Interpreting and Developing Heidegger’s Analysis of Dasein as Philosophical Anthropology, with a Focus on the ‘Revelatory Moods’ of Anxiety, Boredom and Joy

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Submitted to
Central European University
Budapest, Hungary / Vienna, Austria

In fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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Date submitted: March 30th, 2021
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March 2021
Abstract

This dissertation articulates and defends a conception of philosophical anthropology by reading Martin Heidegger’s ‘analytic of Dasein’ as an exemplary case of it and developing its account of anxiety and boredom. I define philosophical anthropology in distinction to empirical anthropology, which I argue is concerned with specificity and difference. Anthropology investigates human beings and their societies in their historical specificity, situated in context, thereby contributing to the understanding of the differences between human beings and their societies across the world and throughout history. Philosophical anthropology, however, concerns the commonality between human beings. It questions at a more abstract level, asking what being a human being is like in general, what structures every case of human existence, what is common to all instances of it. It attempts to account for the structures of human existence and generate conceptual frameworks and vocabularies for describing and analyzing human life. I claim philosophical anthropology and empirical anthropology can complement, make use of and relate productively to each other, two sides of the same coin in the investigation of human existence. After outlining my conception of philosophical anthropology, I show how Heidegger engages in it in *Being and Time*’s ‘analytic of Dasein’ and other texts of the late 1920s that followed shortly after and continue this sort of project. Heidegger himself, emphatically and repeatedly throughout his career, opposed this reading of his work, but I will show that his most significant arguments in support of this opposition are unconvincing. I then critically develop one aspect of his analysis: its account of what I call the ‘revelatory moods’ of anxiety and boredom. Heidegger theorizes a variety of these moods as involving intense, profound experiences of total meaninglessness, with the very significance of the world receding from us. These experiences convey important insights to us about what it means to exist as human beings. In a brief passage, without arguing for it, Heidegger claims that joy is also a revelatory mood in the same sense, despite its seeming very different from
anxiety and boredom. I critically develop Heidegger’s account to theorize joy as a revelatory mood, supplementing his analysis and deepening its usefulness as a philosophical anthropology. Heidegger gives us a conceptual framework for analyzing important human affective phenomena, interpreting their existential significance and their function in the context of our lives. I conclude with a corollary investigation into the relevance that my conception of philosophical anthropology might have to Cognitive Science. I argue, drawing on the work of Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and Mark Rowlands, that philosophical anthropology could aid Cognitive Science in the construction of what Imre Lakatos called a ‘hard core’ – something that has recently been argued to be problematically missing in Cognitive Science. A ‘hard core’ is a set of refutation-resistant principles, conceptions or theories around which a coherent scientific research program can take place. I show that the work of philosophical anthropologists could be useful in debating and deciding what needs to be included in Cognitive Science’s hard core.
Acknowledgements

I am immensely grateful to the philosophy department at CEU and all the faculty and colleagues that have played some role in helping me write this dissertation, or in my academic development in general. I would especially like to thank my supervisor David Weberman, who has been a pleasure to work with from start to finish, always ready to discuss and critique my ideas with me and give me guidance when I needed it. Thank you so much for all your help, David. I would also like to thank the rest of the faculty, whose classes and talks I greatly enjoyed and with whom I had invaluably helpful discussions in Work-in-Progress Seminars, In-House Conferences and the like. Howard Robinson, Tim Crane, Maria Kronfeldner, Hanoch Ben-Yami, Mike Griffin, Nenad Miscevic, Istvan Bodnar, Simon Rippon, Katalin Farkas, Ference Huoranszki – my sincerest thanks to all of you. I am also grateful to the organizers and participants of the CEU/ELTE Existential Emotions conference for their helpful discussion of my thesis topic. For the role they played in my development and preparing me for undertaking a PhD, I am deeply thankful to the philosophy department at Manchester Metropolitan University – especially Anna Bergqvist, Joanna Hodge, Ullrich Haase, Keith Crome, Nigel Hems, and Mark Sinclair. I owe an unpayable debt of gratitude to Parvez Shaheen, who first introduced me to philosophy, and to my friends and family for their continuous love and support. Thank you, one and all.
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Introduction

Martin Heidegger’s work has exerted a tremendous influence on 20th and 21st century philosophy\(^1\), but it comes with its own set of challenges. It is often difficult to understand, open to multiple interpretations, uses a complex invented vocabulary and steadfastly refuses tradition in a quest to begin philosophy again from the ground up. Many of its challenges come from the fact that Heidegger’s project is hugely ambitious and strives to do something different from the tradition he inherits. But for some of them the fault falls more squarely on him. Sometimes the reason his work is open to interpretation is because he was not clear or consistent. It is certainly questionable whether he overcame the metaphysical language he criticised as inadequate. He claimed that his work was not ethical or political, but repeatedly seemed to criticise modern culture.\(^2\) As worthwhile and productive as his philosophy may be, he was prone to some bad decisions - both in his work and, notoriously, his politics. His zealous anti-Semitism, avowed affiliation with Nazism (and his lack of apology or remorse) will taint his reputation forever and only makes his work more puzzling, not least because of its supposed silence on ethics and politics. But Heidegger is especially perplexing because, despite his disastrous politics, his lasting influence on philosophy is well deserved. *Being and Time* is a singular masterpiece that covers a dizzying array of topics and penetratingly analyses the

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\(^1\) And also (to a lesser degree) outside of philosophy, especially in certain circles of architecture, gender, environmental and critical theory, or psychology. Regarding the latter, the *Daseinsanalyse* of Ludwig Binswanger and Medard Boss even borrowed its name from one of Heidegger’s most central concepts (Dasein). They both developed a psychoanalytic theory based on central Heideggerian and Freudian insights. The films (and philosophical writing) of Terrence Malick also show a distinct Heideggerian influence.

\(^2\) I’m thinking primarily of the sections on the ‘they’, everyday being-in and the ‘falling’ of Dasein in *Being and Time*, and the (perhaps more obvious) critique of modernity in *The Question Concerning Technology*. 
human condition. His lecture courses are usually models of clarity which provide engaging introductions to some of history’s most challenging thinkers. His work in the late 1920s includes some of the most significant texts in the phenomenological tradition.

It is therefore fitting that philosophers continue to engage with Heidegger’s thought, grapple with its central tensions and build on it, because it is so ripe for development. This is exactly what I intend to do in this dissertation, which examines Heidegger’s relationship to anthropology in general and philosophical anthropology in particular. I show that, despite his arguments to the contrary, he gave us a philosophical anthropology - which is perhaps his most significant contribution to philosophy. His work purports to be a kind of ontology - the study of the nature of being - but it is at its most interesting when taken as a kind of philosophical anthropology because, even if it does other things too, it simply is a philosophical anthropology, and a very good one. This is a highly controversial claim, not least because Heidegger himself, emphatically and repeatedly, argued against it. I will show that his arguments in support of this view are unconvincing: he was wrong to claim that his work essentially differs from philosophical anthropology. But this is far from a negative outcome. Heidegger makes a productive and interesting contribution to philosophical anthropology, even if he didn’t think that was what he was doing.

Much of this dissertation will consist in unpacking and refuting Heidegger’s distinction of his own work from philosophical anthropology and interpreting his work as philosophical anthropology. Having shown that this approach is legitimate and productive, I will attempt to develop one significant aspect of Heidegger’s philosophy further in this direction – his analysis of what I call ‘revelatory moods’. For Heidegger, ‘moods’ are one of our ‘existential structures’
– a general feature of human existence, an ever-operative structure that plays a constitutive role in our existence and the processes by which we apprehend and live in our world. Our existence consists of the unitary operation of these various structures, their complicated interplay producing our peculiar kind of being. What Heidegger is trying to ascertain when he talks about moods is the role of various affective phenomena – including emotions, feelings, moods – in the context of our existence. His analysis is an interesting one but, as it often is with Heidegger, a difficult one to make sense of, largely because it is remarkably limited - it only discusses three moods in any kind of detail. The two moods he discusses the most are anxiety [Angst] and boredom [Langeweile], both examples of a special, ‘revelatory’ type of mood. While all moods reveal something to us (about particular things in our existence, or our affective state), revelatory moods are disclosive in a more profound sense, revealing something about the nature of our existence, our being-in-the-world as such. They act as an enabling condition for our being able to seize hold of our lives, freedom and possibilities authentically, unlocking our existential potential.

After reconstructing Heidegger’s account of anxiety and boredom, I will develop his analysis and apply it to a mood he did not discuss in detail: joy, which I will argue can be revelatory of our being-in-the-world in a similar way. Heidegger theorizes anxiety and boredom as involving intense experiences of meaninglessness, where the significance of the world completely recedes. When significance drains away, it is revealed for what it otherwise always is – we become aware of the usual significance of things in its absence. Such experiences, Heidegger argues, forcibly confront us with important truths about existence. These include insights our freedom, our role as sense-makers that create and inhabit a space of meaning, and our responsibility for significance. I critically develop this idea by arguing that what is important for a mood to be revelatory is not necessarily the receding of significance, but the complete,
radical transformation of our usual experience of the world. This, I think, can be evidenced in experiences of deep joy – the way we encounter and make sense of the world, in its significance, completely transforms in states of profound joyfulness. Heidegger affords us a way of interpreting the existential significance of the intense experiences of joy which crop up rarely at important junctures in our lives.

My project interprets Heidegger’s work as philosophical anthropology and develops its account of human existence in a direction that he did not. But to begin with, I must examine the constituent elements of my topic, beginning with philosophical anthropology itself. Because to argue that Heidegger’s work is philosophical anthropology, I must justify the following claims:

1) Philosophical Anthropology is possible, and worth pursuing.
2) Philosophical Anthropology differs from other kinds of Anthropology.
3) Heidegger gave us a kind of Philosophical Anthropology.³

The first 3 sections, comprising chapter 1, will establish points 1 and 2. Section 1 provides a working definition of philosophical anthropology and distinguishes it from empirical anthropology. Philosophical anthropology, I argue, is concerned with specifying and examining general features of human existence regardless of historical context, where anthropology is largely concerned with human specificity and difference within historical context. Of the many forms a philosophical-anthropological investigation could take, I defend one which closely ties it to phenomenology, interpreting phenomenology as a particularly

³ Though this is not the main focus of my work, it is worth noticing that this would mean a lot of other philosophers are doing philosophical anthropology in the same sense too. There may be various ways of conducting and conceiving philosophical anthropology, but the one I will defend here has been conducted by philosophers apart from Heidegger: the amount of philosophers influenced by him, have taken ideas and methods from him, or even just see themselves as doing the same kind of work as him, is substantial. Probably the most remarkable example is Jean-Paul Sartre, whose Being and Nothingness was explicitly intended as a companion piece to Being and Time, and whose topic was explicitly 'phenomenological ontology', as Heidegger’s was.
productive type of philosophical anthropology because it examines the structures of human existence from a first-person perspective. Phenomenology concerns the experience of being a human being, reflecting on the structures necessary for our experience to be the way it is, and generating conceptual frameworks for analysing them. It is therefore well-poised for the task of identifying general features of human existence. There may well be other forms that a philosophical anthropology could take, and they may share things in common with my conception of it, but they will not be my concern here. Section 2 considers arguments against the possibility of philosophical anthropology, drawn from the work of Arthur Danto and Charles Walsh on the philosophy of history. They argue that a certain kind of philosophy of history is impossible for reasons that, if true, would also apply to philosophical anthropology. I refute their arguments against the ‘substantive’ philosophy of history, defending it along with philosophical anthropology. Section 3 makes the easier, briefer case that philosophical anthropology is worth pursuing.

Having clarified what philosophical anthropology is, argued that it is possible and worthwhile, I turn to the issue of Heidegger – a more difficult task. To argue that Heidegger’s work is best read as a philosophical anthropology requires confronting the fact that he was staunchly opposed to such a reading. He dedicated a remarkable amount of philosophical energy throughout his career to arguing against this idea. The idea of anthropology, philosophical or otherwise, appears in the overwhelming majority of his texts at some point, where he (almost always) criticises it and distances his own work from it. Chapter 2 deals with what I take to be the most significant criticisms Heidegger made about anthropology throughout his career, reconstructing and responding to them. My overriding objection to Heidegger, expressed in

4 For more on this, see Appendix 3.
different ways, will be that he was mistaken to distance himself from anthropology and to claim that his work essentially differs from philosophical anthropology. His work at the very least contains a powerful, thorough and interesting kind of philosophical anthropology, despite his insistence to the contrary.

Section 4 examines the remarks Heidegger makes about the relationship between his work and anthropology in *Being and Time*, when he is explaining what kind of project he is attempting. He sharply distinguishes it from anthropology, calling it ‘fundamental ontology’. Fundamental ontology, on Heidegger’s view, essentially differs from anthropology of any kind – it operates on a more fundamental level, is motivated by different things and, due to a technicality of his approach, purports not to be concerned with analysing human existence. Rather, it analyses Dasein, Heidegger’s neologism for the entity that can raise the question of the meaning of being. Dasein, in principle, is not limited to human beings – there could potentially be aliens that could do this. Because of this level of abstraction, and his different motivations and concerns, Heidegger claims his work is essentially different to anthropology. But an account of Dasein just is an account of human existence, because human beings are Dasein. There is nothing that can be said truly of Dasein that cannot be said truly of human beings, so when Heidegger is giving an account of the structure of Dasein’s existence, he is giving one of the structure of human existence, discerning its non-contingent features and giving us a conceptual framework to analyse it with – precisely the aim of philosophical anthropology.

Section 5 moves from anthropology to examining Heidegger’s most significant remarks about philosophical anthropology specifically. These appear in *Kant and the Problem of*
Metaphysics, an important text for Heidegger for several reasons, not least because in it he attempts to make sense of the affinity between his work and Kant’s. Both philosophers conceive their work as being a necessary prerequisite for future philosophy, and both think that a fundamental aspect of this work involves the construction of a theory about our existence. For Heidegger, an analysis of the existence of Dasein, the entity that we are one possible instance of, is a requirement for us to be able to pursue the question of the meaning of being, the most fundamental philosophical question. For Kant, philosophy’s questions and concerns all lead back to the question of what the human being is, and its kind of existence. But the affinity between the two ends here, because Kant conceives of this task as being a kind of anthropology (and therefore of philosophy as being anthropocentric) and Heidegger does not. For Kant, there must be a kind of philosophical anthropology at the centre of philosophy – it is its most fundamental task. Heidegger discusses philosophical anthropology with a view to rejecting this. He argues that philosophical anthropology cannot fulfil the role Kant wants it to, that it is inherently unclear, and Kant is unable to show that philosophical questions ultimately lead back to questions of human existence. I refute these claims by considering Heidegger’s conception of his own project, reading him against himself. Much of what Heidegger says about Kant’s approach to philosophy can be applied accurately to his own project, since the giving of an account of human existence (even if under the guise of an account of Dasein) is central to Heidegger’s project, and is conceived of as a prerequisite for future philosophy, just as Kant conceives it. Heidegger’s criticisms of Kant can be applied accurately to his own project, but this is not a negative outcome for it, it gives us more reason to believe that

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5 For instance, it includes the kind of discussion that was supposed to occur in the unfinished third part of Being and Time, which was supposed to engage in a ‘phenomenological destruction of the history of ontology’, beginning with Kant and working backwards through Descartes and Aristotle.
Heidegger’s work is a productive philosophical anthropology, one that can actually answer some of the problems he raises with Kant’s philosophy.

Chapter 3 turns to exactly how Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein constitutes a philosophical anthropology, and how it can be developed. Section 6 details exactly how the analysis of Dasein in *Being and Time* is a philosophical anthropology. It shows how - through its conceptual rubric of necessary, *existential* structures, their contingent, *existentiell* manifestations and their ‘deficient modes’ - how Heidegger provides a theoretical framework and vocabulary through which we can analyse the phenomena of human life. Focussing on the various possible manifestations of our social being, I show how Heidegger engages in philosophical anthropology, directly contributing to the theorizing of human existence. This section is mainly there to give an indication of the breadth of different ways the text can be said to engage in philosophical anthropology. Even though I later examine only one aspect of Heidegger’s analysis – moods – in greater detail, section 6 safeguards against the idea that his analysis of moods is the only way *Being and Time* could be interpreted as philosophical anthropology.

Section 7 deals with the account of moods given in *Being and Time*, which speaks of them in terms of *Befindlichkeit* (disposedness) and *Stimmung* (mood). After dealing with some issues of translation, I explain how Heidegger casts moods as ‘fundamentally disclosive’, meaning they reveal things to us on a more fundamental and different level than reason, cognition and knowing. Moods play an integral role in our most basic, pre-theoretical sense-making processes, our apprehension of the world and the things in it. They reveal not just our general affective state, or ‘how we are doing’, they partly constitute the process by which we meaningfully apprehend objects. Heidegger exemplifies this with reference to fear, which
discloses things as meaningful – as being worthy of fear. Moods give us an affective context through which to experience our world, which discloses the thing in it to us and alters the way we encounter them depending on what mood we are in.

But moods also facilitate a more profound kind of disclosure, which concerns our being-in-the-world as such, and what it is like to be the kind of entity we are. Section 8 deals with Heidegger’s account of the ‘revelatory’ moods of anxiety and boredom, which requires engaging with texts beyond Being and Time such as the 1929 lecture What is Metaphysics? and his lecture course The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics. As we will see, anxiety and boredom both involve states where the significance of the world drains away, a profound experience of meaninglessness where we are left hanging in an all-consuming void. In anxiety, we are paralysed before the awesome weight of our possibilities, anxious in the face of our responsibility over our lives. Anxiety acts as an existential catalyst for our being able to realise these things and press forward into our lives authentically. In boredom, we become so bored that everything becomes meaningless and we have a similar experience, but one that compels us to seize hold of our existence authentically so as to not have empty, boring, meaningless lives. Anxiety and boredom bring us face to face with our being-in-the-world, an experience which confers manifold existential insights onto us. To be confronted with our being is to be confronted with our freedom and our responsibility as sense-making entities to inhabit and maintain a shared space of significance.

Section 9 develops Heidegger’s analysis by using it to make sense of a mood that he did not discuss in detail. It takes as a clue a curious remark he makes in passing which indicates that joy is also a revelatory mood. But why joy? Intuitively, joy does not seem to involve
experiences of meaninglessness, where we can’t make sense of the world. Quite the opposite: the world becomes saturated with meaning. I argue that, with some critical development, Heidegger’s theory of revelatory moods can be made to accommodate the phenomenon of deep joy. What is important for revelatory moods is not that the significance of the world drains away, but that it is radically transformed. Anxiety and boredom involve a kind of ‘you don’t know what you’ve got until it’s gone’ experience, where the significance of the world is revealed and made conspicuous in its absence. In moments of profound joy, we do not apprehend the world and the meaning of the things in it in our usual way: a radical transformation of our experience of the significance of the world occurs. As a concrete example, I take the experiences of MDMA (ecstasy) users. If there is ever an experience of revelatory joy, it seems like it could be found here – though it is not the only place it can be found. MDMA users seem to enter a state where everything is encountered in terms of joy - a complete change in their apprehension of the world. This is what is required for us to have the same kind of existential experience, the ‘you don’t know what you’ve got until it’s gone’, of revelatory moods.

With this, the main aspect of my analysis is concluded. In the space I have remaining, I engage in a different kind of investigation, indicating the potential application of philosophical anthropology elsewhere. Chapter 4 concerns Cognitive Science, a discipline originally conceived of as a unified science of cognition combining elements from philosophy, anthropology, artificial intelligence, psychology, linguistics and neuroscience. But its desire for cohesion, as the authors of What Happened to Cognitive Science? show, has not materialised. Cognitive Science appears troublingly fragmented, with no agreed-upon idea of itself. It lacks what Imre Lakatos called a ‘hard core’: a set of shared core ideas and claims to organise research around that remains unchallenged or at least challenge-resistant by
methodological decision – a necessity for any coherent science. Philosophical anthropology is well-poised to reflect on potential things to be included in it – about cognition, human existence, experience, etc. I draw on ideas from Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty to make the case that the tenets of 4E cognition – extended, embedded, embodied and enactive cognition – must find inclusion in the hard core of cognitive science, and we can find evidence for this in the work of philosophical anthropologists.
Chapter 1: The Possibility of and Need for Philosophical Anthropology

§1: What is Philosophical Anthropology?

Richard Schacht’s eminent defence of philosophical anthropology raises the pertinent issue of “what the point of such an anthropology would be, since we already have a discipline called ‘anthropology’ […] Why add another, ‘philosophical’ anthropology […] and what would be philosophical about it?”6 The question of how philosophical anthropology differs from ‘regular’, empirical anthropology is a good place to begin because it allows us to understand how both can be an inquiry into human existence, and what is philosophical about philosophical anthropology. When discussing Ernst Tugendhat’s philosophical anthropology, Heiss claimed that “as a result of focusing on other themes, anthropology hasn’t developed sophisticated theoretical tools to analyse individuals.”7 Perhaps this indicates something to us about what role philosophical anthropology could fill, and how it might co-exist productively with anthropology. While I won’t focus on the term ‘individual’, I will claim that philosophical anthropology can attempt to make sense of the structure and features of the human experience, from a first-person perspective – which would be relevant for analysing individuals. Philosophical anthropology is concerned with the commonality and generality between human beings, which keeps it at a more abstract (but no less legitimate) level of inquiry that anthropology tends to avoid. This kind of work that can relate beneficially to anthropological research in important ways that would facilitate interdisciplinary dialogue. Philosophical anthropology, and its associated conceptual frameworks and vocabularies, can be used as a means of analysing anthropological research, clarifying and debating the “implicit notions”

7 Assessing Ernst Tugendhat’s Philosophical Anthropology as a Theoretical Template for Analysing the Individual (HET in text), Jan Patrick Heiss, Zeitschrift für Ethnologie, bd. 140 / H 1 Special Issue: Towards an Anthropology of the Individual, 2015, p. 35-54, p. 35
(HET 41) anthropologists have of their concepts. But on the other hand, philosophical anthropology can take inspiration from anthropological research, using its findings as evidence or stimulation for thought in its inquiries into human society.

My initial contention here will be that anthropology is the inquiry into human beings, but the academic discipline of anthropology is primarily concerned with cataloguing and describing the specificity of and differences between human beings. This is a stronger claim than Heiss’: it is not just that anthropology has decided to focus on other things, but that there is a general preoccupation in it with specificity and difference that takes anthropology in a different direction to philosophical anthropology. Anthropologists investigate and describe particular human beings and their societies in their social, geographical, historical specificity. Philosophical anthropology, however, is concerned with finding what is common to or significant for all instantiations of human existence, and every instantiation of the experience of being one. Philosophical anthropology attempts to describe what it is like to live a human life regardless of cultural, historical or geographical situation, specifying and elucidating its significant features and phenomena, “dealing with such phenomena in a way that enables us to discern them as aspects of human life, and to grasp their significance for its understanding” (SPA 157). Rather than examining specific human beings in specific societies at specific points in history or asking what specific societies and cultures have in common with each other, philosophical anthropology abstracts, considering what it is to be a human and what human beings all have in common on an existential level. Empirical anthropology is preoccupied with difference, philosophical anthropology with generality. In line with this orientation, philosophical anthropology has often been defined in terms of ‘human nature’. 8 But, as

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8 In his introduction to a volume on *Naturalism and Philosophical Anthropology*, Honenberger lists Schacht, Haeffner and Pihlström as examples of this tendency. (*Naturalism*...
Honenberger puts it, ‘“human nature’ has problematically narrow implications […] [of being] committed to essentialism, or self-restricted to a concern with the ‘natural’ or ‘innate’ side of human existence” (NPA 16) This is desirable to overcome and explicitly warned against by some philosophical anthropologists. In this dissertation, I opt to speak of philosophical anthropology in terms of being an investigation into human existence, rather than human nature. But this kind of investigation can take many forms and will need clarifying.

I favour an approach to philosophical anthropology akin to the one expounded by Richard Zaner⁹, who closely ties it to phenomenology. Zaner interprets phenomenology as a kind of philosophical anthropology because it analyses the structures and features of human existence. Phenomenologists try to discover what the experience of existing as a human being is like, what structures must be operative for this experience to be the way it is, and what vocabulary is best suited for investigating and describing it. Without necessarily claiming that phenomenology is the best or most productive kind of philosophical anthropology, it does seem to me like phenomenology is particularly well-suited to engage in it. Working from out of our personal experience, phenomenology tries to discover features of it that all human beings share, which would be “not only or merely descriptively true of just this or that individual man, but for the being of man as such.” (ZAP 68) This method, which largely focusses on the first-person perspective, need not necessarily exclude other perspectives from its analysis. It could, for example, make use of and complement empirical research, like empirical anthropology. There is no reason why a philosophical anthropologist could not make use of an

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⁹ An Approach to Philosophical Anthropology (ZAP in text), Richard Zaner, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 27, no. 1, September 1996, p. 55-68
anthropologist’s findings about an aspect of a particular culture to find out what it might tell us about the general structures of human existence which underlie the phenomena that anthropologists analyse.

§1.1 Anthropology: The Exploration of Human Specificity and Difference

I do not know why believing in the brotherhood of man should mean that one cannot say that the Japanese have their own version of the conduct of life and that Americans have theirs. It sometimes seems that the tender-minded could not base a doctrine of good will upon anything less than a world of peoples each of which is a print from the same negative. The tough-minded are content that differences should exist. They respect differences. Their goal is a world made safe for differences, where the United States can be American to the hilt without threatening the peace of the world, and France may be France, and Japan may be Japan on the same conditions.10

- Ruth Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword

To know whether philosophical anthropology is possible, we must know what it is, or purports to be – and what anthropology is. Ruth Benedict’s words serve, I think, as a guide for how we should understand anthropology - as being largely concerned with specificity and difference, rather than generality and commonality. Anthropology investigates human beings in their socio-historical specificity, cataloguing and analysing human differences, in the hope of understanding each other better and living peacefully together. This conception has been echoed by others. Conrad Phillip Kottak named his 1997 book Anthropology: The Exploration of Human Diversity11 and Clyde Kluckhohn wrote similarly to Benedict:

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anthropology provides a scientific basis for dealing with the crucial dilemma of the world today: how can peoples of different appearances, mutually unintelligible languages and dissimilar ways of life get along peaceably together?¹²

By understanding what specific societies are like, we can understand how these societies differ from one another, and understanding human differences is crucial for living peacefully despite them. ‘Anthropology’ is a “science of humanity”¹³ concerned with giving accounts of specific societies and social groups in context, or with comparing societies and their structures. Be it through historical analyses, biological investigation or ethnographic research which describes first-hand experiences, anthropologists attempt to understand human societies in their socio-historical specificity.¹⁴ The more it does this, the richer a picture of humanity we have and the more we can understand the scope of human differences – a necessary step toward living despite them.

Today, anthropology has various subdisciplines that differ in focus, aim and method. Human beings encompass a wealth of phenomena worthy of study, so much so that the discipline has divided into specialized categories over time. These categories have a relative degree of independence but nonetheless overlap. I will briefly characterise each of them and their focusses of enquiry here. Our understanding of the general discipline of anthropology and its

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¹² Mirror For Man, Clyde Kluckhohn, Fawcett, New York, 1949, p. 1


¹⁴ ‘Mostly’ because there is also a wealth of anthropological study devoted to more theoretical concerns, such how this task should be done, the ethical and academic problems it presents. Barbara Tedlock gives an interesting take on how cultural anthropologists’ attitudes have shifted on this since the 1970s. (From Participant Observation to the Observation of Participation: the Emergence of Narrative Ethnography, Barbara Tedlock, Journal of Anthropological Research, Vol. 47, no. 1 (Spring 1991), p. 69-94) For an example of more general analysis, see Vidich. (Participant Observation and the Collection and Interpretation of Data, Arthur J. Vidich, American Journal of Sociology, Vol 60, no. 4 (January 1955), p. 354-360)
subdisciplines will equip us for developing and contrasting the idea of a philosophical anthropology with it later.

*Physical/Biological Anthropology* concerns the biological aspect of the human being, focussing “broadly on three sets of problems: human and nonhuman primate evolution, human variation and its significance, and the biological bases of human behaviour.” (EBA 2) Physical anthropology examines empirical evidence about our biological constitution to construct theories about what we are and how we came to be this way. As a result, physical anthropology becomes both about the similarities and differences between human beings, and the biological basis of these similarities and differences. An example of a physical-anthropological observation might be that all humans have brains, the size and development of which has varied over time – this is something we all share. But not all humans have, for instance, the same skin colour: dark-skinned people have a higher mount of the pigment melanin, which makes skin darker. This is something which (though humans all partake of a similar biological system) varies between humans depending on certain factors, biological heritage being the key one. Physical anthropology accounts for and maps these kinds of differences between people.

*Cultural Anthropology* is “a family of approaches oriented by the culture concept.” (EBA 2) which studies the nature and variation of human cultures throughout history. Cultural anthropology has employed many methods but are united in their idea that culture is the thing to be understood and it does this by studying and interpreting the norms, laws, art, rituals, and ideas from various cultures. Cultural anthropology focusses on a particular culture of a particular historical period (Ancient Greece, Ancient Egypt, Revolutionary France, Modern America, etc.) and tries to describe and understand it as a singular culture as much as possible.
Social Anthropology is largely founded on fieldwork-based study and comparative analysis of human societies across the world and throughout history, with a tendency to avoid the concept of ‘culture’ in favour of ‘social relations’. Alfred Radcliffe-Brown, one of its founders, argued that ‘culture’ is “a vague abstraction”\(^{15}\) that anthropologists should avoid in favour of a more concrete way of speaking about and analysing human beings. Social anthropologists, at least under Radcliffe-Brown’s conception, view their work as “a branch of natural science”\(^{16}\), employing “methods essentially similar” to science to analyse and catalogue “the relations of association between individual organisms”. (OSS 2-3) These relations are most properly understood as social relations, not cultural relations. ‘Culture’ and ‘cultural relations’, according to Brown, do not denote “any concrete reality” (OSS 3) the way the ‘social’ equivalent of these terms does, and therefore do not lend themselves as well to a scientifically minded outlook. Social anthropology was originally conceived of as a scientific way of documenting the relations present between people and the institutions they create in society, and understanding the variety and nature of these relations as they manifest in different societies.

The differences between social and cultural anthropology are not as sharp as the differences between them and physical anthropology. We can note the tendency toward a difference in attitude to comparative study and the keenness of social anthropologists to avoid the term


\(^{16}\) Nowadays, the degree to which anthropology is scientific is debated, with some claiming that it is more humanistic, or literary, than scientific. But in both cases, the concern with specificity and generality would still hold, regardless of the methods or types of evidence employed in it. For more on this, see: (Engelke, Matthew. ed. 2009. *The Objects of Evidence: Anthropological Approaches to the Production of Knowledge*. Chichester, U.K. Malden, MA. Wiley-Blackwell. (Intro)) / (Hastrup, Kirsten. 2004. *Getting it Right: Knowledge and Evidence in Anthropology*. *Anthropological Theory* 4: 455-472.)
‘culture’, but they have much in common. Neither social nor cultural anthropology is concerned with the physical constitution of the human, or the biological similarities and differences in human beings worldwide. This is perhaps, at least in principle, the only thing that cultural and social anthropologists are not interested in: if something about a group of humans at a certain time has significance, perhaps in comparison with other groups of humans, then it can be studied by social or cultural anthropologists. The lines between these subdisciplines are not always sharp in terms of the evidence they use and the aspects of human society they study, which is also evident when considering the remaining subdisciplines of anthropology.

Linguistic Anthropology studies human beings from the perspective of their languages: their nature, development, similarities, and differences. Language is analysed as “the fundamental mechanism through which people create culture and social life.” (EBA 2) Linguistic anthropology studies how language impacts people and the development of their cultures, how languages change over time and how differences in language relate to other kinds of differences: racial, cultural etc. A discipline relating to each of the above without necessarily being considered a kind of anthropology is Archaeology. Often seen as a separate discipline but nonetheless having anthropological concerns (in that it studies historical human societies), archaeology often intermingles with anthropological studies, usually in the form of providing evidence for them. If an archaeologist digs up the bones of an ancient hominid, this physical evidence could become the object of study for a physical anthropologist. Similarly, the discovery of ancient writings could be used by a linguistic anthropologist, a cultural anthropologist, or in the comparative analysis of a social anthropologist, etc. So even if archaeology is not considered to be engaged in anthropology directly, it often intermingles with it closely.
This is obviously a tentative sketch of anthropology, which does not capture the full extent of the range of each of its categories and the disagreements within and between each of them about how anthropology should be done. However, it does note their salient focusses and allows us to make the following observations. Anthropology is a study of human existence, which approaches this topic from a particular perspective, oriented by specificity and difference. I will slightly modify Albert Piette’s conception of anthropology as a means of illustrating this: “anthropology is interested in what [specific] people do. It takes into account those elements of action (for instance, roles, norms, ideas) that are relevant for the action[s] [that specific actors] carry out.”\textsuperscript{17} Anthropology is, by and large, not concerned with human beings in general, but with specific human beings and their societies: what they do, how they live and why, in context.

So anthropology examines specific human beings, finding out as much information about the contingent manifestations of human societies and their people as possible. In doing so, anthropology paints a picture of diverse instantiations of human existence in their historical specificity, showing how similar and different they are to each other. Each branch of anthropology, in turn, isolates a specific aspect of human existence to study: languages, a culture, the comparison of social structures and relations, or the biological body. Each branch approaches their study from its particular orientation and each overlap with the others in terms of what evidence they use and in the results of their studies. So where would something a ‘philosophical anthropology’ fit into all of this? Is there any room, or necessity, for it? If so, what would it be for? For philosophical anthropology to be a useful discipline, it would have to have a clear direction, offer something that anthropologists either do not or tend not to, and

\textsuperscript{17} L’acte d’Exister, Albert Piette, quoted in Heiss 2015 (HET), p. 51
if possible, exist in a productive relationship to anthropological research and its discoveries. I claim that it does and can, because whereas anthropology is concerned with specific cases of human existence, philosophical anthropology is concerned with human existence in general.

§1.2 Philosophical Anthropology: A Working Definition

Because philosophical anthropology is an investigation into the general structures of human existence, there are presumably many possible ways it can be done. Though there may be conflicting conceptions of it, I propose one to focus on here because I will later argue that Heidegger’s work is representative of it, despite his arguments against this view. The words ‘philosophical anthropology’ denote a philosophical kind of anthropology. So a good definition would have to explain the following: why it is both philosophical and anthropological, its aim, what it offers us that anthropology does not, and its productive relevance to anthropology.

Anthropology is concerned with the diversity of human beings and understanding human societies in their historical specificity. Philosophical anthropology, however, is concerned with the general commonalities to be found among human beings insofar as they all exemplify the human condition, or the experience of being a human being. Anthropology attempts to understand and describe humans, their cultures, societies and the differences between them, either isolated and on their own terms, or in how they compare to one another. What

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18 Walter Bruning gives a good indication of this. He lists many schools of philosophy that could be understood as types of philosophical anthropology, or moments in its development – essentialism, naturalism, personalism, subjective and objective idealism, pragmatism, existentialism, transcendentalism, and others. Though all philosophical anthropologies might share a common aim, they may not share methods and assumptions, and here I will be outlining the type I wish to focus on at the expense of analysing potential others. (The Fundamental Types of Present Philosphic Anthropology, Walter Bruning, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 17, no. 1 (September 1956), p. 114-121)
anthropologists tend not to do is go beyond historical and cultural specificity, or the comparison of particular societies. Their level of abstraction tends not to be at a high enough level to find generalities between all humans, characteristics we all share which structure human existence and the human experience. While this is not a criticism of anthropology, this is a space for other legitimate and interesting work to be done, a role that philosophical anthropology could fulfil.

One might immediately raise an objection here. Doesn’t biological anthropology, for example, try to find what is common to all humans, since it analyses the physical constitution of human beings? In this way, it could perhaps find features of human existence present in every instantiation of it. A biological anthropologist could examine countless human beings and find, for example, that despite the equally countless ways in which it happens, all human beings’ bodies eventually die. Bodily death is therefore a universal feature of human existence, and this is something we can discover biologically. This example is true, but the kind of insights one can generate about death through biology and philosophy are very different. When philosophers reflect on death, as they have done since Socrates, they are usually not talking about biological processes and empirical data. Rather, they are trying to figure out what the significance of death is from the perspective of living – how the confrontation with our mortality affects us, how it impacts on our lives more generally, determines how we exist and behave while we are still alive, and what we should think about it.¹⁹ No doubt there is much that biology could tell us about death that is interesting, but not in the same sense as a philosophical anthropology would be interested in. The kind of generality that philosophical anthropology looks for is the kind that inquires into what human existence is like to live through, and how certain features of human existence impact how human beings conduct their

¹⁹ Not to mention myriad of questions that arise in theology about whether there can be any life after death, etc.
lives. Philosophers have often searched for universality in their questioning, whether in terms of goodness, knowledge, truth, certainty or otherwise. What a philosopher might offer anthropology could be an attempt to discover truths and commonalities that all human beings share regardless of geographical or historical situation. Philosophers can look at anthropological findings, examine their own consciousness or their experiences of other people and discover things that are constitutive for and universal about human existence. Rather than isolate societies or a culture or the biological body to study, philosophical anthropologists can consider humans in general and try to work out what is common to them all by considering anthropological evidence, reflecting on their own experience, or both.

This is what makes philosophical anthropology philosophical: it tries to make abstractions and generalizations about human beings that are somehow beyond the purview of anthropological work.\textsuperscript{20} Examples of questions anthropologists might deal with are ‘how do people from society X live, or think?’ , ‘what does phenomenon Y mean for society Z?’ Clifford Geertz’s famous ethnographic essay \textit{Deep Play: Notes on the Balinese Cockfight}\textsuperscript{21} describes Balinese society. It addresses questions like: ‘what are Balinese people like?’ , ‘what is Balinese society like?’ , ‘what role does cockfighting play in Balinese society?’ , ‘what is the relationship between an ‘outsider’ and the Balinese?’\textsuperscript{22} Kenneth Read’s work on the Gahuku-Gama people

\textsuperscript{20} Which means that many (if not all) philosophers will have engaged in it at some point, explicitly or not.

\textsuperscript{21} \textit{Deep Play: Notes on the Balinese Cockfight}, Clifford Geertz, \textit{Daedalus}, Fall 2005, 134, 4, Research Library, p. 56-86

\textsuperscript{22} This particular question is indicative of a philosophical question that anthropologists confront often in the course of its investigations, namely what the role and effect of the observer is in anthropological inquiry, and how to deal with the fact that the person observing and collecting data is just that: an observer, often an ‘outsider’. There are many questions that arise from this important issue, in terms of how the observation impacts what is observed, etc. But, as I will allude to in another chapter, this is a question that would belong to a ‘philosophy of anthropology’, not a ‘philosophical anthropology.’ (§2)
of New Guinea\textsuperscript{23} addresses similar questions about them, but focusses on different phenomena, tackling questions like ‘how do the Gahuku-Gama understand ‘personhood’ or ‘morality’?’ Pierre Clastres’ fascinating political anthropology contains an ethnography of the Guayaki Indians which investigates, among other things, their sense of humour, working lives, and the role of the gruesome torture involved in their initiation rituals.\textsuperscript{24} These sorts of questions are typical of anthropological work, especially in ethnography, which constitutes a significant amount of anthropological research. Generally, anthropological research concerns particular people, particular societies, in a specific time and place. Philosophical anthropology questions at a more abstract level, approaching topics that could not (or at least, overwhelmingly tend not to) be addressed within an ethnography of a society, or any kind of anthropological research that focusses on specific societies in a particular place and time.

The family of interrelated questions philosophical anthropology addresses are ‘what is a human being?’, ‘what kind of existence does a human being have?’ and ‘what is it like to live a human life?’ These questions cannot be answered by describing a single culture, since cultures vary wildly and what is pertinent in one may not be in another. Philosophical anthropology would consider human existence in general and try to uncover commonality between all instances of it, elucidating its constitutive features. Philosophical anthropologists, therefore, could make use of anthropological research in their reflections, since there is no doubt much information within it that could serve as evidence for the claims of a philosophical anthropologist. I will illustrate two examples of this, beginning with humour.


Anthropologists have no doubt amassed much data about differences in senses of humour between cultures: what certain cultures find funny or offensive, the different types of humour they enjoy, etc. Philosophers could contemplate these findings in the following sort of way. They could argue that despite the specific differences in how a sense of humour is instantiated within a culture, a sense of humour of a kind is found in every culture, and therefore might be a general way in which human existence is structured, an ever-present aspect of human existence worldwide and historically. They might also try and elucidate exactly what ‘a sense of humour’ is, or clarify what they think a sense of humour is irrespective of the ordinary meaning. They could also try and pick out specific things about humour and how humans experience it. For example, they could examine disparate examples of comedy from various cultures and conclude that one thing common to all jokes is the subversion of what is customarily expected, or something along those lines. I am not trying to argue for the truth of any of these specific observations here, just illustrating a possible kind of analysis a philosophical anthropologist could engage in.

Another example could be to do with the pertinent example of social relations. It is hard to imagine how there could be an anthropology without a concept of something like this. Every culture at every point in history has had such relations - the kinds of relationships between family members, friends, lovers, other people in general, are an undeniably important aspect of human existence and one that all human beings experience to some degree. (For Heidegger’s take on this, see §6.) But instantiations of the same social relations vary considerably across cultures. One culture may be reticent to public displays of affection in romantic relationships, another may not. The dynamics of family relationships are also, surely, not the same everywhere and can vary depending on cultural background. Anthropologists can collect data about the disparate nuances between different cultures’ social relations and a philosophical
anthropologist could examine this data and try to work out what constitutes a social relation, what is common to all instantiations of them regardless of what kind of social relation it is, or what role these relations play in structuring the human experience generally.

Throughout this dissertation, I will often speak of philosophical anthropology and what it aims to discover about human existence using terms like ‘necessary’, ‘constitutive’, ‘universal’ and ‘fundamental’. On my account, these words describe the types of structures or features of human existence that philosophical anthropology is concerned with – so their meaning must be clarified. In saying that philosophical anthropology searches for ‘universal’ structures of human existence, I mean aspects of it that are present in it in every case despite the fact there may be exceptions to the rule like, for example, people in comas or suffering from ‘locked-in’ syndrome. These people might not manifest the structures of human existence in the same way as people not suffering from these conditions but are still human beings and still bound by similar structures, even if their capacity from exhibiting the structures fully is inhibited by a physical condition. Heidegger, as I discuss in §6, approaches this question in the form of a ‘logic of deficient modes’, which theorizes how the existential structures he identifies in Being and Time can be partaken in deficiently, or in a negative manner which still nonetheless manifests the structure. ‘Necessary’ and ‘constitutive’ I use interchangeably, not to mean structures that are logically necessarily present in the sense that they could not be otherwise, but a structure without which you could not truly be called a human being – these features are ‘necessary’ to be one. An entity that is immortal, for example, is not a human being. It would have a completely different relationship to time, a completely different perspective on its existence and a different kind of being. Mortality is partially responsible for the human condition being what it is – it is ‘constitutive’ of our existence – without it, we would be very different beings. So ‘necessary’ and ‘constitutive’ are two ways of saying the same thing, for
They denote aspects of our existence that are required for it to be what it is and without which our existence would be so different that we could no longer be called human beings. Later (§5-7), I will show how Heidegger’s analytic of Dasein precisely investigates these aspects of human existence in different ways, but especially in his distinction between ‘existential’ and ‘existentiell’ structures. I use ‘fundamental’ to denote either features of our existence that are especially important in a relevant sense, or features of our existence that other things are or can be grounded in. Heidegger shows, for example, that rational thought is only possible based on a prior, pre-linguistic and pre-rational disclosure of the world which is partially constituted by our emotions. (§7) This is characteristic of much of his analysis: he identifies our existential structures and shows how certain other aspects of our being are grounded in, made possible by the more fundamental features. The universal, necessary/constitutive and fundamental features of human existence are what philosophical anthropology searches for, and I will show later in more detail how Heidegger does this with the analytic of Dasein.

So philosophical anthropology studies the universal, necessary/constitutive or fundamental structures of human existence, but also leaves open the possibility of productively engaging with and making use of anthropological research and writing. It is philosophical because it addresses questions that are more general and abstract than anthropologists tend to address. It goes beyond particular societies to say things that would be universally true of every human being, finds ways in which the human experience in general is structured and creates conceptual vocabularies with which to analyse human existence. A philosophical anthropologist can remain in the armchair, so to speak, without conducting any fieldwork, and use the work of anthropologists as inspiration or evidence in their reflections on human existence. Philosophical anthropologists can read anthropological fieldwork and consider what it tells us.
about the constitutive, ever-present structures of human existence. So, because it can exist alongside and in a beneficial relationship with anthropology, sharing the aim of studying human beings, philosophical anthropology is anthropological. But it is philosophical because it attempts to study human beings in general and concerns what is common to every instantiation of human existence. A good definition of philosophical anthropology must explain the following: why it is philosophical and anthropological, how it would relate to and differ from anthropology, what its aim is, and what it offers us that anthropology (usually) does not. I hope to have made some progress here, but there is more to be said.

At this point, a worry one might have about philosophical anthropology is that, even if everything I have said about it so far is true, I have yet to describe a preferred method I will adopt for conducting it, since there might be many, and some more productive than others. This will be addressed more thoroughly as I proceed when I interpret Heidegger’s work as a contribution to philosophical anthropology, but a good indication of the direction I am heading in is given by Richard Zaner in *An Approach to Philosophical Anthropology*. He provides a conception of philosophical anthropology that closely ties it to phenomenology because phenomenology tries to elucidate the human being’s experience of its existence and the structures that must already be present for it to be possible. As explained by Maurice Natanson: “being in a concrete situation of any type, being involved in specific, limited action of any order, presupposes my being involved. To be involved, then, is itself a structure of experience which demands its own explanation.” (quoted on APA 64) It is this underlying structure, or set of structures, that phenomenology seeks to clarify: we have a particular kind of existence, one of meaning, sociality, finitude, language, art, and countless other things. But for us to have this kind of existence at all, certain structures must be in place that go together to make our existence what it is. As Zaner writes,
in order to be involved in writing, walking, or whatever, it is necessary that I be-able-to-be-involved-in. It is this phenomenon, I think, which Heidegger calls Da-sein, Merleau-Ponty 'etre-au-monde’, and Natanson human-being-in-reality, that is brought into question when we ask, "What is Man?" (APA 64-65)

I do not necessarily side with Zaner in saying that only this phenomenon (or set of phenomena) is what is really put into question when we ask what the human being is – there might be many kinds of philosophical anthropology that do not frame themselves like this but would still be philosophical anthropology. But I do think that this is one of the most important and productive kinds of philosophical anthropology, which has been undertaken in various ways by phenomenologists, existentialists and philosophers of all stripes at some point, however implicitly or explicitly.

The general structures of human existence can be productively investigated in terms of elucidating the phenomenon of being-able-to-be-involved-in, uncovering the structures which make possible the way we exist in a meaningful world of objects, concerns and projects – what Heidegger calls our being-able-to-be (seinkönnen). What structures must be present for this to be possible? What is it about them that makes human life the way it is? How do we describe them? These are questions that phenomenologists have explicitly been involved with, and in what follows I will focus on Heidegger’s work as a concrete example of this kind of project. His is an interesting example because, as Cykowski notes, “the question of degree to which Heidegger can be counted as an anthropological thinker is a controversial one.”

that he was wrong about this, that his work is philosophical anthropology, and a productive one at that. This is far from disparaging, as Blair Odgen once similarly wrote of Walter Benjamin:

Theodor Adorno once commented that Benjamin’s work is [...] too concerned with the subjective, that it is almost anthropological. But if the unifying thread of Benjamin’s oeuvre is the documentation of experience, one can without being disparaging call it an anthropology – or, to be precise, a philosophical anthropology.\textsuperscript{26}

Heidegger engages in the same sort of project: his analytic of Dasein is a thorough attempt to account for the structure of our existence. But Heidegger questions who the ‘our’ is, and calls the entity that we are Dasein to clear his project from the meanings usually associated with terms like ‘subjectivity’, ‘consciousness’ or ‘human being’. This is made even more complicated by the fact that Heidegger is not concerned with answering questions of human existence but was famously, from the beginning of his career to the end, concerned only with ‘the question of the meaning of Being’. However, despite all of this, the way he decides to carry out this project begins with a phenomenological investigation of the structures of human existence. This is a species of philosophical anthropology.

\textbf{§1.3 Conclusion: Phenomenography, Phenomenology and Philosophical Anthropology}

The relevance of phenomenology to anthropology is not exhausted in what I have said so far. There are anthropologists that have also understood the relevance of phenomenology for their empirical studies. When philosophers engage with phenomenological methods, it is usually to try and discern the general structures of human experience, but even if these structures are the same for all human beings, these structures manifest in countless different ways, which not

\textsuperscript{26} Benjamin, Wittgenstein and Philosophical Anthropology, Blair Ogden, \textit{Green Room 39}, Spring 2010, p. 57-73, p. 57
every human being will necessarily experience. Michael Jackson’s work on ‘existential anthropology’ takes the lessons of phenomenology and seeks to apply them to specific cases of human existence “to enable us to gain ’a close and detailed appreciation of what actually presents itself”\(^\text{27}\) in specific cases.

This phenomenological method is […] a way of shedding light on the ways in which intersubjectivity reveals itself in the ways we arrange and play with objects, images, ideas, words and others - as well as the reasons and justifications we give, in the form of stories and ethical statements, for making such arrangements. (MJP 37)

Rather than focussing on human experience in general, Jackson’s phenomenological approach to anthropology takes the methodological orientation of phenomenology – the description and elucidation of human experience – and uses it to investigate specific cases of it.\(^\text{28}\) This would be in line with how I outlined the difference between anthropology and philosophical anthropology earlier – one is concerned with difference, the other with generality, but the methodological inspiration would come from a similar place.

The relevance of and interaction between phenomenology and anthropology is made even more explicit and interesting by the existence of a method of educational research first articulated in the 1980s which borrows its name from phenomenology – *phenomenography*. Phenomenography has been seized on and developed by anthropologists like Jackson as a means of pursuing their research. A volume on existential anthropology he edited with Albert Piette\(^\text{29}\) testifies to this:


it is precisely the objective of phenomenography to focus on the phenomenological field. This is to say, we strive to observe and describe what appears to be \textit{there} – the human being in his or her presence, including the subtle changes of expression and gesture that comprise a person’s idiosyncratic being. (WEA 19)

Phenomenography is a potentially very interesting way of applying phenomenology. Phenomenographists employ a similar vocabulary and style in describing specific human beings’ experiences of their existence in a fashion that is particularly attentive to how they, specifically, exist in and apprehend their world. Even if there are general structures and features of the human experience, “each phenomenon, concept, or principle can be understood in a limited number of qualitatively different ways.” $^{30}$ Human beings might share the same existential structures, but these structures give rise to a dizzying array of different types of existence, different ways of apprehending and interpreting phenomena – which phenomenographists can investigate.

Everyone might, as Heidegger argues, exist in a world where everything is structured by significance, but what counts as significant varies from culture to culture. If significance varies culturally, this means that people, even though the organizing principle of their world is the same, have very different worlds and relations to the things in them. The subject of phenomenography would be the various manifestations of “man-world relations” (FMP 31) As Ference Marton puts it, “phenomenographers do not make statements about the world as such, but about people's conceptions of the world.” (FMP 32) The fact of having a world does not vary culturally, but many things about worlds and the way we relate to the things in them,

$^{30}$ \textit{Phenomenography – A Research Approach to Investigating Different Understandings of Reality} (FMP in text), Ference Marton, \textit{Journal of Thought}, vol. 21, no. 3, Fall 1986, p. 28-49, p. 31
does. While phenomenographers try to characterize the variations of experience, for phenomenologists the essence of experience usually is interpreted as that which is common to different forms of experience” (FMP 41). The fact that this method exists and is conceptualized like this, is further evidence for the relevance of phenomenology to anthropological projects, and for the potential of interdisciplinary interaction between philosophy and anthropology. Phenomenographists can engage in the description and clarification of specific cases of human experience and draw on the conceptual vocabularies of phenomenologists to do so. But the interaction could go both ways, with phenomenologists drawing on the work of phenomenographists for inspiration and criticism, in their work.

Phenomenographists borrow a great deal from phenomenology, but engage in a very different kind of practise, which emphasize the third-person rather than first-person description of the way in which a subject apprehends their world. This points to a cluster of difficult questions that, for considerations of space and scope, I will not be able to address. I will focus on a specific type of philosophical anthropology found in a specific type of phenomenology, which focusses on an analysis of human existence from a first-person perspective. However, the way phenomenographists use phenomenological methods and take inspiration from them raises questions about the method, scope and nature of phenomenology, not to mention the methodological transition from first-person to third-person description. Can the same methods...

31 Correlatively, phenomenologists and philosophical anthropologists would ‘make statements about the world as such’, as Marton phrases it.
32 It is important to note that Marton is articulating phenomenography from an educational perspective, and seems keen to distance it in some sense from phenomenology. He claims that “phenomenography is not an offspring of phenomenology” (FMP 40) and that the differences between the two are “disagreements” (FMP 40-42). But I would not necessarily take as strong a view here – the differences are differences of focus, and area of inquiry. It would not be at all disparaging, in my view, to speak of phenomenography as a kind of ‘applied’ or ‘empirical’ phenomenology.
be used in both cases, and how? What would the principal difference be, and how would they impact the project and its results? Is phenomenology inductive and empirical, or deductive, or both? I raised phenomenography here to indicate a way that phenomenology, a productive kind of philosophical anthropology, has had a positive reception with certain anthropologists and ethnographers. This is a good indication that there is potential for many such interactions between philosophy and anthropology – and there is much more that can be said, and questions that can be raised, about this intersection. But my concerns here will be much more specific, my goal being to demonstrate that Heidegger’s work is a kind of philosophical anthropology and build on it in this direction. I have spoken generally here about philosophical anthropology but hope to have addressed some concerns one might have about its legitimacy as a discipline, and its potential for productive interaction with anthropology and its research. Before we can proceed to the analysis of Heidegger’s work, however, some further issues relating to philosophical anthropology must be discussed. The following sections will address a concern that should be addressed in any project: whether there are reasons that it might not be possible or desirable in principle.
§2: Defending Philosophical Anthropology Analogously to the Substantive Philosophy of History

Can there be a ‘philosophical anthropology’? This is one of the many questions that arises from reading Heidegger’s *Being and Time*[^33]. On the one hand, Heidegger sharply distanced himself from philosophical anthropology and repeatedly criticised it. On the other hand, in furnishing an ‘analytic of Dasein’, something like a philosophical inquiry into the structures of human existence, one might think that Heidegger himself provides one of the best attempts at such an endeavour. Husserl, indeed, thought that Heidegger gave us a kind of philosophical anthropology, and perhaps this view is correct. However, Husserl went further, claiming not only that Heidegger was doing anthropology, but he was mistaken to adopt an anthropological perspective within his philosophy. Husserl thought anthropological perspectives should be absent from philosophy (or at least from phenomenology), because they “tend to naturalize human experience instead of examining its *a priori*, transcendental foundations.”[^34] All this raises the question of whether there should be a philosophical anthropology, but also whether there *can* be one, and what it would be like.

Here, I consider three objections to the possibility of philosophical anthropology and refute them. They are three ways of expressing the same idea, namely that philosophical anthropology is misconceived. Anthropology involves the collection of contingent empirical facts about specific societies and people. Philosophy seems to deal with something different: conceptual analysis and deductive thought. There can therefore be no philosophical anthropology because these are two fundamentally different kinds of inquiries. This sort of objection was raised

against another type of philosophy: the ‘substantive’ philosophy of history, which concerns not historical knowledge, but history itself. The same concerns of impossibility arise: history collects contingent, empirical facts about what has happened over time. But philosophy is about something other than contingent events – it analyses our concepts and tries to make deductions and arguments about things. Philosophy is restricted to questions of historical knowledge, not able to deal with ‘history itself’ because philosophy is about something distinct from empirical facts. Therefore, there can be no substantive philosophy of history. This kind of objection is phrased in multiple ways by Walsh and Danto, both ‘analytical’ philosophers of history. I will show that this kind of objection is misguided, thereby defending both philosophical anthropology and the substantive philosophy of history.

§ 2.1 The Business of Philosophy and Anthropology

What is it that philosophers and anthropologists do? There are certain academic disciplines that are inherently involved in the observation, collection and examination of contingent facts about the world. Anthropology is often conceived of as belonging to this category, because it deals with inductive data and the (broadly scientific)\(^{35}\) collection of contingent facts. But history is also like this because it aims to systematically account for past events. History collects contingent facts, interprets them and compiles them into an account. An example of such a fact is the date of the battle of Waterloo: June 18\(^\text{th}\), 1815. This fact is contingent because it is not a matter of logical or metaphysical necessity that the battle of Waterloo happened on that date.

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\(^{35}\) If you’re following, as some do, a conception aptly expressed by Radcliffe-Brown as follows: “I conceive of social anthropology as the theoretical natural science of human society, that is, the investigation of social phenomena by methods essentially similar to those used in the physical and biological sciences.” (Alfred Radcliffe-Brown, On Social Structure, The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland, Vol. 70, No.1 (1940), 1-12, p. 2)
It could have happened on a different date or not happened at all, had history turned out differently. This principle is writ large in the discipline of history: history and historical facts are contingent – it is not a matter of necessity that things turned out the way they did. Major events have been contingent on the whim of people who could have thought or acted differently, and history is our attempt to compile as complete a list of these events as possible to better understand ourselves and our past. The same can also be said of science in a roundabout way. Science consists in the attempt to amass as complete a picture as possible of the behaviour of objects and the physical laws which govern reality, doing it largely by collecting, observing and interpreting contingent facts about it. Anthropology could also be understood similarly, since all its sub-disciplines are part of the attempt to amass contingent facts about human beings and their societies.

But what is a contingent fact? It is not a necessity, for example, that languages are the way they are. The words and phrases in languages mean what they mean because of centuries of historical activity and social interaction. Words are borrowed or adapted from other languages, some drop out of use, new ones appear, and meanings change. The English word ‘snollygoster’, for instance, meaning “a shrewd, unprincipled person”\textsuperscript{36}, has dropped completely out of use. But the fact that it did is contingent, not necessary – it could have continued to be used. It would be the business of linguistic anthropologists to catalogue contingent facts about human languages, just as it is the business of a social anthropologist to catalogue contingent facts about social relations. Anthropology’s objective could be conceived of as amassing as rich a collection of contingent facts about human beings as possible.

\textsuperscript{36} Merriam-Webster Dictionary Online: https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/snollygoster
Based on this, it initially seems that philosophy does something different to anthropology and history, an intuitive idea being that philosophy deals in conceptual analysis and deductive reasoning. Undoubtedly, philosophers often do this - an important part of philosophy is trying to figure out what we mean by our most important concepts: justice, evil, knowledge, etc. A philosopher will ask ‘what is justice?’ and by using reasoning, deduction and conceptual thought, arrive at an understanding of what we mean (or ought to mean) by justice. But this type of work seems different from and does not involve the collection of contingent facts. We can deduce that punishing innocent people is unjust based on how we understand the concepts involved. If it is just to punish those guilty of crimes and ‘innocent’ means ‘not guilty of a crime’, punishing innocent people is unjust by necessity. We do not need to collect contingent facts about unjustly punished people to establish this, we can just reflect on the relevant concepts. This is how philosophy involves but also goes beyond conceptual analysis; not only do they clarify concepts, they also make arguments and deductions. But can philosophy philosophize about contingent facts or contingent-fact-based disciplines? If it deals only in conceptual analysis, deductive thought and necessity, we might be tempted not to think so. But there are at least two ways that philosophers do philosophize about contingent-fact-based disciplines that are unproblematically seen as legitimate - philosophy of science, and the ‘analytical’ philosophy of history.

§2.2 Analytical Philosophy of History, Philosophy of Science, Philosophy of Anthropology

Philosophy of history was at one time divided into the ‘analytical’ and ‘substantive (or speculative)’ kinds. But as Robert Scharff points out:

Far from being neutral, this classification is in fact a slogan for analytical philosophers of history, who regard traditional (mostly Continental) views as
incurably old-fashioned and scientifically unsophisticated divinations of the ‘meaning’ of the whole human past.\textsuperscript{37}

‘Analytical’ philosophy\textsuperscript{38} of history has been defended because of its similarity to philosophy of science, which deals with the philosophical problems of science: what scientific knowledge is, how it is known, what the limits of scientific understanding are, what a ‘law’ of physics is, etc. Analytical history is analogous to philosophy of science in at least one important respect: it also deals with knowledge and its acquisition – but historical knowledge. W. H. Walsh, an important proponent\textsuperscript{39}, lists its primary concerns as: knowledge, truth/facts, objectivity and explanation. So analytical philosophers of history ask questions like ‘how do we know a historical text is accurate?’ – this is an epistemological question, about historical knowledge and truth. Philosophy of science and analytical philosophy of history are unproblematically seen as legitimate because they deal with epistemological questions, which are legitimately philosophical.

Since philosophy of science and analytical philosophy of history both deal with epistemological issues of empirical disciplines, they are legitimate philosophical enterprises. If this is true, then there is another potential domain of philosophy that would be legitimate for the same reasons: philosophy of anthropology. If philosophy of anthropology were a branch of epistemology dealing with anthropological knowledge, then presumably it would also be a legitimate philosophical enterprise. Indeed, there is a massive

\textsuperscript{38} To be clear, if I occasionally say ‘analytical philosophy’, ‘analytical history’, or ‘substantive philosophy’ I am referring specifically to the \textit{analytical and substantive philosophies of history}, not analytic philosophy generally or a specific kind of history.
\textsuperscript{39} Philosophy of History: An Introduction (WPOH in text), W. H. Walsh, Harper, New York, 1960
concern in anthropology about this, with perhaps the biggest question being about the role of the observer and the observer’s effect on their subjects and knowledge-production. But a *philosophy of anthropology* is not what I am seeking to articulate and defend here, I aim to defend *a philosophical anthropology*, a direct philosophical contribution to the understanding of human existence, rather than a philosophical analysis of anthropological knowledge and its methods of production. Walsh and Danto argue that an analogous discipline – the substantive philosophy of history – is impossible in principle, for reasons that would apply to philosophical anthropology if true.

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**§2.3 The Substantive (‘Speculative’) Philosophy of History**

What is called history is a dynamic and open social reality, in a state of functional disequilibrium, or an oscillating equilibrium, unstable and always compensated, comprising not only institutionalized conflicts but conflicts that generate changes.

- Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*

This remark contains the kind of claims that substantive philosophers of history want to make - about the nature of history itself, not our knowledge or account of it. Deleuze and Guattari claim that *history is an open social reality where conflicts generate change*. This is not a claim about how people practise history academically, it attempts to say something directly about what history is. Substantive philosophy attempts to apply philosophical thought to the nature of history itself, past events, or the totality of events. It looks at historical events and asks ‘what is history?’, ‘how should we interpret it?’, ‘is history inherently progressive?’ Walsh, though ultimately critical of it, accurately characterizes it as the attempt to “discover the meaning and purpose of the whole historical process […]

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[and provide] a theory of historical interpretation and causation.” (WPOH 26, 27) Such philosophizing would take us beyond asking about historical knowledge since it asks about the concept of history itself or tries to make inferences about it from past events.

An obvious example here would be Hegel, who “regards history as an intelligible process moving towards a specific condition - the realization of human freedom.” Whether successful or not, Hegel is one of the most characteristic examples of a substantive philosophy of history – he tried to construct a philosophical system that could account for everything that had ever happened. His thesis was that history is the progressive development of human freedom. As history progresses, human freedom develops positively, inclining towards absolute freedom. This is a different kind of claim from claims like ‘the battle of Waterloo happened in 1815’ or ‘Hitler invaded Poland because…’. These claims concern examples of contingent events and the production of an account of these events, whereas Hegel is talking about history itself, the totality of historical events. If Hegel is right, then every historical event would be explained and accounted for by his thesis - everything that has ever happened would be part of the process of the unfolding of human freedom. This is not a claim about a specific historical event or even a period of history, but

41 I ‘accurately’, but there is one problem with Walsh’s characterization - the use of the word ‘whole’. True, substantive philosophy of history often tries to consider the whole of history, but it need not. It can apply philosophical analysis to a single historical event, or a set of historical events, it is not necessary for a substantive philosophy of history that it consider the whole of history. But this is a point to which we will return.


43 It could perhaps be argued that this is an oversimplified version of Hegel’s thesis, because the development of human self-knowledge was also central for him. But considering that freedom and self-knowledge are intimately connected for Hegel – the more we know ourselves, the freer we become – I think it is not an oversimplification, because as one develops, so does the other.
a theory about the whole of history, a way of interpreting it and elucidating the driving forces behind it. Hegel’s claims differ from the claims of analytical philosophy of history, which are typically of the form ‘historical knowledge is X and is known under these conditions…’ Hegel’s claims do give us a kind of knowledge about history, but not the same knowledge found in historical texts because they attempt to catalogue and explain specific past events. Hegel is trying to explain what history, in general, is. Analytical philosophy concerns historical knowledge, how it is gained and under what conditions. But these are epistemological questions. When Hegel says that history is the unfolding of human freedom, he is making a metaphysical or ontological claim - he is trying to answer the question ‘what is the nature of history?’

Substantive philosophy therefore resembles philosophical anthropology, which attempts to go beyond the specificities anthropology usually deals in: ‘what are these human beings like?’, ‘what is this society like?’, ‘how does it compare to others?’, etc. Philosophical anthropology goes beyond this kind of question, abstracting to a more general level, asking ‘what is the nature of human existence?’ Questions like ‘what is culture X like?’ are answered with facts about contingent manifestations of human beings and their cultures, things that could have been (and often are) different in other cultures. Philosophical anthropology, however, searches for general facts about human beings worldwide and historically, facts that are constitutive of human beings that make them human beings no matter where or when they were born. Philosophical anthropology, therefore, does not concern anthropological epistemology either since it deals with more abstract questions of metaphysics or ontology. It asks what the human being is, what human existence is, in every case. Therefore, philosophical anthropology would produce knowledge about the human
being (as Hegel, if successful, gives us a kind of knowledge about history), but philosophical anthropology is not anthropological epistemology.

Philosophical anthropology and the substantive philosophy of history bear parallels: both can be considered as different from the respective epistemologies of their associated disciplines; both attempt an abstract kind of metaphysical analysis and apply this analysis to the subject of a discipline which involves the collation of contingent facts. But concerns arise about whether this kind of analysis is even possible in principle. We can see this in arguments that have been made against the substantive philosophy of history by W. H. Walsh and Arthur Danto. If their arguments are true of substantive philosophy, they are also true of philosophical anthropology. Their basic objection, repeated in different expressions, is that substantive philosophy of history is a “misconceived activity”\footnote{Analytical Philosophy of History (DAH in text), Arthur C. Danto, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1965, p. 14}.

§2.4 Walsh on the Substantive Philosophy of History

For Walsh, substantive philosophers of history can only be doing one of two things. One of them is legitimate but not philosophical, the other is dubious. Either way there is a misconception – the substantive philosopher of history either thinks they are doing something they are not, or they are trying to do something impossible. Firstly, they could just be doing a vague, deficient kind of history. When Hegel claims that history is the unfolding of human freedom, he is really giving an account of past events, which is just history and best left to historians. The other alternative is that substantive philosophers are doing philosophy, but of a dubious, unachievable kind. Their claims are not grounded in historical facts or empirical data,
are unverifiable and (to use Walsh’s preferred description) too ‘metaphysical’ and ‘speculative’
to be able to achieve their goal of making history philosophically intelligible.

Let’s consider Walsh’s first alternative:

The question ‘what are the main moving factors in history’ does not appear to be
philosophical. It is a question which can be answered only by a study of actual causal
connections in history; and why a philosopher should be thought especially equipped
to make such a study is not apparent. (WPOH 27)

If Hegel’s claim is a historical claim, then when he says history is the unfolding of human
freedom, he is basically just telling us what happened throughout history. This might be a kind
of historical claim, but if so, it is a poorly made one for Walsh, since it is too general and
removed from historical facts to be a good example of history. Furthermore, it is difficult to
see how it could possibly be grounded in historical facts, not least because historical facts are
open to many interpretations which can themselves change over time. If Hegel’s claim is
historical, then it is a poor attempt at history.

But is it a historical claim? If Hegel is right, then it follows that human freedom unfolded over
time, but that human freedom unfolded is not the entirety of his claim. There is a big difference
between saying that ‘human freedom unfolded over history’ (a historical claim) and saying that
‘history is the unfolding of human freedom’. The first case is something like an attempt to give
a historical account of events that could have been otherwise and subject to a different
description – human unfreedom could have unfolded instead. But Hegel is claiming that the
being of history consists in the progressive development of human freedom, not just that human
freedom is progressively developing. The historical claim is implied by Hegel’s claim, but not
exhausted in it. Hegel is trying to discover what ‘drives’ history, not just what happened in it.
If someone claimed that human freedom had been unfolding over history, it would still be possible for them to claim that, even though human freedom unfolded, the primary determining factors in history are something else. Human freedom could (contingently) have unfolded, but the truly determining factors in history are economic, for example. Hegel is trying to tell us what history itself is, not give an account of historical events.

If the determining factors of history can only be discovered by analysing the ‘actual causal connections’ of history, total certainty by this method would be unachievable because it would require analysing every historical situation, every causal connection, to confirm it. But this level of analysis is not necessary - a substantive philosopher of history could examine historical situations and find reasons in them to argue or deduce things that would be true no matter what the historical situation was, through reasoning instead of looking at every historical case. Hegel’s claim might imply a certain account of past events, but this is not the entirety of his claim - he is making a one about what history is, or how we should understand history itself, not just describe what has taken place. If substantive philosophers make these claims then they are doing a kind of philosophy, but one that might imply a certain kind of account of history because what they often give us are ways of interpreting history. But a historical account and a theory of historical interpretation are different things, even if they often go together in the work of substantive philosophers of history.

Walsh’s first alternative seems false: substantive philosophers are not simply doing history. But he also argues that it is possible that they are doing philosophy, but of a kind too speculative.

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45 In Hegel, history is interpreted in terms of freedom. In Marx, as the history of class struggle.
to achieve its goals. History is directly involved with the collection of contingent, empirical facts about past events, and philosophy engages in conceptual analysis and deductive thought. The collection and analysis of contingent facts is not the business of philosophy, and conceptual analysis and deductive thought are not the business of history. Their modes of analysis, methods, focus and goals are fundamentally different. If philosophers remain within this traditional kind of philosophical analysis, they cannot make ‘history itself’ philosophically intelligible because their speculations will be too far removed from and insufficiently grounded in historical facts. Substantive philosophy of history operates under the delusion that the kind of truth it seeks after is possible within philosophy. For this to hold, it seems reasonable that:

1) The conception of philosophy and history it puts forward must correlate with how these disciplines are understood and practised.
2) Philosophy and History should be fundamentally different enough from each other that they cannot involve a crossing-over of their methods.

If these two things are true, Walsh’s objection is certainly true. But we have reasons to be sceptical, with the common underlying point being that the operative conception of philosophy here is too narrow to accept.

The first thing to note is that philosophers often engage with or make use of empirical data and inductive reasoning. Philosophy engages with contingent facts and the findings of disciplines that collate and analyse them. There is a wealth of philosophical research that makes use of scientific findings, neuroscience, evolutionary biology, and so on. Whether as inspiration for

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46 There is even ‘experimental philosophy’, which collects people’s answers to certain questions and examines them.
47 This is made especially evident in analytic philosophy of mind, under a number of different positions within this field. Take, for example, physicalist and materialist positions, exemplified by people like Paul Churchland, or Daniel Dennett. Scientific concepts and empirical data are often used in the course of physicalist arguments, if only because physicalism is an attempt to show that reality ultimately reduces to physical facts, or more specifically that the mind or ‘phenomenal facts’ ultimately reduce to biological facts.
or part of a theory, a thought experiment or for polemical purposes, it is a matter of fact that philosophers engage with contingent facts and their analysis all the time, without the impossibility of their doing so being questioned.\textsuperscript{48} What makes history so different? Admittedly, this does not in and of itself invalidate the criticism of substantive philosophy of history we are discussing. But it does give us reason to suspect its legitimacy, because it would be questionable to criticise the other kinds of philosophy I just mentioned (which also deal with contingent facts) for the same reason.

It is also not clear that history never engages with philosophical reasoning or methods. It is possible that, when writing about a historical period, a historian confronts the question of how to describe what they are writing about, especially if writing about a period of hundreds of years. In this process, they might run into problems – how best to find out and describe when this period began or ended, what events to include and why, or how best to characterise it and its relation to other historical epochs. They might even question what we call an ‘epoch’, how we should understand epochs and what the impact this understanding might have on the construction of historical accounts. These are issues about interpretation, knowledge, understanding and conceptual clarification – issues that philosophers spend a great deal of time on. Does the historian stop doing history simply because in the course of their work they pursue these sorts of questions? I would argue not, because the line between ‘collection and analysis of contingent facts’ and ‘conceptual analysis and deductive thought’ is not always a sharp one. I will say more about this when I summarise this section.

\textsuperscript{48} Although this has not always been the case, especially in early 20\textsuperscript{th}-century analytic philosophy. Logical positivists, for example, argued that there are only empirical facts (which are scientifically verifiable), and logical/mathematical truths, which amount to tautologies. Everything else is nonsense, since it can neither be verified scientifically and is neither true nor false.
What I have just outlined relates to a similar point discussed in the philosophy of science, which might give us further reason to be sceptical that the collection of contingent facts is separable from conceptual analysis and deductive thought. A significant issue there is the question of whether it is possible for there to be a ‘pure’ observation, uncontaminated by theory and presupposition. One might intuitively think this is the objective of scientific inquiry, to observe reality in an unbiased manner and collect as much information as possible about it. However, every scientific study, every collection of evidence takes place within a larger context of theory which legitimizes it. No one builds a supercollider for no reason: there are reasons pertaining to larger bodies of theory for doing so – quantum mechanics, relativity, etc. These theories provide a context in which the supercollider’s experiments and observations make sense. These larger theories inform not just the observation and collection of data, but the way scientists write and think about it. Scientific research has sometimes been argued for this reason to be ‘theory-laden’ since it seems difficult for a scientist to fully escape the presuppositions of theory and the influence of a theoretical sense-making context. Any scientific observation is therefore ‘laden’ with background theory and must be to make any sense in the first place.49

We might wonder whether history is also theory-laden, and whether this is a negative outcome. For a historical text to make sense, it would have to relate to and be a part of a larger historical context that allows it to make sense. An account of the Second World War could only make sense if situated in the context of 20th Century European history. Every historical text in some sense relies on previous historical texts and theories about what happened before and around the periods historians write about. History therefore might also be theory-laden. But this not a

negative outcome for history (or science, for that matter), this might just be how things are, and
this does not invalidate either history or science. In fact, it might even be seen as an enabling-
condition for there to be any history or science at all – our being able to do it depends on our
being historically-situated, embedded within a socio-political context and operating within a
larger body of theory. This tentatively brings out further reason to be sceptical of the separation
of theory and observation, the collection of contingent facts and conceptual analysis/deductive
thought. These realms of inquiry are more closely connected than Walsh’s arguments allow
for.

I have pointed out that philosophers often engage with contingent facts, but it is possible to
make the stronger claim that philosophy is not wholly about conceptual analysis and deductive
thought. Just because much of philosophy is nonempirical does not mean that it all is. Part of
what philosophy does is to identify assumptions behind theories and arguments and discuss
them. These assumptions are not always deductive, ontologically necessary or ‘a priori’.
Phenomenology, for example, operates on certain persuasive inductive assumptions.\(^5^0\) As an
analysis of human experience beginning from the perspective of the experience-er, it attempts
to discover and describe human experience and figure out its fundamental, constituent aspects.
It involves assumptions\(^5^1\), one being that human experience is similar in every case. This is not
something that can necessarily be known by deduction but is assumed based on reasonable
inductive evidence.

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\(^5^0\) You could take this further, in a nod to the Wittgenstein of *On Certainty*, and say that these
‘persuasive assumptions’ often *must* be assumed because attempting to justify them may not
make sense or be possible – but their assumption is necessary for us being able to do certain
things.

\(^5^1\) This despite the fact that Husserl, the founder of phenomenology, claimed it was intended
to be a ‘presuppositionless’ philosophy.
I have argued that philosophy is not only about conceptual analysis and deduction. But even if it were, it would still be possible and useful to apply philosophical analysis to historical concepts. No one would deny the philosophical import of conceptually analysing justice, knowledge, truth, etc. What makes historical concepts different? What would be unphilosophical about questioning ‘historical progress’, if only to clarify what we really mean by it? Historical concepts need clarifying like any other, and it seems strange that they should be blocked from philosophical analysis just because they are historical. It could be argued that this kind of analysis belongs to analytical philosophy of history, and this might be true if the concept in question was historical knowledge, given its preoccupation with epistemological questions. But it is not obvious that conceptually analysing ‘progress’, ‘history’ or ‘epoch’ would be epistemological. These seem more like metaphysical questions.

Walsh works with an insufficient conception of philosophy and history. Historians can engage in conceptual analysis and deductive thought, and philosophy often makes use of and depends on the results of science and history. To say that philosophy is only engaged in conceptual analysis and deductive thought does not do full justice to philosophy and claiming that history is exhausted in the compilation of contingent facts does not do justice to history. The theory-ladenness of observation and textual production provide even more reason to be sceptical of the stark separation of conceptual analysis/deductive thought and contingent/empirical facts. The objection that philosophy and history cannot cross over fails, as does its rejection of the substantive philosophy of history. But there is a further argument from Arthur Danto, another analytical philosopher of history, to be considered before I can move towards how all this bears upon philosophical anthropology.
Arthur Danto also defends analytical philosophy of history and claims that substantive philosophy is misconceived but gives us an additional argument which requires separate attention. It repeats the charge that substantive philosophy is too speculative, but because it “tries to give an account of the whole of history […] the whole past and the whole future; the whole of time.” (DAH 1, 4) Deducing anything with certainty about the future, however, is impossible.\(^5\) If the objective of a substantive philosophy is to discover the nature or meaning of history, it must be able to make claims about the future or claims that would apply to the future if true. But the future is unknowable, so any claims made about it are speculative, unverifiable. Substantive philosophy tries to know the unknowable. There are two reasons to be sceptical of this argument. One is that just because much substantive philosophy does theorize about the whole of history including the future, it does not necessarily have to. Secondly, it is possible to make deductions about historical matters based on the past that would apply to future situations by necessity. There is even reason to suspect Danto’s claim if a weaker claim is made here – it is possible for a substantive philosophy to give us strong reasons to think that what we know about the past can inform us about the future.

To illustrate the first objection to Danto, let us go back to Hegel.\(^5\) If ‘history is the unfolding of human freedom’ and this claim is meant to encompass the whole of history, presumably all historical events after Hegel would conform to it. If we look at history, we would see the

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\(^{5}\) Danto’s objection implicitly contains one of Walsh’s concerns within it, namely the idea that substantive philosophers of history are really just giving an account of events, and so are actually doing history. But this objection was answered in the previous section.

\(^{53}\) There is no doubt that Hegel meant this claim to encompass the whole of history, including the future. So what I am about to say may not be faithful to Hegel, but it is solely for the sake of my argument.
Hegel’s claim in action and notice a positive incremental tendency towards absolute freedom. But since Hegel’s death in 1831, has this happened? Catastrophic events like the holocaust, or the fact that millions of people are in slavery even today, cast much suspicion on this idea. But does this mean that history was never the unfolding of human freedom? Perhaps the things I just mentioned represent a monumental, negative turning point in history, where something altered its flow, marking the period where the unfolding of human freedom was halted, and history became something else. Obviously, this is a departure from Hegel, but it seems conceivable that someone could, perhaps, make such an argument, and this argument would tell us something about what history, itself, is. Hegel’s theory would have remained a substantive philosophy of history even if it had said nothing about the future.

The second reply we have to Danto’s argument is a stronger one: it is possible to deduce things about the future, because it is possible to deduce necessarily true and constitutive things about history or historical situations. Let’s turn to Marx as inspiration for an example of this point. I say inspiration because it is a controversial point as to whether Marx actually gave us a substantive philosophy of history, but we can (at the very least) draw this kind of claim from his work, though he denied that this was the kind of point he was making. One of Marx’s key points, as Walsh expresses it, is that “the main moving factors in history are economic” (WPOH


55 In a correspondence with the editor of a Russian newspaper, Marx denies that he is advocating a “historico-philosophic theory of the marche generale [general path] imposed by fate upon every people, whatever the historic circumstances in which it finds itself”. (Marx and Engels Correspondence, 1877, https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1877/11/russia.htm) I think, despite what Marx said here, a substantive philosophy of history is at least part of what he gave us, but the specificities of interpreting Marx is perhaps a subject for another time. G. A. Cohen’s Karl Marx’s Theory of History is far more authoritative and convincing on this than I can be here.
27), where economic factors are understood not just in terms of money, but politics, power and labour. Marx may have denied this idea’s being substantively philosophical, but there is a way of understanding it as such.

It is possible to analyse specific historical situations, collect empirical data and make the claim that the main moving factors in them are economic – this seems to be what Marx claims he was doing for the whole of history: a kind of empirical, ‘material’ analysis. But we can construct this idea in a more substantive manner. One question a substantive philosopher of history might reflect upon is what the determining factors in any historical situation would be. This is a more abstract kind of analysis, which asks what is necessary for something to be considered a historical situation, what is constitutive of them and unites them as ‘historical situations’. A substantive philosopher of history might take Marx’s claim that ‘the main moving factors in history are economic’ as a good candidate for at least part of an answer to this question. If you want to find out what the nature of a historical situation is, what the determining factors in it are, then economic factors must feature in the explanation. Economic factors feature by necessity in historical situations and partly determine all of them. This shows that it is possible to deduce things about future historical situations – refuting Danto’s claim. Anyone that wants to defend Danto must ask themselves whether there could be a historical situation undetermined by economic factors, where a complete explanation of this situation would not need to include them. If historical situations always involve and are determined by economic factors, this will continue to be true in the future by necessity. It therefore seems that a substantive philosophy can deduce true things about the future that would apply to any historical situation.
But it is perhaps not necessary to make such a strong claim to cast doubt on Danto’s argument, though it may give us reason to suspect it. We could make the weaker claim that substantive philosophy gives us strong reasons to believe things about the future, even if it could not deduce them with absolute certainty. An example could be the idea that history is often driven and shaped by seismic events, like wars. Historians have compiled masses of data about wars throughout history, the events that lead to them, and their consequences. A substantive philosopher of history could pore over this data and make deductions about the possibility of wars in the future. They could deduce that wars are usually motivated by certain factors, end up happening under certain conditions and, using this evidence, predict that another war will happen in the future. If wars happen when regimes become despotic and other countries with vested economic interests want to intervene, this gives us a very strong reason to believe more wars will occur. This is not absolutely certain, but we have good reason to believe it.

Danto makes the same argument Walsh does, but for a different reason: substantive philosophy is speculative – it tries to know what it cannot know. It is speculative because it attempts to deduce things about the unknowable future. But just because much substantive philosophy of history does include claims about the future, it does not necessarily have to, and we have reason to believe that it is possible to deduce things about the future, or at least deduce things we have strong reasons to believe about the future.

§2.6: Conclusion: Walsh and Danto’s Implicit Arguments Against Philosophical Anthropology

From how I have framed the above arguments, it has hopefully become clear why I think they are mistaken. But if they were true, philosophical anthropology would also be a misconceived
activity, guilty of the same things substantive philosophy is. Since I have already shown why their arguments are misguided, I will conclude by summarising why these arguments, if true, would apply to philosophical anthropology. If they apply to philosophical anthropology and are misguided, then philosophical anthropology is also safe from these criticisms.

Anthropology can be and often is understood in terms of the collection of contingent facts which, according to Walsh’s argument, philosophy is not concerned with. It is possible that philosophical anthropologists are really doing a deficient kind of (non-philosophical) anthropology, but this should be left to anthropologists because they are better equipped for it.

But philosophical anthropologists attempt a more abstract and general analysis than anthropologists, who attempt to give accounts of human beings in particular societies at particular points in history. Philosophical anthropology attempts to discover general truths about human beings and the human experience, regardless of socio-historical situation. Philosophical anthropologists are doing something different from but related to anthropologists, not simply doing anthropology as the first argument suggests. As for Danto’s argument, if philosophical anthropologists are attempting to do what I have described, then it follows that they are trying to discover things about future possible human beings too, or things that would apply to them. I have shown why this kind of argument is misguided above, and thereby also that it is possible to deduce things which would apply by necessity to future human beings too. If we can figure out something fundamental about the way human existence is structured and what this means, then this by necessity would apply to future human beings.

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56 It remains to be argued what kind of generalities can be drawn from philosophical-anthropological analysis, how useful they are (etc.), but this will be dealt with in what follows when I discuss Heidegger work, and also in Appendix 2.
§3: The Need for Philosophical Anthropology

I have argued that philosophical anthropology is possible, but just because something is possible does not mean it is worth doing. This is something that I hope to have indicated in what I have argued so far, but as a way of concluding chapter 1, I would like to make a few remarks about why it is desirable to pursue philosophical anthropology. In a simple sense it is obvious why philosophers might want to do philosophical anthropology – who doesn’t want to analyse human existence? As time and history move forward, new challenges and changes constantly arise for us that must be confronted, changes taking place in the fabric of our society, with an incalculable amount more to come, each presenting new questions for human beings and evolving the way they exist. In the face of these challenges, the question of what human existence really amounts to, what unites all cases of it and remains constant, will always be of interest to us and will never be a totally settled question. But just because a question can never be completely settled, does not mean it should not be pursued – the never-ending engagement with life’s deepest, most difficult and ever-evolving questions is part of the essence of philosophy.

If philosophical anthropology is defined as the branch of philosophy concerned with accounting for the general structure of human existence, then philosophers, as a matter of fact, already spend a lot of time engaged in some sort of philosophical anthropology, even some that might not think of themselves as such. Somehow, every philosophical endeavour involves questions or assumptions about human existence at some point, which would be of interest to philosophical anthropology. Even logic, mathematics and science pose questions about the human being’s relation to the world, the relationship of these topics to human consciousness and the nature of these things as human pursuits of knowledge. Even if a philosopher does not
understand themselves to be directly engaged in the elucidation of the general features of human existence, their enquiries will always engage with questions, assumptions and ideas about it that philosophical anthropology would be interested in or could use as inspiration. I do not necessarily want to say that all philosophy is philosophical anthropology as I have defined it, although this may be true in a trivial sense. But there is a way that philosophical anthropology can be understood as something of great importance to philosophy, something that manifests in some way in every area of philosophy, even if not in every single philosophical text. Questions about human existence abound throughout philosophy and is one of its most fundamental concerns.

Max Scheler has spoken more passionately and powerfully than most about why we should be doing philosophical anthropology. Scheler had several passages in his work, especially in between the two world wars, that speak of something like a human identity crisis and testify convincingly to the need for philosophical anthropology:

In our ten-thousand year history, we are the first time period in which the human being has become fully and totally ‘problematic’; the first time period in which the human being no longer knows who he or she is, but also does not know that he or she does not know.

This is a dramatic (and perhaps rather negative) picture of the human being’s idea of itself - but there is much truth in it. It was written at a time when political tension gripped Europe and lead to some of the most catastrophic events in history, but it is still relevant today. The sharp political and religious divisions that characterise our era, frequent wars and terror attacks, the

57 I discuss his philosophy and Heidegger’s criticism of it in Appendix 2.
profound changes that technology, the internet, climate change, global media and Covid-19 have brought into human life, I think, testify to the fact that our idea of our existence and destiny is far from clear. This might not be something that could ever be completely clear, but philosophical anthropology can make us better at thinking about these things, via a careful analysis and elucidation of the enduring features of human existence, finding what unites us rather than divides us.

Jo Cox, a British politician murdered by a far-right terrorist in the run-up to the Brexit referendum, offered some words of import, which could be taken as inspiration for the project of a philosophical anthropology. Despite existing in an era when we are divided in many ways and when the human identity is perhaps more in question than ever, “we are far more united and have far more in common with each other than what divides us.”  

Philosophical anthropology, in a way, is dedicated to the task of finding out what this statement refers to, what it is about our existence that we share, what is common to and unites all of us. This can contribute to an understanding of human commonality and unity, improving the idea we have of ourselves in the face of our diversity and divisions. What we normally refer to as anthropology is complementarily involved in this endeavour because of its preoccupation with difference, rather than commonality, between human beings, as Ruth Benedict and others have suggested. (§1) Anthropology would work in tandem with and complement philosophical anthropology, and vice versa, two sides of the same coin in the exploration of human existence throughout the world, from the perspectives of difference and commonality. Let us now turn to Heidegger, and how his work can be interpreted as a kind of philosophical anthropology.

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59 Devolution and Growth Across Britain (19th June 2015), Jo Cox MP
Chapter 2: Heidegger’s Critique of Anthropology

§4: Anthropology and Fundamental Ontology: Being and Time

If the question of being had been grasped, even if only in a crude way [...] then Being and Time could not have been misinterpreted and misused as an anthropology or a ‘philosophy of existence.”

– Martin Heidegger, Ponderings II-VI: Black Notebooks 1931-1938

Heidegger discusses anthropology at several points in Being and Time, always to distinguish it from his own work, clarifying his own project of ‘fundamental ontology’. Although these reflections are largely critical, they are not entirely so - Heidegger does not seek to invalidate anthropology. What concerns him is that anthropology operates on unquestioned assumptions about what it means to be human that have not been clarified adequately in advance. These concerns also apply to philosophical anthropology and Heidegger conceives of the work he does in Being and Time as a prerequisite for any kind of well-grounded anthropology. Despite this, Heidegger also insists that his motivation is not to undertake the groundwork for anthropology, but solely to pursue fundamental ontology, with a side-effect of this pursuit being that it would ground any future anthropology. He remains adamant throughout his career that his work is not philosophical anthropology. Here, I explore what Heidegger meant by fundamental ontology and why he understands such a project as involving a critical engagement of anthropology. I begin by clarifying what the project of Being and Time was: an

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62 This despite passages like the ones on BT 170, where Heidegger explicitly suggests that his work could relate to and be used in pursuit of philosophical anthropology. Or perhaps less explicitly on BT 178 where he writes that the different manifestations of moods and their interconnectedness could be the subject of a different (perhaps philosophical-anthropological) investigation. But more on these points later.
analysis of our existence, the first necessary step in approaching the question of the meaning
of being. I then examine Heidegger’s remarks about anthropology at large and how he
distinguishes from his own project. I respond to his criticisms and argue that, despite his
insistence to the contrary, significant parts of Heidegger’s work should be interpreted as
philosophical anthropology or as directly laying the groundwork for more of it.

§4.1 Answering the Question of the Meaning of Being

Perhaps one of the deepest questions that can be asked in philosophy is ‘why is there something
rather than nothing?’ But to answer this, we must know what it means for something to be at
all, which requires a clarification of the meaning of the word ‘being’. The question of the
meaning of being animated Heidegger’s career from beginning to end. Being seems to be a
fundamental component to everything that is and every sentence that we speak. For its meaning
to remain obscure, therefore, is a radical problem not just for philosophers, but for any
intellectual pursuit of any kind - a problem that Heidegger addresses by means of what he calls
‘fundamental ontology’. It is not necessary to agree with Heidegger about the importance or
scope of this problem to appreciate that his attempt at solving it is one of the most interesting
philosophical undertakings of the last two centuries. Far from being an obscure, etymological
inquiry into a word’s meaning, Being and Time is a compelling reflection on the structure of
our existence and the complex fabric of our everyday lives.

But why is this in a book that is supposed to be about what we mean by ‘Being’? In an important
passage, the answer Heidegger gives is the following:

Any treatment of [the question of the meaning of being] […] requires us to explain how
Being is to be looked at, how its meaning is to be understood and conceptually grasped;
[...]

Looking at something, understanding and conceiving it, choosing, access to it – all these ways of behaving are constitutive for our enquiry, and therefore are modes of Being for those particular entities which we, the inquirers, are ourselves. Thus to work out the question of Being adequately, we must make an entity – the inquirer – transparent in his own Being. (BT 26-27)

The insight here is crucial. Whatever kind of entity we are or turn out to be, we can only act within our particular way of being, which means we can only approach questions through our particular way of asking, understanding and answering them. Heidegger focusses on the question of the meaning of being, but it is true for any question – we must approach questions from the perspective of our kind of existence, in ways that arise from its structure, using its particular capabilities and capacities: we have no other option. If we are to answer philosophical questions adequately, we must know something about what kind of existence we have and reflecting on this should be one of philosophy’s most fundamental tasks. To understand the questions, or the answers, we must understand ourselves and clarify what it is about our existence that gives rise to these questions and capabilities. Heidegger’s attempt at figuring this out takes place in what he calls an ‘analytic of Dasein’, a project central to Being and Time but also for his thought as a whole: he speaks about Dasein throughout his career. Analysing its always an important topic for him, despite the analysis taking on different forms later in his career - it is the key to finding out the meaning of Being.

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63 Robert C. Scharff recently argued that this is an insight Heidegger owes to reading Wilhelm Dilthey (specifically, his idea that life must be understood on its own terms), rather than Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. For Dilthey, “all experience must be related back to and derives its validity from the conditions and context of consciousness in which it arises […] only in the facts of consciousness [as] given in immediate experience do we possess reality as it is.” (Dilthey, quoted in Heidegger Becoming Phenomenological: Interpreting Husserl Through Dilthey, 1916-1925, Robert C. Scharff, Rowman and Littlefield, London/New York, 2019)
‘Dasein’ is a neologism Heidegger creates by borrowing an everyday German word (for ‘existence’, or ‘being-there’) and using it to denote the “entity which each of us is and includes inquiring as one of the possibilities of its Being” (BT 27). Dasein is the entity can do certain things, has various ‘possibilities of its being’ which include raising the question of being. Humans can clearly do this, but Heidegger chooses Dasein as his central concept, concertedly avoiding ‘human being’ (or ‘consciousness’ or ‘subject’), because these kinds of terms come with much philosophical baggage: their ubiquitous use in Western philosophy makes it difficult to approach them from a neutral standpoint. By introducing a new term, we can free ourselves from any preconceptions of what we are analysing. Human beings are Dasein, but the features of our existence that allow us to raise the question of Being, are potentially not limited to human beings. It is possible that there are aliens very different from us that still share the same existential structures – like being social, historical, mortal. Dasein’s being is not necessarily limited to human beings – we are an instance of Dasein. But if any of Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein is true, then it applies truly to us by necessity because we are an instance of Dasein. Heidegger limits anthropology to empirical anthropology, which does not concern universal or constitutive elements of human existence, but if Heidegger had allowed for a philosophical anthropology that searches for this kind of commonality and constitutivity, perhaps he would have been able to see that the analytic of Dasein involves precisely this kind of project.

Division 1 of Being and Time is a “preparatory fundamental analysis” (BT, contents) of the being of Dasein, “to prepare the way for the problematic of fundamental ontology – the

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64 He also says that it is the entity whose being is an issue for it, that always comports itself towards that being, that always conducts its activities in an understanding of being, and that being is disclosed through it. (BT 32)
65 In the context of Heidegger’s project in Being and Time, the analytic of division 1 of the text is preparatory because it is to be deepened in division 2, where Dasein gets analysed in
question of the meaning of being in general.” (BT 227) On Heidegger’s view, this makes his own work distinct from any kind of anthropology because it is conceived and motivated completely differently:

in *Being and Time* the question of who, what, and how the human being is [...] is discussed exclusively and continuously in relation to the question of the meaning of being. Thereby, it has already been decided that the question of the human being in *Being and Time* was not formulated in the way anthropology would. What is the human being in and for himself?66

This is where I want to disagree with Heidegger. Just because his project is conceived and motivated differently does not mean he never engages in anthropology, and nor does the fact that he formulates the question of the human being differently. Heidegger says things that are true of human beings in a manner that a philosophical anthropology should aspire to. The analytic of Dasein attempts to identify features that are necessarily present and operative in every instance of Dasein’s existence and others that are contingently present or contingently instantiate the necessary.67 In doing so, it constitutes a theory about the structure of the being of Dasein, of which human beings are an example.

**§4.2 Heidegger’s Critique of Anthropology, Part 1: The Negative Side**

While Heidegger analysed relevant phenomena and traits of human Dasein, his aim was to give in no way a "regional", but a "fundamental" ontology and not to analyse "all" that is essential to the "nature" of man [...], but to develop the problem of the terms of temporality. But it is preparatory in another sense because such a project, on Heidegger’s view, would clear the way for future philosophical analysis in general.


67 He calls these ‘existential’ and ‘existentiell’ structures, respectively. I discuss these in more detail in chapter 9, where I discuss some of the specific existential structures Heidegger identifies, and how he conceives of these structures. But for now, my concern is with the general project of the text, and how this project does not preclude Heidegger from doing philosophical anthropology.
constitution of Dasein in such a way that thereby the meaning of "Being" could find its elucidation once more.

– Werner Brock, Introduction to *Existence and Being*\(^{68}\)

This is a faithful expression of Heidegger’s attitude to his work. While anthropology only analyses a ‘region’ of beings (human beings), fundamental ontology prepares for investigating the meaning of being in general. Here I will explain this argument via Heidegger’s criticism of Descartes’ philosophy, but various manifestations of this idea appear throughout Heidegger’s career. Early in the analytic of Dasein, he dedicates a section to explaining how this project differs from anthropology, psychology, and biology, with the aim of making his own project clearer. (BT §10, p. 71-77) His reflections on anthropology have positive and negative elements. I will examine these comments and arguing that Heidegger’s work should be conceived of as a kind of philosophical anthropology.

Heidegger’s criticisms of anthropology are the same ones he levels at most (if not all) philosophy of the Western tradition, but specifically at Descartes, who represents some of traditional philosophy’s most characteristic mistakes and to whom a significant amount of Western philosophy is indebted, especially epistemology and philosophy of mind. I will focus on Heidegger’s remarks on two of Descartes’ central ideas: the *cogito* and the *res extensa / res cogitans* distinction.

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Cogito Ergo Sum (I think, therefore I am) is perhaps philosophy’s most famous proposition, one that grounds Descartes’ entire system in the Meditations. Heidegger criticises it on the grounds that its level of analysis is not fundamental enough.

the aim of the existential analytic [of Dasein] can be made plainer by considering Descartes, who is credited with providing the point of departure for modern philosophical inquiry by his discovery of the “cogito sum”. He investigates the “cogitare” of the “ego”, at least within certain limits. On the other hand, he leaves the “sum” completely undisussed, even though it is regarded as no less primordial69 than the cogito. Our analytic raises the ontological question about the Being70 of the “sum”. Not until the nature of this Being has been determined can we grasp the kind of Being which belongs to the cogitationes. (BT 71-72)

Heidegger’s problem with the cogito is not that it is false or contains an invalid deduction. Rather, Descartes leaves one fundamental aspect of this statement unanalysed, spending a lot of time on ‘thinking’ but neglecting the ‘I am’. Descartes makes his deduction and concludes from it that we are thinking things, that the essence of what we are lies in our capacity for thought. Heidegger points out that there is much more to us than thinking - we are not completely defined by it. Before we can think we must already exist in a particular way, so the converse of Descartes’ statement is true in a more fundamental and temporally prior sense: I am, therefore I can think. The starting point in philosophical enquiry should not be thought, but our everyday manner of existence and its structure, since this is what makes thought possible.

If the ‘cogito sum’ is to serve as the point of departure for the existential analytic of Dasein, then it needs to be turned around, and furthermore its content needs new ontologico-phenomenal confirmation. The ‘sum’ is then asserted first, and indeed in the sense that “I am in a world”. (BT 254)

69 A curious word, a translation of the German ursprünglich, which can also be translated as ‘original’, ‘first’, or ‘primary’. In Heidegger’s work it denotes a particularly deep level of fundamentality with respect to our existence, the level of its most fundamental structures which make the more complicated aspects of it possible.

70 Heidegger often capitalizes the word ‘being’ to indicate what he calls the ‘ontological difference’ – the difference between being and beings. The capitalized Being gets reserved for the former sense.
For Heidegger, our existing in an already-meaningful world is what enables our capacities for thinking, communicating and understanding, so to conceive of ourselves as essentially thinking beings without first doing an analysis of our existence that takes this into account is a mistake. The structure and capacities of our existence, insofar as they give rise to thinking, should be clarified before we can get to what thinking is, or define ourselves in terms of thought.

Descartes’ system therefore contains at least one major unquestioned, unclarified assumption about us— that we are essentially thinking things. He builds an entire philosophical system on this idea without a prior analysis of any other aspect of our existence, or the place of thought within it. What we should do is analyse and clarify the nature of our existence in a way that reflects our (often unreflective) immersion in a complicated world of objects, relations and possibilities - and show how this enables things like thought. Such analysis would be based on phenomenological evidence, since our experience of our existence is the most fundamental perspective we could ever have for understanding it. We do more justice to our existence this way than if we judge ourselves to be essentially thinking beings, or a type of object, or a composite of mind and body. Our existence as we experience it is a unified whole, not a computing together of distinct, isolated elements.\textsuperscript{71} It is not defined by thinking, and perhaps does not even consist in it for the most part. Thinking is a possibility of our existence that arises out of and is made possible by its underlying structures – these are what we need to investigate thoroughly first, rather than our thinking.

\textsuperscript{71} More on this point in Appendix 2, when I discuss Heidegger’s engagement with Max Scheler.
Heidegger makes similar criticisms of Descartes’ distinction between *res extensa* and *res cogitans* (‘extended things’ and ‘thinking things’). Everything he says about the *cogito* applies to it: it lacks fundamentality, is not based on a prior analysis of our existence, conceives of us as essentially thinking things, and blocks a more appropriate and fundamental way of understanding ourselves. But Heidegger has more to say about it, emphasizing its negative influence on subsequent philosophy and its prevalent distinctions. He claims that it is the result of negative historical influence itself, being based on the misguided notion of ‘substance’, which in turn is derived from ancient Greek ideas.

But dividing up everything into ‘thinking’ and ‘extended’ also obscures our fundamental engagement with and belonging to the world, giving us an inadequate framework for understanding ourselves. Distinguishing between ‘thinking things’ and ‘everything else’ defines everything else on the basis that it is not us, when in fact we are inherently a part of the world we seek to define. Not only is our inextricable being-in-the-world amongst objects minimalized and conceptually obscured by it, but the world is also deprived of meaning entirely. Our world is not simply a world of ‘extended things’. Our world is one of meaning, where we encounter objects that are useful and significant to varying degrees, and everything is understood in terms of its meaning. This meaning is not something we build into it later, after we have looked at the world, thought about it, and organised it into a structure. The meaning, how these objects matter to us, is always already there, even if in a prelinguistic, pre-theoretical sense. Objects in the world are not just extended things that produce neutral sense-

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72 According to Heidegger, this distinction was “determinative ontologically for the distinction between ‘nature’ and ‘spirit’” (BT 123), one that becomes important in the philosophical anthropology of Max Scheler. (Appendix 2)

73 Not to mention the confusion that can arise from the fact that human beings instantiate both of its categories: we are thinking and extended beings.
data responses in us – they matter to us and have significance, something obscured by characterizing everything in the world that is not us as ‘extended things’. This fails to characterize the complex milieu of our world and the different ways we ordinarily encounter objects there, obscuring the fact that we understand things in the world in terms of their significance – not just their extension.

According to Heidegger, much of what he discovered about Descartes is also true of anthropology. Anthropology finds itself broken down into specific sub-categories (linguistic, cultural, biological, etc.), each with their own aims and methods. Anthropology therefore conceives of human existence as something we already know something about in advance, such that we can divide it up, isolate specific aspects of it and study them independently. Much gets “tacitly assumed as something ‘self-evidently’ ‘given’ whose ‘Being’ is not to be questioned, [therefore] the ontological foundations of anthropological problematics remain undetermined.”

(BT 75) This is an objection Richard Zaner formulates as follows:

No collection of empirical fact can possibly be used to reach a conception of man as such; to the contrary, all such collections are simply collections of empirical fact, which as such presuppose some principle(s) of selection and relevance. They presuppose, in other words, precisely what is in question: a conception of man, which implicitly determines the selection of de facto cases as relevant and the rejection of others as irrelevant.74

What empirical disciplines (like anthropology) end up saying is not necessarily false; the problem is that their foundations are unstable and rest upon an unclarified conception of what they propose to analyse – human beings. Whatever data gets collected, whatever gets said about it, takes place within a theoretical context according to unclarified preconceptions about what

they analyse and how. They are therefore constantly in danger of saying something that would contradict the results of the more fundamental analysis envisaged by Heidegger. Anthropology could be said to be ‘ahead of itself’ because it has jumped ahead in its analysis without doing the requisite work to get to that point: it tries to run before it can walk. This ‘breaking-up’ of discreet aspects of ourselves for study produces much the same effect on our understanding of ourselves that the *cogito* and the *res cogitans/res extensa* did: they force an understanding of ourselves that is not only unclarified, but ontologically inadequate and deceptive.

Heidegger’s project is an attempt to question and clarify the things about our existence that Descartes and anthropologists have not. His analysis of Dasein, he claims, is more fundamental than anthropological analysis because its starting point is our experience of our existence. Because this is all we ever experience and we cannot step outside of it, reflecting on these things is necessary if we want to learn about what it is to be ourselves. By studying our experience phenomenologically, we analyse ourselves at a more fundamental level than anthropology and most previous attempts at philosophy have. This level of analysis is what will most profoundly reveal ourselves since what is analysed there is the existence that we undergo all the time. This would do more justice to our experience of being human than the detached, naturalistically inclined anthropology that has so far been attempted, while also potentially complementing it.

This concludes our exposition of the negative side of *Being and Time*’s critique of anthropology. Anthropology’s level of analysis cannot operate at a fundamental enough level to adequately analyse our existential structure, which must be done if we are to be able to adequately ground any intellectual endeavour. Heidegger’s fundamental ontology, according
to him, can do this. The findings of anthropology are not necessarily wrong, but they do rest on unstable foundations and do not confront the issue of our existence as it is experienced by us. I now proceed to the more positive side of Heidegger’s remarks, which say that although anthropology rests on unclarified foundations, his project would provide these foundations if it is successful.

§4.3 The Critique of Anthropology, Part 2: The Positive Side

The following quote shows a kind of turning point in Heidegger’s critique of anthropology, moving us from the negative side to the positive. Heidegger does not think anthropology is doing illegitimate work. But its object, scope and method of inquiry is different to the analytic of Dasein’s, which Heidegger argues is the proper method for discovering its ontological foundations.

In suggesting that anthropology, psychology and biology all fail to give an unequivocal and ontologically adequate answer to the question about the kind of Being which belongs to those entities which we ourselves are, we are not passing judgement on the positive work of these disciplines. We must always bear in mind, however, that these ontological foundations can never be disclosed by subsequent hypotheses derived from empirical material, but that they are always ‘there’ already, even when that empirical material simply gets collected. (BT 75)

Anthropology and anthropological work is not invalidated just because the analytic of Dasein has not been completed. Heidegger’s concern is that the ‘ontological foundations’, which would ground and guide such research appropriately, cannot come from anywhere but a phenomenological analysis of Dasein’s existence. Anthropology is not invalid or unworthy but would be better pursued and more appropriately founded if done in the wake of Heidegger’s existential analysis, making use of its resources. This is the positive aspect of Heidegger’s
critique of anthropology: despite its currently being unfounded, it still has the potential to be, and Heidegger’s project, if successful, would provide the foundations.

Heidegger later extends this line of thought to include philosophical anthropology:

If need be, there still remains the possibility of broadening out the analysis [of Dasein] by characterizing comparatively the variations of concern and its circumspection, of solicitude75 and the considerateness which goes with it; there is also the possibility of contrasting Dasein with entities whose character is not that of Dasein by a more precise explication of the Being of all possible entities within-the-world. Without question, there are unfinished tasks still lying in this field. What we have hitherto set forth needs to be rounded out in many ways by working out fully the existential a priori of philosophical anthropology and taking a look at it. (BT 169-170, emphasis added)

What I interpret Heidegger to mean here is that, following his identification of concrete features of Dasein’s existence, it would be possible and perhaps the task of a philosophical anthropology to identify the variations in these structures, even analysing Dasein’s structure in comparison to non-Dasein entities. Heidegger’s descriptions of Dasein’s structures could be ‘rounded out’ (improved, developed, etc.) in a philosophical anthropology. Anthropology is fully grounded only when practised upon adequate foundations, and certain aspects of Heidegger’s philosophy can be productively ‘rounded out’ in a philosophical anthropology. Nonetheless, Heidegger insists that his project is not anthropology, nor laying the groundwork for it, but is somehow connected to it, perhaps in being able to be used in it in the future.

§4.4 Responding to Heidegger’s Critique of Anthropology

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75 ‘Concern’, ‘circumspection’ and ‘solicitude’ are technical terms from Heidegger’s analytic of Dasein. It is not important to go into there meaning here in order to understand this quote, but the variations of solicitude will be returned to later when I discuss in more specific detail how Heidegger’s analysis can be understood as philosophical anthropology. (§6)
Heidegger’s remarks on anthropology raise important questions, such as how we are to understand the relationship of his work to it. He says that he does not want to criticise anthropology, that it is not invalidated by his work, but also that it is not adequately founded and would not be without his work. Does it make sense, and is it necessary for his project, for him to say this? Despite pursuing what could be (correctly) interpreted as philosophical-anthropological concerns, Heidegger argues that his work is not anthropology and has nothing to do with it, except in its somehow relating to it or being used in it in the future. He is emphatic that what his work is not anthropology, so if we are to claim that Heidegger’s work can be understood as philosophical anthropology, we cannot ignore this self-assessment: should we take him at his word? I argue that we should not, that his work should be read as a kind of philosophical anthropology, and that certain aspects of it can be taken and used productively in such a project. I will argue to this effect here and in different ways as the dissertation progresses.

Heidegger does not make it clear how his own research would better ground the discipline of anthropology once it had been completed. Anthropology operates using very different methods and practises to the ones Heidegger uses, and philosophers often use. Perhaps the importance of Heidegger’s work in relation to anthropology is not that it grounds or legitimizes it but that it adds to it, informs it and could productively co-exist with it. Heidegger’s idea that anthropology rests on shaky foundations but would somehow be made more legitimate by his project, is a strange and perhaps unconvincing one. But it is one that we absolutely do not have to accept for his project to be interesting to philosophical anthropology. We should judge Heidegger’s project on its merit as a way of approaching the question of human existence – this is where it is at its best. Anthropology has interesting and productive ways of approaching it and so does Heidegger who, despite what he says, undertakes a painstaking examination of
the structure of human existence as we experience it to find what is common to and constitutive for every case of it. This analysis and its concern for a kind of generality is one that might not interest most anthropologists, but it is an anthropological concern because it analyses human beings, even if it only analyses them insofar as the analysis prepares us for the question of being. It is not necessary for Heidegger’s project ground anthropology to be of interest to philosophical anthropology. It can exist alongside anthropology, complementing it whilst being different to it.

As I have characterised it, Heidegger’s analysis seems to be a philosophical anthropology, but he was emphatic that it was not because it is a more fundamental kind of analysis. Is this right? We noted above that, in principle, Dasein is not limited to human existence - Heidegger holds firm to this point throughout Being and Time. This takes him in a particular direction, keeping him at a level of abstraction that can sometimes be problematic. There are moments where Heidegger breaks off interesting lines of analysis because ‘to go any further would take us away from analysing Dasein into analysing human existence’. This occurs when Heidegger discusses Befindlichkeit, an important term for his analysis of moods and affective phenomena, which I address later. (§7) It is worth noticing how Heidegger shies away from certain issues because they are not within the scope of an analysis of Dasein: “the different modes of Befindlichkeit and the ways in which they are interconnected in their foundations cannot be interpreted within the problematic of the present investigation.” (BT 178) Analysing the way in which affective phenomena are connected would be interesting one, but Heidegger directly eschews this because it would take us too far from analysing Dasein, therefore too far from the question of Being. Earlier, we examined a quote where Heidegger indicated the potential of his work to be broadened out in the fashion of a philosophical anthropology. He writes that there is potential for developing analysis of the ‘variations’ in the existential structures he identifies,
like our meaningful engagement with the world, being with others, even comparatively analysing these structures with entities that are not Dasein. But the very next line is “this is not the aim of our investigation” and Heidegger cautions against “inappropriate analysis” that could arise if he takes his work too far in this direction. (BT 170) But taking the analytic of Dasein in this direction can lead to productive philosophical-anthropological work. (§9) It seems that Heidegger is sometimes forgetful of the fact that his analysis of Dasein just is an analysis of our existence, conducted from the point of view of his own, human existence. Its results, if true, apply truly to Dasein. But anything that applies truly to Dasein necessarily applies truly to us because we are Dasein. There is nothing that can be said about Dasein that cannot be said of human beings, and the things Heidegger discovers about Dasein are not incidental, contingent features of human existence, they are non-contingent and constitutive of it – without them, we would not be human beings. Furthermore, throughout the analytic of Dasein, Heidegger constructs a network of concepts and theories and uses them to philosophically analyse human existence and specific types of human behaviour. The relevance of such work to philosophical anthropology is obvious.

Heidegger’s use of ‘Dasein’ might offer us a more neutral view of the entity in question, but it comes at the cost of excessive abstraction. The aim of the analytic of Dasein is to identify non-contingent features of our existence, figure out how our existence is structured, understand our existence as it manifests itself to us. This is precisely the aim of a philosophical anthropology, so Heidegger is mistaken to say he is not engaged in it at all. He engages in it often and gives us productive material for developing it further. Despite its ontological motivations and use of ‘Dasein’, Heidegger’s analytic is a philosophical anthropology, or at least this is how it should be read because it reaches its most interesting and productive potential when it is read like this. The things Heidegger identifies in the analytic could possibly apply to other, non-human
Dasein, but this is not what should interest us. What should interest us is understanding our situation and our existence as adequately as possible. Heidegger’s analytic of Dasein is a particularly powerful philosophical tool for this, even though he denied that this is what it was for.

Heidegger’s aim in _Being and Time_ is to analyse the structures that would need to be in place for _any_ kind of entity to enquire into the meaning of being, but throughout this analysis he approaches anthropological questions and gives answers to them. His account of _Being-in-the-world_ is (if correct) is an answer to the question ‘what is the basic state of human existence?’ His use of the term _Sorge_ [care/concern] refers to the fact that our existence and everything in it is understood in terms of significance, and our ordinary way of existing is one of concernful involvement with our world. His enquiry into _Being-with_ answers to the question of what role other people play in the complicated structure of our lives and in the formation of our identity. His account of _Rede_ [discourse/talk] and _Gerede_ [idle talk] deals with how humans use language and the foundations of this capacity. His account of _Das Man_ [the ‘they’] is one that grapples with the effect other people have on our thoughts and actions, and his account of _authenticity_ (in part) details how we can overcome this and decide things for ourselves, seizing hold of our existence. Later, Heidegger analyses our inevitable confrontation with death and how this confrontation affects our lives, eventually arguing that an authentic confrontation with it allows us to live more completely. If these issues do not pertain to human existence, nothing does. And this is not an exhaustive list of such issues raised in _Being and Time_.

Therefore, my reply to his argument, that his work is not and has nothing to do with any kind of anthropology, is the following: whatever his motivation for making this argument, he is simply

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76 It will still not be exhaustive, but in §6 I will go into more detail about particular examples of these structures and show why they amount to a philosophical anthropology.
wrong. It may have been to emphasize his own originality, or because of a deep commitment
to finding absolute fundamentality concerning being, but whatever his reason is, reading his
own analysis shows that he was mistaken. Our response to his work should therefore be to take
it and use it to do precisely what he thought he was not doing, recognising its productive power
as philosophical anthropology and building on it.
§5: Reading Heidegger Against Himself: The Idea of Philosophical Anthropology in the Kantbook

Perhaps the basic difficulty of a philosophical anthropology does not lie primarily in the task of attaining the systematic unity of the essential determinations of this multifaceted creature. Perhaps instead a difficulty lies in its concept itself.

– Martin Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*\(^{77}\)

Kant was clearly an important philosopher for Heidegger. The famously unwritten sections of *Being and Time*\(^{78}\) were supposed to include a section on Kant that engaged in a “phenomenological destruction” (BT 63) of his work. But this ‘destruction’, as Heidegger understood it, was “far from having the negative sense of shaking off the ontological tradition. We must, on the contrary, stake out the positive possibilities of that tradition” (BT 44). Two years later, Heidegger produced *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* (AKA the *Kantbook*) - an attempt at this sort of project, which also contains Heidegger’s most direct critique of philosophical anthropology. Here, I contextualize his critique within the text as a whole and closely examine it. My response to Heidegger’s critique of philosophical anthropology will read him against himself: his analysis of Dasein’s existence in *Being and Time* actually correlates in many ways with philosophical anthropology as he himself defines it, and answers to some of the criticisms he makes of it.

§5.1: The Project of the Kantbook

Heidegger saw a special affinity between his work and Kant’s and makes sense of it in the *Kantbook*. Importantly for us, both philosophers provide an account of human existence and

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\(^{77}\) *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* (KM in text), Martin Heidegger trans. Richard Taft, Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1997, p. 147

both conceive of this as a prerequisite for future philosophy. For Heidegger, an account of our existence is present in his ‘analytic of Dasein’, an analysis of our existence that prepares us for answering the question of the meaning of Being. The fact that his account is motivated solely by this question, coupled with the fact that his analysis is of Dasein (not human existence as such), precludes his work from being philosophical anthropology. But this view is rendered problematic by Heidegger’s own remarks about philosophical anthropology, and how he conceives the project of Being and Time.

The analytic of Dasein contains an account of our existence, one that prepares us for future philosophizing - which brings Heidegger’s work into sharp affinity with Kant’s. For Kant, an account of our existence is necessary because philosophy tries to answer three questions: “what can I know? What should I do? What may I hope?” (KM 145, quoting Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason) But these questions imply a fourth that must also be addressed if we are to have coherent answers to the others, namely ‘what is the human being?’ If philosophers want to find out how we should act, what we can know or hope for, we need to know something about the thing that is doing the knowing, hoping and acting. For different reasons, Heidegger and Kant both place an account of our existence at the fundament of philosophical questioning. Kant in no uncertain terms conceives of this task as a kind of anthropology. The theoretical anthropology of his three Critiques is supplemented by his later, descriptive, practical account of Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (1798). According to Kant, this is because his transcendental method yields a metaphysical theory of the nature of human experience but tells us little about how to practically apply it. Philosophy therefore needs a complete theoretical and practical philosophical anthropology to be adequately founded.
This is where Heidegger distinguishes himself from Kant, arguing that his account of Dasein is essentially different from anthropology of any kind. Though there is merit in Kant’s work, it is still captive to the manifold mistakes Heidegger locates throughout the history of philosophy. Heidegger’s problem is not that philosophers have never attempted to account for human existence - that is patently false. But their motivations have been misguided, their methods and their frameworks outdated. Therefore, even if they are somehow attempting a worthy project, their attempts are confused and ultimately inadequate, coloured by their neglect of the things that should be motivating them. When Heidegger systematically discusses the work of other philosophers, it is always with a view to re-interpreting their work and salvage any insights relevant to the question of being and overcoming the unbeneficial aspects that inhibit its pursuit. Therefore, the Kantbook is devoted to the task of interpreting Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* as a laying of the ground for metaphysics and thus of placing the problem of metaphysics before us as a fundamental ontology. Fundamental ontology means that ontological analytic of the finite essence of human beings which is to prepare the foundation for the metaphysics which ‘belongs to human nature’. (KM 1)

Heidegger is attempting the ‘destruction’ of Kant’s work he envisaged for *Being and Time* — a critical analysis of what Kant got right and wrong regarding the investigation into the question of Being. One of Heidegger’s key findings is that Kant is right to conceive an account of human existence (or ‘ontological analytic of the finite essence of human beings’) as preparing the way for future philosophy, but he is wrong to conceive of it as a kind of anthropology. Kant,

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79 For reasons that overlap what I discussed earlier. (§4) My reply to this bears briefly repeating: *an account of Dasein just is, even if only in part, an account of human existence.* Humans are instantiations of Dasein, so anything that applies truly to Dasein applies truly to us. An account of human existence is therefore present in and fundamental to the preparing-of-the-ground for philosophy in Heidegger. But I will return in some form to this kind of objection later. Heidegger argues in *Being and Time* (BT 71-76) that his analytic is distinct from anthropology, psychology and biology, but it is only in the *Kantbook* that we find a detailed discussion of its difference from philosophical anthropology specifically.
ultimately, does not conduct his analysis at a fundamental enough level – he is still consigned to human beings and anthropology, rather than Dasein and Being. Heidegger largely spends his time in the *Kantbook* on comparing two of Kant’s discussions of the imagination.\(^\text{80}\) But there is also a section called *The Idea of a Philosophical Anthropology*, which argues that philosophical anthropology cannot fulfil the role that Heidegger’s philosophy does.

Kant and Heidegger both agree that, in some sense, an account of human existence is a prerequisite for future philosophy, which seems like a kind of anthropology. But anthropology, on Heidegger’s view, is too far removed from fundamental philosophical questioning – it does not question its own assumptions, has a pre-determined idea of what the human being is and is unconcerned with the question of Being - the most important question. Therefore, if we must go back to anthropology, it would have to be an anthropology that could reflect and question in that way, and the best candidate for this would be a philosophical anthropology. Indeed, Heidegger writes that “it stands beyond doubt” (KM 146) that only a philosophical anthropology that could assume such a role. But a philosophical anthropology must have a clear idea of itself and its central questions and be able to occupy the central place in philosophy it would need to. Heidegger argues that it does not and cannot.

**§2: The Idea of a Philosophical Anthropology**

Heidegger begins his critique of philosophical anthropology by arguing that the idea of anthropology is indeterminate. Given all its different categories, subdisciplines, attitudes and

\(^{80}\) For the curious, these discussions appear in the first *Critique* and the *Anthropology*. Heidegger concludes that the former is superior, bringing imagination “to light in a much more original way” (KM 92).
methods, many of which disagree with each other, “anthropology becomes so comprehensive that the idea of it becomes mired in complete indeterminacy.” (KM 147) Moreover, ‘anthropology’ now

is no longer just the name for a discipline [...] [but also] a fundamental tendency of man’s contemporary position with respect to himself and to the totality of beings. [...] something is only known and understood if it is given an anthropological explanation. (KM 147)

Anthropology is not just a discipline that has become indeterminate, but brings with it an attitude that Heidegger sometimes calls ‘anthropologism’. Anthropologism has a similar meaning for anthropology as ‘scientism’ does for science, where ‘scientism’ is the belief that science can explain everything, that science is the best route to understanding, or that things are only truly ‘known’ when they are explained scientifically. In a 1925-1926 lecture course, Heidegger calls anthropologism “that specific form of relativism that makes the validity of knowledge relative to the human species”.

Anthropologism is an overconfident attitude towards anthropology, or in general any kind of explanation that understands things solely in terms of how they relate to human beings, thinks understanding things only truly comes this way, or thinks that things like truth, understanding or explanation are only available to human beings. Anthropology, according to Heidegger, is not just indeterminate regarding itself, but relates all knowledge back to human beings and anthropological analysis.

But if anthropology is so indeterminate and we must engage in a kind of anthropology to ground our philosophical questioning (as Kant suggests), what kind of anthropology could we turn to? Surely, it must be a kind that could reflect on its own presuppositions, key questions, and self-

81 See also KM 148, referring to “anthropologism in philosophy”.
conception, and the best candidate for this would be a philosophical anthropology, since philosophy is all about this kind of reflection. This is why Heidegger writes that it is ‘beyond doubt’ that only a philosophical anthropology could provide the kind of philosophy Kant is after: because if it has to be an anthropology, it must be philosophical. But is it possible for philosophical anthropology to be sufficiently self-reflective, or to occupy this place in philosophy?

For Heidegger as well as Kant, the giving of an account of our existence should be at the centre of philosophy. For Kant, explicitly, philosophy is ‘anthropocentric’ - the question of the human being is the decisive and unifying factor to all philosophical questioning. For Heidegger, an account of our own being (as Dasein) is necessary if we want to answer the question of the meaning of being, since we are the entity whose being is an issue for it and therefore has a special relationship to Being. For different reasons and in different ways, Kant and Heidegger both place the giving of an account of human existence at the heart of philosophical questioning. But Heidegger argues that the giving of this account cannot consist in a philosophical anthropology.

A partial reason for this is that philosophical anthropology cannot be at the centre of philosophy because it is a ‘regional ontology’, not a ‘fundamental ontology’ – it focuses on a ‘region’ of beings, not on Being. However, Heidegger is analysing a region of beings and excluding other ones – he is analysing Dasein, not rocks, or tables. His reasoning behind this, as we have seen, is that an analysis of Dasein is necessary preparation for investigating the meaning of Being in general, so a fully realized ontology of the kind his is proposing would lead us to Being, with the analytic of Dasein forming a smaller part of the larger ontological project. So, the analytic
of Dasein is really concerned with Being, not a region of beings. Even if this is the case, Heidegger’s analytic of Dasein still contains the kind of ‘regional’ ontology of human beings – or philosophical anthropology - he claimed he was avoiding, or not engaged in. But this is not a criticism of his work, because this is actually a very useful and productive thing.

Heidegger does concede that there can be a kind of philosophical anthropology, and even seems to understand it similarly to me:

Certainly, an anthropology can be called philosophical insofar as its method is a philosophical one, perhaps in the sense of an essential consideration of the human being. [...] thereby to work out the specific, essential composition of this determinate region of beings. (KM 148)

A philosophical anthropology would consider how human existence is composed, its structure and the features of this structure. However, on Heidegger’s view, such an inquiry cannot be fundamental enough for the kind of work he is envisaging because it fixes on a ‘determinate region of beings’ – human beings - not Being in general.

Philosophical anthropology thus becomes a regional ontology of beings, and as such it remains arranged alongside other ontologies which, along with it, spread out over the entire field of beings. [...] Philosophical anthropology thus understood is not at the centre of philosophy. (KM 148)

Heidegger is not after ‘regional ontology’, but ‘fundamental ontology’. Regional ontology isolates a specific area of beings and studies it and is not fundamental enough to penetrate the question of the meaning of being.\(^{83}\) Fundamental ontology is better equipped for this sort of question because it begins with a thorough analysis of the existence of Dasein: the entity that,

\(^{83}\) He also labelled science a regional ontology for the same reasons. A discussion of this can be found in Rouse, Joseph. *Heidegger on Science and Naturalism* (2005), Division I Faculty Publications, 36. URL = https://wesscholar.wesleyan.edu/div1facpubs/36
by virtue of its very existence, has an essential relationship to the thing in question - Being. By questioning this entity, we get to Being because we get an understanding of this entity’s relationship to Being, as well as an understanding of how this entity could ask, answer, or understand a question like the question of the meaning of Being. Philosophical anthropology, on the other hand, merely isolates one area of beings and studies it, and this kind of analysis could never be deep enough to permeate being, only a region of it.

The first thing to notice is that even if Heidegger’s work takes us beyond philosophical anthropology, it still contains philosophical anthropology, whether he likes it or not. In *Being and Time*, his most significant attempt at ‘fundamental ontology’, he does the exact things he describes philosophical anthropology as doing: analysing human beings, working out their ‘essential, specific composition’. Even though he only analyses human beings insofar as they are an instance of Dasein, Heidegger examines the structure of human existence, developing a conceptual vocabulary and framework we can use to further this analysis. Let’s remind ourselves of some of the text’s concerns:

- Being-in-the-world as the basic state of Dasein (BT 78-91)
- The structure of Dasein’s world (BT 91-149)
- Social being and its role in our existence generally (BT 149-169)
- What being in a world is like, including moods, language, world-disclosing processes and inauthenticity (BT 169-225)
- Interpreting Dasein’s Being as one of ‘care’ or ‘concern’ (BT 225-244)
- Reality and Truth (BT 244-274)
- Interpreting all the previous in terms of temporality (BT division 2 generally)
- Death and Anxiety (BT 279-312)
- Conscience and Guilt (BT 315-341)
- Anticipatory Resoluteness in the face of death, and Authenticity (BT 349-383)
- The temporality of everyday existence (BT 383-424)
- History (BT 424-456)
There may be issues to take with how I have defined these areas precisely. However, if something like an inquiry into any of them with respect to Dasein takes place, and Heidegger manages to deduce non-contingently true of Dasein’s existence on any of these points, then he has by necessity deduced something non-contingently true of human existence, and there is philosophical anthropology in *Being and Time*. Just because he may be doing more than philosophical anthropology does not mean he is not doing any, nor does it mean that the parts of his work that most closely resemble philosophical anthropology are essentially different from it simply because they form part of a larger project. Heidegger still gives us an analysis of the essential composite features of human existence – precisely the goal of philosophical anthropology as he himself defines it. Whether or not this kind of analysis could lead us to an answer to the question of being is another issue, but whether it could or not has no impact on whether Heidegger is doing philosophical anthropology or not.

Next, the claim about philosophical anthropology not being at the centre of philosophy must be addressed. Heidegger argues that only an analysis of Dasein which leads to the question of Being could occupy the centre of philosophy, not philosophical anthropology’s regional ontology. But the analysis of Dasein *must* contain an account of human existence, or at least say true things about the essential features of human existence, as philosophical anthropology aspires to. This is the case even if the things that would motivate an analysis of Dasein differ from what might motivate a philosophical anthropology. An essential consideration of human existence must, therefore, occupy a central place in philosophy, even if it is only a part of Heidegger’s account of Dasein. The analysis of Dasein might be further-reaching and even

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84 Assuming that they are different, and that philosophical anthropology is motivated only by figuring out what human existence is, rather than figuring out the question of Being. But philosophical anthropology could be motivated by the question of Being, as it seems to be for Heidegger.
theoretically include non-human Dasein, but the fact remains that to analyse Dasein just is to analyse human existence and its structures, which is to do philosophical anthropology. Heidegger’s project therefore must contain a kind of philosophical anthropology by its very nature, and if it is indeed at the centre of philosophy, so too is philosophical anthropology.

Another point Heidegger makes is that an anthropology can be philosophical if “it determines in particular either the goal of philosophy or its point of departure or both at once.” (KM 148) A philosophical anthropology of this kind would “delimit the place of man in the cosmos” (KM 148), conceiving the human as occupying a special place in it as the being “which is simply the first given and most certain in the order of grounding an absolutely certain knowledge.” (KM 148) Heidegger writes that “the building up of philosophy planned in this way must bring human subjectivity in as the central starting point.” (KM 148) This is a related but different way of conceiving philosophical anthropology than the one above: it centres itself relative to the goal of philosophy and determines its goal, rather than just as occupying a central place in it. Heidegger points out that there are differing potential conceptions of philosophical anthropology and these differing conceptions give rise to “the indeterminateness of this idea” (KM 148), which is his biggest criticism against philosophical anthropology.

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85 Possibly a reference to Max Scheler, a philosophical anthropologist whose work Heidegger admired that I discuss in Appendix 2. Scheler wrote a text the title of which has been translated as ‘man’s place in the cosmos’.

86 It could perhaps be argued that these are two ways of expressing the same point, in which case my previous arguments above would apply to this conception of philosophical anthropology too. However, Heidegger uses this variety of possible conceptions of philosophical anthropology to make his most significant point about it, so I will assume for the sake of argument (and for the sake of a related point about Heidegger’s philosophy I will make) that they are different.
Everything Heidegger says about this different conception of philosophical anthropology – as determining the goal of philosophy - can be applied accurately to his own project. Heidegger delimits the human being in the place of the cosmos and attempts to illuminate its special place in it – as Dasein, the entity which can understand Being. Furthermore, Heidegger’s project also aims to ground philosophy and is fixed in terms of and determined by what he sees as philosophy’s most fundamental goal – the question of Being. Heidegger wishes to avoid the term ‘subjectivity’, but it can be said without controversy that he brings the human being’s existence as experienced from its own perspective as its starting point in pursuit of the question of Being. Heidegger’s own description of philosophical anthropology correlates strongly with his own project and how he proposes to carry it out. But noticing this correlation is not enough to refute Heidegger’s critique of philosophical anthropology within this text because, even if all this is true, the fact that there are differing conceptions of philosophical anthropology is not his main objection to it. His main objection is that it is an inherently indeterminate idea.

Heidegger argues that the idea of philosophical anthropology has “inherent limits […] for it is itself not expressly grounded in the essence of philosophy but is instead fixed with reference to the goal of philosophy.” (KM 148) The most determinate the idea of a philosophical anthropology could get would be to conceive itself as “a possible catchment area for the central philosophical problems, a characterization whose superficiality and philosophical questionability jumps out at us.” (KM 148-149) At best, philosophical anthropology can give us a possible answer to the question of what philosophy is and what its central problems are. According to Heidegger, this is too superficial and philosophically questionable to belong to

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87 Some would call this ‘subjectivity’, but this is a discussion best saved for another time.
‘the essence of philosophy’ – it could designate what belongs to philosophy but cannot ‘do philosophy’ or ‘be philosophical’ itself. Anthropology can circle around philosophy, but never be at its centre. Heidegger never really gives a reason for why this ‘limitation’ is a negative one, or why this task would not belong to the essence of philosophy. Questions about what philosophy is, its goals and central problems, are philosophical questions. There is an entire subdiscipline of philosophy that deals with them: *meta-philosophy*. Philosophy is and should be self-reflective and self-questioning, and there is no reason why this kind of questioning would not be philosophical.

Heidegger contends that the role philosophical anthropology supposedly has is too indeterminate for it to belong to the essence of philosophy. But even if philosophical anthropology does fulfil this role, and even assuming this role is in some sense philosophical, Heidegger argues that it would still be susceptible to a more crucial objection:

> Even if anthropology in a certain sense gathers into itself all the central problems of philosophy, why are these able to lead back to the central question of what man is? Are they only able to lead back to this question if someone has the inspiration to undertake it, or must they lead back to it? If they must do so, where does the ground for this necessity lie? (KM 149)

Philosophical anthropology fulfils a *meta-philosophical* role, which means that its central question (‘what is the human being?’) cannot occupy a central place in philosophy. It remains to be shown that the central problems of philosophy necessarily lead back to the question of what the human being is. Philosophical anthropology can, at best, offer us a conception of philosophy and the direction it should take, but it cannot demonstrate why its central question would occupy a central place within philosophy itself. Without this, “the basis for the
decisiveness regarding the essence, right and function of a philosophical anthropology within philosophy is lacking.” (KM 149)

Heidegger claims to be able to show why fundamental ontology and its analysis of Dasein occupy a central place in philosophy, but not the question of the human being. This is a question Heidegger is not interested in or motivated by, and not one he understands himself to be answering. As he clarifies later in his career,

as ontology prepares the fundamental question of being as being, it is a fundamental ontology. Here it becomes clear once again how such a misinterpretation occurs if one understands Being and Time as a kind of anthropology.\footnote{Zollikon Seminars: Protocols-Conversations-Letters (Seminars 1959-1969, Conversations 1961-1972, Letters 1947-1971), Martin Heidegger trans. Franz Mayr and Richard Askay, ed. Medard Boss, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 2001, p. 122}

If a philosophical project is singularly concerned with the question of being, then it is a kind of ontology (not anthropology), which is exactly how Heidegger understands the analytic of Dasein. Since it is intimately connected to and motivated by answering the question of being, it cannot be anthropology.

Just because Heidegger engages in fundamental ontology, does not mean he never engages in philosophical anthropology in the process – he absolutely does, even if he is not keen on admitting it. Everything Heidegger says about philosophical anthropology could be aptly applied to his own project as he understands it. Heidegger objects that philosophical anthropology could never occupy a central place within philosophy because it could never show how the questions of philosophy lead back to the question of what the human being is.
But, in the form of Dasein, Heidegger himself provides a convincing answer to this – it is what I earlier called one of the most fundamental insights of Being and Time.

Any treatment of [the question of the meaning of being] […] requires us to explain how Being is to be looked at, how its meaning is to be understood and conceptually grasped: […] Looking at something, understanding and conceiving it, choosing, access to it – all these ways of behaving are constitutive for our enquiry, and therefore are modes of Being for those particular entities which we, the inquirers, are ourselves. Thus to work out the question of Being adequately, we must make an entity – the inquirer – transparent in his own Being. (BT 26-27)

If we want to ask, understand or answer philosophical questions, and we are the only entity we know of that can do so, we had better know something about how this entity operates and exists, and how its Being allows it to ask, understand or answer questions. This is the insight that drives the analytic of Dasein89, which contains an account of human existence even if it is one conceived of in terms of ‘Dasein’. We can take Heidegger’s insight as an answer to the very objection to philosophical anthropology he provides – philosophical questions lead back to the question of the human because the human is the only entity we know of that can partake in philosophy, so an investigation into the existence of this entity and how it operates is necessary if philosophy is to be adequately founded. This is the exact project Heidegger undertakes, and if his work can be understood as philosophical anthropology (which it should), then he has shown why such a project would occupy a central place in philosophy. He is focussed on the question of Being, but it applies to any philosophical question.

The criticisms Heidegger makes in the Kantbook are the most significant ones he makes about philosophical anthropology. I have shown, largely by reading Heidegger against himself, that

89 It also has to be noted that it is not dissimilar from Kant’s anthropocentric insight either – if we want to know what we can know, should do or hope for, we have to know something about the entity that does these things.
they are misguided. This because most of what Heidegger says about philosophical anthropology applies aptly to his own project, because he is mistaken to distance his own project so sharply from it, and wrong to claim that he is not engaging in it at all. He repeatedly insists that he is unconcerned with questions of human existence and philosophical anthropology, but often provides interesting and convincing answers to them in his own work. He employs a similar kind of reasoning to those about the substantive philosophy of history we saw earlier (§2) – philosophical anthropology, for Heidegger, involves misconceptions resulting from an interminable unclarity and contradiction regarding its task and central concepts. He criticises it for being impossible whilst having a successful go at it himself. The phenomenological perspective Heidegger wants to adopt must, necessarily, ontologically speaking be one of a specific kind of Dasein – our kind, the human kind. Everything he says about the existence of Dasein, if it is true, applies to us, so in his purported ontology the things he often looks for and discovers are the same kind of things that philosophical anthropologists look for.
What should we expect from a philosophical anthropology? One thing I have argued it should aspire to is to find necessary, fundamental, universal features of human existence, things that are common to all instantiations of it. This would be broadly opposed to anthropology’s tendency to document human beings in their specificity. But for a philosophical anthropology to be useful beyond this idea, there is something else it can do. A productive philosophical anthropology would give us a theoretical framework we can apply to instances of human behaviour or areas of human life and through it analyse, categorise and understand them. To say that Heidegger does this in *Being and Time* is a massive understatement – he examines many, many facets of human existence, and the conceptual framework and vocabulary he gives us is a productive one we can take, use and build on for a vast array of human phenomena. Throughout *Being and Time*, Heidegger tries to work out what kind of existence we have as human Dasein, what makes it the way it is, and what every case of human existence contains. These sorts of features are what Heidegger calls existenziell structures – something is existenziell if it “is constitutive for those entities that exist.” (BT 33) Existential structures are necessary, universal and constitutive for our kind of existence – without them, we would be a

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90 (*Being and Time* (BT in text), Martin Heidegger trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, Blackwell, London, 1962) It is important to note that *Being and Time* is not the only place where Heidegger attempts this kind of analysis. I will later discuss texts from the years that follow shortly after *Being and Time* that seem to be supplementary to what he does there. The ‘turn’ in Heidegger’s thought is well-discussed, and he does later criticise the kind of analysis he attempted in *Being and Time* for being too ‘subjective’ and ‘anthropocentric’, but for the purposes of a philosophical anthropology it is apt, and the texts of the late 1920s, that I focus on, I think could all potentially be included under the rubric of the ‘analytic of Dasein’, especially the later analysis of boredom.

91 This is not to say that he gets every category right or that his take on every aspect of human existence he analyses is right. But there is a wealth of productive, thought-provoking analysis to be found there.
fundamentally different kind of entity. *Existentiell* structures, on the other hand, are the various possible, contingent instances of the previous *existential* structures – the different ways they can manifest. These categories give Heidegger a framework with which to analyse human life, and *Being and Time* can be partially described as an exercise in determining which aspects of human existence fit into these categories – what are the necessary features, and what are the contingent manifestations of these features? For example, I am a big fan of Manchester post-punk band The Fall, but no matter what I may think about them, being a fan of them is not a defining characteristic of human existence. Many people have never heard of The Fall but are still human beings. Liking The Fall (or not) is a contingent, *existentiell* possibility of my existence, a possible variation of an *existential* structure of human existence. But it may be that being a fan of The Fall involves contingent manifestations of deeper *existential* structures, like aesthetic appreciation, or social being.

Heidegger emphasizes that the *existential* structures do not exist in a hierarchy, where one (or some) are more fundamental than others: they all have an equally fundamental part to play in constituting human existence. He describes the *existential* structures as being ‘primordial’, a translation of ‘*ursprünglich*’ (which can also be translated as ‘original’, or ‘primary’) he uses to indicate how fundamental the *existential* structures are – they have been with human beings since there were human beings. These structures are repeatedly claimed to be *equiprimordial* - they are equally fundamental and have an equal share in structuring our existence. Heidegger explains the significance of this as follows:

> The phenomenon of the *equiprimordiality* of constitutive items has often been disregarded in ontology, because of a methodologically unrestrained tendency to derive everything and anything from some simple ‘primal ground’. (BT 170)
One of the drawbacks of traditional philosophizing about human existence has been overtly foundational tendencies to explain everything in terms of a simple, foundational principle from which all others derive, on which they are based. For Heidegger, this only serves to obscure the unitary nature of human existence: each part shores up and depends on the others. Our existence is not one that is structured hierarchically because the structures cannot really be separated from or understood without relation to each other, and each have an equally important part to play. If any of them were removed, we would have a categorically different kind of existence and be a different entity. *Existential* and *existentiell* structures refer to different ways human existence is structured and the different ways that the necessary structures generate contingent manifestations. There are certain phenomena that necessarily occur in every case of human existence, and some that only contingently occur, but may be manifestations of a more fundamental structure. With this in hand, let us turn to a concrete, important example of a phenomenon within human existence: our social being, the way our existence determined by other people, our *being-with*.

§6.1 Being-With and the Positive Extremes of Solicitude

*Being-with* is an *existential* structure: there is no case of human existence that is not somehow structured by it.\(^92\) While *Being-with* is Heidegger’s term for sociality, he has another for our actual engagements with other people. Engaging with people is not like engaging with objects (which he has other terms for\(^93\)), so he gives interpersonal interaction and the kind of being that goes along with it another name – “solicitude” (BT 157). Solicitude does not mean that we are always solicitous towards others or trying to solicit things from others. It is rather an indication

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\(^92\) I will return later to possible objections to this point, as an illustration of Heidegger’s logic of deficient modes.

\(^93\) Presence-at-hand, readiness-to-hand, for instance.
of the fact that when we encounter and deal with people, we do so in a way that is fundamentally
different from dealing with and encountering objects and which entails a recognition of them
as people.\footnote{This is a highly controversial idea, especially when discussed in terms of dehumanization. Heidegger’s account of solicitude could perhaps be read as claiming that we cannot, really, fail to recognise a Dasein as Dasein, no matter how we perceive or understand them, or how we may treat them. Whenever we deal with people, we somehow recognise them as people. His work on this topic therefore opens onto discussions of dehumanization in a very interesting way, but I do not have the space to go into it here, since my purpose is to document how Heidegger’s work can be understood as a philosophical anthropology and how his thought on social being can be productive for understanding certain types of non-dehumanizing behaviour. I do not think Heidegger’s account of solicitude is committed to the view that truly dehumanizing behaviour is impossible – it even perhaps could be used to explain some of it in the logic of deficient modes.}

Objects are encountered by us, understood in terms of their potential significance – a table is
potentially useful to me for putting things on, a rock for starting a fire, etc. Objects are
understood in terms of what we may or may not be able to do with them – they are invested
with potential significance for our projects. But people, encountered in solicitude, are not
understood solely as objects – when we deal with them, we are aware of and recognise that this
thing in front of me is a person, an entity like me. We engage with people in ways that we
cannot engage with objects: we cannot be kind to rocks, considerate of a table’s needs, we
cannot be rude to a chair, or disappoint a piano. There are ways of engaging with people, modes
of solicitude, that involve similar behaviour our engagement with objects – we can pick people
up or put them down, we can manipulate them. But the manipulation of a person is different:
when you manipulate a person, you are often also treating them badly. Dealing with people
solicitously, in Heidegger’s sense, includes a dimension that is absent from our dealings with
objects – it entails a recognition of Daseins as other Daseins which opens up a social-ethical
dimension of positive, negative and indifferent solicitude. When we engage meaningfully with
other people, recognising them as people, we also treat them positively, negatively or what Heidegger calls ‘deficiently’. In a similar way to how objects are invested with potential significance, people are invested with potential solicitude. We can potentially be kind (or otherwise) to people but cannot potentially be kind to rocks.

Solicitude takes on many different forms, not all of them positive. There are also negative and ‘deficient’ modes of solicitude. Hurting someone, ignoring them, not caring about them or being rude to them are still manifestations of solicitude, just negative or deficient kinds. They still entail a recognition of a person as a person and still manifest a social interaction. Every solicitous social encounter is itself a manifestation of the deeper structure of being-with. But there are many possible manifestations of being-with and solicitude – visiting family, going to the pub, going to class, attending funerals, online meetings, talking to a lover, or a potential employer – these are very different encounters which all manifest our being social. Here we already see an indication of why Heidegger’s account of Dasein is one of useful philosophical anthropology: it specifies necessary, fundamental features of human existence and gives us a framework for analysing human beings, accounting for various aspects of their lives and behaviour. Being-with is an existential structure that has many contingent, existentiell manifestations in the different forms of solicitude. Through thinking about what the different forms of solicitude might be, we can categorise and understand various types of human behaviour, which is exactly what Heidegger goes on to do.

I indicated above that there are three possible categories of solicitude: positive, negative and deficient. Heidegger spends most of his time on the positive and deficient because he thinks these are the most common and the ones we spend most of our time in. Our everyday “Dasein
maintains itself proximally and for the most part in the deficient forms of solicitude” (BT 158), but our social engagement, our “everyday Being-with-one-another[,] maintains itself between the two extremes of positive solicitude” (BT 159). Characteristically, Heidegger constructs the concepts he wants to use to describe an aspect of human being – in this case positive, negative and deficient solicitude – only to then break off a line of analysis at a point which would be of interest to the project of philosophical anthropology: “to describe these and classify them would take us beyond the limits of this investigation.” (BT 159)

The first episode of Showtime drama *City on a Hill* contains an apt demonstration of the ‘two extremes of positive solicitude’: ‘leaping in for’ and ‘leaping ahead of’ the other. In *City on a Hill*, we are introduced to two brothers, both of whom have children and, like anyone else, have responsibilities. The younger brother shirks these responsibilities: is addicted to drugs, doesn’t see his children, has no income, constantly getting into fights, trouble with police, and so on. At one point, the older brother must pick him up from the police station, get him out of trouble, resolve the situation and carry him out because he is too intoxicated to walk. He should be taking his responsibilities on himself, but instead, his older brother must come, assume his younger brother’s responsibilities for his own and do everything for him. This is an example of what Heidegger calls ‘leaping in for the other’, in which someone

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\text{take[s] ‘care’ from the Other and put[s] [themselves] in his position in concern [...]} \text{this kind of solicitude takes over for the Other that with which he is to concern himself. The Other is thus thrown out of his position; he steps back so that afterwards, when the matter has been attended to, he can either take it over as something finished at his disposal, or disburden himself of it completely. (BT 158)}
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In this kind of solicitude, we take on the other person’s cares and responsibilities, when they cannot or opt not to take them on themselves. Parenthood must often involve this kind of solicitude because children are often not able to or do not possess the necessary knowledge to
do certain things for themselves, so parents take on the extra responsibility for them. “In such solicitude the Other can become one who is dominated and dependant” (BT 158), relying on others to take care of their responsibilities. Heidegger suggests that positive solicitude exists on a spectrum between two extreme poles that can manifest themselves in different ways, to differing degrees of intensity – one of these extremes is ‘leaping in’. But leaping in for the other can manifest in more mundane ways - mailing a letter for someone, taking their dog for a walk, washing their coffee mug, etc. ‘Leaping in’ is an extreme pole of positive solicitude that covers a wide range and spectrum of behaviours which involve taking the other’s cares and responsibilities away from them onto ourselves, ‘leaping into’ their world of concerns to help them out.

The other extreme of positive solicitude, ‘leaping ahead,’ involves giving the other’s cares and responsibilities back to them and trying to get them to take them upon themselves in an authentic manner. In City on a Hill, following the events at the police station, the older brother remonstrates with his younger brother in this fashion, tired of having to constantly leap in for him:

What the f*** is wrong with you? […] What’s gonna have to happen to you before you learn, huh? Or are you just gonna let us all in for the ride until you figure it out? Just let Ma watch you kill yourself by inches. […] Listen to me! This s*** that you pull, it don’t just affect you anymore. We’re not 18 years old […] I got kids. Three of them! One who cried herself to sleep the other night because he or her father didn’t come home. He’s at the station house, picking up her scumbag uncle!  

This is a way that ‘leaping ahead’ of the other can manifest itself – the older brother is trying desperately to get the younger to take hold of his life and his responsibilities authentically.

95 City on a Hill, Showtime, Series 1 Episode 1, Created by Charlie Maclean, Broadcast June 2019, numerous obscenities omitted or replaced.
make him realise his actions for what they are and their consequences in his larger social context. The older brother sees his younger brother on the wrong path, so he ‘leaps ahead’ of him to stop him from going any further down it and redirect him onto the right one, where he assumes his cares and responsibilities himself. When we ‘leap ahead’, we act not in order to take away [the other’s] ‘care’, but rather to give it back to him authentically as such for the first time. This kind of solicitude pertains […] not to a ‘what’ with which he is concerned; it helps the Other become transparent to himself in his care and to become free for it. (BT 159)

‘Leaping ahead’ is different from ‘leaping in’ because in leaping ahead, you are not performing the other’s tasks or directly assuming their responsibilities. Rather, you are trying to give them back to them, make them transparent to them and change their attitude to them. You don’t fulfil the responsibilities of the other, you make them take them on themselves. Leaping in and ahead of the other are the two extreme poles between which all possible positive solicitude exists – they are the end of a spectrum on which all positive social interactions exist. This sketch of the positive modes of solicitude is evidence for Heidegger’s theory being a broadly applicable, useful philosophical anthropology – it specifies fundamental features of human existence, examines their structures and gives us a framework through which to analyse, understand and categorise human behaviour.

*Being-with* is a necessary existential structure which manifests contingently in the various forms of solicitude that characterize most human engagement. The different varieties of solicitude that manifest on a day-to-day basis are its contingent, existentiell manifestations – they structure our existence, but are not existential because it is not a matter of necessity or universality which ones will appear or at what time. There are some forms of solicitude that
one may never encounter\textsuperscript{96}, but encountering solicitude in general is unavoidable - it manifests even in insignificant occurrences of social being. There are two extreme poles of positive solicitude, with all positive social interaction taking place on a spectrum between them. This already gives us a way to categorize, question or explain positive human behaviour: what kind of behaviour is it, leaping in or leaping ahead? Where on the spectrum does it take place? Which behaviour do we understand as one or the other? Are there cases where there is no sharp difference? And so on. But obviously this does not exhaust the possibilities of human engagement: there are also negative, indifferent or ‘deficient’ manifestations of solicitude that do not conform to its positive categories.

\textbf{§6.2 Murder and Gaslighting as the Negative Extremes of Solicitude}

Heidegger frames everything about engaging with others in terms of concerns, cares, possibilities and responsibilities, which is typical of his account of Dasein in general. Dasein’s being is inherently one of ‘care’ or ‘concern’ \textit{sorge} – we are concerned with our existence and the things in it and responsible for this existence – we have no choice in the matter. Similarly, Heidegger argues that our engagements with other people are understood in terms of concern, care and responsibility – leaping in and leaping ahead are positive manifestations of concern which are always somehow understood in terms of it. So perhaps there is room in this framework for negative or unethical\textsuperscript{97} behaviour that can still nonetheless be understood

\textsuperscript{96} Being physically tortured for information, for example, entails a recognition of a person as a person, one that has something another person needs. In torture, a person is recognised as an object of potential kindness and considerateness but this possibility is refused and the social interaction takes on a decidedly negative form. Thankfully, this is a kind of solicitude that most of us probably will not encounter.

\textsuperscript{97} Heidegger would surely refuse a term like ‘ethical’ or ‘unethical’ here and claim that his work is unconcerned with ethics for the same reasons it is unconcerned with anthropology. For a critical response to this, see Joanna Hodge’s \textit{Heidegger and Ethics}. (Routledge, London/New York, 1995)
within in terms of concern, on a spectrum between two extremes that mirrors the one between positive ‘leaping in’ and ‘leaping ahead’.

One extreme of this spectrum would almost certainly be murder: the ending of another’s concerns. When a murderer murders, they are still engaging with a person as a person, putting a total end to their responsibilities and their concernful involvement with the world. This could be the extreme negative manifestation of ‘leaping in’ – a murderer leaps into the other’s world of concerns and ends it. Murder would not be the only example of negative leaping in – there could be many cases where a person inserts themselves into the other’s world of concerns and objects in a negative manner that hinders or hurts them. Stealing, violence, wilful neglect, discrimination – all these things could manifest in a negative insertion of one person into another’s world of concerns, cares and tasks.

But what could a negative version of leaping ahead be? The positive version is about trying to positively change the other’s attitude, so they take their responsibilities on themselves and better their lives. It gets the other to take up a more positive and authentic perspective on their existence, possibilities and responsibilities. A negative version of this can be found in ‘gaslighting’, a term originating from Patrick Hamilton’s play *Gas Light*, which features a man changing the brightness of the lights in his family home and when his wife brings it up, denying that it has happened. The wife is thus forced to question her perceptions and begins doubting her sanity. Gaslighting has been described as “an attempt to destroy another’s perception of
a kind of psychological manipulation of someone’s perceptions and sanity designed to disorientate, harm or control them.

There are many characteristics of and potential “warning signs” for gaslighting in a relationship, including the manipulation and withholding of information, verbal abuse in the form of jokes, blocking and diverting the victim’s attention, trivializing the victim’s worth and undermining their thought processes, as Patricia Evans has listed. There is some overlap between Evans and an article by Elinor Greenberg, which phrases the phenomenon in terms of hiding, changing and controlling. ‘Gaslighters’ tend to hide things from their victims, cover them up and lie about them. They may try to change things about their victims in order to make them feel inferior, thereby maintaining a kind of ‘superiority’ and control over them. They may seclude them from friends and family, with the aim of controlling their thoughts and desires. Gaslighting could therefore, perhaps, be a negative form of ‘leaping ahead’. Positive leaping ahead stands before the other and attempts to influence their view of themselves, setting them on a more positive path in which they take authentic hold of their existence. Gaslighting also involves a standing in front of the other in order to influence their view and attitude to themselves and their existence but with negative intent, to put them on the wrong path, negatively distort their perceptions and mental health and control them. Where positive leaping in is an attempt to positively influence a person’s concerns and their attitude to their existence, gaslighting is the attempt to influence these things in the opposite direction.

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99 The Verbally Abusive Relationship: How to Recognize it and How to Respond (2nd ed.), Patricia Evans, Holbrook, Massachusetts, Adams Media Corporation, 1996
Even if you disagree with murder and gaslighting as being the negative extremes of solicitude, Heidegger’s framework for analysing social behaviour is still a potentially interesting one to adopt in thinking about them, and one that is ripe with potential for development and creative additions – and this is true for many aspects of the analytic of Dasein. But for now, by means of considering a set of related objections to what I have said so far, we can glimpse another reason why Heidegger’s thought in this area is productive, and how it has the potential to cover even more than what I have explained so far, to include cases of solicitude that seem to escape Heidegger’s categories.

Faced with Heidegger’s account of being-with and solicitude, you might want to object that, even if everything said about it so far is true, there is still an important aspect of human interaction that it does not account for. What could Heidegger’s account have to say about people who live alone, isolated from society? Can it be said of a hermit that their existence is structured by being-with and solicitude? What about cases of human interaction where, even though there is minimal engagement, it is meaningless, or completely indifferent? If you live in a city, you can walk past hundreds of people every day and not engage meaningfully with any of them. You might be completely indifferent towards them, barely even registering their presence at all. How could this kind of interaction be accounted for in terms of what we have said so far about solicitude? These kinds of questions are ones that can be raised about many aspects of Heidegger’s account. You can look at what Heidegger claims to be an existential structure, figure out an exceptional case of human existence that it seems not to apply to and object that Heidegger fails to account for them. While this initially seems like quite a damning criticism, he anticipates and answers it in the form of what could be called a ‘logic of deficient modes.’ By looking at this, we can bring into view even more ways in which Heidegger’s
account can be applied to human phenomena, especially how it accounts for particularly strange, extreme or indifferent kinds.

§6.3 The Logic of Deficient Modes

Hermits, being alone, or being completely indifferent to people – are these not cases of non-social human existence? If so, then being-with and solicitude are not existential structures, but existentiell phenomena – something that can structure your existence, or not. But if part of the aim of Heidegger’s project is to identify universal structures of human existence, Being-with and solicitude could be cases where he has failed to do this. Heidegger’s answer to this criticism argues that these are still cases of solicitude and being-with, but ‘deficient modes’ of them. In fact, most cases of solicitude, according to Heidegger, are deficient modes of it:

Dasein maintains itself proximally and for the most part in the deficient modes of solicitude. Being for or against, or without one another, passing one another by, not ‘mattering’ to one another – these are possible ways of solicitude. (BT 158)

I think Heidegger is not making a negative judgement here. For many if not most people on earth, most of the people that people encounter in their everyday lives do not matter to them, are not engaged by them, and not known to them. We pass people by all the time without a second thought, but we still inhabit a social space with them, we encounter them in some sense and understand them as other people. So, it makes sense to say that this sort of case is a deficient

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101 Although he often says that he is not making negative judgements, but it is highly questionable whether this is true in many cases, such as when he characterises Dasein’s inauthentic mode of being as one of ‘fallenness’.
102 Dunbar’s number might also be worth bearing in mind here. It suggests, convincingly I think, that there is a limit to how many social connections a person can properly maintain. (Ro, Christine. Dunbar’s Number: Why We Can Only Maintain 150 Relationships, BBC, Oct 9th 2019, https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20191001-dunbars-number-why-we-can-only-maintain-150-relationships)
mode of being social – even if we do not engage with most of the people we encounter, we are still somehow engaged in a social context with them and we still recognise them as people. We still have a social connection to and encounter with them, it is just so minimal that it is barely noticeable. When we walk past people on the street that we ignore, we know we are ignoring people and we know that if the situation were different, we could treat these people in different (positive or negative) ways. They are still objects of potential solicitude for us, even if we do not engage with them when we see them on the street. It is a kind of social interaction because it is still understood as one, as a deficient, indifferent or ‘anti-social’ one, but one still understood in a social context.

But what about extreme cases, like being alone, or living as a hermit, deliberately cutting yourself off from society? If there is any case of human existence that is not an example of solicitude or being-with, these would be good candidates. However,

Being-with is an existential characteristic of Dasein even when factically no Other is present-at-hand or perceived. Even Dasein’s Being-alone is Being-with in the world. The Other can be missing only in and for a Being-with. Being-alone is a deficient mode of Being-with. (BT 156-157)

By saying that being alone is a deficient mode of being-with, or a deficient type of solicitude, I think Heidegger is advocating the following idea – no matter how alone or anti-social you are, other people, social interaction and solicitude still feature in and structure your existence. Being alone is, deficiently, a way of being social, and the person who lives alone still understands their existence in terms of the social. There is no case of human existence where the social is completely uninvolved, not structuring it at all: no one is exempt from being-with and solicitude. Even those who live alone or anti-socially still conduct themselves in a social manner and still somehow understand their existence in social terms. The person who decides
they have had enough of society and wants to live alone, is reacting to society and living among others – it is an anti-social reaction, one that arises from and is understood in terms of the social. You can only decide to be alone if you were previously among others, and to be alone is a decision to not be among other people. The person who exiles themselves from society and lives alone knows that there is a society that goes on without them. It is a deficient way of being social. It therefore makes sense to say that a hermit’s existence is still structured by being-with and solicitude. It is through solicitude, recognising other people as people and objects of potential solicitude, that the hermit decides they want no more to do with being social. The hermit does not want to exist on the spectrums of positive, negative and indifferent solicitude, so they retreat to where they do not have to encounter other Daseins. But doing so is a reaction to being in the social domain and existing in relations of solicitude in the first place. The hermit is not oblivious to society, they conduct their existence in opposition to it. There is a real sense in which engaging with other people structures the existence of the hermit – they are the reason they choose to live alone. Being a hermit still involves a deficient kind of being social, a deficient mode of solicitude, a deficient manifestation of being-with.

Heidegger’s logic of deficient modes is a way of explaining cases of human existence that may seem as though they are ‘exempt’ from the existential structures. There are some, like mortality, that are impossible to deny, but others, like sociality, are more up for debate. But there is something about the logic of the deficient mode that answers these criticisms, at least in the case of sociality, but it could be applied to other areas of Heidegger’s analysis too. Sticking with the case of our sociality, does it really make sense to say that you can be a human being, and that nothing about your existence from beginning to end has anything to do with the social? Even in extreme cases, something about their existence can be said to either be determined by,
depend on, be the result of, or at the very least minimally involve people and social relations. Sociality, solicitude and being-with, therefore, do structure the hermit’s existence.

As we have seen from a close examination of his categories of being-with and the varieties of solicitude, Heidegger’s theoretical apparatus of necessary/Existential structures, contingent/Existentiell structures and their deficient modes gives us a productive, widely applicable framework we can use to examine human beings and their behaviour. So far, my exposition has been confined to how this can be done with respect to our interactions with each other: all manner of positive, negative and indifferent behaviours can be categorised, theorized about and accounted for under it. But this is far from being all Heidegger that applied this analysis to - which I am keen to stress. In what follows, I will examine his account of moods, aiming to deepen and extend his account of the ‘revelatory moods’ of anxiety and boredom.
§7: The Fundamental Disclosure of Moods

In the analytic of Dasein, Heidegger argues that moods are integrally involved in the process by which we meaningfully apprehend our world, reveal information\textsuperscript{103} to us on a different and more fundamental level than reason, cognition or science, and play a part in enabling each of these things. As Richard Polt phrases it, moods are not a pair of “subjective mental spectacles” that we can take off to see the ‘real world’. Rather, “moods are disclosive. They show us things in a more fundamental way than theoretical propositions ever can.”\textsuperscript{104} Moods are a constitutive part of our being able to make sense of the world and the things in it. This section will concentrate on the idea that *moods are fundamentally disclosive* and why they are more fundamentally disclosive than cognition, reason and knowing. The next section will turn to Heidegger’s analyses of anxiety and boredom. While all moods reveal some information to us, these moods are revelatory of our being-in-the-world as such. They reveal information to us about the predicament of our existence, giving us some insight into what it means to be Dasein. I therefore will call them ‘revelatory moods’, and to fully understand them we must begin with their context in Heidegger’s account of mood in general. It will therefore be necessary to clarify the two key terms he uses in his analysis: *Befindlichkeit* and *Stimmung*. As with many of Heidegger’s technical terms, they are difficult to translate into English, so I will begin by justifying the translations I have chosen to use – ‘mood’ for *stimmung*, ‘disposedness’ for *befindlichkeit*.

\textsuperscript{103} ‘Information’ would not be Heidegger’s choice of word, but given what he says about moods it makes sense to use. Moods tell us things, reveal things, disclose things about our existence and the things in it.
§7.1 Befindlichkeit and Stimmung

Heidegger’s account of mood appears in a section of Being and Time called Being-In As Such (BT 169-225), which deals with the ‘being-in’ of ‘being-in-the-world’ – the basic state of Dasein. Prior to this, Heidegger identifies the world as one of the major constituent elements of Dasein’s existence, the world being a context of significance where objects are related to each other and understood in terms of their significance (or insignificance) for us and our projects. After Heidegger explains what the world is, he deepens his analysis by asking what being in one is like, with part of his answer to this question being that our existence in a world is, always, partially structured by moods – “we are never free of moods.” (BT 175) The two key words in the original German - Befindlichkeit and Stimmung - are defined by Heidegger in terms of each other as follows:

What we indicate ontologically by the term “Befindlichkeit” is ontically the most familiar and everyday sort of thing; our Stimmung, our being-attuned. […] it is necessary to see this phenomenon as a fundamental existentiale (BT 172)

Befindlichkeit is an existential structure of human existence, which Heidegger identifies with Stimmung - Stimmung are moods, which are the different kinds of Befindlichkeit – the various existentiell manifestations of the same existential structure. Befindlichkeit is a necessary structure of which Stimmung are its various, contingent manifestations.

Macquarrie and Robinson\textsuperscript{105} opt for ‘mood’ in translating Stimmung, which “originally meant the tuning of a musical instrument, but […] has taken on several other meanings and is the usual word for one’s mood or humour.” (BT 172, footnote 3) The connotation of tuning, or

\textsuperscript{105} And Joan Stambaugh agrees – (Being and Time: A Translation of Sein und Zeit, Martin Heidegger trans. Joan Stambaugh, State University of New York Press, New York, 1996)
‘attunement’\textsuperscript{106}, is important – for Heidegger, moods are different ways you can be ‘attuned’ to the world and your existence, like a radio can be tuned to different stations. I use ‘mood’ because even though ‘attunement’ brings out an important connotation of the original German, it is clear from what Heidegger goes on to say that he is talking about moods and the emotional side of human beings, so it is less confusing to use a term that clearly brings this out. Furthermore, when we ordinarily talk about moods, we talk about ‘being in them’, and in them we often say ‘I am’ whatever that mood is – ‘I am bored’, ‘I am happy’, etc. This way of speaking, in terms of being a certain way, is one of clear importance to Heidegger’s ontology, so it is worth keeping also for this reason. Heidegger uses \emph{Stimmung} to speak of states we may be found in, in which we are a certain way, a way we are disposed to our world, and a way information about things in the world is disclosed to us. Therefore, in translating it I have opted for ‘mood’.

Heidegger avoids using terms like ‘emotions’ or ‘feelings’ because he tries to avoid adopting the same conceptual framework for discussing these phenomena that philosophy normally does. Plus, ‘emotion’ is not as common a word in German, and ‘feelings’ is too generic for what he is talking about because it could include what we normally call ‘sensations’ – we ‘feel’ hot or cold, but this is not the same as feeling happy or sad. Heidegger prefers instead to use a way of speaking that more thoroughly and readily connects what we normally think of as emotions or feelings with the disclosure of our world.\textsuperscript{107} Moods, for Heidegger, are an integral

\textsuperscript{106} As it has also been translated by Blattner, and Haugeland, at least. (See William Blattner’s webpage ‘Translating of Heidegger’s Jargon’ (BHJ in text) - http://faculty.georgetown.edu/blattnew/heid/Heidegger-jargon.html)

\textsuperscript{107} Lauren Freeman criticises Heidegger’s account because he does not adequately distinguish between moods, feelings, emotions. But this charge can be avoided because, judging by what Heidegger says about moods, it is clear that ‘moods’ would include what we refer to as emotions and affective feelings. (\textit{Defending a Heideggerian Account of Mood}, Lauren Freeman, collected in \textit{Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind: Conceptual and Empirical}}
part of the way our worlds are disclosed to us, states of being in which our existence and the things in it get revealed to us in different ways. The way we normally think of particularly intense moods might cast them as colouring everything else around us. In a bad mood, everything can seem disheartening or annoying, driving you further into the mood, and the converse can be said about good moods. This phenomenon, where the mood we are in effects how we encounter everything else around us, is important for Heidegger’s account – another good reason for choosing ‘mood’ to translate *Stimmung*.

*Befindlichkeit* is a much more difficult term to translate - no completely adequate equivalent is available in English. It has variously been translated as:

- ‘State-of-mind’ (Macquarrie/Robinson, BT)
- ‘Attunement’ (Stambaugh, BST)
- ‘Findingness’ (Haugeland, BHJ)
- ‘Affectivity’ (Blattner, in *Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism* (BHJ)
- ‘Disposedness’ (also Blattner, his current preference, BHJ)

Each of these translations has merits and drawbacks. ‘State-of-mind’, though it can refer to a mood or emotional state, is too vague. A ‘state of mind’ can mean many different things – thinking, believing, or dreaming could be called ‘states of mind’, but not necessarily moods. Furthermore, Heidegger is keen to avoid the term ‘mind’, and in this case I think this move is a justified one, since Heidegger does not say that a mood is a state of mind, but a state of

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disclosive being where information about our existence and our world is revealed to us. So a state-of-mind is too far from what Heidegger means by Befindlichkeit. ‘Findingness’ brings out a connotation of ‘finding oneself’ that is important here - Befindlichkeit does refer to our capacity to ‘be found’ a certain way. But it overemphasizes this passive, ‘being-found’ aspect at the expense of some of the other things going on, like our always being disposed a certain way such that things matter to us and the active, constitutive role this disposedness plays in our apprehension of our world. Likewise, ‘affectivity’, though it emphasizes the fact that Befindlichkeit is connected to affect, moods, and emotions, it still seems to indicate too much that these are just things that passively ‘affect’ us, without playing an active role in our disclosure of and engagement with the world. ‘Attunement’ would perhaps be a better translation for Stimmung than Befindlichkeit, though still not one I would use because it takes us too far from the fact that it is connected to moods, and the emotional side of the human being. It captures the fact that Befindlichkeit is our fundamental and constitutive capacity for finding ourselves a certain way, or being attuned, but it does not (I think) capture the active, meaning-making role that Befindlichkeit plays in our engagement with the world and our existence, quite as well as ‘disposedness’.109

‘Disposedness’, I think is the most apt translation of Befindlichkeit. It captures the idea that it is a state in which one may be found, a state in which we are disposed to the world in a non-neutral way such that things matter to us. We are not just found, affected, attuned, but disposed, which immediately implies a kind of active care about the thing we are disposed to and a definite affective connection towards what we are directing ourselves at. ‘Disposedness’ is the

109 Hofstadter’s translation, ‘affective self-finding’, though it does actually manage to bring out multiple important connotations and aspects of Heidegger’s term, unfortunately does not lend itself as well to writing and speaking in English.
necessary *existential* structure which underlies moods, and moods refers to the different (*existentiell*) ways that disposedness can manifest. Moods are argued by Heidegger to be *fundamentally disclosive*, meaning that they play a role in our disclosure of the world, are a constitutive structure of our existence, and operate on a more fundamental level than other mental events like cognition, knowing, and reasoning.

§7.2 ‘The Primordial Disclosure Belonging to Moods’

Historical-human life […] belongs to us and is possessed by us as an endlessly rich, diverse and multiply interested environmental experience that is an already meaningful and understandable process before it gets theoretically sliced up and conceptualized.

– Robert C. Scharff, *Heidegger Becoming Phenomenological*

Much of what Heidegger does in *Being and Time* involves exploring this crucial point. A pervasive way of talking about ourselves throughout the history of philosophy conceives of us as knowing subjects, cognizing consciousnesses to which objects appear. We *know* the world and it is primarily through our rationality, knowing, theorizing and cognizing that we apprehend it. This is a picture that Heidegger seeks to overturn because our connection to the world is in fact much more primal, un-reflective and a-rational than it allows for. Things like rationality, knowing, cognition (etc.) are only possible, he argues, because of a *prior* connection to and understanding of the world, the prior inhabiting of a space where everything already makes some basic pre-linguistic, pre-rational sense to us. Heidegger even uses the term ‘understanding’ to designate another aspect of this inherent, pre-rational, pre-linguistic yet meaningful familiarity with our world. (BT §31-32)
these basic meanings and relations, giving us another useful way of making sense of them that is built on top of our most fundamental way of making sense of them. Babies, before they can talk, already have some understanding of the things around them. When they play with their toys, they act in a way that demonstrates a pre-linguistic familiarity with them and an understanding of the toy’s place in their world: this thing is fun, they like to play with it. Only later does the word ‘toy’ accrue to this already basically understood thing. It is only later, based on our pre-reflective, pre-linguistic familiarity with our world that we talk about things, think about things, and only later do we theorize about them – it is not through rationality that we apprehend them in the first place. We have a much more basic way of being that lays the ground for the more complicated ones involving reason, cognition, knowing, etc. Before everything ‘gets theoretically sliced up and conceptualized’, we already live in a context in which things make sense and are understood. What Heidegger calls ‘disposedness’ and ‘moods’ are important parts of this primal sense-making process.

We always find ourselves in some kind of state or another where we are disposed a certain way to the world, the things in it, and our existence generally. We are always in a state of disposedness, but there are different ways we can be disposed. The different kinds of states of disposedness, Heidegger argues, are our moods. Heidegger does not speak about moods as many traditionally have, as

internal, subjective mental states […] caused by one’s external situation […] for, Heidegger, moods are fundamental modes of existence that are both constitutive and disclosive of the way one exists or finds oneself attuned to the world and of how one is faring with others.\(\textsuperscript{112}\)

\(\textsuperscript{112}\) Affectivity in Heidegger I: Moods and Emotions in Being and Time, Andres Elpidorou and Lauren Freeman, Philosophy Compass, 10/10 (2015), p. 661-671, p. 664 / Companion article: Affectivity in Heidegger II: Temporality, Boredom and Beyond, Lauren Freeman and Andreas Elpidorou, Philosophy Compass, 10/10 (2015), p. 672-684
So how exactly do moods work? What do they do, such that we can be disposed in different ways through them? Despite their differences, what is common to them all, such that they can all be kinds of disposedness? Perhaps the simplest way to approach these questions and begin to grapple with Heidegger’s answers to them is to say that the thing they all have in common - their function - is to disclose things.

‘Disclosure’¹¹³ and ‘disclosedness’ do a lot of work in Heidegger’s thought. To disclose something ordinarily means to reveal it, make it manifest, clear, or available, and his technical definition of disclosure correlates with this.

‘Disclose’ and ‘disclosedness’ will be used as technical terms in the passages that follow, and shall signify ‘to lay open’ and ‘the characteristic of having been laid open.’ Thus, ‘to disclose’ never means anything like ‘to obtain indirectly by inference’. (BT 105)

‘Disclose’ can also be used to indicate the results of inferential analysis: it can be disclosed through logical analysis whether the structure of an argument is valid, or if a mathematical solution is true. But this sense of ‘disclose’ is not what Heidegger has in mind. He is interested in the existential disclosure that takes place on a more fundamental and prior level than inference-making, in our most primal way of being in and encountering the world. This disclosure is what makes inference-making possible.

For Heidegger, we are a deeply disclosive entity – we are the entity to which objects appear as meaningful, the entity which has a world of significance, knows it has one and is responsible

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¹¹³ From the German Erschliessen (disclose) and Erschlossenheit (disclosedness), translations on which all the translators I mentioned previously seem to agree. A testament to the importance Heidegger places on these terms can be found in the fact that between them they occur hundreds of times in Being and Time alone.
for it. Dasein is the entity which creates and maintains the significance of its world. To say that objects appear as meaningful to us, or that we operate in a context of significance-relations is, in Heidegger’s framework, also to say that objects are *disclosed*. During our existence, things are disclosed to us, and we disclose things, all the time. Disclosure is so important for our existence that Heidegger goes as far as saying that “*Dasein is its disclosedness*” (BT 171) - our being *is* one of disclosure. Objects are disclosed as having determinate meanings with different degrees of significance, information is disclosed between people through language, and so on. Disclosure plays an important role in our existence, and moods play a fundamental part in disclosure by partly constituting our disclosing-process and by disclosing specific things themselves. Moods disclose all sorts of things. They can be ‘object-oriented’\textsuperscript{114}, disclosing or and being directed at particular objects. Heidegger thinks that what he calls ‘thrownness’ is also disclosed through moods.\textsuperscript{115} ‘Revelatory moods’ disclose something about our existence as such. But before I get to them, I will briefly explain what these other aspects of moods are, beginning with perhaps the most obvious one.

A mood makes manifest ‘how one is, and how one is faring’. In this ‘how one is’, having a mood brings Being to its “there”. (BT 173)

\textsuperscript{114} I am partially borrowing this from David Weberman, who uses ‘object-specific’. (‘What is an Existential Emotion?’, David Weberman, Hungarian Philosophical Review (Self, Narrativity, Emotions), 2020/1, http://filozofiaszemle.net/2020/12/hungarian-philosophical-review-20201-self-narrativity-emotions/)

\textsuperscript{115} In the remainder of this dissertation, I will not discuss how moods can be object-oriented in detail. I think it is fairly obvious that moods can be about specific objects, situations, or ‘things’ in a broad sense. My good mood can be about seeing my girlfriend, my bad mood about seeing my boss. The fact that moods reveal our ‘thrownness’ is more controversial, but theoretically anything about our existence can reveal this to us, since it refers to the fact that we are ‘thrown’ into the world through no choice of our own, and forced to live in one as a human being. Heidegger has specific ideas about how this takes place, but the disclosure that takes place in revelatory moods is much more interesting and important, so this will be my main focus.
Moods give us different ways we can experience the world, where we are affectively ‘tuned’ one way or another to it. No experience is ever without mood and in whatever mood we are in, we are aware of our affective state – ‘how we are doing’. One way of understanding this could involve taking some inspiration from analytic philosophy, though Heidegger would almost certainly not have. There is a debate surrounding ‘cognitive phenomenology’, one of its central questions being whether our experience of cognitive states is reducible to sensory experience, or not. Those who answer negatively assert the existence of a non-reducible cognitive phenomenology – that there is *something that it is like* to experience phenomenal states. There is something that it is like to experience through the senses (to see red, taste an apple, hear music, etc.), but there is also something that it is like to think, believe, feel, and the like that cannot be captured under the categories of sensory experience alone, a ‘what-it’s-likeness’ they alone cannot adequately explain. As Chudnoff puts it, there are some “*cognitive states [that] put one in phenomenal states for which no wholly sensory state suffices.*”\(^{116}\) It is the complex interplay of perceiving, thinking, believing, feeling and the countless other phenomena that we experience at any given moment that forms our ‘*overall phenomenal state*’ (ICP).\(^{117}\) In many ways, some of Heidegger’s work in his analysis of Dasein tries to figure out what an ‘overall phenomenal state’ is, what kind of being we have at any moment, what its constituent elements are, and how an overall phenomenal state can manifest in the many different ways that it does.

\(^{116}\) *Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy*, article for *Cognitive Phenomenology* (ICP in text), Mette Kristine Hansen, https://www.iep.utm.edu/cog-phen/

\(^{117}\) See also Bayne and Chalmers, *What is the Unity of Consciousness?* (collected in Axel Cleeremans (ed.), *The Unity of Consciousness*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003) - “At any given time, a subject has a multiplicity of conscious experiences. A subject might simultaneously have visual experiences of a red book and a green tree, auditory experiences of birds singing, bodily sensations of a faint hunger and a sharp pain in the shoulder, the emotional experience of a certain melancholy, while having a stream of conscious thoughts about the nature of reality. These experiences are distinct from each other: a subject could experience the red book without the singing birds, and could experience the singing birds without the red book. But at the same time, the experiences seem to be tied together in a deep way. They seem to be unified, by being aspects of a single encompassing state of consciousness.”
throughout our lives. Part of his answer is that (again, using language that he would not, but adequately captures what he says) our overall phenomenal state is partly constituted and structured by mood, and moods are part of the disclosive process by which our overall phenomenal state, and everything that it includes, is revealed to us.

How we feel, how we act, how things come across to us, varies depending on what mood we are in. When happy, you might tend to be more optimistic about certain things, be more energetic or more likely to do certain things over others, than if you were sad – and vice versa. Certain phenomena can be heightened, come across differently or even be obscured depending on your mood. When bored, you might be less likely to find the things around you interesting or engaging, or perhaps find things interesting that you normally would not, out of desire to ease your boredom. Moods are states in which you may be found, where you can be disposed in different ways, and your experience of the world and the things in it will vary depending on your mood. While the specifics of how moods affect us may depend on the person, moods all modify your experience of your existence and provide an emotional context through which you experience it at any particular time - moods disclose ‘how we are doing’.

In this sense, all moods disclose something about our existence to us – the general state we find ourselves in. There is never a moment in our existence when we do not find ourselves in such a state. The lines between moods may not always be sharp, they may come in degrees, but we are always in some mood or another, and “the fact that moods deteriorate and change over means simply that in every case Dasein has some mood.” (BT 173) Even a “lack of mood” (BT

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118 More on this when I discuss the experiences of MDMA users in §9.

119 For example, anger and fear can go together, as can happiness and love.
According to Heidegger (in a case of the ‘logic of deficient modes’, §6), is proof that we are always in a mood, it is just a mood where we find our existence burdensome: “Dasein becomes satiated with itself. Being has become manifest as a burden.” (BT 173) Even when we think we are not in any particular mood, or not sure which one, moods are still doing their disclosive work, it is just that they are doing so in a way that we do not fully appreciate. This is a big claim, but it is one that makes sense. Moods, and our psychological/emotional side generally, are clearly fundamental, important and ever-present within our existence – we can never get away from them. It seems impossible that we could ever be in a completely unmooded state, completely emotionally neutral with respect to our world and our existence. These are impossible to not feel a certain way about or be disposed a certain way toward.

Immediately following Heidegger’s claim that we are always in a mood, however, is arguably an even bigger claim. In a supposed ‘lack of mood’, he writes:

Being has become manifest as a burden. Why that should be, one does not know. And Dasein cannot know anything of the sort because the possibilities of disclosure which belong to cognition reach far too short a way compared with the primordial disclosure belonging to moods (BT 173)

It is hard to overestimate the importance of this kind of idea for Heidegger’s account of human existence. One of its most important insights is that there is much about our existence that takes

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120 Heidegger repeatedly says that we do not always confront what is disclosed to us in moods as fully as we might. We may not adequately reflect on our finitude, or the possibility of authentic existence, for example. This is captured in what he calls ‘falling’ [Verfallen] – our tendency to flee from our authenticity in favour of being absorbed in the world of our everyday concerns. In fact, “for the most part” (BT 174) we evade the deepest insights our moods disclose to us, but the fact that we do not “follow up their disclosure and allow [ourselves] to be brought before that which is disclosed is no evidence against the phenomenal facts of the case […] it is rather evidence for it.” (BT 173)

121 On a separate note, it is also arguably not desirable that we do so, because ridding ourselves of this dimension of ourselves would dramatically change who we are, and rob us of part of the richness and complexity of our existence.
place on a more fundamental level than cognition, inference, reason or knowing. We have a much more primal, original way of interacting with the world and existing in it, and it is this way of existing that enables reason, cognition and knowing. This idea features in and informs almost every aspect of the analytic of Dasein. For example, if we did not operate in an always-already disclosed, meaningful context where things make sense and have significance, we would not be able to reflect, theorize (etc.) because we would not be able to make sense of anything. Making sense comes before reasoning. Things must be able to be encountered as already somewhat meaningful for them to be theorized about. We spend the earliest stages of our lives unable to partake in higher reflection, but nonetheless live in a context of meaningful significance, however primitive or undeveloped it may be. Whatever processes, abilities or features of our existence that are involved in the disclosure of the world cannot be those of cognition, reason and knowing because they are set up and made possible by the more fundamental features.

This is made particularly evident in moods – whatever disclosure they have, it cannot be one of knowing, or cognizing – they operate on a different level, in a different way. Heidegger’s contention that it is more fundamental might trouble some readers, who might want to say it is not more or less fundamental, just different. But this contention is not without merit. Before we can theorize and reason, we have moods. We do not reason all the time, but we are always in a mood: moods come before reasoning and knowing, operating on a more fundamental (or at least existentially prior) level than reason.

This is not to say that moods are always right and reason always wrong, merely that
There is not the slightest justification for minimizing what is ‘evident’ in [the varieties of] disposedness, by measuring it against the apodictic certainty of a theoretical cognition of something (BT 175)

The disclosure involved in moods is different to the disclosure involved in theorizing, cognizing and reasoning – but not necessarily more or less important. Measuring one type of disclosure against the other, therefore, is inadvisable - especially if the result of such a comparison minimizes or undermines mood-disclosure. But moods “are no less falsified when they are banished to the sanctuary of the irrational.” (BT 175) Just because moods are different to cognizing, theorizing (etc.) – what we normally call rational processes – does not mean that they are somehow anti-rational. Rationality is normally understood in terms of things like evidence, reason-giving, sense-making (etc.) – things that Heidegger discusses moods in terms of. From moods, we get evidence for (or against) certain things and reasons for acting in certain ways. Moods are an integral part of our most fundamental sense-making processes and abilities, intimately involved in the disclosure of our world. To brand them ‘irrational’ fails to do justice to the manifold work they do in processes that involve things associated with rationality, and their function in making rational processes possible.

There are no doubt cases where what is disclosed by reason is superior to moods, but this is not true in every case. If I were having an emotional reaction to watching a supernova explode and, knowing nothing of physics, tried to tell you what was going on, my feelings would not be empirically reliable. But if the question were about the existential impact of seeing something so awe-inspiring, then the experience of seeing one would arguably be a better guide. From the perspective of my existence, it might be true that mood-disclosure would be more relevant to me than scientific disclosure. And there are, I would argue, cases where the disclosure of moods trumps scientific and logical/rational disclosure in terms of fundamentality and power. Imagine
being presented with a scientific analysis of a horrific kind of violent crime. It would absolutely be possible for you to deduce from reading it that it should not take place, but seeing it happen and experiencing an emotional reaction to it, would perhaps be a more fundamental, powerful, ‘real’ way for you to come to this conclusion. Such experiences could provide you with evidence for this, or reasons for thinking it, but they would not necessarily be rationally justified, logically deduced reasons. Heidegger, by saying that the disclosure of moods is more fundamental than cognition and knowing, is not committed to saying that the disclosure of moods is ‘better’, or ‘truer’ in every case, just that the kind of disclosure moods have takes place on a different and more existentially fundamental level than these and might be more powerful in certain situations than rational disclosure. Moods take place before and enable cognition and knowing, and mood-disclosure is different in kind. Heidegger cautions against minimizing one type of disclosure in favour of another.

The other side to this coin, however, is that moods can sometimes be deceptive and distort our experience of what is happening around us. This is made evident in angry moods, where things that you might normally be indifferent to or find pleasant can frustrate or annoy you. This is further evidence of the fact that the disclosure of moods takes place on a different level than cognition and knowing – angry moods often make us prone to being irrational or have unreasonable reactions to things. The disclosure of moods, therefore, is not necessarily ‘good’ or ‘bad’, ‘true’ or ‘untrue’ because it takes place on a more primal level than our rational processes. But because it is more fundamental than the processes it makes possible, it cannot have anything to do with their categories. D. H. Lawrence argues something similar about the unconscious, which Deleuze and Guattari quote as follows: “the unconscious contains nothing ideal, nothing in the least conceptual, and hence nothing in the least personal, since personality,
like the ego, belongs to the conscious or mental-subjective self.”\footnote{D. H. Lawrence, Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious, Viking Press, New York, 1969, p. 11-30, quoted in Anti-Oedipus, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Bloomsbury Academic, London/New York, 2019, p. 139} If there is such a thing as the unconscious, it is precisely un-conscious – conscious phenomena can have no place there. As with moods in Heidegger: because they operate on a more fundamental and different level than reason, cognition, knowing, and play a role in enabling these things, any phenomena that relates to or arises out of these things cannot feature in moods. What is disclosed through moods therefore cannot be considered ‘true’ or ‘false’ in a strictly rational sense or be subsumed under any inherently cognitive or epistemological category. It is more fundamental and, in a sense, neutral towards these things. But this is not to say that the disclosure of moods is inferior, or that the information gained through them is not useful. It is one of the most important ways we make sense of things.

Heidegger also argues that moods are involved in the disclosure of a specific existential structure – our ‘throwness’ [geworfenheit]. Kierkegaard aptly illustrates throwness as follows: “No one comes back from the dead, no one has entered the world without crying, no one is asked when he wishes to enter life, nor when he wishes to leave.”\footnote{Either/Or: A Fragment of Life, Soren Kierkegaard trans. Alistair Hannay, Penguin Books, London, 1992} On some level, our existence is difficult and strange, in no small part because we are thrown into it through no choice of our own, left with no option but to deal with it. This, coupled with the fact that we know we one day will die makes for a weird, often burdensome predicament, an aspect of our existence that Heidegger calls ‘throwness’. Thrownness is a fact of our existence which structures it, bearing partial responsibility for “the burdensome character of Dasein” (BT 174). Thrownness is revealed to us, first and foremost, by moods, and if everything Heidegger has
said so far about moods is true, then this is trivially true – moods are somehow involved in our disclosure of everything. But Heidegger gives us, I think, a slightly deeper reason for believing this, in a move that is characteristic much of his analysis – he examines the phenomenon and interprets what else it might tell us about our being. For an answer into how moods reveal our thrownness to us, we must look at what the experience of being in a mood is like.

In some sense, we are thrown into moods through no choice of our own: we cannot directly choose to be in one mood or another. We can choose how to act and pursue things that may put us in one mood or another, but the actual, experiential change of mood and what kind of mood we change into as a result of our actions, is never a matter of choice. We never find out what mood we are in by choosing it, or by first reflecting on it, finding out which mood it is – we are thrown into the mood because it is through our moods that the world is disclosed to us in the first place. “Only because the ‘there’ has already been disclosed in a disposedness can immanent reflection come across ‘experiences’ at all.” (BT 175) World-disclosure is a process that makes reflecting and choosing possible, so world-disclosure and moods cannot be a matter of reflection and choice – “a mood assails us” (BT 176, emphasis mine), we do not choose it. In this lack of choice about our situation, we are made aware of our general state of thrownness.

Heidegger casts moods as fundamentally disclosive – they reveal information about our existence, the world and the things in it to us. Moods ‘lay things open’ in order that we can encounter them meaningfully in different ways. The disclosure of moods takes place at an existentially prior and more fundamental level than cognition, knowing and reason. This is not to say that moods are always right, or always ‘better’, just that they have a different way of operating that takes place at a more fundamental level of our existence, since are part of what
sets up and make possible phenomena like cognition and reason. It is only when things are
disclosed to us as meaningful within our existence that they can be reflected on and theorized
about. Moods are an integral part of the makeup of our existence, our relation to and
engagement with the world. They disclose various things to us - how we are doing, our
thrownness, and information about objects. But perhaps more importantly, they disclose
existential insights about what it means to be, revealing information to us about our being-in-the-world as such, in ‘revelatory’ moods.
§8: Revelatory Moods: Anxiety and Boredom

Only those who are fearless can have anxiety.
– Martin Heidegger, *Ponderings II-VI: Black Notebooks 1931-1938*

We don’t appreciate what we have until it’s gone. Freedom is like that. It’s like air. When you have it, you don’t notice it.
- Boris Yeltsin

The two moods that Heidegger spends the most time on, by far, are anxiety and boredom. His best discussions of them occur in *Being and Time* (1927)\(^{124}\), *What is Metaphysics?* (1929)\(^{125}\) and *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics* (1929/1930)\(^{126}\), where he identifies them as examples of a significant variety of mood, one which reveals something to us about our existential predicament as such. All moods, on Heidegger’s account, ‘reveal’ something to us because they are all disclosive. But the revelation involved in anxiety and boredom is particularly profound - they concern our very being-in-the-world, not specific things in the world. Heidegger speaks of these moods as transformative experiences that convey existential insights, so I think ‘revelatory moods’ is a good term for them. ‘Normal’ moods occur within our everyday context of significance, but in ‘revelatory’ moods the significance of the world is completely transformed, and it is the experience of this transformation that confers insights on us about our situation as human beings. Expressed in the language of Heidegger’s philosophical-anthropological framework, we can say that moods are an *existential* structure, of which there are different possible *existentiell* instantiations. Anxiety and boredom are a

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special existentiell type of mood which disclose insights about our being-in-the-world as such. They share important similarities, manifest similar, subtly interrelated phenomena, but work in slightly different ways, conveying slightly different insights. Experiencing them acts as an existential catalyst, confronting us with our freedom, enabling and compelling us to authentically seize hold of our existence. By giving us some sort of insight into our existence, anxiety and boredom make us more grounded in the world, better able to live more complete, rounded, authentic lives.

Here, I will explain how Heidegger provides a philosophical anthropology of anxiety and boredom, giving us a sketch to work with for developing his account later, applying it to a mood he did not discuss in detail - joy. (§9) Anxiety and boredom both confront us with the fact of our freedom and our active role in constructing the significance of the world. In anxiety, the significance of the world is transformed, draining away into complete indifference - an experience which temporarily leaves us paralyzed, dumbstruck before the weight of our potential, confronted with the burden of our freedom and our existential role in the making of meaning. This allows us to face the world of our existence more authentically than before, in subsequent everyday life. Revelatory moods make us realise our predicament for what it is, feel the full weight of being free and realise our active role in the creation and maintenance of the very significance of things.

Something similar happens in ‘profound boredom’: we are confronted with our being-in-the-world as such, our usual experience of the world is interrupted and the usual significance of things recedes from us. This experience, rather than trapping us anxiously before the burden of our significance-making role, makes us so bored that the world temporarily loses its meaning.
This experience compels us to assume our significance-constructing role more forcefully to avoid empty, meaningless lives. Revelatory moods therefore function similarly to freedom in Yeltsin’s quote above, with a kind of ‘you don’t know what you’ve got until it’s gone’ experience. Revelatory moods temporarily transform the significance of the world so we can come to realise it for what it is, and our role in its creation. In the withdrawal of significance, significance announces itself.

§8.1 Our Everyday Experience of the World

Revelatory moods are moments where our everyday, ‘normal’, human way of existing is interrupted in a “decoupl[ing] from any relatedness to specific situations.” The bedrock of Heidegger’s analysis of our worldly existence is summarised eloquently by Thomas Sheehan:

The most astonishing thing about everyday life is not that things exist out there in the world, standing over against us as independent objects, but that they impinge on us, touch us, intrude on our lives, concern us, in short, are significant to us. In the normal course of our daily lives, things are not indifferently “out there in the universe,” […] Rather, they are meaningfully present to us. They do not just exist; they make sense […] I take note of them, name them, admire them, perhaps possess them. I may also fear and flee them, but even so, I am still involved with them. They still have a place within the world of meaning in which I live.

It is always in terms of significance, usefulness, and meaning that things are ordinarily encountered, but things are very different in revelatory moods. Ordinarily, things are not ‘just there’, they have meaning and are ready for us to engage with and use. Heidegger tries to capture this idea in two of his most famous terms – present-at-hand and ready-to-hand.

Philosophers, according to Heidegger, have always thought of objects as things that are ‘just there’, isolating them from their meaningful everyday context, examining their properties, attributes, etc. This is to treat them as present-at-hand, in a way we ordinarily do not. Things are properly understood in terms of their place in our world and how they bear on our projects – within the framework where they normally have their sense and use. To treat them like this is to treat them as we normally do, as ready-to-hand. Things have their usefulness and significance only because they occupy a meaningful place within the totality of our individual worlds. Heidegger uses the example of a workshop and the tools in it to make this point:

Whenever something ready-to-hand has an involvement with it, what involvement this is, has in each case been outlined in advance in terms of the totality of such involvements. In a workshop, for example, the totality of involvements which is constitutive for the ready-to-hand in its readiness-to-hand, is ‘earlier’ than any single item of equipment (BT 116)

A person goes into their workshop, knowing from previous experience what everything in there is and does. When they encounter, reflect on and use the tools, they first encounter the overall context where the tools make sense. They don’t perceive a single tool, then work out what it is for, decide whether they might need it, or will use it. Their everyday familiarity with the tools and the relationship between them does much of the work for them – they already know their meaning and usefulness to them because they already know their place in the larger context of the workshop. The worker does not ordinarily encounter their tools in isolation, as ‘singularities’ detached from their wider context. What the tool is for the worker is determined by its place in the workshop, what it does there, its potential usefulness for tasks, and its

129 Doubtless there are good discussions about other kinds of ‘worlds’ distinct from the individual one. It seems as though we each have a world unique to our own experience, but there certainly seems room for the possibility of collective worlds that might be discussed in a Heideggerian sense – the global/human world, collective consciousness, national worlds, etc. But since we are talking from the perspective of philosophical anthropology and general features of human existence, about the most direct, primal, everyday way of encountering of objects in general, this discussion is best saved for another time.
relations with everything else in the workshop. The individual tools are disclosed within this context. The same basic principle is true for all objects in our world: we never encounter anything any other way. When we engage with the world and specific objects, we always do so in a way that resonates with our overall world-structure. Everything that we encounter is disclosed in terms of it, and the world itself is structured in terms of “significance […] that on the basis of which the world is disclosed as such.” (BT 182) Moods are “equiprimordial [equally fundamental]” with the other “existential structures”, playing a role in the disclosure and maintenance of our worlds and our existences generally. (BT 182)

Revelatory moods, however, are events where our everyday way of encountering the world is temporarily but radically altered. The significance of the world, and our consciousness of it, does not function as it normally does. This is not the way we normally experience the world, but such moods are deeply important moments in our life-long struggle to understand and cope with the predicament of our existence. Everyone has the potential to experience such moments. Heidegger proposes that there are at least three types, but only analysed anxiety and boredom in detail.

§8.2 Anxiety: Confronting Our Freedom

‘Revelatory’ moods, like all moods, are fundamentally disclosive – they reveal information to us on a different level than, and in a different way to, higher-order rational processes. But the

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130 Like Understanding and Interpretation, which are referred to as complementary world-disclosure abilities. (BT 182-195) Moods are something that go alongside this and other such structures (being-with, mineness, for example) to produce the kind of existence we have.

131 A word among many other traditional philosophical concepts that Heidegger distances himself from and proposes to overcome, but is perhaps still apt for describing certain things.
disclosure of revelatory moods is different to ‘regular’ moods, which always concern particular
things and always disclose things in terms of a larger context of significance. In fear (BT §30),
for example, we fear a determinate thing or set of things, some sort of impending danger, like
an attacker. For an attacker to be disclosed as fearful, it must be disclosed in terms of
significance. The significance of an attacker, the sense they make to us, comes from their place
in our world. To fear an attacker, they must make sense as an attacker, and can only do so if
they have a place within a larger context of significance. Why, for example, would someone
approaching me carrying a gun make me fear them? Because the combination of several related
factors in this situation results in my being afraid. Guns have a certain significance: they are
dangerous, often used in the perpetration of crime, can easily kill people, etc. Because I
understand guns in these terms and as having this kind of significance, when someone
approaches me carrying one, I fear that person. My fear stems from the disclosure of specific
things in my world that have a kind of significance, and partake in certain significance relations,
that makes them worthy of fear.

But in revelatory moods, like anxiety and boredom, our concern is not with a particular thing
or things because in them we are confronted not with objects but our being-in-the-world as
such, and we encounter this in a context where the usual significance of things is transformed.
In revelatory moods, “we ‘are’ one way or another […] which determines us through and
through, [and] lets us find ourselves among beings as a whole.” (WM 87) In anxiety, we
encounter our very being-in-the-world in a state where our world, usually structured in terms
of significance, ceases to be structured this way. Significance recedes from us.
When dealing with Heidegger’s notion of anxiety, it is worth remembering that he is not using the term in the normal sense:

We do not mean the quite common anxiousness, ultimately reducible to fearfulness, which all too readily comes over us. Anxiety is fundamentally different from fear. We become afraid always in the face of this or that particular being that threatens us in this or that particular respect. (WM 88)

What we normally think of as ‘anxiety’, for Heidegger, is really a type of fear because normal anxiety, like fear, is directed at specific things that threaten us - we become afraid of something in the world. Heidegger’s account of anxiety tries to capture a different phenomenon – in anxiety, no clarity about the object of our anxiety is available – “that in the face of which one is anxious is completely indefinite.” (BT 231) This is what distinguishes Heideggerian anxiety from an object-oriented mood like fear: “anxiety is indeed anxiety in the face of…but not in the face of this or that thing” (WM 88). What anxiety is anxious about is not an object at all, rather “the world as such is that in the face of which one has anxiety.” (BT 231) Anxiety occupies a special place amongst the moods because in it we are brought face to face with our world itself and our existence within it. What we are anxious about “is nowhere” (BT 231) because it does not have a meaningful place in the world, and therefore no specific location in it. If it is not a meaningful object in a sense-making context, it cannot be an object of cognition, logic or reason, so “anxiety ‘does not know’ what that in the face of which it is anxious is.” (BT 231, emphasis added) There is a lot to unpack here, and these claims may appear strange. How could we have an experience with no determinate object? Or encounter the totality of our being all at once? How can anxiety bring us face to face with the world if it has no definite object?

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132 Even the more abstract things that we fear have a kind of abstract location, in that they occupy a definite place in the referential context of our world. A fear of the unknown, or loneliness, takes place within a context, from which its significance is derived. What Heideggerian anxiety is anxious in the face of does not.
The most crucial thing to understand for Heidegger’s account of anxiety is the fact that our world and everything in it is invested with significance. The human world is one of meaning and ‘objects’ always have a place in a wider context which determines their meaning for us. The totality of objects that a human being encounters, arranged in terms of their usefulness for projects, forming a context in which things make sense, is what Heidegger calls the world. The fact that we have this sense-making context is what allows us to live meaningful lives and participate in society. However, in anxiety our everyday way of being in this context is interrupted.

When we are anxious, “a peculiar calm pervades it. [...] all things and we ourselves sink into indifference [...] we can get no hold on things” (WM 88). Everything loses its significance - we lose our usual meaningful grip on objects and even lose grip on ourselves. Anxiety involves a profound feeling of “uncanniness”, meaning that our “being-in enters into the existential ‘mode’ of ‘not-at-home’.” (BT 233) Our very being in the world changes, we feel uneasy and strange, as though somewhere we do not belong, paralysed before the weight of the world. We feel this not-at-homeness because this is an unfamiliar context, a world not structured the way we are used to. We are used to making sense of objects, being able to meaningfully latch onto them and use them for our projects, so when we cease to be able to do this, it is an unsettling experience but an oddly calm one. We are not excited, angry, animated or running around – we find ourselves paralysed, looking out towards the world, temporarily unable to make sense of it. In such moments, we are removed from our world because our normal world is one where objects make meaningful sense to us. Because we are in some sense removed from our ordinary way of being, in anxiety we are brought face to face with our world, as a whole, from a different perspective. As a result, we realise in a more profound manner what it is like to be in a world, and our role as human beings within the larger context of existence. Anxiety compels us to
realise our integral role in the free creation of significance as such – we are the beings that live in, make and are responsible for significance. As anthropologist Clifford Geertz once wrote, the human being is “suspended in webs of significance that he himself has spun.”\textsuperscript{133} The existential function of anxiety, for Heidegger, is that it confronts us with this web and our role in its creation.

Anxiety is a therefore a profoundly ‘revelatory’ mood because it brings our world totally into view, disclosing something about the whole of our existence, revealing something about what it is like to be human. Without its temporarily removing us from our normal way of being and bringing us face to face with our being-in-the-world, we would have nothing to compare our normal way of being to. Anxiety’s loss of meaning confronts us with the significance-structure of our world – it becomes present and conspicuous in its absence. Only then do we authentically realise, so to speak, the \textit{significance of significance}. We are the creature that makes significance and attaches it to things, such that subsequent human beings come to inhabit and partake in the webs of meaning that other human beings have constructed, and which they have a role in constructing and maintaining now. Without the human being’s freedom to do this, the world would be devoid of meaning – as it is when we are anxious. Objects, places and practises only take on any meaning at all because we attach significance to them within the context of our world. Even the natural world takes on significance that would not exist were it not for human beings – people often think of the natural world as beautiful, powerful, overwhelming, of teaching us something about our place in existence or our ‘struggle’ against nature. But these are concerns that would not arise were if not for our attaching significance to them.

\textsuperscript{133} \textit{The Interpretation of Cultures}, Clifford Geertz, Basic Books, New York, 1977, p. 5
Anxiety acts as a catalyst for our being able to live an authentic life, unlocking possibilities that would not be available to us otherwise by compelling us to face our freedom and significance-making role, and recognise the application of this to our own lives. This is how Heidegger explains what he is talking about here:

Anxiety makes manifest in Dasein its *Being towards* its ownmost ability-to-be [*Seinkönnen*] – that is, its *Being-free* for the freedom of choosing itself and taking hold of itself. Anxiety brings Dasein face to face with its *Being free for* the authenticity of its *Being*, and for this authenticity as a possibility which it always is. (BT 232)

When we encounter our world, we encounter our possibilities, the things we can potentially do with our lives, our ability to make choices and decide what kind of people we want to be. The experience of anxiety causes us to be able to ‘choose ourselves and take hold of ourselves’, by getting our being as a whole and the structure of our world into view. It is only because of this that we can adequately comprehend our sphere of possibilities since the structure of our worlds determines its limits. Anxiety, by bringing us face to face with our possibilities, frees us for being free. Once we realise our potential possibilities, we can exercise our freedom to make decisions for ourselves and press ourselves forward into our future in a more authentic manner because it is anxiety that brings us to the stunning realisation of our freedom. Who wouldn’t feel anxious upon realising their freedom for the first time?

Anxiety equips us for living authentically: our attempts to take hold of our lives on our own terms and live our freedom, could never be as complete if we had not come face to face with our being-in-the-world and all the possibilities for our existence this brings. In facing our freedom we face our finitude, the limits to our being. This is another reason why we press ourselves forward into our possibilities – we realise our limits and lack of infinite time. If we want to achieve the things we desire, we must seize hold of our existence, decide and act. The
revelatory mood of anxiety is one way we can achieve this authentically, by putting us into a state where the usual significance of our world drains away, allowing us to realise its significance, our possibilities and freedom for what they are. Without this, “no selfhood and no freedom.” (WM 91) While anxiety is one way this process can occur, there are others – boredom is one of them.

§8.3 ‘Becoming Bored By’ and ‘Being Bored With’

Heidegger’s 1929/1930 lecture course on The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics is wide-ranging, even by his standards. It addresses the nature of philosophy, the history of metaphysics, the differences between humans and animals, the concepts of ‘world, finitude and solitude’, and the work of numerous philosophers and historians. At its heart, however, is one of the most sophisticated philosophical treatments of boredom ever attempted. Much like anxiety, Heidegger describes ‘profound boredom’ as a revelatory mood involving a state where the usual significance of everything drains away, and insights about our existence are revealed to us.

Boredom has a close connection to time. Heidegger writes that “whatever its ultimate essence may be – [boredom] shows […] an almost obvious relation to time, a way in which we stand with respect to time, a feeling of time.” (FCM 80) As a good phenomenologist would,

134 In What is Metaphysics?, Heidegger develops his theory of anxiety further, arguing that it also enables other phenomena, such as philosophical/metaphysical thinking, wonder and science because it involves an encounter with nothingness. But for the sake of space and keeping our analysis focussed, I will gloss over this. This is because when I attempt to develop Heidegger’s account of moods it will be with a focus towards how it enriches our everyday lives and existences generally, through their existential insights about our possibilities and our authentically seizing hold of our lives, rather than how they enable more specialized phenomena like philosophy and science.
Heidegger reflects on the experience of boredom, concluding that it is something “we constantly seek to escape […] by welcoming highly important and essential preoccupations for the sole reason that they take up our time.” (FCM 78–79) Time takes on a different character when we are bored, becoming elongated, something we desire to fill with interesting activities and diversions: “time becomes long in boredom” (FCM 80). Heidegger uses the example of waiting for a train to arrive (FCM 93) as a classic case of boredom – one I find wholly convincing. Before travelling, you book your plane and train tickets, taking care to leave enough time just in case there are delays. But nothing goes wrong, there are no delays, everything is fine. You arrive at a station in the middle of nowhere, with nothing interesting nearby, hours before your train will arrive. All you can do is wait for time to pass. Ten minutes goes by, fifteen, twenty, and you become incredibly bored. You keep checking the clock – ‘I’ve only been here for half an hour?!’ Time becomes long, something in need to be filled, even ‘killed’, and you become welcoming of something, anything to distract you from your boredom. All boredom involves similar experiences of time, but there are different varieties. Heidegger identifies three: ‘becoming bored by something’, ‘being bored with something’, and ‘profound boredom’. Only the latter is revelatory in the sense I am addressing here.

For Heidegger, “that which bores, which is boring, is that which holds us in limbo and yet leaves us empty.” (FCM 87) The first type of boredom, becoming bored by something, is perhaps most easily grasped in these terms. The train station example is a case of it, but “a thing, a book, a play, a ceremony, yet also a person” (FCM 82) can also be. To become bored by something is to be bored by a particular thing while you are engaged with it. All these things can be boring even while we are engaged with them:

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135 Boredom is translated from the German langeweile – ‘long while’.
In *becoming bored by* something, we are left unfulfilled. As Slaby writes: “we are somehow bound to that item in expecting a specific fulfilment, [but] the item withholds that fulfilment and leaves us empty” (HOB). For example, you can become bored by a TV programme but carry on watching it just to see what happens, like I did with AMC’s *The Walking Dead*, for a long time one of my favourite shows. The quality, for various reasons, lessened dramatically in later series and - in a crime *unforgivable* for a show about the zombie apocalypse - it became boring. But I carried on watching it - it no longer engrossed me, no longer gripped me and I no longer enjoyed it. I watched just to see what happened, or if it would get any better. This is what Heidegger means by *becoming bored by* something – when we are engaged in or with something or someone, even though at the same time we find it (or them) boring. In the process, we are “held in limbo by time as it drags along […] left empty by things and in general by the individual beings surrounding us in this specific boring situation” (FCM 106) where we are trying to pass the time.

Passing the time is key here: it is something we try to do especially often when we are bored. In ‘becoming bored by’, our efforts to pass the time are not rewarded, our effort to be gripped by something fails. The second type of boredom, however – *being bored with* something – is more complex because it initially doesn’t seem like boredom at all, or even like we are trying to passing the time. In a remarkable passage, Heidegger examines a situation that presumably manifested this type of boredom for him at some point – a friendly dinner party:

> There we find the usual food and the usual table conversation, everything is not only very tasty, but tasteful as well. Afterward people sit together having a lively discussion, as they say, perhaps listening to music, having a chat, and things are witty and amusing.
And already it is time to leave. The ladies assure us, not merely when leaving, but downstairs and outside too as we gather to leave, that it really was very nice, or that it was terribly charming. Indeed. There is nothing at all to be found that might have been boring about this evening, neither the conversation, nor the people, nor the rooms. Thus we come home quite satisfied. We cast a quick glance at the work we interrupted that evening, make a rough assessment of things and look ahead to the next day - and then it comes: I was bored after all this evening, on the occasion of this invitation. (FCM 109)

Heidegger tries at length to figure out how he could have been bored – it sounds like he had a good time! Pleasant company, tasty food, wholesome activities…but nonetheless, Heidegger cannot shake the feeling that he was bored all evening. But he was not trying to pass the time: he chose to be there, and there was nothing and no one there that would be boring to him. He considers where it was a bad mood, or the boredom coming from within: “was I what was boring to myself? […] but I was not occupied with myself, not for a moment. […] No: it is quite clear that we were bored, even though it was all so pleasant.” (FCM 109) So what about this evening was he bored with? And how is this boredom different from the first type? There, we are bored by a specific thing – a book, TV show, person, etc. But here, it seems we can be bored even though the situation we find ourselves in is one that would not ordinarily bore us - we are totally and completely immersed in activities and social situations we find pleasant. We are not ‘passing the time’ because we are bored but enjoying a pleasant diversion that passes the time. How could this be a case of boredom? It is in the way ‘passing the time’ manifests that Heidegger detects the clue to the dinner party situation. In it, “passing the time […] is transformed in a particular way.” (FCM 111)

In another evocative passage, Heidegger reflects on smoking a cigar and the place of this activity in the dinner party. Smoking is a social way of passing the time comprised of various smaller activities: “rolling a cigar between our fingers, inhaling, watching the smoke formations, […] keeping an eye on how long the ash lasts and other such things.” (FCM 112)
The bunch of activities that comprise smoking get woven into the other activities of the evening: conversation, listening to music, etc. In a social situation, smoking is a way of occupying ourselves, passing the time, while we also do other things. But despite all these ways of passing the time being present and woven into each other, Heidegger is still bored.

This being bored is precisely there while we are smoking, and smoking, as an occupation, itself becomes entirely part of the course of the conversation and the other activities. [...] *It is not smoking as an isolated occupation, but our entire comportment and behaviour that is our passing the time*-the whole evening of the invitation itself. This is why our passing the time was so difficult to find. (FCM 112, emphasis added)

In *becoming bored by* something, it is a specific thing we are bored by – a book, a film – that we engage with to pass the time, and a specific aspect of my behaviour that passes the time. When bored on a train I read to pass the time, but the book bores me. In this situation, my options of passing the time are limited, so I focus my attention on one activity – the only other thing I can do is sit there and wait. But at the dinner party, an example of what Heidegger calls *being bored with*, there are lots of things to occupy my time and it is not a *single* thing I am bored with – it is the whole situation, with all its interconnected activities. On the train, I direct my attention and behaviour singularly onto the book. At the dinner party, as Heidegger says, his ‘whole comportment and behaviour’ is directed at passing the time. He is not bored with one specific thing: the company, the food, the conversation, the cigar – he’s bored with the whole evening, the context of people, things, events and activities he finds himself in. He therefore directs his whole comportment and behaviour onto passing the time, rather than only a part of it. This is why the boredom is less noticeable than in the previous case of the train – because Heidegger is doing so many things to pass the time, the boredom is more difficult to find. When being bored by a book it is obvious why I am bored, therefore more difficult to turn my attention away from the boredom. This is the difference between *becoming bored by* and *being bored with* – either we become bored by one thing or are bored with an entire context of
things, people and experiences. Being bored with is more like revelatory boredom than being bored by something, not quite the same but “the more profound of the two.” (FCM 127) For a mood to be revelatory, it must not be directed onto a determinate object in the world. Becoming bored by something obviously is. Being bored with does not have a single determinate object that is boring, but still has something determinate: a set of determinate things forming a context, where our entire behaviour becomes directed onto passing the time. We can see a pattern forming in Heidegger’s categories of boredom: one type has a single determinate object, the next type’s object is less determinate but what I am bored with is still something determinate. The third has no determinate object at all, and is a revelatory mood.

§8.4: Profound Boredom

The second variety of boredom, says Heidegger, is more profound than the first, and “the more profound the boredom, the more silent, the less public, the quieter, the more inconspicuous and wide-ranging it is.” (FCM 134) Profound boredom, the third and final kind, is therefore also the most inconspicuous. It manifests itself whenever we say, or better, whenever we silently know, that it is boring for one. […] What is this 'it'? […] It - this is the title for whatever is indeterminate, unfamiliar. Yet we are familiar with this, after all, and familiar with it as belonging to the more profound form of boredom: that which bores. (FCM 134)

Profound boredom, like anxiety, involves a kind of indeterminacy, captured by the ‘it’ in the expression ‘it is boring for one’. This contrasts profound boredom with the previous forms of boredom because in them the object, the ‘it’ is determinate – this book, this play, this dinner party, these people. But in profound boredom, what bores us is an indeterminate ‘it’, and our selves are reduced to an indeterminate ‘one’. The ‘it’ of profound boredom is no longer a determinate object, or objects, or a context - ‘it’ is our existence as such.
In profound boredom we become “an undifferentiated no one” (FCM 135) to ourselves. Our personality, sense of identity,

one’s own self [...] has been left standing, the self that everyone himself or herself is, and each with this particular history, of this particular standing and age, with this name and vocation and fate; the self, one’s own beloved ego of which we say that I myself, you yourself, we ourselves are bored. Yet we are now no longer speaking of ourselves being bored with, but are saying: It is boring for one. It - for one - not for me as me, not for you as you, not for us as us, but for one. Name, standing, vocation, role, age and fate as mine and yours disappear. (FCM 134-135)

Profound boredom has an “overpowering nature” (FCM 136) – it takes hold of our whole existence, rendering us unable to latch onto the significance of the world and ourselves as we usually do. Since the usual significance of the world provides a context where our identities make sense, when we are profoundly bored we are “relieved of our everyday personality, somehow distant and alien to it, but simultaneously also elevated beyond the particular situation” (FCM 137). We are overcome with a feeling of boredom so intense that the world temporarily loses its meaning. Similar to anxiety, in profound boredom “we can get no hold on things” (WM 88) because they “become indifferent as a whole” (FCM 138). Although boredom involves a different affective experience to anxiety, they both put us in a position where the usual significance of the world drains away and is transformed from its usual form, leaving us “in the midst of beings as a whole” (FCM 138). Profound boredom is a revelatory mood because it puts us in a state where we become receptive to learning fundamental truths about our existence - “the ‘it is boring for one’ - this ‘it is thus for one’ - has in itself this character of manifesting how things stand concerning us.” (FCM 136)

Profound boredom offers us a glimpse into “our existential predicament in general” (HOB 113) by compelling us to ‘listen’ to its insights. The other forms of boredom admit of some possibility of passing the time: in ‘becoming bored by’, we pass time with a specific thing so
we do not have to endure boredom. In ‘being bored with’ we direct our whole comportment and behaviour onto passing the time. But profound boredom is so overwhelming that “the passing the time corresponding to [it] is not simply missing but is no longer permitted by us at all” (FCM 136). It is impossible to sidestep profound boredom by passing the time, we are compelled to confront it, feel its full weight. Like anxiety, profound boredom involves what Heidegger calls a ‘telling refusal’ (FCM 137) of beings – in ‘refusing’ themselves and slipping away into temporary meaningless, we are ‘told’ something about our predicament: “beings as a whole do not disappear but show themselves precisely as such in their indifference.” (FCM 138) But what is it that revelatory boredom reveals to us about our predicament? Again, similarly to anxiety, profound boredom “is related to Dasein's innermost freedom.” (FCM 136)

In anxiety, we are confronted with the full range of our possibilities because we are confronted with our world as it recedes into indifference. Confronted with the awesome weight of our freedom, we are left anxious. In boredom, the same thing happens but it is out of boredom that we become open to “this withdrawal or ‘telling refusal’ of possibilities, [which] is at the same time an announcing of these very possibilities.” (HOB 114) Revelatory boredom puts us into a state where we become so bored that we cannot meaningfully relate to anything, even ourselves, and we are left hanging in an all-encompassing abyss where nothing has significance to us. Because we are usually immersed in a world of significance, this is what we are always used to. But revelatory moods like anxiety and boredom interrupt this usual state of things and, by withdrawing them from us so totally, “‘point to’ the possibilities that they nevertheless would or could offer to Dasein – the beings’ withholding announces these possibilities exactly by refusing, by denying them.” (HOB 115) If we were not so anxious, or so bored, we could be making something of the possibilities that are ordinarily available to us. The experience of revelatory moods is a requirement for our being able to realise the significance of this - we
must experience a temporary and fundamental change in our worlds and the significance therein to be able to fully comprehend them for what they are.

§8.5 Conclusion: You Don’t Know What You’ve Got Until It’s Gone

Profound boredom and anxiety, on Heidegger’s account, both produce a state in us in which the usual significance of the world drains away and our experience is completely transformed. In them, we become open to learning truths about the predicament of our existence that we would not otherwise be able to, or not be able to in the same way. In anxiety, we are anxious about the burden of our freedom. In boredom, everything becomes boring, and we become indifferent to them. We lose our meaningful grip on them and ourselves. Because a fundamentally different experience of the world is engendered, we gain a new perspective on our existence as it otherwise normally is, which allows us to live more complete, rounded lives. Our usual experience of our world of significance must be interrupted for us to see it for what it normally is – as Yeltsin reportedly said: ‘you don’t know what you’ve got ‘til it’s gone’. Curiously, he was talking about freedom when he said that, and Heidegger, when he speaks of revelatory moods and the ‘telling refusal’ of beings involved in them, also highlights freedom as the thing that these experiences really concern. Anxiety and boredom, though they function differently and involve different affective experiences, both disclose something about our being-in-the-world and our freedom to us. In anxiety, we are struck dumb, temporarily paralysed before the burden of being free, the significance of our world receding from us in a profound experience of meaninglessness. This confrontation confers on us the significance of the world, the significance of this significance and our role in its creation and maintenance as sense-makers that are responsible for a space of meaning. Our possibilities are thereby revealed to us – when we realise that our existence is inherently one of meaning and its proliferation,
we get a sense of what we can do. We confront the weight of our freedom, which paralyzes us with anxiety because although it is good to have potential, it is a burdensome responsibility which is forced upon us and a difficult thing to come to terms with. Profound boredom involves a similar experience, where the significance of things drains away in a temporary lack of ability to find meaning in anything at all. This experience, along with making us realise the significance of significance and our freedom in a similar way to anxiety, also compels us to make something of our freedom so we avoid empty, boring lives. Though they both have an experience of meaninglessness at their heart and confer some of the same insights, they work in slightly different ways and each have a unique ‘message’.

In what follows, I will broaden Heidegger’s account of revelatory moods to include a mood he claimed was revelatory in the same sense but without saying why – joy. I will suggest that the full range of revelatory moods and the cumulative experience of them acts to ground us in the world and confer on us the full range of insights we need if we are to live authentic, complete, rounded lives. Heidegger did this for anxiety and boredom, but presumably there are others as well, with different mechanisms, different experiences, and subtly different insights.
§9: Supplementing Heidegger: Joy as a Revelatory Mood

Being attuned, in which we ‘are’ one way or another and which determines us through and through, lets us find ourselves among beings as a whole. Finding ourselves attuned not only unveils beings as a whole in various ways, but this unveiling – far from being incidental – is the fundamental occurrence of our Da-Sein.

- Martin Heidegger, *What is Metaphysics?*\(^{136}\) (emphasis added)

[Joy] doesn’t fit with the everyday.

- Zadie Smith, *Joy*\(^{137}\)

Though I ultimately see a lot of worth in Heidegger’s philosophical anthropology of moods, it suffers because he only discusses three.\(^{138}\) But his framework of necessary, existential structures and their contingent, existentiell manifestations can be productively applied elsewhere, and his theorizing of anxiety and boredom also has much potential for development.

In any philosophical-anthropological theory, moods in general (and existentially significant moods in particular) would be good candidates for universal features of human existence – especially if, as Heidegger claims, moods are integrally involved in our apprehension of the world. Our world is disclosed and encountered in terms of meaning and significance. Moods play a part in this disclosure in various ways, underlying and informing our everyday experience of our world, even in moments when this meaningful everyday experience is interrupted. It gets interrupted in ‘revelatory moods’, which pull us away from the usual


\(^{138}\) Though not our concern here, this suffering is made worse by the fact that the way Heidegger talks about other moods often raises serious questions about extending his theory further. Such as when he reduces a certain (object-oriented) species of anxiety, ‘the quite common anxiousness’, to fear. (WM 88) In another setting, I think this would be worth questioning, even though I think it is fair to say that the existential, authentic anxiety that Heidegger refers to, is different from fear.
significance of the world and reveal insights to us about our predicament as human beings. Heidegger only discussed three moods in detail - two of them ‘revelatory’ - but there is good reason to think there are more. Here, broadly in accordance with Heidegger’s theory, I will try to extend his analysis and theorize joy as a revelatory mood, unlocking some of the philosophical-anthropological potential latent within his accounts of anxiety and boredom.  

From how Heidegger talks about revelatory moods, you could be forgiven for thinking they are characterized by profound experiences of meaninglessness. This makes something else he says rather puzzling indeed. With exceptional brevity and lack of argument, Heidegger claims in *What is Metaphysics?* that joy is a revelatory mood. (WM 87) But moments of deep joy seem to be saturated with significance, not lacking in it. It is on this point that I will depart from Heidegger, critically developing his theoretical framework. I will suggest that what is required for a mood to be revelatory is not that the significance of the world is lost, but that our everyday experience of the world is radically transformed. The experience of a loss of significance is sufficient for a mood to be revelatory, but not necessary. The total loss of significance is a radical transformation of our everyday experience – we are used to existing in a world where everything is invested with significance. But a lack or loss of meaning is not the only way our everyday experience can be transformed, or the only way a mood can be revelatory in Heidegger’s sense. I will argue that joy is inherently an experience of significance: there is no manifestation of joy accompanied by the loss of significance present in anxiety and boredom. However, there are instances of joy in which our everyday experience is radically transformed. This would satisfy the requirement for a mood to be revelatory of significance.

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and our predicament as free sense-makers, just as boredom and anxiety are. But the additional existential insight of revelatory joy would be slightly different, just as boredom’s differs from anxiety’s. Revelatory joy confers on us not just that moments of joyful sublimity are possible but also that, despite their anxiety-inducing possibilities, our freedom can bring an “unshakeable joy” in being the beings we are. In providing a theory about revelatory joy, I will refer to Zadie Smith’s insightful article about joy and take the reported experiences of MDMA (ecstasy) users as a concrete, accessible example of instances of revelatory joy. This may have been far from Heidegger’s intention, but I will suggest that his account of revelatory moods gives us a resource for making sense of the revelatory experiences ecstasy users report having while under the influence. Having argued that joy can be a revelatory mood in the same way that boredom and anxiety can, I will attempt to draw out further what the additional existential meaning of joy might be. Just as boredom and anxiety reveal their own specific insights, revelatory joy does too.

Based on what I say about joy, I will go on to suggest that, because human existence and being-as-a-whole are radically complex and multifaceted, it makes sense that their different aspects might get revealed to us gradually through different revelatory moods. The cumulative, ongoing, lifelong experience of such moods is what affords us the necessary existential insights we need to live more complete, meaningful, rounded and grounded lives. Human being-in-the-world is, to say the least, immensely rich and consists of many diverse, often-contradictory elements. Human beings are not wholly one thing or another – the totality of one’s existence is not wholly ‘good’, ‘bad’, ‘joyful’, ‘sad’, or any one particular thing – it is much more

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complicated than that, and revelatory moods each have their own aspect of this being to reveal to us.

§9.1 Revelatory Joy: The Transformation of Everyday Experience

I previously indicated that ‘mood’ in Heidegger includes emotions and feelings. (§7) In his account (on my interpretation), moods are the various contingent, existentiell manifestations of the necessary, existential structure of befindlichkeit/disposedness. ‘Disposedness’ indicates our multi-faceted capacity to be found and disposed in certain ways to our existence and the things in it. It therefore must include many diverse affective phenomena since our emotions and feelings partly constitute our way of being disposed to things - they are an integral structural component of our way of being in and engaging with the world. Heidegger’s definition of mood is a broad one, including any affective phenomena that plays a part in the disclosing of information about our existence and our world to us. Most of these phenomena could be called ‘everyday’ moods, which reveal information to us about ‘how we are doing’, or particular people and objects, giving us an affective context in which to experience our existence. Although all moods play a disclosive role, some moods are disclosive in an existentially profound way, concerning the nature of our being, what it is like for us to be-in-the-world. These moods, I have termed ‘revelatory’. If philosophical anthropology is the attempt to account for the general structures of human existence, accounting for what kind of existence we have, then theorizing about how we come to know what kind of existence it is would be an important part of a philosophical-anthropological theory.

Part of what distinguishes revelatory moods, on Heidegger’s account, is that they do not have ‘a determinate object’ in the way that being afraid of spiders does, or being angry about
someone wronging you does. Revelatory moods concern *our being-in-the-world* and seem, according to Heidegger’s descriptions of them, to be characterized by profound experiences of meaninglessness, nothingness and a lack of significance. Our freedom, possibilities and the significance of the world are revealed to us in anxiety and boredom because significance temporarily, completely recedes from us and we cease to be able to make sense of anything. In a kind of ‘you don’t know what you’ve got until it’s gone’ experience, we are made aware of our predicament as the creators and maintainers of significance by being temporarily but completely removed from this predicament. The world and everything in it loses its significance, which shows us *what it was otherwise always like*. Once we leave the grip of a revelatory mood and are thrown back into our everyday world, we appreciate the meaning in the world more authentically and are equipped more fully for inhabiting our role as free sense-makers.

The idea that revelatory moods involve feelings of meaninglessness makes this passage of Heidegger’s rather puzzling:

> Boredom manifests beings as a whole. Another possibility of this manifestation is concealed in our *joy* in the presence of the Dasein and not simply the person – of a human being whom we love. (WM 87)

I find it plausible that we can feel great anxiety when faced with the weight of our freedom, the burden of our being-in-the-world. In such a state, we could be so overcome by anxiety that we experience a kind of existential paralysis where we temporarily fail to make sense of things. I also find it plausible that we could become so consumed with boredom that our existence becomes boring, and in such a state we could fail to find significance in anything. Try as I might, I cannot imagine any manifestation of joy which includes the complete loss of meaning that Heideggerian anxiety and boredom do. Heidegger’s phenomenology, at its best, is a
powerful invocation to reflect on the nature of our experience of our existence to see if it correlates with the sketch provided of it in the analytic of Dasein. Perhaps my powers of self-reflection are limited, but intense joy seems to me to involve a different kind of experience than anxiety and boredom – a loss or lack of significance and meaning does not seem to characterize experiences of joy. Nevertheless, there is a revelatory kind of joy and Heidegger’s theory allows for it, with some additional argument.

Joy, in everyday circumstances, is always joyful about a determinate thing or things, or joyful about and in a meaningful context. Imagine you are hungry and, unsolicited, a friend brings you a kebab. You might feel joy, but it is not revelatory because it is about the kebab, your friend’s kind actions, the satisfaction of hunger, etc. It is about particular things, does not concern your existence as such and does not involve a radical transformation of your everyday experience – so it cannot be revelatory. Similarly, you might be joyful about and in a context: an evening spent with close friends or family, talking, eating, drinking, and engaging in fun activities. This might bring you joy, and the joy might not be about this or that particular thing, but the context – the whole evening, the collection of experiences, the situation. But again, the joy would be about something determinate even if it were about a collection of things or a context - and the joy would occur in the everyday context of your world of significance. But Heideggerian revelatory moods seem to involve particularly intense manifestations of moods that have less intense everyday manifestations. So what about a profound, intense, all-consuming joy, the kind you don’t feel every day?

141 This echoes what Heidegger says about the ‘everyday’ manifestations of anxiety and boredom: that they always concern either determinate object(s) or contexts.
142 It is worth bearing in mind that these are just my examples and that different people will get different amounts of joy from similar things – but Heidegger’s theory allows for this. Perhaps there are people that can have revelatory joy engendered by an unexpected kebab.
Zadie Smith writes insightfully about this rare joy, saying that she may have only felt it six times in her entire life, “and if you asked me if I wanted more joyful experiences in my life, I wouldn’t be at all sure I did, exactly because it proves such a difficult emotion to manage.” (SJ) Profound joy, for Smith, “has very little real pleasure in it” (SJ) and is a potentially dangerous type of “human madness” (SJ). Joyful moments, though very pleasant, can also be a disruptive influence on one’s life. Joy might feel wonderful, but it can render you unable to think straight or act in your best interests, and can be a difficult, unsettling phenomenon. Smith’s attitude to joy is reminiscent of what Heidegger says about revelatory moods in general: they are fundamentally disruptive and intense moments that you would not necessarily want to occur: they involve a complete uncoupling from your everyday experience, which must be quite unsettling, strange and even perhaps traumatizing. Nevertheless, Smith (like Heidegger) acknowledges the revelatory potential of such experiences, saying that they can reveal the relatedness of joy to the tragedy that is so often the other side of the joy’s coin. I will return to Zadie Smith’s comments in due course, but this orientation towards joy is worth bearing in mind. Like anxiety and profound boredom, revelatory joy is rare and “does not fit with the everyday.” (SJ)

So, what would this joy be like? Even in moments of absolute, sublime joy, it seems to me that the world does not lose its significance, and nor does the ‘object’ or cause of your joy. If anything, they become oversaturated with significance – they mean an incredible amount to you and make a profound kind of sense. To be joyful about something, it must make sense, and to make sense it must be encountered in the context of your world - you must be able to latch

143 For instance, how the joy of having a child is accompanied by an anxiety over its welfare, a terror at the idea that it might die before you do, and a sadness from knowing you one day will be parted from it. The same goes for human relationships: they bring great joy, but always in the knowledge that they will end tragically, one way or another.
onto it in its significance. Even if the ‘object’ of your joy is not a determinate object but your existence as such, for your mood toward your existence to be called joy at all, your existence must have meaning to you. It is on this point that I depart from Heidegger. In his analyses of anxiety and boredom, he places much emphasis on the experience of significance-loss, but perhaps such an experience is not necessary for a mood to be revelatory, though it may be sufficient. In anxiety and boredom, the experience of meaninglessness removes us from our ordinary experience of our existence and confers on us what it is always otherwise like to be immersed in and responsible for significance. I claim that this is only one way that revelatory moods can confront us with significance, our freedom and possibilities.

What is crucial for revelatory moods is not the loss of significance, but the transformation of our everyday experience of being in a world of significance. We are used to being able to make sense of things, latching onto them in terms of what they mean to us. But when we are profoundly anxious or bored, our experience of the world is transformed and suddenly this becomes impossible - this is one possible radical transformation of our everyday experience. It is the transformation, I suggest, that is required for a revelatory mood to be revelatory of significance – the usual significance of the world must radically change to engender a ‘you don’t know what you’ve got until it’s gone’ experience of what it is normally like. This is how we can make sense of joy being a revelatory mood - perhaps the world, in certain states, can take on a radically different kind of significance, or a radically different degree of significance – to the extent that our experience of our existence is temporarily, fundamentally altered. If such moods were possible, and they could be directed toward our existence as such, this would satisfy the requirements for their being revelatory. The significance of the world could announce itself without being completely withdrawn from us and, in announcing itself, our freedom, possibilities and our role as significance-creators could announce themselves too.
I argue that there are such experiences of joy, where the significance of the world and our experience of it change radically enough to remove us from our everyday experience, and such moods could have our existence as such as their ‘object’. In such states, things, ourselves and the world do not lose their significance, but become oversaturated with it. Perhaps you have had such experiences: the birth of your son, your daughter’s wedding, falling in love, a rapturous concert…you may have been overcome with joy to such an extent that you found everything joyful, and temporarily nothing could make you unhappy. Things that usually would not mean much to you or make you feel joyful suddenly did make you feel joyful, and vice versa: things (or people) that would normally bring down your mood did not. Perhaps you thought ‘isn’t life wonderful’, pondered how lucky you were to be alive, revelled with joy at the very fact you exist and took deep pleasure in being the person you were, living the way you were. Such experiences are just as existentially important and as revealing of the human condition as moments of anxiety or boredom. Wouldn’t such a mood qualify as revelatory? It might be occasioned by a particular object, event, or context, but could propel you toward the kind of revelatory insights Heidegger talks about. In such states, the significance of the world as you usually experience it would alter – everything is not normally this great! How you understand things and what counts as significant (or not), to what degree…the very way you encounter the world would fundamentally change, and the significance of everything along with it. This would, I submit, qualify this species of joy as a revelatory mood.

§9.2 A Concrete Example of Revelatory Joy: The Experiences of MDMA Users

This is all interesting to speculate about, but what about a concrete, empirically available example? Let’s consider the drug 3,4-Methylenedioxymethamphetamine, abbreviated to ‘MDMA’ and commonly known, pointedly, as ‘ecstasy’. Putting it mildly, ecstasy is an
effective way to make people feel joy, and there is much research on its effects and potential psychological benefits under controlled circumstances. On this point, its promise in treating post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, intimacy issues and other mental pathologies has been touted in the scientific community. But our focus is on the revelatory joy it can make one feel. To consider whether or not MDMA-induced experiences can count as revelatory joy in the way I have articulated it, attention must be paid to the effects it has on the user, as reported and experienced by them. Since the effects of ecstasy are well-documented and known even by non-users, and since I have already cited some useful sources of information on this topic, I will not cite evidence for each effect because this information is easily accessible and what I will say about its felt effects is widely accepted. I am by no means claiming that taking illicit drugs is the only way to feel the experiences of revelatory joy I am trying to theorize, but they are a powerful example. As Sam Harris said, quoting Terrence McKenna: psychedelics are a method “that truly guarantees an effect.” Though everyone’s experiences may differ, something significant and revelatory (for better or worse) happening to someone’s consciousness after taking them is all but a certainty.

If you take 100 micrograms of acid, something is going to happen. Two hours later the significance of your existence will have just been borne down on you like an avalanche.

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144 For further reading, these are some good places to start. Science Daily’s article archive on ecstasy: https://www.sciencedaily.com/news/mind_brain/ecstasy/  /  MAPS (Multidisciplinary Association for Psychedelic Studies) https://maps.org/research/mdma  /  The Conversation’s article archive on ecstasy: https://theconversation.com/us/topics/ecstasy-9418

145 Here, and for the drug-taking community in general, Pillreports is an invaluable resource and worth mentioning. Combining scientific research and first-hand reports from users of different ecstasy pills, Pillreports provides a database of information of hundreds of pills in an effort to keep people informed and safe, especially in cases of high-dosage or potentially-lethal pills. https://pillreports.net/

146 Although I should add that not every experiences drugs in exactly the same way, or their effects to the exact same degree. But there are certain things you can expect, and that most people experience, when taking a certain drug.

147 Sam Harris, Can Psychedelics Help Expand Your Mind?, Big Think (SHBT in text), https://bigthink.com/think-tank/sam-harris-discusses-mdma-and-psychedelics
And this can be terrifying or it can be absolutely sublime depending on various causes and conditions. (SHBT)

With this in mind, let us try and make sense of the experiences of the ecstasy user. The desired effects of ecstasy include changes in the user’s physical, mental and emotional states, and their perception. They feel an all-consuming sense of bodily and mental bliss, feelings of deep, profound and constant joy. Their energy level dramatically increases, as does their sense of empathy, confidence, sociability and goodwill to fellow humans. Negative feelings of self-consciousness or social anxiety vanish completely, the user feels uninhibited and rapturous, talking at great speed and at great length to anyone that will listen. Their perceptions of their environment become more intense, colours look brighter and feel warmer, tactile sensations are heightened and more pleasurable. Sounds take on an entirely different dimension: music sounds better, and the user enjoys whatever they are listening to more than they normally might. Their aesthetic sensitivity in general is increased – they see the beauty in everything and experience an increase in emotional sensitivity. The user feels more in touch with and accepting of their emotions and is more likely to be moved by an act of kindness or an aesthetic work than they otherwise would be.

So, there is a lot going on with the ecstasy user. One important, commonly experienced factor across the spectrum of reactions is a feeling of deeply profound and intense joy – one that, because of the accompanying phenomena and their general drug-induced state, is quite overwhelming and difficult to manage. Zadie Smith, speaking about ecstasy-induced experiences, writes “was that joy? Probably not. But it mimicked joy’s conditions pretty well.”
The difference is not obvious to me here: whether stimulated by drugs or not, surely what these people are feeling is joy, albeit of a kind they might not feel on an everyday basis. Ecstasy users seem to be consumed by joy and experience the kind of feelings I spoke about earlier, where *everything* is joyful, and *all* they experience is joy. Such experiences are spoken of by ecstasy users (with regularity) as feeling revelatory and in our framework, I think an ecstasy-induced state of this kind would qualify as a revelatory mood. The everyday experience of the person is fundamentally transformed when under the influence of ecstasy. The significance of things alters too: everything gets raised up to the level of joy, and the significance taken on by the things in the user’s world dramatically alters. Heidegger’s analysis of revelatory moods gives us a potential reason why drug-induced experiences feel so revelatory to users. The very way they apprehend the world changes: their perceptions, thoughts, behaviour toward and understanding of their environment, and people. A common way of speaking about drugs, both colloquially and scientifically, is to speak of ‘altering consciousness’, and it seems to me this is exactly what happens to the ecstasy user – their consciousness, their very way of existing in the world, is fundamentally, temporarily altered. This satisfies one key requirement for a revelatory mood in the sense I have articulated it. The joyfulness of the ecstasy user is accompanied by a profound and complete change in their consciousness - their everyday experience of their world and its usual significance-structure is interrupted. This is what is required for a revelatory mood to be revelatory of the significance of the world as such, and our role as free significance-creators. The significance of the world, and how we apprehend it, must *completely* change.

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148 It is also interesting that she operates a ‘don’t know what you’ve got until it’s gone’ logic, but with MDMA-induced joy and regular joy: “at the neural level, such experiences gave you a clue about what joy not-under-the-influence would feel like. Helped you recognise joy, when it arrived.” (SJ) Following Heidegger, I will operate a similar logic, but it is the significance and intelligibility of the world that revelatory moods help us to recognise and inform us about, not what the less-intense, non-revelatory varieties of moods are like.

149 As it is, in different ways, with other drugs.
The other requirement for a mood to be revelatory is that the ‘object’ of the mood could be the totality of the experiencer’s existence, their being-in-the-world as such. Again, this certainly seems like something that ecstasy users (and drug takers in general) often experience under the influence.\textsuperscript{150} People regularly report feelings of deep understanding about the nature of existence, or insights about their own lives, occurring to them whilst intoxicated. The slogan ‘it’s all connected, man’ is often used to parody stoners and drug culture, and not without reason: experiences of the interconnectedness of things and the feeling of being a small part of something much greater than oneself are commonplace in psychedelic experiences. So it seems plausible, and even more plausible after hearing users report their experiences, that ecstasy users could experience a fundamental change in their everyday experience, accompanied by an all-consuming joy, where they are confronted with joyful insights about their being-in-the-world as such.

There is even another potential similarity between what I have called revelatory joy and the other revelatory moods Heidegger discusses. Anxiety and boredom, on his account, involve depersonalizing experiences. In anxiety “all things and we ourselves sink into indifference” (WM 88) and in boredom we become “an undifferentiated no one” (FCM 135), no longer ourselves. These experiences are described as a radical loss of our usual personal experience and our ability to relate to ourselves as ourselves. When overcome by anxiety and boredom,\textsuperscript{150}

\textsuperscript{150} Just search the internet for ‘drug stories’ for many, many examples. A personal favourite, though not necessarily relevant to our topic here: “The peak involved me composing a complex orchestral piece in my head that was somehow linked to all the best pleasure centres of my brain. The better and more complex the melodies were I was able to create, the more intense the beam of pleasure was, like pure white light injected directly into my mind. And it wasn't like the artificial rush of coke or amphetamines, or even the warmth of ecstasy, but seemingly a gift from the gods or the most benevolent of muses.” (https://www.reddit.com/r/AskReddit/comments/20htfl/what_was_your_best_experience_with_using_drugs/)
we are in a sense no longer ourselves because we cannot even latch onto our own personality as significant – the meaning even of ourselves recedes from us. But this raises a similar question to one we encountered earlier: where is this experience to be found in revelatory joy? Or the experience of the MDMA user? MDMA users usually become more personable, keener to be social and more talkative when they are under the influence – not less. This indicates that, if there is a depersonalizing experience here, it is not the same radical kind present in anxiety and boredom – ecstasy users still seem to be in touch with their personalities insofar as they can understand themselves and talk to others. But there is still something of a depersonalization present in MDMA-induced joy, which Zadie Smith also notices: “the experiencing subject has somehow ‘entered’ the emotion, and disappeared.” (SJ)

Remember what we have said so far: MDMA-induced joy involves a complete transformation of everyday experience accompanied by overwhelming feelings of joy, where everything around them is encountered as joyful. Users become more sociable, more confident, and any neurotic self-consciousness and social anxiety fade away completely. But this kind of transformation is a depersonalization: the user’s normal personality vanishes – they are not usually like this. To have a negative emotion or neurosis temporarily removed from your experience is to undergo a change in personality: human experience is usually a complicated hodgepodge of many different emotions, experienced in many different degrees over time. Ecstasy and revelatory joy, therefore, temporarily block out part of your personality, because the full spectrum of your psychology and emotions is part of what makes you who you normally are. The same goes for feelings of self-consciousness and social anxiety. However negative they may be, they are a part of some people’s personalities and their existential makeup. Overcoming them so instantly and dramatically would involve a change in one’s usual personality. These feelings do not just vanish overnight because you took drugs, but taking
certain drugs may temporarily remove them. A common slogan is that people ‘aren’t themselves’ when on drugs because they behave very differently, or irrationally. But it is literally true: drugs block out aspects of your personality and actively remove certain emotional and social phenomena from your experience. This is a kind of depersonalization, but perhaps not as radical as the kind present in boredom and anxiety, where you totally lose grip on yourself. With MDMA-induced joy, you still have a connection to yourself, but you encounter yourself in a radically different fashion than in your everyday experience.

If revelatory joy is possible outside of MDMA (and I would argue it is) then there is a kind of depersonalization going on there too. Human beings do not normally experience that type of joy, or not to that degree. To be so overcome by any emotion that everything around you gets disclosed in terms of that emotion involves depersonalization - human experience is usually a much more complex affective picture where many things can be felt at once, in different and often complicated ways. Human affectivity is not as simple as it might appear in revelatory moments, where everything ‘is’ one thing or another (boring, joyful, etc.), or we ‘are’ one thing or another. We slide between moods of different types and degrees all the time, but revelatory moods fundamentally alter this kind of experience, and so must involve a change in our everyday personality and our encounter with ourselves.

§9.3 The Existential Insight of Revelatory Joy

My final point concerns what the specific existential insights of revelatory joy might be. I wrote in the previous section about how, although anxiety and boredom do similar things, they both have their unique insight to convey alongside revealing the significance of the world and our free role in its creation and maintenance. Anxiety conveys on us the overwhelming,
burdensome nature of our freedom, while boredom additionally compels us to make something of this freedom to avoid empty, boring lives. I have covered how revelatory joy - because it involves a radical transformation of everyday experience and the significance-structure of the world – can also be revelatory of significance and our role as free sense-makers. But I have yet to specify what revelatory joy’s additional existential insight might be.

To this question, there are many potential answers - maybe not just one correct answer. Perhaps the most obvious ‘message’ that revelatory joy could have for us is simply that moments of such joy are possible: no matter how dark life gets, or how sad you are, there are still moments of joy to be found, and joy is worth pursuing. Revelatory joy might drive this home in a way that everyday joy might not, but the idea that life can be joyful is something we can derive from non-revelatory joy. Revelatory joy could confer on us something about the possibility and nature of moments of completely sublime joy, but this is obvious and akin to saying ‘revelatory joy tells us what revelatory joy is like’, which is not that convincing or interesting a conclusion.

Revelatory joy, by temporarily removing all ‘negative’ emotions and by forcing us into a state where we cannot feel anything except joy, reveals something to us about the inherent belonging-together of joy and sadness, the tragedy that underlies the human condition and all experiences of joy within it. This is an example of what revelatory moods do in general: they each reveal an aspect of the radical complexity and multifacetedness of our being-in-the-world. Any human experience of joy is tinged by a certain tragedy, which is part of what makes the object and experience of joy so powerful. Zadie Smith also notices this in her essay on joy:

Children are the infamous example. Isn’t it bad enough that the beloved, with whom you have experienced genuine joy, will eventually be lost to you? Why add to this
nightmare the child, whose loss, if it ever happened, would mean nothing less than your total annihilation? [...] Joy is such a human madness. (SJ)

The joy involved in having a child is tragic because it is accompanied by terror at the thought of the child’s death and the knowledge that, through its death or yours, one day you will be parted from it. This is true of any experience of human joy: they are all underpinned by a tragic knowledge of the fact that our lives are finite, and these experiences cannot keep coming forever. But this is what makes the experiences so powerful in the first place: if you could keep having them forever, what would make them special? Revelatory joy confers on us the fact that even sublimely joyful experiences are tragic because they will all come to an end at some point. This absurd coupling of joy and sadness partially accounts for the human condition and why the experience of being a person can be so strange and difficult at times, despite the joy and wonder that can be found in it.

Smith also, citing Julian Barnes, writes about the pain that accompanies the death of a loved one: “it hurts just as much as it is worth. What an arrangement. Why would anyone accept such a crazy deal?” (SJ) It is this craziness that revelatory joy is partly responsible for revealing to us. In conferring the relatedness of joy to sadness (and the tragic nature of our existence) on us, revelatory joy reveals an aspect of the radical complexity and multifaceted nature of being a person. Everyday joy is accompanied and informed, however minimally, by the tragedy of living that underpins it. But in revelatory joy, this tragic element is not experienced: all we feel is joy, with everything around us disclosed in terms of it. But this is not the everyday experience of joy: it is not in any way tragic. The removal of any tragic element from joyful experience reveals this aspect of joy to us in the same ‘you don’t know what you’ve got until it’s gone’ kind of way that the significance of the world gets revealed to us in its refusal.
Having examined joy and given a case for its being a revelatory mood, we can return to Heidegger and clarify what revelatory moods in general are for. Heidegger addressed this question in his accounts of anxiety and boredom, but he did not do so as completely as he might have. Heidegger claimed that boredom and anxiety reveal something about our *being-in-the-world as such* and *being as a whole* to us, and revelatory moods do this ‘in various ways’. (WM 100) Far from a passing comment, I think this is worth paying close attention to. What does ‘in various ways’ mean here? It is true that there are different moods that can be revelatory. Heidegger gives an account of how revelatory moods are revelatory of the significance of the world, our freedom and our role as sense-makers that create and inhabit spaces of meaning. He also gives an account of how anxiety and boredom, on top of this, have their own existential insights to convey. But his account is partial. I have argued that joy is also revelatory in this way and comes with its own additional existential insights. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger discusses anxiety before moving on to discuss death and authenticity in division 2. It is the anxious encounter with our being-in-the-world that allows us to get the whole of our existence into view, and it is only when we get the whole into view that we can realise and deal with the fact that we will one day die. On Heidegger’s account, it is this confrontation with our mortality that allows us to live authentic lives and without anxiety, no reckoning with death, no reckoning with the totality of existence, therefore no reckoning with its limits. Anxiety is a condition for being able to live authentically, and this is true in some sense for revelatory moods in general. The general purpose of revelatory moods is to ground us in the world and provide us existential aid in order that we can live more authentic, complete and rounded lives.

Revelatory moods also all seem to be revelatory of what I have referred to as the radical complexity and multifaceted nature of being. Being, and human existence, are not things that can be spoken of as being wholly this, or wholly that, not ‘good’, not ‘bad’, and so on. What
we call ‘existence’ and ‘human life’, are vastly complicated and often-contradictory phenomena, and revelatory moods reveal this to us. I have explicitly argued this about joy already: it shows us that joy and tragedy are conjoined in a strange way that makes the joyful experiences so powerful. But anxiety and boredom also indicate something to us about how phenomena in human life and complicatedly interwoven. Our freedom is anxiety-inducing, but Heidegger describes it as having an awe-inspiring quality too, which brings with it an “unshakeable joy” (BT 358) at the fact we are free. Yes, our freedom is burdensome, but it is also awe-inspiring and should make us happy and grateful to be alive. Boredom, likewise, shows us that life can be so boring that we experience depersonalization, but also that this boredom can compel us to more forcefully take on our roles as makers of meaning, enhancing our personalities and our lives. Revelatory moods provide us with the existential education we need in order to be able to live in as complicated, contradictory and absurd a world as this one. This, I would suggest, is what is really going on when Heidegger tells us that they reveal being as a whole to us ‘in various ways’. In different ways and with different existential insights, revelatory moods allow us to better ground ourselves in the world and live more authentic, rich and meaningful lives.

§9.4 Conclusion: Revelatory Moods and Philosophical Anthropology

To summarize: Heidegger gives an account of what I call ‘revelatory moods’, citing anxiety and boredom as examples, and I have argued that there is a manifestation of joy which also qualifies as revelatory in the same sense. There are moments of profound joy in which a person’s everyday experience of the significance-structure of their world completely changes, which satisfies the requirement for a mood to be revelatory of significance as such, and the role of human beings as free sense-makers that inhabit a space of meaning, creating and deciding
the very significance of things. The object of such a mood is one’s being-in-the-world as such, the totality of one’s existence. A concrete example can be found (not exclusively) in the experiences of MDMA users. MDMA-induced experiences can include profound feelings of joy, a complete transformation in a person’s experience which can be concerned with their existence in the world as such. There is therefore a kind of joy that qualifies as revelatory, in the same sense that Heidegger describes boredom and anxiety. Alongside revealing the significance of the world as such and our freedom, like anxiety and boredom, revelatory joy also has its own specific ‘existential insight’. It confers on us the inherent tragedy that underlies all joyful experiences: because of our finite existence, they will one day come to an end. But this is part of what makes them so special. This revealing of the complex and multi-faceted nature of joy is part of the broader function of revelatory moods. Over the course of our lives, revelatory moods ground us in the world, giving us the insights into the nature of our existence that we need in order that we can live meaningful, complete, sane lives in this complex and multifaceted existence of ours - which they do ‘in various ways’.

My aim in this dissertation has been to show how Heidegger’s work can and should be understood as a philosophical anthropology – it attempts to uncover the structure of human existence, even if this is not all that it does. The analysis of moods, revelatory and otherwise, is an important part of this task. Heidegger identified revelatory moods as a fundamental feature of human existence, theorized about their function and specified how certain revelatory moods work individually, and attempted to discern the meaning behind these experiences. This resulted in a conceptual toolkit that we can take and apply to instances of human behaviour and experience to analyse, categorise and understand them. Insofar as he did all this, Heidegger produced an interesting kind of philosophical anthropology. If he is right, humans experience revelatory moods, which are disclosive of different aspects of what it is like to be a person. To
be human is to be involved in the creation, maintenance and inhabiting of significance, a burdensome task but one that can bring great joy and, if forsaken, can lead to a boring, empty life. Revelatory moods therefore play an important disclosive role in our lives and are an integral part of our being able to live authentically, having more complete existences rich in meaning. These claims and the theorizing associated with them would of more than passing interest to philosophical anthropologists and are an exemplary case of philosophical anthropology itself. Here, I have taken Heidegger’s work, built on it, broadened it out and applied it to another important mood that he did not discuss in detail. I theorized joy as a revelatory mood that plays a similar disclosive role to anxiety and boredom and can be accounted for in a Heideggerian framework, which is one of philosophical anthropology. Anxiety, boredom and joy are important, disclosive human phenomena that are partly responsible for how we make sense of the world and our existence generally. They are how we come to know our freedom and our role as sense-makers, the creators of the significance of the world.
§10: 4E Cognition and Philosophical Anthropology: Constructing the Hard Core of Cognitive Science

The prospect launched by the cognitive revolution of a unified and coherent, interdisciplinarily seamless cognitive science did not materialize. […] the enthusiastic initial common effort [turned] into a rather miscellaneous collection of academic practices that no longer share common goals and paradigms.

- What Happened to Cognitive Science?151

This troublingly well-evidenced paper argues that cognitive science suffers from deep problems of interdisciplinary integration and a profound lack of agreement on its “basic tenets and conjectures” (WHSC 789). This should trouble anyone wanting to practise the discipline as it was originally intended, because it was conceived as an inter-disciplinary but cohesive science of cognition. It proposed to bring together fruitful aspects of psychology, philosophy, anthropology, linguistics, neuroscience and artificial intelligence. Despite the disparity of these disciplines, cognitive science was supposed to be unified and singular, with “a cohesive subject matter, complementary methods and integrated theories.” (WHCS 782) It is certainly questionable whether this has been achieved: a plurality of approaches to cognitive science have arisen since its inception, with differing frameworks, central concepts, ideas and ways of operating. This has led some of its proponents to wonder if “perhaps there are just cognitive sciences”.152 It seems as though cognitive science is at something of a crossroads: either it establishes a path towards unity or abandons its hope of interdisciplinary coherence and splits entirely.

I will suggest that philosophy can help cognitive science in establishing a path toward unity. Philosophy’s relevance to cognitive science is intuitively obvious\(^{153}\), with much being made of ‘the philosophy of cognitive science’\(^{154}\) and potential philosophical applications of cognitive science’s empirical results.\(^{155}\) But these investigations often confine themselves to traditional, long-debated philosophical questions and categories of problems, drawing on the philosophy of science, artificial intelligence, philosophy of mind (etc.), with specific application to cognitive science. Here, I will explore an avenue less travelled: the application philosophical anthropology might have to cognitive science, and how a productive interdisciplinary engagement between it and cognitive science could perhaps aid in the construction of a ‘hard core’ of cognitive science. The authors of *What Happened to Cognitive Science?* borrow this term from Imre Lakatos and use it to describe what is perhaps the discipline’s biggest problem – its lack of agreement on a central set of core principles, claims, assumptions, commitments and ideas around which to conduct its research – a ‘hard core’. Without one, the unification originally desired for the discipline is not possible. For cognitive science to be a singular but interdisciplinary science, consensus is needed around its foundational ideas, self-conception and practise.\(^{156}\)

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\(^{153}\) Philosophy is also concerned with the mind and brain, intelligence, knowledge and knowing, nature vs. nurture, meaning, perception, emotions, free will and other such issues. See also Gardner’s influential history of cognitive science, which lists its key interests (*The Mind’s New Science: A History of the Cognitive Revolution* (MNS in text), Howard Gardner, Basic Books, New York, 1984, p. 6), and *Stanford Encyclopaedia*’s entry of Cognitive Science (*Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy*, article on Cognitive Science (CCS in text), Paul Thagard, Last updated 24th September 2018, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/cognitive-science/)


\(^{155}\) See *Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy*’s article on ‘Cognitive Science’ for a helpful guide to these potential areas of inquiry. (CCS)

\(^{156}\) For the purposes of this paper, I plan to leave aside the questions about whether Lakatos was right about this way of conducting science, because it seems to me that even if there is a
Philosophical anthropology attempts to account for human existence, identify and elucidate its significant features, find what is common to all instances of the human experience and provide theoretical frameworks with which we can analyse human existence. This contrasts with empirical anthropology, which tends to pursue ethnographic research of particular peoples and societies, rather than trying to account for general commonality between all people. Rather than trying to answer the question of, for example, what life in Trobriand Island tribes is like, philosophical anthropology involves a more abstract level of questioning: what is being a human being like? Some of the most productive answers to this and related questions, many of which have come from phenomenology, often overlap in interesting ways with cognitive-scientific interests. Since philosophical anthropology is more abstract and allows considerable space for conceptual clarification, it could give cognitive scientists a valuable resource in reflecting on the core principles, or conceptions of the human being, cognition, or the mind, that it wants to adopt. Every instance of cognitive science, implicitly or explicitly, has such conceptions, whether appropriate or inappropriate, many of which are hotly debated between its various schools. If cognitive science is to have a ‘hard core’, it would at least partially consist of the kind of claims and reflections found in philosophical anthropology. Whether it concerns the nature of human experience, cognition, the co-dependency of mind/world/context, the involvement of emotion and perception in cognition, embodied experience, the famous mind-computer analogy or a host of other topics, philosophical anthropologists have often been stimulated by and written interestingly about issues that powerfully coincide with those of cognitive science. Like any discipline that would study the human mind, cognitive science needs philosophical-anthropological foundations – it needs a conception of the entity it is to

better way, his idea of the hard core points to something important about cognitive science that it lacks.

157 Bronislaw Malinowski – Argonauts of the Western Pacific (1922)
158 Both of which I claim to be species of philosophical anthropology, because they are both concerned with giving an account of human existence and the experience of being a human.
analyse, around which to conduct its research. The work of philosophical anthropologists could function as a resource for the critique and clarification of competing candidates for the constituent elements of cognitive science’s ‘hard core’ – claims and ideas that need to be agreed upon for a coherent research programme to take place. It is not always necessary to experiment in a laboratory to make conclusions, and philosophical anthropologists have often given convincing reasons for adopting certain conceptions and frameworks for analysing cognition, the mind, and human existence generally - without conducting scientific research. Their reflections could aid the construction of a hard core of cognitive science and suggest candidates for inclusion in it.

My focus here will be on work in phenomenology that focusses on issues relevant to the concerns and conclusions of cognitive scientists. Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty are excellent examples of phenomenologists that have engaged in such work and have given convincing arguments for adopting some of the key ideas of ‘4E cognition’.159 They pursue a different kind of research conducted with a more argumentative, philosophical approach that pays close attention to our experience from a first-person perspective, which may well be of complementary interest to the work of cognitive scientists on similar topics. In this paper, I will consider a few examples and explain how and why they are relevant to cognitive science and the potential construction of its hard core. Specifically, I will examine Heidegger’s notion of understanding as the process by which we disclose the world and attain a context of significance to operate in, and Mark Rowland’s engagement with Merleau-Ponty. I will argue

159 Referring to embedded, embodied, enactive and extended. (e.g. Mark Rowlands, The New Science of the Mind: From Extended Mind to Embodied Phenomenology, MIT Press, 2010)
that the tenets of 4E cognition are essential for inclusion in cognitive science’s hard core, and philosophical anthropology is helpful for the process of its construction.

Naturally, my focus here is on philosophy, but perhaps engaging with philosophy is only one possible way cognitive science could return to its roots to construct a coherent hard core and achieve the status of an interdisciplinary-but-unitary science. Maybe a wholesale return to the ideas of the six disciplines that inspired cognitive science in the first place must occur – why the combination of Philosophy, Psychology, Linguistics, A.I., Anthropology, Neuroscience at all? Which of their ideas belong in the hard core of cognitive science? Being largely a reflection on foundational principles, ideas and concepts, philosophy is well-poised to begin answering these questions, with the claims of philosophical anthropology being particularly helpful for this task.

§10.1 ‘Philosophical’ Anthropology?

There are human beings in this world – like and including ourselves – with similarities and differences among themselves and in relation to other things, which are worth investigation.


Philosophical anthropology (as I understand it) is the collective attempt to specify and make sense of the universal, necessary, constitutive, and fundamental features of human existence and among these features those which seem significant depending on what questions are being asked. It concerns how human existence is structured and considers what it means to live a

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human life. Philosophical anthropology provides intellectual tools, frameworks and vocabularies that afford us an array of conceptual ‘grids’ that we can take and apply to human existence, generating analysis of human beings from a philosophical point of view. Richard Schacht does not define philosophy anthropology “at all strictly” (SPA 156), because this kind of analysis can take many forms. But I think it is fair to say that underlying all of them is a concern for finding what is constitutive and universal to human existence.

Here, I will be concentrating mostly on phenomenology, which would be a species of philosophical anthropology as I have defined it, and which often address similar issues to cognitive science – or at least engages them in a way that is productive and relevant for it to consider. I take them to be particularly productive kinds of philosophical anthropology because their entire reason for being is to consider, from the perspective of the entity in question, what it means and what it is like to exist as a human being. Existentialism and phenomenology examine what is defining about the human experience of its own existence, what role these defining features play, what structures and phenomena make them possible and what vocabulary is best to describe them. They therefore question the nature of thought and cognition, and the role they play in the complicated structure of our existence – something cognitive science would no doubt be interested in.

I will examine specific cases of interest we can find in the work of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty later and suggest that such examples and perhaps others can be of use to cognitive science

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161 I am thinking here not just of the influential continental existentialists and phenomenologists (Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Meareau-Ponty, etc.) but also analytic figures who pursue similar questions, like David Benetar (Life, Death and Meaning), Thomas Nagel (The Absurd), or proponents of ‘cognitive phenomenology’ (Chudnoff, Horgan and Tienson, Kriegel, Pitt, Siewart).
as a resource for the construction of a hard core around which its research could be conducted coherently, without as many internal struggles. In the work of these philosophers, we find convincing cases for adopting the basic tenets of 4E cognition into the hard core. These philosophers use different but complementary methods and arguments to deduce their conclusions – their philosophical anthropologies are not based in experimentation and induction, but argument and reflection upon first-person experience with an eye towards giving an account of general features of human existence. While this is a different procedure to cognitive science, it can be complementary to it and give additional reasons for the hard core of cognitive science being centred explicitly around 4E cognition.

§10.2 The ‘Hard Core’ of Cognitive Science

Cognitive science became fragmented partly because of disagreements between its practitioners about how to conceive of and carry out their work. The insights of the various founding disciplines came to compete with and eventually dominate over others, with “cognitive scientists tend[ing] to project their own favourite paradigms onto the field as a whole.” (MNS 37) This has happened to such an extent that, at least “bibliometrically, the field has largely been subsumed by (cognitive) psychology, and educationally, exhibits a striking lack of curricular consensus.” (WHCS 782)\textsuperscript{162} The question of what exactly cognitive science

\footnote{162 As pointed out at WHCS 782, certain academic databases such as \textit{Web of Science} now only index ‘cognitive science’ articles under ‘experimental psychology’. The publisher of both journals of the \textit{Cognitive Science Society} does not list cognitive science as a subject in its own right, but only as a subcategory of psychology. Even the discipline’s flagship journal \textit{Cognitive Science: A Multidisciplinary Journal} seems to have lost its initial sense of multidisciplinarity. For more on this, see WHCS and the following: (Leydesdorf, L. & Goldstone, \textit{R. L. J. Assoc. Inf. Sci. Technol.}, 65, 2014, p. 164–177) (P. Van den Besselaar & G. Heimeriks, \textit{Disciplinary, Multidisciplinary, Interdisciplinary: Concepts and Indicators in Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Scientometrics & Informetrics} (ISSI), eds. M. Davis & C. S. Wilson, University of New South Wales, 2001, p. 705–716) (P. Vugteveen, R. Lenders & P. Van den Besselaar, \textit{Scientometrics}, 100, 2014, p. 73–96)
is or involves, or how it might benefit from a return to its foundational disciplines, is therefore especially worth raising. While its objective is to scientifically study cognition, there is disagreement between cognitive scientists about how it should be studied, what it is that they study and what central ideas or conceptual frameworks should be adopted in studying it. The reason cognitive science has not cohered, according to *What Happened to Cognitive Science?*, lies in its failure to agree on what Imre Lakatos called a ‘hard core’ of its research programme. Without a set of core ideas, concepts and assumptions that all cognitive scientists broadly agree on – a ‘hard core’ - it lacks the foundation or academic environment required for a unified science with a coherent research programme. Artificial intelligence and psychology have exerted such dominance over cognitive science that input from its other foundational disciplines has often been suppressed. Perhaps this has been the case with philosophy, which could be especially relevant to cognitive science.

But why is lacking a ‘hard core’ so problematic? This concept of Lakatos’s comprises part of his attempt to improve on Karl Popper’s criterion of falsifiability, which holds that science should try and falsify, not verify, theories. A theory is individually falsified if contrary evidence to it is found, and we should abandon falsified theories. Lakatos proposes that it is more reasonable and in line with actual scientific practise if we think rather of “a sequence of falsifiable theories characterized by shared a hard core of central theses that are deemed irrefutable—or, at least, refutation-resistant—by methodological fiat.” (SIL) In Lakatos’ framework, a theory is comprised of two key elements: 1) a set of “basic tenets and conjectures that are not meant to be challenged or refuted” (WHSC 783) – a ‘hard core’ – and 2) a set of

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auxiliary hypotheses that put the ‘hard core’ to theoretical and explanatory use.\textsuperscript{164} Per Musgrave and Pigden’s example, in Newtonian mechanics the ‘hard core’ would be “the three laws of mechanics and the law of gravitation”. (SIL) However, “to derive empirical predictions from Newtonian mechanics you need a whole host of auxiliary hypotheses about the positions, masses and relative velocities of the heavenly bodies” (SIL). A Newtonian theory about why Mercury behaves the way it does when it moves around the sun cannot be comprised entirely of the ‘hard core’ because the ‘hard core’ is just a set of general equations and laws that have yet to be applied to specific objects. The theory must take the hard core and supplement it with a host of other specific hypotheses, propositions and evidence about mercury and the sun for it to be a working, falsifiable theory. If evidence is collected about mercury’s behaviour that contradicts Newtonian mechanics\textsuperscript{165}, the most practical and reasonable reaction would not be to throw away the whole theory but to step back and decide whether to throw out the auxiliary hypotheses or the ‘hard core’. Usually, within a specific scientific paradigm, it would make more sense to throw out the auxiliary hypotheses rather than the stronger, agreed-upon hard core. This way of operating would allow scientists to go on reasonably practising their work, safeguarding from the premature abandoning of theories whilst keeping a weaker but still satisfactory criterion of falsification. Rather than an individual theory being falsified instantly when presented with contrary evidence, a sequence of theories with a shared ‘hard core’ would have to be falsified before it makes sense to also throw out the hard core. Such a sequence of


\textsuperscript{165} Which did occur: “the anomalous behaviour of the perihelion of Mercury, which shifts around the Sun in a way that it ought not to do if Newton’s mechanics were correct and there were no other sizable body influencing its orbit. The problem is that there seems to be no such body. The difficulty was well known for decades but it did not cause astronomers to collectively give up on Newton until Einstein’s theory came along. Lakatos thought that the astronomers were right not to abandon Newton even though Newton eventually turned out to be wrong and Einstein turned out to be right.” (SIL)
theories, sharing a ‘hard core’, Lakatos calls a ‘research programme’. The picture painted in *What Happened to Cognitive Science?* indicates the total lack a ‘hard core’ that its practitioners agree on, the lack of a centre around which to build a research programme. Every academic discipline has an outlook, certain assumptions, commitments and ideas about what it studies and how. These ideas are central to it and act as a foundation on which to conduct their research. Cognitive science’s must be decided upon and made explicit if it is to be a unified science. But what kinds of ideas or claims would be included in the hard core of cognitive science? Doubtless there are many candidates, but some of them, plausibly, would have to do with the nature of human existence, the mind and cognition. Specific assumptions about the nature of the entity/entities to be analysed, or the main conceptual lenses they are to be analysed through, must be part of the hard core.

For instance, what is cognition in the first place? In cognitive science, it is an exceptionally broad term on almost any interpretation of it. Cambridge Cognition describes cognition as “a range of mental processes relating to the acquisition, storage, manipulation and retrieval of information.”166 William James, a ‘pragmatist’ philosopher and psychologist influential within cognitive science, listed perception, reasoning, memory and attention as cognitive processes.167 My own university’s cognitive science department’s mission statement lists its concerns as follows:

the ways in which information is acquired and used by humans, other living organisms, and also artificial cognitive systems. […] how learning, processing, and sharing information about and with others takes place, and how computational models of human cognition can be realized in the brain.168

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166 *Cambridge Cognition*, https://www.cambridgecognition.com/blog/entry/what-is-cognition
168 Central European University, Cognitive Science Department website, https://cognitivescience.ceu.edu/
From these definitions, you may be forgiven for thinking that cognition could be applied to anything that could be construed as ‘mental’, anything having to do with ‘information’, or as being computationally representable. This does not exactly narrow it down, and there are deep tensions within cognitive science even about these definitions I just mentioned – especially when it comes to one of cognitive science’s most prevalent conceptions of the mind.

Conceiving of the mind as a representational computer, or at least being powerfully akin to one, has been one of cognitive science’s most pervasive tendencies. The discipline itself has been defined as “the study of intelligence and intelligent systems, with particular reference to intelligent behaviour as computation”\textsuperscript{169}. Something that resembles a proposition for cognitive science’s hard core can be found in \textit{A Companion to Cognitive Science}, which asserts general “assumptions that the mind is (1) an information processing system, (2) a representational device, and (3) (in some sense) a computer”\textsuperscript{170}. Tagard similarly conjoins cognition, computation and representation, stating that “thinking can best be understood in terms of representational structures in the mind and computational procedures that operate on those structures”\textsuperscript{171}. These are characteristic examples of which there are a great many, but not all cognitive scientists (or philosophers) would agree that this is an adequate model. However, based purely on the history of the discipline, the mind’s being a computer is a candidate for


inclusion in cognitive science’s hard core, and the reflections of philosophical anthropologists could be a valuable resource in the debating and deciding of this issue.


Embodied cognition asserts the body’s role in cognitive processes, and Extended cognition theorizes that cognitive processes might extend further than the mind, brain, or even the body. These ideas immediately raise questions about the nature of cognition and computation as a suitable model for it. How could a computer, for example, meaningfully be said to have a culture? Likewise, embodied and enactive cognition theories have rejected the notion of computational representation, instead arguing that cognition is best understood as inherently grounded in the body\footnote{F. Varela, E. Thompson & E. Rosch, \textit{The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience}, MIT Press, 1991}, or as the dynamic ‘enacting’ of the relationship between the mind and its world.\footnote{J. Stewart, O. Gapenne & E. di Paolo (eds.), \textit{Enaction: Toward a New Paradigm for Cognitive Science}, MIT Press, 2010} Those who would reject the mind’s being a computer, or as working representationally, have good company in 20th-century phenomenologists and existentialists, and might find compelling reasons in their work that would back up their own claims and suggest better alternative models. In what follows, I will examine some cases. Such
considerations not only show that the 4 Es of 4E cognition must find inclusion in the hard core of cognitive science, but also go to the very heart of the meaning of cognition, which would also be required in the hard core.

Much cognitive science understands cognition to be a set of mental processes that work akin to representational computation. But to conceive cognition in this way, or even as a ‘mental process’ at all, obscures its intimate relation to, dependence on and even its being partially-constituted by factors and processes of context and embodiment. Speaking of embodied cognition, Wilson and Folia eloquently explain how these kinds of areas of cognitive science can relate productively with phenomenology, in a way that I would argue also holds true for any species of philosophical anthropology that might have something to say about these issues.

Embodied cognitive science pushes phenomenological accounts in new directions. It seeks not so much to understand how physicality opens up the experience of the self, the world and the others, but rather aims to specify the mechanisms that explain just how cognition is grounded in, and deeply constrained by, the bodily nature of cognitive agency.175

Phenomenology, and philosophical anthropologists generally, have tried to account for how human existence is constituted, and the structures and phenomena necessary for it to be constituted in the way that it is. Many attempts at accounting for these things have concerned the idea that what we call the mind, experience or cognition, is not something that just happens inside one’s head - it is dependent on, made possible and partly constituted by several factors, including embodiment and socio-historical context. Alongside establishing candidates for inclusion in the hard core of cognitive science, perhaps there is potential for further interaction

between the two disciplines here. Philosophical anthropologists can reflect on and provide arguments for the interdependency of these phenomena and provide ways that these various interdependences can be interpreted. Based upon this, it could be the role of cognitive science to scientifically investigate the physical and psychological mechanisms that underly what philosophical anthropologists talk about, in ways that could show them to be right or wrong. Let us turn now to some specific cases of philosophers whose reflections bear relevance to cognitive science in the ways I have described.

§10.3 Heidegger: Understanding the World

Heidegger’s account of human existence is relevant to cognitive science and 4E cognition in numerous ways and is particularly famous for its appropriation by Hubert Dreyfus in his critical arguments about artificial intelligence. Dreyfus rejected the idea that a computer could achieve actual consciousness or intelligence, or adequately replicate human cognition. His arguments are well known, well-documented and have become increasingly well-respected since their initial appearance. This is already a useful way in which philosophical anthropology can aid the construction of a hard core of cognitive science: as Dreyfus has already noticed, Heidegger’s work provides a compelling case for believing that we do not apprehend the world in the same way a computer processes information. I do not intend to repeat Dreyfus’ A.I. arguments here. I will rather draw attention to a specific concept in Heidegger’s work that I think has the most relevance for cognitive science, not just in relation to the four Es, but also because it is a specific example of a mechanism that cognitive science could investigate, one

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176 Heidegger gives technical reasons why his analytic of Dasein is not an account of human existence. However, anything true of Dasein is true of human beings, because human beings are Dasein. It therefore is philosophical anthropology of a kind.

177 See these texts for examples: Alchemy and AI (1965), What Computers Can’t Do (1972), Mind Over Machine (1986)
that a cognitive scientist might think of as an example of cognition. In *Being and Time*\(^{178}\), Heidegger attempts to account for the structures of human existence and calls one of them *understanding* (*Verstehen*).\(^{179}\) It is important to note that he is not using understanding in any of the senses we normally might, as comprehension of information, a tolerant attitude to others, or as a kind of agreement between people. All these phenomena, and indeed any phenomena, especially those that are most often subsumed under the label ‘cognition’ are said by Heidegger to be “existentially derivative of [...] primary understanding” (BT 182). To be able to know things, to talk, or do a host of other things, we must, on Heidegger’s account, *already understand the world.*

This might sound like a curious claim but let us think about what it means to know something in our everyday experience. For instance, I think that I can be said to know that, at this moment, a pair of headphones are on the sofa next to me - this is a particular piece of my knowledge about my life. I can reflect on this piece of knowledge and its object: I can discern and enumerate the properties of the headphones, I can pick them up, examine them, reflect on their place within my existence, or talk about them. I can attempt to discover what their being there might mean – perhaps it means that my girlfriend forgot to take her headphones with her today. There is a lot going on behind this simple, banal piece of knowledge, with various processes at work. But what is *required* for all this to be possible? For Heidegger, this question leads to a crucial point about our existence that he thinks philosophers have often failed to appreciate.


\(^{179}\) For the sake of clarity, I will italicize *understanding* when using it in the Heideggerian sense.
To have a relationship of thinking or knowing to anything in the world, to be able to talk about anything, we must already have a pre-reflective, primal familiarity with the world that makes these things possible – we must, always already, be able to be involved with things. One of the most direct, concise phrases in Heidegger’s work occurs on page 204 of *Being and Time*: “to significations, words accrue” - a good indication of what this primal familiarity means. One way of thinking about how the meanings of words arise is to say that we fix meanings onto words – we create meaning in the form of words and attach them to things to make sense of them. For Heidegger, this is backwards – the things in the world already have meaning, and we attach words to these meanings, not the other way round. Even as babies, with no ability to speak, we have a basic, pre-linguistic familiarity of the things around us – things appear to us as having sense and intelligibility even if we cannot say in language what it is. We encounter things as being pleasant, unpleasant, or fun – we play with a toy and it makes us happy. But only later do we attach the word ‘toy’, or ‘food’ to the things we previously only had a pre-linguistic grasp of. For Heidegger, this is true of anything in the world – first we have a pre-reflective but already-involved familiarity with it, we grasp it in a non-linguistic sense, and we later attach words to the intelligibilities, these ‘significations’ we find already in the world.

This familiarity and pre-reflective grasping of things is possible only because of a prior disclosure of the world and its contents as meaningful, a disclosure which is constituted by the process of *understanding*. The world, for Heidegger, is a complicated network of interrelated things that gives us a context of significance to operate in. For anything to make any kind of sense to us, for anything to show up as intelligible, or as having a determinate meaning, it must first have a context to appear in within which it makes sense – “an involvement is itself discovered only on the basis of the prior discovery of a totality of involvements.” (BT 118)

How we make sense of our involvement with anything, how anything shows up to us as
intelligible, depends on the place it has within the larger context of our world, and the structure of significance that is our world must be in place before any act of thinking or knowing can happen. Returning to the headphones, I can say that my involvement with them only makes the sense it does because they appear in the context of my world, they have the significance they do because of their position in a network of significance-relations that concern me and my surrounding context, and I understand them as I do because they as an object have taken on a certain kind of meaning because of their place in a larger social realm - headphones allow human beings to listen to audio. Understanding is a mechanism that operates in our existence that allows us to disclose a world, a space of significance that we inhabit that situates us in a larger social realm. For us to be able to think about, talk about or know anything, this prior disclosure must have taken place – we must already have a basic familiarity with our surroundings and the things in them.

So what significance does Heidegger’s notion of understanding have for cognitive science? On many conceptions, cognition is a way that the mind relates to its surroundings. This is particularly evident in theories of enactive cognition, which emphasizes the dynamic, active relationship between the mind and its world and cognition’s partial constitution in its environment and the processes therein. What Heidegger calls understanding is the existential mechanism by which the human being discloses its world – it is the way we intuit the meaning of things in terms of their larger context of significance, which makes our kind of existence possible. Such a process could quite justifiably, despite Heidegger’s disdain for the term, be called ‘cognitive’, and could just as justifiably be an object of investigation for cognitive science. The dynamic relationship of mind and world, constituted by the process of understanding and expressed in enactive cognition, would therefore seem like a suitable candidate for inclusion in cognitive science’s hard core. Even further, we can say that if our
understanding and its disclosure of the world is shaped by our social context, then it seems like embedded cognition’s central idea, that such things are intimately involved in and partly constitute our cognitive processes, should be included in the hard core too.

§10.4 Merleau-Ponty on the Blind Person’s Cane

I have argued that Heidegger’s account of understanding bears relevance for cognitive science because it is a philosophical account of an important cognitive process (or perhaps processes) that cognitive science could investigate, and because it provides evidence that some of the principles of 4E cognition are essential for inclusion in the hard core of cognitive science. Mark Rowlands has done similar work in relation to disclosure and phenomenology in Disclosing the World: Intentionality and 4E Cognition\textsuperscript{180}, using Merleau-Ponty and his writing on the blind person’s cane as an example of extended cognition. I will use it here as another example, arguing that it is also demonstrative of embodied cognition. It therefore bears relevance to cognitive science in the same ways Heidegger’s work does, by giving us occasion to bring out more clearly the principles of 4E cognition as being desirable to include in cognitive science’s hard core.

In the Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty famously discusses the experience of the blind person who use a stick to navigate their environment. Rowlands calls this behaviour a type of ‘disclosing activity’, which “often – not always, certainly not necessarily – straddle[s]...
neural bodily processes, and things that a subject does to and with its environment.” (DTW)

As Merleau-Ponty writes:

The blind man’s stick has ceased to be an object for him, and is no longer perceived for itself; its point has become an area of sensitivity, extending the scope and active radius of touch, and providing a parallel to sight.  

The blind person’s stick is no longer something they perceive, it is something they use to perceive, navigate their environment, and disclose the position of things around them. The way a blind person relates to and experiences the stick is no longer in terms of its being disclosed, or perceived. An object in their world has become part of their apparatus of disclosure, something that plays a constitutive role in their apprehension of their world. If cognition involves a person’s capacity to perceive and make sense of their environment, then the stick is partially constitutive of a blind person’s cognitive processes. The stick extends their capacity for touch, and touch’s capacity to disclose the position of things. Merleau-Ponty provides compelling evidence that cognition is not something that happens on the inside of one’s head, it is something that extends out into the world, even into objects in the world. As Rowlands puts it, “the cane is not an object of disclosure but a vehicle of disclosure […] the consciousness of the blind person passes all the way through the cane out into the world.” (DTW)

Rowlands argues that this demonstrates the fact that cognition “does not stop short of the world” (DTW) but reaches out, past the body, into it – the central tenet of extended cognition. However, it also evidences the fact that cognition is embodied. Even though the cane


\[182\] This is something that Rowlands presumably would accept, given that the premise he is arguing for when he uses Merleau-Ponty includes the fact that disclosing activity ‘straddles bodily processes’. However, he uses Merleau-Ponty to stress the extension of disclosing activity into one’s environment, but it can be developed in terms of embodiment.
becomes a vehicle of disclosure, it is not the only thing doing the disclosive work: the blind person’s hands, their sense of touch, must be used in a particular way, where it responds to the stick as the stick responds to the environment. Merleau-Ponty highlights the importance of habit in the blind person’s use of the stick, and habit’s bodily constitution. Through habit, we get used to things, as a blind person would have to get used to a stick. “Habit expresses our power of dilating our being-in-the-world or changing our existence by appropriating fresh instruments.” (POP 166) It is through habit that we get used to manipulating instruments, and in the case of blind people, it is through habit that a cane becomes a vehicle of disclosure. But habit is fundamentally bodily, even if there is a mental aspect to it. “[Habit] is knowledge in the hands, which is forthcoming only when bodily effort is made, and cannot be formulated in detachment from that effort.” (POP 166) Getting used to manipulating instruments is necessarily a process that involves the body and bodily knowledge – muscle memory, instinctive reactions, acquired sensitivity to certain forms of touch, etc. Without these bodily processes, the blind person could never appropriate the cane as a vehicle of disclosure, which partly constitutes the processes by which they apprehend their world and therefore also the cognitive processes involved there. The body is therefore fundamentally involved in cognitive processes, partially constituting them.

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183 On a different note, the fact that blind people’s other senses seem to change or heighten as a result of their blindness is something that has been studied by science. (For example: ‘Why Other Senses May Be Heightened in Blind People’, Live Science, Sara G. Miller, March 22nd 2017, https://www.livescience.com/58373-blindness-heightened-senses.html) The hypothesis that a blind person’s other senses could intensify such that they can better perform certain cognitive processes is a plausible one (albeit one that needs further investigation), and this could also perhaps be evidence of cognition’s being embodied, and having much more to it than the brain.
Merleau-Ponty’s example is another way of showing that philosophical arguments can be relevant to and inspire cognitive-scientific research. It provides evidence that embodied and extended cognition should be included in cognitive science’s hard core and delineates an interesting catchment-area for scientific research. What are, and how do we identify, the mental and bodily processes involved in this kind of disclosure? How do they relate to each other, and interact? What implications might the answers to these questions have for our understanding of the mind, the body, and the human being’s disclosure of its world, for both blind and non-blind people?

§10.5 Conclusion: 4E Cognition and Philosophical Anthropology

Rowlands summarises the basic argument behind 4E cognition as follows:

1) Some (not all, by any means, but some) cognitive processes are partly (not completely, obviously) made up of processes whereby an individual operates on (typically, manipulates, transforms, and/or exploits) structures in its environment.

2) The structures carry information that is relevant to the cognitive task in which the individual is engaged.

3) The processes are ones that transform this information from information that is merely present to information that is available to the individual. (DTW)

I hope to have shown that this argument and the general tenets of 4E cognition would belong in any coherent ‘hard core’ of cognitive science. Through engaging with the work of philosophical anthropologists of different kinds, cognitive science could find further reasons for including these and other ideas in it and find interesting inquiries to pursue. I have focussed on phenomenology, which is a species of philosophical anthropology because its arguments, if true, disclose fundamental, constitutive facts about the structures of human existence. Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, if correct, disclose constitutive features of human existence, and facts about the human being’s disclosure of its world. Some of these facts, I have argued,
can be directly identified with the tenets of 4E cognition. But phenomenologists are by no means the only philosophers engaged in philosophical anthropology. Many philosophers, with differing degrees of explicitness and different conceptual frameworks, are also engaged in this sort of project. Which philosophers do not want to discover things about what it means to exist as a human being? There are countless ways in which the work of philosophers contributes to the project of philosophical anthropology, and countless ways that philosophical anthropology could potentially be of use to cognitive science in the ways I have described here. What, for example, might epistemologists and moral philosophers have to say about the human being’s capacity for knowing, or moral deliberation? What cognitive and bodily processes might be associated with such knowledge and thought? What about those associated with the experience of art, or beauty?

Cognitive science seems to be at something of a crossroads. The authors of *What Happened to Cognitive Science?* convincingly suggest that this is because of a widespread lack of agreement on central concepts, ideas and methods, many of which would plausibly concern the entity it spends most of its time analysing – the human being - and its modes of cognition. Part of the solution to this could come from a return to philosophy - it is, after all, one of its founding disciplines. Philosophical anthropology is especially relevant for a discussion of cognitive science’s foundational principles because it is an explicit consideration of human existence and cognition. I have argued here that this is the case for 4E cognition, but it is no doubt true for other aspects of human existence.
Appendices

Appendix 1: General Features of Human Existence, and Foucault’s Rejection of Philosophical Anthropology

Not to be outdone by Nietzsche’s proclamation of the death of god, or perhaps inspired by it, Foucault has proclaimed the end of man.

- Richard Schacht\textsuperscript{184}

Walsh and Danto’s implicit critique of philosophical anthropology is unsuccessful (§2), but there are other reasons that scepticism about it might be warranted. Here, I address some remaining concerns about philosophical anthropology’s possibility. Some might question whether the kind of generality philosophical anthropologists are after is possible in principle, and if it is possible, whether their claims could be productive. Given the diversity of human beings and their societies on offer, one might be sceptical that we can deduce anything that would apply to all human beings, anywhere, any time. If the aim of philosophical anthropology is to identify general, significant features of human existence, say true things about the human condition, identify necessary conditions for it, then these things must exist. I discuss this concern with reference to how a philosophical anthropologist might engage with one of the best contenders for a universal fact of human existence: death.

I will also consider an argument from Foucault, specifically his early, radical rejection of the subject. The subject, as traditionally conceived, is a kind of metaphysical homunculus ‘inside’ us, which presides with a kind of authority over our thoughts, beliefs, desires and actions. Foucault rejects this as an illusion because the things that determine our beliefs, desires and

actions are factors beyond our control, resulting from biology, psychology, labour structures, but most of all power. This idea that there is a subject, or that we ‘are’ subjects that are in control of our existence in this way, is an illusion. Because of this, Foucault famously proclaims ‘the end of man’, the end of the ‘human being’ as a concept that is useful or possible to speak about. If this is true, philosophical anthropology is impossible because the thing it proposes to speak about concretely is impossible to speak concretely about. I will argue that, although Foucault may make compelling points about human beings and their kind of existence, or about the illusory nature of the subject, it does not follow that it is impossible to speak about the human being. In fact, Foucault speaks at length (and perhaps compellingly) about the human being and its being constrained by social, historical, psychological and biological factors. One might even call such constraints on our freedom ‘general features of human existence’. Foucault might successfully reject total human autonomy, but not the possibility of philosophical anthropology. Even if we are not radically autonomous, and constrained by the factors Foucault identifies, we can still theoretically analyse the kind of existence we have and develop a conceptual vocabulary to describe what it is like.

**Are There General Features of Human Existence?**

An obviously important concern for philosophical anthropology, given the staggering amount of biological and cultural diversity on offer, is whether there could possibly be characteristics we all share. Is there any feature of human existence that *every single case of it* has? Reading about anthropology, even cursorily, gives an impression of the incredible amount of diversity there is and has been throughout human history. Over history, people have lived, thought, acted, believed and conducted their existences in countless different ways in different societies at different points in time. And yet intuitively we want to say that they were all humans, all the
same kind of entity, so they must all have something in common. But can there be such commonalities?

There are things that seem obviously and generally true of every human being, regardless of historical situation, geographical location, or context. The fact of our mortality, for example, does not vary culturally, or individually - everybody dies. So it is at least possible that there are things that all human beings share within the experience of being human, and the analysis of this experience would be the territory of the philosophical anthropologist. But even if this is true, it might be argued that commonalities of this kind (like ‘everybody dies’) are trivial - they do not tell us much. But death and mortality have stimulated the work of philosophers for millennia and their analysis of death does not stop at pointing out the fact that we all die. The point is to work out how death structures our lives and our existences generally and what the meaning of death is in the context of our existence.

Existentialists\(^\text{185}\) of various stripes have found great importance in human mortality. Whether it is because death renders our existence difficult, strange or absurd in particular ways, or other reasons, existentialists have often taken our impending death to be a particularly significant, even defining feature of the human condition. Consider this passage from Sartre’s *Being and Nothingness* as an example:

> At my limit, at that infinitesimal instant of my death, I shall be no more than my past. It alone will define me. […] Death reunites us with ourselves. Eternity has changed us

\(^{185}\) Existentialism could be considered a branch of philosophical anthropology in that it tries to give an account of the condition of human existence, often highlighting challenging features of it or trying to reconceptualize it in ways that do not refer to a transcendent framework or higher power.
into ourselves. At the moment of death we are defenceless before the judgments of others. They can decide in truth what we are. This is an indication of the kind of claims philosophical anthropology can make and how they can be useful. Besides identifying general features of human existence, we can reflect on their meaning, making them clearer and develop frameworks or vocabularies for analysing them. Sartre does not just point out that we die, he asks what our death means – for ourselves, for those that are left behind, and for human existence generally. Death is not just the moment a person ceases to exist, it is the moment in which their existence can first be made sense of, as a totality, by those left behind. It is the moment we stop projecting ourselves forward into a future and others can now judge our lives without reply. If we are what we do, the moment of our death is a moment in which we truly are, because at that point we are nothing but the sum of all that we have done, and we can do no more. This is a good example of how a philosophical anthropologist might engage with death in a way that takes us beyond the fact that we die. A philosophical anthropologist might examine death and try to identify the ways death structures our lives, the various attitudes it is possible for human beings to take to it, and the effect taking up these different attitudes to death can have on how we live.

**Foucault’s Rejection of the Subject**

There is another possible objection to be drawn against philosophical anthropology from Foucault. Foucault notoriously declared “the end of man” – meaning that terms like ‘man’ and ‘human being’ have become useless, devoid of explanatory power and impossible to speak

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concretely about. For Foucault, this is the necessary result of his radical rejection of the traditional conception of the subject. The subject, so conceived, is a kind of metaphysical homunculus that exists ‘inside’ us in some sense, presiding self-consciously with autonomous authority over our actions, beliefs and desires while remaining consistent and unified throughout time. This conception of the subject has featured in almost every philosophical area of inquiry, in debates about the nature of the self, experience, personhood, morality, and much else. Foucault says in The Order of Things that “Anthropology constitutes perhaps the fundamental arrangement that has governed and controlled the path of philosophical thought from Kant until our own day.” (TOT 373) But it is one that is “disappearing before our very eyes” (TOT 373) because of its inadequacy. Foucault is critical of the anthropological tendency of philosophy in this vein, denouncing all the facile solutions of an ‘anthropology’ understood as a universal reflection on man, half-empirical, half-philosophical. It is comforting, however, and a source of profound relief to think that man is only a recent invention, a figure not yet two centuries old, a new wrinkle in our knowledge, and that he will disappear again as soon as that knowledge has discovered a new form. (TOT xxv)

Foucault rejects this idea of the subject along with ‘man/the human being’ for the same reasons: because it fails to account for the real factors which explain the things it proposes to account for – actions, beliefs, desires, self-conscious willing, and our constitution over time. When the factors that explain these things are taken into consideration, we can see that the traditional conception of the subject has no explanatory or causal power and is merely an illusion. But since this concept is so deeply embedded in how we think of ourselves as human beings, as each being an ‘I’ or a ‘self’, once the subject is shown to be an illusion, the things that it refers to, informs and influences are also no longer useful or possible to speak about. The

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188 It is true that Foucault’s criticism of the subject varied throughout his career, but the early one which I am concerned with here, is his most radical and perhaps the most penetrating.
disappearance of this ‘recent invention’ will bring about the “unfolding of a space in which it is once more possible to think.” (TOT 373) The concept we have of man is so deeply connected to and influenced by the traditional concept of the subject, that once one is shown to be inadequate, ‘human being’ or ‘man’ will be shown to be inadequate too. I will argue that even if the traditional concept of the subject is inadequate, this does not mean there is no possible adequate one, or no productive way to speak about the human being.\(^{189}\) At best, Foucault’s conclusions mean that we must sincerely re-evaluate how we think of subjectivity, either transforming or abandoning the concept of the subject in favour of more appropriate ways of thinking and speaking about ourselves. It might even be argued that Foucault himself does this in his work.

The subject is traditionally conceived of in philosophy in contrast to the object. As Bliss puts it:

> The *subject* is that to which objects appear, have appeared, or may appear […] The *object*, existing external to and independent of subjects, may appear to any subject that is so qualified and so related as to apprehend it.\(^{190}\)

Objects in the world, such as tables, rocks (etc.) exist without consciousness or experience, and are experienced by subjects. Objects are the object of the experience of a subject, and the subject is the experience-er of their experiences. The table in front of me is an object of my

\(^{189}\) This is something we might want to say to other post-structuralist-type arguments in this fashion, such as the early Derrida’s essay *Differance*, which claims that because the meaning of all words are unstable and subject to change, no ‘definition’ of any kind is possible – which would apply to ‘the human being’. Perhaps we just in need of a new way of speaking about and investigating the human experience that does not look for or believe in the possibility of a universal definition of it.

experience – I can see it, touch it and so on. I myself, on the other hand, am the thing that is having the experience, so there appear to be significant differences between the kind of thing I am and the kind of thing the table is – a difference fleshed out in philosophy in terms of the subject/object distinction. Over time, the following properties have traditionally been assigned to subjects, which David Weberman characterizes well as follows:

An entity is a subject insofar as it:

a) Possesses beliefs, desires and, in general, consciousness;
b) Has consciousness of itself as a self, i.e. has self-consciousness and thus is an ‘I’;
c) Is a bearer or “constitutive subject” (Foucault) of knowledge;
d) Has some degree of unity and (psychological) continuity through time; and
e) Has the capacity to choose or will.\(^{191}\)

As Weberman also notes, along with the subject Foucault also rejects terms like ‘man’, ‘self’ and ‘I’ as inadequate (FAW, footnote 8), but for Foucault’s (and our) purposes these terms and similar ones all get rejected for the same reasons he rejects the ‘subject’, though the connotations of these terms pick out different things about subjectivity. These terms are related and united in the concept of the subject, which Foucault rejects overall. But in rejecting the subject or ‘man’ he rejects all these philosophically characteristic terms for thinking about ourselves.

Foucault gives multiple reasons for rejecting the subject. Perhaps the most characteristic concerns “the omnipresence and inescapability of power” (FAW 256) and other factors beyond our control which influence us and produce our subjectivity. If we want to know what truly motivates, produces or even constitutes our behaviour, for Foucault, we must look to power structures and relations, biology, psychological factors, economic factors, historical situation, labour structures and so on. All the things that are held to be constituted, motivated by or

\(^{191}\) *Are Freedom and Anti-Humanism Compatible?: The Case of Foucault and Butler* (FAW in text), David Weberman, *Constellations*, vol. 7, no. 2, 2000, p. 255-271, p. 258
presided over with authority by the subject are explainable by referring to these factors. Why do I believe X? Because I am psychologically disposed to, or because the power-relations that govern capitalist society are so dominant that I have been conditioned to, or because of the historical or geographical situation I was born into, etc. Why do I desire Y? Not because I deliberate and decide to, but because my biology and psychology effectively force me to. For Foucault, it is mistaken to posit anything beyond these factors if we are looking to explain what motivates or constitutes human behaviour – these factors he describes are all there are, no autonomous ‘self’ exists alongside them. So the subject as traditionally conceived is an illusion, with no causal or explanatory power – we have good reason to reject it.

Foucault’s critique is a powerful, even admirable one that perhaps gives us good reasons to abandon the traditional concept of the subject, and the metaphysical framework for thinking about human beings it gives us. But Foucault’s thinking-through of the implications of his argument leaves much to be desired. For Foucault, the buck does not stop with the subject – its illusory nature leads to the “end of man”. (TOT 385) What this means is that, with the concept of the ‘human’ being so indebted to the subject, that once this disappears, so too does any attempt to speak about ‘the human being’. ‘Human being’ is not only useless for this reason, but not possible to speak about adequately or concretely because there is nothing to speak about over and above the categories that Foucault identifies. If we try to conceptualize the human being in a way that is not subject-influenced, or in any way that does not refer exclusively to Foucault’s categories, we are speaking vaguely or doing injustice to what we are trying to describe.
But Foucault does not show that this is impossible and overreaches his hand when he claims this. At best, he has shown (perhaps convincingly) that the traditional conception of the subject is inadequate and we must re-evaluate how we talk about human beings, to find a way that overcomes its obstructive limitations and carries more explanatory power. Maybe he even approaches such a way himself: with all his talk about how it impossible to speak about the human being, he ends up saying a lot about it that might be convincing about it, and without referring to ‘the subject’. Foucault paints a picture of a human being that has no radical autonomy, is influenced by a myriad of factors beyond its control, inextricably entwined in power relations, etc. He does this all without referring to a traditional conception of the subject or positing anything like one. Foucault therefore, despite his insistence that it is now impossible to speak about ‘the human being’, speaks very powerfully about the human being and even seems to provide something like a theory about what it is like to exist as one. One might even say that the factors that Foucault identifies are general features of the human being’s experience of its existence, and would not be out of place in a philosophical anthropology.
Appendix 2: Heidegger on Max Scheler’s Philosophical Anthropology

Here, I examine how Heidegger engages with the work of a contemporary of his: Max Scheler, a self-proclaimed philosophical anthropologist. Scheler was a prominent thinker in early-20th century Germany, whom Heidegger spoke about often and seemed to admire. I will not talk so much about the quality of Heidegger’s interpretation of Scheler, but focus on his criticism of Scheler’s work and what they can tell us about philosophical anthropology. The most productive passages for this occur in Being and Time and The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics. Heidegger’s critique of Scheler builds on other points he makes about anthropology elsewhere: anthropology lacks fundamentality, is based on unquestioned, illegitimate assumptions about what it means to be a human, has failed to conduct an analysis of our experience of our existence and is unconcerned with the question of Being. (§4)

Heidegger develops these criticisms by criticising what I call a ‘computational’ model of the human being present in Scheler. The computational understanding involves dividing the human being up into discrete parts, supposedly understandable and study-able apart from each other, then conceiving of the human being as a thing composed of these parts or as bearing these properties. Heidegger criticises this method for various reasons: it fails to clarify the nature of the parts, it problematically treats the human being like an object, and presupposes some idea of the unity of the whole being, the nature of which has not been clarified. I begin with the brief remarks Heidegger makes about Scheler in The Fundamental Concepts, which comment

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192 Though, based as least on Scheler’s The Human Place in the Cosmos, it seems to be a fair one. (Northwestern University Press, Illinois, 2009)
on his philosophy of ‘life’ and ‘spirit’, then proceed to the deeper discussion of *Being and Time* §10 on the ‘voluntative theory of Dasein’, which underpins it.

**Human Existence as the Balance Between Life and Spirit**

*The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics* was initially a 1929/1930 lecture course delivered by Heidegger at Freiburg University, known for its remarkable, 100-page analysis of boredom. (§8) But it also contains a brief reflection on the philosophical anthropology of Max Scheler, along with four other German thinkers who in some sense were investigating human existence, attempting to, as Heidegger puts it, “make sure of our situation.” (FCM 690) We can use Heidegger’s remarks on Scheler as a way into understanding Scheler’s general philosophical-anthropological position regarding ‘life’ and ‘spirit’. Heidegger discusses Scheler alongside Oswald Spengler, Ludwig Klages and Leopold Ziegler. Each of these thinkers employ a distinction between ‘life’ and ‘spirit’ to interpret the human situation. Although they all do this, it would not be productive to discuss each of them in detail here - I will briefly explain why.

Heidegger sees the work of Klages, Spengler and Ziegler as somehow philosophical-anthropological in nature: these four thinkers want to ‘make sure of our situation’ and give an account of human being, so intuitively it seems they could in some sense be thought of as philosophical anthropologists. But perhaps they are not best classified in this way. They do say things about human beings and their situation, but their work is either not obviously philosophical, or is philosophical but not best understood as philosophical anthropology. Oswald Spengler and Leopold Ziegler were historians that did say things about ‘the human situation’, but their methods are historical. Ludwig Klages is more philosophical, but it is unlikely he would have been happy with the characterization of his work as philosophical.
anthropology, his ultra-Nietzschean orientation would probably have made him sceptical of such projects and the labels that would dominate them. Klages’ whole project sought to take the Nietzschean affirmation of life to its extreme, to the point where spirit is viewed as antagonistic to life, and to be exorcised. This could again be interpreted as theorizing about the human situation, but it puts his philosophy in sharp contrast to Scheler’s – Scheler emphasizes the balance between life and spirit, not the extermination of spirit. At this point in the *Fundamental Concepts*, Heidegger wants to understand the work of thinkers who employ a distinction between life and spirit. While each thinker does employ the distinction, there are variations in attitude, method, and the understanding of the terms. Therefore, I will focus solely on Scheler, since he can most unproblematically be characterized as a philosophical anthropologist and he wanted to be understood as one. Scheler investigates the experience of existing as a human and what structures and forces are necessary for this experience to be the way it is.

Heidegger explains Scheler’s position as follows:

>[Scheler] sees neither a process of decline of spirit in life, nor […] seek[s] to uphold a struggle of life against spirit. Instead it attempts to find a balance between life and spirit, and regards this as its task. This is the view represented […] during the final period of his philosophizing. (FCM 70)

Scheler’s philosophy conceives of human existence as the ‘balance between life and spirit’. We begin as more life-like, develop spiritual elements as we grow, and exist in a harmonious balance between life and spirit, a balance which is responsible for our existence being the way it is. Scheler’s early philosophy attempted to reconcile Catholicism with certain philosophical insights, but “disappointed by the Catholic Church’s conservatism and political failures […],
Scheler became increasingly critical of religious institutions and dogmas”.

During his ‘Catholic period’, Scheler worked towards unifying three insights from history that reveal fundamental aspects of the human being: the Darwinian ‘tool maker’, the ‘rational animal’, and the ‘child of God’. (SES §7) Each of these were crucial, but the problem was that no one had managed to show their unity in human existence. However, owing to his growing distaste for religion, Scheler’s philosophy changed, placing greater emphasis on science and evolution and less on religious ideas. Despite these changes, the philosophical questions motivating him were constant. Davis and Steinbock illustrate them as follows:

are human beings merely intelligent living beings? Is the difference between being human and being some other animal one of degree or is it a difference of kind? Is there anything “special” or unique about being human? (SES §7)

Another that could be added here is the question of how we overcome the categories of ‘things’ or ‘substances’ when speaking about human beings, since they do not seem to do justice to our kind of existence. These sorts of questions drive philosophical anthropology, and Scheler proposed to have answered them with an account underpinned by the life/spirit distinction.

Life, or the ‘life-urge’ (Lebensdrang), present in every living thing, is simply “the movement or drive to seek the greatest amount of fulfilment and vivacity with the least amount of resistance.” (SES §7) From the amoeba that seeks to replicate its cells to complex life-forms seeking nourishment or to raise their young (etc.), life drives living beings along in this fashion. This process does not stop with human beings just because we are more complicated than other life-forms or have capacities they do not. Humans can seek fulfilment with the least possible

resistance using all the tools that are available to them that animals do not: language, money, the internet, etc. As their complexity increases, more possible avenues of fulfilment among living organisms appear. What might count as fulfilment for an amoeba is not necessarily what counts as fulfilment to more complex life-forms, and with humans this is even more the case.

Even though all living beings share the same kind of drive, and human beings are living beings, there is more to human beings than just the ‘life-urge’. Scheler accounts for this extra dimension with the term ‘spirit’ and by theorizing human existence as a balance between life and spirit. His view of philosophical anthropology conceives its fundamental task “not [as] a search for a definition, but rather an attempt to clarify exactly that which makes the human being undefinable, that which reveals human being as a human becoming” (SES §7). This inherent indefinability is reflected in the fact that human beings partake in both life and spirit, balancing between the two. Conceiving of ourselves in terms of this balance lets us understand the strange indefiniteness and openness of being human. So what is spirit? And how does balancing it with life allow us to understand ourselves while revealing our indefinability? In explaining Scheler’s work, I have been and will be mostly following Davis and Steinbock’s concise exposition. They explain that “there are at least four ways in which Scheler distinguishes spirit from life […] ‘objectivizing’, ‘value’, ‘self-consciousness’ and ‘world-openness’.” (SES §7)

The first way spirit distinguishes from life is found in “objectivizing, a rendering of the world and of beings in terms of what they mean.” (SES §7) For the living being, the world is one of desires, drives and their fulfilment. But ‘spiritual’ beings understand the world in terms of what the things in it mean beyond the mere satisfaction of drives. One example of this is food. For
the living being, food is simply something that will satisfy a drive. For spiritual beings, food is still something that will satisfy a drive, but other ways of engaging with or understanding food are possible. Spiritual beings can categorize different kinds of food, name or organise them. In fine dining, food-preparation is raised to the level of an art form where chefs no longer just prepare food but strive for perfection. This is one way that spiritual beings rise above life while partaking in it. We can still understand things in terms of the satisfaction of drives, but there are other meaningful ways we can encounter, organise and engage with things that take us beyond the satisfaction of life-drives.

The second way life is distinguished from spirit is in terms of value: “the movement of spirit is the disclosure of value. According to Scheler, life-urge is value blind and is motivated solely by greater fulfilment.” (SES §7) For living beings, things are understood solely in terms of drive-satisfaction and resistance. Things like ‘good’, ‘evil’ or ‘justice’ do not feature in their world, but they necessarily do in the world of spiritual beings. This reveals another aspect of the complicated nature of human beings in that, whilst our existence is value-laden it is not necessary that we abide by values. We can choose to act immorally, or in a way that only cares about the satisfaction of drives, regardless of moral considerations.

Spiritual beings are also self-conscious, whereas living beings, “by virtue of having a body, exhibit a type of body-consciousness, a relating of oneself to others in a given environment.”

The documentary *Jiro Dreams of Sushi* is an excellent way to see this level of engagement with food in action. (dir. David Gelb, Magnolia Pictures, 2011)

One thing we can question about this idea is the following: perhaps the life-creature simply has a different notion of value – surely it is in some sense ‘valuable’ for such a creature to satisfy its drives. Could the animal possess a basic understanding of what is ‘good’ or ‘bad’ for it?
(SES §7) Living beings can have a rudimentary understanding of themselves, the status of their body and environment, and other living beings. Spiritual beings, however, “take themselves to be objects of reflection […] be critical of who or what they have become, but are also aware of themselves as being seen by others, as having a different world of experience than others.”

(SES §7) There are ways that spiritual beings can relate to and understand not only their bodies and environment but themselves, which living beings cannot do in the same way. Self-reflection, the recognition that my experiences are ‘mine’, or that other spiritual beings have similar experiences, all exemplify this. But again: even though we have these capacities, we are still also bound to our life-urge origins – we can fail to be self-reflective or fail to appreciate the experiences of others. We can never not be self-conscious in some way, but we also never lose the body-consciousness that living beings have either.

The final way life distinguishes from spirit is in “spirit’s quality of world-openness.” (SES §7) Living beings are concerned with their immediate environment and instincts, which never rise above the domain of life – satisfying drives with the least possible resistance. But spiritual beings understand themselves in terms of a much larger context, ranging far beyond the concerns of the present moment or their immediate environment. We can reflect on and discover our history and understand our situation in terms of a larger, global one, or even reflect on philosophical issues, “contemplate the meaning of being, time, death as well as the purpose of existence itself.” (SES §7) This is another way we can see how human beings are living beings but also transcend life through spirit.

We intimated earlier that Scheler’s philosophical anthropology is not searching for a fixed, once-and-for-all ‘definition’ of the human but tries to capture us in our peculiar kind of
becoming. This improves on ways of thinking about ourselves that have dominated in the history of philosophy, which treat us like objects and miss something essential about what it means to be human. Abandoning the search for a ‘definition’ of the human allows Scheler, he claims, to philosophize in a way that reveals our existence to us in a profound manner. In the balance of life and spirit, we are dynamic, developing, biological and drive-driven without being reduced to naturalistic explanations. By introducing ‘spirit’, Scheler shows how we are living beings, but also how we rise above just being living beings. Each of the ways spirit distinguishes from and balances against life reveals something about the human and its capacity to exist uniquely within and between these elements. This is not a conventional linguistic definition that would account for all instances of the human in the same way because, whilst the human is the balance between life and spirit, the manifestation of this balance varies from person to person and historically. There is also something about this unpredictability and openness that is essential to humanity, so thinking in terms of these categories allows us to understand ourselves without defining ourselves too restrictively, saying ‘this is what human existence is, in every case’, or ‘the human being is a thing which bears properties X, Y and Z’. For Scheler, thinking in these terms captures us in our most fundamental sense whilst retaining the fact that we are capable of change over time.

**Heidegger’s Critique of ‘Life/Spirit Journalism’**

Heidegger’s reflections on anthropology are not purely negative. He does not wish to invalidate it or argue that it is impossible. He is critical of how it is practised, wary that it does not question about human existence appropriately and is concerned that it operates on illegitimate assumptions. Much of Heidegger’s critique of anthropology (§4, §5) applies here too, but he has other things to say about Scheler specifically. Heidegger labels Scheler (and Klages,
Spengler and Ziegler) as examples of “the higher journalism of our age” (FCM 71) – their work is more the exchange of opinion or cultural commentary than philosophical questioning. They look at the contemporary human world and, with a helpful distinction, make observations about our historical-cultural situation. Heidegger repeatedly refers to their work as “philosophy of culture” (FCM 74, 76, 77, 157) because, on his view, all they give us are “world-historical diagnoses and prognoses of culture” (FCM 75). What these thinkers end up saying often seems difficult to deny - Heidegger even says that such observations “always tend to be correct.” (FCM 74) Their work seems powerful because ‘life’ and ‘spirit’ pick out observable aspects of ourselves and, in the case of the life-urge, perhaps ones we can examine scientifically. But it is not clear that the categories of life and spirit are philosophically appropriate or pick out phenomena specific to humans. ‘Spirit’, for Scheler, picks out many things and whilst it allows for an openness in our understanding of the human, it is unclear whether all these phenomena are best classified under one category. ‘Spirit’ includes many different phenomena, practises and capabilities, so when employing such a term it can be easy to be correct because it is so broad. Also, many things can be correct without being compelling or interesting. ‘Most people have eight fingers and two thumbs’ is correct but tells us basically nothing about what it means to be human. This is Heidegger’s criticism of life/spirit accounts of our situation: though correct, they “fail to take hold of us” (FCM 75). Their work does not confront us in our fundamental way of being, “they do not attack us. […] they release us from ourselves and present us to ourselves in a world-historical situation and role.” (FCM 75) The life/spirit thinkers assign us a world-historical role without a prior analysis which would tell us what it would mean to have a world-historical role, without clarifying the nature of the being that would occupy such a role, or the way it would occupy it. They are thus also ‘ahead of themselves’ in the same way Heidegger argues that anthropologists in general are.
According to Heidegger, life/spirit journalism also gives us a mistaken conception of ourselves, one that is too biological to do justice to us: biology cannot explain what it is like to subjectively experience human existence. Opposing life with spirit is susceptible to a criticism that Beth Cykowski expresses as follows: it “treats the human as if it is a being ‘out there in nature’ that we can encounter, entrap, observe and measure, all while retaining a scientific detachment.”

Conceiving of the human this way is already too scientific and misses what are for Heidegger its defining characteristics: its capacity to question philosophically, engage in metaphysics, raise the question of being and consider the significance of its own existence. In the Greek sense of ‘metaphysics’ [*meta*: over / *physika*: nature], the human is the metaphysical being, the only one with the capacity to *stand over beings*, questioning about them whilst being one of them. “This brings with it a profound ambiguity” (HPA 36), one we miss if we conceive of ourselves as a composite of life-properties and spirit-properties, as opposed to questioners that are a part of, or *are*, the existence they seek to question. Applying the category of ‘life’ in this way colours our understanding negatively and is too biological to capture what it means to be human. Questioning about what it means to be human must therefore occur on a deeper level, from within this fundamental ambiguity - out of *our existence as it is experienced by us*, since we cannot escape this ambiguity or maintain any level of detachment from our condition. Understanding our situation is to be done from within it, not by trying to rise above and detach ourselves from it, or by applying the same labels we would apply to any other living being, since this distracts from potentially more appropriate ways of understanding ourselves.

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Heidegger sums up his position on the ‘philosophy of culture’ as follows:

Is this view of man an essential one? [...] the question remains as to whether setting out man in this way concerns and grips his Da-Sein, or indeed brings it to being [...] such philosophy attains merely the setting-out of man, but never his Da-Sein. Not only does it factically fail to attain it, because in itself it blocks the path to doing so. (FCM 75-76)

Here Heidegger turns not to the cultural reflections of life/spirit interpretations, but to what kind of account they present. We have already said that it is too biological to really capture us, but Heidegger goes further. He finds it to be what I will call a ‘computational’ model of the human which identifies certain properties that we possess and ‘computes’ them together. The philosophers of culture ‘set out’ the human in a way that could be correct but does not ‘grip’ us or our manner of existence sufficiently. What does Heidegger mean by ‘setting out’? Well, biology ‘maps us out’ in a certain sense, analysing the structure of our bodies, with its various organs and systems. Each of these elements are connected, made of certain materials, etc. Biology ‘sets out’ its elements to understand how they fit together. This type of enquiry has proven to be vitally important for certain things (medicine being an obvious example), and there is even a sense in which biology provides a kind of answer as to what it means to be a human. But this answer is radically incomplete, failing to account for the human being’s subjective experience of its own existence. It fails to address philosophy’s profoundest questions: the human condition, how we should live, what we should believe, etc. ‘Setting out’ the human biologically, as important as it is, cannot approach these questions, and for Heidegger this is true of Scheler’s philosophical anthropology. It picks out aspects of ourselves without clarifying their nature or connection, ‘computes’ them together and deems the human being to be this combination of properties. Heidegger expresses this idea slightly differently during his discussion of Scheler’s ‘voluntative theory of Dasein’:

In their turn “body”, “soul”, “spirit” may designate phenomenal domains which can be detached as themes for definite investigations; within certain limits their ontological
indefiniteness may not be important. When, however, we come to the question of man’s Being, this is not something we can simply compute by adding together those kinds of Being body, soul and spirit respectively possess – kinds of Being whose nature has not as yet been determined. (BT 74)

Scheler’s theory, though it uses a different distinction, approaches us in the same way that most philosophical attempts have previously, despite its use of ‘life’ and ‘spirit’ as a direct attempt to overcome previous philosophical language. Scheler conceives us as a fixed ‘thing’ bearing a combination of independently identifiable properties, which are retrospectively ‘computed’ together, resulting in human existence. This has been done in numerous ways, perhaps most prevalently in the ‘mind/body’ distinction. According to Heidegger, we must correct ourselves of the misunderstandings and misguided ways of thinking handed down by the history of philosophy and despite its merits, Scheler’s philosophy ends up being one of them - along with Klages, Spengler, and Ziegler. Their motivations and orientations may be admirable, but they still fall prey to age-old mistakes and fail to question our situation adequately.

Max Scheler’s Philosophy, Part 2: The Voluntative Theory of Dasein

The discussion of Scheler in the *Fundamental Concepts* raises interesting issues with Scheler’s general position, but Heidegger’s philosophically deepest discussion of Scheler is found in *Being and Time* §10, where he delineates his own project and distinguishes it from other disciplines. (§4) Heidegger categorises Scheler’s work there not just as ‘philosophical anthropology’ (BT 73) but as constituting a ‘voluntative theory of Dasein’ (BT 253). As with his general remarks about anthropology, Heidegger’s critique of Scheler is not completely negative. Ultimately, Scheler is guilty of the same things anthropology in general is, while also being too confined to a traditional conceptual framework to confront the question of Dasein’s existence adequately.
As we noted earlier, Scheler tries to avoid understanding the human through familiar terms that have been saturated with use throughout the history of metaphysics: “for Scheler, the person is never to be thought of as a Thing or a substance” (BT 73). We have already seen that the alternative for Scheler is life and spirit, but this theory is underpinned by an ontology. Notice how Heidegger is driven by the same questions Scheler is and philosophical anthropologists are, under a different vocabulary. If we swapped ‘human’ with ‘Dasein’ in some of the questions that Scheler is interested in, the questions that motivate Heidegger’s philosophy could be adequately expressed this way: what is distinctive about Dasein? Is Dasein merely an intelligent living being, or is there more to it? Is the difference between Dasein and animals one of degree or kind? How do we talk about Dasein’s existence without falling prey to inadequate metaphysical concepts? These are exactly the kind of questions that motivate Heidegger, in *Being and Time* and elsewhere.

Heidegger discusses Scheler’s ontology twice in *Being and Time* – §10 and §43. Scheler’s ‘voluntative theory of Dasein’ supplements his theory of human existence as the balance between ‘life’ and ‘spirit’. In it, “Scheler is emphasizing [...] that the unity of the person must have a constitution essentially different from that of the things of nature.” (BT 73) We have seen that the unified constitution of living beings can be explained in terms of the life-urge. But the constitution of the human being is essentially different because we partake in spirit also. This already has important implications for Scheler - it means that the person cannot be thought of as a thing because ‘things’ do not partake in both life and spirit. This is a positive consequence of Scheler’s theory, but one that requires development - it leaves open the question of how this double-partaking of life and spirit manifests itself and how are the component elements of both reflected in this manifestation. Scheler’s answer is found in the
‘voluntative theory’, which claims that the human being is a performer of intentional acts which meet resistance.

Scheler argues that human existence consists in ‘the performance of intentional acts’, which reflects both elements of life and spirit. As Heidegger explains:

> What Scheler says of the person, he applies to acts as well: ‘But an act is never also an object; for it is essential to the Being of acts that they are Experienced only in their performance itself and given in reflection.’ Acts are something non-physical. Essentially the person exists only in the performance of intentional acts, and is therefore essentially not an object. Any physical Objectification of acts, and hence any way of taking them as something physical, is tantamount to depersonalization. (BT 73)

For Scheler, the human being cannot belong to the category of ‘thing’ because it is irreducible to the categories of the physical, the natural, or ‘life’. Any explanation that deals in these kinds of categories is bound to be incomplete. The same is true, Scheler claims, of intentional acts. Human acts could be partially explained in natural terms: energy, biological processes, ‘c-fibers firing’, etc. But these explanations miss something about the act because acts “are bound together by the unity of a meaning.” (BT 73) The significance of the act for me cannot be captured in purely scientific terms. Science can tell us certain things about our actions, but not in an exhaustive sense. The meanings and motivations behind certain intentional actions will always escape scientific language.

The human being rises above the categories of the natural by being a performer of intentional acts that are unified by meaning. But from the fact that our acts have meaning, it does not follow that they stop reflecting our ‘life’ aspect. Intentional acts still meet with resistance and we still desire to fulfil these acts with the least amount of resistance. We rise above life, but do
not leave it completely. The performance of acts meets resistance, and we are still driven to perform them with as little resistance as possible. The difference is, because we partake of both spirit and life, we can reason more deeply about our acts and the way we perform them, or even whether to perform them. But we can also choose not to use this ability. Scheler’s theory attempts to show not only that we are in a balance of life and spirit, but also that the way we exist demonstrates the unity of our existence and its difference from the existence of natural things, whilst reflecting the peculiar balance between life and spirit that we uniquely enjoy.

Despite its flaws, Heidegger seems to have respect for Scheler’s theory. Scheler’s most important concerns are shared by Heidegger, like the overcoming of inappropriate metaphysical language and concepts, or refusing to think of the human being as ‘subject’, ‘substance’ or ‘thing’. It seems beneficial for Heidegger that Scheler focusses his analysis on the human being rather these oversaturated and outdated metaphysical notions. Heidegger would also have approved of Scheler’s theory because it is an ontological theory about human existence: it seeks to identify the way in which humans exist. I think this would, for Heidegger, be an improvement upon the ‘life/spirit journalism’ of *Fundamental Concepts* because it seeks to identify an ontological structure beneath the life/spirit balance. The voluntative theory therefore improves upon the theorizing of life and spirit. Characterizing the human being as a performer of intentional acts is a result of reflection on our experience of our existence. In this respect, Scheler’s work here is closer to being right than when he remarks on the balance of life and spirit. A theory of the ontological structures that make this balance possible would plausibly be a step in the right direction for Heidegger.

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199 We should remind ourselves, however, that Heidegger would still be critical of Scheler here because even though he wants to overcome outdated metaphysical concepts, he still makes use of one: ‘the human being’ and not ‘Dasein’.
Scheler also “emphasizes […] that reality is never primarily given in thinking and apprehending” (BT 252), which is a crucial insight for Heidegger. One reason Heidegger is critical of Descartes is his prioritizing of thinking as humanity’s defining attribute, when there are more fundamental structures of our existence, and ways of engaging with the world, that he has failed to recognize. Scheler improves on Descartes because he argues that for thinking and apprehending to be possible, we must first be able to perform intentional acts, which take place at a more fundamental level of our existence than our thinking. This kind of move is one that Heidegger makes often: he identifies a feature of our existence taken to be fundamental and shows that there are more fundamental structures of our existence that they depend on to be possible. For Scheler to take this on board would no doubt merit some approval from Heidegger’s perspective. However, Heidegger is still critical of Scheler’s theory: it fails for falling prey to what I called the ‘computational’ model of understanding the human (in this case, as a composite of ‘performer’ and ‘intentional acts’, or ‘life’ and ‘spirit’), but also for the vagueness about the components he is talking about: “what […] is the ontological meaning of ‘performance’? How is the kind of Being which belongs to a person to be ascertained ontologically?” (BT 73) Scheler failed to clarify the ontological nature of performance and failed to show performance to be an ontological constituent of human existence. Scheler’s theory says ‘the human being is…’ then adds the idea of performance onto it, already presupposing “some idea of the Being of the whole” (BT 74) which, again, has not be adequately determined.
Appendix 3: Index of Appearances of Anthropology in English Translations of Heidegger’s Work

In this dissertation, I dealt with Heidegger’s most significant and strongest criticisms of anthropology – the distinction of his work from it in Being and Time (§4), the direct and detailed critique of philosophical anthropology in the Kantbook (§5), and his engagement with the philosophical anthropology of Max Scheler. (Appendix 2) But these are by no means the only places where Heidegger discusses anthropology – he spent a remarkable amount of time throughout his career talking and writing about it. Examining Heidegger’s published work reveals that anthropology was a consistent preoccupation for him throughout his career, especially when people ‘misinterpreted’ his work as anthropology. It must be said, however, that the points he makes about anthropology are often repetitive. So for anyone interested in pursuing this subject further, what follows is a list of references for English translations of Heidegger’s work that include references to anthropology and any word beginning ‘anthropolog-’ that I have been able to find, including page numbers. For each text, I have done my best to include the page numbers for every page nearby that are especially relevant to his discussion of anthropology for that particular occurrence. For each entry, I have included a brief indication of what kind of references to anthropology Heidegger is making in that text, or at least the most interesting ones. The list is alphabetical by title of the text, and the numbers are that edition’s page numbers.

- Basic Concepts (1941), Martin Heidegger trans. Gary E. Aylesworth, Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1993

  Pages: 70, 77

Here, Heidegger mentions anthropology along with psychology as examples of disciplines that have ‘already decided’ what the human being is. However, he specifically claims that these disciplines have decided that the human being is ‘the rational animal’. But this is just a more specific way of making his general point that these disciplines operate on unquestioned
assumptions and inadequate conceptions of ourselves. (See my §4) This is a point he often makes elsewhere, so I will subsequently refer to it the ‘rational animal objection’.

  
  Pages: 152, 240
  
  Historical remarks in passing about ‘the philosophical anthropology of the modern age’, and ‘Christian anthropology’.

  
  Pages: 51, 54, 55, 278
  
  This is the translation of a lecture course Heidegger delivered the same year *Being and Time* was published and is similar in content. Accordingly, the mentions of anthropology make much the same points as §10 of *Being and Time*. (See my §4) Interestingly, Heidegger calls philosophical anthropology an ‘irrelevant phenomenon’ that accompanies that natural sciences. (51)

  
  Page: 139, 181
  
  Mention of thinking in a ‘psychological-anthropological sense’, and of distinguishing his work from anthropology.

  
  Pages: 37, 38, 71-75, 76, 170, 227, 238, 244, 317, 336, 348
  
  Endnotes:
  
  Division 1, Chapter 6, footnotes 5, 7
  
  Division 2, Chapter 1, footnote 5
  
  Division 2, Chapter 2, footnote 6
  
  See my §4.

Pages: 163-168, 219-220

Distinguishes between his own work and anthropology, psychology and biology. Interesting discussion of asking ‘who’ man is vs. ‘what’ man is (163-168) that parallels with a similar discussion in §25 of *Being and Time*.


Pages: 82-87

This also includes much similar content to *Being and Time*, being delivered as a lecture three years before it and making substantially similar points about the relation between anthropology and fundamental ontology. Also includes the ‘rational animal objection’, and historical references to Christian, Modern, Kantian and Cartesian anthropology.

- *Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning)* (1936-1938), Martin Heidegger trans. Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly, Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1999

Pages: 47, 48, 58, 60, 62, 71, 92, 93, 99, 121, 161, 199, 208, 211, 215, 220, 313, 324, 345-346, 348, 353-354

Numerous references to the distinction between fundamental ontology and anthropology, the anthropological misinterpretation of *Being and Time*, and some historical remarks.


Page: 25

Occurs in a discussion where Heidegger is trying to elucidate the term ‘Greek’: “In our manner of speaking, ‘Greek’ does not designate a particular people or nation, nor a cultural or anthropological group.”


Page: 144

Alludes to a future time when we have ‘unlearned’ to think of ourselves according to the categories of anthropology.

Pages: 73, 99

‘Rational animal objection’, and an assertion of the dominance of anthropology’s conception of the human being over philosophy.


Pages: 83-84, 203

Brief repetition of the points about anthropology from *Being and Time*.


Pages: 26, 75

Claims that anthropology’s way of dealing with human beings is too calculative, scientific, mathematical, data-driven. Reference to an ‘anthropological way of speaking’.


Pages: 77, 157, 183, 192, 280-281, 368

For this text’s discussion of the philosophical anthropology of Heidegger’s time as he saw it, and of Max Scheler, see Appendix 2. Otherwise, Heidegger makes plenty of characteristic remarks that distinguish his work from anthropology, psychology, biology, etc.


Page: 24

A notable reference to National Socialism, claiming that a ‘new’ concept of science is the same as the old one, but dressed up anthropologically:

“Now there is a sharp battle to be fought in the spirit of National Socialism, which must not stifle on account of humanistic, Christian notions that hold us down by their imprecision. It is also not sufficient to pay lip service to the New Order, since one paints everything with a certain political colour. Of the greatest danger to us are the noncommittal plans and slogans that are everywhere springing up, but that lead only to self-deception, just like the "new" concept of science, which is nothing more than the old, dressed up with a few anthropological trimmings.”

Pages: 35-36

Occurs in a discussion of Hegel’s phenomenology, which is claimed to be between anthropology and psychology.


Pages: 129-131, 149, 183-184, 220, 221, 256, 283, 302

Also much overlap with *Being and Time*. Historical remarks about Augustinian and Christian anthropology, and occurrences of the ‘rational animal objection’.


Pages: 149, 151, 184, 187, 219

Some historical remarks, but more significantly the claim that anthropology, zoology, physics and other disciplines have determined our current conception of the human being, which was in turn determined by Christianity. Says anthropology ‘represents humanity in the same way zoology represents animals.’ (219)


Pages: 214, 242

Occurs in a historical discussion of ‘investigations into the way human beings are’ (214), and in an appendix in a discussion of Dilthey, which connects psychology and anthropology as both being ‘doctrines of life’. (242)


In this rich, dense text, Heidegger makes numerous references to a text by Kant named *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, so I have limited the page numbers here to the references which are most relevant to Heidegger’s discussions of the discipline or idea of anthropology, rather than where he is just quoting Kant’s text called *Anthropology*. For my discussion of this text’s section on philosophical anthropology, see my §5.

Otherwise, page 1 contains a characteristic distinction between his work and anthropology, one of many that occur here. Notably, page 161 makes an interesting allusion to the Dasein *in* human beings, rather than human beings as Dasein, or human beings being Dasein. Plentiful discussion of Kantian anthropology and Kant’s anthropologizing of philosophy, connections
of anthropology with psychology, and arguments like those made in Being and Time about how fundamental ontology is more fundamental than anthropology.

Pages: 1, 90, 93-94, 96, 117, 144-150, 151-153, 161-162, 164, 192, 198-200, 202, 204, 212


Pages: 36, 38-39, 42-43, 49, 182

Contains discussions of ‘psychologism’ and ‘anthropologism’ – see my §5. Claims that psychology has been invaded by anthropology and other disciplines. Includes discussions of Kant of a similar nature to those in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. (esp. 43) More connections of anthropology to science, biology and psychology.


Pages: 16-19, 51, 136

Interesting section discussing ‘the basic question of philosophy and the question of man’ (16-19), where Heidegger repeats at length the basic objection that his work and the kind of questioning it involves is ontologically prior to the questioning of anthropology, psychology and biology. But this critique is extended here to include sociology, ethics and characterology. This objection is repeated later in the text. Also mentions Scheler’s anthropology.


Pages: 74, 122-126, 132, 187, 199-200, 209, 288, 290-292, 375

This is a rich text in terms of mentions of anthropology. It includes basically every significant type of occurrence I talk about here, but many of these are substantially akin to those of the more well-known texts like Being and Time. Most of the mentions here see Heidegger distinguishing his work in Being and Time from anthropology.

- Nietzsche Volume 3 (The Will to Power as Knowledge and as Metaphysics) and Volume 4 (Nihilism), Martin Heidegger, ed. David Farrell Krell, Harper and Row, San Francisco, 1987 and 1982

Pages: Volume 3: 25, 216


Many of the references to anthropology in the Nietzsche volumes are either to assert the dominance of anthropology over philosophy and metaphysics, or to distinguish something from it, including Nietzsche’s interpretation of art. (25)
Most of these references come in the form of a discussion of Descartes’ interpretation of the human being as subject in *The Age of the World Picture*. Heidegger argues that this interpretation determined anthropology’s interpretation of the human being. The ‘subject’ becomes one of those unquestioned assumptions that anthropology has ‘already decided about’, much like the notion of the human being as ‘the rational animal’. There is also a repetition of the point made about Hegel’s phenomenology (see entry on *Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit*). In *Nietzsche’s Word*, Heidegger makes the claim that the fundamental question of ‘the essential relation between the truth of beings as such and man’s essence’ is obscured and confused by the dominance of philosophical anthropology. For the occurrence of anthropology in *Anaximander’s Saying*, see entry the above entry on the text *Early Greek Thinking*.

  Pages: 26, 33, 57
  References the ‘replacement of philosophy by logic (logistics), psychology, and sociology, in short, by anthropology.’

  Pages: 21, 23, 82
  Reference to Scheler – see Appendix 2. Historical references to Christian anthropology.

  Pages: 68, 165
  Occurrence of the ‘rational animal objection’, and a reference to how anthropology (which he here equates with Anglo-American sociology) has come to ‘supplant essential thought’, turning us into subjects, which then turns non-human things into ‘objects’, which is presumably a problem for Heidegger because it obscures our more fundamental relationship to the world that he explicates in his phenomenology.

  Pages: 113, 115, 119-120, 154, 181, 234, 253, 260-261, 301
Historical remarks about theological, Greek, Kantian and ‘pragmatic’ anthropology in *On the Essence of Ground*. At the end of *On the Essence of Truth*, a reference to how anthropology was left behind in *Being and Time*. *Plato’s Doctrine of Truth* makes the ‘rational animal objection’ and references Greek anthropology. *Postscript to ‘What is Metaphysics?’* claims that anthropology is different to and outside of the work he does in *What is Metaphysics?* The *Letter on Humanism* also distinguishes Heidegger’s work from anthropology, along with ethics, subjectivism and nationalism. *On the Question of Being* mentions biology and anthropology in relation to Nietzsche’s ‘will to power’.

  Pages: 48-50
  See above entry on *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*.

- *Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression* (1920), Martin Heidegger trans. Tracy Colony, Continuum, London/New York, 2010
  Pages: 48-49
  Occurs in a discussion of ‘enactment’, but only critically and in passing.

  Pages: 198, 280, 291
  See entry on *Pathmarks for The Question of Being*. See my §4 for discussions of anthropology in *Being and Time*. *The Question Concerning Technology* makes references to an anthropological definition of technology.

- *The ‘Ponderings’ Volumes: Black Notebooks*

  These volumes, notoriously, are compiled from Heidegger’s private notebooks from throughout his career and cover a long period. Much of what he writes in there bears substantial similarity to points he makes in his published writings, and this is true for the mentions of anthropology. In much the same way as happens in *Mindfulness*, there are examples of almost every significant type of reference to anthropology that I discuss here, but mostly consist of Heidegger repudiating the interpretation of his work as anthropology.

Pages: 16-17, 58, 74, 138, 326-327, 332, 344-345, 356-357, 366, 373


  Pages: 64, 152, 169-171, 188, 206, 212, 213

  Pages: 69-70
  Refers to ‘human beings as conceived anthropologically’ in a discussion of Aristotle.

  Pages: 38, 187-188, 193
  Historical reference to Kant, and the development of thought since. Reference to how *Being and Time* might be understood as ‘a kind of epistemology of ontology’, and another to anthropological interpretations of the human being as subject.

  The same can be said of this text that can be said of the *Ponderings/Black Notebooks* texts. It was also compiled from Heidegger’s notebooks, which were wide-ranging, cover a long period and mention anthropology in substantially similar ways to many other published texts of his career – most of these references, again, defend his work against misinterpretation as anthropology.

Discussion of the ‘basic sciences’ of anthropology and psychology.

  
  Pages: 58-59, 78-79, 148-149

  References to anthropology in connection with how modern anthropology has exploited Nietzsche’s writings, and in connection to how anthropology is totally guided by the idea that the human being is an ‘organism’.

  
  Pages: 58, 119-120, 122, 125-126, 153, 184-185, 190-191, 211-212, 222, 238, 239, 260-261, 262, 285

  Lots of negative references to anthropology in connection with psychology, and the distinction between Heidegger’s work and anthropology. Contains denials that the analysis of Dasein could serve as the basis for philosophical anthropology.


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### List of Abbreviations

- **BT** – Heidegger, *Being and Time*
- **CCS** – Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, *Cognitive Science*
- **DAH** – Arthur Danto, *Analytical Philosophy of History*
- **DTW** – Mark Rowlands, *Disclosing the World*
- **EBA** – Encyclopaedia Britannica, *Anthropology*
- **FAW** – David WEBERMAN, *Are Freedom and Anti-Humanism Compatible?*
- **FCM** – Heidegger, *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*
- **FMP** – Ference Marton, *Phenomenography*
- **HET** – Jan Patrick Heiss, *Assessing Ernst Tugendhadt’s Philosophical Anthropology*
- **HOB** – Jan Slaby, *Heidegger on Boredom*
- **HPA** – Beth Cykowski, *Heidegger and Philosophical Anthropology*
- **ICP** – Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, *Cognitive Phenomenology*
- **KM** – Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*
- **MJP** – Michael Jackson, *Existential Anthropology*
- **MNS** – Howard Gardner, *The Mind’s New Science*
- **NPA** – Phillip Honenberger (ed.), *Naturalism and Philosophical Anthropology*
- **OSS** – Arthur Radcliffe-Brown, *On Social Structure*
- **POP** – Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*
- **SEC** – Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, *Embodied Cognition*
- **SES** – Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, *Max Scheler*
- **SHBT** – Sam Harris, *Big Think: Can Psychedelics Help Expand Your Mind?*
- **SIL** – Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, *Imre Lakatos*
- **SJ** – Zadie Smith, *Joy*
- **TOT** – Michael Foucault, *The Order of Things*
- **WEA** – Michael Jackson/Albert Piette (eds.), *What is Existential Anthropology?*
- **WHCS** – Rafael Nunez et al., *What Happened to Cognitive Science?*
- **WM** – Heidegger, *What is Metaphysics?* (*‘Basic Writings’ edition*)
- **WPOH** – W. H. Walsh, *Philosophy of History: An Introduction*
- **ZAP** – Richard Zaner, *An Approach to Philosophical Anthropology*