of Internalism under consideration is incapable of explaining this. According to this view, such a case has a certain feature that would account for her not being motivated. As we know that the case has this feature, the view predicts that we should not find her utterance particularly puzzling. However, since we still find it puzzling, it appears that this version of Aesthetic Internalism is unable to explain our response.

This does of course not mean that Weak Rationalist Aesthetic Internalism is false. What it does mean, however, is that this view does not get any support from the type of case that motivated Aesthetic Internalism in the first place.

Furthermore, it is plausible to argue for the stronger contention that Weak Rationalist Aesthetic Internalism *is* mistaken. Let us notice that this view has an important implication. Assume that a person judges that an object is aesthetically valuable and further judges that she does not have any reason that is stronger, or at least as strong, to perform an action which is practically incompatible with acquainting herself with the object. Assume further that she is not motivated at all to do so. According to Weak Rationalist Aesthetic Internalism, it follows that she must be irrational. However, this result seems implausible. Consider the following case.

*Case 8.* Cecilia thinks that Wagner's *Parsifal* is aesthetically valuable. However, she has very little knowledge of classical music or experience of listening to it, and does not get any pleasurable experiences from going to opera performances or listening to recordings of operas. She is not motivated at all to listen to *Parsifal*. At the same time, she does not think that she has any reason that is stronger, or at least as strong, to perform any other action that is practically incompatible with listening to the opera.

As already mentioned in relation to Case 5, a person who judges that an object is aesthetically valuable, but lacks motivation to acquaint herself with it because she recognizes that she would not get any enjoyment from doing so due to lack of knowledge or experience, does not need to lack in rationality. The additional fact that she does not think that she has any reason to do something else that is practically incompatible with this action does not appear to make any difference to her rationality. Furthermore, consider the following case.

*Case 9.* Cecilia thinks that Wagner's *Parsifal* is aesthetically valuable. Indeed, from reading about the history of classical music and over-hearing her opera loving friends talking about operas, she has come to think that it is one of the greatest pieces of music ever written. However, she is aesthetically insensitive with regard to music and does not get any pleasurable experiences from going to opera performances or listening to recordings of operas. She is not motivated at all to listen to *Parsifal*. Moreover, Cecilia does not think that she has any reason that is stronger, or at least as strong, to perform any other action that is practically incompatible with listening to the music.

A person is aesthetically insensitive with regard to a certain type of objects (e.g. a certain art form), we might assume, insofar as she is unable to perceive their relevant aesthetic properties, with the result that she does not get any aesthetic experience or enjoyment from acquainting herself with these objects. Consequently, she lacks motivation to do so. However, lacking aesthetic sensibility in this sense is hardly a matter of irrationality<sup>33</sup>.

#### *7. Second normative puzzle*

Thus, we find ourselves in the same predicament as before: we have not found any version of Aesthetic Internalism that steers free from significant problem. More importantly, we have once again found that considerations regarding the plausibility of Aesthetic Internalism give rise to a puzzle whose relevance goes beyond aesthetics and has implications for the normative domain in general. That is: there are counterexam-

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<sup>33</sup> Cf. Railton 1998: 72. See also McDowell 1995: 78.

ples to Weak Rationalist Aesthetic Internalism. At the same time, claims (1')-(3') which entail this view appear to have initial plausibility. Again, we have to give up at least one of these claims. As already argued, I think we should maintain claim (2'). There are compelling grounds to think that aesthetic reasons are "real" normative reasons. We have already discussed claim (1') and found that there are grounds to retain it.

Hence, in order to preserve claims (1') and (2'), we need to scrutinize (3'): Weak Normative Internalism. In spite of the fact that this claim might appear so weak that it hardly can be questioned, I think there are grounds to be skeptical to it. Indeed, we have already found one such reason: the problem of instrumental overdetermination. Return to the example above. A person has as an end to get to know her new neighbors. She thinks there are numerous means that would fulfil this end equally well. For each of these numerous means she thinks she has a reason to perform a certain action. In order to be rational, she needs to be motivated to perform an action that corresponds to at least one of these means, since it otherwise would be impossible for her to fulfil her end. It might be granted that she would not be irrational if she is motivated to perform the actions corresponding to each of the various means. After all, each such action constitutes a manner to fulfil her end. However, she would not be irrational if she is not thus motivated. After all, it is sufficient that she performs one of these actions to fulfil her end, so being motivated to perform all these actions appears redundant.

Thus, it appears that the following scenario is possible: A person judges that she has a reason to perform an action but is not motivated to perform it even if she is fully rational. Now, let us return to Weak Normative Internalism. It does not mat-

ter to this reasoning whether a person thinks she has a stronger, or equally strong, reason to perform another action that is practically incompatible with the action in question. To illustrate, return to the example. Assume that the person in question judges that she has a reason which corresponds to one of actions mentioned above. For instance, suppose she thinks she has a reason to invite her neighbors for coffee. Now, assume that she does not judge she has a stronger, or equally strong, reason to perform some other action that is practically inconsistent with inviting her neighbors for coffee. For instance, suppose she does not judge that she has a stronger, or equally strong, reason to visit a friend instead. It does not follow that she is irrational if she lacks motivation to invite her neighbors for coffee. It is still the case that she thinks there are numerous other means to fulfil her end of getting to know her neighbors. Hence, in order to be rational she does not need to have a motivation to invite them for coffee even in the absence of thinking that she has another reason to do something entirely different.

The reasoning above puts us in an awkward situation. On the one hand, we have solved the puzzle at the beginning of the section in the sense that we have indications of which claim should be rejected: (3'), Weak Normative Internalism. As a consequence, we can uphold claims (1') and (2'). In particular, we can cling to the important claim (2') according to which aesthetic reasons are real normative reasons. On the other hand, it appears that there must be *some* necessary connection between normative judgments and motivation in rational persons. Surely, if a person judges that she has a reason to perform a certain action, but lacks any motivation to perform it, we *sometimes* take this as an indication of irrationality.

Fortunately, we already have an indication of where the solution to this situation is to be sought. It seems plausible to submit that different normative judgments have different connections to rationality in virtue of concerning different types of reasons. In particular, if a person judges that she has a reason of a certain type, she is *rationally required* to be motivated to perform it. However, if a person judges that she has a reason of a certain other type, she is merely *rationally justified* to be motivated to perform it. This might be described as a distinction between judgments about requiring reasons and judgments about justifying reasons<sup>34</sup>.

*Judgments about Rationally Requiring Reasons:* necessarily, if a person S judges that she has a requiring reason to perform an action, then she is rationally required to be motivated to perform it.

Specification of the subsequent: a person S is rationally required to be motivated to perform the action insofar as (i) S is irrational if she lacks motivation to perform the action, and (ii) S is not irrational if she lacks this motivation in the absence of making such a judgment<sup>35</sup>.

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<sup>34</sup> For the distinction between requiring and justifying reasons, see Gert 2004: esp. Ch. 4. For another way of drawing the distinction, see Strandberg forthcoming.

<sup>35</sup> This holds only *ceteris paribus*. It holds only if she does not make a further judgment according to which she has another requiring reason to perform the action. There is also a further complication. Whether a person is rational arguable depends both on her normative judgments and whether she is appropriately sensitive to facts that, if her beliefs were true, constitute normative reasons. See e.g. Parfit 2011: 118-25. However, this complication is not important in the present context.

*Judgments about Rationally Justifying Reasons*: necessarily, if a person S judges that she has a justifying reason to perform an action, then she is rationally justified to be motivated to perform it.

Specification of the subsequent: a person S is rationally justified to be motivated to perform the action insofar as (i) S is not irrational if she is motivated to perform the action, and (ii) S is irrational if she is thus motivated in the absence of making such a judgment<sup>36</sup>.

In my view, there are a number of important considerations in favour of making this distinction in the normative domain. It is particularly apt in certain parts of this domain, such as morality and aesthetics<sup>37</sup>. As we shall see in the next section, I will suggest that aesthetic judgments are best understood as entailing judgments about justifying reasons.

However, what was said above in relation to instrumental overdetermination provides a very general argument indicating that the distinction is applicable throughout the normative domain. The person in the example above thinks there are a number of different means to fulfill a certain end, and she thinks that for each of these means there is a reason to perform a certain action. As we have seen, she would be irrational if she is not motivated to perform *some* of these actions, since she otherwise would not be able to fulfill her end. Thus, it is plausible to suggest that she judges that she has a reason, in the form of a requiring reason, to perform some of these actions. However, while she would not be irrational if she is mo-

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<sup>36</sup> Again, this holds merely *ceteris paribus*. It holds only if she does not make a further judgment according to which she has a requiring reason or another justifying reason to perform the action.

<sup>37</sup> Most importantly, I think moral reasons constitute justifying reasons. Cf. Strandberg forthcoming.

tivated to perform *each* of these actions, she is not irrational if she is not motivated in that manner<sup>38</sup>. Thus, it seems plausible to suggest that she judges that she has a reason, in the form of a justifying reason, to perform each of these actions.

Hence, I propose that we reject (3'), Weak Normative Internalism, and adopt the distinction above. Let us now return to the difficulty with regard to the normative puzzle. We have already solved the puzzle in the sense that we found which claim to reject: (3'). We are thus free to maintain claims (1') and (2'). However, now we also have a preliminary account of the connection between normative judgments and motivation in rational persons that addresses the worry mentioned above. More precisely, according to this suggestion someone who judges she has a reason to perform an action but who is not motivated accordingly might be irrational, *viz.* in case her judgment concerns a requiring reason.

#### 8. *Rationalist Aesthetic Externalism*

In view of the reasoning above, it is plausible to propose that aesthetic judgments entail judgments about rationally justified reasons. The explanation is the following: there are grounds to adhere to claims (1') and (2'). According to (1'), a person's judgment that an object is aesthetically valuable entails that she has an aesthetic reason to acquaint herself with it. According to (2'), aesthetic reasons are real normative reasons. Considerations in relation to Cases 8 and 9 indicate that a person might judge that an object is aesthetically valuable without being motivated to acquaint herself with it even if she is fully ra-

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<sup>38</sup> In addition, it is plausible to suggest that, *ceteris paribus*, she would be irrational if she is motivated to perform an action without judging that she has any reason to perform it (but see footnotes above).

tional. This means that aesthetic judgments do not entail judgments about requiring reasons. However, aesthetic judgments do entail judgments about some type of normative reason according to (1') and (2'). This line of reasoning then suggests that aesthetic judgments entail judgments about justifying reasons. This view entails the following claim.

*Rationalist Aesthetic Externalism*: necessarily, if a person S judges that an object is aesthetically valuable, then she is rationally justified to be motivated to acquaint herself with it.

Specification of the subsequent: a person S is rationally justified to be motivated to acquaint herself with an object insofar as (i) S is not irrational if she is motivated to acquaint herself with it, and (ii) S is irrational if she is thus motivated in the absence of making such a judgment<sup>39</sup>.

It should be observed that this view is not an instance of Aesthetic Internalism on any reasonable interpretation. There is no necessary, non-trivial, connection between aesthetic judgments and motivation on this view. Especially, it is not the case that someone who judges that an object is aesthetically

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<sup>39</sup> Given the *ceteris paribus* condition mentioned above. Importantly, this view is compatible with the contention that all aesthetic reasons consist in requiring reasons. It says that it is *conceptually necessary* that a person's judgment that an object is aesthetically valuable entails that she has a *justifying reason* to acquaint herself with it. However, a reason being a justifying reason is compatible with it also being a requiring reason. Thus, it might be the case that a person is rationally justified to perform a certain action, but that she also is rationally required to perform it. Hence, the judgment is compatible with the reason in question being a requiring reason. Moreover, what constitutes aesthetic reasons is a substantial matter. For instance, they might be requiring reasons because acquaintance with the objects in question would provide her with a certain type of pleasurable experience.

valuable *needs* to be motivated to acquaint herself with it in *any* non-trivial circumstances. For instance, it does not follow that she in any respect fails with regard to rationality were she to make such a judgment without being accordingly motivated. Thus, the view is an instance of the rejection of Aesthetic Internalism: Aesthetic Externalism.

In spite of this, Rational Aesthetic Externalism is not inconsequential for our understanding of aesthetic judgments. First, on this view aesthetic reasons are real normative reasons rather than mere conventional reasons. Second, it means that there is a connection between aesthetic judgments and reason in a way that makes them consonant with other value judgments in that such judgments entail normative reasons. Third, it entails a constraint on the content of aesthetic judgments. It does not provide an analysis of such judgments, but since it constitutes a necessary condition on aesthetic judgments, it comprises an essential constraint on what a correct analysis would need to look like.

We are now in a position to see that Rational Aesthetic Externalism is able to account for the various cases we considered above: Cases (1)-(9). It should be admitted that Rational Aesthetic Externalism is not by itself sufficient to explain the original case we started with: Case 2. However, it has the important advantage of being part of a plausible account of such scenarios. According to this account, the fact that we find it puzzling were someone to utter a sentence such as “Wagner’s *Parsifal* is absolutely amazing” without being motivated accordingly is to be explained in pragmatic terms. More precisely, it states that there is a standardized pragmatic connection between utterances of a sentence to the effect that an object is aesthetically valuable and a positive attitude towards ac-

quaintance with the object<sup>40</sup>. Here I am only able to describe the bare contours of this account. It rests on four assumptions. First, according to Rationalist Aesthetic Externalism a sentence to the effect that an object is aesthetically valuable entails that there is an aesthetic normative reason to get acquainted with it. As noticed above, a normative reason is something that speaks in favour of acting in a certain manner. Second, it is plausible to suggest that one general purpose of conversations about aesthetic value is to recommend certain objects for aesthetic appreciation. In such conversations, we try to influence those we talk with to acquaint, or not acquaint, themselves with certain objects. Third, a general way of influencing people's actions is to let them know about our attitudes towards what they do. As a consequence, in order to understand a person who utters a sentence to the effect that an object is aesthetically valuable as making a contribution that is relevant to the purpose of the conversation, we should assume that she has a positive attitude towards acquaintance with the object in question. Fourth, it is generally presumed that acquaintance with objects that are aesthetically valuable provides with pleasurable experiences. As a consequence of these considerations, her utterance conversationally implicates a positive attitude towards acquaintance with the object. Moreover, since conversations about aesthetic value generally have the mentioned purpose, and acquaintance with such object generally is considered to provide enjoyment, this is a generalized conversational implicature. Therefore, if a person utters that an object is aesthetically valuable, without being motivated to acquaint herself with it, she conversationally

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<sup>40</sup> For a similar account in the moral case, see Strandberg 2011a: 341-69.

implicates something that is difficult to make consistent with the purpose of the conversation and the mentioned connection to enjoyment. Consequently, we find her utterance puzzling<sup>41</sup>.

Furthermore, it is plausible to argue that Rationalist Aesthetic Externalism is able to account for Cases 3-9. In these scenarios, Cecilia's judgment that *Parsifal* is aesthetically valuable entails that she has an aesthetic reason, in the form of a justifying reason, to acquaint herself with it. In Case 3, she does not enjoy listen to the opera because she suffers from depression, with the consequence that she is not accordingly motivated. As her aesthetic judgment entails a judgment about a justifying reason, she is rationally justified, but not rationally required, to be motivated to listen to it. The fact that her aesthetic judgment entails a normative judgment means, however, that it is sensitive to her rational status. The fact that she is depressed might be an instance of irrationality which annuls her motivation to listen to the music she otherwise would have had. In Case 4, Cecilia does not enjoy listen to *Parsifal* because she has become tired of it, with the consequence that she is not accordingly motivated. However, she is not irrational in lacking the relevant motivation, since it is a matter of a justifying reason rather than requiring reason. The fact that she does not get any enjoyment of listening to the music might be taken as a further indication that she does not have a requiring reason to do so. In Case 5, Cecilia realizes that she would not enjoy listening to the music because she lacks relevant knowledge and experience, with the consequence that she is not motivated to do so. However, this is compatible with

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<sup>41</sup> For a related account, see Marques forthcoming.

her being fully rational<sup>42</sup>. In Case 8, the information was added that she does not judge she has a stronger, or equally strong, reason to do something else. This means that her aesthetic judgment does not entail a requiring reason to listen to *Parsifal*. However, this is consistent with it entailing a justifying reason to do so. Moreover, she does not need to be irrational in lacking the relevant motivation. In Case 9, Cecilia does not enjoy listening to the music because she is aesthetically insensitive, with the consequence that she is not accordingly motivated. However, this is compatible with her being fully rational. The further thought she has about the absence of a reason to perform another action does not make any difference on this account.

The following objection might be directed against the account of Cases 4-9. In these scenarios, Cecilia will not get any enjoyment of listening to *Parsifal*. It may then be questioned why we should think that her aesthetic judgment entails that she has an aesthetic reason, even in the form of a justifying reason, to listen to the opera. There are two principal responses to this objection. First, I have argued that there are grounds to maintain (1'), according to which a person's aesthetic judgment entails that she has a reason to acquaint herself with the object in question. Second, I have argued that it is implausible to assume that, as a matter of conceptual necessity, aesthetic reasons are provided by pleasurable experiences. It might be true that a person has an aesthetic reason to listen to *Parsifal* only if doing so would provide her with enjoyment, but this would be a substantial, not a conceptual, truth. Consequently, Cecilia's aesthetic judgment is compatible with var-

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<sup>42</sup> As Cases 6 and 7 are quite similar to other cases, I do not comment on them.

ious views about what such a reason consists in. To mention two possibilities: it is compatible with the reason consisting in the fact that listening to *Parsifal* makes her having a meaningful aesthetic experience which is not directly pleasurable; and it is compatible with the reason consisting in the fact that listening to *Parsifal* makes her more familiar with sophisticated opera music, which in turn might increase her ability to receive enjoyment from such music in the future, and so on.

In addition, there are three further considerations which are worth noticing. First, since Cecilia's aesthetic judgment entails a judgment about a justifying reason, she is not irrational if she lacks motivation to listen to the opera. This should make it less problematic to maintain that her aesthetic judgment entails that she has a reason to listen to it even in the absence of any enjoyment. Second, it should be pointed out that reasons, including justifying reasons, can be quite weak. This should also make it less problematic to accept that Cecilia's aesthetic judgment entails that she has *some* reason to listen to *Parsifal* also in the absence of enjoyment. Third, it should be remembered that she might be mistaken: her aesthetic judgment entails that she has a reason to listen to the opera, but she does not in fact have any such reason. The substantial view that aesthetic reasons are provided by a certain type of pleasurable experiences is a possible explanation of her mistake.

## 9. Conclusion

Let me summarize the main findings of our discussion. We have found strong grounds to doubt that there is any viable version of Aesthetic Internalism. There are also indications that Internalism is less plausible in metaaesthetics than in metaethics. As a result, we saw that the most plausible argu-

ment against Aesthetic Cognitivism, and for Aesthetic Non-Cognitivism, is mistaken, and that there are grounds to believe that the latter view is incorrect. Most importantly, we found that considerations with regard to Aesthetic Internalism give rise to two normative puzzles with relevance for the normative domain in general. The most plausible solution to these puzzles entails that we need to reject the common understanding of the connection between normative judgments and motivation. Moreover, it suggests that we should introduce a distinction between judgments about rationally requiring reasons and judgments about rationally justifying reasons. Finally, this solution also provides support to Rational Aesthetic Externalism which constitutes a novel understanding of aesthetic judgments.

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