ON HEIDEGGER’S CONCEPT OF FREEDOM: DASEIN’S ESSENCE AND THE DETERMINISM OF TECHNOLOGY

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Introduction

The Dasein has the capacity for self-determination in the background of varying possibilities. Such notion of freedom is worked out in Heidegger’s Being and Time. The existential themes resonate in this early work that Schurmann even describes Heidegger’s notion of the will as “voluntaristic kind” in comparison to his later thinking. This freedom stems in Dasein’s ontological structure called as care (sorge), the primordial structure of Dasein that unifies the three aspect of its fundamental experience: its being thrown in the world, its having sense of “being-ahead-of”; i.e., having existential possibilities to be realized, and its falleness, its preoccupation with entities in this world. In this Dasein’s condition, freedom arises from the determination of one’s existence. Dasein could assert one’s authenticity in the background of the temptation to fall in the anonymous crowd of the they.

The later Heidegger, however, seemingly abandons his early notion of freedom. His depiction of the enormous influence of the modern technology and his introduction of the concept such as of Gelassenheit (releasement), or “letting be,” or letting whatever unconcealment of Being might grant, to address the condition, create an impression of a reversal from voluntarism into fatalism and determinism. Heidegger’s concept of freedom has been a subject of debate, not only to shed light to the changes and developments of his later works. The issue of Heidegger’s freedom

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56 Underscoring Heidegger’s freedom, he perfectly describes Heidegger’s early work as where “[t]he voluntary and involuntary…are opposable as the authentic is to inauthentic.” Reiner Schurmann. “The problem of the Will” in Heidegger on being and acting: From principles to anarchy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1987), 245.

also posits the question of what his thinking can hope of doing to at least alleviate the pressing problems of the modern society he himself articulated.

Feenberg, who is prominently critical of Heidegger, explains that Heidegger holds determinism. For him, Heidegger is an essentialist and determinist in his concept of technology. The *enframing* of technology, which is Heidegger’s understanding of the essence of technology, is an insurmountable determining force. For him, such determinism of technology has transformed Dasein from an active actor of authenticity into a passive receptor of the *inevitable* danger of modern technology. Heidegger’s essence of technology leaves no room for change. There is no escape from the technological *enframing*, and at best what the humans can hope is not an active movement for challenging and reforming technology, but of “letting it be.”

58 Heidegger’s passivity and resignation in the face of the danger do not provide any hope for political and substantial change of the situation. 59

The paper argues that Feenberg’s critique of Heidegger is rather erroneous. Against his accusation that Heidegger is determinist, the *Dasein* rather exemplifies a radical freedom from technology’s *enframing*. Dasein holds a freedom as it has the capacity to be free, not only from the technological devices and attitudes, but also from the ontology of enframing, which is founded to what Heidegger historically described as forgetfulness of Being, where Being is treated only as entities or beings. Feenberg rather misreads Heidegger’s essence of technology as only at the ontic level but not as an ontological problem. Such misreading is based on Feenberg’s neglect to elaborate Dasein’s role in the ontological constitution, or in the concealment and unconcealment of Being. With such neglect of Dasein, the technology is perceived as entities totally outside of human control. The *Gelassenheit* becomes a surrendering to the danger of technology, and not as Dasein’s act of opening to the clearing for the unconcealment of Being.

To show this case, the paper first discusses Heidegger’s expression of determinism. Feenberg, in *Questioning Technology*, sets an important idea on how Heidegger holds determinism. Such discussion on Heidegger’s determinism is followed by a critical clarification of Feenberg’s reading of Heidegger. It shows that Feenberg misreads Heidegger’s position, not only out of the failure to distinguish ontic from ontological, but precisely out of his neglect to elaborate Dasein’s essence and role in engaging the technological condition. After establishing this point, the paper ends by reflecting on Dasein’s freedom and some of the limitations of Heidegger’s

59 Ibid.
philosophy.

**Heidegger's Technology and Determinism**

Heidegger’s perceived determinism is read in his concept of *Gelassenheit*, his call for resignation and passivity to let the new manifestation of Being. According to Feenberg, Heidegger thinks that the dangers of modern technology is unavoidable, and what remains to man is to “let go” and let such destiny be. This letting go places man in subordination to the truth of Being. It is not man who has the final decision; the primary determination is now based upon the granting of the Being. Human being’s task is just to guard whatever that determination is. When and what such determination will come—whether it is the event in the world or a new found thinking—is not of man’s decision but comes from the granting of Being. 60

In *Questioning Technology*, Feenberg argues that such kind of thinking does not provide actual and concrete solutions to the problems Heidegger addressed, specifically to the problem of modern technology, which Heidegger sees as dominating the modern world. He complains that Heidegger’s passivity does not lead into “an active program of reform” and as a result, it “would simply constitute a further extension of modern technology.” 61

Such determinism, as Feenberg’s analysis suggests, is founded on Heidegger’s misconception of the question of technology. The whole technology, for Heidegger, contains a single essence, dominating all aspect of the modern society—including the human lives—to the point that human being can no longer do anything to control its rule. This concept of technology is what Feenberg termed as essentialism of Heidegger. Such essentialism, for Feenberg, fails to grasp the way technology actually works and affects the people. It simply sees technology as containing a single essence that determines the modern world.

Heidegger’s essentialist notion of technology, Feenberg implies, is reductive. It transforms and determines everything into its essence. “How we do things determines who and what we are. Technological development transforms what it is to be human.” 62 Technology is not merely seen as “instrumental,” or a neutral thing to be used. It rather embodies specific values; these tools affect and reshape the human lives in the modern world.

Feenberg refers to how for Heidegger the essence of technology as *Gestell (or enframing)* as what determines everything. *Gestell*, for Heidegger, is not exactly technological but a kind of mindset, where nature and man are

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60 Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism,” 210-211.
61 Feenberg, *Questioning Technology* 184.
62 Ibid., 2-3.
“ordered” and “set.” The reality is reduced to be available—standing reserved—to be manipulated and controlled for expansion or for a certain end. Feenberg precisely reads Heidegger’s *enframing* as a kind of culture created by technological activities and devices. The technology’s effect is taken rather in a negative and dystopian future, which is rather different from its early faith and confidence as the harbinger of progress. The *enframing* is a culture that transforms and reduces everything—man and nature—to be efficiently controlled. It determines everything in the world.

Against Heidegger, Feenberg clarifies that the technology’s essence cannot be merely reduced into *enframing*. The *Questioning* maintains that the essence of modern technology could be contextual, dependent on how the subject is situated in relation to technology. The house, Feenberg cites, could be experienced differently by those who lived inside it than its contractor. He also cites how the online world provides the patient with ALS and AIDs an accessible venue for interaction. Without a single insurmountable essence of technology, Feenberg denies to totally abandon technology—to let be—as what he reads from Heidegger. Technology as enframing is rather just one aspect of the technology, and there are many possible meanings technology could take effect. He denies such hopelessness to mitigate the dangers of technology. Rather, he recognizes the possibility of taking actions to counter the dehumanizing effects of technology. Technology in its varying uses and effects has potential to provide the modern world a humanizing experience.  

The *Gelassenheit*, the stance of “letting the Being be,” for Feenberg, does not provide the answer. It appears that this solution does not solve the issues it intends to address but tolerate it. The *Questioning* raises issue on how Heidegger erroneously defined technology in determinist sense, and leaves nothing for human beings to change their dangerous condition. The humans could be either in “free relations” (i.e. letting the technology enters upon one’s life but prevents its overrule that it controls the agent) or to be in a passive waiting stance to whatever events that will be disclosed by Being. But in the end, with such call for passivity out of determinism, Feenberg thinks that Heidegger, critical might he seems, “ends up agreeing implicitly with technocrats that the actual struggles in which people attempt to influence technology can accomplish nothing of fundamental importance.”

The Ontological Context: Heidegger’s Radical Freedom

63 Ibid., 189-193.
64 Ibid., 185.
65 Ibid., xv.
Contrary to Feenberg’s reading, Heidegger’s notion of *Gelassenheit* should be understood in a different sense of passivity. There’s a radical freedom being cloaked in the apparent determinism of Heidegger. The *Gelassenheit*, although a call for letting be, is not a sigh of despair in view of the gigantic force of modern technology. In its core, it is ontological. Heidegger’s call for a passive stance is a call to be released and be free from the shackles of the previous presupposed metaphysics. The *Gelassenheit* calls to be primordially released from the presupposed notion of reality, and not a mere release from technological activities such as internet addiction. Heidegger aims for ontological freedom. It is the release from the previous understanding of Being, where Being is merely treated as beings, to let the Being and the new sense of reality be.

Thomson, a defender of Heidegger, underscores such contextual misunderstanding of his philosophy in Feenberg’s *Questioning Technology*. Heidegger is being understood without the clear distinction between ontics and ontology. He notes that the ontology concerns the issue of Being, or of the sense of “what is,” while the ontics merely refers to the entities, the presence of which is set and limited by a certain understanding of Being. He argues that Feenberg only understood Heidegger in the realm of entities, without noting the main issue of Being behind the presence of particular technologies. He corrects Feenberg that for Heidegger the essence of technology is “nothing less than ontological self-understanding of the age.”66 Feenberg’s understanding of technology and political actions only refers at the ontic level, without aiming to modify the presupposed understanding of “what is” which is the ontological.67

Feenberg, however, remains unconvinced. He maintains that Heidegger has an over generalized concept of technology, which is the main reason why Heidegger settled into passive resignation over the dangers of technology. Against Thomson, Feenberg suggests that by referring to the ontic level he, at the same time, touches the ontological. For him, both the


67As Thomson argues, “From the Heideggerian perspective, then, the most profound philosophical difference between Feenberg and Heidegger concerns the level at which each pitches his critique of technology... The problem with Feenberg’s strategy is that our everyday ontic actions and decisions almost always take place within the fundamental conceptual parameters set for us by our current ontology, otherwise these actions would not make sense to ourselves or to others.” Thomson, “What’s Wrong with Being a Technological Essentialist? A Response to Feenberg,” 436.
ontological and ontic are unified in Heidegger’s essence of technology. “We cannot cleanly separate the theory of enframing from these regressive attacks on particular technologies because they are of a piece.”

For Feenberg, Heidegger’s ontological presumption made him fail to notice the different revelation of technology, which is even at the ontic level. Such is the reason why, for him, Heidegger rejects totally the technology. As technology’s only essence is control, then both ontic and ontological level will “reproduce the ‘same,’” that is, “it will enact and reduce everything into control and efficiency.” For Feenberg, there is no separate realm of ontological, where Heidegger is referring. The ontological is not insulated from ontic actions. It is interrelated with the ontics, as the “ontological appears in the ontic; [and] the ontic strikes back at the ontological.” With this thought in mind, Feenberg clarifies that when he refers to essence, he is not referring to a mere genus, or an abstract universals, which are “simple generalizations from particulars” (e.g. dog from different types of dogs, trees from different types of trees). The essence for Heidegger, rather, is analogous to culture and language, similar to Hegel’s “concrete universals” as “they exist in their instances.” Heidegger’s enframing is being enacted at the ontic level, as the concrete universals exist in the particulars. The “famous hydroelectric plant on Rhine” enacts the enframing, as all the workings of “actual technologies” and “technical actions” are reflection of an ontological setting, such what Heidegger means by saying “what the river is now, namely a water power supplier, derives from out of the essence of the power station.”

In a sense, Feenberg’s reaction against Thomson is justified, since Thomson fails to elaborate how exactly Feenberg’s critique only refers at the ontic level and not ontological. However, it does not mean that Feenberg’s idea of Heidegger does not contain error. Despite the elaboration of the interrelation between ontic and ontological, Thomson is right in reading Feenberg as misreading Heidegger’s ontological claims as only ontic suggestions, although he fails to elaborate it.

What is greatly missing in Feenberg’s understanding of Heidegger is the role of Dasein in the modern technological enframing. The ontology

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69 Ibid.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid., 445.
72 Ibid., 444.
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid., 445.
necessarily implies an understanding man, since the particular sense of “what is” is dependent on the stance and openness of man. The ontological realm is revealed by man’s relation to Being. Man is the “lighting of Being.” Such Dasein’s relation to Being is emphasized when Heidegger points that “Technology is a way of revealing.” Technology’s essence is being revealed to man. The enframing as technology’s essence, which only reveals Being as entities, arises not out of the revelation of beings alone but of Dasein’s relation of Being.

Feenberg, however, erroneously simplifies Heidegger’s philosophy. He thinks that for Heidegger technology, like things and entities, contains an independent essence from Dasein. Feenberg treats Heidegger’s enframing as only enacted by beings—whether by attitudes, decisions, or devices—an independent realm distanced from the determinations of man. In the Question, Feenberg only thinks of Heidegger’s concept of technology as either referring to a kind of “attitude” or to the “actual design of modern technological devices.” Technology is treated as separate object to be examined. In a sense, he understands Heidegger closely similar with the classical realist epistemology. In this thinking, the assertion that “technology is a way of revealing” means technology’s essence is being reflected to the human subject. Such erroneous understanding of Heidegger is the reason why he thinks Heidegger gave up his phenomenological standpoint in defining the essence of modern technology.

But later Heidegger did not give up his phenomenological standpoint, as what Feenberg suggests. The idea that the subject is united with the object remains, as what the notion of being-in-the-world suggests. It is clear that Heidegger does not separate the subject and the object. In the “Letter on Humanism,” Heidegger clarifies that the Dasein’s essence is “ek-sistence.” Against the previous form of Humanism, the “Letter” redefines that the Dasein is united with Being, as man is standing open in the “ecstatic inherence of truth of Being.” Man is not mere animalitas,

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77 Feenberg, “Questioning Technology,” 146
78 As Feenberg points, “It is curious that Heidegger adopts this view of system, while condemning them, rather than applying his phenomenological approach to the life world.” Feenberg, “Questioning Technology,” 197.
80 Historically, Heidegger traces the humanism as animalitas from the Roman system of education, which can be traced as influenced by Greeks. Here, the humanity of man is based upon the Greek notion of padeia, of a man being trained culturally to ascribe to the Roman virtues. This is to realizing the fitting of essence
separated from the other entities, rather “man is being claimed by being” in comparison to other beings. Man has a unique relation to Being, a distinctive sense that generates an awe and conscious feeling, arising from existence, a sense that inspires questioning of own Being.

The clarification of Dasein’s relation to Being shows that what determines Dasein is not something outside of him, imposed anonymously, as if Dasein doesn’t have any control. In Heidegger’s articulation, it is rather Dasein’s activity and stance that set the technological enframing. The Being’s revelation is out of man’s activity, it is the man who “accomplishes the challenging setting-upon through which what we call the real is revealed as standing reserve[.]”81 “Technology is a way of revealing” deeply implies Being’s certain relation to Dasein. Technology does not refer to the object per se, of technological devices, but to the way Dasein’s stance conceals the primordial meaning of Being, where man only sense Being as beings.82 It is not a question of whether the technology benefits man or not, which Feenberg takes as issue (that could be another point for Heidegger); rather, Heidegger’s technology refers to how limited Dasein’s sense of what is real. Thus, what are technological devices and attitudes but expressions of a dominant understanding of Being, of a presupposed ontology that sees only entities, and where man is only treated as animals and nature as tools to be controlled.

Heidegger precisely refers to it as onto-theological metaphysics. Onto-theology forgets the Being because the manner it answers and thinks the “question of being”—what is being?—is identified with the search for the ultimate ground. Such quest either sees Being in substance ontology, the most general and ultimate ground of all beings; or theological, the highest of all beings. In both cases, they fail to think the difference between beings and Being, in short Being is confounded with beings. In both terms, the Dasein is seen as another entity, and technology another. This metaphysics of man, and that is not be a barbarian, uncultured and uneducated. “Heidegger, Letter on Humanism,” 200-202.


82 Feenberg’s analogy of culture and language is correct, and that every instance could be reflective with those concrete universals. However, it is debatable whether enframing refers exactly to the kind of culture and language. Although Heidegger takes note how language is the house of the Being. It is through language alone where a kind of thinking can be expressed, and thus the constellation of the possible presencing of what is. The enframing could be treated as at the ontological realm, more primordial than culture and language, and that which determines the language and culture.
fails to question the way wherein the essence of man belongs to the truth of being.

Heidegger radically calls for man to be free from the metaphysics that limits the thinking of Being into beings or entities, such is what Heidegger means by letting go. *Enframing* is not an insurmountable force that is imposed to man as Feenberg reads Heidegger. It has indeed determined much of the meaning of reality for the human being, but it does not mean Heidegger is hopeless for the new meaning to arise, the new way presencing, or the new mode where Being will be unconcealed. Heidegger is hopeful. Against Feenberg who reads the *Gelassenheit* as surrendering to insurmountable force of technology’s determinism, Heidegger’s real *Gelassenheit* rather is a conscious act of unconcealment of Being. It is a “step back,” as Heidegger puts it, an act of opposition to the limited ontology of beings, an opposition not by imposing another definition of Being, but an essential initial step of releasing one’s thinking from the underlying metaphysics that historically has determined it. The *Gelassenheit* is not Heidegger’ call for despair out of the fatalism of Being; it is rather an expression of freedom, a hopeful releasement of Dasein from his presupposed relation towards Being. Such releasement sets up clearing, where a new field of movement of thinking, and where everything—technology, life, man, nature—will be rethought anew.

**The Freedom of Dasein**

Man is not the lord of beings, Man is the shepherd of Being. Man loses nothing in this “less”; rather, he gains in that he attains the truth of Being. He gains the essential poverty of the shepherd, whose dignity consists in being called by Being itself into the preservation of Being’s truth. 83

Martin Heidegger, *Letter on Humanism*

Heidegger maintains his concept of freedom, despite the seeming determinism of his later works. In recognizing man’s ecstatic relation to the truth of Being, he underscores how man, in whatever way, takes part in the historical revelation of “what is.” The *Dasein* holds an important role not only in the constitution of *enframing*, but also to the release from such mode of thinking.

Heidegger, however, makes unknown the character of such new sense of reality that will be revealed out of Dasein’s freedom. With this point, Feenberg is right in noticing such problem of “high level of abstraction” in

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Heidegger’s thinking. Such ambiguity blocks and confuses the concrete solution (either political or not) to address the problems of modern technology, even if it is at the ontic or ontological level. To step back and let the Being reveal only sets up a clearing without determining what exactly such new sense of reality will be revealed. The exact concealment and unconcealment of Being remain unclear.

It is such task of clarifying Heidegger’s notion of “letting be” that the succeeding readers of Heidegger undertook. Schurmann, for instance, reads such Gelassenheit as a leap into practical grounds, what he calls as the “practical apriori.” It is to take priority of action over thinking, an idea even developed as early as in Being and Time where thinking is made dependent of doing or in the “mode of living.” Such practical a priori resonates much of the epistemological implication of praxis, where entities and objects are seen not as independent from the subject, rather united in man’s practical activity. Taking the lead of Schurmann’s reading, the call “to let the Being be” could be also understood as going back and acknowledging the truth of one’s Being, it could be the truth of one’s experience, life, and one’s throwness in a unique social, cultural, and political milieu. To “let it be” means to set out one’s Being, and not just mindlessly replicate the monolithic understanding of the reality in terms of logic, rationality, and control. Such alternative to rational thinking could be provided by art and poetry. They could be a way to Being, as Heidegger also thinks. Such arts are not solely dependent on “what is logical” but on “what is,” they have unique language that could say one’s unique experience of Being.

Heidegger anticipates that such new concealment will be distanced from understanding of Being merely as beings and mere tools for manipulation. Although it is fairly clear in Heidegger that his aim of letting be distances from the technological enframing, still, he does not assure what will be revealed would be less dangerous to humanity. It is possible that the revelation of one’s Being could not be as a profound experience of awe given by art. It could be appreciating life without why, but also it could be of anarchic actions of “killing without why.” In the same amount of possibility, given Heidegger’s abstractions, the unconcealment could be the German Nazi movement, which Heidegger’s commentators take also as a plausible reading.

84 Feenberg, Questioning Technology, 187.
86 This reading of Letter on Humanism in view of the circumstances that occurred in Germany is in fact Rabinbach’s historical interpretation of the Letter’s claims. It claims that the “Letter” is a post-Nazi confession of Heidegger, who in his silence of the political violence of his times, pardons himself from any
politically questionable.

Nevertheless, the limitation of Heidegger is not out of his determinism or even of his passivity. Heidegger could be accused of abstractions but not of denying man of freedom or denying man of any hope to be freed from enframing. Heidegger’s Gelassenheit is not a total passivity; rather, in its core, it testifies to the Dasein’s radical freedom, seeking not only to be freed from common activities but to be released from the presupposed sense of what is real, that throughout has determined the thinking and actions of the human being.

Heidegger cannot be categorized under determinism and fatalism, those ideas are rather crude interpretations of Heidegger. The idea that man is no longer a Sartrean creator of his own essence, where “existence precedes essence,” and where man in his letting go, surrenders everything into the destiny of technology and Being, misses the ontological context where Heidegger sets his reflection. Following Heidegger’s ontological context, even Sartre’s freedom is not free at all as it is still enslaved by a presupposed metaphysics of beings. Distinctively, Heidegger does not refer to the common freedom of man, but freedom from a certain ontological presumption that has historically determined such sense of what is. What’s novel with Heidegger’s thinking is on how he traces such limitation imposed not solely by obvious pressures and rules given by the society and situations. He thinks deeper, tracing the limitations of our thinking from the very way we see and understand that which “is,” the limitation imposed by the metaphysics that grounds our thinking.

Despite the accusation of abstraction, Heidegger’s thinking could be taken as a reminder of another possible mode where Dasein could relate to Being, where man could be released from the previous concealment of Being. In the Letter on Humanism, Heidegger speaks that man’s essence is existence, where man is no longer the master but the shepherd of Being. With this, Heidegger frees man from the determinations of the conception that man is a mere animalitas, either as a homo faber, or homo economicus, or a practical animal. Heidegger calls thinking to be released from such ready-made understanding of man. He places man rather into the nearness of Being, where man, although no longer a lord, is a shepherd. As a shepherd, the Dasein is not a slave. The Dasein is free and still an agent, and it is out of shepherd’s freedom to again listen to his originary relationship to Being. It is up to Dasein to step back and let go of the metaphysics of beings, commit to the alternative stance whose character perhaps is not of grasping but waiting, not of demanding but guarding, not of imposing but being open to the possibility of the emergence of the other meaning of “what is”

that perhaps has been long forgotten.

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