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Evaluative Injustice

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1 Introduction

David is a high school history teacher in a very conservative school district in the United States.[1] In his U.S. History class, he describes the central role slavery played in U.S. domestic and foreign policy before and leading up to the U.S. Civil War.[2] David's principal regards David's lesson plans as needlessly politically controversial, telling him that such divisive topics have no place in school. Although the principal acknowledges the pertinence of slavery to the course David is teaching, the principal nevertheless criticizes David's teaching abilities, lecturing David that good history teachers do not broach controversial subjects. David's principal evaluates David as a *bad* teacher. Nevertheless, David does not get fired, or ostracized, or otherwise mistreated by the principal because the principal knows he could get fired or sued otherwise.

Chloe is a woman in a leadership role at work. Chloe works hard to be perceived by her colleagues and superiors as a good leader. According to the prevailing norms of leadership, good leaders are assertive and decisive. However, when Chloe acts assertively and decisively, she is regarded as overly bossy and abrasive. This is because, according to prevailing norms imposed on women in the workplace, women are expected to smile and be cheery in the workplace. It is impossible for Chloe to satisfy both sets of norms simultaneously. Because of Chloe's superiors' perception of her as bossy and abrasive (and not assertive and decisive), she is evaluated as a *bad* leader. Chloe is passed over for promotion.

[1] One could imagine David teaching at, say, Mountain View High School in Shenandoah County, Virginia, where the Shenandoah County School Board recently voted to change Mountain View's name *back* to Stonewall Jackson High School, a general for the Confederacy in the U.S. Civil War, evidently not caring that Jackson waged war against his fellow countrymen for the purposes of maintaining the institution of chattel slavery. See Chappell (2024). I highlight this story to note how plausible David's scenario is.

[2] For an excellent account of the role slavery played in American foreign policy before the Civil War, a less well-trodden aspect of the history of U.S. slavery and racism, see Karp (2016).

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Owen is a father of a two-year-old daughter. Owen decides to take her to the park on a warm, sunny afternoon to join other neighborhood families with whom Owen and his family regularly socialize. Before leaving Owen laughs at his daughter's refusal to keep her hat on while Owen applies sunblock to her arms and legs, so Owen makes sure to apply plenty of sunblock to her head, neck, and face. As Owen's daughter runs off to play upon arrival at the park, another child's mother, whom Owen does not know, assumes on the basis of Owen's being a man that he failed to take adequate precautions. This woman chastises Owen for being so careless as to allow his daughter to play in such warm and sunny conditions without any hat or sunblock. The mother evaluates Owen as a *bad* parent. When Owen explains himself, the mother apologizes for being presumptive. Nevertheless, Owen was insulted at being publicly evaluated as a bad parent in front of the other neighborhood families.

I take it as given that each person in the above examples is wronged, and not only because of how each person was treated. Each case involves the person being evaluated by others against some ideal, being perceived by those others as failing to live up to the ideal, and their being so evaluated wrongs them. It is specifically their being *evaluated* in a particular way that generates the wrongs I have in mind. But more than just being wronged, I argue in this paper that each person in the above examples suffers an injustice on the basis of their evaluations. As such, I contend that each person is subject to what I call "evaluative injustice." Evaluative injustice, as I understand it (and will unpack in detail below), occurs when someone is evaluated against some ideal and the evaluation of them is unjust in a particular way—namely insofar as it constitutes an unjust failure of "appraisal respect" (Darwall 1977). In this paper I argue that evaluative injustice is a distinctive form of injustice, one that concerns the ways in which we are evaluated with respect to how well we perform the various social roles we all occupy. I will also discuss the various forms evaluative injustice can take; despite any similarities in the three cases described above, it is important and useful to notice the precise ways in which they differ, producing distinctive forms of evaluative injustice.

Recently philosophers have begun identifying distinctive forms of injustice. Examples include epistemic forms of injustice (Fricker 2007; Edgoose 2024), emotional injustice (Srinivasan 2018; Whitney 2018; Pismenny, Eickers, and Prinz 2024); ontological injustice (Dembroff 2018; Ásta 2019; Jenkins 2023; Richardson 2023), and conceptual injustice (Bastian 2024). These philosophers have immensely helped refine and improve our understanding of the myriad ways in which we can wrong each other. Evaluative injustice, I argue, is another helpful contribution to this growing catalogue of kinds of injustice.

After characterizing the nature of evaluative injustice (Section 2), I analyze the various forms it can take (Section 3). Throughout this and the previous section I demonstrate clearly how evaluative injustice differs from other forms of injustice already theorized. I then consider what accounts for the injustice in evaluative injustice (Section 4), arguing that it centrally involves unjust failures of appraisal respect and explaining what that involves and what is required for such failures of appraisal respect to be unjust. I discuss throughout, when relevant, the theoretical and practical utility of adding evaluative injustice to our conceptual toolkits. Section 5 concludes.

I should note upfront that there will surely be fringe cases where it is not entirely clear whether something counts as evaluative injustice. This uncertainty might arise in a couple ways. It might be unclear whether some evaluation constitutes a genuine failure of appraisal respect; alternatively, some evaluation may indisputably be a failure of appraisal respect yet it be unclear whether it is an *unjust* failure. If not, it might be wrong but it will not be evaluative injustice. I cannot eliminate all uncertainty in this paper. I will be satisfied if I have made it clear that there are some core cases that should obviously count as unjust failures of appraisal respect—and therefore evaluative injustice—and that this constitutes a distinctive form of injustice that merits philosophical attention in its own right.

2 What is Evaluative Injustice?

I define evaluative injustice as follows:

> Evaluative injustice occurs when someone is evaluated with regard to whether one satisfies the ideal associated with a social role one occupies, and the evaluation is characterized by an unjust failure of appraisal respect.[3]

I understand an injustice to be an "arbitrarily imposed disadvantage" (Pismenny, Eickers, and Prinz 2024: 154). I understand disadvantage to be a deprivation or diminishment of some valued resource, which can be material resources, agential capacities, opportunities, or access thereto (Pismenny, Eickers, and Prinz 2024: 154; see also Wolff and de Shalit 2007; cf Fraser 2024, 451).[4] A disadvantage is imposed arbitrarily if it is imposed on the basis of morally irrelevant considerations (Moreau 2010). I will discuss the nature of appraisal respect (and morally arbitrary considerations) in more detail below, but very roughly, appraisal respect concerns basing

[3] I restrict my focus in this paper exclusively to cases in which the victim of evaluative injustice is evaluated negatively, leaving open for future work the possibility that one's being evaluated positively could constitute an instance of evaluative injustice. I do not build the negative evaluation into my definition because I am open to the possibility that positive evaluations can generate evaluative injustice, but I lack the space in this paper to explore this possibility. See my analysis of Chloe's case in Section 3 for further discussion at a point in my argument that contains sufficient context.

[4] This is a slightly more capacious understanding of injustice than one might find elsewhere in the literature on distinctive forms of injustice. For example, Fraser (2024: 451) says for certain things to be an injustice they must "connect up in some relevant way to social patterns of advantage and disadvantage," and that they connect up in the right way if the patterns of advantage and disadvantage "are expressive of social hierarchies." I think it is not necessary for something to be expressive of social hierarchies to constitute an injustice, which is why I adopt the understanding of injustice that I do. I think, for example, that David is subject to an injustice despite it not being true that his injustice is expressive of social hierarchies. It is worth noting, further, that other instances of the literature theorizing various forms of injustice do not always distinguish in any meaningful way between wrong and unjust. Edgoose (2024: 880), for example, defines epistemic injustice, drawing explicitly from Fricker (2007), as occurring "when someone is wronged in their capacity as a knower." Additionally, Bastian (2024: 3) defines conceptual injustice as occurring when "an agent is wrongfully excluded from (or included in) the application of a concept." In neither of these cases is it made clear what, if any, the distinction between something's being wrong and an injustice is. While theorists of ontological injustice do not discuss it, I submit that the understanding of injustice I adopt is quite apt for explaining why instances of ontological injustice they discuss constitute specifically ontological *injustice* (as opposed to mere ontological wrongs).

one's evaluation of someone on features and norms that are relevant to whether one can become excellent in some pursuit or satisfy some ideal (Darwall 1977). Insofar as one bases one's evaluation of another on irrelevant features or norms, this constitutes a failure of appraisal respect. Failures of appraisal respect can be unjust when they impose arbitrary disadvantages. When this happens, evaluative injustice occurs.[5]

Evaluative injustice centrally involves being evaluated against some ideal. To determine whether evaluative injustice is present, then, we must first understand what is involved in being evaluated against some ideal. Evaluative injustice is inextricably linked to the social roles we all occupy. Social roles are ubiquitous—woman, father, leader, citizen, professor, athlete, etc. A social role can be understood as a "teachable method or way of doing something in a manner that encodes social knowledge (*techniques*), and that involves the acquisition of powers or abilities to engage skillfully with the world by employing those techniques (*expertise*)" (Witt 2023: 6). Once we occupy—whether willingly or not—some social role, it becomes possible to evaluate how well one fulfills the social role in question—i.e., to ask whether one is a *good* or *bad* woman, father, leader, citizen, professor, or athlete (Burman 2023: 180).

I understand an ideal in this context as the set of norms that govern the behavior of occupants of social role *x* in context *c*, with the perceived satisfaction of the norms in context *c* resulting in the role occupant being evaluated as an exemplary *x*. We can be held to multiple ideals simultaneously, oftentimes unproblematically. I am, for example, evaluated against the ideals of being a good spouse, a good parent, and a good philosopher. It may be challenging to find the right balance required to meet all ideals simultaneously, but it is not impossible. Of course, as we will see below, this phenomenon can oftentimes (though not inevitably) be rather oppressive and a key driver of evaluative (and other kinds of) injustice. And, as I discuss below, recognizing the distinctiveness of evaluative injustice will help us achieve a more refined understanding of oppression and the other kinds of injustice related to evaluative injustice.

When I say that we can evaluate how good or bad someone is in a given social role, I am deliberately vague about the relationship between good and bad and related notions like negligent/diligent, proficient/incompetent, reliable/unreliable, etc. The notion of evaluation I employ is a general one according to which evaluations as good or bad could include the notions listed above, as well as potentially others. That one is, say, unreliable with respect to social role x might (help) explain why one is evaluated as a bad x, but this need not be the case with every social role.

[5] This leaves open the possibility that one can be wronged by an evaluation yet not be subject to an evaluative *injustice*. Perhaps I evaluate some dead person in a way that wrongs him (Pitcher 1984). Since this person is no longer alive and therefore cannot be deprived of some valued resource, I take it that this person, even if it is true that he is wronged in virtue of my evaluation of him, is not the victim of evaluative injustice. Not all wrongs are injustices, and so I am focused solely in this paper on instances of evaluations that constitute injustices. I restrict my focus in this paper in another way too: there are surely instances of evaluative mistakes that may not rise to the level of a wrong, much less an injustice. I set this possibility aside in this paper. Evaluative injustice is a distinctive form of evaluative mistake, and it is this form and only this form that I am concerned with in this paper.

I seek to remain pluralistic with respect to why one is evaluated as a good or bad x—in part because individuals who commit evaluative injustice against others will have all manner of notions in mind and reasons why they evaluate others in ways that constitute injustice, and I want my notion of evaluation to accommodate this variation. I also emphasize that my notion of evaluation is scalar. It is not the case that to be a good x one must (be perceived to) perfectly satisfy the relevant ideal and that falling short to any degree whatever renders one a bad x. One can be evaluated as a better or worse x depending on how well, or how many of, the norms that constitute the relevant ideal are satisfied. This could serve as a measure of the relative severity of different instances of evaluative injustice. Consider David's case. Imagine that David's principal evaluates both David and David's colleague, Graham, as bad teachers because they are both perceived as incorporating divisive topics in their lesson plans, but David's principal considers David's lessons to be substantially more problematic than Graham's. Because of this he evaluates David as a *worse* teacher than Graham. Both are subject to evaluative injustice, and the explanation of this will be the same in each case. But, plausibly, David is subject to a more severe evaluative injustice insofar as his principal evaluates him as worse than Graham.[6]

For a morally neutral example of the phenomenon of being evaluated against an ideal, take the ideal of a good barber. 'Barber' is a social role governed by a set of norms. Some of the most important norms include 1) possessing the requisite expertise regarding different hair types and how they respond differently to different hair products and styles of cutting, and 2) the ability to put that expertise effectively into practice via painless techniques that result in the haircuts and styles the barber's customers desire. To the extent that a given barber is perceived to satisfy these norms, the barber will be regarded as meeting the ideal of a barber, and thus as a *good* barber. To the extent that a barber, say, cannot cut hair gently enough to avoid cutting his customers' skin and routinely cuts hair in ways that do not match customers' stated desires, the barber will be regarded as failing to meet the ideal, and thus as a *bad* barber.

These evaluations are very important to our social lives and often come with high stakes regarding the potential practical consequences of these evaluations. If one is perceived as a good athlete, for example, one can earn hundreds of millions of dollars and the adulation of millions of fans. If one is perceived as a bad barber, one might get fired or lose one's business. If one is perceived as a bad leader, one might never get promoted. These practical consequences are important because they often provide us with reason to occupy a given social role and seek to achieve the ideal associated with the social role. I try to occupy the social role of athlete because of the possibility of earning millions of dollars if I achieve the ideal; I seek to achieve the ideal of a good leader at work because it is important for getting promoted. This can be true in oppressive contexts as well. Consider the pressure women are under to shave their legs as part of the oppressive norms that constitute the ideal of a beautiful woman. Imagine Lyndsay chooses to shave her legs despite it going against her anti-oppression values because of the practical consequences she stands to suffer if

[6] I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me to clarify these issues surrounding my notion of evaluation.

she refuses to shave her legs and is therefore evaluated as a *bad* woman and treated accordingly (Killmister 2017: 147; Hirji 2021: 661-662).[7] Others' evaluations of her and the forms of treatment she might expect to follow from those evaluations can provide reason to seek to satisfy the ideal associated with the social role she occupies despite her wanting neither to occupy a social role thus defined nor to seek to achieve that social role's ideal. These evaluations and the practical consequences they produce are ubiquitous and matter a great deal to us, hence the importance of understanding the distinctive nature of evaluative injustice.

Social ontologists increasingly understand the practical consequences at stake in the sorts of evaluations discussed throughout in terms of "constraints and enablements" on agents' actions (Ásta 2018; Jenkins 2023; Burman 2023; Bastian 2024). In the context of evaluative injustice, constraints are things one cannot do on the basis of one's evaluation against a given ideal and enablements are things one can do on the basis of being so evaluated. In what follows I will refer to practical consequences in terms of constraints and enablements.

The discussion to this point underscores an important benefit of theorizing evaluative injustice. As you might notice through the examples discussed so far, evaluative injustice can easily occur in professional settings where the evaluations we receive from others directly impact our prospects for professional advancement and therefore can have rather high stakes for us. One benefit, then, of theorizing evaluative injustice is that it provides conceptual resources for managers without any background in social ontology (or philosophy for that matter) to straightforwardly understand the various moral aspects and implications of how they evaluate their subordinates and why inappropriate evaluations might be unjust. Hopefully, introducing the concept of evaluative injustice and identifying the forms it can take will result in more just evaluations of people occupying important social roles that carry important stakes for their occupants.

Let me briefly take stock. Social roles, the norms that govern these social roles, the ideals associated with perceived satisfaction of these norms, evaluations of occupants of these social roles regarding how well they satisfy the relevant ideals, and the constraints and enablements that result from being evaluated against the ideals are all relevant to the notion of evaluative injustice.[8] However, it is fundamentally

[7] This is an example that illustrates the value of my adopting a general notion of evaluation. In this case it seems appropriate to say that should Lyndsay refuse to shave her legs she might be evaluated as a bad woman, where this is explained by notions, unrelated to other examples, such as 'ugly' (because she does not conform to prevailing beauty standards) and 'defiant' (because she refuses to be acquiescent to oppressive norms (Frye 1983: 2)).

[8] Readers may notice my indebtedness to Åsa Burman's (2023) notion of telic power. Telic power is understood fundamentally in terms of the constraints and enablements one has in virtue of how one is evaluated against some ideal. Both Burman's notion of telic power and my notion of evaluative injustice heavily rely on the idea of being evaluated against some ideal. There are important differences between our two projects, however. Burman's project is primarily descriptive: she is concerned with identifying a form of social power that is central to our social world yet has gone largely ignored by social ontologists. She is not concerned, as I am here, with identifying and analyzing a distinctive form of injustice, though she certainly notes that the notion of telic power can be useful in theorizing cases in which evaluations result in injustice (Burman 2023, 193-197). While one might think my notion of evaluative injustice

the *evaluations* made against occupants of the relevant social roles that determine whether an instance of evaluative injustice occurs.

This means that the presence of evaluative injustice does not hinge on whether an agent willingly occupies a given social role characterized by some ideal against which the occupant is evaluated. I can be forced into a social role, such as that of citizen of the United States (since I could not choose where to be born), whereby I am evaluated against the ideal characteristic of that social role, and this evaluation can have potentially very high stakes with severe constraints should I be perceived to fall short of meeting the ideal. And yet it is possible that I am not subject to evaluative injustice even if the constraints associated with failure to meet the ideal are imposed on me. Similarly, I can willingly occupy a social role and willingly subject myself to the prevailing ideal associated with the social role, and nevertheless fall victim to evaluative injustice.

Evaluative injustice also does not hinge on whether the social role in question is itself an unjust social role. It is possible to experience evaluative injustice while occupying a social role that is perfectly just. It is also possible to occupy an unjust social role and yet experience no evaluative injustice with respect to the ideal that emerges from that social role. Imagine that it is unjust for a liberal democratic state to deny entry to prospective immigrants, yet some such state implements and enforces punitive immigration restrictions. 'Unauthorized immigrant' would become a social role in such a context, and it would be an unjust social role. Anyone subject to the role would be subject to an injustice simply by virtue of occupying the social role 'unauthorized immigrant,' even if they do so willingly. But this does not mean any evaluative injustice has occurred. Only once an unauthorized immigrant is evaluated against whatever norms characterize the ideal of a 'good unauthorized immigrant' does the possibility of an evaluative injustice, distinct from that of occupying an unjust social role, emerge.

Lastly, evaluative injustice is not a matter only of whether one is unjustly constrained or enabled in light of the social role one occupies. One can be unjustly constrained qua social role occupant without experiencing evaluative injustice. For example, if one is evaluated as meeting a certain ideal but is nevertheless denied the enablements other exemplars enjoy, this, though presumably consisting in an unjust constraint, is not a case of evaluative injustice because it is not one's *evaluation* that gives rise to the injustice in question but something else.

These points are important because they help illustrate the distinctiveness of evaluative injustice from the other recently identified form of injustice that seems most closely to resemble evaluative injustice, namely what I refer to as ontological injustice. Ontological injustice occurs when someone is (not) socially constructed as an occupant of some social kind in some relevant context (e.g., woman, wife, illegal immigrant), is (not) subject to a set of constraints and enablements constitutive

Footnote 8 (Continued)

could simply follow Burman's analysis of telic power and be called 'telic injustice,' I refrain from doing so in part because Burman's analysis of the nature of telic power is contested (Guli' and Moretti, 2024), and so it seems reasonably likely to me that, in the final analysis, my notion of evaluative injustice will end up being substantively different from whatever telic injustice might end up involving.

of the social kind, and the fact of one's being (not) subject to such constraints and enablements is in some way unjust to one in that context.[9] This can occur when one is unjustly excluded from being socially constructed as a member of some social kind, such as when a trans woman is excluded from the social kind 'woman' in some context (Dembroff 2018; Richardson 2023). This can also occur when someone is socially constructed as a member of some social kind (such as wife), and the constraints or enablements constitutive of that social kind in the relevant context (such as a context in which wives are not legally able to refuse sex with their husbands) are unjust to the member of that social kind (Jenkins 2023).[10]

Both of these examples involve injustice, but not evaluative injustice—at least yet. Because no evaluations regarding the norms that characterize the relevant social roles have occurred or have anything to do with the wrong suffered, evaluative injustice has not occurred. Yet an injustice has nevertheless occurred insofar as one has or has not been socially constructed—the injustice occurring at an ontological level, "at the level of being," and not at the evaluative level (Jenkins 2023: 24). Of course, once one is occupying the relevant social role, such as wife, one can then be evaluated with respect to how well one meets the prevailing ideal of what constitutes a good wife. If a wife's husband evaluates her as a bad wife, and some aspect of this evaluation is unjust to the wife, then she is the victim of a further, distinct injustice, namely evaluative injustice. In the next section I will discuss the ways this might happen—the multiple forms evaluative injustice can take. The point for now is that evaluative injustice is distinct from ontological injustice insofar as ontological injustice is concerned with how individuals are categorized and evaluative injustice is concerned with how they are evaluated, which can only occur after they have been categorized.

[9] This understanding of ontological injustice combines two sets of views that I take to be compatible with one another. Jenkins' (2023) notion of "ontic injustice," as she formulates the concept, can only occur when someone is positively socially constructed as a member of some social kind. That the absence of such social construction can also lead to injustice is only defended by Robin Dembroff (2018), who terms their notion "ontological oppression," and by Kevin Richardson (2023), who terms his notion "ontological exclusion" (he also discusses the possibility of it being indeterminate whether one is socially constructed as a member of some social kind, arguing that this indeterminateness can result in an injustice he terms "ontological erasure"). While there are differences between these theorists' accounts, they are united in the thought that the phenomena they theorize constitute a form of injustice that occurs at the ontological level. Insofar as I think their accounts are compatible, I understand them as theorists of what I refer to as ontological injustice, broadly construed. I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for pressing me to clarify this.

[10] See Jenkins (2023: Ch. 3) for a discussion of the extent to which social kind theorists understand them in terms of the "constraints and enablements" constitutive of the social kinds in question. With respect to the cases I discuss in this paper, I use the terms 'social kind' and 'social role' interchangeably. I do this because the only social kinds I have in mind are ones, like father, leader, teacher, etc., that can be interchangeably understood as social roles. This is not to say that social kinds and social roles are identical. For one, there are social kinds (namely, nonhuman social kinds) that are not social roles, such as money, war, recession, etc., rendering 'social kind' a broader notion than 'social role.' Second, human social kinds are typically defined as "socially constructed classifications of people" (Munch and Knudsen 2024), where 'classification' seems clearly to be a broader notion than roles, although a notion that can include roles in the sense that people can be classified by the social roles they occupy. At any rate, there are social ontologists who understand many social roles in terms of social kinds (e.g., Mallon 2016), and social ontologists who advocate for conceiving social kinds that might not intuitively seem like social *roles*, such as race and gender, nevertheless as social roles (Witt 2023, 13). So it is not uncommon for at least some social kinds to be understood as interchangeable with social roles.

3 How Can Evaluative Injustice Occur?

There are at least two distinct ways evaluative injustice can occur. In the first form of evaluative injustice, being evaluated against an ideal containing inappropriate *norms* gives rise to evaluative injustice. I call this *norms-based evaluative injustice*. David's and Chloe's cases constitute instances of norms-based evaluative injustice. In the second form, having one's evaluation be based on inappropriate *features* of the person being evaluated gives rise to evaluative injustice. I call this *features-based evaluative injustice*. Owen's case constitutes an instance of features-based evaluative injustice. This is not meant as an exhaustive taxonomy of forms of evaluative injustice—there may be other forms I have not considered. But these forms strike me as rather common when reflecting on the ways our evaluations of others might rise to the level of injustice.

It is natural to wonder why I open the paper with three cases if I only identify and discuss two distinct forms of evaluative injustice. There are a couple reasons for this. First, I want to highlight the fact that evaluative injustice is not a phenomenon that is limited to oppressive contexts and so is a notion that enjoys wide theoretical purchase. This explains why I include both David's and Owen's cases. Second, examining a case of evaluative injustice that occurs specifically within an oppressive context allows me to underscore the relationship between some instances of evaluative injustice and the phenomenon of double binds, which I discuss below. Doing this will, in turn, help to reveal additional important benefits of adding evaluative injustice to our conceptual toolkit. This explains why I include Chloe's case.

The first form of evaluative injustice arises from inappropriate norms that constitute the ideal against which one is evaluated. As discussed above, a set of norms will comprise a given ideal against which occupants of the relevant social role are evaluated, and it is the perceived satisfaction of the norms within the set that is required for one to be evaluated as living up to the ideal. Sometimes one or more of the norms that comprise a given ideal are inappropriate norms—and sometimes they are outright unjust. When someone is negatively evaluated on the basis of an inappropriate norm, norms-based evaluative injustice can occur.[11]

Consider David's case. The ideal against which he is evaluated is that of a good teacher. This, we can presume, is an ideal that emerges from a perfectly just social role, and one David willingly occupies. It is perfectly just for David to be evaluated against the ideal of a good teacher. The constraints and enablements that constitute the social role of a teacher are not unjust to David, so this is not a case of ontological injustice.

David's case constitutes a form of evaluative injustice because how David is evaluated depends on the presence of a norm it is inappropriate to include in the set of

[11] It is conceivable that one is evaluated against an ideal that includes an inappropriate norm, but the inappropriate norm happens to have no bearing on one's evaluation in a particular instance. In such a case, evaluative injustice would not occur. Imagine David's principal holds the view that good teachers should not incorporate politically controversial subjects into their lesson plans yet evaluates David as a bad teacher exclusively because David ridicules any student who answers a question wrongly. Perhaps David's principle evaluated David before he got to the slavery-related lessons and David was evaluated as a bad teacher because his principal was immediately taken aback by David's insulting and disrespectful treatment of his students. In this specific case, I would contend that no evaluative injustice had occurred.

norms that comprises the relevant ideal, and this results in an unjust evaluation of David (for reasons I will elaborate in the following section). The inappropriate norm is one of not teaching politically controversial subjects. This is an inappropriate norm because the mere fact of one's teaching allegedly controversial topics has no bearing on whether one is a good teacher. It is not the case that David incorporated inappropriate subjects in his class—his principal acknowledged the pertinence of the topics David chose to include. In this case, *what* David teaches is irrelevant to an appropriate evaluation of his teaching abilities. Rather, *how* he teaches such subjects is what should form the basis of the principal's evaluation of David. Yet it was what he taught that formed the basis of his principal's evaluation of him as a bad teacher.

Now consider Chloe's case, which is more complicated than David's case in important respects. Chloe is also a victim of evaluative injustice insofar as she is subject to inappropriate—indeed, outright unjust—norms. But whereas in David's case only one ideal (that of a good teacher) is relevant because his principal smuggled into the set of norms that constitute the ideal of a good teacher an inappropriate norm, Chloe's case involves two separate ideals that interact in ways that give rise to evaluative injustice on the basis of unjust norms.

Chloe is subject to the ideal of a good leader. This ideal consists in a set of norms that includes assertiveness and decisiveness. Good leaders act assertively and act decisively. So, insofar as Chloe acts assertively and decisively, she should be regarded as a good leader. With respect to men occupying leadership roles, this is exactly what typically happens. But not so with Chloe. Even though she acts in the same manner as her male colleagues, her behavior is interpreted as not assertive but abrasive, not decisive but bossy. This is because certain norms associated with another social role Chloe occupies, namely woman, affect others' evaluation of her qua leader, and these other norms are incompatible with the leadership norms. As a woman, Chloe is subject to certain norms regarding how women should act in the workplace. These norms include acting cheery and acquiescent, which directly conflict with the leadership norms of assertiveness and decisiveness. The incompatibility of the two sets of norms makes it impossible for Chloe to satisfy the ideal she is seeking in this context to satisfy, resulting in Chloe's being evaluated as a bad leader. This is because those evaluating Chloe smuggle the norms associated with women in the workplace (i.e., cheeriness and acquiescence) into the set of norms that constitute the ideal of a good leader. Chloe is the victim of evaluative injustice insofar as the ideal of a good leader should not include these additional norms. That her evaluation as a woman bears inappropriately on her evaluation as a leader, thus leading to an unjust evaluation (again, for reasons that will be discussed below), gives rise specifically to evaluative injustice, independent of whatever other injustices Chloe suffers from this situation.

One noteworthy aspect of Chloe's situation that will help to understand the contours and distinctiveness of evaluative injustice is that, unlike David or Owen, Chloe is subject to a double bind. Double binds are widely understood as choice situations within oppressive contexts in which the agent is subject to oppressive norms that create the inevitability of only negative outcomes insofar as all the agent's options in the choice situation force the agent to further her own oppression (Frye 1983: 2; Killmister 2017: 147; Hirji 2021: 645). Agents are forced to further their own oppression because the choice is between either complying with oppressive norms,

thus directly reinforcing those oppressive norms, or resisting the oppressive norms, thus being immediately sanctioned in some way that indirectly reinforces the oppressive norms the agent resisted (Hirji 2021). Sometimes a double bind emerges from the interaction of multiple social roles whose norms are in tension. This is what happened to Chloe. But not all double binds involve the interplay of multiple social roles. Consider again Lyndsay, who faces the choice between either shaving her legs and thus complying with oppressive beauty norms or resisting her oppression by not shaving but facing immediate consequences that undermine her future ability to resist her oppression in this way (Killmister 2017, 147; Hirji 2021, 664). This concerns only the one pertinent social role (woman), yet it is a double bind because it is a choice situation that will inevitably result in the agent reinforcing her oppression one way or the other.

This raises the question of what the relationship between evaluative injustice and double binds is. First and foremost, evaluative injustice is distinct from double binds insofar as it can occur outside of oppressive contexts. The fact that David and Owen are not oppressed yet are subject to evaluative injustice shows that evaluative injustice is a distinctive concept requiring its own independent analysis. However, although distinct, it is important to recognize that double binds inevitably generate norms-based evaluative injustice when the person subject to the double bind opts to resist the oppressive norms in question. In Chloe's case, by seeking to fulfill the ideal of a good leader, Chloe resists the oppressive norms imposed on her qua woman in the workplace, which her evaluators have unjustly smuggled into the ideal of good leadership, causing Chloe to be negatively evaluated. And Lyndsay, should she choose to refuse to shave her legs, will also be subject to evaluative injustice insofar as she is negatively evaluated because of her failing to satisfy the unjust norms that constitute the ideal of a beautiful woman.

This raises the further question of whether individuals subject to double binds can experience evaluative injustice if they choose to comply with the oppressive norms. On the one hand, they are evaluated, whether positively or not, on the basis of unjust norms (insofar as they are oppressive). However, in such a case it is not immediately clear to me whether the positive evaluation of one who complies with oppressive norms gives rise to an injustice separate from whatever other injustices one is subject to, largely because it is not clear that positive evaluations can lead to injustice. I regrettably lack the space to examine this in adequate detail, helping to explain my decision to limit the scope of my argument to cases of negative evaluation (see note 3).

Despite the limited scope, the foregoing discussion helps to reveal the theoretic usefulness of evaluative injustice as a concept. Just being subject to a double bind is unjust insofar as double binds inevitably undermine the agency of those subject to them in the service maintaining systems of oppression (Hirji 2021). But a further injustice, namely evaluative injustice, will occur against agents subject to double binds when they seek to resist their oppression and are negatively evaluated as a result. This is a distinctively pernicious aspect of double binds: they encourage agents subject to them to comply with oppressive norms because double binds are choice situations in which resisting oppression will often give rise to an additional

injustice, namely evaluative injustice.[12] It is important to understand the precise wrongs characteristic of double binds, and evaluative injustice can help us to more fully understand them.

For another example of how evaluative injustice can help us theorize double binds and oppression, consider that the literature on the nature of double binds has not systematically distinguished between kinds of double bind. But it would seem that our two cases of double binds (Chloe's and Lyndsay's) reveal distinct kinds of double bind—one kind characterized by the distinctive interaction of multiple social roles and the ideals associated with them, such as in Chloe's case where it is impossible to satisfy all the interacting ideals, and the other kind characterized merely by unjust norms it is possible to satisfy despite the fact that either satisfying them or not comes with oppression-reinforcing costs. Thinking about evaluative injustice can reveal important features of various double binds, providing us tools to better theorize oppression through a more refined understanding of the kinds of double binds that might exist.

One might object here that Chloe and Lyndsay are victims of ontological injustice rather than evaluative injustice. Consider Chloe's case. It might be objected that Chloe's being subject to a double bind reflects her social construction as a member of the social kind 'woman' that is defined by unjust constraints—specifically the constraint of being subject to oppression-reinforcing choice situations. Yet, as noted above, this wrong is different from the wrong of evaluative injustice because Chloe is subject to this injustice independent of how she is evaluated. Once she is evaluated in some unjust way, as she was in the above scenario, an additional injustice occurs, namely evaluative injustice. Chloe could decide to take herself out of consideration for the leadership position, knowing she will inevitably fail due to the oppressive structures in place, foreclosing the very possibility of an evaluative injustice since she is never in a position to be evaluated in a way that causes her to suffer the injustice. While this adjustment to the case takes away the possibility of evaluative injustice, it does nothing to change the extent to which she experiences other forms of injustice, particularly those stemming from her social construction, demonstrating evaluative injustice's distinctiveness.

Inappropriate norms are not the only source of evaluative injustice. Sometimes we evaluate others on the basis of certain features they possess rather than the norms we take to constitute the ideal against which we are evaluating someone. Often the features have nothing to do with the ideal in question. Features-based evaluative injustice occurs when one is evaluated on the basis of inappropriate features of the one being evaluated.[13] This is what happened to Owen. The mother in the park

[12] And if it turns out that double binds can result in evaluative injustice even when one complies with the unjust norms, then it will be noteworthy that all double binds, no matter which choice the agent makes, constitute instances of evaluative injustice. This would be noteworthy because it would highlight the fact that double binds, insofar as they inevitably create evaluative injustice, are a distinctively pernicious aspect of oppression, giving us a fuller understanding of the nature of double binds.

[13] It is possible to mistakenly evaluate someone negatively on the basis of features that seem appropriate in a given context. For example, suppose I notice the barber I anticipate being assigned to has extremely shaky hands and I conclude on the basis of this feature that he is not a good barber. I consider the fact

presumed on the basis of Owen's being a man that he failed to satisfy the relevant norms that constitute the ideal of a good parent. But Owen's being a man is an irrelevant feature when determining whether he is a good parent. Thus, the injustice he suffers here is features-based evaluative injustice. Owen is subject to an injustice (for reasons I discuss in the next section) despite willingly occupying a just social role. Furthermore, the ideal against which Owen is evaluated is comprised by just norms. It is just to evaluate a parent against a norm of taking proper precautions against sunburn. This means that the evaluative injustice Owen suffers is not norms-based evaluative injustice.

What is more, had the mother seen Owen take the appropriate precautions, she presumably would have evaluated him more positively. This means that Owen is not subject to ontological injustice, despite any constraints he experiences in his interaction with the mother. The mother, in virtue of being willing to evaluate Owen positively should she witness him take proper precautions, was not socially constructing Owen as the occupant of a social role *constituted by* unjust constraints or enablements. It is therefore not the constraints and enablements that constitute the social role that explain the wrong Owen suffers. It is, rather, how he was *evaluated* that gives rise to his unjust experience. Appealing to relevant aspects of how he is evaluated is necessary to fully explain Owen's experience, thus demonstrating the distinctive nature of evaluative injustice.

The purpose of this section has been to demonstrate that distinctive forms of injustice which emerge from how one is evaluated against certain norms and ideals can occur and remain conceptually independent of other related injustices such individuals suffer. To this point, I have focused on ontological injustice. But one might wonder whether there are substantive connections between evaluative injustice and epistemic injustice, a form of injustice that wrongs one in one's capacity as a knower, that might undermine my claims of distinctiveness. Consider testimonial injustice (a form of epistemic injustice), which occurs when a hearer's prejudices about a speaker's identity cause the hearer to treat the speaker as less credible and to discount what the speaker says more than they would otherwise (Fricker 2007). One might think my notion of evaluative injustice is captured by this notion insofar as what appears to be happening in cases of testimonial injustice is that a speaker is unjustly evaluated as a bad speaker (or testifier, or witness, etc.) on the basis of the speaker's social identity. Another example could be a student taking a class from a woman professor evaluating her as a bad professor because he thinks that, owing to her status as a woman, she cannot possibly know what she is talking about. Insofar as the student unjustly evaluates his professor on the basis of his perception of her

Footnote 13 (Continued)

that he remains employed as a barber and has cut many people's hair, but I ultimately decide on the basis of his shaky hands that he fails to adequately satisfy the ideal of a good barber, so I request another barber. This seems like an appropriate feature on which to base an evaluation. Perhaps my evaluation is ultimately incorrect—perhaps he is really an excellent barber. Nevertheless, this does not constitute an evaluative injustice in my view because the feature on which the evaluation is based is not an inappropriate one. I will revisit this in Section 4 (n19) when I discuss what accounts for the wrongness of evaluative injustice.

knowledge, then this would appear to be a case of epistemic injustice. Insofar as this is true, my notion of evaluative injustice may not be so distinctive after all.[14]

Evaluative injustice is distinct from epistemic injustice. Not all cases of epistemic injustice are cases of evaluative injustice and not all cases of evaluative injustice are cases of epistemic injustice. Consider hermeneutic injustice, which is a form of epistemic injustice that occurs when someone unjustly lacks the interpretive tools to make sense of her experiences. The classic example involves sexual harassment, a phrase introduced in the 1970s to describe something that many people had long experienced but lacked the conceptual resources to adequately describe and explain to others who had not experienced sexual harassment (Fricker 2007: Ch. 7). Hermeneutic injustice can occur entirely absent any evaluations against ideals associated with social roles one might fill, thus showing that not all instances of epistemic injustice constitute evaluative injustice. And David's case does not involve any epistemic injustice. David is perceived as a bad teacher irrespective of how much he knows about the material he is charged with teaching. David's principal does not question whether David knows enough to teach his course.[15] Thus, not all instances of evaluative injustice are instances of epistemic injustice.[16]

A natural question to pose in light of the distinctiveness of evaluative injustice and the multiple forms evaluative injustice can take is what makes them wrong. What accounts for the injustice of evaluative injustice? In the next section I argue that all forms of evaluative injustice are unified by an unjust failure of "appraisal respect" (Darwall 1977).

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[14] I am grateful to Graham Parsons for pressing this objection.

[15] If one is not entirely convinced that David's case, given that his role is to impart *knowledge*, does not involve epistemic injustice, we can simply substitute a different social role. Imagine David is a mechanic in a small town and David takes great care to keep his hands soft and clean. Imagine his boss evaluates him as a bad mechanic on the grounds that having dirty, calloused hands is a hallmark of a good mechanic. I would submit this is a clear case of evaluative injustice that has nothing essentially to do with David's status as a knower. Indeed, his boss could concede that he knows everything there is to know about fixing cars yet insist that dirty, calloused hands are necessary to be an exemplary mechanic.

[16] Having now differentiated evaluative injustice from both ontological and epistemic injustice, it might be useful to distinguish it briefly from emotional and conceptual injustice. I consign this discussion to a footnote because 1) I think it is much more intuitively clear how evaluative injustice differs from emotional injustice and 2) the reasons evaluative injustice is distinct from conceptual injustice are very similar to the reasons evaluative injustice is distinct from ontological injustice, which I demonstrated above. Emotional injustice occurs when the treatment of one's emotions is unjust, or emotions are used to treat people unjustly (Pismenny, Eickers, and Prinz 2024: 154). It is fairly common to use others' emotions to treat them unjustly (sending a partner on a guilt trip for not wanting to have sex, say). This counts as an emotional injustice, but this instance of injustice is wholly independent of whether the partner is evaluated unjustly. It may be that the guilt trip fails and then she is evaluated unjustly. Or it might be the case that no evaluation occurs at all—the purpose of the guilt trip simply does not call for any sort of evaluation. In each case the emotional injustice is distinct from any evaluative injustice that occurs, if one occurs at all. Ditto for conceptual injustice. Conceptual injustice occurs when "one is wrongfully excluded from (or included in) the application of a concept" (Bastian 2024: 3). This is much more like ontological injustice than evaluative injustice. Conceptual injustice concerns in which categories people are placed. As with ontological injustice, this form of injustice is distinct from any sort of evaluations that may occur. Just being placed into a category can be sufficient for conceptual injustice, while that is not sufficient for evaluative injustice. See Bastian (2024: sect. 4.1-4.2) for differentiation between conceptual and ontological forms of injustice.

4 Appraisal Respect and the Injustice in Evaluative Injustice

The central wrong of evaluative injustice is that the evaluation consists in an unjust failure of appraisal respect. Appraisal respect is a kind of respect whose “exclusive objects are persons or features which are held to *manifest their excellence* as persons or as engaged in some specific pursuit” (Darwall 1977, 38, emphasis added). Appraisal respect therefore consists in positively *evaluating* some person with respect to some domain on the basis of exhibiting or manifesting certain relevant features or characteristics which render the person appropriately deserving of such positive evaluation in that domain. And given that, at least in the cases of concern in this paper, appraisal respect is warranted or not on the basis of excellence with regard to some specific pursuit (a particular kind of domain), appraisal respect is centrally concerned with accomplishments and what we can achieve, or capabilities we can develop, refine, or improve (Darwall 1977: 42).

Appraisal respect is distinct from what Darwall calls “recognition respect,” which is the kind of respect that is most often what philosophers have in mind when discussing various kinds of injustice.[17] Recognition respect consists in the willingness or disposition to appropriately weigh in one’s deliberations about what to do some relevant feature of the person in question and to act accordingly (Darwall 1977: 38). While recognition respect and appraisal respect may overlap in some cases (Darwall 1977: 46-47), recognition respect nevertheless has nothing essentially to do with how we evaluate the person in question—indeed, recognition respect is often required irrespective of how we might evaluate the person to whom we owe our recognition respect. Appraisal respect, on the other hand, is centrally concerned with a person’s excellence with respect to some relevant feature, characteristic, or pursuit. Recognition respect and appraisal respect are conceptually independent and can come apart even if they are closely related in many cases.

When we speak of, say, an artist as deserving respect qua artist, we typically have appraisal respect in mind (Darwall 1977: 39). What we mean by insisting that this artist deserves (appraisal) respect is that the artist merits our positive evaluation on the basis both of appropriate features of the artist qua artist and of appropriate norms to which we subject artists when we evaluate them and their work (Darwall 1977: 41). Appropriate features or norms will be those features or norms that are relevant to whether one can become excellent at a given pursuit. An artist’s race or gender, for example, is not an appropriate feature of an artist qua artist on which to base an evaluation of her. But whether she has steady hands might be an appropriate feature to consider in evaluating her qua artist. Similarly, whether an artist conveys politically liberal messages through her art is not an appropriate norm on which to base an evaluation of her qua artist. But whether she has the requisite expertise regarding, say, color theory might be an appropriate norm on which to base an evaluation of

[17] For example, Jenkins (2023) discusses the relationship between failures of recognition respect and the wrongness of ontic injustice; Richardson’s (2023) discussion of the wrongness of “ontological exclusion” and “ontological erasure,” both of which he takes to be forms of ontological oppression, can be understood as particular kinds of failure of recognition respect; and Bastian (2024) cashes out the wrong of her notion of “conceptual injustice” in terms of recognition respect.

her qua artist. Importantly, then, appraisal respect is subject to conditions of appropriateness. The extent to which an artist satisfies the appropriate norms that constitute the ideal of a good artist and exhibits features that are relevant to whether one can be a good artist should determine the appraisal respect the artist receives.

Appraisal respect can misfire. It can, for example, be withheld despite satisfying relevant norms. This can happen on the basis of norms or features that have no bearing on the pursuit in question or the ideal that emerges from engaging in the pursuit in question. When this happens, we have what I call a *failure of appraisal respect*.[18] Failures of appraisal respect can be unjust, and unjust failures of appraisal respect are what give rise to evaluative injustice. Failures of appraisal respect are unjust when they result in arbitrarily imposed disadvantages. Not all failures of appraisal respect will have this result, of course. Sometimes evaluations of occupants of social roles are simply mistaken, but they are mistaken despite being made on the basis of appropriate norms and features.[19] In such cases we have failures of appraisal respect but ones that are not wrong (and by extension not unjust). But many other failures of appraisal respect will be unjust, and it is these cases that constitute evaluative injustice.

Consider David, the high school history teacher. He experiences an unjust failure of appraisal respect. David's case involves his principal withholding appraisal respect on the basis of teaching controversial, though pertinent, subjects. This is an inappropriate norm on which to base one's appraisal respect for David qua teacher. The mere fact that David teaches pertinent material that may nevertheless be controversial is not relevant to David's ability to teach history—how he teaches the material is what is relevant to his ability to teach. Given that David's job depends to a large extent on how he is evaluated qua teacher, it is unjust for the principal to base his evaluation of David on inappropriate norms. It is unjust because it results in an arbitrarily imposed disadvantage. The disadvantage consists in diminished access to the opportunity to be identified as a good teacher worthy of a raise or a promotion. This is a resource David clearly values, and it is arbitrarily imposed because it

[18] Failures can go the opposite direction, too: One can be given appraisal respect that one does not deserve or merit. The cases of evaluative injustice I have in mind in this paper are not concerned with this kind of failure of appraisal respect. It might be possible for failures of appraisal respect that attribute undue respect to constitute cases of evaluative injustice. Consider the case of Melissa, a white person, attributing more appraisal respect than is warranted to Gabby, a Black person occupying the social role 'orator,' on the grounds that Gabby is "very articulate for a Black person," yet Gabby did not in fact articulate herself very well. There is surely something unjust about Melissa doing this, but I am not sure whether this is specifically an evaluative injustice. It seems plausible that what explains this injustice is not the evaluation but something else. I regrettably lack the space to explore this possibility further, but it is worth noting as a potential avenue of future theorizing of evaluative injustice. It is also worth noting the connections between cases like this and cases of credibility excess, and the fact that there is disagreement over whether ascriptions of credibility excess can be unjust. See Lackey (2023) for excellent discussion of the debate over the ethics of credibility excess.

[19] Recall my example above (n13) of the barber I evaluated as a bad barber on the basis of having shaky hands despite his in fact being an excellent barber. On the grounds that the barber's shaky hands is not an inappropriate feature to take into consideration when evaluating the barber, I take that case to be an instance of a failure of appraisal respect, but one that does not constitute evaluative injustice. The primary reason is that the mistaken evaluation of the barber does not result in an *arbitrarily* imposed disadvantage.

results from considerations that are morally irrelevant to David's performance as a teacher. Even though David was not fired by his principal, he nevertheless suffered an evaluative injustice.

Chloe's evaluative injustice is also explained by her superiors' unjust failures of appraisal respect. Chloe's case involves being evaluated as a bad leader on the basis of irrelevant norms associated with some pursuit other than that of being a leader. Specifically, the oppressive norms associated with being a woman in the workplace became the basis on which Chloe's superiors' evaluate her qua leader. These norms are irrelevant to the pursuit in question because one's gender and any norms associated with one's gender (even if they were legitimate) have nothing to do with one's ability to be a good leader. As such, Chloe's superiors withheld appraisal respect for Chloe qua leader on the basis of inappropriate norms. And, as in David's case, this is unjust because it results in an arbitrarily imposed disadvantage. One disadvantage is similar to that imposed on David, namely diminished opportunities for leadership and professional advancement. Additionally, her supervisors' evaluations of her, and by extension their failures of appraisal respect, also happen to be expressive of unjust gendered social hierarchies (Fraser 2024), thus adding a separate disadvantage that is arbitrarily imposed on Chloe, namely a diminishment in the agential capacities her supervisors attribute to her since she is viewed as lesser than her male colleagues on the basis of her gender and not adequately regarded as an individual (Munch and Knudsen 2024). Importantly, it is their evaluation of Chloe that expresses this social hierarchy. These disadvantages are arbitrarily imposed because they result from considerations that are morally irrelevant to Chloe's performance as a leader.[20]

It is important to stress that Chloe, like David, is not entitled to a perfectly appropriate amount of appraisal respect. Maybe her superiors, in an alternative scenario, pass her over for promotion not due to inappropriate norms that unjustly create incompatible ideals, but rather because her superiors happen to prefer someone who is slightly more assertive than she demonstrated herself to be. Perhaps her superiors decide that someone with more assertiveness than the average good leader is required for this particular position given the particular people the candidate chosen will have to lead. And perhaps her superiors are wrong; perhaps Chloe really is the best leader for the position. In this case there remains a failure of appraisal respect inasmuch as the appropriate amount is withheld despite Chloe satisfying the relevant norms. But insofar as they are not wrong because they base their evaluations on inappropriate features (and presumably assertiveness is a relevant feature) or norms, then Chloe does not appear to suffer from an *unjust* failure of appraisal respect because she cannot be said to suffer an *arbitrarily* imposed disadvantage.

Owen is also the victim of an unjust failure of appraisal respect. In his case, the mother in the park immediately denied appraisal respect for Owen qua parent on the basis of an illegitimate assumption that, because he is a man, he must have failed to satisfy the ideal of a good parent. This is a failure of appraisal respect because the woman's

[20] A similar analysis will apply to Lyndsay, who refuses to shave her legs and is thus negatively evaluated against the ideal of a beautiful woman. This evaluation will also be expressive of unjust gendered social hierarchies, meaning that her negative evaluation also rises to the level of evaluative injustice.

evaluation of Owen was based on an inappropriate feature of Owen. The mother negatively evaluated Owen qua parent on the basis of his being a man. But just like an artist's race is irrelevant to whether one is a good artist, a parent's gender is irrelevant to whether one is a good parent. And this failure of appraisal respect is unjust because it results in an arbitrarily imposed disadvantage. The disadvantage in this case is diminished agential capacities attributed to Owen insofar as he was not regarded properly as an individual but rather merely as a member of a group, namely men (Munch and Knudsen 2024). And this disadvantage is imposed arbitrarily because Owen's gender is irrelevant to whether he is a good parent. Given that the mother's evaluation is based on an inappropriate feature, she cannot be said simply to be making a mistake. This is a case of features-based evaluative injustice. To be sure, the evaluative injustice Owen experiences is not nearly as severe as the evaluative injustices David and Chloe (and Lyndsay) experience. But it is a case of evaluative injustice nonetheless.

5 Conclusion

I have argued that evaluative injustice is a distinct kind of injustice that can take multiple forms: norms-based and features-based evaluative injustice. I have also argued that the wrong of evaluative injustice can be couched in terms of failures of appraisal respect. My account of evaluative injustice is distinct not only from other kinds of injustice, but the wrong that comprises evaluative injustice is also distinct from other kinds of injustice insofar as evaluative injustice is the only kind to be explained in terms of appraisal respect rather than recognition respect.[21] In arguing for the distinctiveness of evaluative injustice, I have also sought to highlight the necessity of the concept for comprehensively accounting for some of the everyday injustices people experience. This helps avoid "remainders of injustice" (Bastian 2024), which are either injustices or aspects of injustice that go unexplained or unaccounted for without appeal to the concept of evaluative injustice.

Chloe's case is a helpful example of this. In discussing the evaluative injustice Chloe suffers, I highlighted the relationship between her evaluative injustice and the fact that Chloe was subject to a double bind. Most philosophical discussion of situations such as those that Chloe faces focus on the fact of its constituting a double bind and the fact that double binds undermine one's agency through forcing them to become mechanisms of their own oppression. Less sustained theoretical attention has been paid to the evaluative aspect of these choice situations. In providing an account of evaluative injustice and how it relates to various kinds of double bind, I hope to have provided a tool that can expand our ability to understand double binds specifically and oppression more broadly, and in doing so help to capture all aspects of the injustices oppressed persons subject to double binds experience.

[21] Or some similar notion, like "moral injury" (Hampton 1992), understood as being treated or represented as having lower moral value than one in fact has. Jenkins (2023: 26-30) analyzes the wrong of her version of ontological injustice, and Bastian (2024: 6-7) analyzes the wrong of conceptual injustice, in terms of moral injury, but both connect the concept to recognition respect. Insofar as moral injury is characterized as "an affront to value or dignity" (Hampton 1992: 1666), one can understand moral injury as occurring because of, or "mediated by" (Bastian 2024: 6), failures of recognition respect.

But, as emphasized throughout, evaluative injustice can occur outside oppressive contexts. Not only do I hope to have provided a conceptual tool that can help us theorize oppression, but I also hope to have provided a tool that can help us be more practically aware of our evaluative practices in all manner of relevant contexts.

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