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**Afterword**

In thanking my friends and colleagues, the editors and authors of the various contributions, I cannot refrain from reacting, or rather from trying to integrate synthetically, as far as possible, by taking up and discussing what has been written within what I dare to call my own philosophical perspective, which is still in progress[[1]](#footnote-1). This is a task I am very happy to take on. It is nice to be able to learn from friends and colleagues even at the end of my career. This possibility of continuous novelty in the chorus of research makes our work fascinating and motivates it. It is an essential part of the 'ethics of intelligence' or 'ethics of philosophizing' that I have long wanted to set as the guiding thread of my research[[2]](#footnote-2).

In an attempt to give a possible order to the various contributions and to respond to their requests, I would start from the theme of the integral experience of man, or rather of experience considered in its breadth and articulation, which is continually enriched thanks to reflection and as a whole has an intrinsic non-sectorial moral dimension, closely linked to its development and its purpose or meaning[[3]](#footnote-3). Human experience proceeds and is organically articulated to the extent that it points to the end-good-sense of life, as it were, unfolding. The theme of the end and the good, which is always re-proposed and refined in our lives by people who are "exemplary" for us, present or past, is central and ultimately judges all existential options and all philosophical-moral approaches, even those which do not recognise this role[[4]](#footnote-4) for the good. Ethics is already directly involved here, as the ethics of a good development of experience and with it of rationality and the affective dimension in fruitful synergy.

The aesthetic dimension is placed at the beginning and end of every meaningful experience as that which fascinates (or disgusts) and as its crowning glory. It must be made clear that by virtue of its link with the reflective dimension, experience in its entirety cannot fail to take into account, albeit at different levels of its articulation and development, the manifestation of reality in its individual phenomenal concreteness, which is exalted and grasped in its universality, particularly by poetry, as well as the tendency towards unification and stability that, in its reflected and systematic form, is typical of philosophy[[5]](#footnote-5). And this happens by trying to respect the diversity and possible correlations between the two dimensions in a "polar" logic of concord of opposites, made of continuous and reciprocal fruitful references. This logic is also manifested in those who dedicate themselves to philosophy, in the dialectical link between *orthopraxis* or philosophical asceticism, on the one hand, and *orthodoxy* in the philosophical meaning of the term, that is, understood as right thinking (*orthos logos*) on the other[[6]](#footnote-6).

The theme of integral experience is by its very nature open to that of intersubjectivity and is certainly enhanced by the presence of those practices through which others are always present in our experience[[7]](#footnote-7). Just think of the role that university philosophical research "with others" has played and continues to play in our lives as researchers. What is more, we always strive for fulfilment, but we do not respond to this need solely and above all with our practicality, but by opening up to something else, to the dimension of the event that corresponds to our constitutive desire for happiness (hence the term *happiness* from *to happen*)[[8]](#footnote-8). The event by its very nature cannot be produced at will by our intelligence and operations[[9]](#footnote-9). This dimension of openness to the new concerns above all otherness in the personal sense, the *you* and the *he,* insofar as they are open, like us, to the totality of being and to the question of the meaning of life, which is also a question of love[[10]](#footnote-10). Friendship in its various forms takes on an ontological dimension in this perspective, that is, it is the event of something that we need in order to know ourselves, to be fully ourselves, friends with ourselves, as Aristotle notes, but it is also an event that is ultimately unnecessary and can only be desired, a *grace*[[11]](#footnote-11). Trust as a fundamental feeling towards the person then underlies friendship itself, widening and making possible the pursuit of a common[[12]](#footnote-12) good.

On careful consideration, the demand for the fulfilment of life cannot be separated from that of morality. Kant is also aware of this when he discusses the *highest good* as a synthesis of virtue and happiness[[13]](#footnote-13). This question can be expressed succinctly in non-moral terms as follows: what does it mean to be *human, truly human*? And again: what good is *worthy of* our love? The certainty underlying moral experience is linked to the certainty of the end we are striving for. Only by aiming high, at the good as such, can one become even moderately, but authentically virtuous and morally creative, without falling into a precept or mere legality of actions reduced almost to conditioned reflexes or into a consequentialism that also disregards the perspective of the first person. At the basis of an ethics of virtue understood in this way, there is not first and foremost an effort of self-realisation, but rather the amazement and gratitude in the face of facts and persons that constitute an event for us (as is friendship) and that continuously open up and specify the dimension of the end to which we must strive. Within this virtuous dynamism, the moral question of meaning and the ontological-metaphysical question on the nature and hierarchy of the goods to be recognised and privileged (*ordo amoris*) also meet, because meaning cannot ultimately be invented, but only recognised. These mutually converging questions translate into a dynamism of adhesion to being, that is, into the implicit admission that "being is better than nothingness"[[14]](#footnote-14).

The aim of the moral life is not merely to respond to the desire for happiness that has always been present as such in the human heart, but the progressive elevation of this desire, the object of which is initially confused, towards ends considered worthy of pursuit[[15]](#footnote-15). This is the classic theme of the relationship between happiness and truth or true happiness (*vera beatitudo*). There is always an at least implicit vision of man, of his dignity as such in acting morally conscious whatever the purpose actually intended. The gaze of others is fundamental in order to read our abilities and, therefore, our own dignity[[16]](#footnote-16). All this makes it possible to discover, if one is loyal to oneself, even through negative experiences such as disappointment, the true measure of what one really wanted and is able to fulfil, at least in perspective, the desire for happiness and, at the same time, the ethical demand itself. This is what is *convenient (conveniens*) to man. The dimension of expectation and hope feeds this desire for fulfilment[[17]](#footnote-17). Finally, it can be seen that this dynamic gives rise to a virtuous circle between happiness and morality: happiness is not really possible without attention to moral demands, but true happiness in turn makes us more moral, or more human, because we are more reconciled with ourselves, with reality and with others.

Moral experience then naturally opens up to the religious dimension, understood in the broad sense as a radical demand for meaning or a demand for the salvation of life in order to fully develop its intentionality, tending towards the fulfilment and unification of man, on the strength of and despite the experience of limitation and evil. The dimension of the invocation of fulfilment already runs through the moral dimension itself. Man's great alternative is to model the infinite openness of desire on the basis of consideration of reality in its finiteness, on the one hand, or to leave it open to the unexpected, thus respecting its infinity, if we are encouraged to do so, on the other. The positive experiences of life (friendship, love, generativity) and not only, and above all, its failures are - on closer inspection - the basis of this question, allowing it to be formulated and cultivated. The religious dimension, which is "triggered" when the question of morality comes to terms with the metaphysical dimension, is always present, even when it is not explicitly thematised and whatever response is given to it (even indifference or its negation in the various forms it can take, such as the absolutization of ever new details of experience or imprecation itself), because, as Pascal had seen so well, and with him, starting from the Augustinian tradition, a large part of modernity, man is placed *between the* finite and the infinite. Although finite, he is paradoxically open to the infinite[[18]](#footnote-18). By virtue of his disproportion to the radical question of meaning that goes beyond him, man cannot respond to it with his own strength, but radically can only await the answer from the Mystery that brought him into being and that this question has aroused in him[[19]](#footnote-19). Hence also the centrality of attention to the events of personal and social history. In the religious dimension, understood in the broad sense, we have the summit of human experience, as a synthetic moment "to infinity" of rational openness and desire-affection, as well as the speculative and practical dimension of rationality. Openness to transcendence is then the condition for the full emergence of the ego in its verticality and unity-articulation of dimensions, reinforcing and re-motivating the moral dimension itself and making possible that assent to being or *amor fati* as interpretation of the signs through which reality manifests[[20]](#footnote-20) itself. In this philosophical perspective open to theism there is strictly speaking no alternative, but complementarity between a hermeneutical approach and one of a metaphysical and rigorously argued nature to the problem of God's existence capable of respecting, together, the rights of being and the rights of God[[21]](#footnote-21). It should also be stressed that - contrary to what a certain popularisation of science would have us think - the transcendence of God, defended with rational arguments by neo-scholastic and neo-classical philosophy and by certain contemporary analytical philosophy of religion, cannot be criticised or confirmed with arguments deduced from the dimension of the sciences, which by definition deal exclusively with phenomena that can be translated operationally[[22]](#footnote-22).

Authentic religious faith tends to have an impact on philosophical research if only because it urges the theme of the absolute and of the great metaphysical alternatives to be posed in philosophy, encouraging consideration of these issues, and because it should, strictly speaking, strengthen the originally critical tendency of philosophy not to unduly absolutize individual details of existence, starting with the very widespread culture in which we are immersed today, contributing to reformulating or refounding and re-motivating its own moral and political agenda. Strictly speaking, the religious dimension of the event and the presence of an eschatological outlook could - although this is by no means a foregone conclusion - make it possible to avoid, on the philosophical level, the opposing risks represented today by the formalism of a philosophy that often deals with narrow themes without having as a background a broad metaphysical horizon capable of contextualising them, on the one hand, and of one reduced to a mere critique of ideology, but without any real hope of change, on the other; as well as on the political level, the opposite risks of perfectionist utopianism on the one hand and defeatism on the other, instilling realistic[[23]](#footnote-23) hope.

Reflecting on moral experience from a meta-ethical perspective, it can be seen that the unity of speculative and practical rationality, as expressions of a single rationality, and not their clear separation, is the basis of the natural law, as discussed in particular by Thomas Aquinas[[24]](#footnote-24). An action is moral or fully human, without running the risk of lapsing into ethical relativism, if, by placing itself in the perspective of the first person, it respects, albeit in ways typical of different cultures and individuals, the humanity of the agent, or rather the nature of man, which is manifested in fundamental inclinations towards certain goods that are common to all men, such as the preservation of life (an extremely topical issue today because of the ecological and health emergency), the communication of the species (not necessarily of the individual) with the consequent care of it, and the development of rationality in its various forms[[25]](#footnote-25). In this way, latent inclinations in man can become, thanks to an initiative of freedom, an active desire for good that moves to action, acquiring a normative charge. In this perspective, the relationship between inclinations and the precepts of natural law is realised when 'the moral horizon opens up insofar as reason-freedom assumes the perfective movement of existence as something that intrinsically concerns it and that it therefore renders normative' or recognises as such[[26]](#footnote-26). One might add that the normative dimension of morality develops according to the type of being that the agent is, that is, according to the more or less virtuous character of his or her identity, and thus according to his or her capacity to open himself or herself loyally to the totality of the factors that constitute his or her experience[[27]](#footnote-27).

Even from the modern subject of rights, if one wants to ground them on a solid foundation, one must inevitably go back to their foundation in natural law. Strictly speaking, this meta-ethical perspective does not violate Hume's law, which prohibits the deduction of normative propositions from descriptive propositions, insofar as one does not start from a mere observation of a given fact, but from an ongoing inclination perceived as such in the first person. It can certainly be said that an interpretation of the dimension of inclination in a moral key is strengthened by an overall non-individualist metaphysical view of society and reality[[28]](#footnote-28). A reading of moral life from different but converging perspectives, including for the believer that of God, is not by chance present in a classic such as Thomas Aquinas. Moral experience can and must be continually re-read from different and ever new perspectives in order to find new reasons and motivations in them. Acquisitions from contemporary psychological research, as well as from a naturalism open to evolutionism, can also be integrated into the narrative of the genesis of moral refinement. Developments that led to the acquisition of proto-virtues[[29]](#footnote-29) can also be usefully exploited in the evolutionary history of man.

As is already the case in the ethics of Thomas, it must be said that there is by right a primacy of virtue over natural moral law. The latter, in fact, is a function of the maturation of the virtues that are required by the different practices in which one is involved and that allow one to adequately face the challenges of the particular, which is where the morality of a man[[30]](#footnote-30) is decided. The relationship between law and virtue does not coincide with the deductive application of a handbook of universal precepts to the concrete, but with the interpretation *here and now,* thanks to practical wisdom, of the teleological-normative tendencies that are rooted in us and without which we would be deprived of any initial orientation in moral action. The acquisition and maturation of the virtues, becoming gradually aware of them, is identified with 'experiencing' in the strong sense. They can be read not only as capacity-building, but also as a willingness to make room within oneself for others and for others. In a "polar" perspective, the affirmation of oneself, of one's own dignity, can then coincide with the affirmation of others, of their dignity. The virtues of character are accompanied by pleasure, which in Aristotelian terms infuses motivation into virtuous[[31]](#footnote-31) action. In this perspective, which is attentive to *virtue ethics,* it is necessary to avoid the risk of stopping at a casuistry, interesting though it is, but static of virtues and vices on the model of the precepts of deontologism, and to privilege, instead, a dynamic and motivating vision of the virtues in the direction of human flourishing. The virtues mature over time and gradually tend to integrate themselves into the unity of the person to the extent that he or she pursues the good.

Among the virtues, the role of *phronesis* or practical wisdom is classically central. Memory, as Aristotle already noted, plays a fundamental role in the maturation of practical wisdom. Even from a past to which we would no longer wish to return, we can still learn, not only to better understand how far we have come since then, but also to understand possible risks and advantages that may reappear, albeit in new forms, in the face of today[[32]](#footnote-32)'s challenges. There is also a continuous evolution of the virtues, particularly in their articulation. In this respect, the tradition of the ancients, although always paradigmatic, certainly does not exhaust the richness of the theme, but must be continually interpreted and integrated[[33]](#footnote-33). In this perspective, for example, *respect*, which has been particularly discussed as such in modern ethics since Kant, can *also* be considered a virtue[[34]](#footnote-34). Indeed, it could be said that if respect does not become a virtue in connection with other virtues, particularly practical wisdom, it risks losing its motivating force and its ability to adapt to various situations that are often completely unpredictable. The risk then is also that of passively conforming to a moral agenda predetermined in advance and perhaps disseminated through the mass media. The feeling of *fraternity* also rebels against such an agenda, which can become a virtue particularly attentive to the always possible exceptions[[35]](#footnote-35).

Today, virtue ethics shows how the sharp contrast between analytical and continental ethics can in fact be overcome if one recognises the centrality of the theme of *phronesis* or *practical wisdom*, which has an intrinsic hermeneutic and intersubjective dimension and the related emphasis on *attention.* Similarly, in the case of applied ethics, it highlights the possibility of overcoming the gap between abstract principles and concrete[[36]](#footnote-36) application. Virtue ethics offers suggestions for making possible, for example, an appropriate ethics of communication, care and responsibility for the future of man and the biosphere[[37]](#footnote-37). In the context of the problem of care, it appropriately also contemplates the possibility of a maturation of the patient's own virtues, in particular practical wisdom and fortitude, in the dynamic perspective suggested by hope and fostered by the development of palliative[[38]](#footnote-38) care itself.

Of course, it should also be emphasised, especially in the intellectual and university context, that culture, understood as the acquisition of knowledge, as such does not determine the maturation of virtue and can even in some cases conceal its lack, thus becoming an expression of vice from the moral[[39]](#footnote-39) point of view. A thorough knowledge of moral philosophy and the ability to argue in that particular area do not in themselves guarantee the correct moral judgement on the concrete, which Aristotelian practical judgement, *sunesis* and *phronesis,* preside over. These in turn require the ethical virtues and, in order to acquire them, the memory and careful following of humanly and morally significant[[40]](#footnote-40) examples or traits of examples. When we judge on the concrete, despite appearances, we never judge alone. As Hannah Arendt rightly observed, a fundamental question of the moral life is: what friends do we have?[[41]](#footnote-41) On the contrary, it should be emphasised that philosophical skills, even in the field of ethics, while undoubtedly broadening our cultural and value horizons and breathing space into our judgments, can in some cases even constitute an excuse for not committing ourselves to the overall maturation of the person and for exempting ourselves from the commitment to judge 'here and now' from a viewpoint that is integral, faithful to the complexity of reality and fully human, that is, morally connoted[[42]](#footnote-42).

Turning to considerations concerning ethics in the face of contemporary challenges, it should first be noted that there is a structural contradiction in modern consumer society between individualistic, libertarian and hedonistic tendencies on the one hand and the urgent demands raised by ecological issues on the other[[43]](#footnote-43). This calls for a rediscovery, together with an ethic of responsibility towards the environment, of the relational and community dimension of the common good. From the genetic and educational point of view of the virtues, it should also be emphasised that because of man's inter-subjective structure, the living testimony of human communities rooted in a tradition is necessary for the maturation of the virtues, which could risk being corroded and emptied by the libertarian individualism of the anarchic proliferation of rights that has developed precisely because of the sap present in those traditions, but which as such risks, according to some, no longer[[44]](#footnote-44) being able to nourish them. The lofty principles inherited from modernity require strong sources, that is, dependent on an idea of the good to which we cannot today return solely by following the path of individual sensitivity. Faced with these contradictory claims, we can therefore legitimately ask ourselves whether we are not living beyond our moral[[45]](#footnote-45) resources. Hence also the growing need for community and the rediscovery of the relational common good, starting from the enhancement of shared goods (*commons*)[[46]](#footnote-46). Of course, it is a question of a community dimension that is not closed in on itself, but capable of being continually open to others and of being prompted by them. This need requires a new synthesis capable of intimately combining the Christian and liberal enhancement of the individual's individuality and need for authenticity on the one hand, and the intersubjective and communitarian dimension of the human being on the other[[47]](#footnote-47). Without the presence of the latter, the individual's own intimate convictions are not consolidated, becoming certainties that allow him to face life and its challenges serenely. However, it should be emphasised that the exaltation of the community dimension, of the '*we'*, of its charm, must never suffocate the confrontation with the individual's evidence, even though we are aware that it is only by following the suggestions of others that we can mature, going beyond ourselves. It is necessary, therefore, to recognise the value of the individual beyond and, above all, *through* the community constraints themselves. In reality, the *'we'*, the sense of belonging, is not in itself a sign of weakness, but presupposes a strong health, a capacity on the part of the individual to relate to others, maintaining and encouraging his or her autonomy. In essence, this is a further reminder of that polar structure which constitutes a fundamental character of our finite experience and which, if cordially accepted, would make it possible to avoid, albeit tentatively and laboriously, the opposing risks represented by an individualistic narcissism incapable of thinking "with others", or desirous of affirming an originality at all costs even when it is not required, or merely polemical-reactive on the one hand, and of the dispersion and flattening of individual experience in the collective and in cultural fashions on the other. One risk continually recalls the other and vice versa. It is enough to observe the various types of stereotypes that in mass society have for some time united many self-styled individualists without their ever being truly aware of it. In other words: critical intelligence requires to be managed carefully and responsibly in harmony with the whole man, including the unconscious, on the basis of an Aristotelian non-despotic government of oneself. Excluding oneself from this inevitable polar dialectic between the individual and the community, avoiding being provoked by it, bearing the fatigue of diversity, in the long run inevitably leads to repetitiveness, sterility and acquiescence to the widespread mentality of living and thinking. Hence the importance of ethical virtues for good philosophizing, in particular humility and fortitude, also understood as the capacity for resilience in its relationship with practical wisdom, and therefore the formation over time of a character capable of living this polarity with conviction, but also ironically, and also the profound sense of the publication of a volume such as this, open to friendly solicitations from the most diverse contributions.[[48]](#footnote-48)

1. I believe that all those who have occupied a chair of philosophy with genuine passion have cultivated and matured a philosophical perspective. This is true regardless of the originality and speculative validity of their endeavours. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Cf. *Ethics of Reason. La filosofia dell'uomo nell'epoca del nichilismo e del confronto interculturale,* Jaca book, Milan 1999; *Etica del filosofare. Frammenti ironici*, Il Melangolo, Genoa 2020. The first work is the one that, although written some time ago, perhaps more widely and rigorously documents my speculative position. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Cf. the title of my book *L'esperienza integrale. Filosofia dell'uomo, della morale e della religione*, Orthotes, Naples 2016. I have written about the *principle of wholeness in* many places. Most recently in *Etica del filosofare. Ironic Fragments*, p. 121. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. I seek to enhance both the Aristotelian and Platonic-Augustinian conceptions of the good, placing them in reciprocal tension. They find a moment of synthesis in the thought of Thomas Aquinas. The theme of the good was re-proposed among contemporaries by C. Taylor in various works, *in* particular *in Radici dell'io. La costruzione dell'identità moderna,* Feltrinelli, Milan 1993. On the fact that also in G.E. Moore the good, although indefinable in itself, can be the object of ostensive definitions or exemplifications, see Simoncelli. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Cf. Langella. On the particular relationship of affinity, even in diversity, of philosophy and poetry, cf. Aristotle, *Poetics* 1451b 1-15. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. On the theme of the polar dialectic see R. Guardini, *L'opposizione polare. Saggio per una filosofia del concreto vivente*, Morcelliana, Brescia 1999. On the connection between *orthopraxis* and *orthodoxy,* cf. my *Ethics of Philosophy,* pp. 113-14. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. See Monti. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Cf. Vigna. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. On the subject of the event, I am indebted to Luigi Giussani's reflections, which are in fact in tune with many contributions of twentieth-century thought. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Cf. Vigna. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Cf. Cunico. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Cf. Niccoli. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Cf. Fonnesu. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Cf. Miano; cf. H. Jonas, *The Responsibility Principle*. *An ethic for the technological civilisation*, Einaudi, Turin 1979, p. 178. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. See Fanciullacci. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Cf. Manti, according to whom for Amartya Sen, unlike Aristotle, the gaze of others is fundamental to reading our own capabilities. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. See Samek Lodovici, Navarini. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. Cf. Pagani. Hence also the interest in the ontological argument in modernity up to the present day. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Cf. B. Pascal, *Pensieri*, Ed, Chevalier 438: "Man infinitely surpasses man"; S. Weil, *Attesa di Dio,* Adelphi, Milano 2008, p. 76: "The most precious goods should not be sought but expected. Man, in fact, cannot find them with his own strength, and if he sets out to look for them he will find instead false goods whose falsity he will not even recognise". [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. See Celada Ballanti. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. Cf. Totaro. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. Cf. Barzaghi. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. The opposite risks are represented today by the formalism of a certain analytical philosophy that does not in fact radically question its presuppositions on the one hand, and of a philosophy of suspicion, but without hope of change on the other. A rather successful example, for me, of a philosophizing that is attentive to the demands of Christian theism and the demands of the contemporary world is the philosophy of Charles Taylor, which focuses on the theme of good (or hyper-good) and the critique of idols. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. Cf. Flannery. The reference is, in particular, to Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, I-II. 94, 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. See De Anna, Miano. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. Cf. Botturi. I find the second formulation more faithful to the spirit of Thomas. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. On the principle of wholeness see, for example, *Ethics of Philosophy,* pp. 121-22. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. Cf. Rolando. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. See Snow and Mercado-Valenzuela. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. Cf. Abba. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. See Mauri. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. Cf. De Caro. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. See Kristiansson and Cattanei. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. See Mordacci. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. Cf. Gomarasca. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. Cf. Fabris. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. See De Caro, Ricci, Miano. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. Cf. Navarini. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. See Tuninetti. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. On the role of the exemplar in Aristotle, see Cattanei. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. See H. Arendt, *Alcune questioni di filosofia morale*, Einaudi, Turin 2006, p. 111. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. The difference between the two levels of moral philosophy and lived morality is in fact part of the difference between *notional assent* and *real assent* discussed in Newman. See J. H. Newman, *Grammatica dell'assenso,* Jaca book, Milan 2005, p. 28. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. See Alici, Miano. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. Of course, rights are not merely subjective needs, but are endowed with a particular normative charge. Cf. C. Taylor, *Radici dell'io. La costruzione dell'identità moderna*, Feltrinelli, Milan 1993, p. 626 cited in Alici. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. Cf. Alici. [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. Cf. Alici [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. On this aspect, I find the work of C. Taylor very significant. Cf. See, in particular, *Il disagio della modernità,* Laterza, Rome-Bari 1994. On the individual-community nexus, see also L. Dumont, *Homo aequalis*, Adelphi, Milan 1984. [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. Cf. A. Campodonico, *Why Wisdom needs Fortitude (and vice versa)*, in "Teoria" *Virtue Ethics* 2, 2018, pp. 67-77. Also important in this context, as mentioned above, is the theme of gladness closely related to that of meaning in life, which allows at least to mitigate, if not eliminate negative dispositions such as resentment and envy. See my *Ethics of Philosophy. Ironic Fragments,* pp. 52 and 114. On the subject of irony in philosophy and religion*, Ibid.* pp. 120 and 193. [↑](#footnote-ref-48)