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## Heidegger's Concept of Time in *Logic: The Question of Truth*

### *Abstract*

In the 1925/26 lecture *Logic: The Question of Truth* Heidegger turns to an interpretation of the *Critique of Pure Reason* in order to elucidate his own understanding of time. The largely overlooked lecture series, I argue, is at the root of Heidegger's exposition of the concept of time and its relationship to human existence (*Dasein*). Although Heidegger claims that Kant's concept of time is confined to that of 'world-time,' Heidegger develops the first exposition of his understanding of time as ur-temporality through a critical analysis of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. The investigation reveals the conceptual context behind the relationship between time and *Dasein*, which develops out of Heidegger's first in-depth interpretation of the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

*Keywords:* Time, Temporality, Heidegger, Kant, *Logic: The Question of Truth*

### *Introduction*

In order to clarify Heidegger's understanding of time in the overall context of his oeuvre, most scholars turn to *Sein und Zeit*<sup>1</sup> or *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*.<sup>2</sup> Yet Heidegger's idea that the question of time and temporality is a foundation for philosophical inquiry is already apparent much earlier in *Der Begriff der Zeit*<sup>3</sup> and in some of his early lectures, e.g. *Einführung in die Phänomenologische Forschung*,<sup>4</sup> *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs*,<sup>5</sup> and

<sup>1</sup> Martin Heidegger: *Sein und Zeit*. Gesamtausgabe 2, ed. by Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. Frankfurt am Main 1977 (hereafter: GA 2).

<sup>2</sup> Martin Heidegger: *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*. Gesamtausgabe 3, ed. by Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. Frankfurt am Main 2010 (hereafter: GA 3).

<sup>3</sup> Martin Heidegger: *Der Begriff der Zeit*. Gesamtausgabe 64, ed. by Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. Frankfurt am Main 2004 (hereafter: GA 64).

<sup>4</sup> Martin Heidegger: *Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung (Wintersemester 1923/24)*. Gesamtausgabe 17, ed. by Friedrich Wilhelm von Herrmann. Frankfurt am Main 2006 (hereafter: GA 17).

<sup>5</sup> Martin Heidegger: *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs (Sommersemester 1925)*. Gesamtausgabe 20, ed. by Petra Jaeger. Frankfurt am Main 1994 (hereafter: GA 20).

*Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*.<sup>6</sup> While these works emphasize the importance of a newfound understanding of time for the understanding of *Dasein* or of philosophy in general and present an understanding of time in the context of an analysis of *Dasein*, the second division of the lecture series *Logik: Die Frage nach der Wahrheit*,<sup>7</sup> (GA 21), held in the winter semester of 1925/26 (prior to the finalization of *Being and Time* and before *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*), is Heidegger's first attempt to expound the content his own concept of time as ur-temporality (*Temporalität*) independently of an analysis of *Dasein*.<sup>8</sup> In order to show what time in his understanding of time as ur-temporality is (as opposed to world-time), Heidegger turns here to a detailed interpretation of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*.<sup>9</sup> The second division of the lecture series<sup>10</sup> ex-

<sup>6</sup> Martin Heidegger: *Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (Wintersemester 1919/20)*. Gesamtausgabe 58, ed. by Hans-Helmuth Gander. Frankfurt am Main 2010 (hereafter: GA 58).

<sup>7</sup> Martin Heidegger: *Logik: Die Frage nach der Wahrheit*. Gesamtausgabe 21, ed. by Walter Biemel. Frankfurt am Main 1995 (hereafter: GA 21).

<sup>8</sup> I worked on this paper using the original German edition of the lecture series, which is published as volume 21 of the *Gesamtausgabe*. For the purposes of comprehensibility, I have used the English translation for quotes throughout the text: Martin Heidegger: *Logic: The Question of Truth*, translated by Thomas Sheehan. Indiana 2010 (orig. publ. 1976). Whenever I was under the impression that relevant nuances were not reflected in the English text I have made a corresponding remark.

Heidegger uses the expression „*Temporalität*” in order to address the time-relatedness of phenomena over and above a mere being “in time” or finitude. The expression is difficult to translate, but it means something like “all that which is related to time or affected by time.” Sheehan uses “ur-temporality” for the translation, which I will adopt here. Heidegger also speaks of “*Zeitlichkeit*” [temporality] in the lecture series in terms of the temporality of time itself: “Only an unrelenting investigation into time in terms of its temporality, will put us in a position to clarify that what Kant understood as the transcendental apperception and placed outside of time *is* the basic determination of temporality [*Zeitlichkeit*] itself.” (GA 21, 272) ‘*Zeitlichkeit*’ has been understood as ‘that which is in time’ in the history of philosophy as opposed to something ‘outside of time’ and Heidegger uses ‘*Temporalität*’ in order to avoid misunderstandings and to signify that ‘*Zeitlichkeit*’ has a different meaning to him (cf. *ibid.*, 200, 258 f.).

<sup>9</sup> Heidegger calls a fundamental philosophical perspective which deals with time (in the sense of ur-temporality (*Temporalität*), not in the sense of world-time) a phenomenological chronology and says that he is developing such a phenomenological chronology here.

<sup>10</sup> In order to shed light on the development of Heidegger's concept of time through his interpretation of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, I focus on the second main division of the lecture alone. The relationship of the second division of the lecture to the first is of course of relevance and is treated in Clara Carus: *Heidegger im Ausgang Kants? Heideggers Kantinterpretation im Lichte der systematischen Rolle der Zeit in Kant*. Freiburg 2021, 2. Hauptteil. Peter Madsen writes, concerning the relationship of Logic, Truth (first division) and Time (second division) in the lecture: “In other words, the ‘Second Main Division’ is not merely a concentrated *Daseinanalyse* along with an interpretation of the place of time in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, the latter being more accessible in Heidegger's ‘Kant books.’ It is this, but more. If the title which this concluding division bears is to make sense, then the interconnection of logic, truth, and time must be seen as dependent on the interpretation of *Being aus der Zeit* and

poses in much greater detail than *Being and Time* and *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* 1. how Heidegger understands time as ur-temporality, 2. how this understanding of time relates to *Dasein*<sup>11</sup> and 3. why Heidegger turns to Kant in order to elucidate his idea of time. The Logic lecture thus offers an invaluable insight into Heidegger's understanding of time as well as into the development of his idea of an existential relationship between time and *Dasein*, which lies at the heart of the question of being in *Being and Time*.<sup>12</sup> Yet *Logic: The Question of Truth* has never been a main focus of Heideggerian scholarship despite numerous scholars' remarks on the importance of the lecture.<sup>13</sup> One reason for this desideratum is the relatively late publication of the volume (the lecture was the last volume to be published in the *Gesamtausgabe* before Heidegger died in 1976) at a time when *Being and Time* as well as *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* were already well established. The lecture may have seemed to be a repetition of already-established Heideggerian ideas, whereas the content and timeline of *Logic: The Question of Truth*, followed by *Being and Time* and lastly *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* suggest that some of Heidegger's most fundamental ideas related to his understanding of time in fact have their origin in

understanding *Dasein* with reference to its *Temporalität*. To interpret Being and the being of *Dasein* in this manner is to hold logic and truth up to a new light." Peter Madsen: "Logik: Die Frage nach der Wahrheit." In: *International Philosophical Quarterly*, 17(4), 1977, 477–486, here: 481.

<sup>11</sup> Heidegger sometimes uses *Dasein* to explain time and sometimes time to explain *Dasein*. In the context of the lecture, we discover what 'time' contributes towards an understanding of *Dasein* (beyond an analysis of *Dasein*).

<sup>12</sup> Cf. GA 2, 24. Frank Schalow writes: "What Heidegger saw in Kant, then, was a unique approach of time, whose explicit formulation would yield clues to the possibility of understanding being and expressing its meaning in conceptual terms." (Frank Schalow: *Departures. At the Crossroads between Heidegger and Kant*. Berlin/Boston 2013, 7) Peter Madsen writes: "Given that Being and truth are so closely united, it becomes mandatory that the Logik text be seen as an indispensable introduction to Being and Time where these two themes are of utmost importance." (Madsen: *Logik*, 481)

<sup>13</sup> Madsen points towards the importance of the lecture right after its publication in 1976: "It is not without some irony that the last volume Martin Heidegger saw published as part of his *Gesamtausgabe* was *Logik: Die Frage nach der Wahrheit*. The irony lies in the fact that this text does not amount to the kind of final and definitive statement which we have come to expect of philosophers upon their death, but rather it reveals much of Heidegger's early formative period. What would later gain prominence as important marks along his *Denkweg* is worked out here in nascent outlines. In other words, this text is not an end at all but a beginning." Cf. *ibid.* 477. The publication of the English translation of the work by Sheehan renewed emphasis on its importance with regard to the second part. Dika writes: "Part II outlines some basic elements of what would soon become the existential analytic of *Dasein* in *Being and Time* and elaborates a close reading of Kant's critical philosophy, thus a reading Heidegger had already begun prior to the publication of both *Being and Time* and, shortly thereafter, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*." (Tarek R. Dika: "Logic: The Question of Truth." In: *MLN* 125(5), 2010, 1155–1158, here: 1156)

this lecture series.<sup>14</sup> Another reason why the second part of the lecture has not been a main focus of Heidegger studies is what Zimmerman points out: the deep entanglement of the origin of Heidegger's idea of time in Kant, which makes an in-depth knowledge of the *Critique of Pure Reason* a prerequisite for an understanding of the text.<sup>15</sup> Lastly, another reason the lecture was largely overlooked is the title, which does not in any way indicate Heidegger's comprehensive exposition of time (or his interpretation of Kant), as Madsen points out.<sup>16</sup>

This paper focuses on Heidegger's concept of time in the 1925/26 lecture and aims to show how the content of Heidegger's own concept of time as ur-temporality (and its relationship to *Dasein* and the question of being) is developed on the basis of his interpretation of Kant's concept of time within its systematic context of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. In the first section, I address the question of why Heidegger turns to the *Critique of Pure Reason* in order to elucidate his idea of ur-temporality. This is especially important in order to understand the context of Heidegger's elucidation of ur-temporality through his Kant interpretation. In the second section, I show in some key aspects how Heidegger's understanding of time as ur-temporality develops on the basis of his interpretation of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. I finish with some concluding remarks.

<sup>14</sup> An exception to this trend is Frank Schalow's *The Unique Role of Logic in Heidegger's Dialogue with Kant* in which Schalow traces the origins of *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* back to *Logic: The Question of Truth* and argues that the dissolution of the barriers between Kant and Heidegger presented in the lecture series make the "emerging parallels – the key themes of finitude, temporality and transcendence – [...] particularly compelling." (Frank Schalow: "The Unique Role of Logic in Heidegger's Dialogue with Kant." In: *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 32(1), 1994, here: 104)

<sup>15</sup> He writes: "[...] unless the reader [of the *Logic* text] is a serious Kant scholar, I advise him to consult *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, which discusses many of the same themes with more clarity." (Michael Zimmerman: "Logik: Die Frage nach der Wahrheit (review)." In: *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 18(4), 1980, 494–496, here: 496) Yet *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* cannot replace a close reading of the second part of *Logic: The Question of Truth*, if we do not want to lose the origins of the ideas that link time to *Dasein* and build a foundation for *Being and Time*.

<sup>16</sup> Madsen writes: "The *Logik* text, which is based on the course of lectures held in the Winter Semester of 1925/26, presents a difficulty from the start; While "logic" and "truth" do refer to a great deal of the contents of the volume, the title *Logik: Die Frage nach der Wahrheit* ignores the third chief topic which takes up some 218 pages, viz., a detailed analysis of the place of time in Kant's first Critique. A more faithful rendition might thus be: 'Logic, Truth, and Time.'" (Madsen: *Logik*, 478) I was pointed to the importance of the lecture for Heidegger's concept of time and his Kant interpretation by Joseph Scheer when I was working on my PhD thesis on Heidegger's interpretation of Kant's concept of time.

### 1. *The Relevance of Kant's Concept of Time for Heidegger*

Heidegger re-worked his lecture plan for *Logic: The Question of Truth* during the course of the semester such that when his lecture on logic and truth led him to the concept of time, he developed a previously unplanned second division of the lecture. Herein, he turns to an interpretation of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* in order to elucidate his own concept of time. Heidegger makes clear that his own understanding of time is one of ur-temporality (*Temporalität*), while he claims that Kant himself remained bound by a concept of time as world-time, which Heidegger opposes. Heidegger's understanding of time as ur-temporality guides his interpretation of the *Critique of Pure Reason* in the lecture and in turn, it would appear paradoxically, develops only out of his interpretation of the *Critique of Pure Reason*.<sup>17</sup> Why, one might ask, is Heidegger interpreting Kant in order to explain his own understanding of time,<sup>18</sup> especially considering the fact that he claims that Kant's understanding of time remained restricted to 'world-time'?

Heidegger claims that time in the *Critique of Pure Reason* is based on the constitutive role it plays for the ontological structure of *Dasein* without Kant himself realising this and above all the importance of time in this very sense. Furthermore, according to Heidegger, the *Critique of Pure Reason* has to be interpreted as a whole and as such as a building in which every block is a necessary part of the entire structure, which is held together only through the phenomenon of time itself.<sup>19</sup> Heidegger explains that in the *Transcendental Aesthetic* time is the 'phenomenon' which is, as a form of intuition, responsible for the a priori representation of the manifold (along of course with space). In the *Analytic of Principles*, it is again this very 'phenomenon' that is to link the 'I think' (which Kant equates with the understanding itself), with the actual appearances that 'carry' the content for every judgment. As such, in Kant, time is the 'phenomenon' that links the faculty of the understanding with the 'outer world.' This crucial role time plays in the different parts of the *Critique of Pure Reason* is, in Heidegger's view, not an accidental one, but the result of the constitutive role time plays in the ontological structure of human existence.<sup>20</sup> The

<sup>17</sup> While Heidegger had emphasised the importance of a newfound understanding of time for the understanding of *Dasein* and of philosophy in earlier works (cf. GA 64, GA 17, GA 20, GA 58), he had not said much about the content of his own understanding of time prior to this lecture. In this lecture, he explicitly turns to Kant in order to elucidate his own concept of time.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. GA 21, 312 and 409.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 270 f.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 402 f.

reality of this ontological structure is, as Heidegger states, what makes it possible for Kant to hit upon the crucial role of time for the understanding (without, of course, developing a proper understanding of time beyond world-time). Furthermore, according to Heidegger, the significance of time for the unity of intuition and thinking,<sup>21</sup> and in his own philosophy for the question of the meaning of being, can be uncovered if we read Kant's system with a view to an understanding of time as ur-temporality.

This, of course, while certainly explaining the project Heidegger is about to undertake, still does not clarify why Heidegger needs Kant in order to elucidate time as ur-temporality. Instead, why does Heidegger not simply develop the meaning of time as ur-temporality in its content independently of Kant? After all, Heidegger says that Kant himself did not grasp the concept of time as ur-temporality. And indeed, Heidegger claims in the lecture series that a phenomenological elucidation of time as ur-temporality independently of Kant is possible but was not undertaken due to a lack of time within the set time-frame of the lecture.<sup>22</sup> Yet this is hardly an explanation for why time as ur-temporality can be elucidated through Kant if Kant did not have such an understanding of time. To turn to Kant in order to explicate time as ur-temporality in its content seems to be a detour at best, if not an impossible undertaking if we take Heidegger's statements for granted. Yet Heidegger still turns to an interpretation of the *Critique of Pure Reason* in order to give a content to his understanding of time as ur-temporality, instead of putting forward a phenomenological interpretation of time. What if Heidegger's elucidation of time itself, beyond an analysis of *Dasein*, remains reliant on Kant in all subsequent works? As is clear from the missing third part of the first division of *Being and Time* the suggested phenomenological elucidation of time as ur-temporality (independent of an analysis of *Dasein*) is never accomplished. We might ask ourselves: Is Heidegger looking for a content for his concept of time as ur-temporality beyond the analysis of *Dasein*, which is not given independently of Kant?<sup>23</sup>

<sup>21</sup> Intuition and thinking (*Denken*) are the terms Heidegger uses for the unity of intuition and understanding, which Kant sets out to explain in the Schematism Chapter (ibid., 21, 272).

<sup>22</sup> Cf. ibid., 206.

<sup>23</sup> Heidegger highlights the important role of time through an analysis of *Dasein* on many occasions. Yet he also emphasises that an understanding of time as ur-temporality is needed in order to understand *Dasein*. Time in its meaning as ur-temporality thus needs a content beyond an analysis of *Dasein* through which it is able to elucidate *Dasein*. It is this content which Heidegger is aiming to develop out of Kant.

## 2. Time in Heidegger Based on His Interpretation of the Critique of Pure Reason

Through his criticism and interpretation of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Heidegger extrapolates certain characteristics of time which, in later works, appear independently of his Kant interpretation as characteristics of his own concept of time as ur-temporality. In the following section, I will show how 1) the notion of time as a pre-view and an antecedent ontological structure, 2) the role of time for *Dasein's* being in the world and 3) the connection of time with 'I' or *Dasein* as 'I myself' are in fact formed in Heidegger's first extensive interpretation of Kant in *Logic: The Question of Truth*.

### 2.1 The Pre-View

In the following, I will show that Heidegger's Kant interpretation in *Logic: The Question of Truth* aims to explain the ontological primacy of time in the context of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. To this end, Heidegger focuses on time as a form of intuition in Kant, queries the givenness of time and develops his understanding of time as a pre-view on this basis. Yet the focus on time as a form of intuition in Heidegger does not take place in the context of sensibility in separation from understanding, as is the case in the Transcendental Aesthetic. Kant's rigid separation between understanding and sensibility into two stems of knowledge is phenomenologically raw to Heidegger. Along with this distinction goes the separation of spontaneity, which in Kant belongs to the understanding, and that which is given, which belongs to sensibility. In his interpretation of Kant's forms of intuition, Heidegger first of all puts into question the character of givenness with regard to time and space. He hints at the fact that there is a certain ambiguity in Kant himself as to the givenness of time and space: time and space are determined by Kant to be 'lying ready in our mind' and are as such associated with an a priori capacity. Yet they belong to sensibility and not to the spontaneous capacity of the understanding, which would indicate that time is somehow *given* with sensibility. Heidegger emphasises that Kant indeed speaks of space itself being given in certain contexts.<sup>24</sup> Whenever something is *being given*, however, it is not a priori to Kant but given in intuition a posteriori. Heidegger thus hints at Kant encountering a difficulty in his systematic separation of a spontaneous understanding on the one hand and sensibility on the other, at least with regard to the phenomenon of time and space. Heidegger be-

<sup>24</sup> For Heidegger's discussion on Kant's remarks on space being given, see GA 21, 298 f.

believes that Kant did not attempt to cover up these philosophical difficulties he encountered and thus made a deep-going philosophical question regarding the problem of the givenness of time and space possible. What we must put into question in this regard, according to Heidegger, is givenness itself and in what way givenness is given to us. On this account, Heidegger turns to a phenomenological analysis of givenness that is not burdened by a separation of the understanding from sensibility, or of spontaneity from givenness.

According to Heidegger, both concept and intuition in Kant are *representation* in the very basic meaning of having an object.<sup>25</sup> What distinguishes intuition and concept as modes of representation is that intuition is immediately related to the object and thus the object is immediately given to intuition. The specific manner of ‘having an object’ for intuition (in Kant) is, according to Heidegger, givenness. Intuition occurs, of course, through the senses; through each sense, and each sense provides ‘its type’ of manifold, i.e. a colour cannot be smelled and a tone cannot be seen.<sup>26</sup> But, Heidegger asks, can we say anything else about that givenness? What character does this givenness have? Heidegger emphasises that the givenness as givenness is characterised by the fact that the “manifold of each sense’s field of givenness has the determinate character of ‘one-after-another’ or of ‘at-the-same-time.’”<sup>27</sup> This means that the ‘mode of intuiting’ and the ‘character of intuition’ is in itself determinable as a *form* of intuition or, as Heidegger puts it, a pre-view.<sup>28</sup>

The pre-view of ‘one-after-another-ness’ is the precondition for any particular representation through the senses – and the pre-view of the manifold as pure one-after-another-ness is, in Heidegger’s exposition, what makes it possible for anything to encounter us as a manifold at all.<sup>29</sup> In his investigation of ‘givenness,’ which he has now coined pre-view, Heidegger explains that the pre-view does not reveal itself. The manifold is given as one-after-another-ness without the one-after-another-ness having to become ‘thematic.’<sup>30</sup> This means that we do not have to have any explicit knowledge of intuition being of this type to ‘have’ or ‘be given’ the manifold in this way.<sup>31</sup> The basis on which a manifold can meet the senses, or the form of intuition, is unthematically and antecedently pure. Owing to the fact that we ‘live’ in this givenness, Heidegger

<sup>25</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 273.

<sup>26</sup> Cf. *ibid.*

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>28</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 274.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. *ibid.*

<sup>30</sup> ‘Thematic’ is Sheehan’s translation for Heidegger’s ‘*thematisch*.’ With the direct translation he emphasises the conceptual use of this word in Heidegger.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 275.



explains, we take it for granted and it does not become thematic, at least not without intentionally putting it into question.<sup>32</sup> We can envisage it as the glasses through which we see – only it is not a medium, but a form that belongs to representation itself.

The fact that we are not normally aware of time as a pre-view indicates to Heidegger that time itself is not intuited. As a condition of intuition time cannot itself be intuited and we cannot 'find' time out there, like a colour, a tree or a chair. Heidegger's analysis of the givenness of time as a pre-view of the manifold thus points out that time is *given* without time itself being intuited through the senses. With his interpretation of time as a form of intuition in Kant and his own interpretation of the character of givenness (of time), Heidegger aims to show that time is crucial to the way in which the world is understood, without restricting time to sensibility. Furthermore, on the basis of his own interpretation of time as a pre-view, he points out that this significant role of time is 'unthematic' to us, i.e. that the pre-view, time, does not simply present itself to us.

Heidegger goes on to question how the pre-view, i.e. the givenness of time itself, is to be understood in its antecedent character. He explains that time has a certain primacy in that it makes possible that a manifold of the senses is presented to us. This expression of time is pure one-after-another-ness, i.e. a form of succession. Heidegger writes: "As regards any manifold that encounters the senses, it is one-after-another as such, pure succession: that is to say – *time*."<sup>33</sup> Heidegger refers to Kant in this context and explains that time as a pre-view, i.e. here as pure succession, is what makes it possible that the manifold encounters us. Heidegger suggests here with reference to Kant and without explicating this suggestion further that time is what makes it possible that the manifold, a world, is given to us. Time is thus suggested to have some kind of primacy in terms of making the understanding of a world possible. But how is this primacy of the pre-view, of time, to be understood according to Heidegger? The primacy of

<sup>32</sup> "The pre-view is what we live in, it is "taken-for granted" and as such it is un-thematic, hidden, yet Heidegger says it is "a state of affairs that harbors and hides *the* enigma for philosophy" (GA 21, 288). Han-Pile discusses the 'givenness' of time in the context of *Being and Time* where Heidegger calls the form of intuition the "phenomena of phenomenology" (GA 2, 31). Cf. Beatrice Han-Pile: "Early Heidegger's Appropriation of Kant." In: Hubert L. Dreyfus & Mark A. Wrathall (Eds.), *A Companion to Heidegger*. Oxford 2007, 80–101, here: 88. William Blattner states in this context: "According to Heidegger and Heidegger's reconstruction of Kant, our encounter with or experience of entities is structured always by a temporal form, one that the philosopher brings into view phenomenologically." (William D. Blattner: "Laying the ground for metaphysics: Heidegger's appropriation of Kant." In: Charles Guignon (Ed.), *The Companion to Heidegger*. Cambridge 1993, 149–177, here: 172)

<sup>33</sup> GA 21, 275.

time and the ‘what makes it possible’ for Heidegger is, in line with Kant, not to be understood as a ‘before.’ Instead it is a general mode that we can make out in any ‘representedness’ at all. It is ‘primary’ not in the sense of it being at an earlier point in time, as if we saw the one-after-another-ness and then, afterwards, the specific manifold, but instead it is primary in an ontological sense – primary in terms of “it has to be this way, in order for it to be possible (that a sense manifold encounters us).”<sup>34</sup>

What becomes clear here is that Heidegger develops the explanation of the ontological primacy of time with a view to his interpretation of Kant’s forms of intuition: The pre-view is explained with a view to the Transcendental Aesthetic in that time makes it possible for the manifold to encounter us. The antecedent and primary character of time is explained through the pre-view being a (un-thematic) condition of our representation. The interpretation of time as the pre-condition of the manifold is now the point where Heidegger makes clear that he takes a different path to Kant. What is given as a precondition of anything manifold is neither ‘subjective’ nor ‘objective’ to Heidegger, but instead an ontological structure that transcends ‘the sensual’ and ‘thought.’ The *a priori* (of time) is not just subjective and it does not reside in our mind, cut off from the object. It can instead be interpreted as objective *and* subjective in the sense that it is the basic structure of the ontology of *Dasein*.<sup>35</sup> *A priori*, of course, can then no longer be defined through Kantian terminology but is now termed by Heidegger ‘what-one-is-antecedently-with.’<sup>36</sup> As such Heidegger calls the pre-view an *existential* – a basic structure of human existence that is given simultaneously with human existence itself. Heidegger writes: “Subjectively given” now means: given with the subject, which now means: given with human existence, and specifically human existence as being-in-the-world.<sup>37</sup>

Heidegger thus explains the possibility of the givenness of time and space by it being given with the subject as human existence, as being in the world, i. e. as something that is always already in the realm of ‘objects.’ Heidegger makes sense of the givenness of time as universally given with intuition through his interpretation that human existence is antecedently in the world or thrown into the world, i. e. is not assumed to be a being that exists cut off from world. Heidegger thus here introduces his own concept of human existence in order to ex-

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., 274.

<sup>35</sup> Heidegger relates this ontology of *Dasein* to a Kantian terminology and calls it the “subjectivity of the subject,” which signifies that the *a priori* is an explanation of subjectivity in the sense of what it is that constitutes the subject as a subject, which is itself also ‘objective’ (cf. GA 2, 24).

<sup>36</sup> Cf. GA 21, 291.

<sup>37</sup> Cf. *ibid.*

plain the character of the givenness of time. An existential structure is given with human existence itself that explains the possibility of the universal givenness of time as belonging to the subject and intuition (or 'the outer world') simultaneously. Heidegger points out the significance of this different perspective on the character of the a priori (the pre-view) when he states that Kant's main mistake was viewing time and space as simply "residing in the subject"<sup>38</sup> and asserts that this is the reason why "the Transcendental Aesthetic falls into a dark pit from which it cannot escape."<sup>39</sup>

Although Heidegger thus reinterprets Kant with a view to overcoming a subject/object division through a new understanding of time, it must not be overlooked that he also bases his interpretation of givenness and the explanation of his notion of time as a 'pre-view' on a question he poses to Kant: In what way is time given/not given to us? Kant's concept of time as a form of intuition is thus the foundation for Heidegger to expound on his own understanding of time as a pre-view in the context of a theory of knowledge, without committing himself to this system. The notion of time he forms on this oblique epistemological basis will in turn become crucial for Heidegger's own main work, as will become even clearer in the next few sections.

## 2.2 Time as Preview with a View to the Determination of Objects through the Understanding – The Link between Time and **Dasein's** Being in the World

With his interpretation of the Transcendental Aesthetic in the background, Heidegger moves on to the role of time in Kant's question of how it is possible for appearances to be determined through the categories, which Kant tackles in the *Analytic of Principles*. Heidegger's interpretation of time in this Kantian context of how it is possible that the understanding a priori determines appearances a posteriori (and thus objects) will serve as the basis to explain the significance of time for understanding objects in Kant and in turn for *Dasein's* being in the world in his own philosophy.

Since Heidegger does not simply place the a priori of space and time in the mind (*dem Gemüt*), but instead queries the possibility of the *givenness* of time and space, the question of how the categories unite with appearances in the *Analytic of Principles* poses the question for Heidegger as to where the a priori content, the transcendental, comes from. Heidegger asks:

<sup>38</sup> Ibid., 290.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid., 279.

Where does this a priori content come from since, as transcendental, it cannot be drawn from experience? How can these pure concepts of understanding, as unities constitutive of merely empty actions of understanding, have any relation to objects, to content-determined objects? What is given essentially a priori, and what is given universally? – specifically, given in such way that (1) it is something given in general for every action of the understanding that is supposed to determine something in the object; and so that (2) this universally given determines every empirically given in its being-given?<sup>40</sup>

To Heidegger, the a priori content is not simply undetermined and he relates the determination of the a priori content to time. He explains that time, differently to Kant's terminology, must already be a preliminary order in its manner of being given. Heidegger argues that the way the manifold is given through the preview is not a general relation, but a concrete one, e.g. 'under,' 'next to,' 'behind' (in the case of space) and an 'after-this' and a 'before-this' (in the case of time) because of which there is relation (as a concept).<sup>41</sup> This signifies to Heidegger that the intuited is already intuited in a pre-order that enables the conceptualising understanding to order<sup>42</sup> the pre-ordered (this pre-order is time and space). The pre-view is thus the basis for ordering not just in intuition but in a conceptual sense as well. This interpretation of givenness signifies that ordering is not only putting something into an order but the pre-view of an order, i.e. order is not merely an act of a subject in isolation from that which is ordered. Rather, things have to be orderable and given in an orderable way for an order to be possible. What is given, the manifold, time and the understanding are thus not strictly separated in Heidegger, as they are in Kant. Instead, Heidegger emphasizes the interwovenness of these elements in knowledge.

Yet although in Heidegger's interpretation of Kant the pre-view is already a preliminary order, the pre-order in view of intuition is not yet an order or determination through the understanding. He thus queries the relationship of time as a pre-order to the understanding (on the basis of Kant's concept of the understanding). He poses the question of how the preview of an order relates to the understanding, or in Heidegger's terminology here, to thinking. According to Heidegger's interpretation, in the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant investigates what it is "that is antecedently given in what is empirically given, and what it is that is antecedently thought in what is understood as thoughtfully given?"<sup>43</sup> The latter question, Heidegger argues, is to ask what it is that makes the determinateness and being-thought-ness of what is given (as a pre-view, i.e. time) possible.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid., 333.

<sup>41</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 300.

<sup>42</sup> Heidegger explicitly addresses the concept of order *ibid.*, 275 and *ibid.*, 281. In this case, relating to the understanding, he would call it an "order as such."

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, 308.

Heidegger interprets Kant further and says that ‘determining’ and ‘thinking’ is to combine and thus Heidegger asks what it is that makes the combination of the manifold possible. Combination is an act of the understanding (in Kant), but because, according to Heidegger, the understanding has the character of a *cogitatio* in Kant something can only be given to the understanding and be combined by the understanding if it is itself of the character of a *cogitatio*, i. e. something ‘internal’ – a representation. Kant in Heidegger’s interpretation thus asks in this context how representations, which are given as the manifold of inner sense, are combinable and thus determinable. To Heidegger this is the question Kant formulates with regard to the main question of the possibility of knowledge the *Critique of Pure Reason* poses. Yet because Heidegger identifies the givenness of the manifold with time as a pre-view, he says that this question of how representations are determinable and combinable is equivalent to the question “what makes possible the determinability of time?”<sup>44</sup> Heidegger makes clear that to him this question relates to the givenness of time, the relation of time to the manifold, and the relationship of time to the understanding as the faculty of determination (understanding) in Kant. To Heidegger, the question “what makes possible the determinability of time?,” which he sees in Kant, is now the question of interest. He says that it is the question that is posed, or should have been posed, with regard to the phenomena that Kant encountered when asking about the possibility of knowledge in the Schematism Chapter.<sup>45</sup> This question of what makes possible the determinability of time, of course, has to be seen in the contextual relevance of Heidegger’s Kant interpretation it refers to: to him this question is promising to provide an answer to the question of how representations, as the manifold of inner sense, can be determined and combined, which he sees in Kant. This in turn means that to Heidegger the question of the possibility of a determinability of time is to lead us to an answer as to how it is possible that objects are understood the way they are (in Kant) or how it is possible for *Dasein* to be in a world in his own philosophy. Heidegger’s question of the possibility of the determination of time is developed within the context of the question of the possibility of knowledge and the possibility of the understanding determining representations in Kant. Yet Heidegger seeks to overcome Kant’s notion that the understanding or that which is given to the understanding must be a *cogitatio*. Through his new understanding of time and the question as to its determination, it is to be possible to overcome this notion of an inner representation (*cogitatio*), and instead grasp *Dasein* as being in the world.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid.

<sup>45</sup> Cf. *ibid.* f.

### 2.3 The Possibility of the Connection between the ‘I think’ and Time

Let us turn to Heidegger’s interpretation of the possibility of a determination of time, which he sees as the crucial question that should have been posed in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Time can, according to Heidegger, only be determined by something ‘out there’ for me (now, the couch, now when the knife fell). There has to be something ‘in’ time for time to be determined.<sup>46</sup> For an objective determination of time this is obviously not enough since ‘now, that the knife fell’ does not mean a specific time for anyone but myself, Heidegger explains. Thus, time can only be determined objectively through a ‘now’ for which the current concretion of the I is irrelevant – “at all time and in all ‘now’ I and the others for whom time is to be determined must be able to come back to that ‘now.’”<sup>47</sup> Two points are of significance for Heidegger here: 1) any time determination is a determination for an I and 2) there has to be something underlying for every ‘now’ to be a ‘now.’ Kant calls that underlying *substratum* or *subjectum* “the everlasting existence of the proper subject in the appearances”<sup>48</sup> and Heidegger concludes on the basis of his interpretation of this sentence: “This *subjectum* that already underlies every ‘now’- and underlies even more so every [pure] manifold of nows and every one-after-another and every at-the-same-time – this *subjectum* is time itself.”<sup>49</sup> Time itself, as this *subjectum* in all appearances, can, according to Heidegger, itself not be determined because it is nothing but a pure preview and every determination is relative to some present thing.

With this interpretation of the determination of time as such, which is only ever possible through a pure ‘one-after-another-ness’ affecting an I, Heidegger arrives at the very heart of his Kant interpretation. The pure one-after-another-ness is not to be understood, Heidegger says, as an empty something, but as a *subjectum*, a unity, that always underlies every determination. In Heidegger’s interpretation, it is the persistent substance that underlies every manifold for it to be determinable. It is the same persisting unity that, for any determination to be possible, has to be given to an I. And it is time that is presenting the unity that is to be determined in any determination for the I. Heidegger thus calls time the ‘making-present.’ The I, on the other hand, to Heidegger is again an underlying unity for anything to be determined as a unity by the very act of thinking. Heidegger writes:

<sup>46</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 349.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>48</sup> Immanuel Kant: *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*. Akademieausgabe 3. Berlin 1968, B 228.

<sup>49</sup> GA 21, 349.

Only through this relation to the I that thinks, to the "I am thinking" (i. e., the "I have this presented in this act of presenting") can the manifold that is given in such a presenting have a unity. The a priori unity is grounded in this *cogito me cogitare*.<sup>50</sup>

Both the 'I think' and time, according to Heidegger, are a *subjectum* in the sense of something underlying that has no predicate, something that can never be determined itself. On the basis of this, Heidegger arrives at the question that to him makes the *Critique of Pure Reason* an intelligible project of philosophy: The question of the connection between the 'I think' and time.<sup>51</sup> Heidegger explains through his Kant interpretation that there is a unity that underlies the manifold in every determination – time – and there is a unity that underlies every act of the understanding qua conceptualizing – I think. Heidegger now states:

Both of them, time and the I, are what is pre-viewed in a pre-viewing, and both are unthematic. Time is not perceivable as an empirical object, and the I is not an object that can be determined by way of predicates. Instead, both, time and the I are the prior, unavoidable pre-viewed of the unthematic pre-view that goes with any concrete act of knowledge. Both are originary modes of being of the subject.<sup>52</sup>

Heidegger explains, using Kant, that time, as the pre-viewed basis on which the manifold is presented, gives a unity to the 'I think' and that the 'I think' as the pre-viewed basis through which the categories are determining, gives a unity to the determination itself. In this constellation, determination is based on two unities that are dependent on each other. Thus, Heidegger asks: "But how are we to understand the connection? Is time a mode of the 'I think'? Or is the 'I think' a mode of time? Or are both of them modes of an even more original connection?"<sup>53</sup>

Heidegger thematises in this context that while for Kant the representing of representations in the mind is determined by time, the 'I think' can certainly not be temporal in the sense of 'in time.' As the determination of subjectivity itself, the 'I think' has to accompany all of my representations and creates one unitary consciousness. As such, it cannot be 'in time,' but instead falls, as Heidegger formulates it, 'outside time.'<sup>54</sup> Thus, according to Heidegger, the connection of time (a manifold that encounters us as a givenness) and the 'I think' (the determination of the manifold) remains unclear to Kant. But this is in Heidegger's interpretation also to say that it remains unclear how the a priori structures of knowl-

<sup>50</sup> Ibid., 324.

<sup>51</sup> The relationship between time and the I think in Heidegger's Kant interpretation is to explain the relationship between time and *Dasein* (ibid., 269).

<sup>52</sup> Ibid., 324.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid., 346.

<sup>54</sup> Cf. ibid., 269.

edge relate to each other, in order to create a unity. Heidegger resolves the problem for his own interpretation of time as follows:

So within the self as such, there remains this aporia of the connection (or lack thereof) between the a-temporal spontaneity of the “I think” and the spontaneity of self-affection, which is time itself. The difficulty is resolved with one blow once we take seriously time as making-present. The “I-think” is not *in* time (Kant is completely right to reject that) but *is* time itself, or more exactly, one mode of time- that of pure making present. As pure making-present, human existence itself is the “for-which” of whatever it might happen to encounter; and making-present is human existence’s way of letting-something-encounter-it.<sup>55</sup>

The synthesis of the ‘I think’ and time is the ontological structure that, according to Heidegger, makes it possible for anything to be understood as an entity and is an expression of the structure of being as becoming present to us. The ultimate question Heidegger poses in this context is how human existence, or *Dasein*, is to be understood in the context of the ‘I think’ and time taken together. The original synthesis is in Heidegger’s interpretation one that constitutes the ‘I think’ as a ‘for whom something is given’ but it also constitutes time as the possibility of something to be *given-for*.<sup>56</sup> Both modes of this constitution are a mode of time, according to Heidegger’s interpretation.<sup>57</sup> In this manner it can be said that time is the very basic existential of human existence<sup>58</sup> – the way in which the human being *is*. Heidegger writes: “[...] with that “now” human existence expresses *itself*, not as something just-there but itself in its being unto the world, i. e. in the basic form of this being unto the world: the act of making-present.”<sup>59</sup> Hence, time, in Heidegger’s interpretation, becomes equivalent to the existentiality of human existence (*Dasein*).<sup>60</sup>

<sup>55</sup> Ibid.

<sup>56</sup> Heidegger writes (ibid., 330): “What makes it [the original synthesis] so exceptional is the fact that one of the things it combines is the I; and the I means: ‘I think.’ I am that ‘for’ which something can be given. Insofar as I am, I am that very ‘for.’ The I is the ‘for-whom-it-is-given’ of whatever can be given and thus whatever can be determined. The ‘for-whom-it-is-given’ (which is I myself) is likewise the that-which-determines. To combine something with the I – i. e., to let it *be with* this I – means that the “something has the possibility of being-given-for [...]”

<sup>57</sup> “In this way the double determination of time becomes intelligible: first of all, as pure intuition and then as an infinite whole of the manifoldness of the one-after-another. The prior letting-oneself-be-given is, in an unthematic way, time. Likewise, what that prior letting lets itself given is time – which is to say that the subject affects itself with itself.” (Ibid., 241)

<sup>58</sup> Cf. ibid., 402.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid.

<sup>60</sup> In bringing time and human existence together through Kant’s ‘I think,’ Heidegger also says that *Dasein* in the sense of ‘that which I come back to,’ i. e. time itself, is “*Ich-beliebig*” and “*Jetzt-beliebig*” (ibid., 350). There needs to be a now in every determination of an entity and there needs to be an ‘I,’ but which I and which now is irrelevant (cf. ibid.).



### 3. Concluding Remarks

What I hope to have shown is that *Logic: The Question of Truth* is a cornerstone in Heidegger's philosophical development of the understanding of time as ur-temporality and its relationship to human existence. On the basis of his Kant interpretation Heidegger aims to give a content to the word 'time' in his own philosophy – a content which goes beyond an analysis of *Dasein* and is thus, at least logically, able to provide further insight into (the being of) *Dasein* itself. This content for 'time' in the sense of ur-temporality, beyond an analysis of *Dasein*, concerns the ontological primacy of time in the pre-view, the relationship of a givenness (time/world) to *Dasein*, and the inherent relationship between time and *Dasein*.

Yet it must not be overlooked that all of these aspects of time in Heidegger are developed on the basis of an epistemological and structural background given through Kant. The content for 'time' is established on the basis of Kant's question of the possibility of knowledge (as Heidegger puts it). Heidegger's own subsequent re-interpretation of how time is to be understood in fact leaves the Kantian systematic question untouched, yet Kant's epistemology remains the basis for Heidegger's own exposition of time. Heidegger thus provides, through his reference to Kant, and only through this reference, an explanation for the significance of time beyond an analysis of *Dasein*. This content of time is significant since Heidegger not only claims that we understand time through (an analysis of) *Dasein*, but also claims the other way around, and perhaps more importantly, that a correct understanding of time is the condition for an understanding of the being of *Dasein*. It is thus clear that a content for what is meant by the word 'time' has to be offered which is not dependent on an analysis of *Dasein*. It is this content of 'time,' beyond an analysis of *Dasein*, which Heidegger develops on the basis of his interpretation of the *Critique of Pure Reason* and which, as we have seen, remains indebted to the question of the possibility of knowledge. The result is the somewhat paradoxical situation that Heidegger's exposition of his understanding of time is dependent upon the Kantian context it expresses itself in, while Heidegger claims that the understanding of time developed on this basis goes beyond Kant's system and is to serve as a foundation for a new question being posed in philosophy. This is a problem which remains unresolved in Heidegger's subsequent works and which we see most clearly in its beginnings here in *Logic: The Question of Truth*.

