

***The Phenomenology of Passion and Sex:
Ascertaining the Species of Pleasure as an Activity of the Mind***

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ABSTRACT

The investigation of the act of Sex protrudes an intricate analysis more so if thus should be justified as an activity of the Mind and not purely physical. This philosophical endeavor investigates on the matter of incorporating Passion in the assertion of Sex as such that will beget Pleasure. In order for the proper direction setting of this inquest, the opus posited a literature review that is akin to the variables of this research. It is therefore qualifiable to assert the variables of Passion, Sex, and Pleasure. As such, these properties allow the rudiments which shall be tackled on the explication. The researcher delved on the investigation on anatomizing Sex and even the Passions involve for it to be protruded in a state that is occupied by the Mind. The very purpose of the opus is to intricately expose the inner workings of the activities that ought to be done in banality.

There is also an explication of thought experiments to highlight the integration to the epistemological property of the variable exposed in this endeavor. In the canopy of this research, the highlight is on the ontological property of the faculties ascertained and the epistemological qualification of the properties that are seemingly isolated from the Mind. It is therefore, phenomenological since it protrudes the nature of the properties as they exist in the current circumstance, as such it is less existential simply because what it ascertains is the circumstance upon which the action attributes itself to.

Keywords: Passion, Sex, Pleasure, Activity of the Mind, Epistemology

I. INTRODUCTION

The concept of Passion has already been qualified and in fact overly analyzed through time in so far as the discipline of Philosophy is concerned (Law, 2007; Abecassis, 1995). Moreso, the development of theories pertinent to this endeavor have evolved and been acknowledged to the psychological premise (Roudinesco and Bowlby, 2001). The latter speaks about subjecting the concept of Passion to an inner working of Psychoanalysis known as the Id, Ego, and the Superego. Id, on the one hand, is the instigator of endless desires of the Being, where desire is qualified to be one that promotes interested pleasures of the Being no matter what the cost may be. The Superego, on the other hand counters the Id. The Superego becomes an entity that is inclined always to the moralistic and altruistic sense of dismissing a provocation of the Id if it is against one's moral standards. The balancing factor for such is the Ego, where the latter ascertains both the Id and the Superego for the functionality of normal and natural behavior to be manifested.

Needless to say, the Passions have been more qualified by philosophy to mean one that is isolated from the idea of the consciousness of the logical mind (Schmitter, 2021). Therefore, there is a debatable concept of the mind where it cannot dutifully control the workings of the desire, which is somewhat contradictory to the psychoanalytic premise. However, the reconciliation of these ideas tends to arrive at a common point where it acknowledges Pleasure as responses of an individual to an object that needs the manifestation of Pleasure (Wallis, 1919). This acknowledgement may be from the assertion that, while it is valid that pleasure is a response of the mind, it may also be valid that pleasure be subjected to either the spirited or the appetitive nature of the Being. If in such manner, this opus seeks to ascertain that Passion and Sex are qualified to be estates of the mind where the latter must be ascertained to also have the capacity to have Sex as under its canopy.

The question, therefore, arises why Passion and Sex? This researcher shall explicate a matter that is and must be present in the physical activity of Sex. Therefore, the opus shall qualify Passion, Sex, and Sex with Passion. The anomalous nature of Sex allows it to be a very physical activity. However, deep within the recesses of the Being that exhibits this act, is one that is Passionate therefore such act qualifies to be mental activity as well, to which this opus must give justice to. In this light, this researcher will utilize a methodology of hermeneutical methodology in order to interpret the philosophical advances of the phenomenon at hand. While existentialism will be best to explicate the matter of continuous consciousness of the Being, phenomenology will be then, best to cover the canopy of the qualification of a set of faculties ascertained in the epistemological tradition and human consciousness.

As such this opus shall be aided by the following questions to direct the objectives of the opus: a) *What qualifications must Sex satisfy for it to be considered as an activity of the Mind?* b) *If Sex indeed qualifies to be an activity of the Mind, then does it alienate itself from its physical attribute? Or can one have Sex that is no longer an activity of the Mind?* c) *How does the necessity of Passion aid in the assertion to qualify Sex as an activity of the Mind more so an estate of consciousness of the Being?* In this light, Passion and Sex become attributes that are connotated as species of Pleasure.

Thus, the explications of this opus will only qualify such and will no longer protrude on the faculties of the mind that are germane to psychoanalysis themselves. In this opus, one may see that the same words vary in their capitalization i.e. Sex may be seen with the uppercase “S” or lower case “s”. This is for the reason that all parts of speech that are in uppercase are proper and therefore a variable, however those in the lower case are protruded to be either verbs, adjectives, or mere modifiers. The latter classifications are made in view of the hermeneutical approach.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

The Literature Review section shall give light to the references upon which this opus qualifies the phenomenon at hand. In doing so, the researcher dissects the very nature of Passion and how it is utilized in the philosophical advancements of epistemology. As such, the first theme will focus on the explications of Natural Passion. This is crucial so that the at least there may be threshold principle as to what this research seeks to identify as a principle in itself.

The next theme shall tackle the physical attributes of Sex and how it may work with the integration or isolation of Passion. The latter being a mode of agency to qualify what is not yet qualified in the phenomenon at hand. This referencing becomes crucial because this may be a means to ascertain the properties of what a physical and mental activity may be and how they are alienated from one another. In other words, this becomes an assertion to reconcile what was once a dichotomy.

Lastly, there can be no further explications if the core organ of the mind is not examined and assessed. Therefore, the mind is also subjected to the analysis, where a specific faculty of the mind is examined. As such faculty aids in the sensation that the Being feels, therefore germane as well to the attributes given to the phenomenon at hand.

a) The Passions as Agencies of the Mind

The Passions are those that drive the urge of the Being to act on a certain circumstance or predicament for that matter (Pinckaers and Guevin, 2015). In such light, the Passions are those strong drives that compel an individual to submit to their desires or at least to what they desire (Watson, 2023; Law, 2007; Salgado, 2017). The ancient philosopher Plato sought to write about the Passion as an agent to imprison the rationality in the temporal vessel of the Being and as such is the body (Kahn, 1987). This premise ascertains that the Passions disorient the rational faculty in order to give in to the urges of the flesh and therefore, are not controlled and tamed.

The Passions are given a qualification in this parlance, as those that dismiss the rationality of the Being and allow the vessel of the Being, which is the body to do actions that are incongruent with reason or simply unreasonable (Gill, 2009). Therefore, this assertion suggests that there is a dichotomy of the Mind and the Body. It is dualist in nature wherein the premise isolates the Mind to be chiefly a seat of rationality and the Body to be a material property (Stocks, 1915). As such is only ascertained by the dictates of either Mind or the Passions. If such is the case, then the Passions are reduced to a concept that are although powerful but ascertained to be those that are contrary to the potentiality of the person to reason.

Therefore, the Passions are irrational motivations actualized to be movements that are against the natural tendencies of the Being. In a relative phenomenon, St. Thomas Aquinas formulated the assertions and explications of Passions. It is in this manner which the researcher thought that Aquinas's explications would be more fitting to ascertain the principles of the Passion. This is because Aquinas provides a tendency that is radical to that of Plato but also contouring to the properties which Plato explicates as attributes of the Passion (Rist, 2012; Law,

2007). This serves as a philosophical canon which the Passion is qualified not in alienation from either the mind or the body. This premise suggests that the Passion is a manifestation of the appetitive soul but is chiefly governed by the Mind, although not rational and apart from reason, still it is a principle under the canopy of the Mind.

a.1) The Concupiscible and the Irascible

The Passions, as qualified by Aquinas, has the absolute tendency to provide the Being a means to achieve either what is good or evil according to dictates of the desire (Hess, 1981; Chenu, 2023). The qualification of Passion is characterized into two paradigms, the Concupiscible Potencies and the Irascible Potencies. They are both classified potencies since they still have to be recognized by the individual in order for these potentialities to become active powers (Jordan, 1990). Therefore, the moment of acknowledgement itself is an activity of the Mind in so much as this proves to be one that is subjected to the will of the Being. The Concupiscible Potencies are concupiscible not solely because they tend to lead a Being to an immoral act but rather because they are volatile in fact fragile to even classify.

These are meta tendencies that allow the possible disregard for ethical practice in view of the appetitive desire of the Being. In such view, the Concupiscible potencies, now powers, become volatile and incline an individual to do something that is contrary to the natural (Sweeney, 2011). The Irascible potencies are somewhat the same as that of the Concupiscible potencies only that the Passion which would come from these potencies tends to be more aggressive (Miller, 2012). As such, it is more aggressive for a very justifiable reason, Irascible potencies, now powers describe a response to a desire that is possible but improbable to achieve. It is irascible not because one is driven by overt tendencies but rather, simply because it leads the will of a Being to act as if it is not within the limits of the body for the purpose of satisfying the desire.

Therefore, at least in this qualification, the Passions are not simply manifested for the purpose of Desire, but rather as an agency of Zeal and the Will. While these do not satisfy the qualification of the Passions as part of the canopy of the Mind, it most certainly qualifies the Passion to be aided by the activities of the Mind. These activities of the Mind are discernment, decision – making, temperance, and much so, sensation.

b) The Philosophical Phenomenon of Sex

The act of sexual intimacy known as Sex probably connotes an ultra-sensation that has for so long a time manifested a very close relationship with the Passions (Soble, 2009). The act of Sex is viewed as a physical activity, while that might be true, the exhibition of such activity, if under the context of urge and sensation, becomes an activity of the Mind (Gary, 1980). In this light, let this opus first tackle the properties and qualifications of Sex. The latter is an intimate physical exchange of bodily sensations where the areas of the body that are restricted from the public becomes allowable for the individual where this act is shared with (Diphooorn and Grasiani, 2020). The qualification in this parlance concerns the consensual activity where one is explicit in the action of expression.

The expression, therefore in this instance, are acts and methods on how one translates the bodily interaction from one person to another. Sex becomes an agent of pleasure, where it is logically surmisable to say that Sex is a causality of pleasure (Beckman, 2003; Diphooorn and Grasiani, 2020). This premise is ascertained in view of the physical property of Sex to cause sensations that are in nature, satisfying the appetitive desires of the Being. This satisfaction becomes a threshold to the experience of pleasure, where the latter is defined as something that is interested to the Being who experiences such. There is a qualifier to what is pleasurable at least in view of the topic at hand. There is a mention of the Interested Pleasure, simply because there is also a Disinterested Pleasure.

The latter protrudes that what generally is pleasing and is appreciated by an interest that is in commonality with everyone (Korsmeyer and Weiser, 2021; Law, 2007; Salgado, 2017). However, Sex cannot be a disinterested pleasure, since it is an activity that stimulates the sensation. If such is the case, then a certain Passion is required for the interested pleasure to be triggered. It then becomes interested because it is personal to the Being, the inviolable becomes violable, at least in the parlance of restriction.

b.1) An Agent and Specie of Passion

Sex, therefore, can be qualified to be an activity that insinuates the bodily pleasures (Halwani, 2020). In order for the possibility of pleasure, the experience of the latter must be driven by the Passions, specifically the passion to manifest one's vulnerability to the other, one's arduous willingness to provoke sensation through the diminishment of boundaries. In this light, it is not the nature of Sex that is ascertained but rather the manner of the experience of Sex.

The act of Sex is therefore qualified to be physical only if it is under the notion of its action (Diphooorn and Grasiani, 2020). However, the experience of Sex is inclined to the activity of the Mind. The latter is justified through the very essence of experience, the causality for such is sensation, and therefore, premium is always given to what and how a Being feels on the experience itself. In this premise, the researcher seeks to dichotomize the experience from the act itself.

This means that if in a situation where Sex is present but without the experience, it mechanizes Sex and therefore denaturalizing the potentiality at hand. Moreover, the experience of Sex, becomes a causality for an even more teleological experience which is only familiar to the Being experiencing it. Therefore, Sex becomes a specie of Passion, where the former acts as a passion in itself to conduit the teleological familiarity of the Being with a specie of Pleasure released through Sex as a Passion in motion.

c) Pleasure and the Mind

The concept of Pleasure has often, been related to the appetitive satisfaction of the soul as according to the Ancient Greek Virtue Ethicist (Olafson, 2019; Stocks, 1915). As such they have reason to justify so, where the appetitive desire is fulfilled by the Passions that seek to disarray the Being from the logical and argumentative (Kenny and Amadio, 2023). In this parlance, the criticism provokes an even treatment to such, isolating the activity of achieving Pleasure, not

through the canopy of the Mind but rather to the bodily entity. The contemporary studies of Philosophy will significantly dictate that Taste and Pleasure are entities not far from the Mind (Korsmeyer and Weiser, 2021). While it may be true that they are of contrasting faculties as that of rationality and reason, the Mind is always present to connote consciousness of the Pleasure attained.

In this sense, there should be a classification that the dichotomy of the Mind and the Body can loosely be interpreted into a reconciliation through the outcome of Pleasure, and Passion is its causality. In this light, what is most prominent is the relational qualification which is the sensation. In this premise, Pleasure is not a volitional concept made to initiate, rather, Pleasure is a response to an experience of an object of appreciation (Korsmeyer, 1993). This explication furthermore protrudes that the Pleasure experience is reliant on the external receptors of what should be appreciated and as such are the senses.

A prominent sense in this discussion is the sense of touch, the process of appreciation in this parlance is determined through the interested Pleasure of the individual (Zuckert, 2002; Law, 2007). In that sense, the response of the individual to an object is the qualifying factor of Pleasure. If the latter must be achieved, it is not actively executed, but rather responsive. However, in view of Sex, as a variable in this opus, the Pleasure is processed through the activity of sensation, the latter acts as the agency of consciousness. Therefore, the Mind ascertains Pleasure to be a response to the appreciation of an active act. Thus, the active act becomes a causality for Pleasure. In turn, Pleasure becomes an active response, one that becomes an initiator of another Pleasure. The premise is possible through the subjection of Pleasure to the powers of the Mind, through the axiological evaluation of sensation. In this assertion, there must be a condition that it shall be under the canopy of the Mind in so far as that sensation is experienced.

III. EXPLICATIONS AND DISCUSSIONS

In this section, the researcher shall state his position on the subject matter and the Phenomenon at hand. The discussions formulated in this section are directed towards the properties of Sex and Passion. These assertions will shed light on the premises surrounding Pleasure as an activity of the Mind. In more ways than one, this opus tends to expose the vulnerability of separating Pleasure from the activities of the Mind.

Needless to say, that there can be no dichotomy of the Mind and the Body when ascertaining Pleasure. This is the very reason why Sex is the given a salient point, because such act will provide a landscape of the Passion as cause for Pleasure qualified to be under the ambit of the Mind.

a) Can Zombies have Sex?

This position tends to test the act of doing Sex, where this ascertains the act of Sex and the properties along with it through the thought experiment of a Philosophical Zombie. This opus firstly qualifies what a zombie is, in common reference to epistemological expositions, philosophical zombies are those that tend to be like humans in almost all faculties except that of

the Mind. The principle that separates an ordinary human being to that of a zombie is that of the Qualia (Horowitz, 2009; Bailey, 2006; Stroll and Martinich, 2023). The latter, is characterized by the feature of experience and as to how an experience is evaluated through axiology.

This means that an act, a perception, or even an intention is measured according to how it is experienced by the individual (Shoemaker, 1991). In this light, the experiences are only akin to the individual, the latter may reveal what the experience maybe but it can never be a vicarious property where another individual may share of the experience or know the experience in its entirety. In such qualification, a zombie, having no reference to the principles of the Mind cannot have the attribution to Qualia. Therefore, a zombie may be able to act as if it is a human being containing all faculties, however the zombie cannot have experience since it would not have any reference to such.

It is possible that a zombie may be able to do the normal and natural volitions of the human being, in fact it may also be able to intent in the same manner as that of a human but it can never have a consciousness of the experience of the act. A zombie may be aware of the circumstances simply because it is mechanized to do so, but such uniqueness of the experience of the circumstances will not be attained by the zombie (Kirk, 2023; Tanney, 2004). In the question, can zombies have Sex? The answer is in the affirmative. The zombies can have an erection or even an orgasm but those activities are purely physical in estate, the latter terminology is referenced not to ascertain the natural scientific and neurological principles, but rather the classifying the activity as physical.

a.1) Unpassionate Sex

In that sense, the zombies ought to have Sex merely as automatons that function based on the dictates not of the Will of the Being, but rather of the volitions alone (Bailey, 2006; Kirk, 2023). While it is true, that zombie can have Sex, most definitely they cannot have the experience of Sex because, again they do not have a reference to this attribute. They can in fact ascertain the intention of having Sex but the Sex experience itself is alienated from them. In this premise, Sex is actualized in properties of purely physical and not of an amalgamation of the physical attribute and that of the Mind. Therefore, this discussion provided a better view on Sex where it can be done by automata but never have the experience of such.

Therefore, this actualized Sex is not Passion - empowered since it cannot in any way produce Pleasure from the Being that begets it. As such, the qualifier for Pleasure is passionate Sex, although one cannot logically decipher if Pleasure is a result of passionate Sex. There is also a tendency for Sex that is not passionate to be pleasurable simply because pleasure in Sex is always self – interested. A contention in this argument is that one cannot explicate certitude on whether the Being is a Zombie or not, because the Qualia is known only to the individual (Block, 2007; Law, 2007). Therefore, if such is the case, then the act of sex can simply only be mimetic.

b) The Isolation of Love

In this explication, the opus ascertains the validity of Love as an agent of Passion in the activity of Sex. In view of the phenomenon at hand, Love may either be a result or a causality of Passion that in the entire process of having sex (Schaler, 1954). The presence of Love is fused with that of Passion. This section first qualifies Love so that the language upon which this opus circulates on is aligned at least in the hermeneutical interpretation of terminologies and nomenclatures. While there are a multitude of qualifications of Love, this opus chooses Love to be that of relation to the Passion. The researcher uses the qualifications of St. Thomas Aquinas on Love simply because such definition has already articulated the nature of the Passion.

In the Thomistic view, Love is therefore a principle that is passionate, making Passion a modifier of Love itself (Kaczor 2008; Enns and Calcagno, 2015; McGinn, 2014). In this parlance, Love is defined to be the desiring of the good of another Being upon which the Being exhibiting Love desires the pleasure of the other (Law, 2007; McGinn, 2014). Thus, in so far as sex is concerned, if at the moment of the sensation, the Beings are concerned with fulfilling the desire of the other and not their own desires then the presence of Love is explicit. As such is a qualifier for it to be deemed as a passion, where passion begets Passion. If such is the case, then the qualification of Love is ascertained to be categorically passionate whether it is concupiscible or irascible.

In such light, the need to isolate Love is explicated, the need comes from the fact that when one ascertains Love, it is immediately treated as a Passion or at least its agency if under this parlance. However, such isolation is not an isolation of the property but rather a mere deconstruction of the act of Sex in view of analysis. This section simply qualifies Sex with and without love. The latter is given premium since it would be prejudicial for one to analyze Sex with Love and will automatically ascertain it to be an activity of the Mind. However, if Love is isolated then such will magnify the properties of Sex as specie of Pleasure, since no qualifier is intended. This, furthermore, gives a justification and a more substantiated qualification for Sex to be of the Mind rather than of the Body.

b.1) The Sensation of Passion without Love

Sex is therefore, ascertained as is and not through a modifier, a qualifier, or even an integration to Love as a specie of Passion. If in such manner, Sex is examined to be qualified as an activity of Mind through the Passion. In this light, the question now arises can there be Passion in Sex without Love, if the definition of the latter is desiring the pleasure of the other? The answer may be inclined in the positive, the Passion present during Sex where Love is isolated can be urged by the irascible.

This means that the strong manifestation of Passion is not so much to say that one desires the pleasure of the other but rather self – pleasure. While in the process of doing so, the other may feel pleasure, but such is contrary to the intention of the Being. The simple absence of the desire for one to seek the desire of the other ascertains the difference. In that very view, the Passion present is not that begets Passion but rather self – satisfaction, while the Pleasure that is protruded in this premise is self – interested Pleasure.

The absence of love does not necessarily mean the absence of Passion, because the urge to achieve the self – interested Pleasure is pointed towards the irascible Passion. As such, the unethical invasion of the personal and restricted areas of the body is very imminent. Therefore, this provides a view that the action done by the Being to the other is to violate; for the satisfaction of the appetite of the doer, without the consideration of the Will of the person being violated.

c) The Passionate Mind

In this discussion, the researcher intends to magnify the agency of Passion as a property under the Mind. While it is a clear notion that the Passion is separated, although can be a modifier of the Mind, there are activities of the Mind that must be qualified to be workings of the Passion as an agent. Thus, in this parlance the Mind may be able to function as if it is determinant of the consciousness of the Being. If such is the situation, then the Mind can be dispositioned to be Passionate if need be or if the Mind ascertains it to be necessary (Aciman, 1990). The question in the said premise may be: Is it incumbent upon the mind to either control or to even restrict the Passions? The answer varies upon the circumstances.

However, it is prominent to say that the Passions are ever present and that the Mind can either regulate or at least trigger the volitional response of the Passion (Rorty, 1982). However, it may be unnoticeable and may be a human act but nonetheless it is still an emission of the Mind. How is this then possible? In the instance of desire and that the inclination to achieve that desire, one is embodied with the concupiscible potentiality. The latter, therefore, seems to be undeliberated but the fact that the necessary Passion is emitted according to the needs of the circumstance makes it a qualifier to be an activity of the Mind. The second question which this section intends to answer is: in any circumstance, can the Mind be Passionate? The answer is yes, the Mind in this parlance is the consciousness of the presence of the condition of a Being and another co – existing Being.

Therefore, this consciousness arouses the Mind to ascertain the Passion. Thus, the concept of Passions, need not to be alienated from the Mind but rather, the Passions are ever present and that the Mind ultimately makes the assertions of the Passion. This is the reason why an individual cannot be controlled fully by the Passions, because even if the Passions overwhelm Reason, the Mind asserts the need for the Passion should circumstances ask for such. While one may say that an urge to act in accordance with Passion is unreasonable, as such may be true, but it is also true that the assertion of such Passion is enacted by the Mind. This is under the principle of the Being as a sentient entity and must protrude the workings of sensation (Clark, 2006).

IV. CONCLUSION

The act of Sex as deemed by the Natural Sciences has always been associated with the Physical activities (Diphorn and Grasiani, 2020). However, this opus provided the view as to how Sex is qualified to be an activity of the Mind. The workings of the Passion have definitely given light to the faculty of the Mind not only to be chiefly governed by the Rational property but also to be also capable of regulating the Passions. This specific activity tends to reconcile the Passionate property of the Being with that of the Pleasures upon which the Being manifests. In the given explications, the conduct of having Sex becomes a category upon which it can be anatomized.

The act per se is given to the Physical canopy as qualified by the Philosophical Zombie thought experiment and the involvement of the Qualia. It is therefore, valid to say that the act is Physical if not done in light of the Being but rather an entity that is non – sentient and not perceiving the Qualia. It is the Passions that actualizes the act of Sex to be one that is attributed to the human estate. The pleasure upon which Sex begets is a product of the Passion that is inevitably manifested in the act of doing so.

While there is an absence of certitude, at least in the view of the spectator or third person, the assertion of the experience is present to the doer. Thus, can only be known by the personal self and not the public self. This enfranchisement of the Passion seeks to ascertain the axiological property of Sex to be that of the Mind. In this light, the opus protrudes a system where one property maybe reliant to another if viewed for the assertion of qualifying this specific specie of Pleasure.

Sex, in order to be qualified as an activity of the Mind must be enfranchised to the Passions, and as such the Passion urged Sex subjects itself to the property of the Mind. Furthermore, the consciousness of the condition of the Being while immersing in the act of Sex, is inclined to the Passion to which it desires pleasure be it for the other Being or the Being that does the action. While these may be true, the opus acknowledges that the other endeavors with respect to sensation mostly that of Taste has not yet been explored. The principle of Taste that ought to be a causality of Pleasure is visceral and therefore, may be asserted recommendation for the qualification of Sex. As such would be a more deepening endeavor considering Philosophy.

V. References

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