The Method of Kant’s *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*:
Establishing Moral Metaphysics as a Science

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy

by

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NOTE ON SOURCES AND TRANSLATIONS

References to Kant use standard Academy pagination from Kant’s *gesammelte Schriften*:

A/B  

BL (24:7-301)  

DR (6:205-372)  

DV (6:373-493)  

DWL (24:676-784)  

G (4:387-4:463)  

HL  

JL (9:1-150)  

KpV (5:1-163)  

KU (5:167-484)  
*(20:193-251)*  

MFNS (4:467-565)  

MM (6:205-493)  

P (4:255-383)  

VL (24:787-940)  

References to G. F. Meier use original 1752 pagination (marginal pagination in the reprint):

ML  
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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

The Method of Kant’s *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*:
Establishing Moral Metaphysics as a Science

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This dissertation concerns the methodology Kant employs in the first two sections of the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (Groundwork I-II)* with particular attention to how the execution of the method of analysis in these sections contributes to the establishment of moral metaphysics as a science. My thesis is that Kant had a detailed strategy for the *Groundwork*, this strategy and Kant’s reasons for adopting it can be ascertained from the first *Critique* and his lectures on logic, and understanding this strategy gains us interpretive insight into Kant’s moral metaphysics.

At the most general level of methodology, there are four steps for the establishment of any science:

1) make distinct the idea of the natural unity of its material
2) determine the special content of the science
3) articulate the systematic unity of the science
4) critique the science to determine its boundaries

The first two of these steps are accomplished by the genetically scholastic method of analysis, paradigmatically the method whereby confused and obscure ideas are made
clear and distinct, thereby logically perfecting them and transforming them into possible grounds of cognitive insight that are potentially complete and adequate to philosophical purposes. The analysis of *Groundwork I* is a paradigmatic analysis that makes distinct what is contained *in* common understanding, i.e. that makes distinct the higher, partial concepts that together define the concept of morality. The analysis of *Groundwork II* is an employment more specifically of the method of logical division, which makes distinct what is contained *under* the concept by which the extension or object of morality is determined.

Part I introduces Kant’s conception of moral metaphysical science and why he took it to be in need of establishment, explains the general method for establishing science and the scholastic method of analysis by which its first two steps are to be accomplished, then provides an interpretation of *Groundwork I* as an execution of this method. Part II details Kant’s determination of the special content of moral science in *Groundwork II* in relation to the central problem for moral metaphysics – how synthetic a priori *practical* cognition is possible.
Introduction

Immanuel Kant’s *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* is one of the most widely used and highly influential texts in philosophy, despite the fact that it is openly acknowledged by Kant scholars to be quite poorly understood. Some aspects of Kant’s moral theory like his formula of humanity express deep insights in moral and political theory that have had profound and widespread influence not only among philosophers and ethicists but also in jurisprudence, politics, and even popular culture. Despite its influence, the central tenet of this moral theory – namely the categorical imperative – is so philosophically problematic that it threatens to undermine these insights and call their use into question. It is disturbing that despite two hundred years of philosophical discourse and human impact there is so little consensus as to what Kant’s principles and arguments really were. We have his words in print, certainly, but what they really mean and how we ought to utilize them is still rather an open question.

Controversies regarding the *Groundwork* range in topic from Constructivism to Compatibilism, but the most fundamental of these ongoing controversies concerns Kant’s method of argument and the structure of the *Groundwork*. Kant cryptically states his method in the Preface as follows:

The present *Groundwork* is…nothing more than the search for and establishment of the supreme principle of morality, which constitutes by itself a business that in its purpose is complete and to be kept apart from every other moral investigation…I have adopted my method in this text, which I believe is the most suitable, if one wants to proceed analytically from common cognition to the determination of its supreme principle, and in turn synthetically from the examination of this principle and its sources back to the common cognition in which we find it used. (G 4:392 emphasis mine)

Nowhere in the *Groundwork* does Kant explain what he means by the search for and establishment of the supreme principle of morality. Nowhere does he explain what he means by the analytic method, the synthetic method, or why these methods would be
appropriate to the task. The problem is exacerbated by Kant’s immediately following declaration that

Accordingly, the division turns out as follows:
1. First section: Transition from common rational to philosophic moral cognition
2. Second section: Transition from popular moral philosophy to metaphysics of morals
3. Third section: Final step from metaphysics of morals to the critique of pure practical reason. (G 4:392 emphasis Kant’s)

These section titles make no mention of a supreme principle of morality, analysis, synthesis, determination, or any other key term that might help connect the method just stated to this division of the text into sections. To make matters worse, there is no indication in the Preface as to why one should begin with common rational cognition, or even what Kant means by this. It is unclear whether philosophic moral cognition is synonymous with popular moral philosophy for Kant, in which case the division between the first two sections might be arbitrary, or whether Kant for some reason begins anew in the second section with a different starting point rather than continuing the original transition.

Due to the opacity of Kant’s statement of method and division, the consensus among Kant scholars is limited to a vague idea that a satisfactory interpretation of the *Groundwork* takes seriously that the body of the text begins with analysis, ends with synthesis, and its purpose is to “establish” a supreme principle of morality, though what these terms mean and how Kant might satisfy these criteria is wide open to interpretation. Nearly all treatments of Kant’s methodology in the *Groundwork* are vague, cursory, and fail to provide significant insight into how Kant carries out the method he explicitly identifies (cf. Hill, Korsgaard, Paton, Wood). Even when the issue is limited to the structure of just the first section, *Groundwork I*, debates over Kant’s method include disagreement as to the identification of the analysandum, whether the analysis constitutes
a valid deduction, whether the analysis is regressive or progressive, where the analysis ends, and what the analysis was intended to accomplish or establish. The location and nature of the transition from analysis to synthesis and the synthesis itself are even more controversial, and the division into sections is typically taken to be less informative than the statement of method from which it allegedly follows.

My purpose in this dissertation is to show that Kant’s Grundlegung zur Metaphysic der Sitten is in fact Kant’s execution of the first stage of the following well-considered method for establishing moral metaphysics as a science (Wissenschaft). The establishment of the supreme principle of morality in the Groundwork as a whole is, methodologically speaking, the establishment of a moral hypothesis, which is a purpose complete in itself that is specific to moral science (A769/B797ff, A795/B823ff). This “establishment” has three parts. The first two of these three parts are the first two steps of establishing any science according to the first Critique and the Prolegomena. Groundwork I is a scholastic \(^{5}\) analysis by which our unclear and indistinct in concreto common cognition of morality is made philosophically clear and distinct in abstracto. Groundwork II is an employment of the method of logical division, which is a specific kind of analysis whereby Kant shows how the clear and distinct idea contained in the common one determines the extension contained under the special content of morality (JL 140). Together these two phases of analysis lay the groundwork for our cognitive grasp of moral metaphysics as a science. Groundwork III is an execution of the method of synthesis \(^{6}\) by which the hypothesis of freedom is established as the condition of all possible practice, where this result is synthesized from the various “data” that resulted from the analysis in Groundwork I-II. In this dissertation I will explicate only how Groundwork I-II execute the first two steps of establishing moral metaphysics as a
science, but with attention to how these first two steps contribute to the remainder of Kant’s project.

§1 Traditional Interpretations of *Groundwork I-II*

Though the bulk of the secondary literature concerning Kant’s *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* is not primarily concerned with the structure of Kant’s argument or Kant’s methodology and does not make it central, there are exceptions. What most method-oriented interpretations have in common, especially those concerning *Groundwork I*, is that they share a bottom-up, detail-centered, isolationist method of interpretation. By this I mean they begin with the details of the body of the text and reverse-engineer the argument, with virtually no appeal to or enlightenment from the critical context of the *Groundwork*. Typically the interpreter identifies statements in the body of the *Groundwork* that appear to be premises and conclusions, for example the three propositions in *Groundwork I* or the three formulas in *Groundwork II*, and the project is to make sense of how these statements fit together in a way that might suit the prefatory statement of method. Passages that do not fit neatly into the structure so understood are either glossed or ignored.

As a general overview of the problem, reverse-engineered interpretations of the *Groundwork* for the most part take *Groundwork I* to be a moral deduction, while *Groundwork II* is a progression from the abstract moral to something more concrete, and *Groundwork III* is a metaphysical argument for transcendental freedom. Kant, in contrast, says that the first part of the *Groundwork* is an *analysis* and this analysis is followed by a *synthesis* which completes the establishment of the supreme principle of morality. The very disunity of the results of reverse-engineering should indicate that this interpretive methodology is inadequate. Reverse-engineers have been unable to explain
how the three sections constitute one complete, well-planned argument that fits Kant’s
descriptions of the structure and nature of his argument.

To take a more specific example, at one end of the reverse-engineering
interpretive spectrum interpreters like Sam Rickless take *Groundwork I* to be a deductive
argument (Rickless 2004). Rickless takes Kant’s frequent use of iiliatives, most
importantly Kant’s statement that the “third proposition” is a “consequence” of the first
two, to be strong evidence that Kant’s so-called method of analysis in *Groundwork I* is
really the method of deductive argument (G 4:400). The general problem for deductive
interpretations of *Groundwork I* is that it is enormously difficult to interpret *Groundwork
I* as a good deductive argument. Kant explicitly identifies only two of the three
propositions he mentions, P2 and P3 below. The deductive reverse engineer must take
the last two propositions as given and extrapolate back to identify a candidate for the first
proposition. For example, a typical deductive interpretation might reverse engineer from
P2 and P3 back to 1:

(1) A human action has moral worth only if it is done from duty.
(P2) An action from duty has its moral worth not in the purpose to be attained by
it but in the maxim in accordance with which it is decided upon. (G 4:399).
(P3) Duty is the necessity of an action from respect for law (G 4:400).
(C) I ought never act except in such a way that my maxim should become
through my will a universal law (G 4:402).

The problem for the reverse engineer is then to fill in any other implicit premises or
reasoning necessary to make this at least appear to be a valid argument. The traditional
reverse engineering project for a deductive interpretation of *Groundwork I* is to specify
Kant’s first premise on the basis of the second two, to make explicit and evaluate Kant’s
justification for the first two premises, and then to close “Aune’s gap” between P3 and
the “conclusion” C, which is Kant’s first statement of the moral law (Aune 1979; see also
The problem with deductive reverse engineering interpretations like Rickless’ is not that the propositional argument cannot plausibly be made sound. I will allow for the sake of argument that it can. The real problem is that according to virtually all deductive interpretations, the first half of *Groundwork I* makes no contribution to the real argument of *Groundwork I*. The obviously deontic, potentially deductive argument (the three propositions concerning duty) is preceded in *Groundwork I* by passages concerning the goodness of a good will and the teleology of reason, and these make no mention of duty. Since the first half of *Groundwork I* most plausibly does not concern duty, the deductive reverse-engineering strategy of interpretation makes it extremely difficulty to attribute any purpose to the first half of *Groundwork I*, especially when considered only in isolation from Kant’s work elsewhere. Rickless in particular takes the first three paragraphs concerning the goodness of a good will to be a deduction in their own right, but one that is “otiose” to the propositional argument.

If we attempt to remedy this by identifying the first proposition as the opening statement of *Groundwork I* rather than some deontic deductive premise (an assertion concerning duty) that we interpolate from the others, then the gap between the first and second premises makes the validity of the argument even more difficult to show:

(GW) Only a good will could be considered good without qualification (G 4:393).
(P2) An action from duty has its moral worth not in the purpose to be attained by it but in the maxim in accordance with which it is decided upon (G 4:399).
(P3) Duty is the necessity of an action from respect for law (G 4:400).
(C) I ought never act except in such a way that my maxim should become through my will a universal law (G 4:402).

Korsgaard and a few others have arguably made a good case for this kind of interpretation, but no such deductive interpretation to date has made essential use of the teleological argument. So the teleological argument still appears to be an irrelevant digression and perhaps even an embarrassment. If the best deductive interpretation that
can be given of *Groundwork I* makes absolutely no use of several paragraphs, possibly even the first half of the section, then either Kant did a very bad job in writing *Groundwork I* or it was never meant to be a deductive argument.

At the other end of the interpretive spectrum, Allen Wood argues that *Groundwork I* has virtually no structure at all (Wood 1999, 21ff). Wood notes that Kant says it is his aim to explicate the idea of a good will, which would naturally imply that *Groundwork I* is an exposition, i.e. a kind of analysis, rather than a deduction. In support of this Wood goes so far as to correctly indicate that in the first two sections Kant’s analysis is “(in scholastic-Aristotelian terms) moving from ‘what is more evident to us’ toward the ‘first principle’ (G 4:445)” (ibid, 18), and to note that Kant’s starting point is an unreflective common understanding (ibid, 19-20). On Wood’s view, however, Kant fails to follow through. As Wood sees it, the good will is not in fact explicated in *Groundwork I*.¹ The text is instead something like a discussion aimed to direct our attention to “certain special cases of good will” (ibid 27). According to Wood there is a substantive unity to Kant’s thought, but there is no methodological unity to Kant’s presentation – Kant is not systematic in his transition from the initial topic of good willing to the special cases of interest. As Wood understands *Groundwork I*, the teleological argument is actually a caveat on Kant’s part (ibid, 25-26), but this is of little interest because “we should lower our expectations for the First Section” anyway (ibid, 20). As I see it, it is bad enough that on Rickless’ view Kant begins the body of the *Groundwork* with irrelevant or dispensable arguments, but on Wood’s view Kant really has no strategy – there really is no method to the *Groundwork*, strictly speaking.

¹ Wood is far less cautious in his unpublished work on this point, even to the point of arguing that the *Groundwork* is not really about good will at all.
The interpretive problem for *Groundwork II* is quite similar, even though it does not appear to be a deduction. While *Groundwork I* involved three propositions that might constitute a deduction, *Groundwork II* involves three “formulas” of the moral law that constitute a “progression”, which Kant says “brings the moral law closer to intuition and thereby to feeling,” and which somehow does so in connection with “matter”, “form”, and “complete determination”, as well as in connection with the “unity”, “plurality”, and “totality” of the moral law (G 4: 436-7). If this is not mysterious enough, the second formula has something to do with “reality” (but does not prove the reality of the moral law), while the third formula has to do with an “idea” and the first formula is adequate for “appraisal”, while the second two are better for “access” (G 4:425, 431, 437). There has recently been a consensus that there are in fact three formulas as Kant says, but which of the five front-running candidates they must be is still somewhat in contention. Everything else is open to debate (See my Part II Outline of *Groundwork II* and chapters 7-8).

Because it is so unclear what Kant even means by a formula of the moral law, most interpretations of *Groundwork II* focus on one formula and attempt to explicate its implications for human agents. The derivation of duties and casuistry are paramount concerns, and these are greatly frustrated by Kant’s parsimony – he gives only four brief derivations of duties, using these same four for both the first and second formulas and providing no derivations of duty from the final formula. The bulk of Kant’s articulation of specific duties and examples are in an entirely different text, *The Metaphysics of Morals*, so *Groundwork II* is not at all as useful in this regard as one might hope. The dearth of guiding examples in *Groundwork II* makes it far easier to reduce Kant’s first formula of the moral law to absurdity than to extend it to other cases (see for example Steinberger 1999).
The most method-oriented interpretations of *Groundwork II* focus on the progression from the first formula as a formula of moral appraisal to the third formula as a formula that is closer to intuition and more accessible (e.g. Korsgaard 1996). For lack of any obvious alternative, the progression is typically assumed to be one that makes the very *abstract* first formula a basis for, or a guide to, the more *concrete* second and third formulas. Given that the second and third formulas are themselves extremely abstract, Kant seems to make little progress in this regard. He would have done better to make the moral law concrete through casuistry, even by his own admission (JL 38-9), and this makes Kant seem rather inept. What is worse from my perspective, a mere progression from abstract to concrete does not do well to explain why there must be specifically three formulas, specifically these three, or what they have to do with matter and form, the categories of quantity, or the real and the ideal. An architectonic interpretation must explain all these methodological clues as contributing, though perhaps in different ways, to what Kant *ought* to include in a groundwork of moral metaphysics.

§2 Interpretive Resistance to the Metaphysics of Morality

The starting point for moving from a vague and cursory methodology to a philosophically insightful understanding of Kant’s methodology in the *Groundwork* is to acknowledge that the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* is literally *about* metaphysics, specifically *moral metaphysics*, just as the title indicates. Kantian ethicists have resisted this because they have wanted very much to show that Kant was correct and his moral philosophy is compelling, despite the long-held strong consensus that Kant’s *non*-moral metaphysics is deeply flawed. Very briefly, one of the most prominent theses of the first *Critique* is that space and time are nothing other than transcendentally ideal pure a priori forms of intuition. Kant argued that this thesis, commonly known as “transcendental idealism,” is central to solving many problems in metaphysics
The interpretation of this thesis and its supporting arguments has been so controversial that transcendental idealism has acquired a conventional meaning akin to “whatever is distinctive about Kant’s metaphysics”. The long history of opposition to Kant’s metaphysics has imparted a negative connotation to this conventional meaning to such an extent that it is sometimes used to mean “whatever is wrong with Kant’s metaphysics”.

As metaphysics, the *Groundwork* would obviously stand to inherit the flaws of the first *Critique*. The task of extricating the metaphysics of the *Groundwork* from the widely advertised flaws of the first *Critique* is quite daunting. It is far simpler to rescue the *Groundwork* by interpreting it as a moral text rather than a metaphysical one. Most interpreters of Kant’s ethics consequently avoid the entire theory of mind Kant develops in the first *Critique* in order to ensure that they do not run afoul of the dreaded transcendental idealism in one of its various guises. Since metaphysics and morality are commonly treated as independent domains of philosophy these days, this tactic of separation has seemed to many to be a reasonable approach despite Kant’s warnings against it (see for example Bxlvii and KpV 5:7). Interpretive strategies for the *Groundwork* have consequently been quite consistent in avoiding mention of transcendental idealism, in treating the moral as an independent and self-contained domain of inquiry, and in making little or no use of Kant’s primary non-moral text in which transcendental idealism appears, namely the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

More recently Kant’s conclusions in the realms of moral psychology and anthropology (e.g. moral motivation, deliberation, responsibility, disorders and their treatments, moral education, and so on) have also been vehemently rejected as sexist, racist, classist, and as being in direct conflict with the moral principles from which they are allegedly drawn (e.g. Bernasconi 2003 and Schott 1997; see also Wood 1999, 2-3).
Not surprisingly then, the perceived flaws at both ends of Kant’s philosophical work have led Kantian ethicists to an isolationist interpretive strategy of studying the *Groundwork* completely independently from all Kant’s other work, even from texts that are obviously moral like the *Metaphysics of Morals*. As a result Kantian ethicists have consistently taken Kant’s first obviously moral critical text, the *Groundwork*, to be the starting point of interpretation and often the endpoint as well.

At some level we all have the goal of finding the moral theory or principle that is best or right or true, but we cannot evaluate whether Kant’s moral theory is correct without understanding it. It makes little sense to apologetically cut Kant’s argument off at the head and the knees in the interest of studying its torso without their interference. Kant explicitly tells his readers that the texts of his critical philosophy form a system which we must “think through” and that the domains cannot be properly understood if they are treated independently (Bxxxvii-viii, KpV 5:10). He consistently describes the argument structure of his critical philosophy as being architectonic and uses architectural analogies to explain the kind of complex interdependence he thinks his metaphysics has, e.g. freedom as the “keystone” of a philosophical arch without which the entire edifice would fall (KpV 5:3-4).

A rejection of Kant’s central metaphysical theses cannot be a premise of accurate interpretation. Whether the *Groundwork* inherits any flaws from the first *Critique* should be a consideration for critical evaluation only subsequent to a detailed understanding of the whole.⁵ If we resolve to interpret Kant as literally and accurately as possible, from his titles to his footnotes, and we accept this architectonic dependence as a requirement of accurate interpretation, the *Critique of Pure Reason* must be the starting point of interpretation for Kant’s moral theory. Instead of focusing on transcendental idealism and trying to save the first *Critique* from its allegedly fatal flaw, however, the agenda
should be to ascertain what the first Critique offers to contribute to the Groundwork. The Transcendental Aesthetic in which transcendental idealism is proposed and defended is only a small part of the first Critique. Though few of the Groundwork’s concepts are defined or explained in the Groundwork itself, nearly all of them are defined, explained, and even treated at length in the Critique of Pure Reason. For example, Kant not only explains what he means by reason in general, he distinguishes its real use from its logical use and sets out the various sorts of principles involved in reason (A298ff/B355ff). Even a slightly better understanding of the structure of reason is enormously helpful in understand what sort of principle a maxim must be, what an imperative is, and how these relate to the supreme principle of morality (A298ff/B355ff, A796/B824, A812/B840, A547/B575). In addition to all the useful definitions and explanations, the first Critique contains statements and sometimes explanations of the criteria Kant thinks he must meet in the Groundwork. Most perspicuously, the Doctrine of Method concluding the first Critique explains where the critical project stands just prior to the Groundwork and what must yet be done (A707/B735ff).

§3  Embracing Scholastic Logic and Method without Dogma

Though the first Critique is immensely useful in understanding the conceptual framework of the Groundwork, it cannot by itself explain why Kant begins the Groundwork with an analysis, ends with a synthesis, and so on. This is because just as the Groundwork presumes familiarity with Kant’s first Critique, the first Critique in turn presumes familiarity with the logic Kant taught for decades. As Michael Young notes in his translators introduction to Kant’s Lectures on Logic,

Kant characterizes the [first] Critique – or the major portion of it, at least – as an essay in transcendental logic. This means, on the one hand, that the work is to be understood as containing something different from logic, something [transcendental] that does not deal merely with the canons of all thought, but with the concepts and principles governing knowledge of objects in space and time. It
also means, however, that both in the broad sweep of its architectonic and in the detail of much of its argument the Critique assumes familiarity with Kant’s views on logic; for transcendental logic, though different from logic proper, is supposed to build upon the latter. In dividing transcendental logic into an Analytic and a Dialectic, in deriving the table of categories, in classifying the dialectical inferences of pure reason, and in numerous other instances as well, Kant simply assumes that his readers are familiar with his views on logic...Kant’s approach to logic falls within what can broadly be called the Aristotelian tradition, which has in important ways been superseded. (Young 1992, xv)

It has become increasingly more widely acknowledged and accepted that the first Critique depends upon and is informed by Kant’s logic (Tonelli 1974, Hinske 1998). It has not yet become widely accepted that Kant’s logic is genetically Aristotelian or that this fact is useful. As to the former, that Kant’s logic is genetically Aristotelian, Kant indicates quite clearly that Aristotle established logic and logic has needed only some refinement over the ages (e.g. Bviii). The logic textbook Kant chose for his lectures, Georg Friedrich Meier’s Vernunftlehre (doctrine of reason), has an obvious scholastic organization and content. Moreover, the first Critique is clearly structured by this understanding of logic. In addition to the features Young mentions above, in the A Preface (the Preface to the first edition) Kant runs through the standard scholastic logical perfections in application to the Critique, using boldface for these terms and describing how his critique will live up to them. All indications are that Kant considered the transcendental logic of the first Critique to be much more a subtle refinement than a radical departure from scholastic logic.

Despite Kant’s obvious embrace of Aristotle and the scholars with respect to logic this fact has nevertheless gained no interpretive purchase, and this is not entirely without reason. To play devil’s advocate, we might reasonably be cautious about importing scholastic logic wholesale into Kant’s metaphysics because Kant clearly indicates

2 The three instances Young mentions here as giving evidence that Kant assumes familiarity with his logic are all features of scholastic logic deriving from Aristotle’s Analytics which Kant intentionally adopted (see JL 20, A94/B128, JL 120ff respectively)
contempt for dogmatists, specifically the dogma of the Aristotelian “schools” (e.g. Aix, Axviii, Bxxxff, especially Bxxx-vi). Yet it was specifically the dogma, the pedantry, the “hair-splitting”, and the rote ‘learning’ of the schools to which Kant and his contemporaries objected, not the content or substance of scholastic logic (JL 46-7, 83-4; BL 205ff). Kant was not alone in this. Meier clearly shared this contempt for “pedantry” of “merely scholastic” logic, but denied that his Vernunftlehre was either an innovation or a reformation of scholastic logic (ML III-V).

It is important, then, to distinguish between the dogmatic, pedantic, bureaucratic attitudes and practices of the schools, and the content to which they take these despised approaches. By failing to distinguish between what is objectionable in the “merely” scholastic and what is substantive and valuable in the logic of the schools, overly cautious Kantian metaphysicians have avoided the obviously Aristotelian logic for fear of importing faulty scholastic dogma. In other words, just as Kantian ethicists have avoided Kant’s metaphysics in order to gain independence from transcendental idealism, Kantian metaphysicians have avoided Kant’s general logic in order to free its transcendental logic from scholasticism. It might be argued, though, that interpretive independence of Kant’s metaphysics from his logic is even more warranted because those who study the first Critique have so far found little need to appeal to general logic in order to explain Kant’s transcendental metaphysics. Since the Groundwork appears to be even further removed from general logic than the first Critique, and it is perhaps not even metaphysical, Kantian ethicists have been disinclined to even investigate whether Kant’s logic and its historical context might provide insight into the method of the Groundwork.

Apart from these concerns regarding interpretive contamination and independence, the evolution of logic has also contributed to the traditionally assumed independence of the Groundwork from Kant’s logic. Logic has changed so much since
Kant’s time that the kind of logic he taught is now unfamiliar to most philosophers. The logic of the Aristotelian tradition has been superseded by symbolic logic and set theory; and parts of Aristotelian logic have been split off into philosophy of language, epistemology, and philosophy of science. Method in particular once belonged to logic but has since become part of epistemology or philosophy of science, resulting in a widespread loss of familiarity with scholastic logic over time that has obscured important features of Kant’s methodology. Method as Kant understood it was structured by the scholastic perfections of thought (BL 290ff). Meier’s Vernunftlehre is the gateway a rich history that could be, but has not been, drawn upon to better understand the structure of Kant’s arguments:

Hinske has shown that Kant gradually put together new philosophical language by drawing upon traditional Greek-Latin or Latin terms and recent Germanizations; and both sort of terms were available to Kant from Meier in great number. For an example, Hinske points out the development of Kant’s understanding of ‘science’. (Pozzo 188)

Together Kant’s contempt for scholastic dogma, the apparent distance between the Groundwork and general logic and our ignorance of scholastic methods have had a very limiting effect on the power and scope of interpretation. By reintroducing Kant’s Lectures on Logic as a guide to the broad outlines of the largely Aristotelian logic Kant took to be uncontroversial, I explain how and why Kant thought these particular methods must be employed and to what end. The scholastic concept of science and the method of analysis that originated with the Ancient Greeks both continued to develop through the scholars, Descartes, Newton, and Leibniz to Kant. As Kant and Meier understood it, a science is simply a kind of system, namely a small finite set of principles from which an entire body of knowledge can be articulated, e.g. Euclidean geometry or Newtonian mechanics (JL 14-16).
This strikingly powerful structure, namely the unity of principle from which a
great plurality follows, is distinctive of *gelehrnte Erkenntnis* (literally learned cognition).
Learned cognition is the highest perfection of cognition, the kind of cognition belonging
only to the learned, the wise, literati, or experts by some other name. Meier’s
*Vernunftlehre* is entirely concerned with this kind of scientific, philosophical cognition.
Every section of the *Vernunftlehre* is entitled according to the particular perfection of
*gelehrnte Erkenntnis* that is to be elaborated in it. This organization according to
scholastic perfections is important because, again, according to Kant,

> [m]ethod is nothing other than the form of a whole of cognitions [form of a
> science], insofar as it is arranged according to the rules of logical
> perfection…either logical perfection according to healthy [common] reason or
> logical perfections according to learnedness and science [proper]. (BL 289-90).

The doctrine of method contains the precepts for the possibility of a system of
cognition of the understanding and reason. It is, then, the doctrine of *methodus*.
*Methodus* – the way cognition can attain scientific form. (DWL 779)

The *clarity* and *distinctness* of learned cognition are of particular interest because these
are the perfections that a cognition gains primarily through analysis and without which
there can be no science (BL 263). The method of analysis is most generally a method
whereby confused and obscure representations can be made into *clear and distinct ideas*
(cf. Descartes), and in some cases the resulting clear and distinct ideas are *complete ideas*
(cf. Leibniz) or grounds of complete cognitive insight into things. Putting these together,
analysis is the method whereby we discover the first principles of a science, and this is
the first step of establishing any science – identifying the laws or first principles from
which the body of cognition can be articulated.

Setting the details aside for the moment, what I claim is that if morality is
*something*, and not an “empty figment of the brain” as Kant might say, it must be
possible to develop a metaphysics of morality that harmonizes with metaphysics more
generally (A770/B798). A better understanding of Kant’s logic and the *Critique of Pure*
Reason reveals a surprisingly rich methodology by which a metaphysics of morality might be developed. Attention to this methodology makes it possible to ascertain and critically evaluate Kant’s strategies, the criteria of their success, and the execution of his plan for establishing moral metaphysics as a science in the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*. Attention to this methodology is possible because the *Groundwork* is the second text about metaphysics in Kant’s critical series and its methodology is derived from the genetically scholastic logic that Kant taught for decades.

§4 On *Groundwork III* and the *Groundwork as a Whole*

Now quite in contrast to *Groundwork I-II*, the secondary literature concerning *Groundwork III* is overwhelmingly method-oriented and architectonic. This is primarily because *Groundwork III* is acknowledged to be a metaphysical argument for transcendental freedom, and Kant’s first *Critique* is unavoidably relevant to any such argument. Unfortunately these more architectonic treatments of *Groundwork III* for the most part ignore or exclude *Groundwork I-II*. *Groundwork III* is not thought to depend on *Groundwork I-II* in any important way, so the architecture elaborated in these interpretations depends primarily on the first and second *Critiques*.

To give a specific example, Karl Ameriks has arguably proven that architectonic methods of interpretation work in general, but not for *Groundwork I-II* (Ameriks 2003). Ameriks’ work is an excellent example of a clearly a top-down, metaphysical approach that takes seriously and makes good use of the systematic methodological structure of Kant’s philosophy. Ameriks’ approach is nevertheless quite topical, and his close adherence to the “moderately regressive” four-step “transcendental procedure” prevents him from explaining how *Groundwork I-II* can make any substantive contribution to the critical architecture.
Since Ameriks takes such pains to use the very kind of methodology I advocate in this dissertation, it is worth taking some time to explain his argument and why it does not do justice to *Groundwork I-II*. Ameriks describes his method of interpretation as taking an “internal comparative” approach to Kant’s critical system with the intention of providing a “unified and non-elementary treatment of fundamental issues in all the main branches of the Critical philosophy” (*ibid*, 2 emphasis mine). The general idea is that the “broader patterns and key developments of Kant’s thought” share “not only a common general philosophical position but also several very similar argumentative structures” (*ibid*, 3), so “sensitivity” to the parallels between the *Critiques* allows Ameriks to interpret difficult aspects of one text by appealing to patterns of argument in another. Ameriks accordingly attributes to Kant the following four-step “transcendental procedure”:

- (E) starting point in common experience;
- (TD) transcendental derivation from (E) of various pure forms, categories, or principles;
- (TI) an ultimate metaphysical account of all this as making sense only on the basis of transcendental idealism;
- (AUT) a guiding idea and concluding argument that the first three steps are the essential prerequisites for vindicating human autonomy in various senses; - where the form of the argument is E only if TD, this only if TI, and given E and TD, AUT only if TI.

Supposing for the sake of argument that Ameriks is correct and this is the overall form of the entire critical argument, *Groundwork I-II* primarily concerns only the first two of Ameriks’ four steps. This is not a problem in itself, but it leads him to neglect *Groundwork I-II* because the last two steps concern transcendental idealism and this is an extremely controversial topic. Ameriks is overtly concerned primarily with how the three *Critiques* support transcendental idealism. In the practical context this leads Ameriks to concern himself almost exclusively with the second *Critique* and the argument for freedom in *Groundwork III*, with no concern for why the first two steps of the procedure
should be the initial steps of establishing moral metaphysics as a science in *Groundwork I-II*. Ameriks orients his interpretation to topics concerning the last two steps, like the distinction between things in themselves and appearances, skeptical concerns regarding whether ordinary experience is sound, and how transcendental idealism differs from both idealism and realism.

As I diagnose the problem here, Ameriks’ ignorance (or rejection) of Kant’s logic and scholastic methods impairs his understanding of Kant’s method in *Groundwork I-II*. Like most Kant scholars, Ameriks assumes that Kant rejects scholasticism entirely, or virtually so, and that Kant’s metaphysics is therefore best understood in a much more local historical context, roughly from Descartes to Leibniz and his intellectual descendents. While this is true topically, it is not true methodologically – Kant rejects the dogma of scholasticism, but not its logic or methods. The substantive metaphysical issues for Kant are seventeenth to eighteenth century issues, but the method goes back to Socrates (see my chapters 2-3).

Consequently, even though Ameriks indicates an awareness that common understanding is vague and that Kant must use common understanding to arrive at “pure components” of experience, he glosses the method by which this is to be done as “philosophical reflection and argument” (*ibid*, 10). This is clearly much too vague to allow anyone to predict any of the details of Kant’s argument between these endpoints. Having no ready alternative, Ameriks assumes that the method of Kant’s argument in the *Groundwork* as a whole is a deduction of freedom from premises and takes a rather dismal view of the value of this argument to the critical project (*ibid*, 161-2). His pessimism is in part due to his skepticism that a “preparatory elucidation” which explicitly falls short of proof can nevertheless make progress towards cognitive insight (*ibid*, 170). Since he thinks Kant’s method for *Groundwork I-II* is not compelling,
Ameriks’ only real engagement with *Groundwork I-II*, in “Kant on the Good Will”, is topical and no more methodological or metaphysical than the three traditional views of good will he compares and contrasts.³ In the end Ameriks finds it very difficult to fit the *Groundwork* into Kant’s broader critical project.³³ Because the *Groundwork* does not have the “regressive” structure of a critique, Ameriks concludes that there is a “great reversal” in Kant’s position rather than a “deep continuity in these major texts” that includes the *Groundwork* as an integral part (*ibid*, 43).⁴ This is not an ideal result of architectonic interpretation and it constitutes an admission of defeat on Ameriks part.

Ameriks’ skepticism and ultimate defeat with respect to *Groundwork I-II* are born of ignorance, not from a careful consideration of Kant’s genetically scholastic doctrine of clear and distinct ideas. In the spirit of Ameriks’ own project, then, it is incumbent upon us to investigate Kant’s methodology, evaluate it, and ascertain whether the architecture of Kant’s critical philosophy may rest more heavily on *Groundwork I-II* than has thus far

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³ Rather than choose between what Ameriks calls the “particular intention”, “general capacity”, and “whole character” views of good will as he advocates, I argue that good will is a common understanding of a capacity that is best metaphysically identified as practical cognition (Bix-x; G 4:389, 420, 444); this capacity has both an empirical and intellectual character; and it realizes particular intentions in a way that is appropriately context sensitive. In other words, upon analysis the vague common notion of good will yields all three – they are not mutually exclusive alternatives as Ameriks’ treatment implies. The first three paragraphs of *Groundwork I* are only the bare beginning of the exposition of morally good will as (pure) practical cognition.

⁴ If the *Groundwork* is not a critique but instead the establishment of a hypothesis, as I contend, it should not have the structure of a critique but there should be similarities because both involve a use of the method of synthesis. The method of hypothesis begins with analysis, which is progressive, and concludes with a use of the method of synthesis, which is regressive (B115, JL 149; see also JL 84-6, BL 220-24). But this synthesis in *Groundwork III* is not precisely the same kind of “putting together” that is used in the method of synthesis required for a transcendental deduction. All of this helps to explain why the regressive/progressive issue has been so confusing for interpreters who attempt to sort out what the *Groundwork* accomplishes in comparison to the second *Critique*. A richer and more profound understanding of available methodology yields much better results for the architectonic method of interpretation because it can explain the need for a *Groundwork* establishment of the hypothesis of freedom before critique (see chapter 6).
been supposed. Kant says his actual method specifically begins with a particular kind of analysis, and this method is explained in some detail in Kant’s logic lectures. As I will argue, Kant has good reasons for thinking his analysis can secure the conditions of the possibility of his analysandum, even if we can never gain theoretical insight into some metaphysically troublesome aspects of morality like how reason can yield pleasure a priori or how God is invested in the highest good.

Although I will restrict my focus to *Groundwork I-II* in this dissertation, it is nevertheless necessary for any such interpretation with architectonic aspirations to indicate how *Groundwork I-II* contribute to *Groundwork III* and what kind of argument Kant is making in the *Groundwork* as a whole. To give a bit more detail as to the positive interpretation I will advocate in this dissertation, there are three levels to Kant’s methodology for the *Groundwork*. At the most general level of methodology, Kant is working to establish moral metaphysics as a science. There are four steps for the establishment of any science:

1) *make distinct the idea* of the natural unity of its material  
2) *determine* the special *content* of the science  
3) *articulate* the *systematic* unity of the science  
4) *critique* the science to determine its boundaries

Only part of this is accomplished in the *Groundwork*. The articulation of moral metaphysics takes place in the *Metaphysics of Morals*, and the critique in the *Critique of Practical Reason*. The *Groundwork* concerns only the first two steps, but these two steps must prepare for the last two.

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5 Even cursory familiarity with *Metaphysics of Morals* and a *Critique of Practical Reason* makes clear that they concern the articulation and critique of moral science. The *Metaphysics of Morals* contains an articulation of the rights and duties that make up the system of moral science, and since Kant claims in *Groundwork II* that the will is nothing other than practical reason, the *Critique of Practical Reason* turns out to be the critique of morality as a science. This leaves only the glimpse, the generation of a distinct
The first two of steps of establishing a science are accomplished by the genetically Aristotelian method of analysis. The method of analysis is paradigmatically the scholastic method whereby confused and obscure ideas (i.e. the common obscure and confused idea of moral conduct) are made clear and distinct, thereby logically perfecting them and transforming them into possible grounds of cognitive insight adequate to philosophical purposes (e.g. duty as the necessity of an action from respect for law). This is what Kant does in *Groundwork I*. The analysis reveals what is contained in our common understanding of morality, leading to a precise definition or exposition of the concept. *Division* is the logical method whereby one ascertains how a representation determines its extension. This is what Kant does in *Groundwork II*. The logical division phase of the analysis divides the sphere of the distinct concept to reveal what is contained under the concept of morality, ideally demonstrating that the now precise concept of morality is adequate for our cognitive grasp of its object.

The *Groundwork* as a whole is an execution of the method of hypothesis (JL 84-5, see also JL 52). Though hypotheses are useless in theory (for theoretical cognition) according to the first *Critique* Doctrine of Method, Kant claims that it is necessary for the establishment of moral science to establish a moral hypothesis as a necessary presupposition of the very possibility of practice (A776/B804). This means that the establishment of moral science requires an extra step, namely the *Groundwork III* idea, and the determination of content for the *Groundwork*. It would be fair to expect, then, that *Groundwork I* does not include step 2, the determination of the special content of morality. This leaves *Groundwork I* with only the glimpsed idea and the process of making it distinct. I will argue in Part II that *Groundwork II* constitutes the second step of establishing morality as a science, i.e. determination of the content of morality. Based on Kant’s distinction in the Doctrine of Method between transcendental proof and establishing a hypothesis, *Groundwork III* is the synthesis which concludes the establishment of the practical hypothesis of the moral law as a necessary practical presupposition. The transcendental proof would then be completed as part of the *Critique of Practical Reason*. Since the articulation is the easiest part of the project and Kant thinks it will differ little from our common understanding of right and virtue, this may be left until last in the order of presentation.
synthesis. Without going into any detail as to what happens in *Groundwork III*, the general form of Kant’s standard “transcendental” argument is that any condition of the possibility of something that is certain to be actual is itself necessary. Kant’s hypothesis is that freedom is just such a condition – freedom is a condition of the very possibility of practice, not just moral conduct but any voluntary or intentional action whatsoever. Ordinary practice (including prudence, self-love, etc.) is only possible if moral conduct is possible, according to Kant, because they share possibility conditions. If freedom is a necessary presupposition of all possible practice and it is the only problematic condition of the possibility of autonomy and morality, morality must be presumed possible along with practice in general.

It is of course contentious whether practice is objectively certain to be actual, but practice can be initially taken as given, as a fact or data, because we are unavoidably committed to it in common life. In other words, we are at least subjectively certain that practice in general is actual. Subtle philosophical arguments, especially Hume’s, can nevertheless give rise to skepticism as to whether our common commitment is correct, i.e. whether we can also be objectively certain that practice is actual (Bxxxiv, KpV 5:14, KpV 5:52-3). In the face of philosophical skepticism Kant thought to vindicate the correctness of our common understanding not by addressing these skeptical concerns directly and refuting each in turn, but instead by positively explaining how practice is possible (G 4:404-5). *Pure* moral conduct is acting from duty alone, and as Kant understands this kind of willing in metaphysical terms, acting from duty or morally good willing is *synthetic a priori practical cognition of objects*. Kant’s plan is to show (a) that there is no obstacle to the possibility of pure practice, where pure practice is moral conduct or the synthetic a priori cognition of objects, and (b) that freedom is a condition of the possibility of all practice. If he can do this, Kant thinks he will have established
the moral hypothesis that *shifts the burden of proof in his favor* against philosophers like Hume who argue in various forms - and almost certainly in other terms, perhaps even unwittingly - against the possibility of synthetic a priori practical cognition of objects. If Kant is right that only speculative metaphysics could refute the hypothesis that transcendental freedom is possible and he has already proven that speculative metaphysics is chimerical in the first *Critique*, Kant’s opponents will be left with no resources. Since the hypothesis is irrefutable, or at least arguably so, Kant will then be entitled to presume it. This is what shifts the burden of proof in Kant’s favor. Since the hypothesis is not proven, though, it *cannot be asserted* and is *not known* by the end of the *Groundwork*.

The method of hypothesis is important for my purposes only because *Groundwork I-II* must contribute in some necessary way to *Groundwork III* in order for the *Groundwork* as a whole to constitute a single argument. According to the method of hypothesis, *Groundwork I-II* prepares the way for the hypothesis by assembling the data for its synthesis. Kant begins with a fairly ordinary understanding of willing, analyzes it until he has reached a far more precise philosophical understanding of moral willing, and opens it to evaluation with respect to metaphysical considerations that might undermine its possibility (see especially chapter 8). Once Kant has finished using the method of analysis in *Groundwork I-II* to resolve morality to its distinct exposition and extension, or once he has made distinct our given concept of morality and determined its object, he then employs the *method of synthesis* in *Groundwork III* to instead make a distinct concept of moral science.⁶ The kind of synthesis employed in this application is a

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⁶ Concepts can be defined insofar as they are given to us only through analysis. A concept that is made a priori, i.e. a *conventus factitii* of reason, is a concept we must make *per synthesin*: “[A]ll concepts that are made…can only be defined synthetically” (VL 914-15; DWL 757; JL 63-4).
method whereby one takes what is sought as given and ascends to the conditions under which alone it is possible. In other words, one takes practice in general (which includes moral conduct) as the “given” analysandum and ascends to the conditions under which such practice is possible. More specifically, Kant assumes the supreme principle of morality is a possible principle or ground of action. Given all the criteria that condition this possibility, Kant plans to synthesize a distinct concept of freedom, where this concept is the ultimate condition of the possibility of all practice because only under the idea of freedom can all these criteria be met.

The *Groundwork* as a whole thus serves two purposes. It begins the process of establishing moral science, specifically the two steps of this procedure which primarily concern the possibility of the science; and by establishing a presumption that pure practice is possible it clears the way for the final steps of establishing moral science, the articulation and critique. Establishing the moral hypothesis is thus the purpose which Kant says is complete in itself, as opposed to the articulation and critique phases which are each similarly complete in themselves and thus suitable for treatment in different texts, i.e. the *Metaphysics of Morals* and the *Critique of Practical Reason* respectively.

Since the method of Kant’s *Groundwork III* argument for freedom is extremely contentious and would require a dissertation unto itself, I will not argue directly for the understanding of *Groundwork III* I describe here. Instead I will take as given only that

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7 There are several distinctions in Kant’s philosophy that share the roots of the analysis/synthesis distinction. In its most general meaning the activity of analysis proceeds from a whole to its parts, while the activity of synthesis proceeds from parts to whole. The distinction between these two activities is surprisingly tricky in its various contexts (see for example P 4:274, 4:276*; HL 115; BL 291; DWL 779). In the context of scientific methodology Kant is fortunately fairly consistent and clear. As part of the method for establishing science, analysis is a search for principles or grounds through the explication or exposition of an analysandum that obscurely and indistinctly represents the whole of the science. Scientific synthesis is the combination of such principles, as parts to a whole, by bringing them together under a single condition of their possibility.
Groundwork III must begin with the parts, aspects, or dimensions into which morality has already been analyzed in Groundwork I-II and these data must be relevant in important ways to the possibility of synthetic a priori practical cognition. I will point out many of the specific criteria Kant must meet in Groundwork I-II to prepare for Groundwork III and the articulation and critique steps of establishing moral metaphysics as a science, and I will explain why he thinks he must do so, but I will not explain how these criteria and the various revelations of the analysis contribute specifically to establishing freedom.

§5  Outline of this Dissertation

A traditional approach to solving these methodological interpretive problems would focus on supplementing and correcting the most prominent and promising existing interpretations of the Groundwork. I will not do so. The bulk of the secondary literature on Groundwork I-II to date does not engage deeply and directly with method. The discourse on Groundwork I-II is largely topical, non-metaphysical, and oriented to current concerns in moral theory. Engaging with this discourse strongly tends to digression from the architectonic methodological project I am pursuing, and in too many cases would predictably result in talking past one another. Refuting interpretations that are not architectonically methodological cannot prove that an architectonically methodological interpretation is useful or even possible, and this would still leave open the question at hand, namely what Kant is doing and how. As for the more method-minded interpretations of Groundwork III, their interpretive assumptions leave me too little to work with for Groundwork I-II. Method in general is a logical concern, and logic is the formal foundation of Kant’s metaphysics. A truly architectonic interpretation of Kant’s Groundwork must begin with the same foundations that Kant does, namely logic and mathematics, and it can be neither cursory or nor vague.
Rather than orienting chapters to relevant secondary literature, then, I will orient them to the text of the *Groundwork* and relegate my arguments and positions with respect to the secondary literature primarily to notes throughout the dissertation. My project is to give a positive account of the structure of the *Groundwork* as a whole, of each section, and of the movements within each section by following Kant’s method. Instead of initially focusing narrowly on how the argument of the *Groundwork* might be constructed from the body of the text, I will begin with the question of how the *Groundwork* fits into Kant’s broader critical project and develop the relevant methodological context before engaging with the details of the body of the text. Unlike the *Groundwork*, Kant’s broader critical project and his lectures on logic engage directly with method itself,\(^8\) which makes it possible to employ a top-down, system-centered, architectonic method of interpretation. My goal is to demonstrate that the methodology derivable from these texts *can* actually be followed, which not only obviates the need to reverse-engineer the *Groundwork* but provides otherwise unavailable insight into the argument and its purpose.

I will begin in Part I by explaining what a science of moral metaphysics would be, why Kant reasonably thought establishing this science was philosophically important, and why the first steps of establishing moral metaphysics as a science should involve analysis. I will use the Preface of the *Groundwork* in chapter 1 to identify moral metaphysics as a science in the Aristotelian sense, which places the *Groundwork* within the rich theoretical context of the first *Critique* and scholastic logic. By using the Canon

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\(^8\) As Georgio Tonelli convincingly argues, the first *Critique* concerns logic and method as much as it concerns metaphysics. Riccardo Pozzo argues that Kant’s logic also included a “rigorous sets of concepts for dealing with what are known today as intensional contexts”, one inherited directly from G. F. Meier (Pozzo 2005, 189).
and the Architectonic from the first *Critique’s* Doctrine of Method, I will explain what it means for Kant to provide the groundwork of a metaphysics of morals by establishing the supreme principle of morality.

In chapter 2 I introduce Kant’s four-step general procedure for establishing a science and explain their underlying logic and metaphysics. By interpreting Kant’s method for establishing sciences in the context of Meier’s *Vernunftlehre*, Kant’s own *Critique of Pure Reason*, and the philosophical tradition from which these arose, I will show that a theory of cognitive insight underlies Kant’s method for establishment of a science and underscores the philosophical importance of establishing sciences. The articulation of the system of a science from its first principle is modeled on the complete determination of an object from its real definition in mathematics. The primitive or fundamental acts of cognitive grasp, scientific insight, and the determination of one’s will to some action are all modeled on Kant’s philosophical theory of how representations can determine objects.

Chapter 3 is a more detailed explanation of how the relevant two methods of analysis underlying the first two steps of establishing sciences work, what their standard strategies are, and the criteria of evaluation appropriate to Kant’s analyses in the *Groundwork*. The first phase of analysis in *Groundwork I* is an analysis from a confused and obscure common understanding of morality to the philosophically clear and distinct exposition of the supreme principle of morality that is contained in it. The second phase of analysis in *Groundwork II* is a logical division of this content, by which Kant intends to determine willing as the extension or object of moral science. Together these analyses provide an idea of moral metaphysical science that is like a real definition in mathematics - a precise and philosophically adequate ground of cognitive insight with a clear and
distinct exposition and a complete determination of its extension (BL 263ff, JL 63, 95ff, 140).

Chapter 4 is a proof of principle based on the specific expectations set up in chapter 3 regarding how Groundwork I ought to begin, how it should proceed, and how it should end. I explain Groundwork I as an employment of the (then standard) method of analysis by which confused and obscure cognitions are made clear and distinct. Groundwork I is an analysis of our common, healthy understanding of practice to find the clear and distinct concept of pure practice obscured within. This, again, is the first step of establishing moral science. By interpreting this section of the Groundwork as an execution of the method I describe in earlier chapters, I show that contrary to tradition the first two topics of Groundwork I, namely the goodness of the will and the teleology of reason, are integral to the method of argument and that the apparent discontinuities between topics are appropriate and even necessary to the structure of analysis.

In order to prepare for the second step of establishing moral science in Groundwork II, which is the determination of the special content of morality, Groundwork I must conclude with a distinct exposition of a pure practical representation that is adequate as a ground of cognition, i.e. from which the special content of morality can potentially be determined both theoretically and practically. This clear and distinct idea with which Groundwork I concludes, namely the exposition of the moral law contained in the concept duty, is guaranteed by the method of analysis to be subjectively valid, but it is not guaranteed to be objectively valid, or really possible. Since the production of objects is the specifically practical feature of morality, in order to prove the possibility of an object of pure practice Kant must remove all obstacles to the possibility that a pure a priori representation could both theoretically determine an object and
produce it as well. This means that Kant must explain how the clear and distinct idea can
serve as a ground of cognition by which the content of moral science can be determined.

In part II, I first outline *Groundwork II* and explain generally what it would take
to determine the content of moral science. The “content of moral science” here is the
result of *Groundwork I*, specifically the exposition of the concepts of duty and the moral
law contained in our common understanding. The determination of this content is
accomplished by the method of logical division which makes distinct the extension, or
what is contained under the concept (JL 140, 146ff). This step is critical to proving that
morality is not empty and that the clear and distinct idea of morality is an adequate
ground for cognizing the object of moral science, namely moral conduct.

The real analysis of *Groundwork II* begins in ¶12, and it begins with a bang.
Chapter 5 is consequently devoted entirely to ¶12. I argue in chapter 5 that the transition
from popular philosophy to metaphysics takes place in *Groundwork II* ¶12 and that this
“purification” is a clever way for Kant to introduce the logic he needs for metaphysics to
the common context from which he began the analysis. Once he has again arrived at the
concept of duty at the end of ¶12, Kant has effectively added all of scholastic logic to the
common context and the “healthy” result of *Groundwork I* without introducing the error
ubiquitous in popular philosophy and without the need for a lengthy derivation of logic
from common understanding. This context-shifting technique is analogous to a
mathematical technique for solving problems via transformations. I argue that ¶12 is of
methodological importance for two reasons. First, a proper understanding of the context
shift explains why the popular mistakes (e.g. divine will belongs to the legal
determination of nature) do not contaminate later analysis. Second, the fact that this
analysis is a purification from popular philosophy to metaphysics makes the marks of
care concern predictably the same as those of concern in parts of *Groundwork I* and
predictably different from those involved in the metaphysical analysis that follows in *Groundwork II* ¶13-28.

Given that ¶12 contains Kant’s striking claim that will is nothing other than practical reason, I also make a substantive argument in chapter 5 for a literal interpretation of this claim: The faculty that we commonly call will, which is scholastically known as the faculty of desire, is metaphysically a faculty of *practical cognition* according to Kant and *practical reason* is its essence. Reason is the faculty of mediate derivation on this view, and practical reason is the derivation of an action from a law by means of a representation (as opposed to the derivation of a conclusion from a major premise through a minor premise in a mediate inference). This theory of will as practical cognition is developed further in chapters 6-8.

In chapter 6 I argue that *Groundwork II* ¶13-28 is the groundwork of a transcendental analytic, which is *logical*. In order to objectively determine the content of morality, Kant must first precisely formulate the objective principle of this determination. The statement of the moral law concluding *Groundwork I* is close, but its logical form is not precisely what Kant needs. I argue that the marks Kant considers and attributes to the objective principle of morality are primarily logical forms of judgment, some of which (e.g. *categorical*) underlie the categories of understanding that are central to Kant’s theoretical Transcendental Analytic in the first *Critique*. I briefly explain Kant’s notion of a transcendental analytic and why the possibility of a synthetic a priori principle would require one as Kant indicates near the end of this analysis. Though synthetic a priori cognition poses the central problem of metaphysics and is a problem concerning determination, as I explain, Kant need not provide a complete transcendental analytic before he can determine the content of morality. Once the logical marks of the objective principle are clear, I explain how these marks and their supporting analysis can be
coordinated into a formula of the moral law, thereby allowing Kant to determine content (extension) from the logical form rather than vice versa. This is strategically critical for Kant if moral metaphysics is to be entirely a priori.

Chapter 7 concerns the reason why Kant nearly immediately reformulates his first formula of the categorical imperative (FUL) to include a reference to nature (FULN). On the basis of the distinction between cognitive insight and significance without insight found in Kant’s extensive treatment of the teleology of nature, I argue that this reformulation is meant to ground the empirical significance of the moral law without thereby making morality empirical on the one hand, or requiring us to have holy wills on the other. The constitutive use of the intellect to determine real objects and thereby provide cognitive insight is the basis of Kant’s explanation of how the moral law can command a priori how we ought to conduct ourselves. The regulative use of the intellect to reflect transcendentally ideal objects, which has cognitive significance without insight, is the basis of Kant’s understanding of how the moral law can have significance in regulating our actual behavior despite the fact that we are naturally influenced by contingent inclinations and other natural forces. In other words, the formula of universal law (FUL) and its corollary formula of the universal law of nature (FULN) concern the constitution of conduct and the regulation of deliberation respectively.

Chapter 8 is aimed to explain the progression from the first formula of the moral law (FUL/FULN) to the second (FOH) and third (FOA/KE). This final chapter brings the argument full circle, back to the notion of cognitive grasp. I argue that the progression of

9 Teleology is a particularly controversial topic in Kantian ethics, and it has traditionally been thought to be radically opposed to Kant’s “deontology”. See Engstrom and Whiting, eds. 1996 for an encapsulated portion of the recently emerging discourse in which the traditionally attributed strict opposition between Aristotelian eudaemonist teleology and Kantian rational deontology is challenged. Though I will rely primarily on Kant’s logical inheritance from the Aristotelian tradition, in chapters 7-8 I will also address the teleology of duty.
the formulas brings the moral law closer to intuition and thereby to feeling not by making it more concrete, as one might assume, but by making it logically precise. More specifically I argue that this famous progression is intended to meet a genetically hylomorphic, metaphysically quantitative set of criteria that provide a touchstone of reality for moral science, set the terms of Kant’s solution to the problem of interaction, and make it possible to attribute the distinctive form of real intention to the will.

I will argue in chapter 8 that on a scholastic level, Kant’s modernized interpretation of hylomorphism requires first that he formulate the moral law in such a way as to make distinct the plural matter of the moral command, humanity as an end in itself. The second formula of the moral law, the formula of humanity, thus more clearly and distinctly expresses the validity of the moral law for this plurality. Division of the plurality by the second formula into the very same division just given for FUL/FULN shows how the plural matter of the object is informed. Together with the principle of complete determination, Kant’s quantitative hylomorphism further requires that he show the moral law grounds a possible system, i.e. a kingdom of ends.

On a much more technical level, one that is specific to Kant’s metaphysics, the metaphysical relation between the matter/form distinction, the categories of quantity (unity, plurality, totality), and the axioms of intuition turns out to make the categories of quantity conditions of the possibility of experience according to Kant. Since experience is the touchstone of reality, the progression of the formulas through the categories of quantity meets a criterion of reality by proving that the moral law conforms to the quantitative requirements of possible experience.

On yet another level, the final formula of autonomy and the idea of a kingdom of ends (FOA/KE) help show that we can ascribe the distinctive feature of intention, namely the causal community of an architectonic end, to ourselves insofar as we are rational
agents. By conceiving an act of will as something we synthesize a priori from multiple heterogeneous principles, in a way that is very similar to the way we reach conclusions in theory, according to Kant we conceive willing as something that we prescribe to ourselves as rational beings, i.e. something we do, rather than an effect of mechanical forces. The subordination involved in the synthesis of subjective principle (maxim) and objective principle (law) implies a sort of self-control or self-legislation that we commonly take to be distinctive of morality according to *Groundwork I*, and it underwrites Kant’s conception of transcendental freedom as a sort of necessary presupposition of autonomy. The formulas by which all this is accomplished are nevertheless abstract, which is a requirement of philosophical cognition.

In addition to the general theory of cognitive grasp, the theory of will as practical cognition, and the other substantive philosophical theses indicated in the outline above, through the course of the dissertation I will also advocate the substantive thesis that *respect* is the pure a priori form of the faculty of feeling that *ought* to be constitutive of how we feel and which *does* regulate it (chapter 4, 6). These substantive philosophical claims are all aimed to provide evidence that Kant’s method *matters*. The methodology has implications not only for the validity of Kant’s inferences in the *Groundwork* but for our deeper understanding of the moral theory the *Groundwork* is meant to establish. These sorts of substantive theses are what makes attention to Kant’s methodology a vehicle of interpretive insight.

To be as clear as possible, my thesis in this dissertation is the following.

1. Kant had a detailed strategy for the *Groundwork*.
2. This strategy and Kant’s reasons for adopting it can be ascertained from the first *Critique* and his lectures on logic.
3. Understanding this strategy gains us interpretive insight into Kant’s moral metaphysics and has substantive consequences.
I am not attempting to prove that Kant was correct, nor am I attempting to provide an irrefutable or complete interpretation of the *Groundwork*. The specific details of my interpretation and the substantive claims for which I argue are provided first and foremost as a demonstration that attention to Kant’s methodology is fruitful. What I most want to prove is that Kant’s *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* is the conscious execution of a method-minded plan. The least I hope to show is that the *Groundwork* is best interpreted as an integral part of his critical philosophy rather than as an independent text that is intelligible and complete in isolation from this context. At best I hope to show that Kant’s methodology is a well-reasoned outgrowth from its historical roots and the *Groundwork* constitutes a compelling argument by the standards of Kant’s methodology. Though I cannot help but argue that Kant’s method and execution are internally consistent and even somewhat plausible, I have no real stake in whether Kant is ultimately correct. It is Kant’s detailed articulation of a potentially complete philosophical and methodological system that is most compelling and worth celebrating.

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1 In his introduction to *Dignity and Practical Reason*, Thomas Hill is explicitly pessimistic about making sense of Kant’s methodology and his explanation of the argument of the *Groundwork* is brief and shallow (see my endnote iv, Chapter 4).

2 Korsgaard construes Kant’s primary (or only) agenda for the *Groundwork* as being how to determine content for a formal unconditional ought, or in Korsgaard’s terms, how obligation (*Verbindlichkeit*) can yield motivation (*Bewegungsmotiven*). Because Korsgaard is not concerned with methodology per se and has only a vague idea of what analysis is according to Kant, as opposed to other methods, she gives only a cursory description of the broader argument and begins her explication of *Groundwork I* with Kant’s introduction of duty.

As Korsgaard describes Kant’s general method, there are two steps. The first step is to show “how pure reason generates these concepts [pure concepts of morality] and so what they (analytically) contain” (Korsgaard 2002, 124). The second step, she says, is a “critical synthesis” beginning in *Groundwork II* that shows how the pure concepts of morality “apply to that part of the world to which they purport to apply: to us” (*ibid*, 124). Korsgaard indicates in a note that she is unsure how this works, claiming that the two steps she mentions “correspond approximately to the metaphysical and transcendental deduction…although the relation between a metaphysical deduction of an a priori concept and its analysis is not perfectly clear” (*ibid*, 124n11). As I will explain, the method of *Groundwork II* is really the method of logical division, which is a variety of analysis. This analysis is easily mistaken for synthesis in *Groundwork II* because this particular division concerns the synthesis of practical cognition, but the method must not be confused with its topic.
As for *Groundwork I*, Korsgaard claims that the analysis is a “motivational analysis…of the concept of a right action that defines or identifies right actions in terms of the motives from which they are done by a morally good person” (*ibid*, 125). She mentions that common knowledge is the starting point of the *Groundwork I* analysis and that the plan is to find the principle “behind” the commonly acceptable notion that only a good will can be unconditionally valuable. The strategy as she construes it is to discover the reason why an action is right by analyzing the reason why a good-willed person does it, because these reasons must be the same (*ibid*, 138). Given this understanding of Kant’s agenda and strategy, Korsgaard skips directly from the commonly acceptable notion that only a good will can be unconditionally valuable to Kant’s claim that the notion of duty includes that of a good will. The teleology of reason is entirely irrelevant to this relation between obligation and motivation as Korsgaard understands it, which makes it seem irrelevant to *Groundwork I*. The “starting point” of Kant’s analysis, Korsgaard says, is the notion that a morally good action is one done from the motive of duty (*ibid*, 125).

While Korsgaard’s treatment of the relation between obligation and motivation quite helpfully makes some of Kant’s real concerns accessible to current discourse in moral theory and ethics, this kind of interpretation makes Kant’s views persuasive but not compelling. There are important controversial claims into which it is virtually impossible to gain insight, like Korsgaard’s claim that the motive of duty is “involved in the very grasp” of the fact that an action is right for an Internalist (*ibid*, 131). In order to find any common ground with opponents, or even to critically evaluate this claim from a friendly position, we must ascertain *what it is to grasp* something and *how* a motive can be *involved* in such grasp, especially since “the bare grasp of a truth about rightness” does not motivate according to Sentimentalists (*ibid*, 122-3). Korsgaard has the right idea here, but much more must be done to make it philosophically compelling. One of the themes in this dissertation will be a view of Kant’s general notion of cognitive grasp that takes advantage of the scholastic methodology Kant employs and extends it from its theoretical paradigm to a notion of practical cognitive grasp that explains how the causal constitution of practical cognition relates reason and desire so that the bindingness of law necessarily influences our actions (see especially my chapters 2 and 8).

iii Paton’s commentary, *The Categorical Imperative: A Study in Kant’s Moral Philosophy* is a useful classroom guide to reading the *Groundwork*. In it Paton raises a great many methodological issues, including why Kant makes an argument concerning the teleology of reason (Paton 1971, 44). His treatment of these issues remains true to the text but only provides rather cursory suggestions as to how most of them might be resolved.

iv Wood’s explication of the *Groundwork* is really a commentary supplemented by a few cherry-picked topical explications with corresponding interpretive arguments – very much like Paton’s. The resulting view of the *Groundwork* is more what we might expect of a Continental philosopher, or perhaps Wittgenstein, than what we should expect as the published work of an analytic philosopher. Since Kant is often taken to be a founder of the Continental tradition – and since Wood studies Hegel, Fichte, and Marx in addition to Kant – this is not entirely unsuitable. However, Kant is also a founder of Western Analytic philosophy, and I aim to show that accordingly there is in fact a very systematic method to the *Groundwork* analyses that is substantively enlightening.

v I will be using the term “scholastic” as an extremely general term for philosophy that is of obvious Aristotelian descent. Kant’s particular version of scholastic logic is informed by the Humanist tradition as well, but Humanism was uncontroversial (see for example JL 14). See also Nuchelmans’ chapters in the *Cambridge History of 17th Century Philosophy* for an excellent summary of 17th Century Humanist versions of scholastic logic, the issues of the period, and translations of 17th Century logic into contemporary terminology (Nuchelmans 1998). According to Riccardo Pozzo, 18th Century logic differed little in substance from 17th Century logic but was much occupied with prejudices, which belong to psychology or anthropology according to Kant (Pozzo 2005). See also de Wulf 1956 for a thorough treatment of the various meanings of scholasticism and a defense of its 20th Century revival.
Kant’s primary example of synthesis is the method of reduction in chemistry. For example, when hydrogen and oxygen are combined (\(2\text{H}_2 + \text{O}_2 = 2\text{H}_2\text{O}\)), the oxygen is “reduced” and an “entirely new” chemical product, water, is synthesized. Authorship and subjectivity, or law and maxim, might likewise be grounds of a synthesis from which transcendental freedom arises ratio cognoscendi (KpV 5:5n). See chapter 6 for more on synthesis.

“Reverse-engineering” is a common term in computer science, denoting the illicit process of constructing source code from executionable software. The term applies to any process by which a finished product is deconstructed into the components from which it is made in order to better understand how the product works and reproduce or improve it without access to the original designs. See Dennett 1994 for a useful discussion distinguishing several uses of the top-down/bottom-up and engineering/reverse engineering methods. Kant’s argument itself is a top-down, engineered argument. What I am arguing is that there is no need for large-scale reverse-engineering to understand his argument because Kant’s method is available to follow directly.

Thanks to the members of the History of Philosophy Roundtable (HOPR) at UCSD, especially Sam Rickless, for helping to clarify the differences between analysis and deduction, and what is at stake. The anti-deductive strain of my argument in part I is largely in response to their concerns.

Susan Niemann (2001) argues that Kant scholarship has not been architectonic historically because history of philosophy (as domain of philosophy) has largely amounted to an undisciplined appeal to authority until quite recently. Niemann even goes so far as to argue that it was widely held to be unnecessary to actually read the works of historical figures before attributing views and arguments to them. Whether or not this is so, there are substantive reasons for even Kant scholars who do read widely and carefully to want to isolate the Groundwork from its critical context, primarily because they do not want any errors on Kant’s part in the first Critique to undermine the Groundwork.

Just for the record, the following is my current position with respect to whether transcendental idealism is correct and whether its transcendental deduction is compelling. I do think that our intuition has a pure a priori spatiotemporal form and that its spatial form is at least grossly Euclidean. This does not preclude the possibility that there is also a real spatiotemporal form that is non-Euclidean and which may have a philosophically explicable relation to our spatial form of outer experience. Neither does it preclude the possibility that our grossly Euclidean form of outer intuition is finely non-Euclidean and strictly transcendentally ideal. I think Kant would much prefer the latter position if pressed: Our common understanding of space is of a real and Euclidean space, but our philosophical understanding corrects these inaccuracies to reveal a non-Euclidean transcendentally ideal space that approximates a Euclidean space very closely in ordinary experience. In other words, the pure a priori form of outer intuition is actually non-Euclidean and transcendentally ideal, but we seldom have cause to think of space this way – at least outside the abstract sciences – because our simpler common understanding is adequately accurate for most ordinary purposes. Kant’s careful constraints on our introspective capacities makes this position viable, though it would of course require some revision of the transcendental deduction. It is worth noting that even if there is no compelling version of the transcendental deduction that can allow for more precise and potentially non-Euclidean understandings of space, the position may yet be correct and supportable by a different kind of argument. To refute an argument is, of course, not to refute its conclusion.

The lectures on logic are lecture notes that were taken by students over Kant’s teaching career or compiled from Kant’s notes in his copy of the textbook. The various sets of lecture notes differ in detail and none can be considered entirely authoritative with regard to specifics, but it is clear from each set of notes that Kant agreed with a great deal of the Meier text on which he lectured and had a generally Aristotelian conception of logic and its methods. The Jäsche Logic in particular was prepared under Kant’s supervision and late in his career as a presentation of the logic that Kant taught, but the Blomberg lectures...
are the most detailed with respect to the perfections of cognition and the method of analysis. These two sets of lecture notes will accordingly be the most referenced. See Michael Young’s introduction to Lectures on Logic and Boswell 1988.

To give another example of how Ameriks’ topical orientation to transcendental idealism can have a substantive impact on our understanding of Groundwork II, Ameriks casts the distinction between the moral law’s constitution of conduct and its regulation of effects as a distinction between the constitution of a will as a thing in itself, i.e. a noumenon, and the will as appearance or phenomenon (ibid, 34); but the distinction need not be cast this way. The distinction is at least as well cast as a distinction between ought and is – how the moral law ought to constitute our conduct and actually does regulate the effects of our conduct, which does not obviously rely on any position regarding things in themselves (see my chapters 7 and 8). Ameriks may be right that the will must ultimately turn out to be a thing in itself, and Groundwork III is sensitive to this consideration, but this issue is quite premature prior to Groundwork III where freedom is hypothesized. Both versions of the distinction lead fairly quickly to the issue of compatibilism, but the issues for ought/is compatibility are quite different from those for the compatibility of noumena/phenomena. Even if the noumena/phenomena distinction is most useful for explaining the compatibility of freedom with the determination of nature, upon which the synthesis of freedom in Groundwork III may well depend, Kant has already argued in the first Critique Antinomies that moral laws of freedom are not incompatible with laws of nature and said that this is not sufficient to show the real possibility of morality. As I explain in chapters 7-8, the ought/is distinction helps explain the need for FUL/N and KE in Groundwork II – a good will must be able to make actual what ought to be, not merely as ideals but as real objects that can possibly appear to us. There are consequently several criteria of reality that must be met in Groundwork II in order for the content under Kant’s philosophically precise concept of morality to provide adequate data for the synthesis in Groundwork III.
Chapter 1  The Idea of a Moral, Metaphysical Science

It is widely known that the stated purpose of Immanuel Kant’s *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* (*Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*) is to establish the supreme principle of morality (G 4: 392). What precisely Kant means by a supreme principle of morality, and why and how such a thing might be established, has always been controversial. In this chapter I will argue that the key to resolving the controversy lies in the first five paragraphs of the Preface where Kant identifies a metaphysics of morals as a *moral science*, in a manner that refers the reader back not only to his prior text, the *Critique of Pure Reason*, but also to the “Ancient Greeks” (G 4:387, Bviii).

In these first five paragraphs Kant locates moral metaphysics within a generally Aristotelian taxonomy of sciences. It may seem odd, even incorrect, to locate moral metaphysics within a taxonomy of sciences in the modern sense. We have come to associate “science” so closely with experimental, empirical methods that “metaphysical science”, “a priori science”, and to a lesser extent “moral science” have the ring of oxymorons. This is not, however, what Kant means by science. Science is here to be understood in the Aristotelian sense as a systematic doctrine or a whole of cognition, ordered according to *principles* (A832/B860ff, JL 23ff). Moral metaphysics is located in the taxonomy as a *proper science* that is determined and circumscribed by the species of its *laws*, which, according to the first *Critique* are special kinds of *a priori* principles.

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10 This taxonomy is the same one Kant uses to identify the topic of the *Critique of Pure Reason* in its own Preface as “metaphysics in general” (Bviiif).

11 In the *Groundwork* Preface Kant says the laws of moral metaphysics are a priori laws of freedom in accordance with which everything ought to happen, in contrast to both empirical laws and to laws of nature (G 4: 387-8). In the first *Critique* Preface he identifies morality as a priori practical science, which is “practical cognition” by which reason makes its objects actual in connection with laws of freedom (Bx, B
As we will see, the principles that are to order moral metaphysics are a priori laws of reason, which are equally canonic laws for the correct use of reason and supreme principles of the faculty of reason (B189ff, LE 36-37). By understanding Kant’s theory of science as he articulates it in the first Critique, then, we can discover what sort of thing a supreme principle of morality should be and why Kant should search for one.

Kant’s taxonomy of sciences in the Groundwork begins with the first sentence of the Preface:

Ancient Greek philosophy was divided into three sciences: physics, ethics, and logic. This division is perfectly suitable to the nature of the subject and there is no need to improve upon it except, perhaps, to add its principle, partly so as to insure its completeness and partly so as to be able to determine correctly the necessary subdivisions. (G 4:387 emphasis mine)

When Kant refers to Greeks here and elsewhere he has in mind Aristotle and the Aristotelian schools. This particularly clear in Kant’s lectures on logic, where he says logic is a science and Aristotle is its father:

Contemporary logic derives from Aristotle’s Analytic. This philosopher can be regarded as the father of logic…From Aristotle’s time on, logic has not gained much in content, by the way, nor can it by its nature do so. But it can surely gain in regard to exactness, determinateness, and distinctness. There are few sciences that can attain a permanent condition, where they are not altered any more. These [sciences] include logic and also metaphysics. Aristotle had not omitted any moment of the understanding; we are only more exact, methodical, and orderly in this. (JL 20 italics mine, see also Bviii)

Kant has a generally Aristotelian understanding of what a science is, and this understanding of science is quite independent of empirical methods of experiment.

Sciences are systems of cognition. For example, philosophy is “the system of philosophical cognitions or [system] of cognitions of reason from concepts. That is the

xxviii-xxix; see also JL 86-7 and 110). Kant maintains this understanding of the moral/practical throughout the first Critique. See for example A531/B559ff, A547/B575ff, and especially the Canon (A795/B823ff).
scholastic concept of this science” (JL 23). Kant expands upon this idea in the
Architectonic of the first Critique:

[S]ystematic unity is that which first makes ordinary cognition [not experimental
method] into science, i.e., makes a system out of a mere aggregate [of
cognition]…I understand by a [scientific] system…the unity of the manifold
cognitions under one idea. This is the rational concept of the form of a whole,
insofar as through this the domain of the manifold as well as the position of the
parts with respect to each other is determined a priori. (A832/B861 emphasis
mine)

A science, then, is a body of cognition that is unified and systematized or organized by a
principle.

This notion of science was a generally accepted scholastic conception of science,
but rather than survey the history of the concept to prove this, it is more useful here to
provide some background on the historical figure who provides the most direct link
between the accepted logic of Kant’s time and Kant’s own views, namely Georg
Friedrich Meier. Georg Friedrich Meier’s Vernunftlehre was the logic textbook from
which Kant chose to lecture for decades. Kant followed it quite closely in his early
teaching career, as evidenced by the very close correspondence between the content and
order of the Blomberg lectures and the Vernunftlehre. Even in his later lectures when
Kant comes more and more to teach his own views, there are only a handful of points to
which Kant offers a correction. Kant’s transcendental logic is much more a supplement
to Meier’s general logic than a revision of it.

Obviously, then, Meier’s Vernunftlehre itself is worth some investigation. In
general the Vernunftlehre was quite suitable as logic text for courses at Königsberg where
Kant taught in part because it was written for beginners, but more importantly because it
was an authoritative logic text belonging to the Leibnizean-Wolffian tradition. There is a
direct line of intellectual descent from Leibniz to Wolff to Baumgarten and then Meier (VL 798), and Meier himself was the chair for logic and metaphysics at the University of Halle. Though he is perhaps not now such a central figure in the history of Leibnizean-Wolffian philosophy, in Kant’s time Meier “was among the most authoritative figures of the Aufklärung [Enlightenment]” and had a great deal of credibility within Kant’s intellectual peer group (Pozzo 2005, 185).12

Like other logicians in the Leibnizean-Wolffian tradition, Meier shared Kant’s contempt for the pedantic and dogmatic aspect of the Aristotelian schools, but he saw his own text as enriching the tradition rather than as an innovation or reformation of it:

He who would judge my book must be no mere School logician: such a man will vehemently condemn my book because I have said nothing of Barbara and Celarent, of the fourth or third Figure, of the reduction of inferences and the like. But also he must be a man who has not yet been contaminated by a merely scholastic [pedantic or dogmatic] doctrine of reason, and he must distinguish the content of my doctrine of reason from the art of elocution to which I help myself. …It is difficult to always make a felicitous choice of material, whether one is a professional academician or one has learned the scholastic doctrine of reason … and to distinguish the useful and needful from the pedantic merely through his own advisement. It should therefore be very acceptable to me, for people who know more than is learned in the Schools to tell me with cause in which regards my book has the [pedantic] flavor of the Schools.

…

He who would charge me with a lust for innovation or reformation would judge me [unfairly]… I advise all my readers who want to learn the specific tenets of the professional academic doctrine of reason to read the doctrines of reason by Wolff, Reusch, Locke, Malebranche, and so on. In themselves the doctrines of reason by many scholastic sages of the world contain very many goods. And therefore I openly confess that I have learned my logical cognition from others, so let the intellectual world decide whether I have enriched this science. (ML III-V translation and emphasis mine)12

Notice that in the culmination of his Preface Meier specifically identifies the non-empirical body of cognition with which he is concerned as a science. This is no fluke. Meier repeatedly refers to the gelehrnte Erkenntnis with which the Vernunftlehre is

12 Though my argument here is consistent with Tonelli and Hinske, Riccardo Pozzo’s 2005 article is conveniently written in English and speaks directly to my purposes.
concerned as a science (Wissenschaft), even describing a “moral science” of “practical cognition” (ML 248, 311, 375).iii

There is some room here to argue that the recommended Leibnizean-Wolffian works Meier’s Vernunftlehre enriches are not to be counted as scholastic, but there are independent reasons for thinking the Vernunftlehre is scholastic in content and Kant approved of this. Young, Pozzo, Hinske, and Tonelli have all argued effectively that Meier and Kant borrow heavily from Aristotelian logic, so the real question is how to distinguish between what is to be rejected and what is to be accepted from the schools. As Pozzo argues, Kant’s courses covered the entire Vernunftlehre, but he notably dedicated “most of his exposition” to the first two parts and especially to the second part, which is “the method of philosophical cognition”, corresponding to the rhetorical dispositio (Pozzo 2005, 190 emphasis mine).iv This method goes back at least to Cicero, and in spirit even to Aristotle:

Meier’s Vernunftlehre is usually placed within the tradition of Wolffianism. There is some truth to this view; however, it cannot explain the most striking traits of Meier’s Vernunftlehre, beginning with its division into inventio, dispositio, elocutio, and exercitatio, which used to be part of the rhetorical canon since the time of Cicero’s apocryphal Rhetorica ad Herennium. Thus Meier’s Vernunftlehre was also influenced by traditions other than Wolff. (ibid, 189)

It is not difficult, Hinske has argued, to demonstrate Meier’s proximity to the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition, apparently so despised by the Aufklärung …[particularly the idea that] the intellect cannot err when understanding first principles…It is remarkable to see the vitality of Aristotelianism and Thomism in the writings of Wolff, Meier and Kant. (ibid,192n39)vi

Meier’s Preface identifies the pedantry of the schools as the objectionable element, and it seems clear that he expected others to share his sentiments concerning the schools, at least his rejection of scholastic pedantry (see also ML 8). The general view is that Aristotle founded logic, but over time the schools which taught this logic became corrupted. The pedantry of the merely scholastic is ‘learning’ without judgment or discrimination – it is the intellectual conceit of an excessive reverence for technical
knowledge without any deeper understanding or comprehension. Among other mistakes, the mere scholars fell into rote memorization of the valid forms of syllogism and other technical details of the articulated system of logic (e.g. Barbara) rather than focusing on how to understand what makes a mediate inference valid and deriving its valid forms from this understanding of its principle as needed. They made distinctions where there is no difference, and failed to make distinctions that were genuinely useful (ML 26). In essence, the nominal expertise of a mere scholar is a merely surface expertise – a facility with a memorized doctrine rather than a genuine grasp of the content of the science.

Kant shared Meier’s view that the technical understanding of mere scholars is a severely impoverished understanding that is inadequate for philosophy. Kant expresses his agreement with Meier on this point through his ubiquitous insistence on thinking for oneself, thinking through his text, and the need for discovering and establishing principles (or Grundsätze) and deriving consequences only from these. He objected to the dogma of scholastic logic more specifically because such dogma is concretized and therefore not subject to any sort of revision, including the refinements Kant needs for transcendental logic. A mere scholar would memorize the categories handed down from Aristotle and only opportunistically supplement these as the occasional need arose, most likely with some fuss and upheaval. A mere scholar would learn how to employ these categories only technically without any deeper understanding of what they are or how they relate to each other, and this makes it impossible for a mere scholar to ever ascertain whether the categories are yet complete.

If one sets a faculty of cognition into play, then on various occasions different concepts will become prominent that will make this faculty known and that can be collected in a more or less exhaustive treatise depending on whether they have been observed for a longer time or with greater acuteness. Where this investigation will be completed can never be determined with certainty by means of this as it were mechanical procedure. Further, the concepts that are discovered only as the opportunity arises will not reveal any order and systematic unity, but will rather be ordered in pairs only according to similarities and placed in series.
only in accord with the magnitude of their content, from the simple to the more composite, which series are by not means systematic even if to some extent methodically produced. Transcendental philosophy has the advantage but also the obligation to seek its concepts [categories here] in accordance with a principle, since they spring pure and unmingled from the understanding, as an absolute unity, and must therefore be connected among themselves in accordance with a concept or idea. Such a connection, however, provides a rule by means of which the place of each pure concept of the understanding and the completeness of all of them together can be determined a priori, which would otherwise depend upon whim or chance. (A66-7/B91-2)

Kant’s point is that a science of understanding must be a system, with a complete set of first principles from which the entire body of understanding can be articulated, and this deeper scientific sort of understanding is absolutely required for philosophy.

Kant thus chose Meier’s Vernunftlehre as his logic text in part because it reflects Kant’s deep concern with principled understanding in that it is entirely concerned with gelehrente Erkenntnis (literally learned cognition). Learned cognition in Meier’s sense is not merely acquired cognition, but instead the kind of cognition that one must possess in order to do professional intellectual work in philosophy or empirical science. This is the kind of cognition attributable to “professionals”, e.g. the Sages and experts in academic fields. It is the kind of cognition that allegedly gives them insight into the matters on which they are expert. Gelehrente Erkenntnis in Meier’s sense is something of an umbrella term for wisdom, intellectual cognition, expert cognition, scientific cognition, and philosophic cognition. It could mean any of these depending on the context.

To show just how deep the agreement is between Kant and Meier of the notion of science, Kant’s distinctive use of analogies between architecture and sciences is actually derived from Meier (JL 48, ML 1-4). vii Meier introduces his doctrine of reason with a distinction between being a spectator (Zuschauer) of the world and being an investigator (Beschauer) of the world. To paraphrase, a mere spectator might be satisfied with sense impressions and appearances, and represent only the surface of the world as if he were nothing more than a mirror. The investigator of the world must instead see through the
appearances to their governing laws and judge the collective surface coincidences of appearance according to these eternal rules of order. The investigator must use reason to delve into and conclusively fathom the substance, purpose, and value of things - among a thousand other things – and to do this the investigator must attend to the architecture of the world. The investigator sees the world as having a palatial architecture perfectly executed from these rules – “nach den vollkommensten Regeln der Baukunst ausgeführten Pallaste” (ML 3). According to Meier, anyone who would be more than a mere spectator must see the world through the eyes of an engineer or architect and understand the structure of the world, specifically how the rules by which it operates or the laws by which it is governed determine the particulars of its surface appearance.

Kant’s notion of science is, however, slightly more specific than Meier’s. According to Kant the principles of a proper science must be a priori: A body of cognition that is systematized and organized by an a priori principle is a science “proper” (MFNS 4:468, see also BL 25). Kant’s favorite examples include formal logic and mathematics, but notably also the natural science of the Enlightenment (roughly Bacon to Newton), which is an empirical body of cognition of the physical that is systematized by laws like Newton’s Laws (Bx). In each case it is the architectonic structure of the doctrine that makes it scientific, specifically the special relation between the unity of principles and the plurality of their articulated consequences which together form a proper whole or a systematic totality. (We will return to this point in chapter 2 and again in chapter 8.)

Returning to the first sentence of the *Groundwork* Preface, Kant says that the Aristotelian division of sciences into physics, ethics, and logic lacks only a “principle” by which to ensure completeness and determine subdivisions. The principle of subdivision
lacking here is a principle of individuation, which scholars might call a principle of identity and diversity, i.e., a principle by which to divide the realm of cognition into organized domains. Once articulated, Kant indicates this principle of individuation will partition the realm of cognition in such a way as to ensure completeness. As Kant will shortly argue, this partition will generate a further subdivision of physics and ethics into their empirical and a priori parts.

The principle of subdivision Kant identifies in the next paragraph is the genus of the objects for each science. Logic is “formal” philosophy, which is “occupied only with the form of the understanding and of reason itself and with the rules of thinking in general, without distinction of objects” (G 4:387 emphasis mine). This makes logic “a canon for the understanding or for reason, which holds for all thinking” (G 4:387 emphasis mine; see also JL 11-21, especially JL 15). Physics and ethics, in contrast, both concern objects and are differentiated by something about the objects they concern. The general implication regarding the scholastic division of science into logic, physics, and ethics is that logic is not beholden to objects and it is therefore more fundamental and general than the other sciences. Both physics and ethics presuppose logic – there can be no cognition of objects that is ungoverned by logic. This clearly indicates that Kant expects his readers to not only be well-versed in scholastic philosophy, especially logic. Together with Kant’s mention of a canon of reason, Kant clearly also expects his audience to have read the Critique of Pure Reason, which contains a section entitled “The

13 I have in mind here the mathematical concept of a partition, which would normally be called a division (Abteilung) in the scholastic tradition. Venn diagrams are the most common intuitive representation of formal division (see JL 108). Division of a sphere guarantees completeness because correct division requires that the mutually exclusive members of the division together exhaust the whole. This is one of the central tools of analysis to be discussed in chapter 4.
Kant goes on in this paragraph to identify ethics and physics as “material” philosophy in contrast to logic. Ethics and physics, he says, both specifically concern “determinate objects and the laws to which they are subject” rather than the rules of thought in general (G 4: 387). It is not simply the kind of object that distinguishes ethics from physics, then, according to Kant. Human beings are, after all, objects of both sciences. It is instead the kind of laws governing the object(s) that individuate the sciences because these laws are the principles from which the body of the science is articulated and bounded, and which make the science what it is. Here Kant says that physics and ethics are distinguished from each other by the kind of law that can serve as a systematizing principle for the science. The laws of physics are “laws of nature” (G 4:387), while ethics is the “science” of the “laws of freedom”, where again science is to be understood as a “doctrine” of “rational cognition” (G 4:387).

In the third paragraph, Kant more carefully describes what kind of laws distinguish moral philosophy from other sciences, saying that ethics

must determine…laws of the human being’s will insofar as it is affected by nature…as laws in accordance with which everything ought to happen, while still taking into account the conditions under which it very often does not happen. (G 4:387-8 emphasis mine)

According to Kant a human being’s will is a causal nexus, i.e. at a crossroads, between the laws of nature by which is it affected (hindered) and the laws of freedom by which it makes its objects actual. This peculiarity of the human will makes it absolutely necessary – for reasons Kant argues in ¶6-12 of the Preface14 – to clearly separate “practical

14 Kant considered moral philosophy to be in a state of crisis, riddled with error and misconception, and corrosive of the common healthy understanding of morality through its clever abstractions. His diagnosis of the problem was that the empirical and the a priori were continually being confused, confounded, and
anthropology”, which is the empirical science of ethics, from moral metaphysics (G 4:388).

This division of ethics and physics into their pure and empirical parts is the subdivision Kant mentions in the first sentence that he thinks is required to improve the Ancient Greek taxonomy of sciences\(^\text{15}\). Since logic is purely formal and therefore entirely a priori, it requires no subdivision. Ethics and physics, on the other hand, both concern the laws to which determinate objects are subject and therefore they both have an empirical part. *Metaphysics* is the non-empirical part of both physics and ethics; it is a “two-fold” “pure philosophy”, i.e. a pure a priori science, “limited to the determinate objects of the understanding” (G 4: 388). *Theoretical* metaphysics, which Kant thinks to have for the most part established in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, is the a priori subdivision of physics. Moral metaphysics is the pure subdivision of ethics.

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\(^\text{15}\) Though Kant does not mention it here, the status of mathematics is also quite important because it is the key to refuting Hume’s skepticism (KpV 5:13-14, 52-4). According to Kant, mathematics determines its objects purely a priori, having no empirical part (Bx). Mathematics is a synthetic a priori science concerning the conditions of the possibility of objects, specifically with the possibility of the determination of things in intuition, where the a priori form of intuition is the central concern (see B14-17). Mathematics can be glossed as the pure a priori science of the form of intuition. The relevance of mathematics to moral metaphysics will be taken up in chapter 8, where I argue that the characterization of the three formulas as progressing through the categories of quantity is meant to indicate the consonance between the conditions of the possibility of volition and those of intuition.
To give a sense of what Kant had in mind with regard to the subdivision of ethics, consider that practical anthropology is a science concerning the way intelligent beings, e.g. human beings, actually do act. The empirical science of how human beings actually do act is a systematization of human inclinations, character traits and other hindrances to intelligent action. These hindrances to intelligent action by humans are empirical and contingent. They belong to natural feeling and sensibility rather than to intellect per se. Moral metaphysics, which is ethical science proper, concerns how human beings qua intelligent beings necessarily ought to act, regardless of how they actually do act (which is often more in consequence of the sensible and desirous aspects of their nature than the rational aspect). This moral science proper would be an apodictically certain whole of cognition that is systematically ordered by its a priori principles (MFNS 467ff). As Kant cashes out intelligence, the intelligence of conduct is essentially rational, so moral metaphysics is the a priori science of how rational beings necessarily ought to act. This science is distinct from and prior to the nominally moral empirical sciences of actual human behavior and practice (moral anthropology).

Once Kant has set out the principle of individuation for sciences and identified moral metaphysics as a subdivision intersecting both ethics and metaphysics, he spends the next five paragraphs of the Preface arguing that the subdivision of ethics and the restriction of moral philosophy to moral metaphysics is “indispensably necessary” (G 4:389). Without getting into the details of the argument, the general idea is that the elision of a priori with empirical is a great source of error and confusion (G 4:410, see also the Outline of *Groundwork II* in Part II).

Suppose for the sake of argument that Kant is right, that moral philosophy must be a metaphysical science proper with a priori laws of the human will as its principles
from which the entire body or doctrine of moral cognition can be determined. In order to really understand what Kant thinks must be done, we need to know what a principle is, what a law is, and what connection these might have to the idea of a supreme principle. Given that moral metaphysics is a subdivision of the sciences, we may look Kant’s understanding of other sciences for help.

Since the laws of nature are a familiar idea, we can begin with the idea of a law as a kind of scientific principle and use mechanics as a paradigm. The establishment of mechanics required the specification of laws like the laws of gravitation and inertia that could be used as principles for the derivation and therefore control of the movements of natural things. In order to qualify as a law in the relevant sense a principle must govern determinate objects in some way. This idea of governance, or of an object being subject to a law, implies that the law describes and in some sense necessitates the causality of the object.

The kind of law Kant needs to subdivide ethics and establish moral metaphysics is the most basic law to which human will is subject. He needs a law that is general enough to govern the entirety of moral metaphysics and so fundamental that only the principles of formal logic are prior. What he needs is the a priori moral analog of Newton’s Laws.

According to Kant’s Doctrine of Method, the metaphysical analog of Newton’s Laws would be a canon of pure reason, which is a small finite set of positive supreme principles, possibly a single supreme principle. A supreme principle is a maximally general principle for the correct use of a faculty (B189ff, LE 36-37). For example, the supreme principle of analytic judgment is its criterion of truth, the Principle of Contradiction, which requires that no predicate contradict its subject (B189ff). A canonic principle is thus a maximally general, positive, a priori principle for the correct use of a faculty (B824).
Kant explains in the Canon that the principles for the correct use of pure speculative reason Kant are all merely “negative”, meaning they merely set boundaries by telling us what reason cannot do (A795/B823ff). These supreme negative principles are important, but a canon of pure reason must tell us what reason can do, especially what it necessarily does. Even though there is no positive theoretical supreme principle of reason, Kant argues, we should expect there to be a moral law for the canon of pure reason (B826-7).

So far we know that the laws of freedom in general, as laws of reason, may be positive or negative. The supreme principle of moral metaphysical science to be established in the Groundwork may likewise be either positive or negative. The complete establishment of moral metaphysics, however, requires a positive supreme principle that is a canonic law of practical reason. Whatever Kant does in the Groundwork must then somehow contribute to establishing a canon of moral metaphysics, i.e. to discovering or establishing a small finite set of principles from which all rational (intelligent) actions could be derived or determined because they are all necessarily governed by it.

There appears to be an unacknowledged but striking gap between the principles of a science and the principles of a faculty here, yet according to Kant the canon of moral metaphysics just is the supreme principle (pure) practical reason. This is a crucial point. In order to better how a canonic principle of a science could also be a supreme principle of a faculty, recall that metaphysics is a priori. Kant argues in the first Critique that we can know a priori of objects only what we ourselves put into them (see Bxvi-xviii). This means in effect that a priori cognition is cognition of our own intellectual faculties, especially reason. The reason why Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason helps establish metaphysical science is that to critique and articulate the faculty of reason is in a sense to
critique and articulate the body of cognition it generates. Consider how closely Kant’s description of the critique of reason resembles the establishment of a science:

[By this [the critique of pure reason] I do not understand a critique of books and systems, but a Critique of the faculty of reason in general, in respect of all the cognitions after which reason might strive independently of all experience, and hence the decision about the possibility or impossibility of a metaphysics in general, and the determination of its sources, as well as its extent and boundaries, all, however, from principles. (Axii emphasis mine)]

The body of cognition that constitutes the system of a priori moral science is determined by the very same a priori principles that are the laws governing the correct use of pure practical reason.16 Reason itself, insofar as it is practical, is the determinate object governed by the laws of freedom. Throughout the first Critique, the idea of a human will as a faculty of practical cognition is clearly already in Kant’s sights as the object of moral metaphysics, though we are not yet in a position to understand the relation between practical cognition, will and reason.17

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16 Of course this is not to say that moral science and practical reason are identical. Moral science is a body of cognition and practical reason is the faculty of such cognition. For the time being it may be useful to think of moral science and practical reason as isomorphic systems with convertible principles.

17 As I will argue in chapters 5-8, moral metaphysics is not merely theoretical metaphysics that is about how we ought to act, and practical reason is not merely theoretical reasoning about how we ought to act (qua Thomas Hill). Moral metaphysics is the science of practical cognition, which is a distinctively Kantian notion (see Bx, B xxviii-xxix, JL 86-7, 110). Practical cognition is the philosophical term for will (Wille). Practical cognition is the faculty whereby we make objects actual by representing them. More specifically it is the derivation of an action, which is the synthesis of an action, from heterogeneous grounds (subjective maxim and objective law). Just as theoretical cognition requires the synthesis of sensibility and understanding, practical cognition requires the synthesis of feeling and reason.

The body of cognition for moral metaphysical science is accordingly a body of practical cognition, and this has interesting potential implications that go beyond the issue of moral internalism and connect to practical wisdom. As a body of practical cognition, moral science is essentially active: Morality is cognition in action, or reason in practice, rather than merely in thought. Moral science can be glossed as systematic willing. This implication of Kant’s notion of practical cognition may require a more radical revision of the notion of science instead of merely a return to an earlier notion of science as I indicate in this chapter.
So what would it take for a supreme principle of reason to be positive and therefore at least potentially canonic? This turns out to be an extremely difficult question. As a first pass, consider the fact that reason is a faculty. According to Kant a faculty is a kind of organic unity, which means that there is a necessary connection between its organic elements:

1) vocation (purpose, telos, aim, end)
2) drive (first cause, need, impelling cause)
3) use (form, its operation, what it does, e.g. logical inference or real use)
4) element (matter or material on which it operates, e.g. concepts or ideas)

To illustrate, suppose the vocation or function of the heart is to nourish the cells of the body. The heart’s use might be to circulate blood, which is roughly the means by which it furthers its vocation. The drive of the heart might then be the rhythmic contraction and relaxation which impels the blood, its element, to circulate. We can think of these as being roughly the equivalent of Aristotelian causes, where the drive and vocation would be the first and final causes and the use and elements would be the formal and material causes.

Now it is a critical feature of any organic explanation that the various “causes” are connected in such a way that they necessarily further the vocation. In the case of the heart, the organic elements are causally related in the physical sense, taking advantage of natural mechanical causation, and this provides the necessary connection between the activity of the heart and its purpose. If we take the organic unity of faculties seriously, in order to be a faculty at all reason must have a drive, use, and element (or equivalents) that all necessarily further its vocation or final end.

In support of this conjecture that what Kant needs in order for the supreme principle of morality to be positive is something like a four-cause relation, in connection with his organic analytic of the intellectual faculties in the first Critique Kant attributes
something to understanding and to reason for each of these four roles. According to Kant’s analytic of understanding (as conceiving), *concepts* are the material or element used by the understanding, or on which the understanding operates. These concepts serve to unify thought through their use in predication, which is the comprehension of a subject representation by a concept. This description of understanding as predicative conception, as in the determining power of judgment, suggests that predication is the use, operation or logical form of understanding and that the function, purpose or end served is *unification*. The comprehension of a subject might be thought of as the first cause, as in the need, drive or impulse to comprehend. More briefly, Kant’s analytic of reason also involves these four roles: The logical use of reason is mediate inference, which serves the ground-seeking drive of reason, through the use of concepts or ideas (the material or elements), to the final purpose of universalization through grounds. According to the first *Critique*, the drive of reason in general is to seek grounds and the elements of reason in general are concepts, including ideas.

The “real use” of reason is synthetic a priori cognition of objects. What Kant means by synthetic a priori cognition and how it is possible is too complex to consider carefully just yet, so I will table the topic until chapters 5-8 when it can be considered more fully in the context of *Groundwork II*. For the time being it should be sufficient to gloss synthetic a priori cognition in general (both practical and theoretical) as the generation or production of concepts that refer to or are about objects which are themselves also entirely a priori. Kant initially characterizes practical reason as the cognitive production of objects, so we can think of practical reason as the real use of

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18 The logical use of reason is mediate inference, but this is theoretical. Since we are concerned primarily with moral metaphysics, not theoretical metaphysics, I will focus for the time being on the real use of reason and its obvious practical leanings (A299-306/B355-363. See also A7/B10ff).
reason. To foreshadow where this idea will take Kant in the *Groundwork*, think of practical reason as the idea of a will spontaneously and autonomously self-actualizing, and doing so a priori with regard only to what *ought* to be. The candidates for the vocation of (practical) reason would then include happiness, the highest good, virtue, rational self-perfection, and perhaps others.

One of the important tasks that remains for Kant’s critical project, then, is to find a principle for the correct use of pure practical reason that is *positive*, perhaps in the sense that it makes a necessary connection between the already identified ground-seeking drive of reason, some practical use of reason, some (special) kind of representation, and a vocation of reason. If such a principle were found, it would be a practical law for the canon of pure reason, and the canon would be propadeutic to a (scientific) metaphysics of morals. If the *Groundwork* identifies and establishes such a practical law, it would complete a significant step in preparing the way for a moral metaphysical system by providing its canon.

The first *Critique* has already identified three of the four organic components. The drive of reason is to seek grounds. The (logical) use of reason is mediate inference. The element of reason is the idea. The mystery is how these three things could be organically connected, and to what. The philosophical issue concerning the drive of reason, Kant says, is how to transcend the series from each condition to its condition, i.e.

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19 As it turns out, the positivity of the moral law is more complex and subtle than this simple teleological picture indicates. The criteria of significance and real possibility that Kant attempts to meet in *Groundwork I* are positive and connected to “four-cause” teleology, but not as straightforwardly as I imply here. I argue in Part II for example that the moral law must (positively) *constitute* conduct a priori and *regulate* its effects a priori, and that the *reality* of intention requires the hylomorphic causal community of an architectonic end. A complete treatment of the positivity of the canonic law of morality, which I will not give, would require interpretations of both *Groundwork III* in which Kant introduces freedom and the *Critique of Practical Reason* in which Kant relates the moral law to the highest good. Here I want to introduce very general criteria that may be met in unexpected ways later on.
from each ground to its own higher ground (A307/B364, see also A508/B536ff). The
drive of reason can do no more than impel a regress if it is restricted to ordinary concepts.
If, however, there is a special transcendental use of reason and a special kind of
representation that allows reason to seek a ground outside the series of conditions, say an
“idea of reason”, then there is hope that the activity of reason can further some “higher”
vocation.

The point I want to make is that given the organic nature of Kant’s understanding
of faculties in general and reason in particular, Kant’s audience has reason to expect a
positive supreme principle to provide insight into how the a priori practical use of reason,
which is the synthetic a priori practical cognition of objects, necessarily furthers some
unequivocally and characteristically moral vocation. Moreover, given this understanding
of what it would take for a supreme principle of morality to be established as a positive
canon law, we should expect the *Groundwork* to include some mention or discussion of
the real vocation of reason in a teleological context, or even better, to identify the
vocation of reason in practice and then connect the organic features of reason in one
principle so that the necessity of the furtherance of the vocation is clear.

Kant begins to address the positivity of the moral law, then, early in *Groundwork*
*I* with the teleological argument concerning the vocation of reason. As we will see in
later chapters, though, the issue is not so simple. The vocation of reason Kant identifies
is to make the will absolutely, incomparably good in itself. Since it is the copula or the
form of a principle that makes it positive in the required sense, Kant must carefully
explicate (via analysis) what it would take for a will to be absolutely, incomparably good
in itself and how reason contributes to this very distinctive good.
We know have a very basic idea of what moral metaphysical science would be, what it would be to establish such a science, and how a better understanding of Kant’s philosophy of science can generate expectations and even criteria for the *Groundwork*. In the next two chapters Kant’s *procedure* for establishing moral metaphysical science and the *method of analysis* with which it begins are considered in more detail, with the intention of illustrating how Kant’s methodology makes the *Groundwork* more predictable and critically evaluable.

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1 The idea of generating an apodictically certain moral system from a priori principles owes its Kantian inception both to the scholastic idea of a first principle and to the Newtonian idea of a law. Scholastic first principles, including their Leibnizean incarnation as monads, are relatively simple natures or essences of things which are proposed to explain all the myriad behaviors and movements of things. Though they are principles in a somewhat different sense, Newtonian laws are also relatively simple principles proposed to explain the myriad behaviors, changes and movements of things in nature. The architectural principle these two sorts of system, that is, these *sciences*, bear in common is the tenet that a plurality of motion or change can be explained by or generated from the unity of a principle. Given that morality is at bottom a kind of doctrine of causality, the search for a “principle” of morality by which the doctrine could be systematized is a worthy pursuit regardless of the specific theory of causality Kant’s contemporaries might initially have in mind. Given this ideological background, it should not be terribly surprising that one of the most overarching goals of Kant’s critical philosophy was to revolutionize morality by establishing moral science.

2 “Wer mein Buch also vernünftig beurtelen will, der muß kein bloßer Schullogicus sein: denn ein solcher Mensch wird mein Buch gewaltig tadeln, weil ich nichts von Barbara und Celarent, von der vierten oder dritten Figur, von der Reduktion der Schlüsse und dergleichen Sachen gesagt habe. Sondern er muß ein Mensch sein, der noch nicht durch eine bloße schulmäßige Vernunftlehre vergiftet worden, un der muß, den Inhalt meiner Vernunftlehre, von der Art des Vortrages unterscheiden, der ich mich bedient habe.

Es kann sein, daß ich die Wahl der Materien nicht allemal glücklich genung angestellt habe. Es ist schwer, daß ein Mensch, welcher von Profession ein Gelhrter ist, welcher die Vernunftlehreschülmaßig gelernt hat, und welcher sein Schicksal beklagt, vermöge dessen er gezwungen ist, bloß durch seine eigene Überlegung das nützliche und nötige von dem pedantischen zu unterscheiden, in der Wahl der Materien allemal glücklich sein sollte. Es soll mir also sehr angenehm sein, wenn Leute, die mehr wissen, als was man auf Schulen lernt, mir mit Grunde sagen werden, in welchen Stellen mein Buch nach der Schule schmeckt.


3 “Wenn wir nun diese Handlungen auf eine gelehrte Art erkennen, so ist diese gelehrte Erkenntnis unleugbar eine *praktische Erkenntnis*. Wir rechnen hierher nicht bloß die *moralischen Regeln*, als deren
**Wissenschaften** vorzuglicher Weise die **praktischen Wissenschaften**, z. E. die praktische Weltweisheit, die praktische Gottesgelahrheit usw.” (ML 375).

iv Kant explicitly rejected the paradigmatically persuasive rhetorical character, or style of elocution, of the *elocutio* later in his career, perhaps in response to the eighteenth century elocutionary movement. Readiness and accuracy in speaking (which taken together constitute rhetoric) belong to the beautiful art, but the art of the orator (*ars oratoria*), the art of availing oneself of the weakness of men for one’s own designs (whether these be well meant or even actually good does not matter) is worthy of no respect. Again, this art only reached its highest point, both at Athens and at Rome, at a time when the state was hastening to its ruin and true patriotic sentiment had disappeared. (KU §54 5:328; see also *Reflexionen* 3444 16:840)

This may be one of the reasons why Kant chose Meier’s *Vernunftlehre* over Reusch’s *Systema logicum* (JL 21). It was not the inclusion of elocution or other typically sophistic and rhetorical aspects of Aristotelian logic that drew Kant, but instead the relation between concrete sense and abstract intellect involved in cognitive grasp implied by Meier’s treatment of logical and aesthetic perfections.

v The following five canon of rhetoric were taught primarily for public debate, as in a senate:

1. **Inventio** (invention) was the art of discovering a means for finding arguments using a standard classification of topics like the one below. Kant adhered rather closely to these topics.

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<th>Common Topics</th>
<th>Special Topics</th>
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<td>Definition</td>
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<td>justice (right)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Division</td>
<td>injustice (wrong)</td>
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<td>Whole / Parts</td>
<td>Deliberative</td>
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<tr>
<td>Subject / Adjuncts</td>
<td>the good</td>
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<td>Comparison</td>
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<td>the advantageous</td>
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2. **Dispositio** (arrangement) was the method of organizing an argument. *Groundwork II* arguably follows this standard rhetorical order.
   a. exordium (introduction)
   b. partitio (statement of facts)
   c. confirmatio (proof)
   d. refutatio (refutation)
   e. peroratio (conclusion)

3. **Elocutio** (style) involved diction and the organization of phrases (tropes) for three levels: low (teaching), middle (persuading), and high (entertaining).

4. **Memoria**, (memory) was the ability to use mnemonic devices to call forth and sustain an argument.

5. **Pronuntiatio** (delivery)

   Despite Pozzo’s implication, *Exercitatio* (exercise) was not a canon in the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (sometimes) attributed to Cicero.
Pozzo and Hinske even argue that Kant’s distinction between noumena and phenomena is even grounded in Meier’s logic:

The basis of most eighteenth-century logics is representation. Baumgarten and Meier presuppose the traditional notion of the human mind as a thinking and acting subject, or, as Aristotle would say, as a carrier of intellectual and ethical habits. Everything in the mind is, in the wake of Locke and Leibniz, representation and, therefore, every content of knowledge is valid as a representation made by a subject with respect to an object, in the sense of a conceptus obiectivus…Meier’s conclusion [in 1766] that the immediate object of our sensation is not identical with the object in front of us and that the world of our sense experience is something different from the world of the objects ‘in and for themselves’ (an und vor sich selbst), although still consistent with the premises of Leibnizian and Wolffian philosophy, is, as Hinske has observed, an important step on the path that leads Kant to set up the laws of sensitive cognition on the basis of the distinction between the phenomenal and noumenal world. (Pozzo 2005, 196-7)

“…Ohne Zweifel bedarf es keines Beweises, um überzeugt zu sein, daß wir uns als Zuschauer oder Beschauer dieser Welt verhalten müssen. (ML 1)

Er muß sich nicht die bloße Oberfläche der Welt vorstellen, als welche eben dasjenige ist, was der erste Anschein, der erste Eindruck derselben in unsere Sinne, uns darstellt. Der beschauende Einwohner der Welt muß durch diese Oberfläche der Welt durchsehen, er muß die Zusammenführung der Welt nach den ewigen Regeln der Ordnung beurteilen, welche der Schöpfer der Welt vor Augen gehabt hat, als der die Welt erschaffen hat. Er muß den Ulstoff der Welt ergründen, die Absichten, den Nutzen der Dinge erkennen, und tausend andere Sachen, welche nur durch die schließende Vernunft, und durch ein forschendes und tiefhimmiges Nachdenken, können erkannt werden. Es verhält sich mit der Welt, wie mit einem nach den vollkommensten Regeln der Baukunst ausgeführten Pallaste…. Ein Bauverständiger betrachtet dieselben mit ganz andern Augen. Er schaut bis auf den Grundriß hindurch, er beobachtet das Ebenmaß oder die Proportion aller Teile; er allein wird, durch die Kenntniss der Regeln der Baukunst, vermögend, die wahre Vollkommenheit dieselben mit Erwählen und Bewunderung zu erkennen” (ML 2-3).

Kant’s Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science is a good guide to his understanding of physical laws. Michael Friedman has several recent works concerning the relation between theoretical metaphysics and natural science in Kant’s philosophy. Friedman’s work is primarily oriented to Kant’s position within the (empirical) scientific revolution and later developments, and does not generalize to moral science without qualification. My concern is specifically Kant’s understanding of non-empirical practical science and its development from earlier philosophical traditions.

See for example 4: 395, A336/B393, A832/B860ff, A303/B359ff, A321/B378ff. Organization, teleology, and the distinctive feature of intention (causal community) will be addressed less casually and in more detail in Part II.

It is tempting to posit comprehension as the function of understanding, but comparison with reason makes this unlikely. Function is most plausibly something like a purpose or final cause. Unity and universality are explicitly the (logical) functions of understanding and reason respectively. Since reason has a ground-seeking drive, understanding should have a comprehension-seeking drive.
Chapter 2   The Method\textsuperscript{20} for Establishing a Canon of Moral Science

As we saw in the last chapter, to establish the supreme principle of morality is to begin the establishment of moral science. The obvious point of doing this is to make it possible for us to gain insight into morality and to thereby cognize moral sorts of things with objective certainty. If morality were established as a proper science with \textit{a priori} principles from which a \textit{complete} body of cognition \textit{necessarily} followed, Kant thought, we could be certain that our moral judgments are correct when they are because we would have insight into why they are correct. We would not only be able to discover when we are wrong, but why.

But this is not all. Moral science proper would also help correct us, Kant thought, not merely by allowing us to theoretically ascertain when we morally err, it would actually help us \textit{do} better. Establishing moral metaphysics as a science would not only secure our theoretical understanding of morality, it would ideally gain us a practical grasp of morality as well. Kant claims in the Preface to the \textit{Groundwork} that a full grasp of the pure a priori canonic \textit{laws} of morality would not only help us “distinguish in what cases they are applicable”, but it would also “provide them with access to the will of the human being and efficacy for his fulfillment of them” (G 4:389).\textsuperscript{i}

To provide some initial motivation for this idea that cognitive grasp should include or imply practical grasp, consider that even as we ordinarily think of it, to genuinely grasp something like an idea or a process is more than merely to have a theoretical familiarity and facility with it. A genuine grasp of physics does not merely give one insight into physical workings, it gives one the wherewithal to design, and even

\textsuperscript{20} As a scholastic term “method” is a name for doing logic, i.e. for practical logic (A708/B736). A Doctrine of Method is an organon of scholastic method (JL 18). Method is to be distinguished from exposition, which is “the manner of communicating one’s thoughts in order to make a doctrine understandable” (JL 19-20).
build, bridges and airplanes. To genuinely grasp music is more than merely to enjoy and appreciate it, but to engage with it on another level, to participate in it. To truly grasp music to have the potential to play or compose it. We use this analogy between cognitive and manual grasp of an object to underscore that the kind of understanding we mean by “grasp” is a kind of understanding by which we in some way access an object. Grasp in this sense connotes concrete employment, or even control of the object. To put this point in Kantian terms, cognitive grasp of something is more than theoretical insight; it implies at least the potential for practical grasp of it.

In order for Kant’s stated general procedure for establishing sciences to have any hope of fulfilling his vision for the science of moral metaphysics, then, this procedure must engage with Kant’s understanding of cognitive grasp. With this in mind, the purpose of this chapter is to explain Kant’s procedure for establishing sciences. I will begin with the procedure itself. Since *Groundwork I-II* only concern the first two steps of this procedure, I will explain fairly briefly how the first step is required by the definition of a science as a system, then spend the remainder of the chapter explaining how the first two steps of establishing a science ground cognitive grasp according to Kant.

As I will explain, these first two steps of Kant’s procedure for establishing sciences arose from several sources, and each step relies on both logic and metaphysics. The initial transformation from a great amount of concrete data into a clear and distinct idea of the science has a strong precedent in Descartes, but Kant’s understanding of how this transformation works and what it gains us relies on both the relation between aesthetic and logical perfections in Meier’s logic and transcendental idealism. The next transition, from the clear and distinct idea of the science to the determination of its special content, has a strong precedent in Leibnizean-Wolfian logic. This step is a logical division to the complete determination of the object of the science, and as Kant
understands it, the complete determination metaphysically rests upon his solution to the central problem of metaphysics.

Each of these elements of the first two steps of Kant’s procedure for establishing sciences is worthy of philosophical consideration in its own right. My goal in this chapter is only to outline Kant’s general strategy and sketch why he thought it would work. This very general understanding of Kant’s plan will set some minimal expectations for how Kant should begin to carry it out in the *Groundwork*. The next chapters will take a closer look at the methods of analysis, how Kant executes his plan in the *Groundwork*, and the some of the metaphysical implications these have for morality.

§1  **How to Establish a Science**

Kant describes the process of establishing a science in fairly generic terms in the Doctrine of Method near the end of the first *Critique* (B862). In order to establish a science, he says, one must first *make distinct the idea* of the natural unity of its material. From this distinct idea one must then *determine* the special *content* of the science. Once the idea is clear and its content determined, one must *articulate* the *systematic unity* of the science, and then finally *Critique* the science to determine its boundaries. These four steps are quite general in the Doctrine, so we should expect the procedure to be applicable to the establishment of any science. Before we can even begin this process, though, Kant says we need a great deal of material from experience to work with “in order to first glimpse the idea” that is to subsequently be made distinct, systematically articulated, and critiqued (B862-3). This gives us the starting point from which the process begins.

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21 See also Kant’s slightly more opaque description in the *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics* of the method whereby one would establish metaphysics as a science (P 4:365).
Starting at the beginning of this process, Kant further explains in the Architectonic of Pure Reason what he means by this glimpsed idea and how the process of establishing a science begins (A832ff/B860ff). Sciences always begin as rhapsodic aggregates of cognition that are collected haphazardly. We initially turn these heaps into pseudo-sciences by giving them an “empirical” “schema”, which is an ordering of parts determined by contingent aims that give the aggregate a “technical” unity (A833/B861). In order to then establish a science proper, we must get from this contingent technical unity to architectonic unity. The architectonic unity of a science requires an “idea”, which is a concept of the form of the whole of cognition (A834-5/B862-3):

[S]ystematic unity is that which first makes ordinary cognition into science, i.e., makes a system out of a mere aggregate… I understand by a system … the unity of manifold cognitions under one idea. This [idea] is the rational concept of the form of a whole, insofar as through this [idea] the domain of the manifold as well as the position of the parts with respect to each other is determined a priori…. Under the government of reason our cognitions cannot at all constitute a rhapsody but must constitute a system, in which alone they [our cognitions] can support and advance its [reason’s] essential ends. (A832/B860 emphasis mine)

The schema of the idea, which is required for the “execution” of the idea, is the “essential manifoldness and order of parts determined a priori from the principle of the [‘supreme and inner’] end” (A833/B861). This is what “grounds” the architectonic unity of science proper:

What we call science, whose schema contains the outline (monogramma) and the division of the whole into members in conformity with the idea, i.e. a priori, cannot arise technically, from the similarity of the manifold or the contingent use of cognition in concreto for all sorts of arbitrary external ends, but arises architectonically, for the sake of its affinity and its derivation from a single supreme and inner end, which first makes possible the whole; such a science must be distinguished from all others with certainty and in accordance with principles. (A833/B861)
What we should initially take from all this is that the idea of a science is a concept of the whole body of cognition, and this whole is a totality that includes a “principle of the end” that orders and unifies the domain of cognition, thereby making a system of the aggregate.

With regard to establishing sciences, the difficulty for us according to Kant is that such special concepts only come to us after a great deal of work. We must first generate a large aggregate of cognition to be organized. Then we must organize this aggregate, working through it all and ordering it according to contingent aims, and only then can we glimpse the idea of the whole as a science proper:

It is too bad that it is first possible for us to glimpse the idea in a clearer light and to outline a whole architectonically, in accordance with the ends of reason, only after we have long collected relevant cognitions haphazardly like building materials and worked through them technically with only a hint from an idea lying hidden within us. The systems seem to have been formed, like maggots, by a generatio aequivoca from the mere confluence of aggregated concepts, garbled at first but complete in time, although they all had their schema, as the original seed, in the mere self-development of reason, and on that account are not merely each articulated for themselves in accordance with an idea but are rather all in turn purposively united with each other as members of a whole in a system of human cognition. (A834-5/B862-3)

Kant goes on to say that “at the present time, since so much material has already been collected” and technically ordered that we are ready for the idea of the science of reason (A835/B863). This architectonic science of reason for which we are now ready, as Kant explained in the Canon, unavoidably includes practical reason, i.e. morality (A796ff/B824ff).

It is worth noting that here that in the case of moral science it is not experience per se from which we must glimpse the idea, as in theoretical sciences, but rather practice. The aggregate data of morality includes not only our experience of practice, but everything concerning practice – our thoughts, judgments, presumptions, and feelings, the artifacts we make, the qualities of our character, our various limitations, and so on.
Some of this data will end up belonging to moral science proper, and some will be relegated to another science, but we must not begin with too restrictive a data set. Everything that seems relevant to morality should initially be considered.

Now the difference between an idea of a science that is inadequate for its systemization and one that is adequate for the first step of establishing the science is that the adequate idea is distinct. As Kant explains in his logic lectures, a representation is distinct if we are conscious not merely of the whole, but also of the manifold that is contained in it.

If we want an example of indistinctness in concepts, furthermore, then the concept of beauty may serve. Everyone has a clear concept of beauty [i.e. everyone is conscious of it]. But in this concept many different marks occur, among others that the beautiful must be something that (1.) strikes the senses and (2.) pleases universally. Now if we cannot explicate the manifold of these and other marks of the beautiful, then our concept of it is still indistinct. (JL 34)

So by definition, a distinct idea is one that involves a manifold of marks and from which one can explicate these marks. The distinct idea of a science should presumably be one from which one could articulate the body of cognition. Since sciences are organized by their a priori principles and in the case of objective sciences these are laws, the distinct idea Kant needs for the first step is a distinct idea of the canonic law of moral science, i.e. a distinct idea of the supreme principle of morality.

The second step of establishing a science is to determine its special content. This is the step that connects the idea of the science to its objects, by relating the distinct representation of the canonic law to the objects it governs. Without this step, the science could not really be about anything. As we will see in later chapters, in the case of moral science the object to be determined is an activity, namely willing. Morality is

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22 Logic is the only science that abstracts entirely from all objects, so it is the only science to which this step does not apply. Kant presumably did not see the need to make any qualification to his procedure for logic since he thought it had already been established for thousands of years.
about voluntary actions, intentions, and above all what we ought to do. To determine the special content of moral science is therefore to determine the will. What I will argue in this chapter, though, is more basic. The determination of content from a distinct idea, whether moral or otherwise, is what underwrites cognitive grasp.

Before getting into the details of how the first two steps work together, the last two steps of the procedure should be mentioned. Neither of these steps of establishing moral science takes place in the *Groundwork*, so they may be dealt with very briefly. The articulation of a science, step three, is the derivation of secondary and lower principles from the first principles of the science. These lower principles are more specific than the first principles, but no less important to our use of the science. In physics, for example, these would include principles concerning friction or other concepts that must be employed in some contexts but not needed in others. For moral science, Kant articulates the principles of virtue and right, e.g. the principle of contract right, in the *Metaphysics of Morals*. This third step would ideally provide the complete set of principles by which the objects of the science are governed. Even though Kant claims that all these lower level principles must really be contained in the first principles of the science, we need these principles for the same reasons we need theorems in mathematics. Some of the most useful secondary principles may be quite difficult to derive. Articulating all these principles in the establishment of a science, Kant thought, would not only save us from the burden of beginning always with the canon to solve any problem, but it would ensure that we do not mistakenly use an incorrect principle.

The fourth step of establishing science, namely its critique, takes place in the second *Critique*. This is the step that determines the boundaries of the science. As Kant emphasizes in the first *Critique*, we have a natural tendency to push our reasoning to its utmost limits. The danger for sciences is that this tendency will sometimes lead us to
speculation that cannot be supported by the science from which it arose. In some cases we make mistakes because we cross the boundary between two sciences, e.g. when we infer how people ought to act from how they do act. Critique prevents this by circumscribing the domain that is proper to the distinct idea of the science:

It is sometimes hard to explain what is understood by a science [because our idea of it is indistinct]. But the science gains in precision through establishment of its determinate concept, and in this way many mistakes are avoided which otherwise creep in, for certain reasons, if one cannot yet distinguish the science from sciences related to it. (JL 21 emphasis mine)

In other cases the problem is even worse because the speculation exceeds the bounds of possible cognition entirely. The most important purpose of metaphysical critique according to Kant is to curb such speculation (Bxx, A3ff/B6ff, A11/B25).

As things stand at this point we should have two expectations of the Groundwork based on the Doctrine of Method. We should expect the Groundwork to at least identify a practical law or a positive principle for the correct use of pure practical reason, and we should expect it to begin to do so by making distinct an idea glimpsed from the “moral data” of our lives. Since Kant says in the Preface that the purpose of the Groundwork is to establish the supreme principle of morality, the Doctrine of Method seems to have us on the right track. The supreme principle of morality is the idea made distinct, i.e. the result of the first step, and this is the canonic law of moral science. The next question is how determining the content of a science from its distinct idea could ground cognitive grasp.

§2 Why Determination requires Distinct Philosophical Cognition

The notion of cognitive grasp, apprehension, or insight has taken various forms through the history of Western philosophy and has typically been closely associated with the notion of science. Aristotle’s “topics” for example, are scientific in that they
constitute a system of distinctions which allow one to discover first principles that can be grasped in their own right through a form of immediate intellectual apprehension. To take an example closer to Kant, the Cartesian notion of cognitive grasp posits the “light of reason” as allowing one to cognitively grasp the truth of clear and distinct ideas. Kant’s view of logic generally, and of analysis more specifically, belongs to this tradition.

From Aristotle on, the notion of cognitive grasp, insight, or apprehension was modeled on the operation of corporeal organs, where such organs were understood in teleological terms (Gaukroger 1989, 38-47). It was widely held in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance that reasoning is the exercise of one’s faculties and that logic and inference must be understood in terms of the modes of operation of the faculties (Gaukroger 1989, 39). These faculties were understood teleologically, but not necessarily materially. This strong historic precedent of modeling reasoning and cognitive insight as teleological organic systems explains Kant’s casual assumption that the cognitive faculties can be attributed drives, functions, forms, and elements corresponding roughly to the four Aristotelian causes. The standard of explanation for faculties of mind that Kant inherited from the philosophical tradition was thus teleological, and in order to depart from it Kant would have had to both carefully argue against it and replace it with a clear alternative.

Aside from the generally organic understanding of insight, like his predecessors Kant also takes insight itself to be primitive or fundamental insofar as it is an act and he agrees that we cannot have insight into it. Yet like many other issues near the boundary

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23 Gaukroger 1989, 21. See also Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics Book II §10ff for an account of how explanatory definition enables cognitive grasp. This is a very early predecessor of Kant’s understanding of how ampliative definitions, as opposed to tautologies, enable cognitive grasp.
of experience, Kant thought it both possible and philosophically necessary to investigate the conditions of its possibility. If we consider the conditions of the possibility of distinctness grounding cognitive insight, according to Kant we should immediately realize that by virtue of being related as ground and consequent, distinctness and insight must have something in common. There must be something about distinct cognition that makes it possible for insight to follow from it. In other words, there must be a necessary connection between distinctness and insight.

A contrast with Descartes is helpful to bring out the issue. The basic idea behind Descartes’ claim that clear and distinct ideas are certain to be true is roughly this. One cannot refuse to assent to what one conceives clearly and distinctly. The impossibility of refusing assent is certainty, and certainty implies justification. Since assent or certainty can only be justified for what is true, whatever one conceives clearly and distinctly must be true. The weak link here, as Descartes was aware, is the connection between subjective certainty, objective justification, and truth, where truth is the correspondence between idea and reality. In order to explain how clear and distinct ideas enable us to grasp truth, Descartes’ posits a divine guarantee that whatever we conceive clearly and distinctly does correspond to reality. The actual grasping of truth is left as a primitive act not subject to further analysis or explanation.

For reasons beyond the scope of this discussion Kant cannot posit a divine guarantee, so though his view is similar to Descartes’ in several regards, his explanation of how distinct ideas generate insight must be different. Kant might agree with Descartes that one cannot refuse to assent to what one conceives clearly and distinctly and that this

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24 Gaukroger 1989, 27 and 63ff. Kant endorsed the spirit of Descartes’ principle: “Descartes rendered it [philosophy] no small service, in that he contributed much to giving distinctness to thought by advancing his criterion of truth, which he placed in the clarity and evidence of cognition” (JL 32).
assent is therefore subjectively justified, or even subjectively certain. What he cannot do is bridge the gap between subjective and objective justification through any appeal to divinity. Kant needs some other way to explain how cognitive insight or grasp can follow from a distinct idea.

Turning to Kant’s positive view, the terms of the issue are set as follows. Since we are concerned here with the establishment of objective sciences, the kind of representation at issue is cognition, where cognitions are representations that relate both to a subject (representer) and to some real object, and which are therefore candidates for truth. Subjectivity concerns the relation between representation and subject (the representer); objectivity concerns the relation between representation and its object. Given that cognitions are the representations of interest and these involve relations both to subject and object, they must be evaluable with respect to both relations. As Kant sets the scene in his logic lectures, subjective and objective justification are ordinarily described in terms of the three the scholastic degrees of holding-to-be-true: opinion, belief, and knowledge (JL 66ff, see also BL 147-8, VL 850ff). These three degrees of holding-to-be-true are roughly what we now call propositional attitudes (because they are holdings). Truth, i.e. what is held, is the agreement between representation and object. Consciousness of this agreement objectively justifies one in holding a cognition to be true.

Opinion is the lowest degree of the three because it requires merely that the representation agree somewhat with the subject, not necessarily with the object. In this case there is little justification for either the holding or the truth of the holding-to-be-true. Belief is the middle degree of holding-to-be-true. It requires a quite strong agreement between representation and subject (the degree we would count as subjective certainty), and the representation must also agree reasonably well with the object (BL 229). This is
a higher degree of holding-to-be-true because it requires a stronger objective justification – a better agreement between representation and object – and it is a higher degree of holding-to-be-true because it requires a stronger subjective justification. Knowledge (Wissen) is the highest of the three degrees of holding-to-be-true, requiring very strong agreement on both fronts, and it is notably the root of science (Wissenschaft): “From Wissen comes Wissenschaft, by which is to be understood the complex of a cognition as a system” (JL 72).

So the immediate question is how clear and distinct cognition supports knowledge, especially scientific knowledge. If clear and distinct ideas are to be as compelling as Kant thinks, they must by their very nature be both subjectively and objectively quite well justified. According to Kant, distinct cognition is cognition in which one is conscious of the grounds of determination\textsuperscript{25} of the object. In other words, in distinct cognition one is conscious of specific predicates involved in the relation between representation and object. Consciousness is or involves a kind of agreement between subject and representation (JL 33). The upshot is that subjective clarity as to the predicates being attributed to the object enables one to consider the objective agreement, i.e., whether the object really has the property as represented. In other words, one is able to assess the agreement between representation and object and become aware of the truth of the cognition, which can then objectively justify one in holding it to be true. This is why distinct cognition is a natural starting point, or even an obligatory starting point, for the establishment of sciences.

\textsuperscript{25} Determination is a predicative representation of content. A complete determination concerns the whole of possibility for a subject representation because it assigns every possible predicate to either be affirmed or denied of the subject (B579).
Kant’s problem is to explain how this is *metaphysically* possible. Kant must explain how distinct cognition *guarantees* or *secures* truth insofar as it does. It is one thing to claim that distinct cognition involves consciousness *of* truth, but another to explain *how* this can be. Rather resting on a primitive intellectual act underwritten by God, Kant sought his guarantee in the nature of our faculties themselves. There are two steps to Kant’s solution, each having both a logical and a metaphysical part. The first metaphysical element is Kant’s controversial transcendental idealism. For moral science we need only the general outline of how transcendental idealism would secure a concrete grasp of objects. The second part comes from Meier’s *Vernunftlehre*. According to Meier’s explanation of analysis, it is possible to take an analysandum that is concrete or intuitive and transform it into a clear and distinct, philosophically adequate concept. So we begin with a metaphysically explicable concrete grasp of an object and use a method of logic to transform it into a clear and distinct idea. Using some inspiration from Leibniz, this distinct idea will be adequate if it grounds the complete determination of the object, i.e. if by means of the method of logical division we can use the distinct idea to ascertain whether and how every relevant predicate pertains to the object. The next step is to explain how this clear and distinct idea retains its grasp on the object through the transformation, or barring this, to explain how an abstract concept can *ever* have content in the requisite sense. Kant also explains this in the first *Critique*, using a transcendental schema to bridge the gap between pure concepts of the understanding and intuitions. Except for some of the metaphysical details of concrete grasp, this entire plan is derived from the model of real definition in mathematics.

Since transcendental idealism is extremely complex and controversial, I will provide only the briefest sketch of how Kant thinks it would secure our concrete grasp of objects. We need not become transcendental idealists to understand Kant’s plan. The
procedure for establishing sciences does not rest on transcendental idealism. It only rests on the very basic assumption that we do in fact concretely grasp objects somehow. Only skeptics would claim that we cannot do this. One may insert any plausible metaphysical explanation of how this is possible without undermining the procedure for establishing sciences. If we suppose that concrete grasp of objects is possible and metaphysically explicable, we can move on to the transition between concrete grasp of the content of a science and the clear and distinct idea of the science.

In a nutshell, the upshot of Kant’s solution to this very fundamental problem of objectivity is that we ourselves underwrite objective truth: Our faculties of representation are constitutive of the objects we represent in a very specific way, thus there can be no gap between representation and object in this regard. Kant introduces the inspiration for his solution in the Preface to the first Critique as a “Copernican hypothesis” positing that objective a priori cognition is possible only insofar as the objects conform to our cognition rather than vice versa (Bxviff). He later argues in the Transcendental Aesthetic of the first Critique that space and time are nothing other than pure a priori forms of the way in which we intuit objects. To put it very roughly, when an external object affects us, we can concretely grasp the object with necessity insofar as it is spatial because its essential spatiality is really a feature of our faculty of sensibility rather than some independent thing in itself. The details of how this works are important in the end, but they will be left for part II. In order to understand Kant’s strategy, again, we only need to know for now that Kant thought he had a compelling metaphysical explanation of concrete grasp.

§3 Meier’s Vernunftlehre
Kant chose G. F. Meier’s Vernunftlehre as the logic text on which he lectured for more than thirty years specifically because it is especially well-suited to provide the
logical basis of a transition from concrete to abstract, clear and distinct cognitive grasp. As I will explain in this section, by including aesthetic perfections in the perfections of cognition, by fully describing *gelehrte Erkentnis* (learned cognition) as the highest perfection of cognition, and by explaining analysis as an instrument of acquiring learned cognition, Meier’s text enabled Kant to teach the method of analysis as a method by which common *in concreto* understanding could be transformed into philosophical *in abstracto* understanding (BL 17ff, JL 33-39, JL 99-100).26

This particular transformation from common to philosophic understanding is critically important to Kant because sciences must be both accurate and precise.27 Common cognition is accurate but imprecise, while popular philosophy is precise but inaccurate. Analysis from the common to the philosophic would yield a kind of cognition that is both accurate and precise because it would preserve the accuracy of common understanding while increasing its logical perfection. The prospects of the alternative are not at all good. There is no method for increasing the accuracy of an inaccurate but precise cognition. Given the need for both accuracy and precision, then, Kant had some reason to believe that his four-step method for establishing sciences is the only viable method. The fundamental job of the philosopher must then be to explain how and why it

26 There are four dimensions of aesthetic or sensible perfection, which are concrete perfections attributable to common (and popular) understanding (JL 33-39). *Aesthetic universality* is the breadth of application of a cognition to a multitude of objects that serve as examples. *Aesthetic distinctness* is the exhibition in concreto through examples of a concept that is thought abstractly. *Aesthetic truth* is the agreement of cognition with the subject and the laws of sensory illusion. *Aesthetic certainty* rests on confirmation through the senses and experience.

27 To use an analogy by way of explanation, a shot is accurate insofar as it is centered on target, so a shotgun blast and a .22 round may be equally accurate. They are not, however, equally precise because the radius of impact is quite different. If the goal is to hit the bull’s eye and only the bull’s eye, the .22 shot is precise and the shotgun is not. Common understanding is accurate but imprecise because it is concrete and perhaps vague, while philosophy is often precise but inaccurate. The method of analysis from common to philosophic is meant to preserve accuracy while increasing precision. See chapter 5 for the purpose of the *Groundwork II* analysis from popular philosophy to metaphysics.
works, which arguably requires a critique of reason to explain the metaphysical underpinnings of the logical method.

Supposing the initial metaphysical explanation of concrete grasp is in place, the next element of the strategy is to use a logical method adopted from G. F. Meier to transform this concrete grasp into an adequately abstract scientific grasp. Since Meier’s *Vernunftlehre* is unfamiliar to most philosophers today, I will begin with a little background on the text itself. Most generally a doctrine of reason, i.e. a *Vernunftlehre*, is a science of the rules of rational thought (ML 5). Meier’s *Vernunftlehre* is about what he calls *learned cognition*, which is to be understood as rational cognition that has a high degree of *perfection* and is adequate to philosophical purposes. Accordingly Meier’s doctrine of reason is in large part a systematic treatment of the perfections of rational cognition (ML 5-6) as the section titles below indicate:

- Introduction to the Doctrine of Reason
- Of learned cognition
- Of learned cognition overall (in general)
- Of the extensiveness of learned cognition
- Of the magnitude of learned cognition
- Of the truth of learned cognition
- Of the clarity of learned cognition
- Of the certainty of learned cognition
- Of learned cognition in so far as it is practical
- Of learned concepts
- Of learned judgments
- Of learned inferences
- Of the art of teaching learned cognition
- Of learned elocution
- Of the use of words
- Of the art of learned writing
- Of learned speech
- Of learned writing
- Of the character of a learned person

Meier’s doctrine of reason thus articulates the body of a science of reason. It provides a systematic analysis of the perfections of learned cognition so that by understanding these
perfections we can grasp the rules that structure reason itself. In a sense, then, Kant’s own critical project is to extend Meier’s articulation of general logic, which is supposed to abstract entirely from all consideration of objects, to a transcendental logic that applies to objects in a metaphysically explicable way.

As Pozzo documents, Kant specifically chose Meier’s *Vernunftlehre* because it correctly captures the relation between our common, concrete understanding of things and a philosophically refined, abstract understanding of them:

> In the program he wrote for his courses in Winter 1765/66, Kant notes that Meier’s effective explanation of the interaction between the ‘critique and precept of the common understanding’ and the ‘critique and precept of true science’ was the reason he adopted his textbooks. Meier makes it possible, says Kant, to *cultivate* the “more refined and *philosophical* reason” together with the “*common*, but active and *healthy* understanding.” (Pozzo 2005, 190 emphasis mine)

As both Meier and Kant define it, *common* understanding is understanding *in concreto*, which is *intuitive*, thus best judged according to *aesthetic* perfections. *Philosophic* understanding is understanding *in abstracto*, which is *discursive* and must be held to the standards of *logical* perfection (Axvii).28 One of the ongoing philosophical issues of the seventeenth and eighteenth century was whether and how to distinguish between these two kinds of representations. On some views there is no distinction in *kind*, only a distinction in the *degree* of their perfections, for example of their liveliness or their clarity. If there is no distinction in kind, then no special metaphysical explanation is required to explain how one may transform the obscure into the distinct, because this is only a matter of perfecting the representation. If, on the other hand, there is a difference in kind, any such transformation is metaphysically suspect. Kant thought that intuitions and concepts are distinct kinds of representations, each with its own set of perfections specific to its kind.

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28 It is worth noting that even when Kant denies that absolute perfection can be attained, his notion of approaching perfection is very likely analogous to approaching a limit in mathematics (BL 215).
In order to account for the possibility of improving our representations, then, Kant at least needed a way to relate the perfections of the two kinds at a logical level.

As the quote above indicates, Meier did this for him. According to Meier, the highest perfection of representation is a perfection of learned cognition that includes both aesthetic and logical perfections. Though there is ordinarily a tradeoff between aesthetic perfections like liveliness and logical perfections like clarity, they can all belong to one lucid representation. Just as importantly, Meier not only systematically presented the full range of cognitive perfections Kant needed, he also explained the method of analysis as a means of exploiting the trade-off between aesthetic and logical perfections. This enabled Kant to teach the method of analysis as a method by which common, concrete understanding could be transformed into abstract philosophical understanding.³

It is particularly elegant and pedagogically useful that not only does the content of Meier’s Vernunftlehre correctly relate the common to the philosophic, the Vernunftlehre is itself an illustration of how the method of analysis gains one insight into a matter and by following it one can transform one’s own common understanding of reason into a learned one. The Vernunftlehre was not written merely as a supplement or sequel to existing texts, but was intended to be a complete doctrine of reason that takes its audience all the way from a largely ignorant common understanding of matters to a thorough, philosophically adequate, understanding of cognitive science as it stood at the time.

I would wish that everyone be able to understand and rely on my book … should they only have the intention and possesses the natural skill to think reasonably philosophically and wisely. (ML IV translation mine)⁶

This pedagogic journey takes the form of an analysis of learned cognition: Meier begins by describing learned cognition in general, and then through the course of the text he systematically analyzes learned cognition in order to provide an extensive treatment of all
the relevant distinctions and perfections. It is through analysis of a thing that one arrives at a distinct cognition by which to grasp it.

If all goes well, Kant’s students would end the course with more than a merely scholastic understanding of learned cognition. They would experience the transformation themselves and to grasp learned cognition in philosophically adequate depth, coming to possess a learned cognition of learned cognition. To grasp these rules of reason in Meier’s sense is not merely to be familiar and facile with the scholastic tenets of reason, but to have a deeper understanding of their *Grundsätze* and *Gesetzen*, i.e. to grasp the first principles and fundamental laws of reason (ML 6-7). This systematic treatment of perfections is meant to help Meier’s readers to become investigators of the architecture and mechanism of reason itself, i.e. to transform themselves from mere spectator (*Zuschauer*) of the world and being an investigator (*Beschauer*) with the eyes of a engineer or an architect (*Bauverständiger*) of the world (ML 1-6). To put this another way, the successful student would in the end have both an abstract and a concrete understanding of the process of becoming learned. Kant’s students could thereby attest to the efficacy of the process of establishing the science of learned cognition by undergoing the transformation from a vague understanding to a clear and distinct one.

At this point the first step of establishing sciences should be fairly compelling. We begin from a great aggregate of material that we initially grasp concretely. From this we glimpse the vague idea of a science and by means of analysis transform it into a clear and distinct idea of the science. If we begin from what we already know concretely and intuitively, then by making us conscious of the grounds of determination of the object, i.e. making this representation distinct, the process of analysis can generate insight into what we already knew in a confused, obscure, or intuitive way. We should, then, have a
general expectation that *Groundwork I* should begin with an analysis that will take us from a concrete, or common, understanding of morality to a more distinct and abstract understanding of it. The second step of Kant’s procedure is to use this distinct idea to determine the special content of the science. Like the first step, this will require both logic and metaphysics. I will begin in the next section with the logic.

§4 Complete Determination

According to the generic scholastic understanding a distinct cognition is one in which we are conscious of precisely the necessary and sufficient marks of identity and diversity of a thing, and these marks are therefore necessary and sufficient for the determination of the object. The method of analytic logical division is the method by which one makes such determinations from a distinct idea, and this rests on the principle of contradiction (JL 146-8, 149, DWL 760-2, VL 925-8). This method will be explained in greater detail later, but for this chapter a general description should suffice.

To logically divide a concept is to “take apart” the “sphaera” of the concept by partitioning the manifold under the concept (VL 925). For example, *movement* is within the sphaera or scope of the concept of animals, thus the concept of animals contains *under* it animals that move on land, in the air, and in water:

> [W]e say, then, in accordance with the example we used, that all *animals*, divided according to *movement* are such as can move *either* on the earth or in the air, or in water. This *either, or* expresses the fact that they are different, and that one kind is opposed to the other. Through the word *all*, however, one expresses the face that together the marks constitute the concept. (VL 926)

Kant typically does not categorize division as a kind of analysis in his lectures because he wants to emphasize to his students the difference between taking apart a concept and taking apart its *sphaera*. The former is analysis in the traditional sense, but the latter is
still an analysis, i.e. a taking apart, as opposed to a synthesis, which is a putting together (A130ff/B129ff).²⁹

Since Kant thinks the method of division is quite well established and philosophically unproblematic, the logical issue for this step of establishing a science is whether division of the distinct concept is adequate for the complete a priori determination of the object. In other words, it is not enough to be able to ascertain the members of the divisions falling under the concept, which is merely a relation between concepts, we must also be able to ascertain the specific membership of each object within the extension of the concept. For example, given a division of duty into narrow and wide and some dutiful action, one must be able to ascertain whether the action is narrowly dutiful, widely dutiful.

Following Leibniz, a perfectly distinct cognition would be a cognition in which one is conscious of precisely the marks that are necessary and sufficient for the complete determination of its object, where a complete determination is a determination for which every possible predicate is affirmed or denied of the thing. In other words, a perfectly distinct cognition is sufficient for one to determine everything about the object. This kind of cognition seems an excellent candidate for insight, supposing as Kant does that we need not be able to consciously grasp all (perhaps infinitely many) predicates in one act (as God might) in order for the cognition to qualify as grounding determinate insight (BL 133, 135). If insight or cognitive grasp amounts to (more or less) completely

²⁹ Divisions themselves can be either “analytic” or “synthetic” according to Kant. Analytic division is dichotomous, i.e. into logically mutually exclusive members like A and not-A. The members of a synthetic division must be mutually exclusive, but really rather than logically. These are polytomous divisions, e.g. into A and B, that logically rest on the law of the excluded middle rather than the principle of contradiction (DWL 761-2).
determinate cognition for Kant, then clear and distinct cognition is the right sort of
ground.

Leibniz’s notion of complete determination was too inclusive because it made
every concept a complete mirror of the universe, of course, but Kant’s understanding of
complete determination is more feasible. It is not, strictly speaking, the determination of
whether and how every possible predicate pertains to the object that is at issue for
metaphysics, but only whether and how every possible predicate necessarily pertains to
the object or necessarily does not. Contingencies belong primarily to the empirical
sciences. According to Kant the determination of a proper a priori science is complete if
and only if the distinct concept is adequate to determine everything about the object that
can be determined entirely a priori.

Complete determination is a very high standard of adequacy, but still an
appropriate one. We commonly think sciences must be quite powerful in this regard, and
if Newton’s laws are adequate for the complete determination of everything that happens
mechanically then Kant’s moral law should be adequate for the complete determination
of everything that ought to happen. More importantly, though, there is a logical reason
why determination must be in some sense complete in order to secure truth. Predicates
can contradict their subject, obviously, but they can contradict each other as well. Only
in a complete determination could it be ascertained whether any of the latter sort of
contradictions are unavoidably entangled with the glimpsed idea of moral science. This
is merely a negative criterion of truth, but still a necessary one.

Kant thinks we are already familiar with the general idea of a complete
determination from mathematics, and to a lesser extent from empirical cognition (B755-8).
Mathematical definitions exemplify for Kant how a distinct cognition, which must in
the end have a finite and rather small number of marks, could be sufficient for the
complete determination of a thing. A definition is most generally a complex of marks, i.e. of partial representations, which together constitute precisely what is needed to cognize a thing. Definitions in mathematics are fully distinct, and sufficient for the complete determination of their objects. For example, let the definition of a circle be the set of points in a plane equidistant from a given point. This definition is sufficient to determine everything that is true and false of circles. If one grasps circularity, it is quite easy to determine whether the vast majority of predicates apply – circles are not dogs, have no angles, are closed forms, etc. The application of some predicates might be less transparent and require some thought, e.g. whether a conic section is a circle. Difficulties of this sort may indicate that one’s grasp is incomplete, and perhaps that an articulation of the science is due, but this is no fault of the definition. Again, one must clearly and distinctly grasp the definition to have insight. It is not sufficient to merely know the words and string them together (as a mere scholar might).

In contrast to mathematics, empirical definition is impossible according to Kant, but our empirical concepts nevertheless admit of something approaching this. Grasp of the species concept dog, for example, does allow for the affirmation and denial of a great many predicates, though not all possible predicates (see for example JL 61). One cannot tell from the definition of dog whether a given dog will be brown or have a tail, no matter how well one grasps the definition. Empirical descriptions provide a lesser degree of insight than definition, allowing for a partial determination of the thing that is adequate to some purposes. Where an empirical description falls short, we rely on experience to fill in whatever remaining contingencies we may.

30 In the scholastic tradition, the most likely exemplar is an acorn growing into a tree, and this would be understood as occurring according to the first principles of the acorn/tree. For more on definition and mathematics, see the Discipline of Pure Reason (A712/B740ff), Kant’s lectures on logic, e.g. JL 140ff, and Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics.
In the context of these two familiar examples, Kant thinks moral exposition is quite close to mathematical definition, but there is some prima facie ambiguity as to how complete it can or ought to be. Kant suggests that complete determination is required in moral contexts, but he also claims that we can never be certain we have reached the highest marks (A728-9/B756-7). This second-order uncertainty could indicate that perfect moral insight is possible though we can never be certain we have it, or it could instead indicate that Kant thinks we simply cannot have perfect moral insight. There are also indications Kant thinks we can approach complete moral determination but never achieve it, as an approach to a mathematical limit. Since Kant mentions in the first Critique that “in the sequel” it will only be necessary to expound so far as is “sufficient for a purpose”, we can assume that the exhaustiveness or completeness of the exposition is not an issue for Kant in the Groundwork, even though it might still be an issue for the critique of moral science (A83/B109).

Some of this tension concerning the completeness of moral exposition is due to the ambiguity between theoretical determination and practical determination in the moral context (see part II), but regardless of how Kant’s statements regarding this point are to be reconciled, it should still be clear enough why Kant would take a distinct idea of morality to be an important step towards moral insight and thus a useful step in the establishment of moral science. On this model of real definition, the heretofore primitive act of cognitive grasp is something like having command of a definition. Command of a definition, as opposed to mere possession of it, is the ability to determine everything about the object by using the grounds of cognition explicitly identified in the definition as

31 It is not clear whether Kant consistently holds this position throughout his critical philosophy. Mathematical concepts at least seem to be an exception (BL 197).
principles\textsuperscript{32} from which to derive consequences. The consequences are ultimately predications, and these are true just when the representation agrees with its object.

§5 How Objective Conception is Metaphysically Possible

Now the reason why the determination of content is crucial to the establishment of moral science is that in the worst case there might be no real object of morality at all. Allegedly objective moral representations might be mere thoughts with no content at all, like square circles, or they might be purely subjective representations which represent only the inner states, e.g. feelings, of the subject. We can play with concepts all we like, but ultimately these concepts must be connected to objects in order for our thoughts to have any truth to them. Given the possibility of radical objective failure, if complete determination rests only on logical division, it is necessary but insufficient for the objectivity of a science. A complete logical determination alone cannot guarantee objective reality. What Kant needs is something like a complete real determination, and this requires metaphysics.

To put the issue in a slightly more perspicuous way, even supposing that the complete determination of an object from its distinct idea allows us to affirm or deny every possible predicate of the object, or at least all the predicates that relate to the object with necessity, we still need a metaphysical explanation of what justifies these affirmations. Truth is the agreement of representations with their objects, and no matter how clear and distinct a representation might be, there is still a gap between representation and object that cannot be bridged within the representation itself. Since logic must abstract entirely from objects, logical division cannot bridge this gap. As we

\textsuperscript{32} A principle in the loose sense is simply a ground of possible consequences, where the ground to consequence relation is maximally generic and includes theoretical inference as well as agency (see A300/B356ff).
saw earlier, Kant can use transcendental idealism to support concrete grasp. Here the representation must be a distinct concept rather than a concrete intuition, so transcendental idealism will not do. Kant still needs something that can play the role of a divine guarantee or a construction in intuition to bridge the gap between concept and object and in some sense secure the truth of a science.

Kant’s treatment of the possibility of objective judgment in the first Critique provides the metaphysical explanation of how Kant thinks our concrete grasp of an object could support full cognitive grasp of it (A137/B176ff). Judgment in this context is to be understood generally as the subsumption of object under concept. In the philosophically problematic case, judgment is understood in the strict sense as the subsumption of the particular under the general, e.g., the subsumption of particular intuition (of an object) under pure concept. Kant takes the possibility of such judgments to be a problem because the particular and the general, or intuition and concept, are fundamentally heterogeneous. In other words there is a sort of categorical gap to be bridged between the proposed relata. This gap is important because all thought is fundamentally conceptual, and as Kant famously says, “[t]houghts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind” (A51/B75). Intuition is our window to objects, but it is only through concepts that we can think them. The gap between concept and intuition thus threatens to undermine the possibility of objectivity, and ultimately the possibility of cognition in general, by blocking our intellectual access to objects even within the realm of representation. If concepts and intuitions could not be related properly, we would be left with an entirely abstract intellect that is unable to think about anything at all.

33 Very roughly, objects are intuitively represented by the impressions they make on us. The manifold of intuition can be thought of as a manifold of affect.
The general form of Kant’s solution to any heterogeneity problem is to posit a sort of “third thing” that stands between the heterogeneous relata, in this case, between the general and the particular. This third thing, the mediator, bridges the gap by having something in common with each relatum. The mediator of judgment in the strict sense, i.e. the “transcendental schema”, must be both particular and general, though in different ways (A138/B177). The specific details of how the distinct idea of morality determines moral content will be left for chapters 6-8.

What is important for the moment is a very general feature of the metaphysics of theoretical determination according to Kant. In both mathematics and objective theoretical judgment, which are the two cases closest to moral metaphysics, the gap is bridged by something that suggestive of an activity. In the paradigmatic real definition in mathematics, the gap between mathematical representations and their objects is bridged through the idea of construction in intuition, where the activity of construction is suggested by the definition of the object. For example, it is not difficult to see how from the definition of a circle as the set of points in a plane equidistant from a given point one might construct a circle in intuition (or in imagination if you prefer). For objective theoretical judgment, the schema of a concept is a representation of a general procedure called a schematism. Kant describes schematizations in several related ways. Most generally a schematism is a procedure for providing a concept with its image or object. More technically schematizations are rules for the synthesis of the imagination, or more importantly for the Groundwork, rules for the determination of our intuition (A140-1/B179-80).

Obviously the problem for moral science will differ in various ways from the problem Kant thought he solved for theoretical metaphysics, but given the general form of his solution we should expect some suggestion of an activity to be very close to the
surface in the moral exposition. We should expect *Groundwork I* to conclude with something like a schema or a procedure of the imagination, e.g. “I ought never act except in such a way that I *could also will* that my maxim *should become* a universal law” (G 4:402 emphasis mine). In order for Kant to establish moral metaphysics, he will ultimately need a metaphysical explanation corresponding to each of these first steps. He will need to secure our grasp on the data to be used in the first step, and he will need some procedure by which the distinct concept of morality can be related to a real object.

§6  **A Glimpse of Practical Cognition as the Faculty of Practical Grasp**

Now that we have a better understanding of how the first two steps of Kant’s procedure for establishing sciences are supposed to work, we are in a better position to infer how the analysis of *Groundwork I* might ultimately yield something like practical grasp or self-command. Kant says in the *Canon* of the first *Critique* that he explicitly assumes there really are moral laws that *command* absolutely and are necessary in every respect. The legitimacy of this presupposition is “evident”, he says, “from the moral judgment of every human being if he will distinctly think such a law” (B835 emphasis mine). In order for a distinct idea to have any practical implications at all, Kant will need to bridge the gap between the distinct concept of the moral law and the object it governs, the will. How precisely Kant plans to do this is unclear, but following the example of real mathematical definition we should expect the distinct concept of the moral law to be strongly suggestive of some sort of procedure or act by which one could gain access to the will.

If this act of determining one’s will is a kind of cognitive grasp, moreover, what one is doing in determining one’s will is grasping one’s own will. This has a causal connotation that should not be ignored. To be clear as to precisely what is suggested here, we should distinguish between theoretical and practical moral grasp. *Theoretical*
grasp of one’s will is in general an insightful theoretical understanding of the will. Theoretical moral grasp of one’s will would be more specifically the theoretical determination of what and how one ought to will. This would be a determination in thought that need not have any consequences in actuality. Practical moral grasp of one’s will would be the actual determination of one’s will to act as one ought. This kind of practical moral grasp is a kind of command or control of one’s will. In order to have full moral grasp, one would need all the above.

Now we have become so accustomed to assuming that there is a radical gap between the theoretical and the practical, often because we presume there is a radical gap between the ought and the is, that this idea of full grasp might seem prima facie to be rather disjunctive. Kant did not think so. According to Kant, the theoretical and the practical are two sides of the same coin:

Insofar as there is to be reason in these sciences, something in them must be cognized a priori, and this cognition can relate to its object in either of two ways, either merely determining the object and its concept (which must be given from elsewhere), or else also making the object actual. The former is theoretical, the latter practical cognition of reason. (Bx)

Since reason is required for the derivation of actions from laws, the will is nothing other than practical reason. (G 4:412)

What we commonly think of as the will is metaphysically a kind of cognition, according to Kant, practical cognition. As I will explain in chapter 6, an architectonic interpretation of Kant’s work has the resources to make sense of this equivalence between will, practical cognition, and practical reason: Willing is really a kind of cognition, essentially a kind of reason (mediate derivation) that yields an action rather than a conclusion. Given that practical cognition is the metaphysical capacity to make objects actual by means of representations, practical moral grasp should be command of one’s capacity to make things actual, i.e. a kind of command of one’s own will.
For the time being what I want to suggest is that if the equivalence between will, practical reason, and practical cognition can be born out, it should be no great leap to think that the methods which best promote theoretical cognitive grasp may be effective in the practical case as well. Like any exposition or definition, the philosophical cognition resulting from the analysis in *Groundwork I* should ground theoretical insight, but it might also ground self-command as Kant claims. Accordingly, the first step of the argument will be complete when Kant arrives at a distinct concept that is adequate for cognitive grasp, perhaps including practical moral grasp. The second step should ideally get us closer to this practical grasp. Whether Kant can explain how such practical moral grasp is really possible will ultimately depend on how successful the determination of moral content in *Groundwork II* and the *Critique of Practical Reason* turn out to be.

I hope to have thus far provided some insight into the first steps of Kant’s procedure for establishing a science and how we might expect Kant to execute them to begin the establishment of moral metaphysical science in the *Groundwork*. To recap, the first step of establishing moral science is to make distinct an idea of the natural unity of morality, which we glimpse from common experience and practice. In *Groundwork I* the transition is to be made via analysis from common cognition to a distinct philosophic rational cognition of the canonic moral law, a.k.a. the supreme principle of morality. Once the distinct exposition of the moral law is available, preferably with schematism in tow, Kant can use the method of division in *Groundwork II* to determine the content of morality and prove its objective validity, at least to the extent that this is possible prior to a full articulation and critique of morality.

1 Kant says here that the sort of full grasp that would secure the moral law’s access to the will requires judgment sharpened by experience. We should be familiar with this requirement of full grasp in physics. When one first learns the laws of physics, it takes some practice, i.e. experience to learn to apply it and
solve problems. In order to become an engineer, it takes more concrete experience. We should expect, then, that the process of attaining full moral grasp will require the same sort of practice. In order to morally better oneself, one will need to practice using the moral law more consciously in everyday life. Since this requirement of full grasp is far downstream from the initial metaphysical issues and Kant does not discuss moral education in the Groundwork, we need not directly address the issue of how experience sharpens judgment or works to our moral betterment.

ii To see why Kant would restrict the domain of clear and distinct ideas to cognition, consider that clear and distinct representation could arguably be entirely subjective. In this purely subjective case, one might argue, the representation would not purport to represent any object -- what the representation represents would be only the subject. Since truth is the agreement between representation and object, any attribution of truth in this case would be a category mistake. Even so, purely subjective clear and distinct ideas might nevertheless be grounds of a sort of insight, perhaps as exemplified by Cartesian introspection. Kant would deny that there could be such a thing as a purely subjective clear and distinct representation because clear and distinct ideas must be about something in order for them to ground insight into anything, and this means they must have objects. An allegedly purely subjective representation must really be a cognition if it is to be clear and distinct, then. A subjective cognition would require both a subjective relation (between representation and subject) and also an objective relation (between representation and subject-as-object).

iii Kant distinguishes between several senses of object. Objects in the loose sense are merely intentional objects, e.g. a grammatical or prepositional object. These are opposed to, among other things, objects that are quantifiable, real, and fully determinate. These fully determinate objects are sometimes called Gegenständen to indicate that they stand against their representations as something apart from the representation and the subject. The distinction is controversial and Kant is not entirely consistent in his terminology. (See Smit 2000 for a useful clarification of the proposed distinction between Objekt and Gegenstand.) I will consider the criteria of objectivity in more detail in chapters 7-8.

iv “Wir geraten also, durch eine ganz gezwungene und natürliche folge unserer Betrachtungen, auf eine Wissenschaft, welche die Regeln abhandelt, die man beobachten muß, wenn man vernünftig denken will. Diese Wissenschaft wird die Vernunftlehre, oder die Vernunftkunst genannt. Ich werde, in der Abhandlung dieser Wissenschaft selbst, zeigen, daß die vernünftige Erkenntnis verschiedener Grade der Vollkommenheit fähig sei, und daß eine vernünftige Erkenntnis, wenn sie in einem hören Grade vollkommen ist, die gelehrte und philosophische Erkenntnis genannt werde. Ich werde auch alsdenn zeigen, daß es zur Beförderung der vernünftigen Erkenntnis, sowohl sein uns selbst als auch bei andern, nötig sei, daß wir sie bezeichnen und vortragen. Und alsdenn werden meine Leser überzeugt werden, daß die Vernunftlehre eine Wissenschaft sei, welche von der gelehrten Erkenntnis und dem gelehrten Vortrage handelt. Diese Wissenschaft unterrichtet uns von den Regeln, die wir beobachten müssen, wenn wir recht vernünftig denken und recht vernünftig reden wollen. Sie ist der Plan der Wirksamkeit der Vernunft. Sie leitet und führet die Vernunft, in ihrer Geschäftigkeit. Sie handelt die Gesetze ab, nach welchen wir unsere Vernunft, in einem hohen Grade der Vollkommenheit, brauchen sollen. Sie zeigt, wie wir durch unsere Vernunft die Wahrheit, die Welt, und wie alle Dinge genennt werden mögen, auf eine vollkommener Weise erkennen sollen. Die Mechanik lehrt die Gesetze der Bewegung, und man kann die Vernunftlehre die Mechanik der Vernunft nennen” (ML 5-6 italics mine).

v The reason Meier took it upon himself to write yet another text on logic and reason, he says in his Preface, is that the existing texts “have not dealt with one of the most important perfections”: Ich glaube, daß die meisten Vernunftlehren, mit denen die gelehrte Welt, als mit einer Sündflut, überschwemmt ist, vornehmlich eines doppelten Fehlers wegen getadelt werden können, wenn übrigens alles war ist, was sie vortragen. Einmal, daß sie, einige der wichtigsten Vollkommenheiten der gelehrten Erkenntnis, entweder gar nicht, oder nicht ausführlich genug abhandeln. Und zum
Meier does not name this important perfection in the Preface but there are only two compelling candidates, either aesthetic perfection or learned cognition. Pozzo argues that it is aesthetic perfection that Meier means here, but Kant needs both.

vi “Ich wünsche, daß jedermann mein Buch verstehen und brauchen könne, … wenn er nur die Absicht hat, und das natürliche Geschick besitzt, vernünftig philosophisch und gelehrt zu denken.”

vii It is important for *Groundwork I* to distinguish between predication in propositions and in affirmative judgments, but the distinction is not important here. Briefly, propositional predications are thoughts with a categorical (subject-copula-predicate), hypothetical (if-P-then-Q), or disjunctive (Either-P-xor--P) form. Affirmative judgments are propositions involving some degree of holding-to-be-true (opinion, belief, knowledge), i.e. propositional attitudes, and for which justification can be at issue. *Groundwork I* concerns propositions, not judgments. The criteria for the philosophical adequacy of propositions are prior to the criteria for the adequacy of judgments.
Chapter 3  The Paradigmatic Method of Philosophical Analysis

*Analysis* is such a familiar tool that we seldom bother to consider the rules by which we differentiate good analyses from bad ones. Yet it takes little reflection to recognize that the standards of analysis are relative to the kind of thing to be analyzed. We take for granted that the analysis of events and procedures, for example, should generally be chronological. The standards of chemical analysis are quite different, we know, though only chemists are likely to be well-versed in them.

It takes only a little more reflection to realize that the standards of good analysis are also relative to our purposes.¹ The analysis of a photograph, for example, has different standards depending on whether it is to be analyzed as a crime scene photo or as a work of art. The analysis of a crime scene photo must make distinct how specific features of the view and the objects depicted provide clues to the relevant prior events. The analysis of photographic art should instead concern the perfections of this art, like composition and the use of light.

What the various methods of analysis have in common is that they are in general all ways of resolving or making distinct the parts, features, perfections, and so on that make up or pertain to the analysandum. The criteria of good analysis thus depend upon which of these features or perfections will best serve the purpose of the analysis, how they are best discovered, and in what order.

As Kant explains in his logic lectures, most extensively in the Blomberg Logic, the analysis of *representations* is a well-developed domain of scholastic logic involving a great many fine distinctions that for the most part have well-established relationships to each other. The methods of analysis for this domain are structured according to the various perfections proper to each kind of representation, e.g. aesthetic or logical perfections, and the standards of adequacy for a particular analysis depend upon the direction, order, and depth these perfections must be pursued to suit one’s purpose.
In order to be more specific as to which perfections must be addressed and what
must be made distinct in the *Groundwork* analysis, we must identify the kind of
analysandum and the purpose of the analysis. According to the title of *Groundwork I*,
“Transition from common rational to philosophic moral cognition,” the analysandum is a
common cognition and the result is a philosophic one (G 4:392-3 emphasis mine). As I
indicated in the last chapter, according to Kant’s lectures on logic common cognition is
an obscure, intuitive, concrete way of understanding things, or from experience (BL 21,
VL 795, 798, JL 57, A467/B495ff). It is an ordinary, intuitive way of understanding.
Though it may be *healthy*, meaning accurate or correct, according to Kant our common
understanding is nevertheless unclear and indistinct (BL 17ff). An obscure understanding
like this is often *adequate* for common purposes, but not for all purposes. For example, it
might be enough for common purposes to be able to recognize and refer to justice, but a
judge (or a philosopher) would need a far clearer and more precise understanding of
justice. A judge, after all, must appreciate subtleties to make fine distinctions (JL 55).
The problem with common cognition is merely that it has a low degree of logical
perfections like clarity, distinctness, profundity and precision.

Philosophical purposes require a high degree of logical perfection. While
common understanding may obscurely contain the necessary and sufficient grounds for
the cognition of a thing, the standard of adequacy for philosophic understanding is
*consciousness of precisely* the necessary and sufficient grounds for the complete
cognition of the thing. Philosophic cognition must accordingly be abstract
understanding, or cognition through concepts (Bxxxv, B741, B762). Philosophic *rational*
cognition is cognition *through reason* from concepts (B741). This sort of cognition is
clear and distinct, and therefore logically more perfect than common concrete
understanding.
This transition from concrete to abstract understanding is by definition a logical transition from what is unclear and indistinct to what is clear and distinct. The process by which this kind of logical transition is made is analysis, and the philosophical endpoint and purpose identify the transition as a philosophical analysis (VL 845). Philosophical analysis is structured first and foremost according to the logical perfections of cognition.

Supposing, then, that Groundwork I is the first step of the search for and establishment of the supreme principle of moral science and that Kant first uses the method of analysis to make a glimpsed idea distinct, it would help a great deal to have a more detailed explanation of the relevant method of analysis and how it generates distinctness. It would help to know what these logical perfections are, how they relate to each other, how we increase their respective degrees, and so on.

Considering how important this method is to the Groundwork, we may well ask why Kant did not include this explanation in his critical philosophy, or at least publish his own text on the logic and method we need to understand the Groundwork. To be fair, Kant’s lectures on logic were primarily addressed to his undergraduate level students, but the Groundwork was written for Kant’s philosophical peers, not the public in general or even his junior students. He would naturally have expected his peers to teach logic just as he did, and to be thoroughly familiar with its methods. Given this audience and the fact that Kant thought scholastic logic and its methods of analysis were in general unremarkable, Kant would have had far less motivation to write his own logic text than to complete his much more difficult and revolutionary metaphysical critiques (G 4:391-2).

In the absence of a moral formal work we can still assume that Kant’s lectures on logic provide a reasonably accurate representation of the methods he intended to employ

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34 See for example BL 131, P 4:269. Method itself concerns logical perfection, so the analytic method is by definition a logical process or procedure (BL 289-90).
in the *Groundwork* and that he reserved comment in the first *Critique* for those aspects of his logic and method that were not widely accepted and used by his peers. Since Kant does not make a point of explaining anywhere in his critical philosophy what the difference is between common and philosophic cognition or how a philosophical analysis from the former to the latter should work, Kant apparently expected the readers of the *Groundwork* to already have a fair grasp of all this.

In order for *us* to critically evaluate the argument of *Groundwork I*, however, this method must be made explicit. As I will explain in §1, analysis as Kant understood it originated with Socrates and over the centuries developed into a more formalized procedure. As I will explain in §2, the primary steps of the more formalized procedure are to i) elicit all the marks, or strategically elicit the marks adequate to some purpose, ii) coordinate the marks, setting them into the appropriate relations with each other, and iii) pare away all the unnecessary marks, leaving only the precise definition or exposition.

What I ultimately hope to do in this chapter is motivate the idea that the method of philosophical analysis Kant taught is actually rather familiar and we already have a fairly good concrete grasp of how one ought to analyze a concept for philosophical purposes. This concrete grasp can be developed into a more learned one by taking some time to reflect on the original Socratic method and what we actually do when we analyze a concept.

§1  The Socratic Roots of Analysis

The scholastic method of analysis prevalent in Kant’s time has its roots in the Socratic method.\(^\text{35}\) The Socratic method begins with a simple question to the interlocutor

\(^{35}\) Kant indicates in his lectures on logic that he sees Socratic dialogues as interlocutive, primarily pedagogic, analyses, and such analyses are the antidote to dogmatism (JL 150; VL 844; BL 207, 292).
concerning something we intuitively understand quite well, but which upon reflection poses philosophical problems, for example what is truth? or what is justice?. The interlocutor first answers with an unreflective opinion that might have wide appeal. Socrates then asks questions to elicit further opinions from the interlocutor until they have either arrived at an adequately clear and precise concept of the matter at hand, or until they arrive at a contradiction between the interlocutor’s stated opinions. A contradiction requires a return to the source of error, perhaps even to the initial opinion, and then they begin the analysis anew from there.

The method of analysis is a formalization of this process. The method of analysis as Kant understood it was a streamlined and updated, perhaps even refined, version of the Socratic method. By the seventeenth century the method of analysis had long dispensed with the overt interlocutor, but the common understanding from which Kant begins in Groundwork I can be thought of as a formalized interlocutor. Common understanding represents an arbitrary interlocutor who has a healthy concrete understanding of the subject at hand, but who has not yet carefully reflected and logically perfected this understanding. The choice of a common analysandum thus reflects Kant’s assumption that the common public has a generally healthy, i.e. correct, understanding.

Not only did Kant take common understanding to be generally healthy, he also thought we are quite justified in taking experience and practice to be possible because they are actual for us and this is overtly evident in our daily lives. It is only because

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36 The art of the Socratic method, in contrast, is to strategically ask the right questions so that the interlocutor is guided efficiently to the correct answer without omitting considerations that might later lead to second thoughts. This art is not really a procedure that one could follow, but a knack. As Kant would describe it, the art of the Socratic method is a skill or talent that requires lucidity. A lucid understanding is a popular understanding that rests on systematic and deep philosophical cognition (VL 849; JL 47-8, 100). This kind of understanding is paradigmatic of the learned.

37 See G 4:403-4 for a concise confirmation of the method I describe here.
philosophical considerations consequent upon analysis present apparent obstacles to the possibility of such things (c.f. Descartes, Hume, Spinoza, etc.) that the establishment of metaphysics, i.e. the *Critiques* and the *Groundwork*, are necessary:

[T]he great multitude...are always most worthy of our respect...[T]he critique of reason...can never become popular, but also has no need of being so; for just as little as the people want to fill their heads with fine-spun arguments for useful truths, so just as little do the equally subtle objections against these truths ever enter their minds. (Bxxiv. See also G 4:404-5, MM 206)

The common understanding with which Kant begins is an understanding that excludes the theoretical commitments of his dogmatic opponents by restricting the analysandum to the pre-theoretical understanding of an arbitrary reasonable person. Kant already argued in the first *Critique* that the fine-spun alleged truths of dogmatists are illusory. Here he appeals to common understanding in part as a way to exclude these philosophical mistakes wholesale while still attempting to engage his opponents on a potential pre-theoretic common ground, merely as people.

This kind of appeal to the common does not, however, amount to an objective justification on the basis of common sense (G 4:259). Philosophical considerations really do cast doubt and common understanding unavoidably involves a degree of error insofar as it is imprecise. The remedy is not a justificatory appeal to common sense but instead an analysis that precisely exposit common understanding in order to generate insight. The form of argument suggested is this. We already commonly know that practice, and perhaps even morality, is possible because it is actual.38 Only philosophical considerations imply otherwise, casting doubt and thereby necessitating the philosophical question of *how* practice is possible (not *whether* it is possible), and particularly how

38 It will be crucial to the form of Kant’s ultimate argument that any condition of the possibility of something actual must itself be necessary. Kant uses this form of argument repeatedly throughout the first *Critique*. See chapter 3 for more detailed explanation.
pure practice is possible. Once this question is answered and any obstacles to the possibility of morality have thereby been removed, Kant thought, moral science can be positively established.

§2 Scholastic Logical Distinctions as Marks of Logical Progress for *Groundwork I*

According to Kant’s plan, the result of the *Groundwork I* analysis must be an exposition of a philosophic rational cognition that is adequately clear, distinct, profound and precise for its purpose in *Groundwork II*. Even though there are points of controversy within the scholastic tradition, these terms had well-established meanings in scholastic logic which Kant explained in his lectures on logic. In this section I will briefly explain the most relevant logical terms and how they would set standards of argument for *Groundwork I*.

Beginning with clarity, the clarity of cognition is in general the degree of our consciousness of it. A representation is clear “if the consciousness in it is sufficient for a consciousness of the difference between it and others” (B414). According to Kant’s lectures on logic, clarity can be either subjective or objective, and each of these can be in turn either intensive or extensive. Subjective clarity concerns the relation between the representation and subject, specifically the liveliness of this relation. The extensive subjective clarity of a cognition is the extent of intuition involved in the cognition, i.e., its concreteness or its extent of use and import in common life. Its intensive subjective clarity is the intensity or strength of the feeling the cognition excites.

Applying this to the *Groundwork*, the common, concrete, intuitive kind of cognition with which Kant begins the *Groundwork* is one for which both intensive and extensive subjective clarity are perfections. It is not obvious from the definitions just how lively the analysandum of *Groundwork I* must be, but given our expectation from the Doctrine of Method that we need a great deal of experience or practice to glimpse the
idea that is to be made distinct, the analysandum of the *Groundwork* should have a fairly high degree of extensive subjective clarity.

If the initial analysandum is not yet adequate for his purposes in this regard, Kant could increase the degree of this perfection by relating the cognition to more of common experience through examples and cases. But increasing subjective clarity alone cannot generate abstract understanding, which is what the *Groundwork*’s analysis must do in order for Kant to arrive at philosophic moral cognition. For philosophic cognition in abstracto, it is the relation of the cognition to its object or content, not to the subject, which must be made clear and distinct. So we should expect *Groundwork I* to begin with an analysandum that is quite clear in subjective extent and perhaps even subjective intensity, but which is not adequately objectively clear or distinct for philosophical purposes. We should expect the analysis to take a representation that is extensively subjectively clear and make it objectively clear.

*Objective clarity* is consciousness of the relation of the cognition to its object. In order to give an objective clarification, or make a cognition objectively clear, whether extensively or intensively, Kant first needs a concept. Now suppose our analysandum is at first entirely concrete, i.e. suppose we have the relevant experience but have never reflected on it and have no conscious concept of its unity. Reflection is the gateway to abstract concepts. The method by which we move from our most concrete representations to conceptions is reflection upon concrete experience. By considering

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39 It is not always clear whether Kant has in mind the subject of predication, where the concept is to be clarified primarily with regard to its use in predication, or whether he instead has in mind the subject who conceives (the representer as opposed to the semantic subject). Here the subject is the mind or the representer. Kant also makes use of several senses of object. For an analysis of common understanding he needs a minimal ontological commitment, so the object should be thought of merely as that which is represented.
examples and elements from common life Kant can both increase the degree\(^{40}\) of extensive subjective clarity and lead us to first glimpse the idea of the unity of morality.

Once the idea is glimpsed, Kant can easily make us conscious of the relation of our cognition to its object because the very nature of our faculties makes us disposed to judge that unity is objective. According to Kant, the ground-seeking drive of reason always pushes us to find the reasons, the causes, and the objects responsible for the phenomena we experience. Unity is fundamentally non-random, and this defeasibly implies to us that some principle or law is at work. Such principles and laws govern objects. When we glimpse an apparent unity, then, we are unavoidably led to consider whether there is a real object that lies behind it.

From a more metaphysical perspective, it might have seemed that Kant would have a difficult time explaining how to transform subjective clarity into objective clarity given that these perfections belong to two quite different kinds of relation. However, they are really both degrees of consciousness. The difference between subjective clarity and objective clarity is really only a difference in the intensional object of consciousness, or its application. A difference in application poses no special metaphysical problem for Kant, so clarity in general is unproblematic.

Analysis of a cognition is not merely clarification or consciousness-raising. Analysis is paradigmatically the systematic elucidation of marks whereby a cognition is made \textit{objectively distinct}. Objective distinctness\(^{iv}\) involves \textit{marks}, where a mark is a “ground” of cognition for the comparison of things, especially with respect to their identity and diversity (VL 834, JL 58ff, JL 95). Criteria of identity and diversity are paradigmatic marks, but any representation that pertains to the analysandum in any way

\(^{40}\) “[C]onsciousness, and thus the clarity of representation in my soul … have a degree, which can be greater or smaller” (MFNS 4:542).
can count as a mark.\textsuperscript{41} The marks of primary interest are usually essential marks of identity, but contingent external relations are marks as well. As indicated in the last chapter, the necessary and sufficient conditions of the identity and diversity of a thing would be something like a definition that would yield a complete system of all the marks pertaining to the analysandum (VL 835). Paradigmatically marks are the “partial representations” of a definiendum that appear as terms in its definiens.

As Kant describes the analytic method in his lectures, the analytic method begins with clarity and this clarity is then extended to marks (BL 106ff, VL 834-5, 845). When all the necessary marks have been elicited, or at strategic steps along the way, the important marks are coordinated or brought together as propositions where these marks are together predicated of the subject. For example in the proposition “duty is the necessity of an action from respect for law” the coordination of marks the necessity of an action from respect for law is predicated of duty. Somewhere in the process, all the superfluous, redundant, and mediate marks are pared away. The final result of the process is a definition, exposition, empirical description, etc. as appropriate to the nature of the analysandum. A slightly more detailed explanation of the process should help explain what these logical terms mean and how they serve as criteria for the method of analysis.

Since any representation that pertains to the analysandum counts as a mark of the analysandum, marks can be elicited simply by drawing attention to examples, associations, and relations between the analysandum and other ideas. Drawing our

\textsuperscript{41} This is important only because analyses may have all sorts of purposes and a too-restrictive definition of marks would undermine these purposes. For example, in the investigation of dogs one might be interested in genetics, the social role of dogs in America, or hunting. Supposing the social role is of interest, the relevant analysis might require one to consider whether dogs are friends, family, property, wards. If these cannot count as marks because they are not essential to what it is to be a dog per se, the uses of analysis will be restricted to little more than definition.
attention this way makes us *conscious* not only of the initial concept but *of its mark*, and this is distinctness.

A genuine analysis is not the random acquisition of marks, though, it is the systematic elucidation of marks. At the logical level, this means that only certain kinds of marks bearing certain kinds of relations to the analysandum are to be considered. Starting with the most basic distinction required for philosophical analyses, *external* marks are criteria of diversity by which to compare and distinguish what is represented in a cognition from other things, while *internal* marks are criteria of identity, or representations of the object apart from any comparison with other things (BL 106). Together these two kinds of marks can make up a definition, which again is a precise representation of the grounds of identity and diversity of the thing.

These two kinds of marks are elicited in different ways. A typical analysis begins by eliciting external marks of the analysandum through a comparison between the given thing and other things. Such a comparison at least implicitly introduces a relevant conceptual sphere that *divides* between the analysandum and other things. For example, dogs belong to the sphere of living things. One might begin the analysis of doghood by noting that dogs are not flora, and not fungi; they are fauna. Once we have made the diversity of an analysandum from other things clear and distinct it is easier to focus our attention on the identity of the thing and elicit its internal marks. The next step in the doghood analysis would be to identify the characteristics of fauna that flora and fungi do not share, e.g. the capacity to move, and posit these as marks of identity for doghood. This is how the extension of clarity to internal marks allows us to more clearly cognize the thing “as it is” and thus increases our insight.

Once the first mark of identity has been identified, there is a choice. One can either introduce a new relevant conceptual sphere that divides between the analysandum
and other things according to different criteria or considerations, or one can perform a subordinate analysis on the results of the initial division. For example, in the analysis of *bachelor*, suppose the first mark of identity is *unmarried*. One can either take *unmarried* as the new local analysandum and pursue it to deeper distinctness, exploring what it is to be unmarried, or one can instead search for the missing coordinate mark *man*. In other words, since analyses are for us linear investigations or presentations of non-linear systems, we must at each step choose between subordinate and coordinate.

Since a random or haphazard walk through a non-linear system is quite confusing, conceptual analyses are almost always best organized as follows. We make a first pass definition by finding a set of coordinate marks that together make up a complete and slightly more distinct representation of the analysandum, e.g a bachelor is an unmarried man. If this is inadequate to our purposes, we then perform a subordinate analysis on each coordinate mark in turn, making this mark as distinct as needed before turning to the next one.

This process leaves us with discontinuities. For example, if we begin with $A = B r_1 C$ as our first pass definition and then perform subordinate analyses on $B$ and $C$ in turn to get $B = D r_2 E$ and $C = F r_3 G$, the linear series of marks will be $ABC BDE CFG$. The actual structure of the relations, though, is this:
The depth of the tree represents the profundity of the analysis, while the breadth of the tree represents its extent. Subordinate analysis increases profundity while coordinate analysis increases extent.

Both coordinate and subordinate analyses are required in virtually all analyses, but according to Kant subordinate analysis is the primary method for philosophy because philosophy is a profound science requiring deep distinctness (VL 835, 847; BL 291). This merely means that since subordinate analysis involves a regress on marks, the subordinate analysis of a representation makes its distinctness profound, i.e. deeper in the conceptual tree. Since the subordination of concepts must become very deep, or profound, to be adequate for philosophical purposes, very many of the marks involved will be mediate, i.e. marks of marks, rather than immediate marks of the initial analysandum itself (BL 108, 126). We gain deeper insight through this process because subordinate analysis brings to consciousness the relation between the analysandum and marks which we might not otherwise think of as being closely associated with it.

Philosophical purposes require this kind of depth because, for example, Kantian metaphysics concerns the conditions of possibility, and these are very far removed from our common, shallow understanding. Coordinate analysis is also required for philosophy, however, because sciences must be comprehensive. It is important to keep in mind that maximizing the sheer number of coordinate marks without regard to their contribution or overlap does not effectively increase the extent of cognitive insight.

What we really want is not merely a series of marks or a tree, but something like a definition. After the many coordinate and subordinate marks are elicited and the analysis has reached an adequate degree of profundity and extent to serve its purpose, the highest marks must be coordinated. They must be compared and considered together, Kant says, not merely as a collection or aggregation but in coordination with each other, meaning
the marks must be appropriately related to each other (BL 136-7). Because each mark in
an analysis is elicited as pertaining to the initial analysandum in a particular way, though
perhaps through other marks, the specific relations between the final marks is already
implicit in the analysis as it proceeds. These relations are made explicit in a particular
step of analysis Kant describes as “the coordination of marks”, which makes clear how
the marks together constitute a more distinct representation of the initial analysandum.
Symbolically, the result of coordination is definitional: $A \equiv D \, r_\alpha \, E \, r_\beta \, F \, r_\gamma \, G$.

Though a given coordination of marks may be adequately profound and complete,
it might not yet be precise. Precise cognition can by definition involve nothing
extraneous or redundant. A precise cognition contains all and only the marks that are
required for cognitive insight. Moral distinctness in particular, Kant lectures, must be
both profound and precise. It requires ascent to the highest mark (profundity), with
regard to precisely (only) the marks required to determine the object (BL 137, 139, 272).
This means that a philosophical analysis is not complete until all superfluous branches of
the analysis are removed, along with all redundant marks, leaving only the highest
coordinate marks.

To reiterate, the purpose of philosophical analysis is to bring the marks of
cognition under more universal marks (higher marks) and thereby gain insight through
definition. A definition is the relation of equality of two concepts so that one can always
be substituted for the other (BL 264). Since the point of analysis is to find marks of
which we were originally unaware so that we may ultimately cognize with insight, a
definition cannot be a mere “rearrangement of the same marks” or a tautological
proposition (BL 265). This is why subordinate analysis is so important. The regress of
analysis from mark to mark brings to consciousness relations between the analysandum
and other things that would otherwise remain obscured (BL 835).
In the example below subordination is represented by depth, specifically by *paths* from the analysandum (or a given mark) to marks further down the chain of associations. Hindrance is subordinate to opposition, which is in turn subordinate to friction.

Because opposition lies between friction and hindrance in the flowchart, opposition is an *immediate* mark of friction, while hindrance is a *mediate* mark of friction. Hindrance and ground are implicitly coordinate with respect to each other above because they are both marks of friction that belong to different paths or branches. The definition of friction concluding the analysis above expresses the explicit coordination of marks. It represents the step of analysis in which the implicit relations between marks that were confused and obscure in the initial analysandum are made explicit by bringing them together in a distinct relation, paradigmatically a definition.

At this point we should have a fairly specific but abstract idea of Kant’s method for *Groundwork I*, what he intended to accomplish by it, and why he thought an execution of this method might succeed. Kant thinks we already have a healthy and extensive intuitive understanding of morality, but this understanding is logically imperfect in various ways. In order to make a science of moral metaphysics, we must bring the understanding we already have of morality to a philosophically adequate degree.
of logical perfection. In systematically identifying the relevant conceptual spheres and dividing them, we make distinctions between morality and other things that are easily confused or confounded with morality (e.g. prudence, martyrdom, sympathy). We then use the difference between morality and these other things to discover what specifically and essentially makes morality *moral*. If we are thorough with respect to the breadth and depth of this investigation, if we correctly coordinate the resulting marks, and we omit anything that is unnecessary, we should arrive at the precise grounds that are necessary and sufficient for the complete determination of moral science.

By presenting this general methodology in the first three chapters in increasingly more detail before addressing its employment in the *Groundwork*, I hope to avoid any appearance of the sort of reverse-engineering that I mean to argue against. With the exception of the supporting metaphysics mentioned in chapter 2, very little of Kant’s method for establishing moral science as I have described it requires a significant departure from the scholastic tradition of logic, or even from our common understanding today. By explaining why Kant’s methods *make sense*, both to us and within their historical context, I hope to show here that it is possible to *predict* some aspects of how the *Groundwork* will proceed in advance because this is how they *ought* to proceed.

In order for the argument to be successful, though, I must obviously claim that the text can be reasonably interpreted as an execution of the method I describe. The next chapter is intended to make good on this claim by providing an interpretation of *Groundwork I*, nearly paragraph by paragraph, as an analysis that promises to make distinct the idea of moral science. The primary purposes of chapter 4 are to confirm that Kant is following his plan as I have described it and to reveal the more specific and concrete internal criteria of evaluation. In order to do this I must argue that Kant executed his plan reasonably well, but I do not claim that Kant made no mistakes, that his
method is the correct method of moral argument, or that there are no remaining interpretive issues. The point here is to understand Kant, whether or not his argument succeeds.

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i Consider some of the obvious aims or purposes an analysis might have:
- study: first-person individual insight into what is generally known (by others)
- teaching: second-person individual insight into what is known first-person (by the teacher)
- research: extension of what is known locally to what is not yet known locally
- discovery: extension of what is known (by anyone, anywhere) to what has never been known at all
- rhetoric, propaganda, persuasion: to elicit agreement or acceptance from uncooperative, unsympathetic, or hostile audiences

These aims are by no means exhaustive, but they illustrate that even along the dimension of what is known by whom, the purposes of logic and the methodologies they recommend can be quite specific. Supposing truth is the ultimate aim of analysis, a philosophical analysis might still need to be more specific as to what precisely the analysis is to accomplish:
- definition of truth: to define the nature, character, or essence of truth
- epistemology of truth: to explain how we come to know truths
- metaphysics of truth: to explain and defend the possibility of truth
- criteria of truth: to determine and justify the criteria of truth
- application of truth: to distinguish truths from falsehoods
- semantics of truth: to explain the meaning and significance of truth

ii Karl Ameriks’ “moderate regressive” interpretation makes Kant’s argument less compelling than the very close alternative I advocate here (Ameriks 2003). Ameriks correctly contends that Kant begins with ordinary experience and argues “regressively” to the conditions of its possibility. Kant’s logic lectures make very clear that common understanding is healthy, meaning accurate, in the main (though it is admittedly imprecise). Ameriks sees the argument as being compelling only relative to its starting point, though, because ordinary experience is uncertain, i.e. subject to skeptical doubts. He gives the following rather weak description of Kant’s justification of ordinary experience in the face of skepticism:

Kant does not follow their path for a moment [the skeptical path of Spinoza, Leibniz and Hume], and it is not clear that he is proceeding improperly… if there are no specific reasons to say that things are definitely unlike what we ordinarily suppose, we have a right to go on and continue to believe what we already do believe. (Ameriks 2003, 26)

Kant’s justification is stronger than Ameriks realizes, though, and this is largely because Ameriks does not appreciate the value of the *Groundwork I-II* analysis. Kant thinks it is quite clear that we cannot fail to have experience. Our common understanding of experience in general therefore has a quite strong presumption in its favor because it is extremely difficult to doubt experience wholesale, e.g. to doubt the reality of the world in general, even though we can easily doubt specific instances of experience in a variety of ways. Clever and subtle philosophical abstractions may call experience as a whole into doubt in some ways, but only such considerations could do so, and once refuted, the presumption of experience must stand. Kant’s strategy is to use analysis to reveal the specific inaccuracies of common understanding and arrive at philosophically adequate exposition. If Kant can then show that the philosophically precise understanding of our cognition of experience is not undermined by these skeptical doubts, he can vindicate the health of common understanding. By explaining how synthetic a priori cognition is possible, with these clever skeptics in mind, Kant intends to refute all such threats to the reality of ordinary experience, or at least all foreseeable threats.
iii There is evidence that Kant did not favor the notion of subjective clarity, and would have preferred a different name for consciousness of the relation between subject and representation, e.g. aesthetic clarity. Whether or not the term “subjective clarity” appears in Kant’s lectures only because he lectured on Meier’s text, the issue is not relevant here because logical clarity is to be perfected in *Groundwork I*.

iv The first Wolffian “degree” of objective perfection, Kant lectures, is merely to represent *something* (VL 845). Cognition has this degree of perfection whenever it is objective. We might call this indistinct cognition because it has the very lowest degree of distinctness possible for an objective cognition. The second Wolffian degree of distinctness is to perceive or to cognize something with consciousness, which Kant says requires insight into the identity and diversity of the object (VL 846iv). As Kant typically uses the terms, however, *clarity* is consciousness of a cognition, and *distinctness* is consciousness of the marks of cognition. In other words, Kant would have two degrees of perfection for Wolff’s second degree. Since it is not entirely clear how sharply Kant’s logic departs from Wolff or Meier here, I will follow the Jäsche Logic and assume that clarity concerns consciousness of a cognition and distinctness concerns clarity of the marks of cognition.
Chapter 4  Meeting Expectations: *Groundwork I* as Scholastic Analysis

According to its title, the first section of Kant’s *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* (*Groundwork I*), is a “transition from common rational cognition to philosophic moral cognition”. As we will soon see, this transition has four obvious topical movements. Very roughly these movements concern the good, teleology, duty, and law. The first movement, constituted by the first three paragraphs, concerns the specific features of a kind of goodness, “unlimited goodness,” which Kant claims only a good will could conceivably have according to common understanding. The second movement, commonly called the teleological argument, is an argument that the vocation of reason must be to make the will good in just the specific way that only a good will could be according to the first movement, “absolutely good in itself” ([G 4: 395-6](#)). The third movement is the deontic propositional argument. Based on two propositions, only one of which Kant explicitly identifies, Kant arrives at a third proposition that appears to be conclusive and definitional: “Duty is the necessity of an action from respect for law” ([G 4:400](#)). The fourth and last topic is the kind of law the third proposition would require, which Kant concludes is: “I ought never act except in such a way that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law” ([G 4:402](#)).

Even though the topics of the four movements are obvious, little progress has been made in determining their internal structure, the relation between them, or how they were ultimately intended to satisfy the method Kant identifies in the Preface. I will argue in this chapter that *Groundwork I* is an execution of Kant’s method of analysis as described in chapters 1-3. Focusing attention narrowly on the details of the text in *Groundwork I* can easily obscure the broader structure of the argument, both at the level of the method of analysis and at the level of Kant’s procedure for establishing moral
science, so I will begin with an overview of the structure of *Groundwork I* and then argue for this interpretation using specific textual references.

What I will argue in this chapter is that the obvious topical movements described above correspond to distinct branches of analysis, and the “propositions” and “principle” are expositive coordinations of marks. I will argue first that the opening statement of the *Groundwork* sets the analysandum, the idea\(^\text{42}\) of a will that is good without limitation, and expresses this idea as belonging to our common understanding of practice as a confused and obscure understanding of morality.

This analysandum has two components, the idea of a will and the idea of being good without limitation. The first branch is a subordinate analysis of the *unlimited goodness* of a good will (see flowchart §2). In the first three paragraphs Kant compares the idea of a good will with other kinds of goods: ordinary conditioned goods, aids to the will, and teleological goods. The marks of diversity elicited through these comparisons allow Kant to attribute marks of identity to the good will by eliminating the alternative disjuncts of the implicit conceptual sphere, goodness. The result of this branch of analysis is the *idea* of a *will* that is *absolutely, incomparably, good in itself*.

The teleological argument is a second, locally independent branch of the analysis stemming from the same ultimate analysandum (see flowchart §3). Its immediate analysandum is our common cognition of *will*, which includes a concept of prudence as one of its closely associated marks. *Prudence* is the *influence* of reason on the will to overcome immediate inclinations for the promotion of one’s overall happiness. Our common cognition of will thus contains the idea of reason as a *causal ground* which

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\(^{\text{42}}\) I will be using the term “idea” in this chapter as Kant does in *Groundwork I*, as in the common loose sense of an idea as a thought, not as an idea of reason. The strict sense of idea, as in a transcendental idea, will not be relevant until *Groundwork II*. 
makes the will better, by means of representing something. Since reason is very ineffective in the promotion of happiness (and prudence is only somewhat good), Kant argues, the natural vocation of reason cannot be the promotion of happiness despite what common understanding might initially recommend. Kant reaches a potential candidate for the first proposition, that the vocation of reason is to make the will absolutely [incomparably] good in itself, through a coordination of marks. Kant reaches this proposition by combining the idea of reason influencing the will to its betterment with the result of the first three paragraphs, the idea of a will that is absolutely good in itself.

The introduction of duty is also a coordination of marks. Duty, like prudence, is a concept that is contained in our common cognition of practice according to Kant. Duty is closely associated with both good will and morality, and can be elicited through the prior marks prudence and hindrance. (Hindrance is an alternate disjunct of aids to the will in ¶2.) According to Kant, our common understanding of duty is an idea of willing in a way that is even better than prudential willing, willing that is estimable even despite natural hindrances and limitations. The first proposition may then instead be the proposition that all good willing is dutiful. The analysis of duty then promises to help explicate the idea of a will that is absolutely good in itself by distinguishing more finely between what makes such a will good and what poses a hindrance (or makes no contribution) to its goodness.

Since both the vocation of reason and the introduction of duty are coordinations of marks, Kant might have been referring to either as the first proposition. A good case can be made for either, but the latter has some logical advantages. The proposition all good willing is dutiful has the paradigmatic universal categorical form one might expect, of a proposition and Kant identifies the copula as a containment relation. I will
consequently favor the interpretation that the introduction of duty is Kant’s statement of the first proposition.

Just as he did in the first branch analyzing unlimited goodness Kant begins the deontic analysis by comparing duty to other things to discover its marks of diversity. By eliminating these marks as not belonging to the identity of duty, Kant elicits their collective alternative as marks of identity for duty. The analysis reveals, he thinks, that to act from something is to act from a subjective Princip, which is a maxim (G 4:401*). To act from duty is then to act from a particular kind of maxim. The result of this branch of analysis is the second proposition, which Kant explicitly identifies as this:

[A]n action from duty has its moral worth not in the purpose to be attained by it but in the maxim [Princip of volition] in accordance with which it is decided upon, and therefore does not depend upon the realization of the object of the action but merely upon the principle of volition in accordance with which the action is done [the representation] without regard for any object of the faculty of desire. (G 4:399 emphasis mine).

This step of the argument extends the analysis of ¶3, which considered the goodness of the will in comparison with the goodness of teleological goods. According to ¶3, the unlimited goodness of the will cannot be due to or derived from purposes, consequences, or ends to be attained. The alternatives are either that the goodness of the will is teleologically derived, or that the will is good in itself. The second proposition proposes that what it means for the will to be good in itself, is that the will must have its moral worth in its own principle of volition rather than deriving it from elsewhere.

For the next step of analysis, which is also deontic, Kant argues that the third proposition follows from the first two. This third proposition is the exposition of duty as the necessity of acting from respect for law. According to this interpretation of the argument, the propositional argument has the following structure:

P1. All good willing is dutiful (by coordination).
P2. An action from duty has its moral worth in its principle of volition, i.e. the representation which grounds the actuality of the object, rather than in its object (from ¶3).

P3. Duty is the necessity of an action from respect for law (by coordination).

C. I ought never act except in such a way that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law (G 4:402).

This argument is too technical to summarize in a very enlightening way, in part because so many steps are skipped. I will say here only that the key point is that P3 follows from the first two propositions as a coordination of marks. The method of analysis makes available to Kant all the marks elicited through prior analysis, as well as any other marks that pertain to our common understanding of practice. In any analysis marks are already implicitly (obscurely) coordinated in specific relations to each other which derive from the manner in which they were elicited as pertaining to other marks. Kant’s justification for the specific relation he posits between marks in P3 should therefore take the form of making explicit what is already obscurely contained in our common understanding of practice. Kant’s actual justification of P3 is an explanation of how respect and law are combined as the subjective and objective grounds of willing in one expositive proposition.

The final movement of *Groundwork I* is the analysis of law, which is a mark of duty expressed in P3. Kant’s proposal for the clear and distinct idea of law is “I ought never act except in such a way that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law” (G 4:402). *Universality* is the logical function of reason according to the first *Critique*, so Kant has philosophical reasons for positing it here, but universality is

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43 Again, marks are representations (e.g. concepts) that are “partial” with respect to the analysandum or the definiens: “A mark is that in a thing which constitutes a part of the cognition of it, or – what is the same – a partial representation, insofar as it is considered as ground of cognition of the whole representation. All our concepts are marks” (JL 58). An aggregation or coordination of marks is an ordered combination of coordinate marks into a potentially whole representation of the thing, e.g. an analysans or definiens: “The combination of coordinate marks to form the whole of a concept is called an aggregate…[T]he aggregation of coordinate marks constitutes the totality of the concept” (JL 59).
also an important mark of morality according to common understanding. If Kant is correct, this principle specifies the role of universality obscurely contained in our common understanding of morality. I will argue that final movement of *Groundwork I* makes the critical step to set up *Groundwork II* for the determination of moral content because it expresses the necessity of acting from respect for law (duty) in a form that suggests a *procedure* for the moral determination of objects. The idea of *making one’s maxim a universal law through one’s will* is suggestive of a moral schematism or *type* (as in archetype) by which one would determine, synthetically and a priori, a moral object (B177ff, B322ff, B579ff, KpV 5:68, A313-5/B370-2).

§1 The Analysandum

According to the standard, genetically Socratic method of analysis described in the last chapter, Kant’s first step in *Groundwork I* should be to identify a first-pass definition of morality. In answer to the question *what is morality?*, it should be fairly obvious that any reasonable answer must somehow involve the *value* of what we *do*. Morality concerns the goodness, rightness, or virtue of human agency, rational choice, intentional actions, or voluntary behavior. *Good will* is an appropriately general and vague, common eighteenth century conception of morality that encompasses these more specific ones. We might therefore expect for Kant to open the *Groundwork I* analysis with good will. If we press slightly for qualification as to the value, it would not be surprising for a Socratic interlocutor to answer that *morality is infinitely good willing*.

This is very nearly what Kant does. The first sentence of *Groundwork I* is famously,

*It is impossible to think of anything at all in the world, or indeed even beyond it, that could be considered *good without limitation* except a good will.* (G 4:393 emphasis mine)
This is not the only possible starting point, but Kant has some room to maneuver here. He needs an analysandum that an arbitrary eighteenth century common interlocutor might accept, but he may strategically choose a conception of morality that will *invite* the right questions to quickly distinguish morality from other things that can be good. By including the qualification that the goodness of morality is good without limitation, Kant immediately invites questions concerning what this means and implies.

If our doctrinal expectations from the previous chapters are to be met, this opening claim involves the glimpse of an idea of moral science that is generated from experience/practice and from which we can proceed to establish moral science. The sweeping nature of the claim here seems to indicate that Kant thinks we have all already glimpsed this idea from our broad experience of the world or from our practice in the world. The claim invites us to *consciously* entertain the idea of a will that is good without limitation and *investigate* what such a thing might entail, involve, or imply. In other words, this first sentence invites us to employ the method of analysis to further explicate the idea of a will that is good without limitation, where this idea is proposed as a rough definition of morality that is to be made clear and distinct.

It is important to note that Kant does not claim that there *is* such a thing as a will that is good without limitation. He explicitly makes only a negative claim that we *cannot* think of anything *else* that could be good in this way, and the claim concerns what is possible to think (especially not without a great deal of reflection), not what we could or do know, or what is true. The criterion of a possible thought is logical self-consistency, which is revealed or proven through analysis, so Kant has not overstepped in his opening statement.

Even though the idea of a will that is good without limitation is explicitly posed only as potentially thinkable,¹ the negative claim suggests a positive claim that we *can*
think of a good will as being good in this particular way, and perhaps even that we can hold it to be true. The latter stronger suggestion implies that it is common opinion that a will, and only a will, could be good without limitation. According to scholastic logic as Kant understood it, opinion is a logical degree of holding-to-be-true that requires only subjective justification. Belief and knowledge are degrees of holding-to-be-true that are logically more perfect in that they require moderate to complete objective justification in addition to subjective justification.

Why would Kant choose a common analysandum rather than a philosophical one? Kant explains this early in *Groundwork II* where he claims that popular philosophy without determinate insight from pure reason is entirely chaotic:

> [If votes were collected as to which is to be preferred – pure rational cognition separated from anything empirical, hence metaphysics of morals, or popular practical philosophy – one can guess at once on which side the preponderance would fall. This descending to popular concepts is certainly very commendable, provided the ascent to the principles of pure reason has first taken place and has been carried through to complete satisfaction…[T]here is no art in being commonly understandable if one thereby renounces any well-grounded insight; it also produces a disgusting hodge-podge of patchwork observations and half-rationalized principles in which shallow pates revel because it is something useful for everyday chitchat, but the insightful, feeling confused and dissatisfied without being able to help themselves, avert their eyes – although philosophers, who see quite well through the deception, get little hearing when they call away for a time from this alleged popularity, so that they may be rightly popular only after having acquired determinate insight. (G 4: 409-10. See also VL 849)]

If popular philosophy is riddled with error and contradiction, it can provide no clear choice of analysandum. Any popular analysandum one might choose could be false or nonsensical and its analysis might provide a deceptive illusion of insight. On other hand, when common understanding has not been corrupted by the high flown fantasies and clever abstractions of philosophers, it is generally healthy. A healthy common understanding is unclear and indistinct but nevertheless correct. This means that while it
may be vague, common understanding also contains more than a grain of truth that may be revealed through careful analysis. Once the grain of truth has been separated from the chaff and made clear and distinct, it should then be adequate to philosophical purposes. In other words, a clear and distinct idea of morality derived from a common healthy understanding should be adequate for the examination and resolution of philosophical problems, e.g. moral dialectic or synthesis.

Why will? Even though Kant made it quite clear in the first Critique that practical reason is to be the moral faculty, he does not assume this in his choice of analysandum. It might turn out upon further analysis that the will is nothing other than practical reason, as Kant later claims, but he does not assume at the outset that our common cognition of morality immediately involves an idea of practical reason. In order for Groundwork I to be an analysis of common understanding according to the standards of the method, Kant cannot import his philosophical preconceptions or conclusions. By the standard of the analytic method, every mark must be elicited through some common association with the analysandum, where the standard of association is the pre-theoretical agreement of an arbitrary common person, the formalized conception of what Socrates could elicit from an interlocutor. Will was both commonly and philosophically thought to be the faculty of all practice. As morality is fundamentally a kind of practice, Kant must begin with the association of will with morality and work towards the idea of practical reason.

And yet, the idea of a will that is good without limitation is a rather special idea, not as common an idea as one could get. What Kant needs for the establishment of science is an idea that can be glimpsed from common experience or practice, again, by an arbitrary reasonable implicit interlocutor with no prior philosophical commitments. Kant’s implicit claim here is that the idea of a will that is good without limitation can be
glimpsed from or inspired by, for example, acts of great altruism, examples of heroism, or unimpeachable character. Kant need not claim this idea is an immediate and central part of our common experience like the more mundane idea of a good will *simpliciter*. The analysandum is strategically chosen as one that will lead where Kant wants, but which does not on its face presuppose too much. Though it might take a bit longer for Kant to elicit this analysandum from a real interlocutor and he might have to rule out several other common answers to the question “What is morality?” before arriving at this one, it is nevertheless an idea at which anyone might arrive given some Socratic guidance.

I hope so far to have clarified the primary ways in which the opening statement of *Groundwork I* meets some of the general criteria Kant would have had for a common analysandum for the scholastic analysis of morality. In the remainder of this chapter I will suppose that the opening sentence of *Groundwork I* proposes the idea of a will that is good without limitation, as the answer an arbitrary common person might give to the implicit question, “what is morality?” according to Kant. I will suppose too that the scholastic method of analysis was the standard method of vindicating such an answer in Kant’s time, and the agreement of an arbitrary interlocutor is the general standard of correctness for steps in such an analysis.

If this is all correct, the local challenge for Kant is a Socratic sort of challenge. Eliciting marks is easy given that every idea is related in *some* way to every other, but Kant’s task is to efficiently elicit marks in a way that rapidly increases logical perfections without digressing from the question at hand. Kant must trace a path from obscure common ideas to a logically perfected principle, using only associations and marks that are fairly easily elicited through examples and comparisons. The clear and distinct result of analysis must be *adequate* for the purpose of determining the special content of
morality, which means this logically perfected principle must meet all the theoretical
criteria Kant sets in the first Critique for a canonic principle of moral science.

§2 Phase 1: From the Idea of a Will that is Good without Limitation to the Idea of a Will that is Absolutely Good in Itself

The first three paragraphs of Groundwork I constitute the first branch of analysis.

They all concern the marks specific to being good without limitation, but the marks
considered in each paragraph are grouped as into three classes: ordinary goods, aids to
the will, and teleological goods. Consider the first paragraph:

It is impossible to think of anything at all in the world, or indeed even beyond it,
that could be considered good without limitation except a good will. Understanding,
wit, judgment, and like, whatever such talents of mind may be
called, or courage, resolution, and perseverance in one’s plans, as qualities of temperament,
are undoubtedly good and desirable for many purposes, but they
can also be extremely evil and harmful if the will which is to make use of these
gifts of nature, and whose distinctive constitution is therefore called character,44
is not good. It is the same with gifts of fortune. Power, riches, honor, even health
and that complete well-being and satisfaction with one’s condition called happiness,
produce boldness and thereby often arrogance as well unless a good
will is present which corrects the influence of these on the mind and, in so
doing, also corrects the whole principle of action and brings it into
conformity with universal ends – not to mention that an impartial rational
spectator can take no delight in seeing the uninterrupted prosperity of a being
graced with no feature of a pure and good will, so that a good will seems to
constitute the indispensable condition even of worthiness to be happy. (G 4:393
emphasis mine)

Here Kant begins by drawing attention to the comparison between good will and the
goodness of other things (in italics), especially with respect to their limitations. The good
will is being compared to other good things in order that we might discover more about
the goodness of a good will by ascertaining whether it shares marks with other things or
whether it differs from other things in specific regards. In other words, the implicit

44 Character is closely associated with legality for Kant. Kant may have in mind some scholastic
association that would legitimately introduce the idea of law here, but there is no overt local evidence that
Kant has such an inference in mind. This issue might be worth taking up, but I will not do so here.
conceptual sphere of good things is being divided. Since the opening sentence indicates that the goodness of a good will is in a class of its own, we should expect most of the marks elicited through comparison to be marks of diversity,\(^4\) like conditionality/unconditionality, which divide the analysandum from other things or set it apart. In general the marks elicited through comparison are either marks of identity, which are marks of commonality between things, or they are marks of diversity, which provide a distinction between the analysandum and other members of some conceptual sphere. A few of the marks elicited above are marks that Kant elicits as distinctive marks of a good will (in bold) in contrast to other things.

In scholastic form, Kant indicates that happiness is good only on condition of a good will, which is to attribute a positive mark to happiness: happiness is conditionally good. Unlike these various other goods, a good will is not conditionally good. (Conditions are limitations, so the opening sentence of the paragraph rules this out.) To say that a good will is not conditionally good is to attribute a negative mark to the good will. If we convert this, we find that a good will is unconditionally good. So Kant can use scholastic method to attribute a positive mark to the good will, unconditionality, by comparing it to other goods and finding it to be different.

This is a stereotypical strategy of the method of analysis. The underlying logical device is that there is an implicit conceptual sphere, e.g. either conditional or unconditional but not both. In stereotypical analyses, the strategy is to first compare the analysandum to other things, thereby setting the conceptual context and eliciting marks of identity and diversity through its division. These divisions allow one to make a

\(^4\) It is not clear in Kant’s logic whether marks of diversity are simply negative marks, e.g. not conditionally good, or whether they are the distinctions (or the partitions themselves) between classes of things, e.g. conditionally/unconditionally good. I will assume that marks of diversity divide and marks of identity indicate commonality.
distinction between the analysandum and other things. Paradigmatically the comparisons are chosen strategically so that the marks of identity and diversity considered define a complete disjunctive conceptual sphere when taken together. For example suppose events are temporal, which is a conceptual sphere that divides into past, present and future. If the items to be compared are chosen so that together they represent all the possibilities (as in a mathematical partition into equivalence classes), one can rule out possibilities until only one alternative remains. This remaining alternative may then be converted from a negative mark (e.g. the event is not past and not present) to a positive mark (the event is therefore future).

Filling in the steps, Kant compares the idea of unlimited good will with other alleged goods. He finds a distinctive mark of one group of other goods, conditionality, and finds this mark to divide his analysandum from these other goods. In other words, this equivalence class of other goods has some attribute or property that the analysandum does not. The attribute the analysandum does have is the alternate disjunct of the implied conceptual sphere, unconditionality.

What Kant actually claims in this paragraph has two parts. He claims that for each of the contrasting goods, whether the specific example or the class to which it belongs, the good is merely conditionally good according to common understanding. He also claims that each contrasting good is conditioned specifically on the goodness of the will. Both of these claims are made on the basis of common understanding, again, where the standard of justification is the pre-theoretical agreement of an arbitrary reasonable interlocutor. Kant thinks a reasonable person should agree, upon considering the evils these alleged goods can bring and when it is that they do, that each alleged good is really only good when a good will regulates and corrects potentially selfish and evil influences.
These alleged goods are thus only conditionally good and the goodness of the will is the condition of their goodness.

Kant’s much bolder claim in this paragraph is that the interlocutor should agree that the way a good will conditions the goodness of all these other things is by bringing the principle of action into conformity with universal ends. This is the inference requiring the greatest scrutiny if Kant is really giving an analysis of common cognition. Since Kant really says nothing here to explicitly justify this bolder claim, it may seem at this point that Kant has omitted far too much of his justification. He first failed to indicate how the analysandum might be glimpsed from experience or practice and then, still in the very first paragraph, he seems to introduce a theoretical commitment with no indication of how a common interlocutor might be persuaded of it.

In Kant’s defense, the audience of this analysis is specifically Kant’s peers who he expects to be experts in the method (G 4:391-2). Kant need not justify every inference of the understanding in great detail, and it might well have been an insult to the intelligence and expertise of his audience to make every step explicit in excruciating detail. For example, given the algebraic “analysandum” $4x + 6x/3x = 5$, an algebra expert might immediately realize that $6x = 5$ and therefore $x = 5/6$ without explicitly reducing the fraction, adding the $x$-terms, and dividing both sides explicitly by 6. Only beginners in algebra would need all these steps explained. Just as textbooks in higher math routinely omit steps that only beginners would fail to understand, Kant can present abbreviated inferences of the understanding and omit steps in his analysis so long as an arbitrary expert in the method could reconstruct the omitted steps with reasonable ease (JL 135).

I have already indicated above how an inexpert interlocutor might be guided to the analysandum through the consideration of examples of heroic acts or unimpeachable
character. In defense of Kant’s “bold” claim that the way a good will conditions the goodness of other good things is by bringing the principle of action into conformity with universal ends, Kant might have thought it would be obvious to an expert in scholastic analysis that boldness and arrogance are vicious qualities of temperament, and that it is their selfishness which makes them vicious rather than virtuous. If selfishness is taken to be the pursuit of ends that are fundamentally particular to the individual, the alternative to selfishness would be the pursuit of ends that have a universal character. Suppose that the pursuit of ends characterizes the whole principle of action. The way a good will would correct evil influences would then be by correcting the whole principle of action and bringing it, the pursuit of ends, into conformity with universal ends. None of this reasoning would have been foreign or inaccessible to the scholastic tradition and all the key terms appear in the paragraph.

My primary aim, though, is not to determine once and for all precisely which inferences Kant makes and to evaluate his justification. I am not at all certain that there is a single correct formal structure to either Kant’s analysis here or analysis as he thought of it more generally. It is part of Kant’s understanding of the logic of thought that each mark Kant mentions must have multiple relations to multiple other marks and ultimately to the analysandum. Overdetermination of the specific relations he needs for the final exposition would not have been a problem for Kant. All paths should lead to the same end. For the sake of elegance, Kant wants only the shortest and most compelling path.

What I do want to argue is that the text can be interpreted as the execution of the method of analysis Kant says it is, and that because the standards of this method are different from the standards of deduction, the text here has a reasonable claim to being a good analysis even if it is not a good deduction. The bulk of my argument is a positive interpretation of the Groundwork that makes explicit the criteria, standards and purposes
of the method of analysis and indicates the issues from an internal perspective. I should take a moment, however, to explain where this leaves deduction.

First, I admit there is nothing in this particular paragraph that cannot be reconstructed in deductive form. Each step in a subordinate analysis is logically an inference of understanding, and these are valid inferences for deduction. Technically inferences take place between representations that have the logical form of a judgment, rather than representations that have the logical form of a concept, but Kant thought concepts could easily be converted into propositions. For example rather than analyzing the concept arrogance to get the concept selfishness, one could just as easily make the inference from “Arrogance is vicious” to “Selfishness is vicious”. The underlying logical form of the inference is the same in each case even though the overt logical form of the ground and consequence differ.

Supposing momentarily that the transitions of subordinate analysis are always convertible inferences of the understanding, and subordinate analysis is logically isomorphic to deduction, how do the standards of argument differ? Because the relata of analysis are representations, they are paradigmatically concepts which do not have the logical form of a judgment and which therefore have no modality, no truth value, and no degree of holding-to-be-true according to Kant. They need not be affirmed or denied. It is arguable that they need not even have quantity. For example, selfishness must be used as the subject or predicate of a predication in order for there to be any agreement between the concept selfishness and some object, i.e. in order for there to be any truth to it. The relata of deductions, in contrast, must always be cognitions that have the logical form of a judgment. This means, among other things, that they must not only be thinkable (logically self-consistent apart from any consideration of their objects), but they must also be objectively valid and have a truth value and modality. In the paradigmatic case,
the relata of deductions are premises that must also be presented as true, which requires a degree of holding-to-be-true.

If these standards of deduction were the standards to which Kant held himself in the “analysis” from “common cognition to philosophic rational cognition”, Kant would have overtly begged the question. By his own standards Kant absolutely cannot assume that morality is objectively valid. He must prove it, or at least prove that it is possible for morality to be objectively valid. This is precisely the philosophical problem he means to solve. If Kant cannot assume that morality is objectively valid, then neither can he assume or claim that there is any truth to it, or that it is genuinely necessary.

In an analysis of common understanding, though, Kant need not rely on the objective validity, truth, or modality of morality. All Kant needs to do is to clarify and distinguish the conceptual relations underlying our common cognition of morality without running into a contradiction. The standard he must meet is not that his premises be true, because he has no premises as such. What he has are representations to be logically perfected. At the most Kant has commonly held opinions, which need only be subjectively justified. These opinions, if some degree of holding-to-be-true is required, concern specifically the relations between the analysandum and its marks. These are relations between representations, not relations between representation and object. Since these opinions need only be subjectively justified and their relation to objects is not the concern, the standard of inference is fundamentally subjective so far. Kant only needs to restrict his inferences of the understanding to those to which an arbitrary interlocutor would agree given sufficient Socratic prompting.

It might seem at this point that the standards of analysis are so much lower than those of deduction that Kant must be begging the question simply by choosing to analyze rather than deduce. If an analysis is really a deduction minus objectivity and truth, it is
not obvious what analysis can really accomplish for Kant. Recall, though, that the standards of philosophical analysis are actually quite high. The result of the analysis must be clear, distinct, extensive, profound, and precise in order to be adequate for philosophical purposes. Moral exposition must have such a high degree of logical perfection that it is sufficient for the complete determination of its object, or very nearly so. The standards of philosophical analysis are no lower than those of deduction; they are merely different. Philosophical analysis allows Kant to take nothing for granted: He must painstakingly establish that morality is a logically possible concept with a definition (exposition) and marks for the determination of its object before he can address the possibility of moral objects and eventually its truth and goodness.

Besides these differences in standards, even if deductive inferences are convertible with and isomorphic to subordinate inferences of the understanding, it does not follow that every inference in *Groundwork I* is convertible to a deductive inference. There are aspects of analysis that arguably cannot be reconstructed accurately as deductive inferences, e.g. the coordination of marks. Representations frequently have multiple coordinate immediate marks. For example, suppose *bachelor* has two immediate marks, *unmarried* and *man*. A full analysis, like a philosophical one, would require a subordinate analysis of each of these marks. These subordinate analyses would constitute independent branches or chains of inference that might only be related in the initial analysandum. The various termini of these chains of inference would eventually have to be aggregated, where the principle of order for the aggregation is simply the relation the termini already bear to each other, though confusedly and obscurely, in the initial analysandum.

Perhaps branching and aggregation could be handled by modularizing the deductive reconstruction, and analysis and deduction really are isomorphic and
convertible in the end. Even if this is so, however, the deductive isomorph of a stereotypical analysis would bear a convoluted relation to its textual presentation. The order of presentation would be off, and the explicit justifications would be distorted at best. It is not at all surprising to my mind that these are just the sorts of difficulties that proponents of deductive interpretation for *Groundwork I* have faced. The sort of distortion involved makes Kant’s own reasoning appear to be a confused or muddled version of a deduction rather than the careful articulation of an excellent philosopher. This is not the *kind* of mistake we should attribute to great historical figures.

Returning to *Groundwork I*, suppose the form of analysis in §1 is a comparison of good will to conditionally good things in order to elicit marks of diversity, and through these, positive marks of the unlimited goodness of a good will. The marks Kant elicits included *unconditioned*, *condition*, and the idea of the will influencing the principle of action towards universal ends. Since an unconditioned condition is *absolute*, the result of analysis in §1 is the idea of a will that is absolutely good and which regulates action according to universal ends.

In the next paragraph Kant goes on to say that some qualities like self-control are conducive to good will, making its work much easier, but these also fail to be absolutely good for similar reasons:

Some qualities are even *conducive* to this good will itself and can make its work much easier; despite this, however, they have no *inner unconditional worth* but always presuppose a good will, which limits the *esteem* one otherwise rightly has for them and does not permit their being taken as *absolutely* good. *Moderation* in affects and passions, *self-control*, and *calm* reflection are not only good for all sorts of purposes but even seem to constitute a part of the inner worth of a person; but they lack much that would be required to declare them *good without limitation* (however *unconditionally* they were praised by the ancients): for, without the basic principles of a good will they can become extremely evil, and the coolness of a scoundrel makes him not only far more dangerous but also immediately more abominable in our eyes than we would have taken him to be without it. (G 4:393-4 emphasis mine)
Kant claims that these qualities like moderation and self-control are not good or evil themselves according to common understanding. They merely aid the will, and in so doing these qualities derive their value, whether good or evil, from the will. The first mark for the contrast class, aids or instrumental goods, is external worth. In contrast the good will must have an inner worth. This distinction between external and inner worth underlies Kant’s later distinction between instrumental and categorical goods.

The second mark of identity for the “modifier” contrast class (which might either be a distinct contrast class or a subclass of aids) is degree, where a degree is a kind of limitation, as in for example degrees of perfection. In contrast to the varying degree of goodness the listed qualities can have, a will that is good without limitation would have no such degree. The result of analysis here is the idea of a will that has an infinite inner worth which makes it worthy of esteem.

In ¶3 Kant argues in comparison with the value of consequences that a will that is good without limitation would have to be good in itself:

A good will is not good because of what it effects or accomplishes, because of its fitness to attain some proposed end, but only because of its volition, that is, it is good in itself and, regarded for itself, is to be valued incomparably higher than all that could merely be brought about by it in favor of some inclination and indeed, if you will, of the sum of all inclinations. Even if, by a special disfavor of fortune or by the niggardly provision of a stepmotherly nature, this will should wholly lack the capacity to carry out its purpose – if with its greatest efforts it should yet achieve nothing and only the good will were left (not, of course, as a mere wish but as the summoning of all means insofar as they are in our control) – then, like a jewel, it would still shine by itself, as something that has its full worth in itself. Usefulness or fruitlessness can neither add anything to this worth nor take anything away from it. Its usefulness would be, as it were, only the setting to enable us to handle it more conveniently in ordinary commerce or to attract to it the attention of those who are not yet expert enough, but not to recommend it to experts or to determine its worth. (G 4:394 emphasis mine)

The contrast class in this paragraph is useful goods or teleological goods, which include effects, accomplishments, fitness for proposed ends, achievements, fruits, and so on.
Two points are important to note here. First, the disfavor of fortune Kant mentions implies *hindrance* to the good will, as opposed to amplification or aid as in the last paragraph. Kant says that even if the hindrance to the good will were so great that it could achieve nothing at all, its goodness would still “shine” like a jewel as something that has an incomparable value and has its full worth in itself. This is just the sort of remark Kant makes when he introduces duty:

[W]e shall set before ourselves the concept of **duty**, which contains that of a good will though under certain subjective limitations and hindrances, which, however, far from concealing it and making it unrecognizable, rather bring it out by contrast and make it shine forth all the more brightly. (G 4:397)

If one were to take the disfavor of fortune to heart as a hindrance, the deontic argument which has so long been thought to be completely independent of this passage is actually a subordinate analysis stemming directly from it. At the least this second paragraph foreshadows the later explicit introduction of duty as a concept which clarifies the incomparable value of the will in the context of hindrances.

The second point to note here is that the sorts of goods compared to the good will in this paragraph are all purposive sorts of goods. The issue is whether the purpose or the end confers value on the will or vice versa, i.e. whether the goodness of the will is derivative from something else or whether the goodness of things derive their goodness from the will. It is not obvious here whether Kant is eliciting an entirely new mark. The derivation of goodness is in general different from its conditionality. Enabling conditions, for example, need not contribute to what they enable. They may merely remove obstacles without positively aiding. Recall that ¶1 explains the conditionality of goodness in terms of the will correcting the principle of action towards universal ends, but this could be conceived either positively or negatively. If it is conceived merely negatively, the good will might be an enabling condition that merely gets selfishness and
other hindrances to goodness out of the way but does not itself contribute anything to the goodness of what it conditions. If it is conceived positively, the correction towards universal ends implies that the goodness of other things somehow has its source in the goodness of the will on which it is conditioned.

Whether or not the derivation of goodness is implicitly introduced in ¶1, what Kant claims here is that upon reflection a common interlocutor would agree that the value of a will that is good without limitation cannot be limited by the value of a purpose or end, or by the will’s furtherance of some purpose or end. The alternative disjunct of the conceptual sphere is that the will is good in itself. Depending upon whether the will itself is genuinely teleological and has an inner purpose or inner principle, e.g. the formal determination of its own activity, this implies one of two things. Either the will is good in itself apart from all possible purposes, where “some purpose” in the passage above indicates an arbitrary externally attributed purpose as in natural teleology, or the will is good in itself through its own purposiveness and has its own intensional teleology. This will be explored further in chapter 7. Whether or not the will is genuinely purposive or teleological, the inference eliminates external purposiveness to posit that the will must be good in itself.

Taking a step back to the bigger picture, the purposive or teleological marks introduced in ¶3 prepare for at least two phases in the remainder of the *Groundwork* analysis. ¶3 at least foreshadows the teleological argument in ¶5-7, and perhaps even provides its immediate analysandum. The distinction between the *useful* and its implicit alternate disjunct *categorical* reemphasizes and underwrites Kant’s later distinction between hypothetical practical principles and moral ones. By the standards of analysis, it may be better strategy for Kant to introduce these marks early in the analysis in order to gain access to a neighborhood of concepts, as he does here, even if he is not yet prepared
to follow up on all their implications. By the standards of the method he claims to be employing, every idea must ultimately arise from common understanding. The further along Kant gets in the analysis, the less common the marks and the more difficult it would become to introduce purposiveness without begging theoretical questions or retracing his steps back to obscurity. If we include these locally superfluous marks, the analytic structure of the first branch of analysis in *Groundwork I* is something like the structure shown in the flowchart below:
§3  Phase 2: From Prudence to the Vocation of Reason

We have seen that the first three paragraphs of *Groundwork I* all clearly concern what is entailed by or implied by the notion of a will that is good without limitation. Each mark elicited through Kant’s examples makes the initial analysandum more distinct by telling us more of what it would take for something to be good without limitation. Since the exposition of a cognition cannot be a mere aggregation of marks (analysis is the *systematic* elucidation of marks), the marks must be coordinated and the superfluous marks pared away in the last stages of analysis. The interpretive problem is to determine the precise relations between the analysandum and its marks and whether these meet the standards of the scholastic method of analysis as Kant understood it.

I explained in the last section how this might all work for the first three paragraphs, but the fourth paragraph throws a wrench in things:

There is, however, something so strange in this idea of the absolute worth of a mere will…that, despite all the agreement even of common understanding with this idea, a suspicion must yet arise that its covert basis is perhaps mere high-flown fantasy and that we may have misunderstood the purpose of nature in assigning reason to our will as its governor. Hence we shall put this idea to the test from this point of view. (G 4:394)

This is clearly not a continuation of what has gone before. It clearly marks a discontinuity in the flow of the analysis, but its purpose is obscure and the new topic seems quite tangential to the argument as we have understood it so far. Why would skepticism about the goodness of the will lead one to investigate the natural purpose of assigning reason to the will as its governor? Why should we think reason has anything to do with it?

This kind of discontinuity, of which there are several, is the greater challenge to interpreting *Groundwork I* as a single coherent argument. The discontinuities demarcating its topics give *Groundwork I* a rather schizophrenic appearance. The fact
that Kant sometimes appears to argue from examples, sometimes from concepts, sometimes indirectly, and sometimes leaps ahead, just exacerbates the problem. If the argument is really a scholastic analysis rather than a modern deduction as I have explained, all of this is quite explicable. Some of the leaps are explained by the fact that Kant’s audience is assumed to be expert in scholastic analysis. The various local forms of argument generally fit the pattern of eliciting marks of identity through comparison and the use of a disjunctive conceptual sphere. The particular kind of discontinuity that appears in ¶4 (and also in ¶8) is an artifact of the logical structure of analysis. Analyses are fundamentally non-linear in their logical structure, but their presentation is necessarily linear. This necessitates occasional discontinuities. Coordinate branches cannot be pursued all at once, so there must be “jumps” from the result of one subordinate analysis to the beginning of another.

Kant initially focused his attention in ¶1-3 on the idea of unlimited goodness. After reaching the idea of a will that is both absolutely good and good in itself, the analysis of goodness has reached an adequate depth. The overall analysis accordingly then ceases to be a resolution of good without limitation. In ¶4 Kant is announcing a shift in attention to what kind of will could be good in this specific way. This is a shift from the result of one subordinate analysis in ¶1-3 focusing on goodness to a coordinate branch, a new subordinate analysis of the analysandum now focusing on will. The method of analysis frequently requires just such prima facie tangents. Because the non-linear real structure of an analysis must be presented in linear form, discontinuous shifts between branches are par for the course.

Kant follows this declaration of suspicion about the high-flown, fantastic goodness of the will with an argument concerning the vocation of reason, which he claims is some purpose that is “higher” than happiness. The question is why. Given the
announced change in focus, we should expect the immediate contrast class or sphere of relevance to be *other faculties* now rather than *other goods*. Though it may seem odd to us now, faculties were generally understood in teleological terms, both commonly scholastically. If Kant’s interlocutor would expect an analysis of will to be a teleological one, then the teleology of reason is not an unreasonable choice of topic here, and such an analysis would be expected to posit a vocation or final end of some sort. What we should ask is what kind of mark the idea of a vocation of reason is with regard to the common understanding of will, how the vocation is elicited, and most importantly what it shows about will.

Kant gives an argument in the *Canon* that is strongly reminiscent of this teleological argument in the *Groundwork* and which illuminates his strategy. Just prior to the argument for practical freedom Kant says, “the ultimate aim of nature which provides for us wisely in the disposition of reason is properly directed only to what is moral” (B828-9). This claim is cryptic, but Kant’s argument following it in the *Canon* makes it clear enough for our purposes. Kant argues that practical freedom can be proved through experience as follows. We know from experience that there are rational grounds of choice that can determine the will, because we know from experience that prudence is possible. When we act prudentially we overcome our immediate impressions by representing what is useful or injurious “in a more remote way”, e.g. by representing elements of our future happiness (B830). Such prudential behavior depends on reason, meaning that reason is an aid or instrument to the determination of the will. (This much is commonly understood, though remainder of the argument is less plausibly so.) A *free will* as Kant defines it is a faculty of choice that can be determined through motive grounds (*Bewegursachen*) that can only be represented by reason, as opposed to motive grounds that can be represented through feeling (B830). Human will is therefore
practically free in that it can be determined at least to some extent by rational causes. (This argument does not show that human will is transcendentally free because rational causes may yet be necessarily conditioned by the inclinations that make up our happiness.) Everything connected with free will as **ground or consequence** (cause or effect) is **practical**, so Kant concludes that we know empirically there are objective **laws** of freedom that say what ought to happen, i.e. practical laws (B830).

The Canon helps explain Kant’s strategy by explaining how he thinks prudence works, and how he thinks the idea of **prudence** leads via analysis to the idea of a practical, free law of reason. As I argued in chapter 1, this is where Kant ultimately wants to arrive, so the local question is how he intended to get there in *Groundwork I*. To make some of the intermediate steps more clear, the argument in the Canon implies that our common understanding of **prudence** includes the idea that reason **influences** the will, where an influence is a **cause**. The concept of a cause is a concept of the **necessitation** of an effect according to common understanding (and Hume, among others). Since a **law** is a formula expressing the necessity of an action according to Kant, the idea that reason is a cause presupposes that there is a law for this causal necessitation. Though Kant does not explicitly introduce the idea of law in the teleological argument, it nevertheless follows by scholastic analysis. The analysis of prudence thus leads to the idea of a law of reason, which will turn out to be a moral law of freedom.

Supposing the Canon explains Kant’s strategy, how much of this might he hope to accomplish in the teleological argument in ¶5-7? Kant clearly wants to elicit our agreement to his claims regarding the purposiveness of reason by introducing prudence. Prudence requires or involves the use of reason to influence the will by representing something as **better** than the objects of immediate inclination, e.g. reason recommends that a long and luxurious retirement is better than a binge at the casino today. At the risk
of subreption, our common understanding of prudence implies an idea of reason representing something (as better) and thereby bringing it about (influencing the will). This is a fledgling idea of practical reason (though not pure practical reason), which can be elicited through the idea of prudence. This idea of practical reason might not stand up to scrutiny in the end, but it is still fair to say that prudence is a common idea that relates will and reason in a potentially illuminating way. Kant could have attempted to compare will directly with other faculties, but it might take a full analysis and critique of each faculty to get at anything like an idea of practical reason. This would be a lengthy process and it would take Kant quite far from common understanding.

Supposing that prudence is strategically chosen as an instrument of comparison between will and reason because it reveals their interaction, it is still a leap to Kant’s far more specific claim that the vocation of reason is to make the will absolutely good in itself. Not only is it a leap, the vocation Kant identifies for reason contradicts common understanding: Happiness is the vocation we commonly attribute to reason. In order to get to the correct vocation, then, Kant needs to first reject the vocation that we commonly and unreflectively attribute to reason.

To see why we commonly make this mistake, consider how it is that we commonly think reason promotes happiness through prudence. The sorts of examples of prudence Kant has in mind are examples like saving against future need, which concerns reasoning about one’s overall happiness. Impulses and inclinations do not come to us already organized into a system. They contradict one another and compete, and this is a continual problem for us. The faculty of pleasure cannot itself systematize our impulses and inclinations and bring them into order, but according to common understanding reason can and does. The purpose of reason with respect to the will is to organize or systematize inclinations, we commonly think, in order to promote happiness. What Kant
wants to argue is that the purpose of reason is to organize the will, but not merely to promote one’s happiness – the organization is not merely a means to the end of happiness.

It is important here that this systematizing or organizing purpose of reason does underlie our common understanding of reason. One cannot judge an action to be reasonable or unreasonable without checking its fit with some context, and the broader and more systematic the context, the more certain one can be of one’s judgment. It is part of our common understanding that the rational is in general well-connected to a systematic view of the world and our experience in it. Again, in order to represent something as better than that which an immediate inclination recommends, reason organizes multiple inclinations, needs, and competing possible grounds into a system. The more extensive and organized the system is, the better reason’s claim on the will.

So we commonly do think that reason makes the will better by systematizing its subjective grounds. Once this idea is on the table, Kant argues in ¶5-7 that happiness cannot be the natural vocation of reason because it is so poorly suited to it: Reason has a strong tendency to make us miserable when it is aimed at our happiness. What Kant claims here is that we commonly think reason is self-defeating when aimed at happiness. (Kant ultimately does think that happiness follows from reason, but the metaphysics of how this works is quite complex.) Since reason does so badly at making us happy, Kant argues, it cannot be the natural vocation of reason, echoing his claim in the Canon that “the ultimate aim of nature which provides for us wisely in the disposition of reason is properly directed only to what is moral” (B828-9 emphasis mine). If Kant needs only to

46 It is not clear here whether Kant is attributing a genuine purpose to reason or merely a natural purpose akin to the purposes we attribute to things in nature. See for example A547/B757. I will take this up in more detail in part II.
reject a mark, happiness, as being genuinely contained in or underlying our common understanding of practice so that he may replace it with another, he can argue that common understanding would be incompatible with itself on the assumption that the vocation of reason is to make us happy, and thereby prompt us to dig deeper to find the mark that is really obscured within common understanding. This move is quite like the Socratic tactic of giving a reductio of the opinions of his interlocutor in order to prompt the interlocutor to admit that perhaps his initial opinion is not what he really thinks after all.

Suppose that upon reflection we agree with Kant that reason does a remarkably bad job of making us happy, so this cannot be its real purpose with respect to the will. Kant’s analysis then shows that we commonly think the vocation of reason is to make the will better by systematizing its subjective grounds as described above, but this cannot be simply in order to make us happy. Having rejected the incorrect mark, Kant still needs to connect reason and will correctly. Why should anyone think that deep within our common understanding of practice, or will, or of reason, that the vocation of reason is to make the will absolutely good in itself? Kant may have excellent theoretical reasons for thinking this is so, and it may be his ultimate aim to prove it, but he would be making quite a leap in the analysis if his theoretical reasons are the only ones available. Kant has two prima facie options here. The first option is to appeal to common exemplars of good willing and analyze these to find that reason is responsible for the goodness of the will in these cases. Kant does not do this, and he later argues that it would be a mistake (the exemplars are actions solely from duty, and we can never be certain that any example we find in experience is really an action solely from duty).

The alternative is to coordinate marks from the preceding analysis, including ¶1-3. To see how this should work, recall that the analysandum of *Groundwork I* is an idea
of a will that is good without limitation. The first three paragraphs of analysis reveal that such a will would have to be absolutely good in itself. The introduction of prudence shifts the analysis to a new branch, a subordinate analysis of will rather than its goodness. But the introduction of prudence is also the introduction of the idea of a will that is better than it otherwise would be, and this bettering of the will is due to the influence of reason. This is an important point. Even though it may appear that reason is the local analysandum in this branch of the analysis, by the standards of proper analysis, it would be inappropriate for Kant to make reason the analysandum and will its mark. Since the initial analysandum is a will that is good without limitation, the second branch must be an analysis of will and reason a mark.

This is primarily a structural point, but it may have substantive implications in the end. As I will explain in part II, what Kant really wants to show is that reason is essential to the will or constitutive of will. Reason is not merely an independent faculty that serves well as a contrast. Nor is it a subordinate faculty that serves the will’s vocation. What Kant wants to show in the end is that metaphysically will is practical cognition, for which practical reason is formally constitutive. Kant cannot show this yet, but he can show that reason is a mark of will in a way that foreshadows where the analysis will take us. When it comes to willing we commonly tend to agree that external influences cannot make the will itself good or better, but Kant only argued in ¶1-3 that a will that is good without limitation must be good entirely in itself. He has not shown that a somewhat good will could not be improved by reason, and several ways remain open to complete the view, e.g. reason could be an organ of will.

47 According to the scholastic tradition or at least to a large movement of it, good is a kind-relative sort of thing. For a thing to be good is for it to exemplify its kind, resemble its archetype, or be true to its essence. Consequently, the goodness of a thing can only be determined by its first principle, not by something external to it.
Now the vocation of reason should be to do something really good or very well. What is the very best reason could do according to common understanding, given that a) reason can and does make the will better and b) it might be possible for a will to be absolutely and incomparably good in itself? The best reason could do would be to make the will as good as we can think it could be, absolutely good in itself. (It is important to keep in mind that a vocation need not be perfectly achievable. A vocation can be served by approaching an ideal.)

To put Kant’s strategy back in terms of the steps of analysis, Kant is collecting and coordinating marks from prior analysis here. Prior analysis generated several immediate marks of good will, which are partial representations of good will. If he has generated the right marks and he coordinates them correctly, these marks will together provide a whole representation of good will that is more distinct than the original common idea. Kant takes himself to have elicited a telos or purpose of practical reason, to influence the will. A high or higher telos conveys, engenders, or confers value in some way. The kind of value a good will must have according to the first branch of analysis is absolute and incomparable goodness in itself. If we were to “read off” these termini from a conceptual analysis tree, the proto-definition of a will that is good without limitation would so far be something like the true vocation claim: The higher purpose of reason is to influence the will so as to make it good in itself. Kant could have been more explicit in the passage as to how he arrives at this particular vocation for reason, but his entitlement to the coordination is not unavoidably in jeopardy.
To connect this back to the larger project, it is crucial to Kant’s science project that the teleological argument in *Groundwork I* does not rest with a vague idea that some concept of an end of reason is somehow involved in our common concrete understanding of will. According to Kant a positive canonic law of reason would have to be such that some use of reason necessarily furthers the vocation of reason, or so I suggested in the previous chapter. The structure of the argument here is parallel to the argument in the Doctrine of Method for the expectation that practical reason will have a positive law. In both places the hypothesized organic elements of reason are allegedly related in a way that cannot be correct. Here in the *Groundwork*, the argument is that according to common understanding the natural purpose of reason must be well served by its operation and our happiness is not well served by reason. In the Canon, the argument was a philosophical argument that we cannot cognize things in themselves through reason, even though this seems to be the theoretical vocation of reason. This led to an expectation that practical reason would succeed where speculative reason failed *without* necessarily
abandoning the proposed vocation. There is no equivalent recourse in the *Groundwork* however, because theoretical and practical reason exhaust the alternatives. In the *Groundwork* the hypothesized vocation, which is notably quite different from the theoretical one, must instead be abandoned in favor of something “better”.

§4 **Phase 3: The Introduction of Duty as a Concept that Contains the Concept of a Good Will, Though under Certain Limitations**

After the teleological argument, Kant reiterates the method that has been employed, where the analysis stands, and then sets a new local analysandum, *duty*:

> We have, then, *to explicate the concept of a will* that is to be esteemed in itself and that is good apart from any other purpose, *as it already dwells in natural sound understanding* and needs not so much to be taught as only to be *clarified*...In order to do so, we shall set before ourselves the concept of *duty*, which contains that of a good will though under certain subjective limitations and *hindrances*, which, however, far from concealing it and making it unrecognizable, rather *bring it out by contrast* and make it *shine forth* all the more brightly. (G 4:397)

This paragraph is strongly reminiscent of ¶4 and for good reason. It also marks the transition to a new branch of analysis. Kant has already analyzed the idea of a good will in two ways. In ¶1-3 he focused on the idea that its goodness might be unlimited and then in ¶5-7 he focused on prudentially good willing. Now he wants to shift the focus again.

The purpose of this particular transition from will to duty requires a bit more motivation, however. Why would Kant introduce duty rather than continuing to analyze the vocation of reason or ending the elicitation of marks entirely? After all, Kant implicitly acknowledges that if reason is to have a single purpose as we commonly hold, its vocation should ultimately comprise happiness – according to the second *Critique* the highest good is happiness proportioned to virtue (KpV 5:110ff). The vocation identified thus far rejects happiness, so it cannot be “sole” or “complete” (G 4:396). Since Kant
does not yet have a sole and complete vocation for reason, the subordinate analysis of its vocation could continue in this direction, and it ultimately should if Kant is to establish moral science.

The most obvious reason why Kant should not continue analyzing the vocation of reason until happiness is somehow comprised in the vocation of reason is that happiness is unavoidably *empirical*, and Kant made a point of arguing in the Preface for the absolute necessity of establishing an entirely a priori moral metaphysics and *completing* this project before descending to popularity (See chapter 8, VL 849, JL 48, 100). A second, less obvious reason is that Kant simply does not *need* to deal with happiness yet and it presents complications that would derail the analysis here. There may well be further analysis Kant *could* do with respect to will or practical reason without introducing or reintroducing empirical concepts, but the real issue is whether Kant *should* continue the analysis regarding the vocation of reason or whether the termini he has so far reached are *adequate* for the philosophical purposes at hand. Since adequacy is nearly impossible to evaluate prospectively, it is more useful for my purposes to mark this as an issue for critical evaluation and move on to ask why he might next turn to a concept of duty that contains the concept of a good will.

It is well known that the notion of conceptual containment is a long-standing scholastic notion that is ubiquitous in Kant’s philosophy of mind. Analytic categorical propositions are true when the subject and predicate belong to each other, pertain to each other, or one is contained in the other. If we take “containment” to be the most general and generic term for such relations, then all such containment relations are relations “through identity” or homogeneity (A6ff/B10ff, JL 101ff). In the paradigmatic case, the predicate of a proposition is contained in the subject, they are related directly through identity, and the predicate is a mark of the subject.
What is odd about Kant’s claim that the concept of duty contains that of a good will is that Kant seems to have it backwards. The obvious proposition implied is something like duty is good will, where good will is a mark of duty that is contained in the concept duty. The idea of a good will, however, is prima facie more general and abstract than the concept of duty, so the proposition should instead be good will is dutiful. If this proposition fits the paradigm, the idea of a good will would contain the concept of duty rather than vice versa. More importantly, good will is the initial analysandum of Groundwork I, so according to the method of analysis every mark in the analysis should be a partial representation of good will. If duty contains good will, though, it seems that perhaps good will is the partial concept, so duty is not a proper mark of good will and its introduction would violate an important standard of the method of analysis. Analysis always proceeds towards distinctness.

This difficulty can be resolved by appealing to Kant’s distinction between “containment in” and “containment under” and the convertibility of propositions. Like Leibniz and other philosophers of the period, Kant thought of predication in terms of conceptual containment, but Kant made a distinction based on the asymmetry of containment relations. The best-known relation is the containment of a predicate in a subject. The lesser-known conceptual containment relation is the containment of a subject under a predicate. If representation A is contained in representation B, then B is contained under A. The representations that are contained in a concept are broader, higher, more general, and typically partial in the sense that they represent only part of the concept in which they are contained. For example, in swans are feathered, the predicate feathered is contained in many species concepts other than swan, e.g. ostrich. These species concepts are all contained under the concept feathered because their extensions are included in the extension of feathered - any swan is a feathered thing. As Kant
explains in his lectures on logic, universal affirmative (categorical) propositions are propositions for which the predicate is a *broader* concept than the subject (JL 98,103). Because the predicate is broader than the subject, Kant says the subject is contained *under* the sphere of the predicate. Such *containment under* relations are represented as Venn diagrams in the Jäsche logic:

As the diagram shows, whatever is contained *in* the subject is also contained *in* the predicate, but not vice versa. The predicate contains, or can contain, something that is not also in the subject.

The term “containment” is ambiguous as to which relatum is contained in/under the other, so it is not clear whether Kant is claiming that duty contains good will in or under it. Kant may either be claiming that good willing is dutiful or that duty is good willing. Notice though, that it may not matter which containment relation Kant has in mind since the two candidate propositions are likely convertible without alteration. If *good will under certain hindrances* is coextensive with *duty* and their conceptual content is the same, then the two concepts can be substituted for each other without alteration or loss. If one concept is broader than the other, though, then they are still subject to *altered* conversion, e.g. the universal proposition *The dutiful is good will* converts to the particular proposition *Some good will is dutiful* (JL 118). The important point for my purposes is that binary containment relations like the one Kant posits between good will and duty are *propositional*, and Kant’s genetically scholastic, general logic includes *criteria* by which various specifications of the proposition *can* be adjudicated.
As a matter of strategy, moreover, Kant must at some point introduce a containment relation and thereby a proposition in *Groundwork I* if he is to arrive at a supreme principle of morality as he plans. A supreme principle of morality is not merely a principle in the loose sense that something follows from it. A supreme principle of morality is a *Grundsatz*, which is literally a ground-proposition and this sort of principle must have *propositional* form. It cannot be just a concept. There are three basic propositional forms according to Kant: categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive. The categorical proposition is the most basic. (Hypothetical and disjunctive propositions are composed of more atomic propositions, e.g. categorical propositions.) A categorical proposition is a predication, i.e., a subject and predicate related through a copula (JL 105).

If Kant is ever to arrive at a *Grundsatz*, then, he must at some point introduce a predication, and I contend that the introduction of duty is the point. As this is a highly contentious claim it would take a great deal of work to rule out the other likely alternatives, e.g. the first sentence of *Groundwork I* or the vocation of reason claim. My project is not to settle such issues, but only to establish criteria by which they can be settled, based on Kant’s own logic and metaphysics. Since the containment relation between will and duty has not been a serious contender for the first proposition thus far and I do think it is the first proposition, I will assume in what follows that I have it right. Even if it can be proven that I have misidentified the first proposition here, the remainder of the analysis should illustrate how the interpretive method I advocate can bring out useful criteria of evaluation for Kant’s argument.

Suppose then that when Kant says that the concept of duty “contains” that of a good will, he sets up a predication (a proposition) with an eye to arriving at a supreme principle of morality. Since Kant neglected to overtly state the proposition implied here,
as described above, there is some room for interpretation as to precisely how it should be
stated. The simplest candidate that retains good willing as the analysandum is *All good
willing is dutiful*. This is a universal affirmative categorical proposition that represents
good will as being contained under duty, and makes duty a mark of good will.

To illustrate how this candidate for the first proposition could be evaluated, consider an alternative that might better fit the propositional argument: *Only good willing is dutiful*. In support of this alternative against the proposition I identify, Kant explicitly says that the concept of duty has marks like *hindrance* and *limitation* that *cannot* be marks of good will according to the prior analysis. A will that is absolutely, incomparably good in itself cannot involve hindrances. Moreover, perfectly good willing is possible, metaphysically if not humanly. Since the kind of good willing at issue cannot be limited as duty is, not all good willing is dutiful. Finally, duty is defined a few paragraphs later in *Groundwork I* as a kind of necessitation, and Kant says in *Groundwork II* that a perfect will is not necessitated. It would seem to follow that a perfect, presumably perfectly good, will could not be dutiful.

My reply is that the proposition *good willing is dutiful* is vague, perhaps ambiguous, and calls for further analysis. This is precisely why Kant next distinguishes between actions that are from duty and actions that are in accordance with duty. *Dutiful* actions as I interpret the term include actions from duty, from duty alone, and actions that are merely in accordance with duty. To elaborate this idea a bit, actions are a kind of ground-to-consequence relation. We can classify actions according to whether they have the same kind of ground, e.g. from inclination or duty, or we can classify actions according to whether they have the same consequence. Actions that accord with duty are classified by their consequence, not their ground. They include actions from duty. Actions from a perfectly good will, from duty, and from an immediate inclination can be
indistinguishable with regard to their consequence. From an external perspective, Kant says we can never be certain which ground in fact produced a given action. What it means for an action to be in accord with duty, i.e. to be dutiful, is merely that the consequence is the same consequence that would result from duty alone. Perfect willing, morally necessitated willing, and impulsive willing are therefore all dutiful in this sense precisely insofar as their consequences accord with duty. Since this concept of the dutiful is therefore a broader concept than good will, Kant needs to narrow the conceptual sphere of the dutiful down to a more specific concept of duty (via analysis) that does not contain marks that are extraneous to the kind of good will at issue.

Kant also needs to narrow down the kind of good willing at issue. We are concerned with *morally* good willing, which need not be perfect but neither can it be too imperfect. A morally good will is subject to hindrances, but the first branch of analysis requires that these hindrances be external influences rather than intrinsic limitations to the goodness of the will. The idea is that a morally good will can itself be absolutely incomparably good in itself while nevertheless being subject to external influences that are causal hindrances. What Kant needs to do, then, is divide the vague concept of the dutiful into two more specific concepts so that the distinction partitioning the too-broad sphere cuts precisely at the boundary between a good will and a morally good will. If the analysis succeeds, the initial proposition *all good will is dutiful* will resolve into a more precise and therefore illuminating proposition: A good will is a will whose consequences accord with duty, but more specifically a *morally* good will is a will whose *ground* is duty, perhaps duty alone.

So far I have merely assumed that Kant’s first proposition is an affirmative categorical proposition, but there theoretical considerations that support this. One of the most basic requirements of cognition is that the single object putatively cognized can be
conceived in multiple ways: Any possible object must fall under more than one concept. We may call this the multiple conceivability requirement. Historically affirmative predication was thought to have two requirements, diversity of conception and sameness of reference. In other words the subject and predicate must be non-identical, but coextensive or having some extensional overlap. The function of the copula in such propositions is to “propound” the non-identical subject and predicate “as applying to one and the same thing outside thought” (Nuchelmans 1998, 121). We might now think of this as reference through conceptual overlap. Given this slightly better understanding of how affirmative categorical propositions were thought to work, we can see that the introduction of the first proposition is not merely necessary because Kant wants to eventually arrive at a principle that must have the logical form of a proposition. The introduction of a proposition that is specifically affirmative and categorical is strategically necessary for Kant to have any hope of later showing that good will refers to something.

Supposing all this is correct, one might still complain that Kant’s introduction of duty is ad hoc. Kant has made no comparisons here and provided no obvious motivation for choosing the concept of duty as his predicate rather than some other concept that might be predicable of a good will. I would argue that by raising the issue of what kind of willing might be better than prudence, the preceding teleological argument can elicit the concept of duty, as an answer to the question it raises. From the perspective of common understanding, dutiful willing is arguably both better than prudence and a better candidate for the incomparable moral good. Recall that the way reason influences the will in the case of prudence is by representing something as better than the objects of immediate inclination. Though it was not an issue in the teleological argument, it is also part of our common understanding that prudence involves reason as an aid to will,
contrary to immediate inclination, which can be a hindrance to its goodness. In other words, duty is not far below the surface of our common understanding of prudence. At best this prudential willing is still only somewhat good, so in order to get at what precisely it is in the representation of will and in will itself that would make the vocation of reason possible, Kant needs to identify some feature of practice according to common understanding that might make the goodness of an absolutely good will “shine forth” despite its hindrances and limitations (recall the implications of the disfavor of fortune in ¶3). The concept duty is strategically the right conceptual tool to access the ground of our esteem for an incomparably good will because duty as Kant conceives it is predicable of a good will, perhaps even of a will that is absolutely and incomparably good in itself, but it conceives the object of a good will in a different way, as being potentially subject to hindrances and limitations rather than perfect (G 4:397).

§5 Transition from the First to the Second Proposition

Supposing we now have a reasonable understanding of how and why Kant introduces the concept of duty in such a peculiar manner and we have thereby identified the first proposition. We are now in a better position to investigate how Kant makes the transition to the second proposition he explicitly identifies without reverse engineering the argument.

First Proposition: All good willing is *dutiful* (from G 4:397; See also G 4:401, 407).
Corollary: All *morally* good willing is *from duty*.
Second Proposition: An action *from duty* has its moral worth in the *maxim* in accordance with which it is decided upon, not in the purpose to be attained by it (G 4:399).

As I mentioned in the last section, the argument justifying the transition between propositions is primarily a process of eliminating the disjuncts of a relevant conceptual
sphere. There are four possibilities constituting the implicit conceptual sphere according to Kant’s classification:

I here pass over all actions that are already recognized [1] as contrary to duty, even though they may be useful for this or that purpose; for in their case the question whether they might have been done [2] from duty never arises, since they even conflict with it. I also set aside actions that are really [3] in conformity with duty but to which human beings have no inclination immediately and which they still perform because they are impelled to do so through another inclination. For in this case it is easy to distinguish whether an action in conformity with duty is done from duty or from a self-seeking purpose. It is much more difficult to note this distinction when [4] an action conforms with duty and the subject has besides, an immediate inclination to it. (G 4:397 emphasis mine)

Actions that discord with duty can be divided from those which accord with duty on the basis of their consequences, and these are not dutiful in even the loosest sense. The grounds of action contrary to duty are unlikely to help explain the ground of our esteem for dutiful willing, except perhaps in a negative sense, so Kant need not consider subdivisions of this class. The remaining distinctions can only be made on the basis of grounds. The alternatives Kant passes over are the alternatives that do not make the goodness of the will shine forth despite hindrances. Actions according to duty divide into (at least) the following classes:

a. Actions from immediate inclination
b. Actions from mediate inclination (prudential action)
c. Actions from duty with no inclination (strictly from duty)

The classes of interest are the two classes of actions that will make the goodness of the will shine forth in comparison. As we will see, Kant thinks the sharpest contrast is between (a) and (c). (This should be no great surprise if prudence is somewhat rational,

48 Kant does not consider vicious actions, even though these might accord with duty. Vicious actions are certainly a possible contrast class for morally good ones, but not a strategically well-chosen one. Our common understanding of vicious action is associated with both evil intent and bad consequences, so Kant would need to obtain an adequate concept of viciousness before he could use it to make our concept of morally good willing more distinct.
inclination is non-rational, and we anticipate that morally good willing will turn out to be essentially rational.)

Among actions that are from inclination and whose consequences accord with duty, there are actions from immediate inclination and actions from “more remote” prudential grounds. The question is whether prudence or immediate inclination is the perspicuous contrast class. Prudence is idiosyncratically conditioned upon the contingent natural inclinations that happen to make up happiness for an individual, according to Kant, so prudence is fundamentally oriented to self-interest (though not necessarily selfish in the vicious sense). This places prudence near duty in the conceptual sphere but the contrast it poses is not sharp enough to be useful:

It certainly conforms with duty that a shopkeeper not overcharge an inexperienced customer, and where there is a good deal of trade a prudent merchant does not overcharge but keeps a fixed general price for everyone, so that a child can buy from him as well as everyone else. People are thus served honestly but this is not nearly enough for us to believe that the merchant acted in this way from duty and basic principles of honesty; his advantage required it; it cannot be assumed here that he had, besides, an immediate inclination toward his customers, so as from love, as it were, to give no one preference over another in the matter of price. Thus the action was done neither from duty nor from immediate inclination but merely for purposes of self-interest. (G 4:397 emphasis mine)

Since in both cases it is ultimately reason which grounds their goodness insofar as they are good, the contrast between acting from duty and acting from prudence is not much help in investigating the ground of esteem.

The useful contrast class, Kant thinks, is actions from immediate inclination. Actions from immediate inclination and actions strictly from duty are both presumably cases for which the ground of volition is absolute and arguably internal to the will. According to common understanding at least some immediate inclinations like empathy or fellow-feeling are also potential candidates for incomparable goods. According to common understanding it might also be possible to act both from duty and from fellow-
feeling at once. Fellow-feeling might turn out to be an aid to duty. In order to make a clean comparison, then, Kant needs to ensure that the cases he compares do not have multiple grounds. Since the goal is to investigate the ground of esteem and aids have already been identified as having no inner worth in ¶2, Kant’s strategy is to find cases in which immediate inclinations are themselves hindrances to duty, duty prevails, and this makes the absolute, incomparable goodness of the will shine forth:

[T]o preserve one’s life is a duty, and besides everyone has an immediate inclination to do so. But on this account the often anxious care that most people take of it still has no inner worth and their maxim has no moral content. They look after their lives in conformity with duty but not from duty. On the other hand, if adversity and hopeless grief have quite taken away the taste for life; if an unfortunate man, strong of soul and more indignant about his fate than despondent or dejected, wishes for death and yet preserves his life without loving it, not from inclination or fear but from duty, then his maxim has moral content. (G 4:397-8).

Following the suicide case, Kant presents three other cases concerning beneficence, happiness, and loving one’s neighbor. These are all intended to show that even though immediate inclination may be an absolute ground, in that we can and do act directly from it according to common understanding, it is not an absolute ground of incomparable value. We judge the cases of acting from duty to be morally valuable, Kant thinks, specifically because the subject acts from duty and not from any natural inclination.

First Proposition: All good willing is dutiful (from G 4:397).
Revised Corollary An action is absolutely, incomparably good in itself, i.e. it has moral worth, without being perfect if and only if it is an action solely from duty.
Second Proposition: An action from duty has its moral worth in the maxim in accordance with which it is decided upon. (G 4:399 abbreviated).

The second proposition with which this phase of the argument ends is the proposition that actions from duty have their moral worth specifically in their maxim. Kant defines a maxim as a subjective principle of volition. In order to understand how
Kant reaches the second proposition, we need to see what this means. A *principle* in the loose sense is anything that serves as the ground of a ground-to-consequence relation, where ground-to-consequence relations include inference and causation (B356).iv A *principle of volition* is a ground of volition, a practical ground, or that from which one can will. Principles of volition can be merely subjective or they can be objective. Objective principles of volition are imperative laws. These are principles from which one *ought* to will (either hypothetically or categorically). Maxims are *subjective* principles of volition from which one has willed, does will or shall will, whether or not one ought.

Since willing is essentially causal, a ground of volition must among other things be an impelling cause or motive cause49 of willing. So to (actually) act *from duty* is to act from a specific subjective principle of volition, i.e. from a specific maxim.

[A]n action *from duty* has its moral worth not in the purpose to be attained by it but *in the maxim* in accordance with which it is decided upon, and therefore does not depend upon the realization of the object of the action but merely upon *the principle of volition* in accordance with which the action is done without regard for any object of the faculty of desire. (G 4:399-400 emphasis mine)

The idea of a maxim or principle of volition here is fairly generic and does not entail any philosophical commitments foreign to the scholastic tradition, but it seems rather uncommon. Before getting to Kant’s argument for this proposition, then, it may help to translate it into more common terms so that we can see why Kant might think it is initially plausible from the common perspective. The common notion of a maxim is something like a personal reason for doing something. This is not entirely unlike the idea of a subjective ground of willing. We commonly think morally exemplary people are people who act on principle. This means, we think, that their personal reasons for acting

49 *Bewegungsgrund*. Kant does not clearly disambiguate the specific ways in which a subjective ground of volition must be a ground, e.g. motivational ground, justifying ground, ground of goodness, etc. It is the causal aspect of a subjective ground of volition that best suits the analysis just here.
are not merely subjective idiosyncratic rules of prudence, but they are instead objective principles on which everyone ought to act even though we very often do not. Our common understanding of what it is to act on principle in this sense may not be adequate to Kant’s metaphysical purposes, but at least the second proposition is not entirely alien to common understanding as it might at first seem.

As a point of methodology, it is important that Kant first states his ‘proposition’ and then follows it with a ‘proof’, as one would in using the mathematical method:50

The second proposition is this: an action from duty has its moral worth not in the purpose to be attained by it but in the maxim in accordance with which it is decided upon, and therefore does not depend upon the realization of the object of the action but merely upon the principle of volition in accordance with which the action is done without regard for any object of the faculty of desire. [Proof:] That the purposes we may have for our actions, and their effects as ends and incentives of the will, can give actions no unconditional and moral worth is clear from what has gone before [by ¶3]. In what, then, can this worth lie, if it is not to be in the will in relation to the hoped for effect of the action? It can lie nowhere else than in the principle of the will without regard for the ends that can be brought about by such an action [the will is good in itself]. For, the will stands between its [pure] a priori principle, which is formal, and its a posteriori incentive [e.g. immediate inclination], which is material, as at a crossroads; and since it must still be determined by something, it must be determined by the formal principle of volition as such when an action is done from duty, where every material principle has been withdrawn from it [by the case comparisons in ¶9-13]. (G 4:399-400 emphasis mine)

Notice that Kant’s proof is based on prior analysis, notably relying on ¶3 – the second proposition is justified by coordinating the results of two different phases of the analysis. In ¶3, Kant compared the goodness of the will to the goodness of purposes and ends, concluding that the unlimited goodness of the will cannot be teleologically derived and so the will must be good in itself. For the will to be good in itself means that its own principle is the ground of its goodness.

50 In his *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science* Kant uses the mathematical method, which is executed in part by stating propositions and following them with proofs based on prior definitions (*Erklärung*) or propositions. See BL 231ff for Kant’s views on proof.
The last claim in the quote above is the weak link in Kant’s proof in that it is less plausibly common and fairly opaque. Kant needs to justify the claim that every possible ground other than duty is a posteriori and material. If Kant has already arrived at a philosophic moral cognition of duty, it might be legitimate for Kant to propose a disjunctive conceptual sphere composed of (a) an a priori formal principle as determining ground when one acts from duty and (b) an a posteriori material determining ground when one acts otherwise. The philosophical difficulty for Kant would be to justify this partition in the face of the obvious objection that actions contrary to duty and actions from prudence are also included in the conceptual sphere.

In Kant’s defense, suppose there are only two faculties that can influence the will, reason and the faculty from which inclinations arise. The latter is sometimes called the faculty of feeling or the lower faculty of desire, and it is both commonly and scholastically understood to be a natural faculty, i.e. a source of a posteriori or natural grounds of volition. If there are any a priori grounds of volition, e.g. any supernatural or transcendental grounds of volition, we do not commonly think they could arise from this lower, natural faculty of feeling. Such grounds, we think, could only arise from a “higher” faculty of desire, perhaps a rational faculty of desire. On this view, prudence combines the lower and higher faculties of desire. It is grounded in the natural feelings and desires of the lower faculty – these are its a posteriori material – but these grounds are regulated by the higher faculty. If it is really the grounds of volition that are at issue and not their ordering, then prudence counts as a posteriori and so do most other common kinds of willing. It is actually quite difficult for us to imagine what it would be to will without any sort of inclination or feeling that could serve as a motive ground.\footnote{This is why so many interpretations of Kant’s ethics, both friendly and unfriendly, end up claiming that inclinations are necessary for the determination of a will to action (e.g. Engstrom 1992, 751). See chapter 5} In order
for a volition to be formal and a priori, the grounds themselves would have to be a priori. This is such an exceptional possibility that Kant’s burden of proof is really to show that such a thing is possible, not to show that none of our common cases of willing must be excluded.

§6 Coordination of Marks to Generate the Exposition of Duty (P3): The Necessity of an Action from Respect for Law

The third and final proposition, immediately following the proof of the second proposition, is the penultimate step of making distinct the idea that is to canonize moral science: “duty is the necessity of an action from respect for law” (G 4:400). Kant says this proposition is a consequence of the two preceding. This is usually taken to mean that the first two propositions are premises from which the third follows as a deductive consequence. Since Groundwork I is an analysis rather than a deduction, however, Kant’s claim that the third proposition is a consequence of the first two means only that the third proposition can be elicited via analysis from an arbitrary reasonable interlocutor who already accepts the first two propositions. In order to explain the transition to the third proposition, then, we must explain how Kant gets to necessitation of an action, respect and law in connection with the first two propositions, and explain how these marks of duty are coordinated.

The exposition of duty as necessitation of action from the second proposition is fairly straightforward from Kant’s perspective. Recall that the second proposition proposes that an action from duty has its moral worth in the maxim, i.e. the (subjective) principle of volition in accordance with which it is decided upon (G 4:399). The key concept for the third proposition is the concept of a principle of volition. A principle in

for an explanation of the alternative, namely how respect for law as the pure a priori form of feeling can generate particular feeling without presupposing any given feeling.
the loose sense is simply a possible ground of some ground-to-consequence relation. Loosely speaking, a principle by definition necessitates some consequence, either logically or causally (or both) simply because it is by assumption a ground.⁷ Kant thought we commonly and unavoidably understand causation as a necessary relation between cause and effect: Causation is the “necessitation” of effects, as consequences, from the causes which ground them. In the case of a principle of volition, i.e. a maxim, the necessitation is a causal necessitation whose consequence is an action (we make things happen by acting on maxims).

Eliciting respect and law as marks of duty is a bit more difficult, particularly since they must stand in a very specific relation to each other. In his explanation of how the third proposition follows from the first two, Kant makes two important distinctions. The first is the distinction between consequences that are mere effects, which Kant claims cannot command respect, and consequences that are activities of will, which can:

The third proposition, which is a consequence of the two preceding, I would express as follows: duty is the necessity of an action from respect for law. [Proof:] For an object as the effect of my proposed action I can indeed have inclination but never respect, just because it is merely an effect and not an activity of a will. In the same way I cannot have respect for inclination as such, whether it is mine or that of another; I can at most in the first case approve it and in the second sometimes even love it, that is, regard it as favorable to my own advantage. Only what is connected with my will merely as ground and never as effect, what does not serve my inclination but outweighs it or at least excludes it altogether from calculations in making a choice – hence the mere law for itself – can be an object of respect and so a command. Now an action from duty is to put aside entirely the influence of inclination and with it every object [end] of the will [by P2]; hence there is left for the will nothing that could determine it except objectively the law and subjectively pure respect for this practical law, and so the maxim of complying with such a law even if it infringes upon all my inclinations. (G 4:400 emphasis mine).

First consider respect. Though Kant has not yet discussed respect specifically in the Groundwork up to this point, it is not ad hoc. The first distinction above, between things that can be respected and things that cannot, originated in the first phase of analysis when Kant compared the goodness of a good will to the goodness of mere
effects in ¶3 (G 4:394). Mere effects, we have already agreed, can have only a limited value. If an action is good only because its effect is good, the action can only be somewhat good and therefore the action is not worthy of esteem. A will that is good without qualification, however, is absolutely incomparably good in itself and is worthy of esteem. According to the first proposition as I have interpreted it, all such good willing is dutiful. So an action is absolutely, incomparably good in itself, i.e. it has moral worth, if and only if it is an action solely from duty. The analysis in the first three paragraphs of *Groundwork I* concerning the goodness of a will thus comes very close to the concept of respect, particularly with the concept of esteem.

Esteem is not quite the mark Kant needs for the exposition of duty, though it is very close. Esteem is a special feeling that is responsive to the worth that moral actions have: Esteem is necessarily for some object which itself necessitates our esteem for it. Also, as a feeling, esteem is a prospective motive ground of the faculty of desire. Feeling is the ordinary basis of our potential subjective causal grounds, and maxims are expected to involve, rely on, or be feelings.

Both the objectivity of esteem and its connection to feeling are important for Kant’s purposes, but esteem is commonly understood as a representation we have for the dutiful actions of others. We esteem dutiful actions as third parties, and this does not do well to satisfy Kant’s internalist requirements. Perhaps more importantly, though, as Kant indicates in the second *Critique*, the common conception of self-esteem that is closely related to self-conceit in that the propensity to self-esteem “rests only on sensibility” and “belongs with inclination” (KpV 5:73). If the will is to be good in itself

52 Kant attempts to cater to common understanding and common usage in his choice of terminology, especially in *Groundwork I*, and this can be sensitive to historical usage. There is an important difference between the notion of self-esteem employed in earlier centuries and the current notion of self-esteem. In centuries past, self-esteem was conceived as a form of self-conceit, implying inappropriate pretentions, arrogance, and other negative connotations as Kant indicates in this passage. The prevalent conception of
without alienating us from our own good willing, the object of its subjective principle must be first person or self-regarding without resting on sensibility, so esteem is not the ideal concept for Kant’s purposes. If this first person or self-regarding aspect of the subjective principle is to avoid falling back on sensibility and inclination, which Kant has argued cannot be the source of absolute worth, then Kant needs something like rational self-esteem, which he calls respect. Respect is this first-person counterpart of esteem that is to be contrasted with the unfounded conceit of sensible self-esteem, which Kant calls self-love.

Like esteem, respect is a special feeling but it is important for Kant’s purposes here that according to common understanding respect is not merely something we feel, but something we do.\footnote{Our current common understanding of respect does not have this feature to the extent that it did in the eighteenth century. Respect was then fundamentally associated with social hierarchy and obedience, as in “respect for one’s betters” or “respect for one’s elders”. More recently respect has evolved into a more liberal notion of respect for autonomy as non-interference.} Respect is a verb, not merely a noun, and obedience is an immediate mark of respect. Respect is commanded, and insofar as we are subject to a command, we necessarily obey. To respect authority is at least in part to be disposed or prepared to obey. This is important because a distinct concept of duty must provide marks concerning how action is necessitated. Esteem, awe, adulation, and other more passive responses to incomparable worth are poor candidates in this regard even if they may have features that are useful in value theory more generally.

This leads us to the second important distinction Kant makes in his explanation of how the third proposition follows, the distinction between the subjective determination

self-esteem is now instead a conception of oneself as a person who has the same basic value as every other person, and to lack self-esteem is pitiable. Insofar as this basic value of a person is most closely associated with intelligence and free will, not sensibility or desire – thanks to Kant – Kant would instead call it self-respect.
and the objective determination of the will. There are two roles Kant needs to fill in order to cover his bases with regard to how action from duty is necessitated. Willing is a cognitive activity, therefore it is a kind of cognition. According to Kant’s lectures on logic, every cognition must involve both a relation to the subject and a relation to the object (JL 33). Distinct cognition, or a distinct concept of acting from duty, must make these two relations explicit. So Kant needs to resolve respect into its subjective and objective aspects.

The subjective aspect of respect is mentioned in a fairly cursory way here in the text because the relation to the subject is of less use in determining the special content of morality. As I will explain in more detail in chapters 5-6, the relation to the subject for practice primarily concerns the role of the faculty of feeling rather than reason. The more scholastic name for will is the faculty of desire, and Kant’s philosophical name for the kind of faculty of desire humans have (which is commonly called Wille) is practical cognition. Just as theoretical cognition requires both sensibility and reason, practical cognition (Wille) requires both reason and feeling (KU 20:206-7). The element or material ground of desire, even for animals, is feeling, which we can think of as the representation of our affect on things. Just as sensibility is the faculty for incoming causality, i.e. the ability to be affected by things, the faculty of feeling is most generally the faculty for outgoing causality, i.e. the ability to affect things. The faculty of feeling is the faculty of representation that subjectively grounds the outgoing causality of the

54 Kant’s understanding of feeling is a complex topic. I will assume the following for the time being. Feeling is the primary, and sometimes only element of desire and it necessarily involves our ability to affect things. Inclination is the paradigmatic habitual species of causality of feeling. Impulses are non-habitual inclinations (6:213). All empirical motives rest on impulses. Some feelings may have a phenomenal character (how it feels to x), but this is not what makes them feelings (intuitions may also have a phenomenal character without thereby being feelings). Feeling and its relation to desire and reason will be addressed in somewhat more detail in chapter 6.
faculty of desire. Since all representations are “modifications” of mind, feelings are literally causal determinations of the subject to will something, i.e. subjective determinations of the will (A97, A139/B178).

In order to make the subjective aspect of respect more distinct, then, Kant addresses what kind of feeling is involved in, or constitutes, respect. Since inclination is excluded from consideration by prior analysis, Kant needs an extraordinary feeling. The description of respect as a moral feeling that is “self-wrought by means of a rational concept” acknowledges that the subjective principle of volition must somehow belong to feeling and yet avoids contradiction by specifying that this feeling is different in source and kind from inclination.

We may take for granted that morality is subjective, at least initially, so Kant need not go into great detail here as to precisely what the relation to the subject must be. Kant needs his exposition of duty to be adequate to determine the object of morality, but he need not here provide a full analysis of desire and feeling to make respect aesthetically or teleologically distinct. Since feeling is not an intellectual capacity, the proper place for Kant to make distinct the subjective aspect of respect would be a transcendental teleology (the practical counterpart of a transcendental aesthetic), which belongs to the critique of moral science and is here premature (see KpV 5:9†, 5:72-82). The point is that what Kant needs here is just an initial identification of the subjective principle of moral volition that is accurate and precise enough to begin the objective analysis. This is why it is so important that respect be fundamentally object-oriented and oriented to the correct object.

Unlike the subjectivity of morality, the objectivity of morality is presumed to be in contention. Kant must do a great deal more work to even make it plausible that morality could be really be objective (contra Hume, he thinks). One of the first questions we should then ask is what sort of object respect could have, keep in mind that the object
of respect and the object of morality might yet differ. The *intentional* object of respect is simply whatever respect is *for*. Since we do not commonly distinguish between intentional objects and objects in a metaphysically more robust sense, analysis should lead us to ask what kinds of things we can respect. According to common understanding, Kant thinks, only something that has authority over us as its subjects can be respected, because only that which has this authority can command respect.

When we consider what sorts of things can be authoritative for us, Kant claims law is the only possible object. The specification of law as the object of respect is a bit tricky because respect is supposed to be in part a value-response like esteem. According to the initial phase of analysis, only good will can have the kind of value that would be worthy of respect, so it seems odd for Kant to identify law rather than good will as the mark of objective determination. The obvious reason why Kant cannot use good will here is that it would make his explication of duty circular. Good will is the initial analysandum. It cannot reappear as a mark of itself. Kant needs something more precise – he needs to specify more distinctly what it is about good will that makes it respect-worthy.

Law is a good candidate because we do commonly think (genuine) laws have the authority to command our obedience and we commonly associate duty with law. This was truer in Kant’s era, when monarchies were common and divine law was accepted as authoritative. Clearly *some* representations can necessitate action (recall prudence), so a *representation of law* might objectively necessitate our action from respect for its authority to command our obedience. Insofar as respect must be *for* law, respect is a representation of law. Insofar as respect is a *response* to its object, law objectively necessitates respect for it and thus necessitates actions from respect for law. This is the idea, at least.
The issue for critical evaluation of the analysis here is why presenting law as the objective ground of duty here does not contradict Kant’s earlier claim that only a good will could have the kind of value this objective ground would need to have. Even though Kant claims in ¶1-2 that only the activity of a will could be respect-worthy (esteem-worthy), in ¶3 and P2, Kant finds that it is more specifically the ground of the will and not its effect that gives the good will its moral worth. As a cognitive activity, good willing involves complexities (a prima facie teleological organization), and it is just these complexities that analysis is intended to reveal. As we saw in chapter 1, the law of a faculty, i.e. its supreme principle, is its ground, to which the entire faculty can in a sense be reduced, just as sciences are “reducible” to their laws or first principles and cognitive insight is “reducible” to definition. The law of a faculty makes the faculty what it is; it is the essence of the faculty or an essential mark of the faculty. In the moral case, the law that is a mark of duty is a law of volition, i.e. a law of good willing. This law is a causal law and the kind of causality it governs is the activity willing that is (allegedly) absolutely good in itself, so the law is essentially a law of absolute goodness. Kant’s transition from the (somewhat) obscure idea of a will as object of respect to the more distinct idea of a law of the will as the objective determining ground of respect is intended to be a logical transition from obscurity to distinctness: The idea of a law of good willing is a somewhat common understanding of Kant’s supreme principle of practical reason. Since law is an essential mark of that which is absolutely incomparably good in itself, law fits the role Kant needs to fill for the mark specifying the objective determination of the will: Law is the objective ground of the will in action from duty. This close connection between good will and law, combined with the differences in their specificity and scope allows Kant to avoid circularity here without thereby generating a contradiction.
To make this a bit more intuitive, consider the objection that one must respect a direct order from the king, even when it is given only to one individual on one occasion and is therefore not itself a law. Upon analysis it seems more appropriate to say that though we obey such orders, what we respect is the embodiment of law in the king. The command of a king does not therefore constitute a counterexample. What Kant ultimately needs to claim is that only law can command and only that which has a legal character can be respected. More perspicuously, consider that Kant later claims in *Groundwork II* that the moral law requires us to treat humanity in ourselves and others by treating persons always as ends in themselves and never merely as means (G 4:429). This second formula of the moral law is often characterized as mandating respect for persons. Upon further analysis, humanity in Kant’s sense is really autonomous self-legislation. Autonomous self-legislation is a more precise specification of what it is for willing, volition, or practical reason to be good without qualification. In every candidate object of respect that one might consider as a possible counterexample to Kant’s claim that law uniquely commands respect, Kant would presumably claim that upon analysis there is either a law that makes the object respect-worthy (as in persons or kings), or the object is demonstrably not good without qualification and therefore not respect-worthy (see KpV 5:72-76).

Taking a step back from the body of the *Groundwork* to its method, there are two important indicators in this paragraph as to where Kant thinks he stands in the analysis. Again Kant presents a proposition, but he also uses the terms consciousness and determination to indicate that he thinks he is at or near the clear and distinct idea from which the special content of morality can be determined. Specifically Kant claims that the object of respect can only be a determining ground of the will, and he tries to capture the idea of respect for law by describing respect both as consciousness of the immediate
determination of the will by means of a law and as consciousness of the subordination of my will to a law (G 4:400, 401*). The explanation of duty in terms of consciousness and determination is to be expected if Kant is attempting to use the method of analysis to explain willing on the model of cognitive and scientific insight as I argued earlier. The method of analysis, again, is fundamentally a method whereby confused ideas are made clear. Clarity is consciousness of the idea. This consciousness can be extended to the idea’s marks, thereby making the idea distinct. Consciousness of the idea’s marks is the ground of cognitive insight, where cognitive insight enables the (more or less) complete determination of the object through its representation in the idea. The underlying idea that Kant wants to motivate is that respect is the esteem-like objective moral feeling that the canonic law of morality necessitates in a subject when the subject is conscious of it as a law of transcendental freedom, i.e. when the subject is distinctly conscious of it as an absolutely free determining ground of his or her will. This is the sense in which distinct cognition of the moral law could command our obedience according to Kant.

§7 From the Exposition of Duty to the Moral Imperative

In the last phase of Groundwork I Kant asks “what kind of law can that be, the representation of which must determine the will, even without regard for the effect expected from it, in order for the will to be called good absolutely and without limitation?” (G 4:402). Kant’s answer results in the first statement of the supreme principle of morality:

Since I have deprived the will of every impulse that could arise for it from obeying some law, nothing is left but the conformity of actions as such with universal law, which alone is to serve the will as its principle, that is, I ought never to act except in such a way that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law. Here mere conformity to law as such, without having as its basis some [particular] law determined for certain actions, is what serves the will as its principle, and must so serve it, if duty is not to be everywhere an empty delusion and a chimerical concept. (G 4:402 emphasis mine)
The impulse Kant mentions is a collective term comprising all the a posteriori material inclinations, whether immediate, prudential, selfish, beneficent, or of some other description. In claiming that the principle of the will is left with nothing but conformity with universal law once these are excluded, Kant is in part claiming that respecting a law is not to be understood as simply acting on a feeling that is naturally caused by a representation of law. The contrast between universal law and particular laws is a clue to what Kant has in mind. If we consider particular laws, or representations of law that are not entirely general, the particularity involved in their representation would make these representations effectively intuitive, at least in part. Respect for law might then reduce to an intuitive feeling no different in kind from any other impulse. The subjective ground of morality would then be material, a posteriori, and no different in kind from any other possible ground of volition. If on the other hand the law is entirely universal, i.e. if it is pure a priori, there could be nothing at all particular or concrete in its representation. Consequently respect would have to be a pure a priori representation analogous to the pure a priori forms of intuition Kant posits in the first Critique (see chapter 6). If Kant cannot posit respect as a pure a priori form, i.e. as pure conformity, he thinks his analysis would eventually have to reveal that there can be no such thing as moral worth (duty will be chimerical). He thinks he has already ruled out every alternative in the conceptual sphere except this one.

Suppose Kant has in fact met his burden thus far but he has yet to explain how pure practice is possible. The central problem for metaphysics Kant described in the first Critique is to explain how (pure) synthetic a priori theoretical cognition of objects is possible. The practical analog of this problem is how pure synthetic a priori practical determination of objects is possible. One of the great obstacles in the first Critique to solving the central problem of theoretical metaphysics, Kant says, is that pure concepts of
the understanding must ultimately somehow be related to appearance, despite their fundamental heterogeneity, in order for concepts to relate to objects at all (B19, A137/B176). In order to explain how pure concepts, which are entirely abstract, could relate to appearance which is entirely concrete, Kant claimed there must be some “third thing” to bridge the gap of their heterogeneity. As I will explain in chapter 6, respect, or perhaps respect for law, is the initial specification of this mediator. Suppose then that pure conformity to universal law is the pure a priori form of practice analogous to the pure a priori forms of intuition he posits in the first Critique. In addition to the mediator, though, Kant must also propose a schematism, which is something like a procedure to help bridge the gap between the heterogeneous relata. Very roughly, the schematism helps explain how the cognition could be synthesized from the relata. For example in the mathematical paradigm the coordination of marks in the definition of a mathematical object is somehow suggestive of a procedure by which one could construct the object in intuition.

Now suppose action and law are heterogeneous, as they so obviously seem to be. Kant will need something like a moral schema and schematism. He will need an exposition of acting from duty, i.e. moral willing, that coordinates marks in a way that is somehow suggestive of both a mediator and a procedure for the pure a priori determination of an object. Kant’s first statement of the moral law has this feature: I ought never to act except in such a way that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law.

The universalizing procedure vaguely suggested is strategic for Kant in another regard. Kant posits in the first Critique that the logical function of reason is to universalize (as opposed to the logical function of judgment which is to unify). If the pure practical determination of objects is ultimately explicable in terms of the
universalizing logical function of reason, Kant will have a good start on identifying a positive canonic law of morality that explains how the drive, uses and elements of reason further its vocation. We may not have any insight into how this would work, which Kant admits the philosopher must still investigate, and we may not be convinced that Kant has correctly ruled out every possible alternative, but at least we can see from Kant’s treatment of theoretical determination in the first Critique why he would want to generate such an odd specification of the supreme principle of morality.

Of course these are all philosophical considerations. If Kant must satisfy the common interlocutor here he cannot rely on his philosophical claim that the logical function of reason is to universalize, much less his explanation of the theoretical possibility of synthetic a priori cognition. Kant’s actual justification appeals to common understanding:

*Common human reason also agrees completely* with this in its practical appraisals and always has this principle before its eyes. Let the question be, for example: may I, when hard pressed, make a promise with the intention not to keep it? Here I easily distinguish two significations the question can have: whether it is prudent or whether it is in conformity with duty to make a false promise…But it is soon clear to me that such a maxim will still be based only on results feared [impulses]. To be truthful from duty, however, is something entirely different from being truthful from anxiety [impulse] about detrimental results [c.f. P2], since in the first case the concept of the action in itself already contains a law for me while in the second I must first look about elsewhere to see what effects on me might be combined with it [derivative value]…[T]o inform myself in the shortest and yet infallible way about the answer to this problem, whether a lying promise is in conformity with duty, I ask myself: would I indeed be content that my maxim (to get myself out of difficulties by a false promise) should hold as a universal law (for myself as well as for others)? (G 4:402 emphasis mine)

It is important to Kant’s justification here that the specification of the moral law is negative, specifying how one ought never act rather than how one ought always act under some more positive description. The distinction is specifically between actions in conformity with duty and actions contrary to duty, not between actions from duty and
actions not from duty. What Kant is claiming is that given the distinction the common
interlocutor has presumably just made between acting from duty on the one hand and
acting either from impulse or on the basis of the value of an expected effect on the other,
she should be able to tell the difference easily in other cases now that the formerly
intuitive procedure has been made clear and distinct.\(^55\)

After his justification of this first negative specification of the moral law, Kant
makes a statement that clearly reiterates the method he has employed thus far in precisely
the terms I used in chapter 1 to explain the method of analysis:

> [W]e have arrived, within the moral cognition of common human reason, at its
principle, which it admittedly does not think so abstractly in a universal form
[clearly and distinctly] but which it actually has always before its eyes and uses as
the norm [supreme principle] for its appraisals. Here it would be easy to show
how common human reason, with this compass in hand, knows very well how to
distinguish in every case that comes up what is good and what is evil, what is in
conformity with duty or contrary to duty, if without in the least teaching it
anything new [logic of truth, not discovery], we only, as did Socrates, make it
attentive to [expound] its own principle; and that there is, accordingly, no need of
science and philosophy to know what one has to do in order to be honest and good
and even wise and virtuous [i.e. for the health of common reason]. (G 4:404)

The need to establish morality as a science arises from the vulnerability of common
reason to the seduction of “fine-spun” philosophical arguments and the corruption of our
inclination to happiness (Bxxiv, G 4:404-5). Because analysis leads to insight and
cognitive grasp, analysis of healthy common reason protects against speculative
corruption and selfish seduction. Kant may not have adequately supported his implicit
claims regarding what and how we commonly understand, but his method can be

\(^{55}\) As I will explain in more detail, there is a reason why the common interlocutor might accede to Kant’s
claim that in evaluating our maxims we commonly do consider whether they could stand as universal laws
for everyone, but this explanation is not strongly supported by the local text.
followed and to some extent predicted given an adequate understanding of his logic and the first *Critique*.

§8  **Mathematical Reconstruction of the Analysis**

It is always tempting to reconstruct an analysis as a deduction, in part because we are more accustomed to the deductive form, and in part because deductive form lends itself well to clear and concise presentation. As I have argued, however, it is difficult to present an analysis in deductive form without prematurely opening it to evaluation with regard to its objective validity, truth, modality, and objective justification. It is possible, however, to render an analysis in mathematical form without prematurely focusing attention on the object. Since Kant employs the mathematical method in the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science* and in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, which are both critical philosophical texts, it might seem perverse that Kant avoids the clearest method of presentation available.

As Kant explains in the first *Critique*, the reason why the establishment of moral science must begin with the method of analysis rather than the mathematical method is that the mathematical method presupposes a clarity that we do not yet possess for moral metaphysics. The mathematical method begins with definitions (or expositions) that are already logically perfect (clear, distinct, precise). Analysis has the advantage of being able to generate the logically perfect definitions we need for philosophy. Kant explains:

[Int philosophy one must not imitate mathematics in putting the definitions first, unless perhaps as a mere experiment. For since they are analyses of given concepts, these concepts, though perhaps only still confused, come first, and the incomplete exposition precedes the complete one, so that we can often infer much from some marks that we have drawn from an as yet uncompleted analysis before we have arrived at a complete exposition, i.e. at a definition; in a word, it follows that in philosophy the definition, as distinctness made precise, must conclude rather than begin the work… Philosophy is swarming with mistaken definitions, especially those that actually contain elements for definition but are not yet complete. (A730/B758, A731/B759*, see also VL 916, BL 272)
In the establishment of a science, one cannot assume that any alleged definitions in hand are already adequately clear, distinct, profound, extensive, and precise for the purposes of philosophy. Once an analysis is complete, though, such definitions are available from which one could employ the mathematical method. If we render the analysis of *Groundwork I* mathematically on the basis of chapter 2, it would look something like the following.

**Exposition 1**

*Morality* is the activity of willing in a way that is absolutely, incomparably good in itself.

**Exposition 2**

*Prudence* is the influence of reason on the activity of the will, to the betterment of the will, by means of representing some object as an end.

**Corollary Exposition 1**

The vocation of reason is to make the will absolutely, incomparably good in itself by means of representing some object as an end, i.e. to give the will moral worth.

**Explanation**: The natural vocation of a faculty must be its highest, best possible purpose. Prudence entails that reason does influence the will to good purpose. Based on this use of reason, the practical vocation of reason must be to make the will as good as it can be. By Exposition 1 the best a will can be is absolutely, incomparably good in itself. Therefore, the vocation of reason is to make the will so.

**Exposition 3**

*Duty* is the grounding of the activity of the will (the necessitation of an action) by reason to the purpose of making the will absolutely, incomparably good in itself, by means of representing some object as an end (and thereby making it actual).

**Proposition**

All good willing is dutiful.

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56 Kant uses the term “Theorem” in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, but he uses “Proposition” in *Groundwork I* and in the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*. Propositions are required in the context of analysis. Theorems can arise only in proof or deduction, which Kant is explicitly not doing in *Groundwork I-II*. Theorems and corollaries are theoretically provable propositions; *problems* are practically provable propositions (BL 280).
**Explanation:** Perfectly good willing accords with duty, and is therefore dutiful, in that the consequences of action from duty and perfectly good willing coincide even though a perfectly good will is not necessitated strictly speaking. Imperfectly good willing is necessitated, meaning that such a will is subject to possible influences that make what is objectively good and practically necessary subjectively contingent. When no subjective inclination actually contributes necessitated willing is action from duty and therefore dutiful. When contrary inclinations contribute, imperfectly good willing is nevertheless dutiful insofar as its consequence accords with the consequence of acting from duty, but in this case the will is not absolutely, incomparably good. Action from inclination, i.e. impulse, can also accord with duty in its consequence and therefore be both dutiful and conditionally good. Action from inclination that is contrary to duty, even in its consequence, is not good.

**Proposition 2**
An action from duty does not derive its moral worth from any consequence, i.e. any object or end, represented through reason, but instead has its moral worth solely in its maxim, i.e. in its grounding principle (Princip) of volition.

**Proof:** By ¶3, the unlimited goodness of the will cannot derive from the value of purposes, ends, effects, etc. and the morally good will must therefore be good in itself. In any ground to consequence relation, besides the consequence there is only the ground and its necessitation of the consequence. An action from duty must therefore have its moral worth in its ground, i.e. in the Princip which necessitates these effects in the subject, which is the maxim of the subject’s action.

**Exposition 4**
*Respect* is pure a priori conformity to law, i.e. the subjective effect of consciousness of the moral law (the canonic law of practical reason) as the objective ground of the goodness of the activity of the will; we may call this moral feeling.

**Proposition 3**
Duty is the necessity of an action from respect for law.

**Proof:** The relation between law and action is *necessitation* because the subjective is not necessarily in conformity with the objective, i.e. subjective inclinations may hinder the objective determination of the will. Though it is different in kind from inclination, respect is a kind of *feeling*. Feeling is the manifold of affect from which our action is *subjectively grounded*. Respect is also the *consequence* of a command. Respect can only be *for* that which commands it. Since that which commands respect is both the object of respect (that which respect is for), and the ground of respect (that which necessitates respect as a consequence), that which commands respect is the *objective ground* of respect. The objective ground of respect must be a universal necessitating ground for all that is subject to its authority or within the scope of its validity. Only *law* has this kind of authority. Therefore only law can be an objective ground of respect. The consequence of
command is not merely a phenomenal sort of feeling but obedience, i.e. conformity to law. Since respect is a consequence necessitated only by the representation of law, respect is pure conformity to law. A representation of law is a representation of necessity, which can only be a priori. Therefore respect is an a priori moral feeling that is equally pure conformity to law. Duty must therefore be understood to be the necessity of an action from respect for law.

(Negative, Singular) Statement of the Supreme Principle of Practical Reason
I ought never act except in such a way that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law.

Notice that this mathematical method is still not precisely a deduction. The mathematical method begins with clear and distinct propositions but these need not be, and perhaps cannot be, premises. Premises must be truth-evaluable judgments that are held to be true. Definitions may be logically possible even without being objectively possible or referring to real objects, and they are stipulative, so it is really their objective validity rather than their truth that is potentially at issue.

§9 The Contribution of Duty to the Canon of pure reason

Groundwork I not only provides the distinct idea from which the special content of morality can be determined, it also helps set up the distinction between practice in general and pure practice, i.e. morality.

Immediately following the argument in the Canon that we are practically free, (the argument that motivated the transition from will to a telos of reason), Kant argues that a prudential law of practical freedom is not enough to establish that there is a canon of pure reason. The issue for the canon according to Kant is not merely whether there are practical laws, but whether there are practical laws that command absolutely, meaning that their command is not empirically conditioned. There are two possibilities with
regard to the conditions of free choice (Wilkiühr), he says. Paraphrasing very closely, the alternatives are either:

(A) The conditions of free choice are empirical, in which case reason has only a regulative use to unify empirical laws, e.g. to unify the pragmatic laws of prudence under its end happiness, or

(B) The conditions of free choice are not empirical, in which case there would be a pure practical law whose end is given by reason completely a priori and which commands absolutely, meaning it commands without empirical conditions, e.g. a moral law (B828).

There can only be a canon of pure reason, Kant says, if (B) is the case. Not only must there be such a thing as free will or free choice, then, there must be absolutely free choice if Kant’s project of establishing moral science is to succeed.

Why must it be possible for representations of reason to ground the will absolutely in order for there to be a canon of pure reason? A canon of pure reason according to Kant is the sum total of the a priori principles of the correct use of reason in general (B824). If the only practical laws we can find are empirically conditioned, then they are not pure a priori principles for the correct use of reason. They do not qualify for the canon unless they are absolute. The principles of the canon must be laws that establish morality as an independent, bounded, and complete metaphysical science in its own right. If (A) were the case, then practical reason would be subordinate to the empirical faculty of desire or dependent on sense, and Kant’s project would be doomed. Transcendental freedom, in contrast to practical freedom, requires the independence of reason itself from all determining causes from sense (B831, see also G 4:448). Transcendental freedom would require that reason alone be able to causally initiate a series of appearances. This is the kind of freedom Kant must establish.

The point of focusing on duty in *Groundwork I* and distinguishing between actions from duty and actions according to duty is in part to lead us from the concept of
practical freedom implicit in the teleological argument to the concept of transcendental freedom required for a canon of pure reason. The hindrances and limitations of will allow Kant to clearly distinguish between a mere practical law of empirically conditioned freedom and a moral law of absolute or transcendental freedom. Kant needs this to distinguish between practice in general and pure practice. Duty is strategically introduced in the analysis in part because it leads to the idea of an absolutely free faculty of choice.

Though Kant has arrived at a clear and distinct conception of the moral law from which the special content of morality might be determined, the arrival at philosophic moral cognition is not yet sufficient for insight (G 4:403). Kant has not yet addressed the fact that pure practice must be not only pure a priori but also synthetic, which poses special problems for the determination of content in itself. He has not yet given a positive formulation of the moral law suitable for the canon, and he has not yet investigated whether the representation he posits could determine a real determinate object without contradiction. These are all tasks for Groundwork II.

§10 Conclusions from Groundwork I

What I hope to have shown thus far in this dissertation is that the first Critique and Kant’s lectures on logic provide a great deal of insight into the aims and structure of the Groundwork, particularly with regard to Groundwork I. The context of Kant’s project to establish metaphysics as a science provides insight into the title, the method, and the purpose of Groundwork I. I hope to have shown that although Groundwork I can potentially be reconstructed as a deductive argument, it is much better interpreted as just what Kant says it is, an analysis whereby a common cognition is made distinct by systematically eliciting its marks of identity and diversity. Kant’s argument is a better
argument, by the standards of scholastic analysis than it would be by the standards of modern deduction.

I hope to have also shown that interpreting the *Groundwork* as a continuation of the project Kant began in the first *Critique* and using the Doctrine of Method as a guide allows us to set fairly specific expectations and to anticipate the argument. It allows us to see how Kant sets and meets his own criteria and to evaluate his success both internally and externally. Contra Allen Wood we need not “lower our expectations” for *Groundwork I* because Kant had a quite detailed grand plan (Wood 1999, 20). A thorough understanding of Kant’s logic and method could consequently be used to evaluate *Groundwork I* in great detail. We could evaluate whether Kant elicited the necessary marks in the proper manner, whether he correctly posits and partitions his conceptual spheres, whether his philosophic moral cognition is genuinely philosophic or moral, whether the exposition is sufficiently profound or precise, whether the marks elicited are essential or contingent, and so on.

Finally I hope to have proven that the first few pages of the *Groundwork* are important, that they are in fact integral to Kant’s first step of establishing morality as a metaphysical science. The propositional argument of *Groundwork I* is a continuation of the analysis of good will Kant begins in these first few paragraphs, its presumption of accuracy depends upon this connection to our common healthy understanding of morality, and the remainder of the establishment of moral science depends upon the results of the propositional analysis.

One very contentious result of this analytic interpretation is that it makes the moral law a law of practical reason that is elicited through teleological considerations very early in *Groundwork I*, rather than a law of will that is later deduced to be a law of reason on potentially non-teleological grounds. Some Kant scholars may find this
congenial, but many will not (see Guyer 2002). Given Kant’s clear conviction in the first Critique that practical reason is the moral faculty, that reason is in part a faculty of practical cognition, and his explicit conclusion in Groundwork II that the will is nothing other than practical reason, I see no reason to be squeamish about how deeply embedded practical reason turns out to be. It would be far stranger, I think, if Kant’s argument concerning the vocation of reason in Groundwork I had no role in the generation of the initial formulation of the moral law and then reason appeared again in Groundwork II without connection. For any interpretation that aims to accurately reflect Kant’s work, I think the burden of proof on this point should be in my favor. Nevertheless, questions concerning whether will and reason are genuinely teleological and how deeply embedded the idea of practical reason is in the Groundwork are contentious and I will treat them with more care in the next Part.

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1 If one were to insist that concepts can only be used in judgments according to Kant and that therefore the analysandum must have the logical form of a judgment, this judgment would be a problematic judgment: It is not possible to consistently think of anything other than a will as good without limitation. One reason why I take this to be an interpretive mistake, though minor, is that the scholastic method of analysis does not allow one to import uncommon theoretical or philosophical commitments, preconceptions, or biases; Socrates may know at the outset where his conversation will lead and he may ask strategic questions to get it there, but he does not state his own opinions or stipulate principles of his own. The method of analysis itself gives no special priority to predications or judgments, and Kant’s reasons for doing so in the first Critique are very far removed from common understanding.

ii There is a long-standing controversy concerning Kant’s apparently “sour grapes” view of morality, i.e. whether morally good willing can be overdetermined in having both duty and immediate inclinations as grounds. With Barbara Herman and others, I take it that Kant’s emphasis on acting from duty alone is really aimed to make a clean comparison, Kant’s explicit division does not rule out the possibility of overdetermination (see Herman 1993, “On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty”). Kant need not explicitly identify all the divisions of the conceptual sphere in order to make a useful comparison.

iii Kant seems to be treating action from immediate inclination as an undifferentiated class without allowing for the possibility that some immediate inclinations might be grounds of moral goodness. This is a point of contention. For Kant’s real motivations, see Theorem II of the Critique of Practical Reason (5:22). His reasons there are philosophical and unlikely to support a common analog.

iv It will be important for the next step of analysis that any representation that serves as a ground is a Princip of its ground to consequence relation “even if in itself and as to its own origin it is not a principle”
(B356). In other words, a *Princip* in the loose sense need not be a concept or an idea, much less a proposition, despite the connotation of its translation as “principle”. It could instead be a *feeling* that is *used* as a ground, as in the ordinary case of acting from immediate inclination, e.g. acting on impulse, or perhaps as in the case of respect, which is a moral feeling.

In order for a principle to *actually* ground a consequence, either theoretically or practically, the principle must be represented in the thought of some intelligent (rational) being. Insofar as a principle is represented, it is an element, state, property, or “determination” of mind (A50/B74, See also JL 545, A319/B376). Such modifications of mind can be very specific and temporally limited, or they can be very general or universal features of one’s mental activity as in elements of character. It is important to note that even though grounds can be representations and therefore event-like, Eric Watkins has argued convincingly that Kant’s model of causality requires objective grounds to be temporally indeterminate (Watkins 2004). The distinction between a law itself as objective ground of determination, and the representation of law as a determinate subjective ground of other determinations reflects this distinction.

Thomas Hill thinks it is most reasonable to construe “humanity in a person” as “including only those powers necessarily associated with rationality and the ‘power to set ends’” and as excluding animality and physical abilities (Hill 1992, 40). Since Hill’s understanding of practical reason is not adequate generate much more than an association between humanity, reason, and end-setting, he does not extend the association to the legal character of a maxim or person, though he does notice that dignity is attributed to a variety of related things, e.g. humanity, morality, good-willers, and so on (ibid, 47).

Korsgaard takes Kant’s strategy in *Groundwork I* to be to analyze the reason why a good-willed person does an action because this reason is also the reason why the action is right (60/138). The result of the analysis, she says, is that the legal character of the maxim is the reason for both: The internal legal character of a maxim, i.e. its universalizability, is the reason why actions from it are right and thus the reason why a good-willed person does it (60/138). Grasp of legal character is then what motivates us in our morally good willing (61/139). Since Korsgaard is concerned with how a formal obligation can yield motivation for an individual agent, she does not make the broader connection to practical reason and what it is that commands respect in a rational being.

I would argue that practical reason is the formal intellectual aspect of practical cognition, i.e. will; practical reason is the autonomous capacity to set ends and make them actual. The legal character of such a being is its autonomy, i.e. its self-legislative character, and this is what ultimately commands respect. The legal character of a maxim is its universalizability, which is its conformity to the legal character of the good-willed person. This overview should become more clear and compelling in Part II as I develop the view of practical cognition.

Since Kant characterizes a law as a formula expressing the necessity of action, Kant’s question here is ambiguous. The analysans of duty is a law that refers to a law. Though the alternative might be worth exploring, I take it that Kant’s question is specifically about the object of respect and this law may be distinct from the necessity of acting from respect for it, i.e. from duty. Since nothing central to my argument here rides on the resolution of this issue, I will suppose without argument that the analysandum involves law as a first-order concept, and the necessity of acting from respect for this first order law as a higher order law, e.g. an idea of reason. If this distinction collapses upon further analysis, I do not take the self-referentiality of duty to be unavoidably problematic for Kant. The self-reference of duty is less problematic than the self-realization of an autonomous end in itself.
Part II  The Determination of Moral Content in *Groundwork II*

**Introduction**

I claimed in Part I of this dissertation that Kant’s *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* is an execution of the first two steps of the procedure for establishing moral metaphysics as a science, where the general procedure for establishing a science has four steps:

1) Make distinct the idea of the science glimpsed from familiarity with its material,
2) Determine the special content of the science from this distinct idea,
3) Articulate the science, and
4) *Critique* the science and thereby determine its boundaries.

I argued that *Groundwork I* is Kant’s attempt to complete the first step of this process by using the scholastic method of analysis to make distinct our common cognition of morality. The result of this analysis, the explication of duty and its law as the “definition” of good willing, should be a clear and distinct idea of pure practice from which it is possible to determine an object as the special content of morality.

I will now begin to argue that *Groundwork II* is Kant’s execution of the second step of establishing the science of moral metaphysics, the determination of the content of morality. Kant has been defining the concept of duty in *Groundwork I*, but now he needs to determine the objects that fall under this concept. This step of the procedure more directly addresses what morality is *about* (as opposed to its idea), which is one of several prerequisites for the possibility of its truth. The bulk of *Groundwork II* concerns the prospective content of morality and the architectonic adequacy of its principle. In other words, *Groundwork II* concerns the properties of the object of morality and the adequacy of our clear and distinct representation of it.
Kant’s answer to the content question is in short that morality is about a special kind of activity, specifically *necessitated willing*. He has already arrived at this idea in *Groundwork I*. In *Groundwork I* the concern was to analyze the concept of morality to find precisely what is contained in it. Morality was initially taken to be about *good willing* according to common cognition. Upon sufficient analysis this was found to be acting from a special principle, duty, which was then more distinctly presented as the necessitation of an action from respect for law.

Now in *Groundwork II* Kant must ascertain what is contained under the concept of morality. To do this he must divide the extension of the concept, following the universal rules of logical division:

In every division of a concept we must see to it:
1. that the members of the division exclude or are opposed to one another, that furthermore they
2. belong under one higher concept (*conceptus communis*), and finally that
3. taken together they constitute the sphere of the divided concept [its extension] or are equal to it

Note: the members of the division must be separated form one another through *contradictory* opposition, not through mere *contrariety*. (JL 146; see also BL 273)

These codivisions are equivalence classes with respect to a set of mutually exclusive properties that exhaust the possibilities. A singular judgment that predicates one of these properties of some thing that falls under the concept is a determinate judgment that contributes to the determination of the concept’s content. In order to determine the content of moral science, then, Kant will need to show that for every possible activity, his supreme principle of morality is adequate to determine where the activity falls within some division of duty. Since intuitive judgments are singular, this will bring morality closer to intuition (BL 279-80).

Slowing down a bit, Kant must first identify a contrary pair of predicates, i.e. according to duty vs. contrary to duty. He must employ a principle of identity to individuate activities, e.g. on the basis of their maxims. He must identify a
philosophically adequate standard by which to judge which predicate pertains to a given activity, e.g. a formula of the moral law. Finally he must show that for every activity, exactly one of these predicates can be correctly predicated of the activity. As we will see, willings are individuated by their maxims or principles of volition according to Kant and these principles are the basis of the determination.

In order for this step of establishing moral science to fully prepare Kant for the articulation of the system, the determination here must also be an adequate exemplar for how activities could be determined with respect to other moral predicates. In order to best make his case, then, Kant will need a somewhat finer-grained predication. This is why Kant’s predications turn out to be according/contrary to either strict or wide duty. Every other moral predication must have a basis in some feature of the principle of volition, though these features need not be overt.57

As I indicated in chapter 3, the logic of this step of establishing moral science is actually the easy part. Kant thought the method of logical division is quite uninteresting and unproblematic, but the metaphysics required to establish the truth of moral determination is very difficult. The general metaphysical problem Kant faces in *Groundwork II* is that the object of moral science is a kind of causal necessity that is so special that it seems metaphysically impossible. It must be synthetic, a priori, objective, practical, categorically imperative, reciprocally determined, and more. Because there are

57 We do not conceive our maxims clearly and distinctly in our routine activities. In other words, maxims are typically *in concreto* representations of ourselves as doing things. Upon reflection and analysis we can come to understand clearly and distinctly the details of the plans, contingencies, and even the self-image involved in our own principles of volition. According to Kant these are all things we already think in our principle of volition, though we are not initially conscious of it. For example when I take the bus to work I take advantage of all sorts of skills and physical laws, which requires me to represent them at least obscurely, and I obscurely represent myself as meeting several sorts of obligation. Upon reflection and analysis these obscure representations can become conscious conceptions *without* thereby altering the identity of the maxim in question. This is an unavoidable presupposition of the method of analysis.
so many ways that duty might fail to be possible, Kant must be very careful to explain how duty can meet all the criteria for real, fully determinate objectivity. As we saw in chapter 4 §4, one of the very most minimal criteria of objectivity is multiple conceivability. There are several other extremely basic criteria that a real determinate object must meet. Kant’s division of duty by the first formula of the moral law shows how the first formula can be used to determine the will, i.e. the object of moral science, but this addresses only the logical possibility of the object. It does not prove that the object of morality is a candidate for reality or that it is a fully determinate object. Duty might yet, for example, be a merely intensional or transcendentally ideal object.

In order for Kant to show that the content of the supreme principle of morality is even a candidate for reality, he must show that duty meets a genetically Aristotelian criterion of real objectivity: Real objects are constituted as informed matter. The first formula of the moral law specifies the form of the moral object, but Kant must still identify its matter and explain how this matter is informed. Kant’s argument for the validity of the moral law for all rational beings specifies a plurality, namely humanity as the plurality of rational beings, as the matter of the moral law. The introduction of the second formula of the moral law and the division of duty by the second formula according to the same partition given by the first formula are intended to show how the

58 Though Kant says there are three formulas, he seems to state five or more (Paton 1948). Kant individuates the formulas of the moral law according to their quantity because the criteria of objectivity he needs to meet are quantitative. Universality is the first category of quantity, plurality the second, and totality is the third. Both “first” formulas are quantitatively universal. Both “third” formulas are quantitatively total.

59 It is important to keep in mind that using the first formula correctly requires the same kind of expertise that using the principles of Newtonian mechanics or Special Relativity would require. Kant’s audience is constituted by his philosophical peers who are presumed to have this kind of expertise with respect to the scholastic logic to be employed. Scholars should already know how to employ the principle of contradiction and the principle of determinability in determining the content of a representation.
principle of unity embodied in both formulas of the moral law informs the plurality of matter for which the moral law is valid. This is an argument for the real possibility of duty as the special content of morality.

It would not be enough for Kant, though, that morality have a real object. The third formula of the moral law helps Kant meet several very closely related criteria of scientific and intentional objectivity. In order for moral metaphysics to be a potentially sound and complete science with distinct boundaries, its object must be a fully determinate system. This means in part that the object must meet Kant’s principle of complete determination; it must be completely quantifiable. Since Kant intends to employ the method of synthesis in *Groundwork III*, the object must also meet the very closely related principle of thoroughgoing determination, which requires that none of the predicates of the object contradict each other. Since the form of a system is congruent with an end according to Kant’s “architectonic of pure reason”, Kant must also meet the reciprocal criterion of an end, which turns out to be the distinctive feature of intentionality (A832/B860). As we will see in chapter 7, these principles together require Kant to provide a third formula of the moral law that combines the first two in a specific way and through them expresses the individuation of singular objects belonging to a totality.

In addition to all the criteria the object must meet if it is to be a candidate for fully determinate reality, Kant must also negotiate several prior difficulties regarding how the moral law could govern action. One concern is the logical form of the representation that grounds moral volition. Another concern is Kant’s solution to the fundamental problem

60 An argument for “real possibility” in the relevant sense here is an argument that an object is possibly real, i.e. that the object is a candidate for reality. It is not an argument for the possibility of the object (Kant says he does not do this in *Groundwork I-II*) or an argument that the object is contingent.
of cognitive synthesis, presumably by positing a mediator and schema, which is a very basic and unavoidable prerequisite for the possibility of determination. This was a central concern in the first *Critique* and it is no less important for practical cognition, but Kant’s solution for practical cognition is very easily lost in the transition from *Groundwork I* to *Groundwork II*. As I will explain in chapters 5-6, these two concerns will require Kant to provide at least a partial transcendental analytic of practical reason.

In addition to addressing the issue of how the volitional relation between law and action is possible, Kant also needs to show that the principle of his putative science provides cognitive insight and has empirical significance even though it is entirely a priori. In order to do this, Kant must employ two distinctions that he introduces in the first *Critique*. The first is the distinction between cognitive insight and cognitive significance without insight. Kant uses this distinction to show that transcendental ideas can have empirical significance even though they are “given only in the idea”. The second important distinction relevant to moral insight is the distinction between determination and determination a priori. In the end what Kant must show is that the supreme principle of morality completely determines its object entirely a priori, thereby providing a priori insight and yet it still has empirical significance even without determining *contingent* particulars.

The issue of moral insight is complicated by the fact that Kant presents the relevant distinctions most clearly in the context of teleology. Whether and in what regard Kant’s moral philosophy is teleological has been, I think unnecessarily, quite controversial. Since I argued in Part I that the teleology of reason in *Groundwork I* is an important part of Kant’s analysis and I want to use Kant’s treatment of teleology in the first *Critique* to set criteria he must meet in *Groundwork II*, it will be necessary to briefly clarify Kant’s philosophical understanding of intentional teleology as purposiveness.
(Zweckmäßigkeit) in chapter 7 before addressing the issue of insight and significance. This will also help avoid misunderstandings regarding in what sense the reciprocal determination\(^1\) of an object described is teleological.

Only after all this is accomplished in *Groundwork II* can Kant prove in *Groundwork III* and the *Critique of Practical Reason* that the content of morality is possible, and only then can he directly address whether morality is chimerical like speculative metaphysics (Bxxiv-v) or whether it is instead the keystone of metaphysics in general. In the interest of providing some orientation and connecting these issues to passages of the text, I will begin with a brief outline and commentary on *Groundwork II*.

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\(^1\) Since the method of analysis is a method by which marks are systematically attributed to the analysandum, analysis is convertible with predication and determination. Each time a mark of the analysandum is identified it can be predicated of objects falling under the analysandum. The contrary mark or marks must be denied of the analysandum. Since the process of analysis is a basis of determination and Kant has already divided willing into actions from inclination, from duty, etc., *Groundwork I* he must subdivide these possible predicates in order to make any real improvement on this in *Groundwork II*.

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\(^2\) Kant’s employment of the matter/form is ubiquitous and he takes it to be logical, which implies that it derives from Aristotle. The scholastic model of causation was replaced historically with an atomistic model beginning roughly in Kant’s time, most prominently by Hume. Eric Watkins argues that based on Kant’s analogies of experience, Kant cannot have adopted an atomistic event-event model of this sort even though it has often been assumed he must do to in order to refute Hume. The model of causality Watkins argues that Kant employs is a (temporally indeterminate ground)-(change of determination) model. This sort of causation is a species of scholastic causation in that it requires a principle of change, enduring matter and changeable form. In order for real objects to be subject to change they must be constituted as informed matter.

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\(^61\) Recall that to theoretically determine content is to ascertain, specify, or render definite an object of representation by attributing or denying properties or predicates to it, where this object is ultimately given through experience. To practically determine an object is to produce it by means of a representation, where an object of practice is an end. The possibility of theoretical and practical reciprocal determination is what Kant needs to explain, insofar as it can be explained, in order to determine the special content of morality.
§1  **Outline of *Groundwork II***

According to its title, *Groundwork II* is a transition from popular moral philosophy to metaphysics of morals. One might wonder why Kant did not simply begin the establishment of moral science with popular philosophy, which presumably already has the advantage of being more clear and distinct than common cognition. In the first ten paragraphs of *Groundwork II*, Kant expands on the argument he began in the Preface for the indisputable necessity of subdividing popular moral philosophy into its pure and empirical parts. Here he explains in more detail why it is that the failure of popular moral philosophy to entirely exclude the empirical inevitably leads to error and confusion.

In the first paragraph Kant explains that to draw (*ziehen*) the concept of duty from the common use of practical reason as he has done in *Groundwork I* is not to draw it from experience (G 4:406). Kant reminds us that what he has been doing in *Groundwork I* is analyzing a common cognition to discover a philosophically adequate idea of morality, where this process tells us only what kind of thing morality is *if* it exists. He goes on in the second paragraph to say that it is absolutely impossible to draw a concept of duty from experience because it is impossible to identify with absolute certainty any case that is truly a case of action *from* duty.\(^{62}\) The argument against moral empiricism in general continues until ¶6 when Kant begins to argue more directly against popular philosophy.

\(^{62}\) Though this is not an argument that Empiricists would likely accept, it does fit with the methodology that I argue Kant employs. If the goal is to establish a science, especially if the process must be initiated with analysis, it would be critical to be certain that the starting point is accurate. Common understanding of morality as a whole is presumed healthy (accurate, though imprecise) and analysis is the correct method by which to identify any errors it involves. Misidentified examples might arguably skew the whole enterprise. If, for example, one began with a set of cases that included cases of mere etiquette or acting from both duty and inclination, analysis of the cases might not reveal the correct common factor. In order for generalization from cases to be valid in a way that supports claims of universal necessity, the procedure must be like a mathematical induction, not an empirical induction. An induction *could* work if it began with even one case that is absolutely certain, because a correct analysis of the case would necessarily reveal the distinctively moral features. An induction might also work if the data of induction include all possible examples because this would unavoidably include a genuine case if any exist (see JL 52). Since this is obviously impossible for us, Kant’s rejection of empirical methods was not entirely unreasonable.
He describes popular philosophy as a “hodge-podge patchwork” (¶7-9) and diagnoses the problem as a failure to first establish an entirely a priori science that is adequate for “determinate insight” before descending to popular accessibility (G 4:409, 410; see also JL 46-9).

These first ten paragraphs are a transition between the *Groundwork I* analysis of a common cognition of morality, and the *Groundwork II* analysis of the faculty of reason. Beginning in ¶11 Kant analyzes reason, very cryptically, to arrive at the idea of necessitation (¶12). As I interpret Kant’s plan, the common analysis of *Groundwork I* and the extremely brief analysis of reason in ¶12 begin to converge here through the concept of necessitation. (Recall that duty was explicated in *Groundwork I* as a kind of necessitation.) Further analysis of necessitation then generates the concept of an imperative (¶13). Kant clarifies the relevant sense of *ought* involved in imperatives (¶14-15) and then divides the necessity of command involved in imperatives into hypothetical and categorical necessitation (¶16-23). The result of this analysis is that moral necessity must be categorically imperative if there is to be any such thing as moral metaphysical science.

When the analysis of the ground of necessitation is adequate to his purposes, Kant turns to the question of how these imperatives, i.e. these kinds of necessitation, are possible (¶24). He explains how hypothetical imperatives are possible, which he takes to be straightforward. He then claims that the possibility of a categorical imperative is a far

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63 I will assume without argument that this analysis from reason to a categorical imperative is internally subject to the standards of analysis discussed in chapter 3.

64 Since Kant has treated reason fairly extensively in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, it is not entirely out of bounds for him to give such a short analysis from reason to necessitation here.
more difficult case because the categorical imperative turns out to be both synthetic and a priori:

[I]n the case of this categorical imperative or law of morality the ground of the difficulty (of insight into its possibility) is also very great. It is an a priori synthetic practical proposition; and since it is so difficult to see the possibility of this kind of proposition in theoretical cognition, it can be readily gathered that the difficulty will be no less in practical cognition. (G 4: 420)

This is the point at which the *Groundwork II* analysis of reason fully intersects with the *Groundwork I* analysis of good will in a specific concept of duty, namely the categorical necessitation of an action from respect for law. Since necessitation can only be a priori according to Kant, and the necessitation here can only be synthetic (by elimination), Kant has also arrived at the central problem for moral metaphysics, how synthetic a priori cognition of objects is possible. As I will explain in the next two chapters, ¶12 is a general analytic of practical reason followed by an abbreviated transcendental analytic of practical reason in ¶13-28.

After pointing out that we should expect to have great difficulty gaining insight into the possibility of a categorical imperative given that it is a synthetic a priori practical proposition, Kant then perversely claims that the mere concept of a categorical imperative contains or provides its “formula” (¶29-30). We must gather from this that the formula itself is not all we need to gain the requisite metaphysical insight. Kant then states the formula, perhaps twice, and announces that he “shall now enumerate a few

65 See B18-19, A9/B13.

66 Kant says earlier in *Groundwork II* that he will be analyzing reason up to the point at which it intersects with the common analysis in a concept of duty (G 4:412). See chapter 6.

67 A formula is a precise, determinate universal proposition (VL 867). Examples include common proverbs, theological dicta, and most perspicuously canons of science. Canonic scientific formulas “serve to make it possible to expound the thing more easily” (VL 867). The various formulas of the moral law differ with respect to which aspects of the thing they precisely determine.
duties in accordance with the usual division” (G 4:421). He proceeds to give four scenarios and explain briefly how it is in each case that a contradiction in will or a contradiction in thought/conception arises for actions contrary to duty in connection with the formula of the moral law, but not for the dutiful action.\textsuperscript{i}

After the first division of duty Kant goes on to state and support other formulas of the moral law and relate them back to this first formula (G 4:425-440). The second formula, called the formula of humanity, requires that we treat humanity always as an end in itself and never merely as a means (G 4:429). This formula is preceded by an argument that the moral law is valid for all rational beings (G 4:425-429). It is followed by a division of duty by the second formula that has the same partitions as the division of duty by the first formula (G 4:429-30). As I will argue in chapters 7-8, this second division of duty is intended to show that the object of morality is constituted as informed matter and therefore potentially real.

The third formula, which may be considered either a formula of autonomy or a formula of the kingdom of ends, is surrounded by a discussion of how the authorship embodied by the first formula of the moral law and the subjectivity to this law embodied by the second formula combine together to form a reciprocally structured totality (G 4:433). I will argue in chapters 7-8 that this meets three further criteria of objectivity for Kant.

These passages on the formulas have traditionally been taken to be the core of *Groundwork II*, sometimes the core of Kant’s moral philosophy more generally, and they are even more notoriously controversial than the propositional argument of *Groundwork I*.\textsuperscript{ii} What Kant means by a “formula”, whether he gives us three or five of them, how he

\textsuperscript{68} *Abteilung*. Some translators substitute “ableitung” for “abteilung”, but as I will explain this is a mistake – the *Abteilung* is a logical division.
argues for or supports them, and what they mean has been open to debate. The reason why these issues have been taken to be fundamental to understanding *Groundwork II* is that Kant seems to say so, though very cryptically, just after he discusses the idea of a kingdom of ends:

The above three ways of representing the principle of morality are at bottom only so many formulae of the very same law, and any one of them of itself unites the other two in it. There is nevertheless a difference among them, which is indeed subjectively rather than objectively practical, intended namely to bring an idea of reason closer to intuition (by a certain analogy) and thereby to feeling. All maxims have, namely,

1) a *form*, which consists in universality; and in this respect the formula of the moral imperative is expressed thus: that maxims must be chosen as if they were to hold as universal laws of nature;

2) a *matter*, namely an end, and in this respect the formulas says that a rational being, as an end by its nature and hence as an end in itself, must in every maxim serve as the limiting condition of all merely relative and arbitrary ends;

3) a *complete determination* of all maxims by means of that formula, namely that all maxims from one’s own lawgiving are to harmonize with a possible kingdom of ends as with a kingdom of nature.

A progression takes place here, as through the categories of the *unity* of the form of the will (its universality), the *plurality* of the matter (of objects, i.e. of ends), and the *allness* or totality of the system of these. But one does better always to proceed in moral appraisal by the strict method and put at its basis the universal formula of the categorical imperative: act in accordance with a maxim that can at the same time make itself a universal law.

If, however, one wants also to provide access for the moral law, it is very useful to bring one and the same action under the three concepts mentioned above and thereby, as far as possible, bring it closer to intuition. (G 4: 436-7 formatting mine, emphasis Kant’s)

This passage poses the central *interpretive* problem for *Groundwork II* according to the philosophical tradition. The individuation of the formulas, their relation to each other and their purpose, the meaning and significance of maxims having “matter”, “form” and

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69 This is traditionally called the Formula of the Universal Law of Nature (FULN). See G 4:421 for its first introduction.

70 Formula of Humanity (FOH), introduced at G 4:429.

71 Formula of the Kingdom of Ends (FKE), or the idea of a kingdom of ends (KE).

“complete determination”, and the progression between them are all opaque and highly contentious.

I will have a great deal to say about the three formulas in the next chapters. Let it suffice for the moment to say that these three formulas are Kant’s means of meeting the criteria of cognition and objectivity mentioned above (insight, significance, a priori determination, reality, quantitative completeness).

After Kant’s very dense and contentious explanation of what he has been doing in his presentation and treatment of formulas, Kant returns to the central concept of the opening sentence of *Groundwork I*, the concept of an unconditionally good will. He says here that the “categorically imperative” “supreme law” of an unconditionally good will is to “act always on that maxim whose universality as a law you can at the same time will” (G 4:437). He goes on to reiterate the relation between the unconditionally good will, its supreme law, rational nature, the rest of nature, and autonomy (G 4:437). This passage is primarily reiterative, as one would expect of a summary of what has just gone before.

Following the formulas Kant states three principles, “Autonomy of the Will as the Supreme Principle of Morality”, “Heteronomy of the Will as the Source of All Spurious Principles of Morality”, and “Division of All Possible Principles of Morality Taken from Heteronomy Assumed as the Basic Concept”. These are each followed by a brief proof-like passage that seems to reiterate some of the highlights of earlier analysis (G 4:440, 441). The first principle of the three is a mathematical presentation of the supreme principle of morality Kant set out to seek.

The second two principles are the principles that condemn popular doctrines. After the mathematical rendering of these three principles, Kant gives a “postface” in which he revisits the failure of popular philosophy. Like the first ten paragraphs of *Groundwork II*, this section is justificatory with respect to Kant’s choice of analysandum.
The first ten paragraphs made a claim that popular philosophy was an unsuitable initial analysandum because it cannot be presumed healthy and contains no certain starting point. These first paragraphs did not explain in detail why any particular doctrine from within the hodge-podge would unavoidably lead to failure, leaving open the objection that he could have instead, for example, analyzed popular perfectionism to obtain metaphysical perfectionism. Kant leaves this to the end of *Groundwork II* because he can now evaluate popular doctrines according to what he has just shown must be the case if there is to be any such thing as a moral metaphysical science. Once Kant has specified a distinct supreme principle of morality, determined its content in general, indicated its empirical significance, and shown the object is possibly real and completely determinate, he is in a much better position to explain (or at least indicate) why the analysis of various popular doctrines could not have succeeded.

The very last paragraph of *Groundwork II* reaffirms that the method of argument Kant has been employing thus far is the method of analysis and that this has important implications for what he takes himself to have established:

> How such a synthetic practical cognition is possible a priori and why it is necessary is a problem whose solution does not lie within the bounds of a metaphysics of morals, and we have not here affirmed its truth, much less pretended to have a proof of it in our power. By explicating the generally received [common] concept of morality we showed only that an autonomy of the will unavoidably hangs upon it, or much rather lies at its basis. Thus whoever holds morality to be something and not a chimerical idea without any truth must also admit the principle of morality brought forward. This section, then, like the first, was merely analytic.iiii That morality is no phantom – and this follows if the categorical imperative, and with it the autonomy of the will, is true and absolutely necessary as an a priori principle – requires a possible synthetic use of pure practical reason, which use, however, we cannot venture upon without prefacing it by a Critique of this rational faculty itself [as opposed to an analysis], the main

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73 I take Kant’s choice of the word *anhänge* here to indicate that autonomy is a result of analysis and therefore methodologically depends on the common idea from which it arises, but the common concept metaphysically depends upon autonomy as a condition of its possibility.
features of which we have to present, *sufficiently for our purpose*, in the last section. (G 4:444-5)

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1 Kant’s strategy in enumerating duties on pain of contradiction here is likely genetically attributable to Leibniz. According to Gabriel Nuchelman’s digest of Leibniz’s position, Leibniz thought that “[t]hrough real definitions the possibility of a thing is ascertained, in the sense that its concept does not imply a contradiction. The possibility of a thing is known *a priori* when its concept can be consistently resolved [analyzed] into its necessary elements or into other concepts whose possibility has been established already”. If Kant intended for the formula to function like a real definition, this would explain why Kant later resolves morality to autonomy and addresses the possibility of autonomy in *Groundwork III*.

2 I cannot help but agree that the three formulas pose the greatest interpretive problem for *Groundwork II*, but this is not to concede that the formulas are themselves the core of Kant’s moral philosophy. The core of Kant’s moral metaphysics, again, is how synthetic a priori practical cognition is possible. The formulas are intellectual tools to be employed for *philosophical* purposes. Whether the formulas are adequate to popular purposes will not be my concern, but I recommend caution in employing them out of context. As we should all remember from our first attempts at projectile mechanics, to know the formula of a law is not to be able to employ it well, either in theory or in practice. Since descent to the popular abandons philosophical expertise, the wisdom of experience must stand its stead.

3 It might be objected that a determination unavoidably involves objects and therefore cannot be analytic. In reply, “analytic” does not mean logical. Aesthetic analyses perfect representations with respect to intuition. For example, the analysis of a photograph might involve its composition, but it would also involve distinct color shades and fineness of detail. The hallmark of analysis is that it takes some analysandum as given and explicates only what is already in it. The hallmark of synthesis is that it produces something new, where the whole is more than (or very different from) the mere sum of its parts, as in the synthesis of water from hydrogen and oxygen.
Chapter 5  Analysis from Popular Philosophy to Metaphysics

§1  Two Distinctions in Analysis

As described in the outline above, Kant argues or explains in the first ten paragraphs of *Groundwork II* why the analysis that takes place in this section must be entirely a priori. The transition to the first phase of the actual analysis begins in ¶11 where Kant says:

[I]n order to advance by natural steps in this study…from a popular philosophy…to metaphysics…we must follow and present distinctly the practical faculty of reason, from its general rules of determination to the point where the concept of duty arises from it. (G 4:412)

As the quote indicates, the aspect of practical reason to be presented distinctly is its *determination*. This is no surprise. If Kant is following the procedure for establishing moral metaphysics as a science, the determination of the special content of morality should be the issue for *Groundwork II*. The interesting feature of Kant’s plan is that the transition between popular philosophy and metaphysics is to be accomplished via an analysis of practical reason, and that moreover the transition made via the analysis is a transition between general rules of determination and the concept of duty.

Now the method by which one presents something distinctly is the method of analysis. Since according to the title of *Groundwork II*, the transition is to take place between popular philosophy and metaphysics, the kind of analysis to be given is a philosophical one, just as in *Groundwork I*. In this case, however, the analysandum is an intellectual faculty, rather than a common concept. The philosophical analysis of a *concept* should yield a definition or a ground from which the entire thing can be cognized. The philosophical analysis of a *faculty* should instead yield a supreme principle, which is a ground from which the correct use of the faculty can be completely determined. In both cases, the result of analysis is a *distinct* representation that can be
used to generate a *completely articulated structure*. This similarity of structure makes the distinction between the analysis of concept and of faculty somewhat subtle. There are differences in the specific form the distinct representation must take, how the articulated structure follows from the distinct representation, and what kind of thing it is that has this structure. A definition, a supreme principle, and a canonic scientific law are all very closely analogous and perhaps even entirely convertible, but they are not identical. Whether or not this first distinction between kinds of analysandum has any great philosophical import is arguable, c.f. Allen Wood. I think it does not.

The philosophically significant distinction here is a distinction between analyses of faculties. The first paragraph of the analysis of practical reason is quite dense, as if it is merely a review or summary rather than an explanation or proof, and the key terms have already been introduced in *Groundwork I*. The following paragraphs are distinctly different in density and tone. There is far more explanation, new concepts, some examples, and Kant seems to be working harder to justify his steps. As I will explain in this chapter, the reason for this difference in density and tone is that ¶12 is a *general* analytic of practical reason that is focused specifically on isolating the pure a priori. The analysis in ¶13ff is instead a *metaphysical* analytic that lays the *Groundwork* for an eventual *transcendental* analytic. Unlike the general analytic, the metaphysical analytic is philosophically new territory, so Kant must proceed more slowly and state more explicitly how each mark follows. More importantly, as a purification of popular philosophy to metaphysics, the general analytic involves a *predictably* different set of marks than the marks involved in the *Groundwork* for a transcendental analytic.

The transition in ¶12 is a purification in the sense that it begins with an analysandum that has a “mixed” status, i.e. the analysandum is not entirely a priori, and it ends with an analysans that is allegedly “pure” a priori. It is no accident that the marks
Kant uses in ¶12 are the very marks that are most significant in *Groundwork I*. The analysis from common to philosophical cognition and the analysis from popular philosophy to metaphysics are both analyses by which a general analysandum is refined to a specifically a priori analysans.

Recall that common understanding is the concrete sort of understanding people have of things prior to reflection and consideration. We commonly make no distinction between empirical and a priori. The analysis of *Groundwork I* was supposed to result in a philosophic moral cognition. Since a philosophic moral cognition is allegedly a priori, the analysis of *Groundwork I* necessarily involved a “purification” of the common analysandum by differentiating between the empirical and a priori aspects of practice. (This purification was not always the primary focus, but it was nevertheless an important aspect of the analysis.)

Popular philosophy is post-reflective to some extent, but when it comes to the distinction between empirical and pure a priori, popular philosophy has no advantage over common cognition. It is specifically this failure to distinguish between pure a priori and empirical that Kant thinks leads to error, useless hair-splitting, and all the failings he mentions in the Preface and ¶1-10 of *Groundwork II* (see also JL 45-48). Recall that practical reason in general (*überhaupt*)\(^{74}\) includes prudence, production of artifacts, and morality. Of these broad categories of practice, Kant argues only morality is pure a priori. The “general rules” with which the analysis of *Groundwork II* is to begin are “popular” in that they do not clearly (or even necessarily) differentiate between the pure a

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\(^{74}\) Keep in mind that “in general” (*überhaupt*) is not meant to express a generalization that may admit of exceptions. It is rather a qualification of inclusiveness emphasizing that all uses or classes are to be attended, not merely the paradigm. *Überhaupt* is perhaps better translated as “overall”, but I have followed tradition in translating it as “in general”.

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priori and the empirical: General\textsuperscript{75} rules may include counsels of prudence, etiquette, and other prescriptive normative rules that are easily confused and confounded with morality. The transition from general, popular rules of determination to metaphysics thus requires the same sort of purification process as the transition from common cognition to philosophic. We should consequently expect many of the same marks to be involved in the two analyses even if the order of explanation and other features of the analyses differ.

Now the point at which the concept of duty arises in *Groundwork II* (at the end of ¶12) is the point at which the analysis has yielded a rule of determination for practical reason that is pure a priori - the concept of duty. This is where metaphysics begins. Suppose this representation is not yet philosophically adequate, meaning it is not yet as distinct as Kant’s determination project requires. The analysans from ¶12 must then be used as the analysandum of a pure a priori analysis of practical reason in ¶13ff. This is where the general analytic of reason ends and the metaphysical or transcendental analytic of reason begins.

According to Kant a philosophical analysis of the pure use of a faculty is an analysis specifically directed to explaining how the a priori use of the faculty is possible. There are two examples in the first *Critique*, the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Transcendental Analytic. The Transcendental Aesthetic is an analysis of the faculty of sensibility directed toward explaining how it is possible for us to cognize anything a priori about things external to us.\textsuperscript{76} Since cognition of any kind necessarily also involves

\textsuperscript{75} Strictly speaking, the general may admit of exceptions, as in generalities or generalizations that are true more often than not or virtually always true. Universal rules are exceptionless. Particular rules are true some of the time, as in true for a particular subset of possible cases. A singular rule would be a rule true for only one instance, but this would be at best a limiting case.

\textsuperscript{76} The primary concern presenting a philosophical need for such analysis is Hume’s challenge to the possibility of cognizing necessity (i.e. natural law) with regard to objects given to us through experience. Since a priori cognition of objects given through sense would require an a priori use of sensibility, a use of sensibility that seems prima facie absurd, a transcendental aesthetic is philosophically required.
an intellectual component, this a priori use of sensibility must be combined with an a
priori use of the intellect. The Transcendental Analytic is an analysis of the pure use of
the faculty of reason, where reason is Kant’s favored conception of the intellect. Even
though this analysis of reason is directed toward explaining the pure a priori use of
theoretical reason in the cognition of objects given through experience, the
Transcendental Analytic is nevertheless an analysis of (an application of) the very same
faculty with which Kant is concerned here in Groundwork II. We should expect, then,
that the practical transcendental analytic in ¶13ff will involve the same marks, or very
similar marks, to the marks involved in the theoretical transcendental analytic. As we
will see, it does.

Before getting into the details of the analyses, the methodological point I want to
emphasize is that the analysis of practical reason from popular philosophy to metaphysics
is a general analytic, not a transcendental analytic. Once the transition from popular
philosophy to metaphysics has been made in ¶12 the analysis becomes a transcendental
analytic of practical reason, or at least the initial steps of one. Unlike the distinction
between analyzing a concept and analyzing a faculty, this distinction makes a difference
in how Groundwork II proceeds. The marks involved in the transition to metaphysics are
predictably different in kind from the marks involved in the transcendental analytic. The
marks involved in the transition from popular philosophy to metaphysics are marks that
help differentiate between pure and empirical, e.g. laws, incentives, subjective vs.
objective grounds. All of these marks have already been considered in Groundwork I
because Groundwork I was in part also a purification-type analysis. The marks may be
elicited in a different way in ¶12 than in Groundwork I, and the order or structure of the
actual analyses may differ, but the results must be consistent.
In contrast, the marks involved in a transcendental analytic are marks that belong to *logic*, e.g. categorical, apodictic. These marks are not required for purification purposes. They are required, however, to explain the possibility of the pure use of practical reason. As I will explain, in order to address how a pure use of practical reason is possible, the *logical form* of (pure) practical reason must be made distinct, particularly the logical form of the objective ground (principle). A transcendental analytic of practical reason must identify the logical form of the ground of volition with respect to each of its four dimensions: quantity, quality, relation, and modality. As soon as we know that §13 begins a metaphysical analytic of practical reason, we already know that the marks of concern will be quantitative, qualitative, etc. These marks are not at all ad hoc. The real issue is not which marks to consider, but how to eliminate the alternatives within each conceptual sphere.

Given a clear understanding of the kind of analysis proposed for §12, i.e. a purification from mixed to pure a priori, and the kind of analysis that follows, i.e. a metaphysical analytic, then, we should already know which marks Kant must consider in each part of the analysis. The context of the analysis - its purpose, goals, endpoints and so on - determines the relevant conceptual spheres and therefore the relevant marks. Since the dimension or aspect of the analysandum that must be made distinct differs between a purification of the popular and a metaphysical analytic, the spheres of relevant marks must reflect this difference. If we understand that the transition from popular philosophy to metaphysics is a transition from general to metaphysical, we know it is a purification and thus many of the marks involved in *Groundwork I* should also appear in this analysis. If we recognize the analysis in §13ff as a practical metaphysical analytic, we know already what is at issue and which conceptual spheres are to be divided by which marks.
I have made several claims above that require some defense. The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to explaining the analysis in ¶12 in defense of these claims. The transcendental analytic will be left to the next chapter.

§2 The General Analytic of Practical Reason (¶12)

The first paragraph of analysis in Groundwork II is an analysis of practical reason from popular philosophy to the point at which the concept of duty arises and metaphysics begins. Given how much Kant intends to accomplish in one paragraph, this analysis is consequently quite dense:

Everything in nature works in accordance with laws. Only a rational being has the capacity to act in accordance with the representation of laws, that is, in accordance with principles,77 or has a will. Since reason is required for the derivation of actions from laws, the will is nothing other than practical reason. If reason infallibly determines the will, the actions of such a being that are cognized as objectively necessary are also subjectively necessary, that is, the will is a capacity to choose only that which reason independently of inclination cognizes as practically necessary, that is, as good. However, if reason solely by itself does not adequately determine the will; if the will is exposed also to subjective conditions (certain incentives) that are not always in accord with the objective ones; in a word, if the will is not in itself completely in conformity with reason (as is actually the case with human beings), then actions that are cognized as objectively necessary are subjectively contingent, and the determination of such a will in conformity with objective laws is necessitation: that is to say, the relation of objective laws to a will that is not thoroughly good is represented as the determination of the will of a rational being through grounds of reason, indeed, but grounds to which this will is not by its nature necessarily obedient. (G 4:412-13)

Even though the structure of this analysis is unclear and it contains contentious and controversial claims, it should be clear from Part I of this dissertation that the terms of analysis here are the same as the terms of the analysis in Groundwork I. Kant appeals

77 Principle of volition is intentionally ambiguous between subjective and objective here because Kant ultimately needs both.
to concepts like law, principle, the objective necessitation of an action despite subjective hindrance, and so on. Traditionally there has been an unresolved question as to whether this paragraph merely summarizes the highlights of *Groundwork I* or whether it is something more. Since there are no new marks, the analysis might merely be a reminder to the reader of what Kant means by rational necessitation in the current context of practice. Since this kind of necessitation is not simple, a very brief analysis summarizing the highlights of the more complete analyses in *Groundwork I* and/or the first *Critique* might well be in order. Since, however, the order of explanation in ¶12 appears to be different from that of *Groundwork I* and Kant claims to be analyzing a faculty rather than a concept, it cannot merely be assumed that there is nothing new to be gleaned here.

What I will argue is that the analysis in ¶12 has a discernable structure that Kant’s audience should be able to identify, follow, evaluate, and perhaps even predict. I will not be arguing that Kant has the right method or that he follows it correctly. Whether Kant has it right is not the first order of business. The first order of business is merely to discern what structure the text should have by Kant’s lights and what the standards of critical evaluation should be. In order to make a good case that Kant actually has a detailed method and is making a reasonable attempt to follow it, however, the method and his execution must both be plausible and compelling to some degree.

The context of the analysis is absolutely critical with regard to its standard of evaluation. Kant’s starting point for this analysis is the context of popular philosophy. Recall that a common understanding is the sort of concrete understanding we have of things prior to reflection and consideration. Popular philosophy is not common. A popular philosophical understanding of something is the kind of post-reflective understanding an amateur philosopher would have. Popular philosophers are familiar with the scholastic tradition of philosophy, broadly construed. They take an interest in
and reflect upon the philosophical issues of their day and engage in philosophical disputes in a primarily social context. Popular philosophers of Kant’s time would have been occupied with socio-political issues related to the Enlightenment and they would have been familiar with some of the philosophical ramifications of Newtonian mechanics.

Recall, though, that Kant’s audience is not popular philosophers. His peers are his audience and they are no amateurs. Unlike popular philosophers, Kant’s audience is expected to have expertise in scholastic analysis, highly developed intellectual capacities, and at least familiarity with Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. Kant’s audience can be held to a much higher standard with regard not only to the breadth and depth of their philosophical background and education, but also with regard to the subtlety and sophistication of their conceptual and reasoning capacities.  

Recall that the standard of critical evaluation for a common analysis is the agreement of an arbitrary interlocutor, as in a Socratic dialogue, but Kant’s presentation in Groundwork I was pitched to an audience that was at least expert in scholastic analysis and somewhat familiar with the first Critique. Since the context for Groundwork II is a popular context with an expert audience, the standard of critical evaluation for this kind of analysis is not merely what an arbitrary popular philosopher would actually assent to upon further reflection, but what an arbitrary expert philosopher would assent to upon analysis, given a starting point that is drawn from popular philosophy rather than from metaphysics. Kant cannot address this analysis to an audience that is unwilling or unable

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78 Barbara Herman correctly includes training in casuistry as an essential part of moral education (Herman 1993, 69). Kantian moral agents in general are not morally naïve; they are sensitive to moral salience and need only explicitly engage in casuistry when alerted to circumstances that require moral attention and prompt deliberation (Herman 1993, 75-78). The scholastic context of expertise may justify Kant in demanding an even higher degree of expertise specifically in casuistry for Groundwork II given that casuistry was historically considered to be a particular application of more general scholastic methods. Since the upcoming divisions of duty arguably involve casuistry, it will be important to keep the expertise of the audience in mind.
to set aside commitments drawn from speculative metaphysics. Neither can Kant can address it to an audience that lacks the requisite intellectual wherewithal to understand it. Since metaphysics is the end point, his audience must be assumed to have the intellectual capacities of a professional philosopher, but not the philosophical commitments.

Kant negotiates this difficulty by beginning with a concept or principle to which an arbitrary popular philosopher would assent because only a very clever speculative philosophical argument could bring one to doubt it (Bxxiv, MM 206). This is as close to a healthy (correct) popular philosophy as Kant can get. He wants an analysandum that can serve as common ground for all philosophers and that will not turn out to be riddled with error upon further analysis. The closest he can come to this is an analysandum that has an extremely high presumption of truth: Everything in nature works according to laws. (If this principle were to be found false, the philosophical ramifications would be very deep and disconcerting: Newtonian mechanics and even the principle of sufficient reason would be threatened.)

Supposing the standard for this analysis is clear enough, the next issue is the structure. Recall that an analysis is a method by which marks are systematically attributed to an analysandum, where these marks are to be thought of as partial representations of the analysandum. Each mark attributed to the analysandum finds a place in its analysans and thereby makes the analysandum more distinct. The final result is something like a definition or exposition. The first step of analysis is to locate the analysandum within a broader conceptual sphere so as to ascertain what it is in a merely negative sense, i.e. in contrast to what it is not. For example, dogs are not flora but fauna. Analyses then typically proceed by introducing and dividing a series of conceptual spheres that are relevant to the analysandum, each time eliminating all the alternatives but
one, and then attributing the remaining mark to the analysandum as part of its analyses.

This is the sort of structure we should be expecting ¶12 to have.

In the next sections I will argue that ¶12 has the following structure:

As I will explain, the broader conceptual sphere within which practical reason is to be located is the sphere of legal determination. Unlike all other legal determination, practical reason is mediated legal determination, and unlike a holy will, our kind of will is necessitated. This necessitated willing is acting from duty, which brings us to metaphysics.

§3 Will and Practical Reason as Mediate Legal Determination

Suppose that popular philosophy is our starting point and we are concerned with the determination of moral content. According to Kant’s characterization in the Preface, determination concerns “determinate objects and the laws to which they are subject”. In a popular context, the determination of an object is conceived as its governance by laws.

The way a popular philosopher would address Kant’s issue, then, is by considering determination by, or from, law. (The popularity of Newtonian mechanics would have made this widely acceptable.) According to popular philosophy, nature is a realm of objects governed by, or determined by, laws. Hence according to popular philosophy the
The next two sentences in the analysis have been quite controversial: “Only a rational being has the capacity to act in accordance with the representation of laws, that is, in accordance with principles, or has a will. Since reason is required for the derivation of actions from laws, the will is nothing other than practical reason” (G 4:412). There are several potentially substantive claims here:

i. A rational being has the capacity to act in accordance with the representation of laws.
ii. To act in accordance with the representation of laws is to act in accordance with principles.
iii. To act in accordance with principles is to have a will.
iv. Only a rational being has this capacity.
v. Reason is required for the derivation of actions from laws.
vi. The will is nothing other than practical reason.

The last claim, that the will is nothing other than practical reason is especially perplexing and controversial.

In order to reach an appropriate perspective from which to evaluate these claims, it is necessary to recall the standard of critical evaluation described above: Kant must gain the assent of an arbitrary expert philosopher who has no prior speculative metaphysical commitments. An expert in analysis would expect these first sentences to introduce a divided conceptual sphere. If the first sentence introduces the conceptual sphere, nature conceived as legal determination, these next two sentences should propose a division. Since Kant says the project is to analyze practical reason, the division Kant

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79 It will be important to keep in mind in what follows that the issue Kant wants to address here in ¶12 is not what kind of law or what kind of object is involved in moral determination. The issue he wants to address is what kind of determination it is by which the law and object are related. The issue is how the law determines its objects.
needs is a division that distinguishes practical reason from other things within this conceptual sphere. By establishing what distinguishes practical reason from other things within the context of legal determination, Kant will then be able to identify practical reason as the capacity to derive actions from representations.

Suppose the structure of this initial step of analysis is something like this. Natural laws paradigmatically determine or govern natural objects directly or immediately, e.g. gravity. By the standards of a philosophy that mixes pure a priori with empirical, i.e. a popular philosophy, nature includes human nature but human nature presents the exception in nature. This implies a division. According to the scholastic tradition human nature is, above all things, rational. According to popular philosophy then, the natural domain of legal determination prima facie divides into practical reason and other. Unlike all other legal determination, practical reason is mediated by a representation.

As further support of this division, Kant’s audience has presumably already acknowledged in the teleological argument of Groundwork I that to act rationally (or to will rationally) in the prudential sense is to act according to a representation. This generalizes across all volition. Whether we are attempting to act prudently, producing an artifact by design, authoring a poem, or performing any other activity that counts as a genuine case of willing, there is always some kind of representation according to which we act. If there is no representation whatsoever, no plan or design, no conception whatsoever of what one is doing, one’s activity is not being governed in the volitional

80 This is the same sort of procedure Kant used in ¶1-3 of Groundwork I to find the distinctive marks of a will that is good without qualification. The conceptual sphere was the realm of the good. A will that is good without qualification was initially contrasted with other good things. This division of the good then allowed the goodness of the good will to be made more distinct.

81 Since popular philosophy allows the employment of empirical methods in moral philosophy, generalizing from a wide range of diverse cases would be compelling given the standard of critical evaluation here.
sense. Twitches and palsies do not count as volition. Acting according to a representation is the most general conception of volition that is distinct enough to distinguish it from other kinds of natural legal determination.82

Recalling *Groundwork I* again, upon further analysis it was found that to act according to a representation is to act from a *principle*, where a principle is a representation that *grounds* the action. (A maxim is a subjective principle of volition that may also be objective insofar as it embodies or respects law.) Volition, then, is activity that has a ground-to-consequence structure with a representation as ground and an action as consequence. Ground-to-consequence relations can be either mediate or immediate. What is distinctive of the relationship between the law and the actions it governs in the case of volition is that this relation is *mediated* by a representation. One familiar with Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* or the scholastic logic on which it is based should know that *reason* is the faculty of mediate inference or derivation (JL 114ff).83 According to the standard of argument for this analysis, what Kant implicitly claims here is (a) an arbitrary expert philosopher with no prior metaphysical commitments should be willing to admit that the relation between law and action in volition is mediated by some kind of representation, and (b) in light of the *Groundwork I* analysis, such a person who is also acquainted with Kant’s division of the faculties and his explanation of reason in the first *Critique* would agree that practical reason must be the faculty of volition.iii The former, (a) is not especially controversial, but (b) requires some further defense.

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82 See for example Kant’s distinction between animal and human will (A802/B830, MM 213).

83 If all and only rational determination is mediate, this division is a step in the direction of a transcendental analytic of practical reason: It isolates practical reason from within a popular context, thereby making it accessible to analysis. Kant says in the first *Critique* that the logical use of reason “has obviously long since been defined by the logicians as that of drawing inferences mediately (as distinct from immediate inferences, *consequentis immediatis*)”, indicating his assumption that popular philosophers and metaphysicians would take no exception here (A299/B355 emphasis mine).
As Kant describes it in ¶12, practical reason is the derivation of an action from (a representation of) law. Since this is a remarkable use of the notion of mediate derivation, it may help to contrast Kant’s notion of practical reason with a standard but mistaken interpretation. There are many Kant scholars who conceive practical reason as a capacity to reason theoretically about what one ought to do. Thomas Hill is a case in point. Following Rawls, Hill is most concerned with explaining deliberation in terms of reason for action, which is prima facie inferential and traditionally belongs to moral psychology (Hill 1992, 129n7). Hill thinks that practical reasoning is making judgments and inferences about what one ought to do, and this activity gives rise not only to “reasons for belief” (theoretical reasons), but also to “reasons for acting” (practical reasons) (ibid, 126, 125). To “acknowledge” reasons for acting, he says, “is to be disposed to follow them” and will is the faculty of such acknowledgement and disposition; to have a will according to Hill “is to acknowledge the force of certain rational constraints” (ibid, 125). Since will is essentially a reasons-responsive faculty according to Hill Kant is an “‘internalist’ about reasons”, but by this Hill means that a will cannot be “indifferent” to the conclusions of practical reason (ibid, 125). So reasons for acting are rational in that they are the results of reasoning about what one ought to do, on Hill’s view, but the acknowledgement of a reason is instead volitional.

Because Hill thinks a distinct volitional faculty is required to acknowledge a reason for acting in order for it to dispose us to action, Hill’s view is in a sense internalist about will, but not about reason. Practical reasoning does not motivate; willing does. Granted, Hill conceives will as a reason-responsive faculty, but he denies Kant’s identification of will and reason, calling it a grand announcement that cannot be maintained (ibid, 124-5). This is not an internalist position in the traditional sense Korsgaard maintains (see my Preface endnotes).
I sympathize with interpreters who take practical reason to simply be theoretical inference about what one ought to do, and who leave the causal work to a distinct faculty of will or desire. This is the simplest view, and it accounts well enough for at least some of what Kant says about practical reason and will. To state the case for this view in more Kantian terms, Kant does explicitly identify practical reason as belonging to a faculty of practical cognition that makes objects actual. One might well think that practical cognition is just an odd name for the combination of will and reason, where reason supplies reasons for action in discursive form and will supplies the causality. For those who wish to pursue moral psychology more or less independently of metaphysics, Hill’s conception of the relation between practical reason and will may be adequate.

For those who wish to gain insight into how Kant attempts to solve the central problem of moral metaphysics, it is not. My task, unlike Hill’s, is to take an ambitious optimistic approach to Kant’s architectonic methodology for metaphysics in its historical context and use it to make sense of practical cognition (among other things). Kant says practical reason is the derivation of an action from a law, not the derivation of a reason for acting. Will is practical reason, Kant says, not a causal post-processor of reasons. My project is to vindicate the so-called dream.

To give an overview of where practical reason fits into the scholastic and common taxonomy, according to Kant every living thing has a faculty of desire. This is the very general scholastic name for the faculty to make things happen by means of representations. Unlike photometers, plants move in response to representations of light intensity. Animals behave according to representations of pleasure and pain. The difference between the kind of faculty of desire that humans have (Wille) and the kind of faculty of desire that animals have (Wilkür), is that the human faculty desire is a faculty of practical cognition. Practical cognition is the metaphysical name for the faculty that
we commonly call will; it is the faculty whereby rational beings like us make objects or ends actual.

While theoretical cognition is synthesized from intellect and sensibility, practical cognition is instead synthesized from intellect and feeling. (The animal faculty of desire has no rational constituent.) Practical reason is the intellectual aspect of practical cognition; it is literally the (non-inferential) derivation of an action from a law (objective ground) and a maxim (subjective ground), where maxim and law are constitutive grounds of the will (of the practical cognition). Deliberation, as we will see in chapter 7, is a *reflective* use of the intellect rather than a determinate use of theoretical reason as Hill assumes.

Since practical reason is the intellectual form of the will, it *is* the will in a scholastic sense. Consider Kant’s division of the faculties in his introduction to the *Critique of Judgment*. In order to explain the need for three critiques, Kant claims that there are three mutually irreducible “higher” faculties that have some claim to autonomy because they contain their own constitutive principles *a priori*.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>All [higher] faculties of the mind</th>
<th>Faculty of Cognition</th>
<th>A priori principles</th>
<th>Application to</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[Theoretical] cognition</td>
<td>Understanding</td>
<td>Lawfulness</td>
<td>Nature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feeling of pleasure</td>
<td>Judgment</td>
<td>Purposiveness</td>
<td>Art</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faculty of desire</td>
<td>Reason</td>
<td>Final end</td>
<td>Freedom</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

84 Respect, I argue, is the pure *a priori* form of desire, or more specifically of feeling, through which reason spontaneously materializes volition (see chapter 6). This a priori form is the form of the material constitution of the will. The matter of the will is the particular feeling generated by respect for law (or given through inclination).

85 The division of faculties here at KU 5:198 is somewhat misleading. This division maps the need for three critiques; it is not a map of “all” the faculties of mind as the first column title indicates (KU 5:167-70, 196 and KU 20:195ff, especially KU 20:206-7 and 245-246). Sensibility is absent from the table because it is a “lower” faculty. Feeling is present because teleological and aesthetic judgments have a claim to autonomy, but feeling has other roles in addition to those involved in these special kinds of judgment.
The faculties listed in the second column as faculties of cognition are the mutually irreducible “higher” faculties that are subject to critique because they have some claim to containing constitutive principles a priori (or perhaps merely regulative ones) for the faculties listed in the first column as “all” faculties of the mind.

The intellectual faculties of cognition listed do not, however, exhaust the faculties of mind for which they are constitutive. Theoretical cognition, for example, is constituted a priori by the categories of pure understanding, but sensibility with its pure a priori forms (space and time) is also an indispensably necessary material ground of theoretical cognition. Practical cognition, which is commonly called will and scholastically conceived as the kind of faculty of desire that rational animals have, is constituted a priori by reason (KU 5:220, Bix-x). Reason is what makes practical cognition a higher, autonomous faculty, but a faculty of feeling is nevertheless materially necessary.

The methodological question for ¶12 is whether Kant is in any position to claim that all and only rational determination is mediate legal determination, and whether this somehow implies that the will is nothing other than practical reason. The issue of mediation never arose in any obvious way in Groundwork I. The concept of law arose in the context of an analysis of duty (as the objective ground of respect in the necessitation of an action), but since Kant says we are to arrive at a concept of duty in this part of Groundwork II we cannot appeal to it on the basis of its role in duty. The order of explanation would beg the question.

We can obviously appeal to popular philosophy since it is the context of analysis, but it may help to first develop a better understanding of how Kant’s understanding of practical reason as constitutive of practical cognition could be an outgrowth from the
The general definition of reason as the faculty of mediate derivation is basic logic from Kant’s perspective – this is the scholastic syllogistic understanding of reason that appears in the Meier’s *Vernunftlehre* which Kant used as his logic textbook for decades (see BL 280ff). Inferences of the understanding are analytic, Kant says, because the conclusion is contained in the premise without need for any mediation, e.g. (See JL 115ff). In these cases, the conclusion is merely the premise in an altered form, e.g. a difference in quantification as in the cases of instantiation of a universal judgment or conversion. Inferences of reason, in contrast, are synthetic inferences for which a mediating concept is needed because the relation expressed between the relata in the conclusion is not contained in that of the (major) premise (JL 120ff). For example, *All A is B* cannot yield *All A is C* where $C \neq B$, unless the minor premise *All B is C* is added. In these cases, the conclusion contains matter that the major premise does not.  

Kant’s logic is restricted to inferences of reason, which involve only the logical ground-to-consequence relations, but in the beginning of the Transcendental Dialectic Kant says he plans to use the logical use of reason as a guide to identifying the other uses of reason. He says more specifically that “every syllogism is a form of derivation of a cognition from a principle” and that in its “real use” a principle of reason would be a synthetic a priori principle that prescribes a law to objects (A300/B357, A306/B362). Moreover, in the Transcendental Analytic Kant derives the category of causality and dependence from the hypothetical form of judgment (A76/B102ff). The interesting point is that Kant’s metaphysics concerns derivations more generally, among which he includes causal ground-to-consequence relations. Reason is the faculty of all such derivations.

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86 Hypothetical syllogisms therefore turn out to actually be inferences of understanding according to Kant even though they are traditionally classified as inferences of reason (JL 129).
So the question is really one of scope – other than inferences, what other kinds of derivation might there be?

The use of reason at issue in *Groundwork II* is practical reason, which Kant conceives as the prescriptive derivation of an action from law. An action, as opposed to a mere movement or behavior, is a cognitive activity, i.e. a kind of cognition, so it has an intellectual component. Since action obviously involves a ground-to-consequence dependence relation and reason is the faculty of all ground-to-consequence relations, the intellectual aspect of an action is at least in part rational.

The logical form of this derivation is just like the logical form of a mediate inference, even though the matter and the dependence relations differ. The premises of an inference are its logical grounds. As we will see in chapter 8, the grounds of an action are instead its constituents. Practical reason is the real constitution (constituting) of an action from multiple grounds (subjective and objective). As Kant sees it, to prescribe the moral law to an action is to derive the action from the law through a clear and distinct representation of that law (as represented in a maxim), where this representation generates moral feeling and thereby makes the subjective principle (maxim) subordinate to the objective principle (the law).

If Kant is entitled to maintain that logical dependence relations and real dependence relations are both species of ground-to-consequence relations, he may be entitled to maintain also that reason is the faculty of both and that reason constitutes the logical form of practical cognition. Kant’s claim that will is nothing other than practical reason ultimately depends on the equivalence of these dependence relations at a sufficiently high degree of abstraction. Since this is a matter of logic, albeit arguably transcendental logic, it is not entirely outside the scope of the analysis from popular
philosophy to metaphysics. However, since an arbitrary popular philosopher would not have been likely to agree, the success of the analysis cannot depend on this understanding of ground-to-consequence relations and reason in general.

Now that we have a better idea of the view Kant is trying to reach and its scholastic roots, we are better prepared to consider the popular analysis. We may take it as established in the first sentence that everything in nature works according to laws, including rational beings. The question now is how, according to popular philosophy, rational beings are governed by laws and what analysis of this popular understanding may reveal.

The paradigmatic case of our governance by law for popular philosophy is our governance by law in civil society. If it is possible for us to be law-abiding citizens, which was and still is a great popular concern, clearly the principles from which we can act include representations of law. (The kind of law is not at issue just here, only the way law determines or governs objects.) Thus it is clear that according to popular philosophy a rational being can act from a representation of law even if we set aside this aspect of the analysis in *Groundwork I*. Furthermore, this is a mediated legal determination. The law in this case does not govern or determine our actions directly as natural laws paradigmatically do for natural beings. It determines our action through a representation of it. We must know of a civil law in order to be properly said to obey it. There may be

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87 My aim, again, is to explain Kant’s method, not defend his metaphysical positions. I think Kant’s conception of reason übertaupt (in general or overall) as including both logical and real dependence relations makes the idea of will as practical reason intelligible, but I do not see how he can avoid reducing the first two categories of relation: It may well be objected that if Kant takes the dependence involved in subsistence-inherence relations to be categorically distinct from those of causality, then he is not entitled to equate logical and real dependence at any level of abstraction.

88 Though he does not use the example to quite the same effect, Kant mentions civil laws in a similar context in “On Reason in General” (A301/B358). Again, popular philosophers were likely to conceive all laws as given through God in some way. Civil laws are laws given via a monarch with divine right.
natural laws that determine us directly (physics) and there may be representations from which we can act that are not representations of law (inclinations), but it is also possible for us to act from a representation of law, and this is a mediated legal determination.

Consider another case. When we produce artifacts by design, the representations according to which we act must in some sense represent the natural laws that permit, restrict, and otherwise govern this production. We cannot build skyscrapers or play billiards or write poetry without taking advantage of physical laws. We cannot eat or speak or do anything (except think), without acting from at least an obscure “technical” representation of natural law. We need not conceive law clearly and distinctly when we act on such maxims – our maxims are typically rather concrete – but upon reflection and analysis Kant thinks representations of law must be discoverable within all our representations of ourselves as causes.

Suppose that this generalizes across volition: Each case of volition we may consider confirms the general principle we have been investigating. (Though Kant would deny the validity of this empirical induction, popular philosophers might well accept it.) If all determination is legal determination, if volition is determined, and if volition is action that must be directly from a representation rather than a law itself, then the relation between the governing laws and the action must be mediated by the representation that serves as principle or grounds the action. So far, then, i-iii should at least be plausible: Kant’s audience should agree that a rational being has the capacity to act in accordance with the representation of laws, that to act in accordance with the representation of laws is to act in accordance with principles, and to act in accordance with principles is to have a will (in the “higher” faculty of desire sense).

With regard to iv-v, consider that only an intelligent being can represent law at all, since a representation of law must be conceptual. This claim does not extend beyond
the scholastic tradition. In order to see why intelligence should be conceived more specifically as practical reason here, we must first identify what reason is, as opposed to intelligence more generally. Again, according to Kant, reason is most generally the capacity of mediate derivation\(^\text{89}\). Reason is the capacity to relate a ground to a consequence through a mediator (A303ff/B360ff). Paradigmatically this is the capacity to make mediate (logical) inferences, as in syllogisms, which all philosophers should accept (BL 282ff, JL 120ff). Kant thinks this is merely one application of reason, which his audience might well not accept. However, if Kant’s audience has agreed that volition has a mediated ground-to-consequence structure and they further agree that reason is the capacity to do just this sort of thing, Kant has some entitlement to claim that only\(^\text{90}\) a rational being could use a representation to derive an action mediately from a law.

The most controversial claim here, and perhaps in the *Groundwork*, is vi, that the will is nothing other than practical reason. If the analysis elaborated above is correct, what Kant is claiming is that upon analysis of a popular philosophy with which an arbitrary expert philosopher could agree, will is *structurally* nothing other than (impure) practical reason. This claim depends heavily on the claim that reason is required for the derivation of actions from laws. If we consider a more complete set of the kinds of rational volition widely accepted in popular philosophy (prudence, citizenship, authorship, design and production of artifacts, etc.), it seems fairly clear that each kind of activity is mediated by some representation. If all determination is legal determination, then each of these kinds of activity is a mediated legal determination. The kind of law

\(^{89}\) “[E]very syllogism is a form of derivation of a cognition from a principle” (A300/B357). In its real use a principle of reason would therefore be a synthetic a priori principle that prescribes a law to objects (A306/B362).

\(^{90}\) Capacities are functionally defined. If \(A\) and \(B\) are both capacities to do the same thing, \(A=B\).
may differ, as may the mediating representation and the specifics of the relation, but from
the perspective of the *structure* of activity, will and practical reason are one and the same:
They are both activities that have a ground-to-consequence structure, where the ground is
a representation serving as principle, the consequence is an action, and the law
determines the action mediately through the representation that grounds the action.

Supposing will and practical reason have an identical structure as I describe,
Kant’s claim might still seem too strong. The claim appears to *reduce* will *entirely* to
practical reason. Non-rational volition is arguably possible, and voluntary action could
arguably fail to be mediated by any conscious representation or even by any conceptual
representation. So suppose for the sake of argument that popular philosophers would not
assent to a complete reduction of will to practical reason based on the sorts of
considerations presented so far as an elaboration of the first sentences of ¶12.

This is not a problem for Kant. Kant is not claiming that will reduces to *pure*
practical reason. Practical reason in general includes prudence, artifact production, etc.
It is not limited to morally worthy actions. As explained above, reason is not the only
faculty involved in practical cognition; feeling is the material or lower faculty of practical
cognition that is clearly necessary for actions that are not from duty alone.

Kant’s particular agenda in the context of an *analytic* of reason is to give a *logical*
analysis of practical reason. He neither needs nor wants a strict identity between will and
practical reason that would imply that reason is both constitutive of and exhaustive of the
faculty of will. He wants instead to claim that will and practical reason are identical *with
respect to their logical structure*: Will and practical reason are both to be understood as
legal determination mediated by a representation. At this level of description, namely
logic, will is arguably nothing other than practical reason.
A popular philosopher might well agree with Kant that the logical structure of a capacity is what makes it what it is. Faculties are defined and individuated at least primarily if not entirely by what they do, i.e. their form, rather than what they use to do it, i.e. their material. For example, a statue of David is a statue of David in virtue of its form: It makes no difference whether it is made of copper or clay. Supposing Kant’s current interlocutor will agree to this functional or operational understanding of faculty identification, then insofar as willing is intellectual, the faculty of willing is reason in a relevant sense.

§4 The Division of Will into Holy and Necessitated Mediate Legal Determination

The remainder of ¶12 presents a division of mediated legal determination into two possible kinds. The first kind, which is not the human kind, is adequate and therefore infallible objective determination. The second kind of mediated legal determination is necessitation in the strict sense:

The primary distinction underlying the division here is the distinction between subjective and objective determination, which is also drawn from *Groundwork I*. This leads to a distinction between two kinds of will, *holy* and *necessitated*. This distinction is
important because, as we saw in *Groundwork I*, a morally good will must be absolutely, incomparably good in itself *even though* it is subject to influences that pose causal hindrances. A holy will is simply a will that is not at all subject to any such hindrances.\(^9^1\)

The first case Kant describes is the case of a holy will. We need this case primarily for contrast with the kind of will humans have, so a brief gloss should be adequate here. For a holy will, Kant says, whatever is objectively necessary *necessarily coincides* with what is subjectively necessary because the constitution of the subject in this case is such that *only* reason can influence the will. Reason and only reason is constitutive of a holy will according to Kant. There can be no contention between subjective and objective necessity. Since there can be no non-rational subjective influences on a holy will, whatever is objectively necessary must then be practically necessary as well, i.e. good (the good is the practically necessary according to scholastic tradition). This kind of will is thus a capacity to choose only the good. Determination must ultimately be complete, so reason must adequately and infallibly determine a holy will.

The second kind of will is a necessitated will. This is the kind of will humans have. In this case, reason solely by itself does not adequately determine the will because

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\(^9^1\) As it turns out, Kant does not think a holy will could be accurately described as *mediate* legal determination. The reason why Kant is entitled to this division of mediate legal determination into holy will and necessitation here, and only here, is that the popular context justifies it. Kant is elsewhere quite concerned to defeat design arguments for the existence of God, which assume or presuppose that God has a will like ours insofar as representations like plans and designs are used to produce or create things. This conception of holy will is widely assumed in popular philosophy and also held by some of Kant’s peers.

This point leads to an interpretive choice. The simplest interpretation is that there is a rather sharp distinction between holy will here and divine will elsewhere. A methodologically more interesting option is that Kant may be taking on popular assumptions merely for the sake of argument to show that even when one begins with these flawed popular notions one still arrives at the very concept of duty Kant does in *Groundwork I*. 
the will is subject to other influences, including at least inclinations and perhaps other kinds of non-rational subjective conditions. These influences are not necessarily in accord with the objective ones, so insofar as these possible influences do influence the will, pure reason fails to fully determine it. A necessitated will therefore does not reduce entirely to pure practical reason. Actions that are objectively practically necessary (good) are necessitated rather than necessary in this case, meaning that they are objectively necessary but subjectively only contingent. An action is subjectively contingent when the relation of the action to the subject is contingent, e.g. the subject might do otherwise than she ought, so what necessarily ought to happen might not actually happen.92

This introduction of necessitated will, I contend, is the point at which Kant has arrived at the concept of duty. He explains that necessitation is the determination of a will in conformity with objective laws despite subjective conditions that may be contrary (G 4:413). This is another description of the necessity of acting from respect for law, i.e. acting from duty (G 4:397, 400). A holy will is obviously pure a priori, since reason alone determines it, but a necessitated will must be rationally determined despite empirical influences.

§5  The Indispensability of Context

Why bother with popular philosophy at all? Why not merely continue with the Groundwork I analysis straight through the determination of moral content? The answer is that Kant really needs the resources of logic to continue the analysis into metaphysics.\(^v\)

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\(^{92}\) In contrast, the action is objectively necessary when the relation of the object (end) to the action is necessary. The necessity of this relation is at least arguably most clear in the case of an action that is constituted by respect for law.
Metaphysics will require a transcendental analytic of practical reason and this kind of analysis is logical. It would be an enormously long and tedious project to generate scholastic logic from an analysis of common understanding. Kant may even think that we cannot generate logic from common understanding (JL 19). It would at least be a waste of time from Kant’s perspective because there is no need to establish logic here, only a need to access it. Popular philosophy has the advantage of overtly containing the logical resources Kant needs to continue the analysis. The hitch is that popular philosophy is riddled with error, not only the failure to distinguish between empirical and a priori but other sorts of error as well, and this error must not be allowed to creep into the analysis. Here, then, is the trick. If Kant can switch contexts and thereby bring in scholastic logic, then quickly eliminate all the error by reaching the very concept of duty already established by the common context, he effectively adds all of logic to his resources without losing ground or wasting effort.  

As a corollary, Kant need not himself take the analysis of practical reason in ¶12 to be correct. Kant’s context here demands that his peers set aside their own metaphysical preconceptions and commitments, but Kant must do so as well. Kant is entitled to assume here that *Groundwork I* is correct. He is also entitled to some assumptions from the first *Critique*, like the assumption that reason is a capacity for mediate derivation. Most interestingly, though, Kant is entitled and even required to

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93 This trick is very much akin to a mathematical method of problem-solving using transformations like change of base. The method of transformation is paradigmatically used when 1) a problem is very difficult to solve within the system in which it first presents and the difficulty is identifiable on the basis of known properties of the problem and its system, 2) there is a second system in which the problem type is relatively easy to solve, and 3) there is a (perhaps reversible) transformation available from the first system to the second. Formulating a principle without the benefit of the logical forms of judgment is a very difficult problem. The transformation of context from common to philosophic allows the formulation to take place in a context in which the problem is comparatively quite easy to solve.
employ divisions that he takes to be incorrect without thereby being intellectually dishonest or disingenuous.

For example, the most obvious flaw in the analysis here is that Kant does not in fact think a holy will could be a faculty of mediate legal determination. For the purposes of this analysis, though, he has no choice but to place holy will under mediate legal determination because this conception of divine will is required by design arguments for the existence of God, which he took to be particularly well-entrenched in popular philosophy. If God created the world according to designs or plans, then some representation of this sort must stand between the objective ground(s) of divine will and its effect(s). If the assumption that a holy will is mediated seems innocuous or redeemable, consider that according to this popular analysis both rationality and holy will belong to nature. This is clearly incorrect and it is very difficult to reasonably interpret §12 in a way that eliminates this error.

If all Kant really wants to do here is continue the *Groundwork I* analysis from precisely where he left off, with only the qualification being that he may now help himself to the resources of logic, he need not avoid or point out flaws in the popular analysis, or indicate what a correct analysis of practical reason would look like. He need not even take this analysis to be especially privileged within popular philosophy. Only logic is to be retained from the popular context once Kant has arrived at metaphysics, (only its logic is assuredly pure a priori). Since any analysis of practical reason that begins from popular philosophy must be assumed to be flawed, which flaws appear here is somewhat beside the point. The particular conceptual spheres chosen and

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94 A correct metaphysical analysis of practical reason should begin by dividing reality rather than nature. This is the kind of analysis of legal determination Kant gives in his Prefaces. Nature is very well-entrenched in popular philosophy as a realm of legal determination, but reality was far more contentious in part due to Cartesian-inspired trends and responses to them.
the divisions made in ¶12 need only be a) well-entrenched in popular philosophy, b) unexceptionable to Kant’s peers, or c) already established in *Groundwork I*. As a sort of anecdotal confirmation of the strategy I am attributing to Kant, given that everything from this analysis except logic and the concept of duty will be discarded, the popular analysis ought to be as brief as possible, which it certainly is.

Suppose that by the end of ¶12 Kant has arrived at the very concept of duty with which he left off in *Groundwork I*, but now he is entitled to make use of logical conceptual spheres and their divisions which were not readily available in the common context. If we still want to understand how action from duty is possible, how it is possible to act *solely* from respect for law, we will need a *transcendental* analytic. In order to determine the content of moral science, Kant must further investigate the manner of objective determination for this peculiarly necessitated sort of will. Most specifically, Kant will need to make distinct a pure a priori representation of law that could serve as the objective ground or the objective aspect of the maxim. The next chapter will take up this issue of how the relation between law and action is mediated, the logical form of the mediator, and why the analysis of practical reason in ¶13-28 directed at these issues must be at least the initial stage of a transcendental analytic.

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1 The ontological and epistemic status of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) was and still is controversial. According to Kant PSR is a *logical* principle that is canon for metaphysics and physics. PSR is “the criterion of *external* logical truth or of accessibility to reason (*rationabilität*)” “through which” the “logical actuality” of a cognition is determined (JL 51). In other words, PSR requires that cognition have grounds and not have false consequences. This makes cognition accessible to reason, which is the faculty of inference or derivation. If not for PSR, there might be entirely independent logically possible cognitions upon which no other cognitions depend in any way. This would be unwelcome to a Leibnizean-Wolffian philosophers (and Kant) who presume or argue that the universe, world or reality must be connected or well-ordered. The application of PSR to metaphysics and physics depends on Kant’s position that ground-to-consequence relations may be *real, causal* relations rather than merely logical dependence relations.
Though we now make a sharp distinction between the legality of civil laws and the legality of physical laws, the common distinction was not at all sharp. Physical laws were commonly considered to be God’s laws and physical legalities were not radically different from moral or civil legalities. It would have been natural to think, say, that physical laws are given through God’s understanding, moral laws are given through God’s will, and civil laws are given by God through the divine right of a monarch. The point is that all laws were thought to be metaphysically comparable because they belong to a single conceptual sphere as being ultimately given through God in some way. Kant rejects this particular conceptual sphere because it is speculative and requires that we cognize particular things about God, but he would not reject the idea that there is a commonality to our conception of law that is applicable in all three cases. Legal determination can be ambiguous between the three. In *Groundwork II* Kant is obviously concerned with the moral determination of what ought to happen.

The general definition of reason as the faculty of mediate derivation is basic logic from Kant’s perspective – this is the scholastic syllogistic understanding of reason that appears in the Meier’s *Vernunftlehre* that Kant used as his logic textbook (see BL 280ff). Inferences of the understanding are analytic. Kant says, because the conclusion is contained in the premise without need for any mediation, e.g. (See JL 115ff). In these cases, the conclusion is merely the premise in an altered form, e.g. a difference in quantification as in the cases of instantiation of a universal judgment or a conversion. Inferences of reason, in contrast, are synthetic inferences for which a mediating concept is needed because the relation expressed between the relata in the conclusion is not contained in that of the (major) premise (JL 120ff). For example, *All A is B* cannot yield *All A is C* where *C ≠ B*, unless the minor premise *All B is C* is added. In these cases, the conclusion contains matter that the major premise does not. Hypothetical syllogisms therefore turn out to actually be inferences of understanding according to Kant even though they are traditionally classified as inferences of reason (JL 129).

Kant’s logic is restricted to inferences of reason, which involve only the logical ground-to-consequence relations, but in the beginning of the “Transcendental Dialectic” Kant says he plans to use the logical use of reason as a guide to identifying the other uses of reason. He says that “every syllogism is a form of derivation of a cognition from a principle” and that in its real use a principle of reason would be a synthetic a priori principle that prescribes a law to objects (A300/B357, A306/B362). Kant’s metaphysics concerns derivations more generally, then, among which he includes causal ground-to-consequence relations.

Practical reason is the prescriptive derivation of an action from law. An action is a cognitive activity, i.e. a kind of cognition. To prescribe the moral law to an action is to derive the action from the law through a clear and distinct representation of that law, where this representation generates moral feeling and thereby makes the subjective principle subordinate to the objective principle (the law). As we will see in chapter 8, this kind of derivation is the real constitution (constituting) of an action from multiple grounds (subjective and objective).

My aim, again, is to explain Kant’s method, not defend his metaphysical positions. If Kant is entitled to maintain that logical dependence relations and real dependence relations are both species of ground-to-consequence relations, he may be entitled to maintain also that reason is the faculty of both. Kant’s claim that will is nothing other than practical reason ultimately depends on the equivalence of all these dependence relations at a sufficiently high degree of abstraction. I think Kant’s conception of reason überhaupt as including both logical and real dependence relations makes the idea of will as practical reason intelligible, but I do not see how he can avoid reducing the first two categories of relation: It may well be objected that if Kant takes the dependence involved in subsistence-inherence relations to be categorically distinct from those of causality, then he is not entitled to equate logical and real dependence at any level of abstraction.

Hill is unduly pessimistic about architectonic methodological projects like mine: “Only dreamers could imagine that Kant’s writings on ethics are like the pieces of a perfectly designed and flawless jigsaw puzzle, merely waiting for devoted and meticulous scholars to put them together” (Hill 1992, 3). It is a
“central idea” of Hill’s interpretation of the *Groundwork* that Kant’s arguments and concerns are not metaphysical, and he indicates that his own view may yet be “disappointingly abstract” and formal (*ibid.*, 12, 143). If I am a dreamer, I say Hill is an apologetic defeatist. Views like Hill’s force us to take many of Kant’s statements as metaphorical, figurative, analogical, overstated, or misleading (see Hill 1992, 3-4, 140). Kant says he is doing metaphysics and not psychology.

\(^{*}\) Kant probably also has an eye to “external extension”, which is a “truly popular perfection” that “can provide a proof of complete insight into a thing” (JL 47-48). However, external extension cannot be Kant’s immediate concern because this perfection can only be reached by descent to the popular from a scholastically correct and technical perfection. Popular philosophy is a starting point in *Groundwork II* that is not well connected to the endpoint of *Groundwork I*. 

I argued in the last chapter that ¶12 of Groundwork II is a general analytic of practical reason with a very specific purpose. The concept of duty with which Groundwork I ends is still in need of further analysis, but the kind of analysis now required is specifically logical, and common understanding does not overtly contain the logical resources Kant needs to continue the analysis into metaphysics. By changing the context to popular philosophy Kant introduces scholastic logic, but also a great deal of error. By quickly analyzing practical reason to reach precisely the point where he left off Groundwork I, at the concept of duty, Kant positions himself to enter metaphysics with just the resources he wants. He retains a “healthy” concept of duty supported by a correct analysis in Groundwork I as well as the “pure a priori” part of popular philosophy, namely scholastic logic, while he purges the remainder of popular philosophy and all its error.

In this chapter I will argue that ¶13-28 is the beginnings of a transcendental analytic of practical reason. There are two dimensions to the argument. The most straightforward dimension of the argument will show that the marks Kant considers and attributes in this part of Groundwork II specifically concern the logical form of the objective principle of volition. The second dimension of the argument concerns the fundamental problem of cognitive synthesis that a transcendental analytic must aim to solve.

As a preliminary argument that ¶13-28 must be the Groundwork of a transcendental analytic, Kant argued in ¶1-10 that moral metaphysics must be entirely a priori and then says in ¶11 that he will now be analyzing practical reason. This shows that what follows beginning in ¶12 should be an analytic of practical reason. As I explained in the last chapter, ¶12 is an analytic, but not a specifically transcendental one.
So the transcendental analytic in *Groundwork II* may begin in ¶13.\(^95\) As I will argue in this chapter, the marks Kant considers in ¶13-28 are primarily logical forms of judgment and other marks that belong to logic or transcendental logic (e.g. imperative, hypothetical, categorical, analytic,\(^96\) synthetic). This is prima facie evidence that Kant is involved in a transcendental analytic, or at least that the context is oriented to providing one. The confirmation comes in ¶28, when Kant reintroduces the fundamental problem of synthetic a priori cognition in a newly practical guise, as the problem of how synthetic a priori practical cognition is possible (or how a categorical imperative is possible), and he says that insight is no less difficult for practice than for theory (G 4:420). This is compelling evidence that the kind of analysis Kant has been giving, at least once he nears ¶28, is a transcendental analytic of practical reason.

In the course of the argument I hope to not only show that ¶13-28 is in fact the beginnings of transcendental analytic, but more importantly I hope to explain why it matters.

§1 The Need for a Transcendental Analytic of Practical Reason

As we have seen in the last chapter, a general analytic is the analysis of an intellectual faculty, especially an *a priori* one, and perhaps with particular attention to one or more aspects of the faculty, e.g. purification. A transcendental analytic is far more specific. As Kant describes it in the first *Critique*, a transcendental analytic is part of a

\(^{95}\) Moreover, Kant claims in the Preface to the *Groundwork* that he will seek and establish the supreme principle of morality. In the first *Critique*, supreme principles appear in the Analytic of Principles, which occurs after an Analytic of Concepts. If Kant follows the same order of presentation here, as we might prima facie expect, there should be something like an analytic of concepts leading up to an analytic of principles in which he presents the supreme principle of morality.

\(^{96}\) The noun “analytic” refers to a kind of analysis; the adjective “analytic” refers to a logical distinction between analytic and synthetic representations (see §4).
transcendental logic. It is an analysis of the pure a priori use of the intellect or the understanding broadly construed (A64/B89ff). Unlike general logic, transcendental logic does not abstract \textit{entirely} from all consideration of objects, but instead is restricted to a “particular use” of the intellect that Kant calls transcendental cognition. Transcendental cognition is cognition

\textit{by means of which we cognize that and how certain representations (intuitions or concepts) are applied \textit{entirely} a priori, or are \textit{possible} (i.e., the possibility of cognition or its use a priori)…}\textit{[e.g.] neither space nor any geometrical determination of it a priori is a transcendental representation, but only the cognition that these representations are not of empirical origin at all [i.e. that they are pure a priori] \textit{and the possibility that they can nevertheless be related a priori to objects of experience} can be called transcendental. (A56/B80-81 emphasis mine)}

As the above quote indicates, transcendental cognition is not merely a pure \textit{a priori} cognition. It is also specifically concerned with the possibility of “cognizing objects \textit{in general}”, or with “our \textit{manner} of cognition of objects” entirely a priori \textit{even though} these objects belong to experience (A11-12, B25, A90/B120).

Now the faculty of cognition is not precisely reason. Cognition arises only from combination of (at least) two faculties, one of which must be an intellectual faculty. As I mentioned in the last chapter, theoretical cognition can only arise through the synthesis of understanding and sensibility, while practical cognition can only arise through the synthesis of reason and feeling. To recap Kant’s division of the faculties\textsuperscript{97}, every living thing has a faculty of desire according to both Kant and the scholars. According to Kant the \textit{faculty of desire} is a being’s faculty to be by means of its representations the cause of the reality of the objects of these representations. A plant differs from a photometer on this view because the leaves of a plant follow the sun by representing its light, while the

\textsuperscript{97} See Bix-x; KpV 5:8n, 9n\textsuperscript{3}, 172; and DR 6:211-214. See also G 4:412, 413n\textsuperscript{5}, 420, 444, 389; DV 6:407, and KpV 5:198.
photometer’s indicator does not move by means of a representation. The \textit{animal} faculty of desire, \textit{Willkür} or \textit{arbitrium brutum}, does not require intellect and effectively reduces to feeling, which is the susceptibility to representations of pleasure and displeasure, and impulses of sensibility. The specific relation between the faculties of sensibility, feeling and pleasure is unclear, but the general idea is adequate here.

The \textit{human} faculty of desire, \textit{Wille}, is the faculty of \textit{practical cognition}. Reason and the faculty of feeling, and perhaps also sensibility, are constitutive of this kind of will. Reason is the formal, objective constituent of the will. The faculty of feeling (whose a priori form I argue is respect) is the material, subjective constituent. Sensibility may be a third constituent or feeling may reduce to sensibility, but I will not address the issue directly (see A534/B562, MM 211n*). In the interest of clarity and simplicity, I will use the following incomplete division:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theoretical Cognition</th>
<th>Practical Cognition (Human Desire, Wille)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Formal Constituent:</td>
<td>Understanding categories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material:</td>
<td>Sensibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>\textit{space/time}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal Constituent:</td>
<td>(practical) Reason</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material:</td>
<td>Feeling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>\textit{respect}</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

So the general division of faculties that is useful in the context of cognition is the division into sensibility, intellect, and feeling. Intellect resolves into specific functions, i.e. conceiving, judging, reasoning.\textsuperscript{98} Reason is the highest function of intellect in that reasoning presupposes the other specific capacities that belong to intellect. For example, insofar as reason is a capacity for mediate inference it presupposes the possibility of

\textsuperscript{98} It is not entirely clear how Kant divides the intellect into specific functions. For example he notoriously slides between a use of “understanding” as the entire intellect and a more specific use of “understanding”. I will assume only the simplest logical division, with a three-level hierarchy from derivations (inferences and willings) down to their relata (propositions, grounds, principles) and down again to their relata (concepts, intuitions, ideas).
judgment, which in turn presupposes conception: One cannot infer without a premise, which is a judgment, and one cannot judge without subjects and predicates, which are concepts. Since a complete analysis of reason would unavoidably involve the analysis of all the intellectual functions it presupposes or comprehends, a transcendental analytic turns out to be primarily an analysis of reason with particular attention to the possibility of its transcendental use.

In order to explain how a synthesis of cognition is possible a priori, e.g. the synthesis of sensibility and understanding, Kant takes it to be necessary to analyze each faculty involved and precisely specify the pure a priori representation each faculty contributes to the synthesis, e.g. spatiotemporal form for sensibility and the categories of understanding for the intellect. In other words, Kant must at least specify the relata. The pure a priori form of intuition, which is the contribution of sensibility to the synthesis, is addressed in the Transcendental Aesthetic. The pure concepts of understanding, or categories, are identified as the intellectual contribution to the relata of a priori synthesis in the first part of the Transcendental Analytic, the Analytic of Concepts. It is not enough, however, to merely present the relata. Kant must also show how these entirely heterogeneous relata may be synthesized into a cognition according to a principle. In other words, Kant must also specify the relation between the proposed relata in a way that attends to its origin or genesis. This takes place in the second part of the Transcendental Analytic called the Analytic of Principles.

Because a transcendental analytic must attend not only to the elements of pure understanding that serve as relata in the a priori synthesis of cognition but also to their relation to the elements contributed by sensibility or desire, a transcendental analytic must be an analysis of the intellect, up to and to some extent including its interaction with sensibility and desire. A transcendental analytic must attend to the boundaries and
interactions between faculties instead of considering the intellect entirely apart from these relations (and as we will see this requires critique).

As we will see in §6, the reason why Kant finds it necessary to analyze the faculty of reason in the first Critique is that the problem of a priori synthesis arises from a tension between the a priori and the empirical. Metaphysically this tension presents as a fundamental heterogeneity of the relata (pure concepts and intuition) that must ultimately be synthesized to produce cognition. Kant treats this problem at length in the first Critique, but the scope of his investigation there is limited to synthetic a priori theoretical cognition of given objects.

The fundamental problem of synthesis for practical cognition arises instead from a tension between the contributions of feeling and reason. Willing is a cognitive activity according to Kant; it belongs to both feeling and intellect. Since there is a prima facie cognitive tension arising from how precisely intellect (reason) and feeling can work together to produce volitional cognition, especially how this is possible entirely a priori, there is a prima facie philosophical need for critical analyses of these two contributing faculties, i.e. a transcendental analytic of practical reason combined with a transcendental teleology of desire. Given that the solution Kant ultimately proposes concerns conditions of the very possibility of objective cognition and this is clearly an issue that is

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99 Robert Benton helpfully introduced this problem with respect to the second Critique, focusing on the special relevance of the categories of modality (Benton 1980; see also Anderson-Gold 1985). I argue that Kant’s concern with the central problem of moral metaphysics influences his strategy of argument even in the Groundwork, focusing on the special relevance of the quantitative categories of understanding.

100 A transcendental aesthetic is the analysis of the faculty of sensibility with respect to the possibility of transcendental cognition. Though Kant does not name it so, the parallel analysis of desire might most aptly be named a transcendental teleology. Kant’s Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment includes an analysis of purposiveness, and as we will see in chapter 8, intentional purposiveness is a conception of the faculty of desire.
metaphysically prior to the determination of objects more generally, Kant must raise the issue in *Groundwork II*.

Given the philosophical importance of the fundamental problem of cognitive synthesis and the fact that the only solution Kant has provided so far (in the first *Critique*) works only for theoretical cognition of objects given through experience, one might expect Kant to pursue the issue in ¶28ff. We might expect Kant to forge ahead and detail the problem involved in synthetic a priori practical cognition of produced objects, then explain how the problem is to be solved. Instead Kant sets the problem aside, saying at the end of *Groundwork II* that he will provide the “main features” of the solution in *Groundwork III* (G 4:445). This seems perverse, but Kant has good reason. Though Kant must raise the issue of the a priori synthesis of cognition in *Groundwork II*, he need not resolve it entirely. Unlike the *Groundwork*, the first *Critique* was specifically a critique of pure reason. It was intended to be a virtually exhaustive, systematic treatment of the faculty of reason: “In this business I have made comprehensiveness my chief aim in view, and I make bold to say that there cannot be a single metaphysical problem that has not been solved here, or at least to the solution of which the key has not been provided” (Axiii).

The *Groundwork of a Metaphysics of Morals* is not a *Critique of Pure Practical Reason*. It is not required to be exhaustive and it need not match the scale of detail and subtlety Kant gives in the first *Critique*. *Critique* is the final step of establishing science. *Groundwork II* concerns only the second step. Since the problem of synthesis concerns determination, and the second step of establishing a science does as well, it seems incumbent upon Kant to mention the problem. Yet since the problem cannot be solved
without the full critique, it is not unreasonable for Kant to first address the simpler and more straightforward problems concerning the determination of moral content. If we grant that it is reasonable for Kant to follow his procedure to establish moral metaphysics as a science, then it is appropriate for Kant to hold a place for this problem. The fundamental problem of the possibility of a priori cognitive synthesis is philosophically prior to the possibility of determining the special content of morality, but it need not be prior in presentation. The details of its solution can be tabled so long as the main components are available in the *Groundwork*.

Given that my agenda in this dissertation is to explain the method and structure of the *Groundwork*, it might seem most appropriate for me to table this problem as well. After all, if Kant can skip this problem even though it is relevant to determination, then perhaps it really need not be addressed. Unfortunately, tabling the issue creates much more trouble than it avoids. This is in part because ¶13-28 of *Groundwork II* constitute a transcendental analytic, but this is not all. Because the issue of synthesis is philosophically prior to the issues on Kant’s explicit agenda for *Groundwork II*, Kant’s explanation of the problem and its solution in the first *Critique* are quite enlightening in other ways.

For example, in ¶12 *necessitation* was characterized as “conformity with objective laws”. According to *Groundwork I*, this is necessitation from respect for law: Respect is “pure conformity” to law. But Kant also characterizes respect, in the same part of the text, as a special kind of *feeling* and the principle of volition in which it appears is a maxim, which is a *subjective* principle of volition. Since *Groundwork I*

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101 I will argue in this chapter that Kant needs a mediator and something like a schema. Since Kant actually introduces a new table of categories in his *Critique of Practical Reason*, it should be evident from this broader context that Kant has reason to wait.
concerned the analysis of common cognition, it would have been out of order to appeal to Kant’s specifically philosophical problems and solutions to justify these very odd and prima facie incompatible characterizations of respect. Now that the common analysis is finished and we have arrived in explicitly metaphysical territory that is concerned with the possibility of synthetic a priori practical cognition, Kant’s philosophical treatment of this problem in the first Critique can be used to show that respect is our common understanding of the mediator of a priori cognitive synthesis for practice, or at least a precursor of this mediator. 102 This idea will be considered in more detail later in this chapter and the next.

The methodological point I want to make here is that by using this analysis in Groundwork II as a guide to the most important features of practical reason, we can use Kant’s more detailed treatment of synthetic a priori theoretical cognition in the first Critique to provide critical insight into not only ¶13-28, but also into the logical structure of volition, the metaphysics of maxims, respect, and the procedural character of the moral law. Since Kant explains very little of his theory of volition, there has understandably been a great deal of confusion and controversy concerning what a maxim is, how willing works, what respect is, and what it is to act as if the maxim of one’s action were to become a universal law. 103 Some of this, perhaps much of it, can be resolved by understanding the practical transcendental analytic as an analysis of volition.

102 While spatiotemporal form is the pure a priori constitutive form of intuition, respect must instead be the pure a priori regulative form of feeling because respect is allegedly rational.

103 See Frierson 2006 for a very recent example.
As a preview of the analysis in ¶13ff, the chart below highlights the most obviously logical marks in the structure of the practical transcendental analytic.

Before turning to the actual analysis, I should emphasize that this is only the *Groundwork* of a transcendental analytic. The Transcendental Analytic of the first *Critique* contained both an Analytic of Concepts and an Analytic of Principles. The analytic in ¶13-28 concerns only the former, and even this is not complete.\(^{iii}\) According to Kant’s methods, the full analysis of practical reason should be completed in the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

§2  *Imperative* as a “grammatical” Logical Form

After the very dense general analytic in ¶12, ending with necessitation, Kant defines a *command* in ¶13 as the representation of an *objective* principle *insofar as it is*
necessitating for a will (G 4:413). This should not be terribly mysterious. An imperative, Kant says also in ¶13, is the formula of such a command:

The representation of an objective principle [of volition], insofar as it necessitating for a will, is called a command (of reason), and the formula of the command is called an imperative. (G 4:413).

This is not quite so clear. A formula is a precise, determinate universal proposition (VL 867). In other words, formulas are universally quantified, philosophically clear and distinct representations that have an articulated structure like a definition. Examples of formulas include common proverbs, theological dicta, canons of science, and the formulas of the moral law in *Groundwork II*.  

Since precision admits of degrees and representations can be quite complex, there can be many formulas of the same proposition or command, differing with regard to which aspects or dimensions of the proposition are most precisely expressed. Reformulations of a command or proposition can consequently be used to highlight particular features that are of interest or at issue. For example, the familiar formula \( F=ma \), which is the first formula of the physical law of mechanical force, can be reformulated as \( a=F/m \). This reformulation follows trivially using basic algebra, but it differs from the original by making the concept of acceleration most distinct rather than the concept of force. It should be kept in mind, though, that not all reformulations are as trivial to make as this one.

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104 Kant also describes a formula as an expression of law, but the definition above is the most general and independent of context.

105 Because they are precisely articulated, canonic scientific formulas “serve to make it possible to expound the thing more easily” (VL 867). As we will see, the various formulas of the moral law in *Groundwork II* differ with respect to which aspects of the object they most precisely determine.
In Kant’s early 1770’s lectures on logic (Blomberg lectures), he contrasts two kinds of practical judgment, one expressing a possibly (hypothetically) necessary action, and the other an imperative:

A judgment is expressed practically if it enunciates a *possibly necessary* action. This probably seems contradictory, that something is possibly necessary. But here it is completely correct, for the action is always necessary to be sure, namely, if I want to bring the thing about[,] but the case is not necessary, but merely possible. It is very good that one does not posit the *imperativum* with this kind, but instead only the *infinitivum*, and that one expresses them with *if*, etc. (BL 278 emphasis mine)

The kind of practical judgment that expresses a possibly necessary action, is what Kant calls a hypothetical imperative in the *Groundwork*, though he resists calling them imperatives here. The important point for the time being is that the distinction between a practical judgment and its implied alternative is logical. The distinction appears just after Kant has gone through the logical forms of judgment, first quality, then quantity, mode, and relation. This context suggests that imperative is a logical form of judgment, though not one of the ancestral twelve.\[106\]

Later in Kant’s career he lectures that there are two kinds of practical propositions (Vienna and Jäsche logic lectures). Imperatives are the paradigmatic practical propositions (JL 86). These command what ought to happen, as opposed to theoretical propositions which say only how a thing is (VL 900-1). Every proposition that expresses a possible free action whereby an end is to be made real is an imperative, Kant says, and these may be absolutely practical (JL 86-87, JL 110). There are also practical propositions that we might ironically call theoretically practical propositions. These are

\[106\] *Imperative* might instead be something like a propositional attitude, but this would still make it a logical mark according to Kant. The degrees of holding to be true - opinion, belief, and knowledge - are what we now call propositional attitudes and these belong to logic according to Kant. Since there is a syntactic difference between imperatives and theoretical propositions, it seems better to think of *imperative* as a logical form.
propositions that contain the grounds for possible imperatives, but which do not themselves command what ought to happen, i.e., theoretical propositions from which imperatives follow, like the theoretical proposition that God exists. These are opposed to speculative propositions that provide no grounds for an imperative.

Kant’s mention of imperatives in the first Critique is brief, but consistent with what he says in his logic lectures. He says we propose imperatives as rules to our powers of execution in everything practical (A547/B575). Imperatives are the formulas of *oughts*, which express the necessity of a possible action, the ground of which is a concept (A547-8/B575-6, See also A811/B839ff).

There are two points to take from this now. First, Kant thinks his claim in *Groundwork II* that the *formula* of a practical command is an *imperative* is elementary logic. The necessitation involved in the moral command is philosophically difficult, but the imperative form is comparatively trivial. Second, the contrast classes are theoretical propositions that say how a thing is, in contrast to practical propositions that say what ought to be. These two points indicate that *imperative* form is simply the familiar “grammatical” logical form with which we are all familiar. There are three obvious divisions of this grammatical conceptual sphere: interrogative, statement, and imperative. When written, *statements* end with periods, e.g. “You ought to take out the trash.” or “You seem insincere.” *Interrogatives* end with question marks, e.g. “Oughtn’t you take out the trash?” or “Do you mean it?”. *Imperative* form is the form of command. These end with an exclamation mark, e.g. “Take out the trash!” or “Act like you mean it!”. What Kant claims here is merely that volitional grounds must have an *imperative*

107 Maxims are volitional grounds of this sort, specifically subjective grounds of volition. The distinction between objective and subjective ground would complicate things unnecessarily here. A maxim has a categorically imperative universal form if its form is “Always do X!” and its consequences are not contradictory.
form. Given the absurdity of an interrogative principle of volition, it need not be considered. An objective principle of volition is not very plausibly a statement either. Statements convey information or inform. Imperatives command. If we have already agreed that the principle of volition must necessitate and that this requires that it command, then it seems fairly obvious that the objective principle of volition must have the logical form of an imperative.

Since Kant explicitly calls the synthetic a priori practical imperative a “proposition”, we may infer that imperatives and the other grammatical forms of propositions are convertible as shown in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Imperative Form</th>
<th>Statement Form</th>
<th>Interrogative Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Do E!</td>
<td>F is G.</td>
<td>Is F G?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If E do A!</td>
<td>If P then Q.</td>
<td>If P then Q?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do Either A or B!</td>
<td>Either P or Q.</td>
<td>P or Q?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The important point for *Groundwork II* is that when Kant claims the objective principle of volition must be imperative, he is attributing a logical mark to the principle and thereby making the somewhat indistinct notion of necessitation involved in acting from duty *logically* more precise.

By moving from necessitation to command (as representation of necessitation) and then from command to imperative (as formula of this representation) Kant explicitly introduces a concern with the logical structure of this kind of necessitation, i.e. the transcendental logical structure of volitional necessitation. A formula must have the

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108 As we will see in chapter 7, this is not precisely the imperative form Kant needs for morality. Kant argues that it is not the production of a consequence that makes an action moral. An action from duty, he claims, must have moral worth even if by some misfortune it utterly fails to produce the intended consequences. The form “Do E!” prima facie implies that the value of the action lies in the production of the effect or that it is the *accomplishment* that is commanded. Since it is really a manner of acting that is morally required, “Act thusly!” or “Act X-ly” is a more accurate presentation of the imperative moral form. This is why the moral law turns out to have a form like “Always act such that…” rather than “Always do …”.


logical form of a proposition. This means that not only must it have the form of a statement, imperative, or interrogative but also that it is subject to categorization according to the four elemental dimensions of logical form: quantity, quality, relation, and modality. In the chart above for example, problematic, assertoric, and apodictic are the three moments of modality that represent possibility, existence, and necessity respectively. These are modal forms, which are a specific kind of logical form. When Kant introduces this trio of concepts, he introduces a divided conceptual sphere, modality, that pertains to the imperative analysandum. By eliminating two of the three possibilities, according to the method of analysis Kant is thereby able to ascertain the modality of the imperative, and this makes the imperative logically more distinct.

Though it is somewhat less obvious, the introduction of hypothetical and categorical introduces the relational dimension of the logical form of the imperative. (Since it would be fairly obviously absurd to think the moral imperative could be disjunctive, Kant doesn’t bother to mention it.) This claim that “categorical” vs. “hypothetical” concerns the logical form of relation is fairly contentious and there are textual grounds for dispute. As a very preliminary defense, it should be relatively uncontroversial that the analysis of an intellectual faculty ought to involve the logical form of the representations it involves. Since categorical and hypothetical are logical forms of relation according to the first Critique, it is at least likely that these logical forms are what Kant has in mind here in Groundwork II. The alternatives will be considered in more detail in §3.

The claim I want to make for the moment is more general. The fact that Kant says he is giving an analysis of the faculty of practical reason in Groundwork II, combined with the fact that this analysis leads to the explicit identification of the problem of how synthetic a priori practical propositions are possible, together provide compelling
evidence that the kind of marks initially at issue are concepts that belong to logic. Since this is contentious, a closer look at the analysis is in order.

§3 The Categorical

The idea of imperative necessitation has not been especially contentious, but Kant’s identification of the moral law as a categorical imperative has been widely misconstrued. The text does not entirely discourage this. Rather than clearly defining what he means by “categorical” in this context, Kant merely contrasts the idea of a categorical imperative with that of a hypothetical imperative. He says that a hypothetical imperative commands only on condition of a given end, clearly implying that categorical imperatives command unconditionally. He also says that the necessitation of a hypothetical imperative is analytic, while the necessitation of a categorical imperative must be synthetic. Were there nothing else to go on, it would be tempting and perhaps unavoidable to assume that we are to reduce the significance of the categorical mark of the objective principle of volition entirely to Kant’s claims that such an imperative is unconditional and/or synthetic.

If we appeal to the first Critique for help without fully understanding the system we might prima facie assume that “categorical” means “concerning the categories”, where the categories are the scholastically derived pure concepts of understanding (A70/B95). Since these categories are maximally general concepts from which the term “category mistake” derives, we might then think “categorical” means “maximally general” or “across the board”, or “unlimited”. It is particularly tempting to construe “categorical” to mean “unlimited” given Kant’s claim in Groundwork II that a categorical imperative is unconditional, especially considering the initial analysis of a will that is good without qualification or condition.
On the surface, the problem with interpreting categorical imperatives this way is that it adds nothing to our understanding of *Groundwork II*. If Kant says a categorical imperative is unconditioned, the fact that a condition is a limitation gives us no additional insight. If Kant says the moral law is universal, then it is no help to point out that a universal is maximally general. The deeper problem is that the particular categories Kant identifies in the first *Critique*, the relations he specifies between them, and the table of the logical forms of judgment from which he derives them pose some rather inconvenient problems. Since these complications are relevant to the correct interpretation of “categorical” as a *logical form of relation* pertaining to the imperative insofar as it is a *proposition*, a brief summary of this aspect of the Transcendental Analytic in first *Critique* is helpful.

As part of his *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant finds it incumbent upon him to articulate the elements of reason, especially those elements belonging to pure reason. The elements of reason are paradigmatically concepts but these have a special subset, the elemental or ancestral pure concepts of understanding which Aristotle called categories. Kant argues that since logic is the canon of the understanding, the logical functions of the understanding must reflect these pure concepts in the logical forms of judgment. The idea is that we already know that propositional logic is sound and complete but there is more to the intellect than propositional logic. The same sorts of operations or functions may be performed on different relata. If we abstract from the logical forms of judgment to the maximally general concepts that underlie them, Kant thinks we can be assured that our table of categories will also be sound and complete.

If we consider the logical forms that propositions and judgments can have, Kant thinks we find that there are four dimensions\(^\text{109}\) of logical form with three “moments” for

\(^{109}\) Kant says the categories fall under four “titles”, but “dimensions” is more informative.
There are three ways to quantify propositions, three ways to qualify, three possible relations, and three modes as shown below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Quality</th>
<th>Relation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Universal (All…)</td>
<td>Affirmative (It is the case that…)</td>
<td>Categorical (F is G, F(x), etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Particular (Some…)</td>
<td>Negative (It is not the case that…)</td>
<td>Hypothetical (If P then Q)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singular (individual, e.g. Socrates…)</td>
<td>Infinite (internal negation)vi</td>
<td>Disjunctive (Either P or Q)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Modality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problematic (Possibly…)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assertoric (Actually…)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apodictic (Necessarily…)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Every other logical form can allegedly be derived from these forms.

Though Kant would perhaps not have advocated our current emphasis on symbolization, and he named them differently than we might, these dimensions of logical

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110 Kant explains these relations clearly in the Jäsche Logic:

In **categorical judgments**, subject and predicate constitute their matter; the form, through which the relation (of agreement or of opposition) between subject and predicate is determined and expressed, is called the copula. Note. Categorical judgments constitute the matter of the remaining judgments [but] …All three kinds of judgments rest on essentially different logical functions of the understanding [forms] and must therefore be considered according to their specific difference…The matter of **hypothetical judgments** [conditionals] consists of two judgments that are connected with one another as ground and consequence. One of these judgments, which contains the ground, is the antecedent (antecedens, prius), the other, which is related to it as a consequence, is the consequent (consequens, posterius), and the representation of this kind of connection of two judgments to one another…is called the consequentia, which constitutes the form of hypothetical judgments…A judgment is **disjunctive** if the parts of the sphere of a given concept [implicitly given] determine one another in the whole or toward a whole as complements (complementa)…The several given judgments of which the disjunctive judgment is composed constitute its matter and are called the members of the disjunction or opposition. The form of these judgments consists in the disjunction itself, i.e. in the determination of the relation of the various judgments as members of the whole sphere of the divided cognition which mutually exclude one another and complement one another. (JL 105ff emphasis mine; see also JL 107 note)

Categorical and hypothetical judgments differ because in a categorical judgment, the entire judgment is asserted, but only the consequent of a hypothetical judgment is assertoric (JL 105-6).
form and their moments are quite close to the logical operators (quantifiers, etc.) that we use in first order logic today. For example, problematic and apodictic propositions would be expressed using modal operators like ◊ and • respectively in modern day modal logic.

To take the most pertinent form from the table, consider the categorical relation expressed in propositions of the form “F is G”, where F is a subject concept and G is a predicate concept. There are many ways to characterize the relation between F and G expressed by the copula. We could say that G is a property of F, that G belongs to F, that G pertains to F, and so on. The copula of a categorical relation can also be more specific than the relations best expressed with “is”. For example, “F looks G” and “F drives away” are also categorical propositions. The most general scholastic characterization of the concept underlying all of these sorts of relations is inherence in a substance. Inherence and subsistence is the category underlying the logical form. For any proposition or judgment X, to claim that X is categorical is to claim that it has a particular logical form, specifically the logical form of a subsistence/inherence relation.

Each of the twelve logical forms of judgment is convertible with an ancestral pure concept of the understanding, a.k.a., a category. The logical forms are shown on the left and the categories that allegedly underlie them are shown on the right in the table below.
The categories are “concepts of an object in general by means of which its intuition is regarded as determined with regard to one of the logical functions for judgments” (A94/B128, see also A88/B120). Kant argues that these categories are not merely pure a priori concepts but maximally general, ancestral, pure a priori concepts without which no thought is possible because they constitute the contribution of the intellect to the conditions of the possibility of experience (A94-6/B129).

Now that we have some sense of the difference between and the relation between the logical forms and the categories, recall that it is typical for an analysis to proceed by dividing a conceptual sphere to which the analysandum belongs and eliminating alternatives to identify the specific mark pertaining to the analysandum. When Kant introduces the distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives in his analysis of the necessitation of reason, he implicitly introduces the logical forms of relation as the conceptual sphere to be considered. We can be sure of this because the alternatives to a categorical relation are a hypothetical relation and a disjunctive relation,
while the alternative to a “categorical” (as in a category) is not a hypothetical or a hypothesis. The alternatives to a category are impure concepts, intuitions, feelings, and pure concepts that are less than maximally general, derivative rather than ancestral, or which do not underlie the logical forms of judgment. If “categorical” were a reference to the twelve categories, Kant would have had to eliminate these alternatives rather than hypothetical form. Furthermore, “categorical” and “hypothetical” are not themselves categories. They are logical forms of judgment, and Kant emphasizes that this is an important distinction.\footnote{In his explanation of how the logical function differs from its corresponding category, Kant says: “the function of the categorical judgments was that of the relationship of the subject to the predicate…[y]et in regard to the merely logical use of the understanding it would remain undetermined which of these two concepts will be given the function of the subject and which will be given that of the predicate…Through the category of substance, however, if I bring the concept of body under it, it is determined that its empirical in tuition in experience must always be considered as subject, never as mere predicate” (B128-9). See also MFNS 4:475.}

Here he explicitly argues that the representation in question cannot have a hypothetical form, but he fails to mention the disjunctive form before claiming that the moral imperative must be categorical. There is a reason. A disjunction is a relation between parts belonging to a whole, e.g. multiple divisions belonging to one conceptual sphere. A disjunctive proposition or judgment has the logical form of an exclusive “or”, e.g. \textit{either A or B} (but not both). We may assume that Kant’s expert audience would find the idea of a disjunctive moral necessitation obviously absurd, so there are only two possibilities worth considering.

Now imperatives do not necessarily wear their logical form of relation on their sleeves. It can be quite difficult to tell in some instances what logical form a proposition really has. Categorical propositions that do not overtly have the form “F is G” can (allegedly) be reformulated, or converted, into propositions that have an overt categorical
form, e.g. “Do E!” or “Act thusly!”, but the results of conversion are often ungainly at best. For example “I drove away” can be converted to something like “The subject, myself, is driving away at past time t”, but this reformulation is highly unnatural. Tense, second order logical forms, and predicates that are not paradigmatic properties can be quite difficult to convert without distortion. (These problems are not at all unique to Kant or even to eighteenth century logic and language.) Given the difficulty of expressing some categorical propositions in standard categorical form without semantic loss, the direct approach may not be optimal.

Furthermore, in order to take the direct approach, one must first have a proposition in hand. In this part of the text Kant wants to arrive at a formula of the moral law that supplements the results of *Groundwork I*, but this time without direct appeal to common understanding. If Kant’s first specification of the moral law in *Groundwork I* seemed to follow too quickly and without sufficient justification, the analysis here may better articulate the relation between necessitation and the formulation of the moral law that analytically follows from it according to Kant. In order for Kant to arrive at the supreme principle of morality through analysis here he must ascertain the logical form the moral imperative would have to have, identify any other marks that would impact the formula, and articulate the proposition as a coordination of all these marks.

Since there are only three logical forms of relation, and the hypothetical and disjunctive forms are not as prone to disguise, the easiest way to identify a proposition as categorical is to ascertain that it is neither hypothetical nor disjunctive. Conveniently for Kant, this is also the tactic recommended by the method of analysis. The second logical form of relation is the hypothetical form. This is the logical form of dependence relations for propositions and judgments. Paradigmatically these propositions are conditionals expressing the dependence of the conditioned, i.e. the consequent, on its condition, i.e. its
antecedent. A hypothetical proposition or judgment paradigmatically has the logical form \( \text{If } P \text{ then } Q \), where \( P \) and \( Q \) are themselves propositions. Instead of a (subject concept)-(inherence relation)-(predicate concept) form, hypothetical propositions have an (antecedent proposition)-(dependence relation)-(consequent proposition) form. In other words, hypothetical propositions, whether imperative or otherwise, must involve an antecedent, i.e. a condition.

In ¶14-18 Kant defines the good as the practically necessary. He goes on to explain how it is that this notion of the good as the practically necessary can help identify the logical form of relation involved in the principle of volition.

Since every practical law represents a possible action as good and thus as necessary for a subject practically determinable by reason [i.e. practically necessary], all imperatives are formula for the determination of action that is necessary in accord with the principle of a will which is good \( \text{in some way.} \) (G 4:414)

The issue is really whether the will is absolutely good in itself without any qualification, or whether it is only, say, conditionally or relatively good. An imperative that commands hypothetically represents the practical necessity [the goodness] of a possible action as a means to achieving something else that one wills. The action is then good, but not good in itself. Its goodness is contingent upon and relative to its condition. Supposing an imperative could not command disjunctively, this implies by elimination that only an imperative that commands categorically could represent an action as morally good.

When Kant claims that the moral imperative must be categorical because it cannot be hypothetical, then, he is claiming that the logical form of relation a moral imperative must have is the categorical form, which expresses an inherence or subsistence relation to a subject. In order to support conversion, categorical imperatives and categorical propositions must both have two relata: a subject, i.e. the subject of predication or command, and something attributed to the subject through the predication or the
command. When an action or effect E is commanded of a subject, E is represented as belonging to the subject or to the subject’s volition. This is a relation of inherence or subsistence according to the table of categories. A categorical imperative, then, is a formula expressing the (perhaps hindered) necessitation of a subject by attributing some action or effect as belonging to the subject’s volition, e.g. “Do E!” or “Act thusly!” If Kant can eliminate the possibility that the moral imperative is hypothetical, it will follow that the moral imperative can only be categorical, even if Kant cannot yet distinctly express the subject and predicate involved. He need not specify who is commanded or what is commanded of them at this point.

As a last note on why the moral imperative must be categorical, consider the following complication. One might think that for practice, the relation of primary interest is a “hypothetical” ground-to-consequence dependence relation rather than a “categorical” subject-to-predicate containment relation. This is true in a sense. Volition is causal, so it clearly involves a ground-to-consequence or dependence relation. A hypothetical relation is a kind of ground-to-consequence relation, so we might think causal relations are hypothetical. What has recently been at issue, though, is the logical form of the ground of volition with respect to the logical forms of judgment, not the logical form of volition itself with respect to the pure concepts of understanding.112 The ground is only one aspect of the volition as a whole. The form of the ground and the form of the volition are two different things, and they must be classified using different sets of marks.vii

As Kant introduced it in ¶12, the logical form of volition is mediated legal derivation. This is a mediated ground-to-consequence dependence relation: The ground

112 See B128-9 for a specific implication regarding the difference.
or principle is that upon which the consequence depends. Beginning in ¶13, Kant is more specifically investigating the logical form of the representation that mediates this dependence relation between law and action, i.e. the logical form of the objective principle of volition. This representation has a propositional form, which makes it subject to the logical forms of judgment. It can be quantified, qualified, related and modified using these specific forms. With regard to the relation, it can only be categorical, hypothetical, or disjunctive. A command or proposition has a hypothetical form when it has the logical form of a conditional proposition (“If P then Q.” or “If P do Q!”). This logical form concerns the relation between the parts within the command or proposition, not the role of the proposition as a principle or ground in the derivation of an action. An imperative is a ground of volition, not a volition itself.

When it comes to the form of volition, rather than the form of its ground, we should look to the categories. Hypothetical propositions are conditionals, but inferences, derivations, and volitions are not propositions at all. Since volitions are not propositions, the logical forms of judgment do not apply to the form of volition as a whole. A volition cannot be categorical, hypothetical, or disjunctive. However, the form of volition can nevertheless be categorized with respect to the form of the relation it involves. It can be quantified, qualified, related, and modified using the pure concepts of the understanding. The categories of relation, which are again the pure concepts of the understanding that underlie the logical forms of judgment, are inherence and subsistence, causality and dependence, and community. The relation involved in volition as a whole is clearly causality or dependence rather than inherence or community. Volition is obviously causal and the primary relation involved in a mediate derivation is clearly a dependence relation.
The categories of relation are less specific than the logical forms of judgment they underwrite. The form of a conditional and the form of an inference certainly have something in common, after all, a conditional expresses a dependence relation between antecedent and consequent, while an inference expresses a dependence relation between premise and conclusion. The category of causality and dependence is the ancestral concept of both relations. Conditionals and inferences are nevertheless not identical. The category is maximally general. The corresponding logical form of judgment is the more specific form or guise the category takes in application to a proposition or judgment.

This fact that the category of dependence underlies hypothetical form is the very fact that may make it tempting to identify volition as hypothetical and confound this with the form of its imperative ground. In return, the fact that a categorical proposition expresses an inheritance relation may make it tempting to think of volition itself as an inheritance relation rather than a causal one, e.g. it may be tempting to think of an action as a property of the subject or a property of the will (rather than a consequence of a representation). Both temptations must be resisted. Not only do the relevant sets of marks differ, which could possibly reduce to a quibbling over terms, the form of volition and the form of its ground are independent. The relation involved in volition as a whole is the category or pure concept of causality and dependence. The relation involved in the moral ground of volition, i.e. the logical form of the moral ground apart from its role in the volition, is categorical, which is a relation of inherence and subsistence rather than a relation of causality or dependence. To infer that the ground of volition must be hypothetical because volition is causal would be analogous to inferring that the major premise of an inference must be hypothetical simply because it premises some conclusion.
§4  Analytic vs. Synthetic

Apart from the categorical/hypothetical distinction, the second most interpretively problematic distinction in the practical transcendental analytic is the distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions. Kant claims that the categorical imperative cannot be analytic, therefore it must be synthetic, and as mentioned above, this presents a philosophical problem. Like the distinction between imperative form and the standard theoretical form of a proposition, the analytic/synthetic distinction belongs to logic in a slightly different way than the categorical/hypothetical distinction. “Analytic” and “synthetic” are not listed in Kant’s tables of the logical forms of judgment or the categories of understanding. The analytic/synthetic distinction belongs primarily to the method of logic rather than its grammar or its categorization.113

Because the distinction between the activities of analysis and synthesis is easily confused with the logical distinction between the analytic and the synthetic that derives from it, some clarification is in order. Both distinctions are extremely general and have a wide range of application. Analysis and synthesis are activities. They are processes, not logical relations. Analysis proceeds from a whole to its parts, e.g. decomposition or resolution. Synthesis proceeds from parts to whole (A130ff/B129ff). The scholastic method of analysis was Kant’s method for Groundwork I. The method of synthesis, exemplified by reduction in chemistry, will be Kant’s method for Groundwork III. In a very loose sense, we might (wrongly) think synthesis includes any sort of composition, coordination, connection, or aggregation. However, synthesis in Kant’s sense is the

113 Recall that scholastic logic is in great part a system of concepts by which to classify bodies of knowledge. The categories and logical forms belong to the system of classification, but analysis and synthesis are methods by which the goals of such systematization can be accomplished. Analysis is the method by which things are categorized.
production of a whole that is more than the sum of its parts, as in the synthesis of water from hydrogen and oxygen – when hydrogen and oxygen are combined (\(2H_2 + O_2 = 2H_2O\)), the oxygen is “reduced” and an “entirely new” chemical product, water, is synthesized. To take a more extreme example, imagine the “synthesis” of a living organism. Life is more than a collection of chemicals or physical parts. The production of life from non-life would be a synthesis in Kant’s sense. The fundamental synthesis of pure a priori cognition is a synthesis in this sense.

“Analytic” and “synthetic” are genetic logical adjectives that modify logical relations, i.e. categorical, hypothetical or disjunctive relations. The descriptor “analytic” applies to complex representations whose parts or components are related through identity. The simplest and most obvious examples involve an overt identity: \(F = F\), \(If \ P \ then \ P\), or \(Either \ P \ or \ not \ P\). Analytic representations are not synthesized; they are generated through analysis. The descriptor “synthetic” applies to complex representations that involve heterogeneous parts or components that cannot be related directly through identity with each other. These must be synthesized.

Consider how this distinction applies to categorical propositions. For analytic categorical propositions, the subject and predicate are related directly “through identity” (B10). Paradigmatically, the predicate is a mark of the subject and can be subsumed under the concept directly because it is already contained in the subject concept. Kant calls analytic propositions “propositions of clarification” because they do not add anything to concept of the subject, but only break it up by means of analysis into its component concepts, which were already thought in it (though confusedly)...I do not need to go beyond the concept... but rather I need only to analyze that concept, i.e. become conscious of the manifold that I always think in it, in order to encounter this predicate therein. (B11)

For synthetic categorical propositions, there is no such identity between the subject and predicate: There is no sense in which the predicate belongs directly to the
subject, and no dimension in which the predicate is homogeneous with the subject. One cannot perform any kind of analysis of the subject and find the predicate already contained in it. When a subject and predicate cannot be related directly through identity, Kant argues, they can only be related mediately through identity with a third thing. This third thing, whatever it might be, must be a representation that is a) homogeneous with both subject and predicate in order to relate them, and b) homogeneous with each relatum in a different way (since the two have no identity with each other, i.e. nothing in common).

For empirical propositions, which are all synthetic according to Kant, the subject and predicate are related through experience. The whole of experience serves as a mediator for the relation, which Kant describes:

It is thus experience on which the possibility of the synthesis of the predicate of weight with the concept of body is grounded, since both concepts, though the one is not contained in the other, nevertheless belong together, though only contingently, as part of a whole, namely experience, which is itself a synthetic combination of intuitions. (B12)

What Kant has in mind here is that experience is a manifold and particular product of intuition. But experience is also a synthesized whole, which means it has a form or a universality as well. Because experience is both universal and particular, it can mediate relations between universals and particulars that cannot be directly related through identity. For synthetic a priori propositions, as opposed to synthetic a posteriori propositions, the mediator cannot be experience. As we will see in §6, there is a serious philosophical problem concerning how this kind of proposition is possible.

§5  Respect as the Pure A Priori Form of Feeling

If we consider the context of where Groundwork I left off and Groundwork II picks up the analysis, the issue concerns the objective aspect of respect. Respect is
neither entirely subjective nor entirely objective. It relates to the subject on the one hand as a special feeling, and it mediates the relation between law and action as “pure conformity” on the other hand. As we will see in the remainder of this chapter, respect was the first presentation of a mediator between law and action (duty is the necessity of acting _from respect for law_) for the a priori synthesis of practical cognition. Since the issue for a practical transcendental analytic concerns primarily the _objective_ aspect of the principle of volition, i.e. of the will, and the _mediation_ relation (whereas a transcendental teleology would concern the subjective aspect), the goal for Kant is to make distinct how respect mediates between law and action _apart_ from consideration of the subject, i.e. feeling. Since this relation is rational, it must more specifically involve making distinct the logical form of the representation of law that must be involved in respectful necessitation, a.k.a. acting from duty. The underlying idea is that part of what it is to respect law is to reflect or represent it. This implies that respect and law are homogenous in some way. The logical form of the representation of law involved in respect is an obvious line of inquiry that can be pursued through analysis.

In a sense, then, the analytic of practical reason in ¶13-28 is also an analysis of respect. It is not useful for Kant to couch the analysis in terms of respect, though, because the faculty of feeling is not the faculty to be analyzed. The agenda is to set aside the subjectivity of moral actions in order to focus as exclusively as possible on the rational objectivity of moral actions. It might be suggested that Kant should first present an analysis of desire or feeling, a transcendental teleology, before determining the content of moral science. Kant’s response is that there is no need to explicate desire and feeling beforehand because the psychological understanding of them is adequate:

The further objection could have been put to me, why have I not previously [e.g. in the _Groundwork_] explicated the concept of the faculty of desire or of the feeling of pleasure, although this reproach would be unfair because this explication as given in psychology could reasonably be presupposed. However,
the definition there could admittedly be so framed that the feeling of pleasure would [unavoidably] ground the determination of the faculty of desire (as is in fact commonly done), and thus the supreme principle of practical philosophy would necessarily turn out to be empirical, although this must first be settled and in the present Critique is altogether refuted. I will, therefore, give this explication here in the way it must be given in order, as is reasonable, to leave this contested point undecided at the beginning –

- *Life* is the faculty of a being to act in accordance with laws of the faculty of desire.
- The *faculty of desire* is a being’s faculty to be by means of its representations the cause of the reality of the objects of these representations.
- *Pleasure* is the representation of the agreement of an object or of an action with the subjective conditions of life, i.e., with the faculty of the causality of a representation with respect to the reality of its objects (or with respect to the determination of the powers of the subject to action in order to produce the object).

For the purposes of this Critique I have no further need of concepts borrowed from psychology; the Critique itself supplies the rest. (KpV 5:9† emphasis and bullet formatting mine)

In particular, the Critique supplies the explication of *respect* in connection to desire (KpV 5:72ff). While pleasure is subjective, respect is instead the representation of the agreement of an object or of an action with the objective conditions of life, i.e., with the faculty of the causality of a representation with respect to the reality of its objects (or with respect to the determination of the will of a rational being to action in order to produce the object).

The reason why Kant is justified in tabling the explication of respect until the critique is that there are some very important complications involved in the role of respect and these cannot yet be handled well. As we will see in the next chapters, the objective conditions of life turn out to be quite complex. In particular, there is an important difference between the kind of a priori form respect must be in comparison to space and time. Space and time are pure a priori constitutive forms of intuition. Since respect is *rational*, it cannot be a constitutive a priori form of *feeling* without qualification. It can, however, be a pure a priori regulative form of feeling, i.e. the form feeling *ought* to take but often *does* not. In other words, respect is the pure a priori form
that ought to be constitutive of feeling, but which actually only regulates feeling. As Kant 
cashes this distinction out in the second Critique, admittedly in simpler terms, these 
are the positive and negative roles of respect (KpV 5: 72ff).

As I will explain in the next chapter, the moral law itself requires a similar 
distinction: The moral law must be constitutive a priori of how we ought to conduct 
ourselves as well as regulative a priori of our deliberation and the effects of our conduct 
even though we often do not act as we ought. Kant cannot determine the object of moral 
science without appeal to the laws governing the will, but he can do so without detailing 
the roles of respect with regard to the objective conditions of life. Kant notably addresses 
respect in the Critique of Practical Reason only after the categories of freedom and the 
typic of practical judgment have been introduced, indicating that his treatment of respect 
must be sensitive to considerations involved in solving the fundamental problem of 
cognitive synthesis for practice.

§6 The Fundamental Problem of A Priori Cognitive Synthesis

According to the first Critique the very possibility of objective determination, 
with which Groundwork II is concerned, depends on solving the philosophical problem 
posed by the heterogeneity of relata that must be synthesized\(^{114}\) a priori to produce 
cognition. As Kant famously says,

Without sensibility no object would be given to us, and without understanding none would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind. It is thus just as necessary to make the mind’s concepts sensible (i.e. to add an object to them in intuition) as it is to make its intuitions understandable (i.e. to bring them under concepts). (A51/B75)

\(^{114}\) Practical cognition is cognition \textit{per synthesin} (VL 914-5, JL 63).
The problem is that since the pure concepts of understanding (from intellect) are entirely *abstract* and intuition (from sensibility) is entirely *concrete*, according to Kant they cannot be related *analytically* though identity. There is a “quantitative” gap between pure concepts and intuition that must be bridged in order for a priori objective cognition to be possible. Concepts are fundamentally *general*, while intuitions are fundamentally *particular*. Since this gap precludes an analytic relation, the concrete and the abstract must instead be *synthesized* to produce a cognition.

The most basic philosophical tool Kant uses to solve this problem of a priori cognitive synthesis for theory in the Transcendental Aesthetic of the first *Critique* is a *pure* a priori *form* of a *manifold of particularity*, either of appearance or desire/feeling. In the theoretical case, sensibility is the initial faculty of interest. Sensibility is the receptive capacity to acquire representations through the way in which we are affected by objects, i.e. the capacity to acquire representations by intuiting objects given in experience (A19/B33). The representations acquired, the effects of objects on us, are called sensations. *Intuition* is the intuiting of objects. Empirical intuition is the ability to intuit objects “through sensation”, while *pure* intuition is the pure form of sensibility itself apart from any involvement of the sensations themselves. *Appearance* is the manifold of “the undetermined objects of an empirical intuition” (A20/B34). By *undetermined* here Kant means that the objects intuited are represented entirely in concreto; the objects in appearance are as of yet *unconceived*.

The problem is that since the manifold of appearance is entirely intuitive (concrete) and the categories of understanding are entirely conceptual (abstract), it is difficult to see how appearance could ever be subsumed under a category. As Kant puts it,

> pure concepts of the understanding…in comparison with empirical (indeed in general sensible) intuitions, are entirely unhomogeneous, and can never be encountered in any intuition. Now how is the subsumption of the latter under the
former, thus the application of the category to appearances possible, since no one would say that the category, e.g., causality, could also be intuited through the senses and is contained in the appearance? This question, so natural and important, is really the cause which makes a transcendental doctrine of the power of judgment necessary, in order, namely, to show the possibility of applying pure concepts of the understanding to appearances in general. (A137/B176)

To put this another way, intuition and appearance is entirely particular or concrete, while pure concepts must instead be entirely general or abstract. Since the two are entirely heterogeneous, they cannot be related through identity as one would in an analytic predicative judgment.

The solution to any heterogeneity problem according to Kant is to find a mediator that has something different in common with each candidate relatum so that this mediator will be homogeneous with both relata but in different ways. In this case Kant says,

it is clear that there must be a third thing, which must stand in homogeneity with the category on the one hand and the appearance on the other, and makes possible the application of the former to the latter. This mediating representation must be pure (without anything empirical) and yet intellectual on the one hand and sensible on the other. Such a representation is the transcendental schema. (A137-8/B176-7)

The gap is bridged as follows. As forms, space and time are abstract or general. They share this generality with pure concepts, and in this way spatiotemporal form is related to pure concepts - they are homogeneous insofar as they are both abstract. As forms of intuition, they are clearly (somehow) related to intuition as well. Because spatiotemporal form is pure a priori and it is homogeneous with both pure concepts and with intuition, though in different ways, it bridges the quantitative gap and thereby helps explain how the synthesis of cognition is possible.

The scholastic idea behind this heterogeneity problem and Kant’s solution is that the principle of identity and difference is the principle of all relations. Every representation of a relation expresses a way in which two or more relata pertain to each other, belong to each other, participate in each other (cf. Platonic forms), or contain each
other. There are many ways such relations can be more specifically conceived, but the scholastic tradition requires that there must be some commonality, homogeneity, likeness, or identity in order for two things to be related. The absence of any such identity would result in a radical category mistake, e.g. *Red smells good*. Kant departs from this tradition not by denying that some sort of commonality or homogeneity is required for all relations, but by claiming that relations can be fundamentally mediate. When two candidate relata have no commonality with each other whatsoever, they may still relate mediately, Kant claims, if each relatum can be related to some third thing. Since the primary relata have nothing in common by assumption, obviously the two sub-relations to the third thing must depend on diverse commonalities. (It would seem to follow that mediators cannot be simple, but it is not clear how Kant would handle this issue.)

For my purposes it is enough to identify the general form of the problem and Kant’s solution. The problem is that cognition must be constituted by heterogeneous relata. The solution is in part that relations can be irreducibly mediate, which requires the identification of an appropriate mediator and the two homogeneities that allow it to bridge the gap.

It was not enough, however, for Kant to posit spatiotemporal form as the a priori mediator to bridge the gap between pure concept and appearance. In order for the pure a priori form of intuition to be of any use in subsuming appearance under the categories, the transcendental schema must involve or somehow be suggestive of a procedure (schematism) by which to synthesize the relata (A97, A140/B179). Since space and time themselves are presumably not especially suggestive of any such procedure, Kant more specifically identifies “transcendental time-determinations” to help bridge the gap. Kant describes a transcendental schema as the “representation of a general procedure of the
imagination for providing a concept with its image” (A140/B179-80). The procedure represented is the schematism. The important point for the moment is merely that the procedure is the second criterion that any solution to the fundamental problem of cognitive synthesis must meet. Kant will need both a mediator and something with a procedural character to solve the problem of *a priori* synthesis for practical cognition.

In case the fundamental problem of cognitive synthesis seems to be one of the “hair-splitting” variety, since it concerns the synthesis of the very most diverse representational relata, according to the first *Critique* the possibility of ever cognizing *any* object depends on this pure *a priori* synthesis of cognition. Mundane cases of cognition ultimately depend upon its possibility. Given Kant’s transcendental thesis that the pure *a priori* relata are conditions of the very possibility of objective cognition, the *a priori* synthesis of cognition is metaphysically prior to all other kinds of cognition. The schema and schematism of synthesis are criteria of the very possibility of objective reference for theory.

Given the dependence of all theoretical cognition on the possibility of synthetic *a priori* theoretical cognition, we may infer that all practical cognition will depend on the possibility of the pure *a priori* practical synthesis of cognition. Kant therefore faces the same kind of gap for practical cognition in moral metaphysics that he did for theoretical cognition in theoretical metaphysics. In order for Kant to solve the fundamental problem of heterogeneity for *a priori* practical cognitive synthesis, he must at least i) identify a pure *a priori* form of particularity to mediate the heterogeneous relata and ii) provide the basis for a practical schematism, preferably a transcendental schema that represents such a schematism.

If Kant has an eye to solving the fundamental problem of cognitive synthesis for practice in the *Groundwork* even though he need not actually solve it here, ix we as critical
readers should have an eye to identifying the pure a priori form and the procedure. There should be precursors, indistinct marks, or placeholders somewhere in the *Groundwork* for whatever will ultimately serve these two roles. More specifically, these precursors should appear in the analysis, i.e. in *Groundwork I-II*, and they should reappear, perhaps in a different guise, in the synthesis in *Groundwork III*. This is why. *Groundwork III* is allegedly an execution of the method of synthesis using the results of *Groundwork I-II* as its data, and it allegedly reveals the main features of the solution to the fundamental problem of cognitive synthesis. If the analyses reveal nothing at all that could fill either role, Kant has no resources for the “main features” he intends to outline in *Groundwork III*.

§6.1 Respect as the Mediator of Synthetic A Priori Practical Cognition

What I claim is that Kant’s characterization of respect as both a “moral feeling” and “pure conformity” near the end of *Groundwork I* indicates that respect is our common understanding of the mediator of a priori cognitive synthesis for practice. In other words, *Groundwork I* ends with a (somewhat common) practical equivalent of a transcendental aesthetic, which I will call a transcendental teleology (see A19/B33ff, especially B73). The main features of Kant’s solution will be presented in *Groundwork III* (as opposed to their precursors appearing in *Groundwork I-II*) but the entire solution will not be available until after Kant has presented the pure a priori categories of freedom in the *Critique of Practical Reason*. Or at least this is Kant’s plan.

In support of this claim that respect is the mediator of practical cognition, consider once more that there are most generally three scholastic faculties from which Kant derives his theory of mind: intellect, sensibility, and desire. Reason belongs to intellect, along with conception and judgment, and its analysis is called an analytic. Sensibility is the ability to receptively acquire representations through the way in which...
we are affected by objects. Its analysis is a called an aesthetic, and it is in the Transcendental Aesthetic that Kant posits spatiotemporal form as the mediator of cognitive synthesis. Only later in the Transcendental Analytic of Principles does Kant specify transcendental time-determinations and their schematism to address the relation between appearance and the pure concepts.

In parallel, will and volition belong to desire, where desire is most generally the capacity to affect things (by means of representations). To put this in sensorimotor terms, sensibility corresponds to incoming sense affect, while desire corresponds to motor effect – sensibility and intuition concern the *incoming* causality of a subject, while desire and feeling concern the *outgoing* causality of a subject (See MM 211). The counterpart to sensation, *feeling*, is the element of desire or the kind of representation that specifically belongs to desire: Feeling is the manifold representation of the affect of us on things. When it comes to sensibility, we can only intuit objects. When it comes to desire, however, things are a bit more complex. We can be inclined, which is passive. We can be interested, which is rational but not fully and not moral, or we can take an interest, which is moral and ultimately requires transcendental freedom (G 4:413*). All these together can be thought of as *volition*, as opposed to *intuition*. When we are inclined, the representation is pleasure, or an “agreeable/disagreeable” feeling. When we take an interest, the representation must still concern the agreement between object/action and desire but it cannot be pleasure/displeasure.

Respect is the representation of the agreement of an action, not with the contingent and idiosyncratic subjective conditions of life, but with the action’s “principle in reason (the law)” or with the law of volition as objective ground (G 4:413*, 401*; MM 211). What I am claiming is that *pure conformity to law* and *moral feeling* are more distinct concepts of respect that identify respect metaphysically as the common precursor
of the pure a priori form of desire. *Pure conformity to law* is an *objectively* more distinct representation of respect that exhibits its homogeneity with law. By describing respect as pure conformity to law, Kant alludes to its potential role as the counterpart to pure intuition. *Moral feeling* as consciousness of one’s active response to the moral law is instead a *subjectively* more distinct representation of respect that exhibits its homogeneity with feeling in action.⁵ It would be overreaching to claim that respect is the practical counterpart to space and time, but there is clear indication that Kant describes respect with the idea of a practical transcendental schema in mind.

I also claim that the procedural character of the law Kant specifies at the end of *Groundwork I* is the basis of the practical schematism (which is really a typic)¹¹⁵ for the fundamental synthesis of cognition a priori. Kant introduces the law as the object of respect, i.e. as what respect reflects or represents. This is appropriate if respect is the precursor of a transcendental schema/typic. More importantly, Kant intentionally presents the moral law in a form that suggests or implies the *manner* in which the relata are to be synthesized: we are to act as if the maxims of our actions were to become through our will universal laws. This sounds quite like a general procedure for providing a concept with its image, though some qualification and revision will be necessary. Both these claims will be taken up again when more relevant evidence is available.

¹¹⁵ In the practical case it is actually a typic rather than a schema (KpV 5:67ff). A schema represents a procedure in imagination for generating an image, but a typic is more like a template for producing the object. In the case of analogy, the typic is the form of the analogy, or the known relation that serves as a basis for positing the fourth member when given the third as an analog of one of the first pair, i.e. the “is to” relation in “A is to B as C is to X”. The nature of the sensible world is the type (as in an archetype) of an intelligible nature in that “the form of lawfulness in general” is the basis of the analogy: sensible being/nature = intelligent being/intelligible world (KpV 5:70, BL 47, A313-5/B370-2). This analogy with nature is relevant not only to the “as if” involved in the first statement of the moral law in *Groundwork I*, but also to FULN and the idea of a kingdom of ends discussed in chapters 7-8. The general idea is that the way in which natural laws govern us as sensible beings belonging to nature is analogous to the way in which the laws of freedom govern us as sensible beings belonging to a kingdom of ends, and this *tells* us something important about how things ought to be. Since Kant does not introduce the typic until the *Critique of Practical Reason*, “schema” and “schematism” are adequate here.
§7 Maxims as Principles of Synthetic, Mediate Causation

Though the fundamental problem of synthesis may still sound overly technical as I have described it, the price of failure can be put more simply. To put the problem in traditional terms, Kant claims that the moral law commands entirely a priori. It is often objected that to command only in the abstract is not to command at all. If the moral law is to command us, it must command us to particular actions. Either Kant’s moral law is epiphenomenal, then, or it is not entirely a priori.

To fill out the objection a bit in more Kantian terms, a determination in general is a determination with respect to general representations, e.g. concepts. A determination in the abstract would involve predication only of general or abstract predicates. A determination in particular, or a concrete determination is a determination with respect to particulars, i.e. with respect to intuition. A priori representations include concepts and ideas, which are abstract or general representations. Determination a priori would then seem to be determination only in the abstract. The problem is that if the moral law is to genuinely command, it must command concretely and in particular, not merely abstractly or in general as pure a priori determination presumably would. According to the objection, moral command requires a concrete determination in particular that Kant cannot provide.

Because it is true that an entirely a priori determination could not involve the predication of contingent particulars, it is tempting to think that an entirely a priori determination would have to be a determination only in general or in the abstract. This is not the case, though Kant’s reply will take some development. In order to explain why practical cognition of objects is unavoidably synthetic and therefore requires a pure a priori form of feeling as mediator, we need to ascertain the structure of volition. This is a
particularly challenging problem for interpreters, but the analytic of practical reason in *Groundwork II* §§13-28 provides clues as to the main features of the structure of volition.

Since there are two volitional relations indicated in the analysis so far, and each of these can be either analytic or synthetic, there is a potential ambiguity involved in Kant’s claim that morality is synthetic a priori. When Kant explicitly raises the issue, the issue is the possibility of a categorical *imperative* or the possibility of a synthetic a priori *proposition*, not the possibility of its use as a principle or ground. Kant should have asked after the possibility of a synthetic a priori principle (*Princip* or *Grundsatz*) if he were concerned with its use as a ground. If the categorical imperative itself is not possible, then of course there can be no question of whether it can ground an action, but we are not yet in a position to identify the relata of the synthesis that is *internal* to the categorical imperative. As we saw in the last section, we are nevertheless in a position to begin to articulate the structure of willing (which will involve the use of the categorical imperative in the synthesis of an action). I will argue in the next chapter that the notion of causal community is especially enlightening, but the resources we have so far are sufficient to explain how Kant might answer this objection.

We may begin from the idea that volition involves a dependence relation. Apart from conditional propositions, inferences are the most familiar dependence relations. When an inference is analytic, as in a two-premise inference of understanding, the relation of the ground to the consequence is through identity, just as in the case of analytic predication. In the analytic case, the consequent (conclusion) is in some sense contained in or belongs to the antecedent (premise) and could be discovered by analyzing the antecedent. When the inference is synthetic, as in a syllogism, a middle term is required to mediate the relation.
An imperative is a *causally* necessitating ground rather than a merely inferential
*logically* necessitating ground. It involves a somewhat different dependence relation than
an inference, but like inferences causal relations are ground-to-consequent dependence
relations that can be either analytic or synthetic. As Kant obscurely indicated in the ¶12
popular analysis, the paradigmatic relation between laws of nature and the objects they
govern is analytic because it is direct, requiring no mediator. A holy will is subject to no
influences other than the determination of reason, so it too would be analytic. Human
volition, in contrast, is mediated legal causation because human will is subject to the
influence of inclination, which belongs to desire rather than reason. This makes
necessitated will synthetic. (If a mediator is *required*, analysis of the relata cannot reveal
that they belong directly to each other.)

It may seem in some cases as if the causality involved in volition is analytic and
immediate. For example, an impulse can be an immediate ground of some effect, e.g.
erking away from a hot stove. Recall, though, that causality in general belongs to the
conceptual sphere of determination, which is to be understood as the legal governance of
objects, whether naturally or volitionally. The issue is not whether there must be some
mediator that stands between the representation and action. The issue is whether there
is a mediator between the law and the activity it governs. Even if an impulse is not a
cognition, which is debatable, it is nevertheless a representation. Acting on impulse is a
species of volition, even if we do not think of it as voluntary in the usual sense, because
the immediate ground of the effect is a representation. The volition relation is really a

\[\text{\begin{footnotesize}
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\begin{enumerate}
\item Note that deliberation would not count as a mediator between representation and effect. Deliberation is temporally prior to actual maxim-to-action relations. As we commonly describe it, we \textit{adopt} a maxim after deliberation. Deliberation does not stand between the use of a maxim and its consequence.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}}\]

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law-representation-action relation. Law and action are heterogeneous. In order to relate them, the mediator must be homogeneous with law in one regard and homogeneous with action in some other regard. In the moral case, the synthesis must be a priori, so the central problem of metaphysics arises in various guises: How is a synthetic a priori volition possible? How is pure a priori practice possible? How is synthetic a priori practical cognition possible?

According to Kant in order for us to cognize objective necessity of any sort, including objective causation, there must be something about objects that we can determine a priori, c.f. Hume. To review the theoretical solution to the fundamental problem of cognitive synthesis, intuition is the manifold of particular effect of things on us through which objects of theoretical cognition are given to us. In order for us to cognize a given object a priori, Kant thinks we must be able to synthesize intuition and pure concept to produce objective cognition. The difficulty for theory, again, is to explain how a pure a priori concept, which is entirely general or abstract, can relate to an entirely particular, concrete intuition even though the two relata are therefore entirely heterogeneous. For practical reason, the difficulty is to explain how an entirely universal a priori law can ground particular products. The objects of morality are not given in experience, so an a priori form of intuition will not do. The objects of morality are ends to be made through representations of reason. Feeling is the manifold

117 It is important to keep in mind here that though the relata of inferences are propositions or judgments, the relata of causal relations need not be. A law and a representation of law are two different things; a law is a spatiotemporally indeterminate objective ground of determination, while a representation of law is a temporally determinate subjective ground of other determinations, i.e. a modification or determination of mind that may endure over time.

118 Oil and water can be mixed with some ingenuity. They are at least both chemical. But how could one synthesize oil with a character in a novel? The problem of synthesis Kant thinks he faces is very much like this kind of category mistake; the proposed relata are categorically different and they must nevertheless be combined per synthesin.
representation of particular *affect* by us *on things* through which *we produce* objects. The pure a priori form of an end would then have to be a pure a priori form of feeling.

Though we might not have been in a position to appreciate it in the common analysis, *respect* is Kant’s preliminary identification of the mediator. First, respect is a representation. This is the absolutely minimal requirement for a mediator of volition. Second, respect is intended to be a relatively *common* representation that stands between the moral law and our actions. Any arbitrary interlocutor should admit that there is such a representation. These are fairly strong initial desiderada for the mediator of volition. Next, Kant characterizes respect specifically as both a “moral *feeling*” and as “*pure conformity* to law”. By the former respect has the particularity of affect (as a feeling), and by the latter it has the universality of form (as pure conformity) that are required for the production of a particular end from a pure a priori categorically imperative ground.

Since respect must relate both to law and to action, and since it must relate to each in a different way, these two sub-relations may each be analyzed. An analysis of respect as moral feeling would make distinct the subjective aspect of actions from duty, while an analysis of respect as pure conformity to law would make distinct the objective aspect of this kind of action. Kant begins the objective analysis *Groundwork I* when he asks what kind of law it must be that we respect when we act from duty. In order to answer his question, Kant must analyze the relation between respect and law, i.e. the “*pure conformity*” aspect of respect.\(^{119}\) This analysis takes up again in *Groundwork II*, where Kant’s analysis of practical reason reveals that the mediating representation has a

\(^{119}\) It would be inelegant at best to analyze law without making use of its relation to respect. As Kant has already pointed out, law divides into laws of nature and laws of freedom. If laws of nature have already been eliminated along with inclination and hypothetical imperatives, Kant should not allow them to be reintroduced here. Further, the distinction between laws of nature and freedom is a suspiciously metaphysical distinction and therefore inappropriate to *Groundwork I*. From a strategic standpoint, Kant is much better off analyzing the idea of respect as conformity to law than the more general idea of law per se.
categorically imperative logical form. Logical form is a specifically intellectual kind of concern. It concerns the objective relation of the representation to law in understanding and eventually leads to three formulations of the moral law that meet important criteria of objectivity. This is all by way of making distinct pure conformity to law.

The other aspect of respect gets somewhat short shrift. Though we may be keenly interested in the mediator-to-consequence relation and the synthesis of volition, Kant has very little to say about it in the *Groundwork*. This is unfortunate because the mediator to consequence relation involves feeling, which is the venue of particularity we need to address the objection at hand. Fortunately we can fill in some of the gaps. The ground of action is a categorically imperative representation of universal law, i.e. a command to do something. As a representation, this ground is a modification of the subject from which consequences may follow (A97, A 98-99, A139/B178). More specifically, imperatives must be connected to possible effects through feeling, because feeling is the manifold representation of our affect on things. Insofar as the principle of volition is subjective, then, it involves feeling.

The issue of philosophical interest is in what sense this feeling could be objective or moral, or reasonably construed as “pure conformity”. Insofar as respect represents law, it represents law as commanding, which necessitates or engenders respect as feeling. What this means is that as a pure a priori form of affect grounded in reason, which is a spontaneous capacity, respect generates its own particularity or concreteness. There is a sort of bootstrapping here that depends on the spontaneity of reason. If reason is really not a spontaneous capacity, then respect is a high-flown fantasy, but if Kant is right, particularity need not be given to the will from intuition in order for the moral law to command particular actions. Reason affects, even in particular, all on its own. This is
perhaps the most important criterion for the possibility of acting \textit{from duty alone} without any inclination at all.

By the end of \textit{Groundwork I} Kant has the tools in place for solving the fundamental problem of pure a priori practical synthesis, or at least precursors of these tools. To recap, respect and the schematic character of the moral law meet two very fundamental criteria of a priori determination that are prerequisites for the determinate \textit{production} of the special content of morality. The special content of morality is a kind of legally necessitated activity. This particular kind of legal necessitation is the necessity of an action from respect for law according to \textit{Groundwork I}. This turns out to be the derivation of an action from a law by means of a representation, which is a mediate derivation, and the faculty of mediate derivation is reason. In order for reason to produce and action, it must be synthetically related to the manifold of feeling via the pure a priori form of feeling, which I argue is respect. Since there must also be a procedure by which the synthesis can be accomplished, the moral law must be formulated in such a way as to suggest an activity analogous to construction in intuition for mathematics. If respect as the pure a priori form of feeling is pure conformity to law, moreover, respect may be able to generate particular feeling and thereby help answer a traditional objection via Kant’s explanation of how the moral law could command particular actions entirely a priori.

Second, even supposing Kant is wrong and respect cannot generate its own particularity of affect, he is still in position to \textit{theoretically determine} the practical object and this is quite important. We need theoretical access to particulars in order to produce ends even in the mundane sense. Production of an object in the mundane sense is production of an artifact by design. When we make artifacts, we plan the details not only of what we want the object to be, but how to bring it about. We gather resources, consider what must be done first, employ means, and so on. If moral science is to
provide the metaphysical foundation of technical practice, we must be able to theoretically cognize our ends in detail, which metaphysically requires a source of particularity. Kant has both intuition and feeling (or inclination) available as sources of particularity. In addition, when we produce objects even in the mundane sense we unavoidably rely on a priori cognition of the natural laws governing the artifacts we produce. (Our behavior might sometimes happen to have congenial effects without the use of natural laws, but this is not intentional production of an end by design.) Kant still has the pure a priori form of intuition available to explain how the moral law could theoretically determine an object a priori.

§8 Universalization as a Logical Inference (Universal Generalization)

Even though this claim is still a bit premature, now that the context is logical I want introduce the claim that the universalization schematism represented in Kant’s first three statements of the moral law is a kind of logical inference that is very close to a universal generalization. In modern terms, this inference would be an inference from an arbitrary member of a class having some property to every member of that class having the property. In Kant’s terms it is a transition from general form to universal form (JL 102).

Notice first that “universal” is a logical form of quantity. There are two other pure forms of quantity. Particular form is the form of a proposition quantified over a plurality, e.g. some ducks are black. Singular form quantifies over individuals, e.g. Socrates is mortal. Now there is another very important logical form of quantity, namely

\[ P(c) \rightarrow \forall x \in X \ P(x) \]  

Induction is an empirical generalization that does not yield universal propositions (JL 133). What Kant needs here is a genuine universalization. I suggest that universalization is more like a mathematical induction, specifically an a priori inference of reflective judgment that can be objective because it is practical (JL 131-3).
the general. Generality is a *predicable* resulting from a combination of the pure forms of quantity, specifically from making singular or particular *exceptions* to the universal. Such exceptions would interfere with universal generalization.

To illustrate, in most contexts the default quantification for categorical propositions, including imperatives, is general. For example, “Swans are white” is a true generalization. There are several ways a general proposition like this can be requantified. It can be instantiated (with a little empirical help), which would result in a singular proposition with much limited scope, e.g. “This swan, Sammy, is white”. It can also be converted to “Some swans are white”, which is a relatively weak claim of somewhat limited scope, though still true. Most perspicuously, the universalization of “Swans are white” would be “All swans are white”, which happens to be *false*. The reason it is false is that the generalization allows for or admits of exceptions.

While empirical inductions like the swan example do not constitute valid universal generalizations, mathematical inductions do. Kant’s use of mathematics as a paradigm for many aspects of moral metaphysics then naturally leads to the idea that perhaps there is a valid moral equivalent to mathematical induction. If there is a valid a priori moral induction, then we should be able to disambiguate the pure a priori rational aspects of conduct from the sensible and desirous empirical aspects by testing whether maxims of possible conduct can be universally generalized without contradiction. If a maxim can be universally generalized without contradiction, the induction is not empirical and there must therefore be some a priori principle that makes the universal generalization valid. We are not yet in a position to ask what that principle might be, but we can at least consider how the test might work.

The important inference for the moral context is the universalization of a general maxim. A maxim is a subjective principle of volition, which means it is a ground or
principle of a subject’s volition or willing. We may assume for convenience that maxims have a propositional form (though we should keep in mind that common maxims might be so intuitive or concrete as to be pre-reflectively non-propositional). As we have just seen in the *Groundwork II* analysis, insofar as a ground necessitates some action as consequence, the ground must be formulable as an imperative. The default form of a subjective imperative is a categorical *generalization*: “Do E!”. To universalize a general categorical imperative is to move from “Do E!” to “Always do E!”. This is an inductive sort of logical inference, but again not necessarily one that is always valid. Some general categorical imperatives can be universalized and some cannot, Kant says, and the reason the universalization fails sometimes is that our maxims may involve exceptions:

If we now attend to ourselves in any transgression of a duty, we find that we do not really will that our maxim should become a universal law…but that the opposite of our maxim should instead remain a universal law, only we take the liberty of making an *exception* to it for ourselves (or for just this once) to the advantage of our inclination. Consequently, if we weighed all cases from one and the same point of view, namely that of reason, we would find a contradiction in our own will, namely that a certain principle be objectively necessary as a universal law and yet subjectively not hold universally but allow exceptions. (G 4: 424)

So far this merely confirms the idea that Kant intends to exploit a distinction concerning the validity of inductions to ascertain whether a maxim accords with duty.

General imperatives like prudential counsels and heuristics, can fall short of laws by permitting exceptions in at least two ways. There may be exceptional occasions (e.g. when you really, really, really don’t want to), and there may be individuals excepted from the command (e.g. everybody *else* ought to do it). Since these exceptions make the difference between a maxim that can have universal form and a maxim that can have only general form according to Kant, it will turn out that any maxim that trades on an exception for its value cannot have moral worth. For example, the maxim “Be a free
"rider!" depends in an integral way upon taking oneself to be exceptional. The point can also be put in terms of the subjective/objective distinction. If the necessitation of a general maxim is entirely subjective, the universalization will fail according to Kant because the ground-to-consequence (or representation-to-action) relation depends on contingent and idiosyncratic inclinations, i.e. it depends upon "exceptional" non-rational feelings. If, on the other hand, the effect or action is objectively necessitated, according to Kant the universal generalization is logically valid because any idiosyncratic inclinations that might be present are merely hindrances (like a sort of volitional friction) rather than exceptions that are integral to the command.

To put the idea another way, consider Kant's claim that for beings with imperfect wills like ours, what is objectively necessary is subjectively only contingent. Suppose the ultimate ground of an action is a subjective contingency, e.g. an inclination. In this case the consequent action is necessary only given that contingent ground, the necessity is relative to a contingent instance. I may be able to act as I ought (according to duty) from inclination today, for example, but tomorrow I may not be so inclined. Rendering this in terms of a mathematical induction, this is equivalent to being able to prove the base case, say \( n=1 \) for today, but not the induction rule \( n \rightarrow n+a \). If the ultimate ground of an action is objectively necessary, though, the moral possibility in one case should guarantee the moral possibility of the next. If it is ever possible to act from duty, it is always possible to act from duty. Kant's metaphysical problem then is not to prove the rule, but to prove the base case -- that it is ever possible to act solely from respect for law, spontaneously from pure reason, or that we are transcendentally free.

Suppose the universalization of a maxim is an inductive sort of logical inference from a general form that may permit of exceptions to a universal form that does not, and the standard of success or failure is whether the universal form is contradictory in some
way. Even if the details were quite clear, this still seems an odd choice of procedure for
the moral schematism. Logic is a convenient context that promises to provide very clear-
cut results in the end, but it seems to have little to do with causality or moral worth as we
commonly understand it, even given the mathematical motivation I describe above.
Consider, however, that the moral schematism presented here arises from the context of a
transcendental analytic of practical reason and it is aimed specifically towards
determining the special content of moral science. This is metaphysics, not normative
ethics or moral psychology. Kant is attempting to establish the supreme principle of
morality as part of the establishment of moral metaphysics as a science. The moral good
is really objective practical necessity. Moreover, in order to “be” a supreme principle of
practical reason or a canonic principle of moral science or a moral law, the categorical
imperative at issue would have to be convertible with each of these. In order to
determine whether a proposed subjective principle of volition (maxim) is morally worthy,
then, we may attempt a logical conversion to see whether it has the form that a moral
canon must have. Since supreme principles, canonic principles, and laws must be
universal, Kant has a programmatic reason to consider whether the maxim can be
requantified as a universal imperative.

§9 Formulating the Categorical Imperative

In *Groundwork I* Kant effectively defined morality as dutiful willing. The
concern was to use the method of analysis to discover the marks belonging to the concept
of morally good willing in order to arrive at a philosophically clear and distinct idea of
morality. Now in *Groundwork II* the concern is not to clarify and make distinct the
concept of morality, but to do the equivalent for its object, namely to determine the object
or the extension of the concept. **The object of moral science is willing,** so in order to
determine the object of morality Kant will need to predicate morality of *activities.* Given
the analysis of *Groundwork I*, he will need to predicate *duty* of activities. Since the properties of an object are determined by the *laws* which govern them, the first order of business is to identify the law or laws governing this kind of object with sufficient precision to support the predication. *A formula* is a precise, determinate, universal proposition. What Kant first needs, then, is a formula of the law in question. Only once this is in place can he determine the content of moral science.

As we saw in the last chapter, the analysis of practical reason in ¶13-28 generated several logical marks of the objective principle of volition, a.k.a. the law of volition: imperative, categorical, apodictic, synthetic. Just afterwards, Kant makes the prima facie surprising claim that we know the formula of the law from only two of these:

> [W]e want first to inquire whether the mere concept of a categorical imperative may not also provide its formula containing the proposition which alone can be a categorical imperative…[W]hen I think of a categorical imperative I know at once what it contains. For, since the imperative contains, beyond the law, only the necessity that the maxim be in conformity with this law, while the law contains no condition to which it would be limited, nothing is left with which the maxim of action is to conform but the universality of law as such; and this conformity alone is what the imperative properly represents as [practically] *necessary* [i.e. as good]. (G 4:420-21 bold mine)

Though it seems that Kant is claiming to know what a categorical imperative must contain only from these two marks of its logical form, this is not quite the case. Categorical *statements* *predicate* something of a subject. Categorical *interrogatives* instead *ask* something of a subject. Categorical *imperatives* *command* something of a subject. The content of the imperative is that which is commanded (the counterpart of the predicate). If what is commanded is the production of an object as effect, the categorical imperative would by default have the form “Do X!” The formula Kant identifies as the formula of the categorical imperative does not look quite like this. The formula of the
categorical imperative Kant identifies as meeting the requirements described in the quote above is commonly known as the Formula of Universal Law:

\[
\text{FUL:} \text{ Act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law. (G 4:421)}
\]

The problem with the categorical imperative form “Do X!” is that it implicitly requires the achievement of an effect. Kant has argued earlier that it cannot be the accomplishment of effects that are commanded because this would make the will only conditionally good. Kant’s argument for this form of the imperative began with the initial analysis of good will in *Groundwork I* where he claimed that a will that is good without qualification would have to be absolutely, unconditionally good in itself. In *Groundwork II* Kant returned to the issue in his argument that the moral imperative would have to be categorical. The argument is briefly this. The good is the practically necessary. The practically necessary is that which necessarily follows in the derivation of an action from law, i.e. in willing or practical rationality. What follows in this sense is what is commanded or necessitated, and this is the content of the moral imperative. Given the effective equivalence of goodness and imperative content, which we might certainly press, any condition involved in the imperative content (apart from the law itself) would constitute a condition of the goodness of the will. Since a morally good will must be absolutely, unconditionally good in itself, the formula of the law can contain no condition to which it would be limited, including the requirement that some effect be achieved. In other words, it cannot be a hypothetical imperative of the form “If Q then do X!”, and it cannot be a nominally categorical imperative of the form “Do X!” if X is the achievement of an effect because the latter form may obscure a condition.

In order to capture Kant’s unconditionality requirement properly we should take the categorical imperative to have the form “Act such that…!” rather than “Do X!”.
form allows the content of the imperative, i.e. what is commanded, to be more easily construed as a way of acting rather than the achievement of some external state of affairs, and it is the form Kant’s formulas in fact have.

So far we know very little about the content of the categorical imperative. We are looking for a formula that contains a proposition that can be a categorical imperative. Kant says the imperative contains exactly two things. First the formula must “contain” the law insofar as it is a formula of law. This would get us only a vague imperative like “Act legally!”, which is neither precise nor determinate.

Second and more importantly, Kant says the formula contains the necessity that the maxim be in conformity with this law. In order to justify this claim, Kant must appeal to *Groundwork I*. A maxim is a subjective principle of volition. The analysis in *Groundwork II* has concerned instead the objective principle of volition (the law). According to *Groundwork I*, morally good willing is acting from duty, which is more specifically the necessity of acting from respect for law. Respect for law subjectively described is moral feeling. This is not at issue. Respect for law objectively described is pure conformity to law. The relevant claim from *Groundwork I* is that morally good willing is acting in pure conformity to law. If the ground-to-consequence relation is not at issue, but only the form of the principle of volition or the formula of the law, pure conformity should be thought of as an accordance rather than as “acting from”. (To formulate the law in terms of acting from would require appeal to a causal ground, but accordance is quite neutral.) This gets us to an imperative like “Act in accordance with law!”. Now any accordance requires two relata. The law is obviously that to which one’s action is necessitated to conform, so this is one of the accordance relata. The one thing we know about laws is that they must be universal. Gravity holds for physical
objects whenever and wherever they are encountered, no matter the circumstances. The law of volition must be similarly universal for volition or willing. As I explained in the last section, there is textual evidence that Kant thought we could ascertain whether a maxim accords with the universality of law by attempting a universal generalization.

The obvious candidate for the second relatum should be the subjective principle of volition, i.e. the maxim. Both times Kant introduced the concept of duty, first in *Groundwork I* and then again in *Groundwork II*, he emphasized that the kind of will we humans have is one for which whatever is objectively necessary is not thereby also subjectively necessary. In other words, the subjectively necessary (the agreeable) is not necessarily in accord with the objectively necessary (the good). The *possible discord* between subjective and objective principle is precisely what makes a human will necessitated according to Kant and this in turn is why the form of the objective principle must be imperative. If what the law commands is pure conformity and this is a command that something accord with law, the maxim must be the second relatum. Supposing the content of the categorical imperative is the accordance of one’s maxim with the universality of law, the imperative should be something like a formula of accordance with law:

FAL: Act such that your maxim accords with the universality of law!

All of this so far depends not only on Kant’s identification of the objective principle of volition as being categorically imperative, but also upon the analysis by which he arrived at this identification. In order to understand why Kant thinks the content of the imperative must involve maxims, again, we must trace the imperative back to his concept of necessitation, which involves a possible discord between the subjective and objective principles of volition. Kant very explicitly claims that any will that does
not involve such a possible discord, e.g. a holy or divine will, is not a necessitated will and the form of its principle is not even under consideration.

We are now quite close to the formula Kant actually identifies as the formula of the moral law. The aspect of the formula that has not yet been justified is the implied thought experiment in acting only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law.

[FUL:] Act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law. (G 4:421).

This is a very odd description of the manner in which one must act in order to act morally. It arguably alludes to divine aspirations or delusory powers that we might think are vices (pride, greed) and ought to be strongly discouraged. Even worse, Kant’s nearly immediate reformulation of the moral law refers to nature. These remaining problems will be addressed in the next chapter.

\[i\] “Now these concepts, which contain a priori the pure thinking in every experience, we find in the categories, and it is already a sufficient deduction of them and justification of their objective validity if we can prove that by means of them alone an object can be thought. But since in such a thought there is more at work than the single faculty of thinking, namely the understanding, [but also pure intuition:] and the understanding itself, as a faculty of cognition that is to be related to objects, also requires an elucidation of the possibility of this relation, we must first assess not the empirical but the transcendental constitution of the subjective sources that comprise the a priori foundations for the possibility of experience” (A97).

\[ii\] As Kant explains it, the reason why the principles of synthesis and schemata belong to the Analytic of Principles is that the categories call into question the objective validity of space as well:

With the pure concepts of the understanding, however, there first arises the unavoidable need to search for the transcendental deduction not only of them but also of space, for since they speak of objects not through predicates of intuition and sensibility but through those of pure a priori thinking, they relate to objects generally without any conditions of sensibility; and since they are not grounded in experience and cannot exhibit any object in a priori intuition on which to ground their synthesis prior to any experience, they not only arouse suspicion about the objective validity and limits of their use but also make the concept of space ambiguous by inclining us to use it beyond the conditions of sensible intuition, on which account a transcendental deduction of it was also needed above.

(A88/B120)

[A] difficulty is revealed here that we did not encounter in the field of sensibility, namely how subjective conditions of thinking should have objective validity, i.e., yield conditions of the possibility
of all cognition of objects; for appearances can certainly be given in intuition without functions of the understanding” (A89-90/B122). “…appearances could after all be so constituted that the understanding would not find them in accord with the conditions of its unity, and everything would then lie in such confusion that…the concepts of cause and effect] would therefore be entirely empty, nugatory, and without significance. Appearance would nonetheless offer objects to our intuition, for intuition by no means requires the functions of thinking. (A90/B123)

As evidence that ¶13-28 do not constitute even a complete transcendental analytic of concepts, supposing one thought otherwise, the marks Kant attributes to the objective principle of volition here are logical forms of judgment, not categories. It is the categories that are specifically transcendental marks, and Kant does not introduce the categories of freedom as the practical categories until the Critique of Practical Reason (A88-90/B120-3, B128). Since the marks of concern in ¶13-28 are logical forms of judgment, Kant is primarily concerned here with the a priori theoretical determination of the practical moral object, where this object is willing. This determination is an appropriate task for the Groundwork even though it leads to the fundamental problem of cognitive synthesis that Kant cannot yet solve. The practical determination of the practical object concerns instead the product of moral willing (the highest good), but this goes beyond the scope of this dissertation.

This is an unavoidable presupposition of the method of analysis. The method of analysis presupposes that it is possible to make the analysandum more distinct without changing its identity.

As an interesting note, these three grammatical forms correspond roughly to the problematic, assertoric, and apodictic modes of judgment, perhaps suggesting that they are modal predicables. Kant does not consider interrogatives, though, and it is arguable that interrogatives are not judgments at all.

The example Kant discusses in his justification of including infinite quality as a distinct moment is predicate negation, as in “F is not G” (A72/B97). This is the infinite form of a categorical proposition. The infinite form of a hypothetical proposition would be “If P then not Q”.

Though Kant does discuss categorical and hypothetical syllogisms, it is important to keep in mind that the designation of a syllogism as categorical, hypothetical, or disjunctive is parasitic upon the propositional relation:

In every syllogism I think first a rule (the major [premise]) through the understanding. [E.g. All men are mortal.] Second, I subsume a cognition under the condition of the rule (the minor [premise]) by means of the power of judgment. [E.g. Socrates is a man.] Finally, I determine my cognition through the predicate of the rule (the conclusion), hence a priori through reason. [E.g. Socrates is mortal.] Thus the relation between a cognition [Socrates] and its condition [man], which the major represents as the rule constitutes the different kinds of syllogisms. They are therefore threefold – just as are all judgments in general – insofar as they are distinguished by the way they express the relation of cognition to the understanding: namely, categorical or hypothetical or disjunctive syllogisms. (A304/B360 emphasis mine)

As the passage indicates, all syllogisms must have conditions, so “categorical” cannot mean unconditional (See also A300/B357). Notice that it is really the minor premise that determines whether a syllogism is categorical in the quote above. This leaves room for Kant to say that practical reason is the derivation of an action from a law by means of a representation, where the law has the role of major premise, the representation is a categorically imperative minor premise, and the conclusion is the action.

Since Kant does not provide a term that cuts across volition and intuition, I will be using this locution to streamline the conversion of the theoretical issue into an equivalent practical conception of the problem. Kant explains the theoretical manifold of particularity as follows:
In whatever way and through whatever means a cognition may relate to objects, that through which it relates immediately to them, and at which all thought as a means is directed as an end, is \textit{intuition}. This, however, takes place only insofar as the object is given to us; but this in turn, <at least for humans,> is possible only if it affects the mind in a certain way. The capacity (receptivity) to acquire representations through the way in which we are affected by objects is called \textit{sensibility}. Objects are therefore \textit{given} to us by means of sensibility, and it alone affords us \textit{intuitions}; but they are \textit{thought} through the understanding, and from it arise \textit{concepts}. But all thought, whether straightaway (directe) or through a detour (indirecte), must, <by means of certain marks,> ultimately be related to intuitions, thus, in our case, to sensibility, since there is no other way in which objects can be given to us.

The effect of an object on the capacity for representation, insofar as we are affected by it, is \textit{sensation}. That intuition which is related to the object through sensation is called \textit{empirical}. The undetermined object of an empirical intuition is called \textit{appearance}. I call that in the appearance which corresponds to sensation its \textit{matter}, but that which allows the manifold of appearance to be intuited as ordered in certain relations I call the \textit{form} of appearance.(A19/B33)

The practical equivalent of the manifold of appearance Kant describes here would be a manifold of feeling or desire, though there is no adequate common name for this. My locution \textit{manifold of particularity} is intended to be a term that comprehends appearance and its practical equivalent.

\textsuperscript{ix} Kant had an eye to solving this problem even in the first \textit{Critique}: “There are only two possible cases in which synthetic representation and its objects can come together, necessarily relate to each other, and, as it were, meet each other: Either if the object alone makes the representation possible, or if the representation alone makes the object possible. If it is the first, then this relation is only empirical, and the representation is never possible \textit{a priori}. And this is the case with appearances in respect of that in it which belongs to sensation. But if it is the second, then \textit{since representation in itself} (for we are \textit{not} here talking about its causality by means of the will) \textit{does not produce its objects as far as its existence is concerned, the representation is still determinant of the object \textit{a priori} if it is possible through it alone to cognize something as an object}” (A92/B124-5 emphasis mine).

\textsuperscript{x} Insofar as respect is an effect of the moral law, it has an “analogy with fear” because we obey externally imposed laws for fear of punishment (4: 401*). Insofar as respect is self-wrought, it has an “analogy with inclination” because to take an interest in something is somewhat like being inclined towards it. So feeling in the loose sense resolves into subjective and objective representations. The subjective representation is pleasure or displeasure, which concerns the relation of the principle representation to the subject. The objective representation is the objective principle, i.e. the representation whereby the object is produced. Respect for law indicates the (temporal) precedence of the subjective indicated above without violating the imperative priority of law. When we represent the law to ourselves, this produces an effect in us that is pleasant. (See the Preface to the \textit{Religion}, and \textit{Lectures on Philosophical Theology}: Cosmotheology 95-6 for later and more precise descriptions.)

\textsuperscript{xi} The mediating representation is a ground, but not an absolute ground of action. In the syllogism
\[
\text{All } F \text{ is } G \\
\text{All } G \text{ is } H \\
\therefore \text{ All } F \text{ is } H
\]
G is the mediator above, not the major premise. G is an inferential ground of H, but not the only one or the highest one.
Chapter 7  The Nature of Teleology: Criteria for the a priori Determination of a Real Object of Moral Metaphysical Science

In the last chapter I argued that §13-28 is the beginnings of a transcendental analytic of practical reason in which Kant systematically identifies the most important features of the logical form of the objective principle of morality, a.k.a the moral law. I argued that this analysis can reasonably be construed to justify his initial formulation of the categorical imperative, with one possible exception. The exception was the prima facie self-aggrandizing character of the procedural relationship between maxim and law. I argued that the general procedural character of Kant’s specification of the accordance of maxim and law satisfies one of the requirements of a transcendental analytic, namely that a transcendental schema or type must represent a procedure. I also argued that the use of universalization is an appeal to a logical inference, universal generalization, which should be welcome in a transcendental analytic. It still remains to be explained why universal generalization should be described as making one’s maxim through one’s will a universal law. This does not sound like a logical inference; it sounds more like a kind of causality that obviously exceeds human power.

To add to this perplexity, almost immediately after Kant introduces his first formula of the categorical imperative, FUL, he introduces yet another formula known as the Formula of Universal Law of Nature (FULN):

[FUL:] Act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law. (G 4:421)

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121 It may already seem that Kant’s transcendental argument has outstripped the resources of his analysis because no need for a moral schematism or typic has been established in the Groundwork itself. I would contend that the need for a moral typic follows as soon as the categorical imperative has been identified as a synthetic a priori proposition, assuming the first Critique has done its work as Kant intended. The typic itself, though, is best left until the categories of freedom and respect have been introduced explicitly as the relata of the synthesis for practical cognition in the second Critique.

122 P(c) → ∀x ∈ X P(x).
Since the universality of law in accordance with which effects take place constitutes what is properly called *nature* in the most general sense (as regards its form) – that is, the existence of things insofar as it is determined in accordance with universal laws – the universal imperative of duty can also go as follows [FULN]: *act as if the maxim of your action were to become by your will a universal law of nature.* (G 4:421)

This reference to nature in FULN and its analogical character are even more peculiar. The appeal to universality in FUL may appear to be somewhat ad hoc or unjustified, but there is no obvious reason to think it contradicts any of Kant’s other positions. The potentially vicious law-making involved in FUL is troublesome, but it can be resolved in the end since one turns out to be making a law only for oneself. The appeal to analogy in FULN, in contrast, seems to greatly deflate the “absolute necessity” of morality, and the introduction of nature in FULN seems to be an outright mistake on Kant’s part.

There are many ways to put this latter point. Kant has been trying to argue all along that rational beings are not entirely subject to nature, but are instead transcendentally free. Yet in his justificatory introduction of FULN Kant seems to premise the formula on some restriction of morality to nature, as if morality were subject to nature, or as if the goodness of a morally good will could be qualified. It might well follow that we are unfree. To put the problem a slightly different way, as I claimed in chapter 6 Kant thinks it is a popular mistake to take nature to be the entire realm of legal determination. Nature is the empirical realm of physics according to Kant, but morality is *metaphysical*, *real*, and a priori. Reality is a realm of legal determination that is broader than that of nature and which includes nature as one of its divisions. FULN seems to involve the popular mistake of taking nature rather than reality to be the relevant realm of legal determination for morality. This would make morality empirical, at least in part, which Kant clearly and repeatedly denies.
To put the problem in yet another, but ultimately far more useful way, given the close textual association between nature and teleology in Kant’s critical philosophy, Kant’s substitution of natural law for universal law in his transition from FUL to FULN may easily be mistaken for an inference from the teleology of nature to the teleology of morality. Though it is in some sense obvious that willing is teleological according to Kant, since he seems to take it quite for granted in the *Groundwork* that willing involves ends or purposes (*Zwecke*), the teleology of Kant’s moral theory is surprisingly controversial even apart from the priority issue. Kant’s “purely formal” deontology has traditionally been thought to be diametrically opposed to and incompatible with teleology, and yet many Kant scholars assume or argue that either the inclusion of nature in FULN or the involvement of even a purely formal end (of humanity) in the second formula of the moral law makes it, and therefore morality, teleological. The problem is aggravated by the fact that Kant speaks of purposiveness (*Zweckmäßigheit*), his ubiquitous and general term for teleological sorts of things, in widely differing terms depending upon the context. For example, Kant explicitly assumes that an organized system involves means and end, at least in some contexts. In other contexts he posits drives and functions, elements and uses. Sometimes he indicates that teleological or purposive systems involve material and form.

I will make no attempt here to sort out the various positions or even specify clearly what is at stake in the controversy over Kant’s teleology. What I want to do in this chapter is to use Kant’s treatment of teleology to access distinctions and criteria that help explain Kant’s method in *Groundwork II*. The first payoff will be a reason to think that both the “as if”, specifically analogical, procedural character of the moral law and the

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123 Kant’s *Critique of Teleological Judgment* begins with a very useful analysis of the varieties of purposiveness.
reference to nature in FULN are both motivated by a specific criterion of empirical significance. The second payoff will be a criterion of cognitive significance that is not limited to empirical significance, extension of cognition without contradiction. Together these two criteria will help explain Kant’s division of duty according to the first formula.

As a preview of where the investigation of purposiveness will lead, consider that according to Kant the moral law must command entirely a priori, determine its object entirely a priori, and be a ground of a priori insight. We humans are actually influenced by contingent inclinations, though, and the moral law cannot determine these contingent particulars of our actual willing (though it might determine the necessary particulars of actual willing).\(^\text{124}\) This leads to a tension. The supreme principle of morality must determine its object entirely a priori, and yet it must still have empirical significance without thereby being a ground of empirical insight. The significance of purposiveness in natural science is closely connected to the significance of transcendental ideas, especially God, and both involve a similar tension. Kant’s treatment of these two tensions will show that the moral law must a) be a priori constitutive of how we ought to conduct ourselves and b) have empirical significance by regulating our actual practice.\(^\text{125}\) More specifically, in order for a concept or idea to have any significance at all, it must extend cognition without contradiction. Once these criteria have been made explicit, FUL is easily identifiable as the principle for a priori cognitive moral insight, while FULN expresses the empirical significance of the moral law without compromising its pure a priori status: If the moral law is to have empirical significance, it will have to be a

\[^{124}\text{The particularity of respect would be necessary, but the particularity of feeling in general is contingent.}\]

\[^{125}\text{To give a general idea of how this should work out, we ought to conduct ourselves as if we are perfectly intelligent designers authoring a legal realm like the kingdom of nature to which we are subject. Insofar as our designs are intelligent, we actually do behave so.}\]
necessary maxim of reason that we think (deliberate) of the natural empirical effects of our actions as if they are products of our will, even though these effects are not entirely within our control. Since a cognitively significant representation must serve to extend cognition in some way without contradiction, even if it is an idea of a transcendental object, Kant will need to show in *Groundwork II* that the employment of the concept duty does not lead to contradiction before he attempts to show that the object of morality is real.

My overall goal is still to show that we need not reverse-engineer the text in order to understand Kant’s method. What I want to do in this chapter is explain these distinctions and criteria somewhat apart from the context of *Groundwork II* in the hope that by addressing some of the subtleties and justifying the criteria in general, some objections and misunderstandings may be preempted. Since teleology is a very broad and ambiguous term both in the scholastic tradition and in Kant scholarship, it will help to first orient the investigation of teleology by identifying three potentially independent conceptions of teleology attributable to Kant from a surface reading of his critical philosophy.

§1 Three Conceptions of Teleology: Scholastic, Technical, and Metaphysical

Teleology as I have described it thus far is a generically organic scholastic model according to which purposive things are understood in terms of something like the four Aristotelian causes: first cause, form, material, final cause. As we have seen, this scholastic model of teleology (derived primarily from *natural* philosophy) is supported by Kant’s treatment of organization in natural science and his descriptions in the *Critique of Pure Reason* of the faculties as having drives, elements, uses and ends (KU 5:371). If we think of these four “causes” as the most general descriptions of four roles that are necessary features of scholastic purposiveness, this leaves room for Kant to explain the
purposiveness of particular organic entities in terms of more specific conceptions of these roles:

1. first cause (impulse, drive, need)
2. form (operation, use, whole)
3. material (element, manifold, part)
4. final cause (function, vocation, purpose)

This natural understanding of teleology is the conception of teleology to which Kant most plausibly appeals in the vocation of reason argument in *Groundwork I*. If Kant is right, we commonly understand reason and will in terms of these four scholastic roles. Since common understanding is “healthy” according to Kant, we may presume he thinks there is at least some truth to our understanding of reason in terms of scholastic purposiveness.

*Groundwork II*, however, prima facie involves a means-end *technical* teleology. *Technical* teleology is the common means-ends, hypothetically imperative understanding we have of our own activity, of human agency or voluntary action. The second formula of the moral law, typically called the Formula of Humanity, is also prima facie technically teleological in that it commands that we treat humanity always as an *end* in itself and never as a mere *means* (G 4:429). This sense of teleology appears in Kant’s treatment of natural science, and it is this sense of teleology upon which Kant scholars like Guyer, Paton, and Korsgaard rely in their arguments concerning whether and in what way Kant’s moral philosophy is teleological.

Consider briefly the relation between scholastic and technical teleology. Technical teleology involves only two roles. An end might be reducible to a final cause, but it is difficult to see how means could reduce to any or all of the remaining roles. Consider also that these two conceptions of teleology do not explain phenomena equally well. For example, according to common understanding *I* am not a will. Though I commonly think of *myself* as using means to my ends, I do not commonly conceive my
will or reason as using means to their own ends. To attribute means and ends to my will itself, as if my will has its own means and ends independently of mine, risks alienation or personification. Even if I commonly understand my will to have a function, e.g. to serve my ends, my ends are surely something else (c.f. Korsgaard). According to common understanding, then, it seems that human activities are better explained technically and faculties are better explained scholastically. It appears then that technical and scholastic purposiveness are prima facie irreducible and potentially incompatible.

There is also a third sense of teleology present in Kant’s work that contends with these other two conceptions of teleology. Kant’s philosophical or *metaphysical* understanding of teleology is a clear and distinct understanding of our pursuit of ends according to which willing is a kind of *practical cognition*. Metaphysical teleology in Kant’s sense is the synthetic a priori practical cognition of an object, i.e. the rational determination (production) of an end through its representation. Metaphysical teleology requires an understanding of will as practical reason, and of ourselves as rational beings.

It is this metaphysical understanding of teleology at which Kant needs to arrive the in the *Groundwork* in order to give a philosophically adequate explanation of the possibility of pure practice, i.e. moral metaphysical science. Using Kant’s most specific language, *intentional* teleology is practical cognition in Kant’s first *Critique* sense. Compare Kant’s description of practical cognition in the first quote from the first *Critique* with the second quote from the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*:

Insofar as there is to be reason in these sciences, something in them must be cognized a priori, and this cognition can relate to its object in either of two ways, either merely determining the object and its concept (which must be given from elsewhere), or else also making the object actual. The former is theoretical, the latter practical cognition of reason. In both the pure part, the part in which reason determines its object wholly a priori, must be expounded all by itself. (Bix-x emphasis mine)

If one would define what an end is in accordance with its transcendental determinations (without presupposing anything empirical, such as the feeling of
pleasure), then an end is the object of a concept insofar as the latter is regarded as the cause of the former (the real ground of its possibility);[ii] and the causality of a concept with regard to its object is purposiveness (forma finalis). (MFNS 5:219 emphasis mine, see also KU 5:220)

As these passages indicate, practical cognition is the production of an object by representing it, and this is purposiveness in the robust “forma finalis” sense. This sense of practical cognition is what Kant calls intentional purposiveness:

A fundamental force, which creates an organization, must therefore be thought of as a cause operating on the basis of purposes, and in such a way that these purposes must be basic to the possibility of the effect. But we know such forces according to their intentional basis, through experience, only in ourselves, that is to say, in our reason and will, as the cause of the possibility of certain effects directed entirely toward ends, namely artifacts. Reason and will are with us fundamental forces, of which the latter, insofar as it is determined by the former, is the capacity to produce something according to an idea, which is called the purpose. (8:181-2 emphasis mine; see also KU 5:376 and A538/B566a)

In the Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment Kant says outright that this human causality is teleological:

[W]e have in the world only a single sort of being whose causality is teleological … The being of this sort is the human being. (KU 5:435)

§2 Kant’s Theory of Cognitive Significance

Kant first introduces teleology in the Critique of Pure Reason (first Critique), but his most extensive treatment of purposiveness is in the Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment (third Critique). There are two closely related problems concerning the purposiveness of nature that Kant addresses at length in these texts. In his solution to the two problems to be identified shortly, Kant distinguishes between the constitutive use of the intellect to determine real objects and thereby provide cognitive insight, on the one hand, and the regulative use of the intellect to reflect transcendentially ideal objects, which has cognitive significance without insight. Kant will need this distinction, or something very close to it, in order to explain how the moral law can command a priori
how we ought to conduct ourselves and have significance in regulating our actual behavior despite the fact that we are naturally influenced by contingent inclinations.

The first, simpler, problem is the problem of purposiveness in natural science. Teleology in natural science is philosophically problematic for Kant because he thought natural laws must be strictly mechanical and yet he recognized that natural scientists need concepts like purpose and design, at least with respect to organisms. Since metaphysics is to be the foundation of natural science, the question natural science poses to metaphysics is from whence it inherits teleological ideas and what legitimate role, if any, they have for natural science. Kant’s answer is that the pure concepts of the understanding for the determining power of judgment are sufficient for the material articulation of natural science; but ideas of reason, including teleological ones, are needed to guide and regulate the scientific investigation of nature. It is critical to keep in mind that this claim is specific to natural science; it is not a claim that teleological concepts or purposes can never determine objects of any sort in any context.

The second relevant problem Kant considers concerns the limitations of speculative theology.iii As part of a larger project to ascertain the limitations of speculative metaphysics, Kant’s primary theological concern is to preempt or refute design arguments for the existence of God, especially arguments that purport to determine predicates of God (which would constitute insight into God’s nature). Kant wants to show that the object of our representations of a highest being is “given only in the idea”, which makes God as object transcendentally ideal.

These two problems are closely connected. Design arguments for the existence of God typically work by beginning with natural objects that cannot be scientifically investigated without attributing a design, function or purpose to them. If there is a design, there must be a designer, or so the argument goes. Organisms and organs are not
artifacts, so we are not their designers (and besides, we are not that smart). Nature is itself inanimate, so nature is not the designer. This leaves only some other supremely intelligent designer. Furthermore, an actual design implies a real designer. If this sort of argument works, natural laws might include teleological laws, and speculative theology might have no bounds.

Kant’s general strategy of response is to contrast the purposiveness of nature with intentional purposiveness in order to illuminate the reason why design arguments for the existence of God as a real object of cognition must fail. The issue for both natural science and speculative theology is whether purposiveness constitutively determines real objects and thereby provides cognitive insight or whether it merely reflectively regulates transcendentally ideal objects and provides only cognitive significance without insight.

With regard to the first problem of teleology, i.e. whether there are teleological natural laws, Kant argues that even though it is a subjectively necessary maxim of reason that we think of organic things in nature “as if” they were ends produced by design, the purposiveness of nature is not a ground of cognitive insight (determinate judgment):

In order to avoid even the least suspicion of wanting to mix into our cognitive grounds something that does not belong in physics as all, namely a supernatural cause, in teleology we certainly talk about nature as if the purposiveness in it were intentional, but at the same time ascribe this intention to nature, i.e. to matter, by which we would indicate (since there can be no misunderstanding here, because no intention in the strict sense of the term can be attributed to any lifeless matter) that this term signifies here only a principle of the reflecting, not of the determining power of judgment, and is thus not meant to add to the use of reason another kind of research besides that in accordance with mechanical laws…rather, such talk is only meant to designate a kind of causality in nature, in accordance with an analogy with our own causality in the technical use of reason, in order to keep before us the rule in accordance with which research into certain products of nature must be conducted. (KU 5:382-3 emphasis mine)

Furthermore, Kant argues that we cannot be objectively justified in judging that natural things were produced according to a representation, i.e. by design, at all:

But that things of nature [actually] serve one another as means to ends, and that their possibility itself should be adequately intelligible only through this kind of
causality, for that we have no basis as all in the general idea of nature as the sum of the objects of the senses … [W]e have no basis at all for presuming a priori that ends that are not our own, and which also cannot pertain to nature (which we cannot assume as an intelligent being), nevertheless can or should constitute a special kind of causality, or at least an entirely unique lawlikeness thereof …Moreover, even experience cannot prove the reality of this. (KU 5:359)

The gist of Kant’s argument is that we do not have any basis at all for judging that organic natural forms are actually designed by us, by nature, or by God. If we take the notion of design literally, which we must in this argument, then we cannot judge that there are actual designs. Without actual designs in nature, there is no basis for positing the reality of God or teleological natural laws. Mechanics will do. To put the point in terms of determination, Kant is arguing that we have no basis for claiming that teleological laws determine natural organic forms and therefore we cannot justifiably predicate intentional properties of natural things. We can and must think of organic forms as having teleological properties, but we may not judge that the objects actually have these properties.iv

These somewhat deflationary descriptions of the teleology involved in natural science are easily misinterpreted. At the extreme it might seem that there is no real teleology anywhere. Living things, organs, faculties and sciences would all fail to be genuinely teleological in any sense even though we necessarily speak and think of them in purposive terms. If the claim were truly this general then reason, will, and morality would fail to be teleological. To put the point more perspicuously with respect to the Groundwork, as Kant indicates in Groundwork I, our common understanding of nature is teleological. But even though common understanding is usually healthy, i.e. correct, Kant argues in the first and third Critiques to the effect that this aspect of our common understanding of nature is inaccurate. Even in Groundwork I Kant allows that common understanding can be mistaken even though it is generally healthy, when he argues that the vocation of reason is not happiness as we commonly assume. These common
mistakes raise the issue of whether morality is subject to the same argument. Perhaps we necessarily proceed as if we are free to conduct ourselves morally, one might argue, but this is a delusion on our part.

I think this reading is very clearly wrong even from the quotes above. In many of the passages where Kant considers the application of teleological concepts to natural science, he contrasts natural science to reason and will, and he implies that reason and will are the genuinely teleological intentional exemplars on which we base our analogical attributions of teleology to nature. In other words it is our purposiveness, not as human beings belonging to nature but as metaphysically free rational beings, that lies at the basis of our analogical attribution of purposiveness to nature. Kant’s claim, again, is that we necessarily think of things in nature, i.e. we reflect on them, as if they were purposive because we are purposive, but this is not to judge that these natural systems actually are designed. The problem of teleology in natural science is not how to explain the purposiveness of human action, but how to explain the appearance of purposiveness in organisms, weather, and other systematic phenomena that bear some resemblance to intentionality but which are not genuinely intentional. Intelligence or reason is the basis for the application of teleology to biology, but its merely regulatory status in natural science is no reflection of its proper role for metaphysics. Kant’s order of explanation is from the genuine teleology of will, reason, and thus morality to the (somewhat

126 The scholastic purposiveness of reason in the first Critique and the common analysis of Groundwork I are at least purposive in the natural science sense. Insofar as we are to critique, or investigate, reason as a faculty, it is subjectively necessary for us to think of reason in scholastic teleological terms simply because reason is an organized system. This merely regulative, reflective purposiveness of reason is easily mistaken for, or confounded with, the intentional purposiveness of reason.

127 Lest it be objected that empirical science is in part practical and this reflects on moral science, moral science concerns pure practice, i.e. moral conduct. As a bounded science, it does not concern psychological or anthropological empirical aspects of practice. Ethics more general does include empirical practice.
deflated) teleology of nature. The questions natural science poses to metaphysics are not the primary issues for metaphysics proper. The problem of teleology in metaphysics is quite different, i.e., to explain how it is possible for a synthetic a priori cognition to produce an object as its end.

Though it is less obvious, Kant’s arguments concerning the teleology of nature are also arguments that despite the fact that teleology does not belong to the determining power of judgment and reason with respect to nature, it nevertheless has cognitive significance for natural science. Recall that Kant’s conception of cognitive insight, scientific insight, and willing as a cognitive activity are all modeled on the complete determination of mathematical objects from their real definitions through construction, or constitution, in intuition. Kant’s critical aim in the context of teleology, apart from the speculative theological agenda, is to explain how “ideas of pure reason” like the idea of a highest being can have significance and use without determining objects:

[The] highest formal unity that alone rests on concepts of reason is the purposive unity of things; and the speculative interest of reason makes it necessary to regard every ordinance in the world as if it had sprouted from the intention of a highest reason. Such a principle, namely, opens up for our reason, as applied to the field of experience, entirely new prospects for connecting up things in the world in accordance with teleological laws, and thereby attaining to the greatest systematic unity among them. The presupposition of a supreme intelligence, as the sole cause of the world-whole, but of course merely in the idea, can therefore always be useful to reason and never harmful to it...As long as we keep to this presupposition as a regulative principle, then even error cannot do us any harm [at worst we find that] where we expected a teleological connection (nexus finalis), a merely mechanical or physical one (nexus effectivus) is to be found. (A687/B715 emphasis mine)

We can glean from this passage that by using the presupposition of a highest being “in the idea” as a “regulative principle” – which amounts roughly to thinking of the world “as if” it were intelligently designed – we extend the systematic unity of our experience of the world through teleological laws. The passage encourages the “regulative” use of
intentional teleology in application to nature, with a significant but vague caution regarding how this is to be done.

In order for a general representation like a concept or idea to have significance, it must be related to the element of a faculty of particular or concrete representation, e.g. intuition (sensibility) or volition (desire). Otherwise the general, abstract representation would be blind. The reason why both pure concepts and transcendental ideas require careful treatment from Kant’s point of view is precisely because the mathematical determination of an object is such a strong paradigm of insight that it is difficult to see how an idea could have any significance apart from its paradigmatic use in determining an object.

Kant handles this difficulty by retaining the criterion that transcendental ideas can only have significance through their use in determining objects, and arguing that this regulative or reflective use nevertheless departs from the paradigm because its relation to the determination of an object is very indirect. Transcendental ideas do not in any way determine their direct objects or provide insight into them, but their regulative use in empirical investigation nevertheless makes it possible or easier for other objects to be determined and this is what it means for them to be cognitively significant.

The constitutive use of the intellect is the paradigmatic determinate use of the intellect by which we gain cognitive insight through predication. In order for a representation to have cognitive significance without being a ground of insight, its relation to particulars (its extension of cognition) must be explained via something other than predicative determination. The alternative proposed here is the regulative use of an idea, which is a heuristic use. Though we may use purposive concepts to regulate our investigation of nature, we cannot thereby determine nature. We cannot be objectively justified in judging, for example, that an organ has an actual purpose, even though we can
scarcely investigate an organ scientifically without thinking of it as having one. The use of teleology to regulate investigation for natural science exemplifies how a representation can have cognitive significance and can lead indirectly to cognitive insight even though it is not itself a ground of cognitive insight for those objects.

§3 The Analogical Extension of Moral Cognition to Nature

This distinction between significance and insight is worth developing a bit further. Kant says the purpose of the critique of speculative theology is to give a deduction of the ideas of reason, where these are ideas in the strict sense, i.e. transcendental ideas. He admits he cannot give a transcendental deduction of the same kind for these ideas as he did for the pure concepts, and shortly thereafter states the method he thinks he can use:

[If one can show that although the three kinds of transcendental ideas (psychological, cosmological and theological) cannot be referred directly to any object corresponding to them and to its determination, and nevertheless that all rules of the empirical use of reason under the presupposition of such an object in the idea lead to systematic unity, always extending the cognition of experience but never going contrary to experience, then it is a necessary maxim of reason to proceed in accordance with such ideas. And this is the transcendental deduction of all the ideas of speculative reason, not as constitutive principles for the extension of our cognition to more objects than experience can give, but as regulative principles for the systematic unity of the manifold of empirical cognition in general, through which this cognition, within its proper boundaries, is cultivated and corrected more than could happen without such ideas. (A671/B699 italics mine)]

Notice that Kant says here that the significance of the three transcendental ideas must be deduced by showing that they extend cognition of experience without contradicting experience.\textsuperscript{128} This criterion that cognitively significant representations of

\textsuperscript{128} This is a particular specification of a more general criterion of cognition attributable to Kant, namely the criterion that even the significance of a concept (a general representation) requires its extension of cognition (as a ground of cognition) without contradiction. Kant uses particular versions of this very general criterion throughout his critical philosophy. To give an idea of how diverse the context can be, the Principle of Sufficient Reason and the Principle of Contradiction express the extension/non-contradiction requirement in their roles as the supreme principles of judgment (A150/B189ff. See also A571/B579ff). In the passage here Kant qualifies the general criterion, tailoring it more specifically to the issue of the
the intellect must extend cognition without contradiction will be the most general and basic criterion Kant must meet in *Groundwork II*.129

We can be a little more specific, though. There are two modes of reflective inference, inductive and analogical. First consider induction. Induction most generally is an inference from many to all things of a kind. An empirical induction, Kant says, is an inference from many to all things of a kind, where the basis of the inference is given in experience, and the inference yields only a logical presumption. For example, suppose we inductively infer from honesty is usually the best policy to honesty is always the best policy. The problem with an inductive inference of this sort according to Kant is that we must first know from experience that honesty is best in the many cases that serve as the ground of inference. If we know this empirically, though, what we know is merely that honesty is usually prudent, not that it is literally best. As the opening of *Groundwork I* emphasizes, the best thing is a will that is good without qualification. As we learn upon further analysis, the best policy is the moral policy, and this is a matter of what ought to be. We cannot know what ought to be from experience, so empirical induction is no use.

Universal generalization, in contrast, is basically an induction with an a priori basis. Universal generalizations like mathematical inductions and, I contend, moral inductions, are a priori inferences of reason (B3-4). If we were to infer that honesty is always the best policy though a universal generalization, we would infer on pain of contradiction from one usually ought to act honestly to one always ought to act honestly. Both the premise of the induction and the “inductive rule” are a priori in this case, so the empirical significance of transcendental ideas by specifying a regulative extension rather than a determinate (constitutive) extension of cognition.

129 There are even more basic criteria, like the criterion of multiple conceivability, but these have already been met in *Groundwork I*.

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inference is itself a priori. If we could infer a priori that honesty is always the best policy, empirical induction would be superfluous – we could cognize its necessity in each or all cases equally well.

Induction is not the kind of inference Kant needs here. Though there is an induction of sorts involved in the supreme principle of morality, i.e. the universal generalization to which Kant appeals in the first division of duty, this is a constitutive inference rather than a reflective one. The reflective induction is the empirical one. So if Kant needs a reflective, regulative inference to explain the empirical significance of the moral law, empirical induction will not do. On the other hand, there is an analogical inference involved in the supreme principle of morality – we are to act as if the maxims of our actions are to become universal laws. This may be the kind of inference Kant needs.

Kant describes analogy in somewhat more detail in logic, mathematics, and natural science. As Kant describes analogy and its supreme principle in his lectures on logic,

Analogies inhere from particular to total similarity of two things, according to the principle of specification: Things of one genus, which we know to agree in much, also agree in what remains …[A]nalogy extends the given properties of one thing to several [other properties] of the same thing …[yet the] identity of the ground is not required. (JL 131-33 emphasis mine)

Principle of Reflective Inference (induction and analogy): “[T]he principle that lies at the basis of these inferences of the power of judgment is this: that the many will not agree in one without a common ground, but rather that which belongs to the many in this way will be necessary due to a common ground” (JL 132).

This general description in the logic is meant to be specific to reflective analogies, following Meier, but just as in the case of induction we can distinguish between the reflective empirical form of the inference and the constitutive a priori form. In the first Critique, Kant says that mathematical analogies are:
formulas that assert the identity of two \textit{relations of magnitude} and are always \textit{constitutive}, so that if two members of the proportion are given the third is also thereby given, i.e. can be constructed. (A179/B222)

In other words, mathematical analogies are \textit{proportional}. The kind of proportions Kant typically had in mind for mathematical analogies are geometric relations like the similarity of triangles, but numerical analogies fall under this description as well. For example, given the relation of magnitude $3/4$, an assertion of identity with $x/8$ will yield $x=6$. These are the a priori constitutive sort of analogy.

In the case of natural science, though, the principles that are to bring the existence of appearances under rules a priori cannot be constitutive principles:

[S]ince this existence cannot be constructed, [in contrast to mathematics,] these principles can concern only the \textit{relation of existence}, and can yield nothing but merely \textit{regulative} principles… analogy [of experience] is not the identity of two quantitative but two \textit{qualitative} relations, where from three given members I can cognize and give a priori only the relation to a fourth member but not this fourth member itself, although I have a rule for seeking it in experience and a mark for discovering it there. (A179/B222)

In this case we still have a given relation, e.g. $A$ is to $B$, and an identity with another relation, e.g. $X$ is to $C$. The $A$, $B$, and $C$ here are “members” in that they are given through experience, while the $X$ is not. The analogy posits that there is something possible through experience that bears the specified relation to $C$ and does so in a way that would make the fourth member identifiable were one to come across it.

Now the inference from human intention to the teleology of nature is the paradigmatic (reflective) analogical inference. The given relation is the relation between human intention and artifacts, and the identity is to a relation between \textit{something} and organized beings: intention/artifact = $X$/organized being. The striking similarity between artifacts and organisms makes it a necessary maxim of reason that we presume a common ground, intention, even though we cannot specify the identity of the ground (God).

What this means for \textit{Groundwork II} is that we are morally required to act as if the causality of the maxims of our actions \textit{extends} into the realm of nature and has effects in
nature that are the products of our will, even though we know that these empirical effects are not entirely under our actual control. The analogy is something like this. The given relation is an *ought to is* relation between how I ought to will and how I do will, which Kant has been explicating in the *Groundwork*. The identity is with another *ought to is* relation, this one between empirical effects that ought to be and empirical effects that occur.

\[
\begin{align*}
A &= \text{how I ought to will} = \\
B &= \text{how I do will} \\
C &= \text{effects that ought to occur} \\
X &= \text{effects that do occur}
\end{align*}
\]

Insofar as the moral law is constitutive of the will, the relation between *ought* and *is* (A/B) is given for the will itself. Insofar as the moral law is not entirely constitutive of the empirical effects of the will, though, we cannot infer a priori from what really ought to be to what actually is, was, or shall be. But since the relation between how one ought to will and the effects that ought to occur (A to C) is also given a priori, Kant has enough for an analogical inference to the effects that do occur in nature. The inference from *ought to is* that we can make in relation to nature is a reflective, analogical inference that presumes that our own intention is the “common ground” that bridges from what ought to be to what is. The conclusion of the analogy is that the fourth member, the empirical is/was/shall be, is *regulated* by the moral law.

What this shows is that the moral law commands that we *deliberate* – we reflect, and regulate our behavior accordingly – under the analogical presumption that empirical occurrences will be proportional to our willing. Since practice (practical cognition) is simply the *making actual of things* by our will, what the moral law prima facie should command is that we make what ought to be, *actually be*. Since our causal powers are empirically limited, though, the moral law instead commands that we act as if the laws governing what ought to be were to become laws of nature by our will, even though we know that we will have limited success in making nature conform.
Returning to the issues of significance and reality, we should now have a better idea of how morality extends cognition without contradiction. Insofar as the clear and distinct representation of the moral law is a ground of insight into a real object of morality, the moral law has constitutive significance and follows the predicative model of determinate cognitive insight. Since the object of morality is cognitive activity, i.e. willing, the moral law must somehow be constitutive of willing. It must be a constitutive principle of moral conduct or of duty. So far there is no need for analogy. Since, however, the will is also subject to natural influence and must have possible effects in nature, which are empirical, the moral law cannot fully determine actual willing a priori, if by actual we mean to include empirical effects (G 4:406-7, 425, 436-7). Accordingly, Kant must explain in *Groundwork II* how the moral law can be constitutive a priori of what one ought to will and also have empirical significance indirectly through its regulation of what one actually does will.\(^\text{vii}\)

The object in this case is not just the real will itself, but an ideal cosmological whole that includes will and its empirical effects (A671/B699). The distinction between an object that is “in the idea” and an object that is not given merely in the idea is the distinction between a transcendentally ideal object and a real object (A670/B698)). In ordinary theoretical cognition a concept determines some object as something real that is neither the representation nor the subject (see Smit 2000 and Nuchelmans 1998, 121). More specifically the concept determines the constitution and connections of the object to other things by affirming and denying properties or predicates as pertaining to the object or not pertaining to the object. In such theoretical cognition the object is ultimately “given absolutely”. For each of these transcendental ideas, however, Kant says the object is “given only as an object in the idea” rather than as a real thing that stands against the idea, i.e. not as a Gegenstand (A670/B698).
In his explanation of this notion of an object “given only in the idea”, Kant says the transcendental ideas are schemata for which no real object is given, even hypothetically. The direct object of the idea is instead a schematic and completely indeterminate analog of a real thing, which we assume only relatively as a heuristic for the purpose of the systematic investigation of other things that are real objects. These other real objects are represented indirectly in the idea through the direct but schematic transcendental object, while the idea itself determines nothing at all. In other words, the idea attributes no properties or predicates to either the direct transcendental object or to the real objects indirectly represented; it only regulates or guides, for example, our empirical investigation of the constitution and connection of objects of experience. The significance of these transcendental ideas is thus not given in their objects, but is instead given through their schematic regulation of empirical investigation for natural science (A684/B712).

To make this a bit more concrete, the three kinds of transcendental idea Kant considers in this section are the psychological idea of the thinking nature (soul), the cosmological idea of the world as a whole, and the theological idea of a highest being. Psychology, cosmology and theology are thus ideas and their transcendental objects “given only in the idea” are the soul, the world, and God. Kant’s thesis with regard to these ideas and their objects is that we think of things as if these transcendental objects were real because this is a useful or even necessary tool for investigation. For example we think of ourselves as individual, thinking, simple substances because we can only gain scientific insight by thinking of psychological appearances systematically, considering them as if they were determinations of souls.

More pertinently for Groundwork II, we think of the natural world as if it were designed by some great intelligence because the investigation of the purposiveness of
nature leads us to discover (empirically) more about the constitution and connection of natural things than we would otherwise be able to discover. We investigate nature as if it were a kingdom of nature designed and authored by a perfect intelligence.\(^{130}\) Even so, in no case can we attribute any properties, affirm or deny any predicates, or in any way determine the constitution of the transcendental self, the constitution of the world, or of God according to Kant: “no windy hypotheses about the generation, destruction or palingenesis of souls, etc. will be admitted” (A683/B711).

Returning to the issue that prompted this investigation of the constitutive and regulative uses of the intellect, Kant’s answer to both problems regarding the teleology of nature is that both the design of nature and the designer are transcendentally ideal. The design of a natural end is given only in the idea of the end as an organized being with special sort of structure. This design is neither actual nor real. Since we are to infer the designer from the design here, the purposiveness of nature leads us only to a transcendentally ideal designer as well. We necessarily reflect upon nature as if there were a real design and designer, but we must do so without judging that either is actual. The ideas of design and designer regulate how we think of nature and have significance by extending our cognition of natural objects indirectly.

In application to *Groundwork II*, if Kant is gearing up for a full-blown transcendent analytic in a critique of practical reason as I have argued, he will need his moral schematism or typic to relate morality to experience, not just to desire. Given Kant’s definition of nature as the realm of legally determined effects in *Groundwork II*, it

\(^{130}\) When we act as if the maxims of our actions were to become by our will universal laws, we act as if we ourselves are the supremely intelligent designers authoring a legal realm like the kingdom of nature, but one to which we are ourselves nevertheless subject. This is part of what it means to bring the moral law closer to intuition by a certain analogy with nature (G 4:437).
seems clear enough that Kant is concerned with the effects of the will. Our problem is that Kant seems to have left no room for possible effects of the will to have any relevance at all to the morality of an action. His analyses have revealed, he thinks, that the goodness of a morally good will is in no way dependent upon its effects, that morality is not subject to nature, that the morally good will is subject only to the pure universality of law, etc. Given all the ways that effects cannot be relevant, it is difficult to ascribe a morally relevant role to effects without running afoul of the text in some way. But willing is not wishing. It must be possible for willing to have effects. This is not to say that every instance of willing must have some empirical effect, nor is it to say that there cannot be willing that happens to have no possible effects. The criterion here is an extremely fundamental criterion that fends against epiphenomenalism – it speaks to the objection that willing as Kant understands it could never have any empirical effects whatsoever.

If Kant’s treatment of teleology with respect to nature and transcendental ideas is any guide, though, there is still room for Kant to claim that the pure a priori moral law could have empirical significance. Just as it is a necessary maxim of reason that we think of organized beings in nature as if they were intentionally designed for purposes, according to Kant we necessarily must think of the products of our own actions as if they too were intentionally designed for purposes, our purposes. The reason it is necessary for the effects of willing to have some moral significance is that the outer effects of our actions are genuinely effects that we cause. They necessarily follow from our willing. Things can go wrong, certainly, because effects that actually follow may be causally influenced by other forces besides reason, but insofar as one’s will is the cause of an effect, that effect is a product and part of what one wills. We are therefore morally required to act as if the causality of the maxims of our actions extends into the realm of
nature and has effects in nature that are the products of our will, which is another way of saying that we must act as if the laws governing our will were to become laws of nature.

Notice that this does not imply that moral law is in any way subject to natural law. What it implies, Kant thinks, is that we must make use of our empirical knowledge, however limited it may be, to plan the effects of our actions even if we cannot judge that these effects shall come about. Deliberation belongs primarily to the reflective power of judgment (see JL 131ff), but it nevertheless has empirical significance because it genuinely regulates our behavior. Insofar as we are concerned with the effects of our will in deliberation (e.g. how to bring things about, what might interfere, etc.), we are engaged in reflection concerning the empirical significance of our willing and this is subject to the moral command. We cannot absolve ourselves of responsibility for the outer effects of our actions by appealing to a veil of ignorance and pretending that they did not necessarily follow from our own will.

To recast this in terms of the distinction between cognitive insight and significance, the constitutive use of practical reason to determine real objects and provide cognitive insight is the pure a priori determination of willing itself, where the effects of the will are part of willing, but only insofar as they are actually caused as planned.¹³¹ Thus the moral law can command a priori how we ought to conduct ourselves. The regulative use of pure practical reason to reflect on the ideal products of our will (something like moral cosmology or the highest good)¹³² has cognitive and empirical significance without thereby grounding transcendent insight. Reflection or deliberation

¹³¹ We need not clearly conceive consequences of a plan in order for them to be consequences of the plan, but Kant will still face the usual difficulties in specifying responsibility for necessary effects that are difficult for an individual to foresee.

¹³² See the Canon section 2 – “The Ideal of the Highest Good, as a Determining Ground of the Ultimate End of Pure Reason” (A804/B832ff). See also endnote ii of this chapter.
regulates our behavior and has (or can have) empirical effects, then, despite the fact that we are naturally influenced by contingent inclinations and despite the fact that other forces in nature may interfere with the outcomes of our plans.

The following (rather long) passage from Kant’s *Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment* highlights several points of the view I have been describing.

**Just as in the theoretical consideration of nature** reason must assume the idea of an unconditioned necessity of its primordial ground [God], **so, in the case of the practical**, it also presupposes its own unconditioned (in regard to nature) causality, i.e. freedom, because it is aware of its moral command. Now since here, however, the objective necessity of the action, as duty, is opposed to that which it, as an occurrence, would have if its ground lay in nature and not in freedom (i.e., in the causality of reason), and the action which is morally absolutely necessary can be regarded physically as entirely contingent (i.e., what necessarily should happen often does not), it is clear that it **depends only on the subjective constitution of our practical faculty that the moral laws must be represented as commands** (and the actions which are in accord with them as duties), and that reason expresses this necessity not through a be (happening) but through a should-be: which would not be the case if reason without sensibility (as the subjective condition of its application to objects of nature) were considered, as far as its causality is concerned, as a cause in an intelligible world, corresponding completely with the moral law, where **there would be no distinction between what should be done and what is done, between a practical law concerning that which is possible through us and the theoretical law concerning that which is actual through us.** Now, however, although an intelligible world [highest good], in which everything would be actual merely because it is (as something good) possible, and even freedom, as its formal condition, is a transcendent concept for us, which is **not serviceable for any constitutive principle for determining an object and its objective reality**, still, in accordance with the constitution of our (partly sensible) nature, it can serve as a universal **regulative principle** for ourselves and for every being standing in connection with the sensible world, so far as we can represent that in accordance with the constitution of our own reason and capacity, which does not determine the constitution of freedom, as a form of causality, objectively, but rather **makes the rules of actions in accordance with that idea into commands** for everyone and indeed does so with no less validity than if it did determine freedom objectively. (KU 5:403-4 emphasis mine)

Kant’s analogy in the quote above works from the transcendental ideality of God to the transcendental ideality of freedom and the highest good, just as I have suggested. As evidence that Kant may be entitled to use this in *Groundwork II*, notice that the analysis
thus far in the *Groundwork* provides the basis for the analogy. As Kant’s analysis thus far has shown, he thinks, human causality involves a non-rational subjective condition (sensibility), and this is why occurrences or effects that are morally necessary are nevertheless physically contingent. It follows directly from this that we must be commanded and have duties: Were it not for this possible discord between subjective and objective principles of human volition, there would be no distinction between practical and theoretical law – it would be as if the law of freedom were also a law of nature. As evidence that the reference to nature in FULN need not make morality subject to nature, consider that as a transcendental idea, the whole of moral effects (the idea of a highest good) includes nature and serves as a regulative principle that is involved in or part of the moral command.

What I hope to have shown so far in this chapter is that Kant’s distinction between cognitive insight and significance in the first *Critique* introduces a criterion Kant thinks he must meet if he is to establish moral metaphysics as a science. Despite his continued insistence that morality is metaphysical and a priori, if morality is to be the metaphysical basis of moral psychology or normative ethics it must have empirical significance. This means it must be at least reflectively connected to nature, the realm of empirical effects. Kant’s argument is both more elegant and more compelling in some ways if his specification of the “as if” procedural character of the moral law is motivated not merely by a general need for a schematic procedure but also by more specific criteria of reflective, regulative empirical significance.

I have sketched some of the details of how this might be worked out and tried to make this specific interpretation plausible. There are many more details that require attention and some of those I have given may require revision when pressed, but most are
very well supported by the text. My thesis, though, is really that many of the details can be worked out using the interpretive method I am advocating in this dissertation.

§4 The Division of Duty According to FUL/N as Determination of Moral Content

As I briefly explained in chapter 3, the method of division is a method of analysis whereby the extension of a concept, or what is contained under a concept is made distinct. This method is to be contrasted with the paradigmatic method of analysis whereby one makes distinct the content in a concept, i.e. the higher concepts contained in a concept which together yield its definition or exposition (JL 140, 142). The division of duty, accordingly, is a determination of the precise extension of morality (JL 140, 146ff). Kant says that purpose of the “division” of the object of the moral law into duties is to “set forth distinctly and as determined for every use the content of the categorical imperative, which must contain the principle of all duty (if there is such a thing at all)” (G 4:425 emphasis mine). It is clear from Kant’s statement here that the categorical imperative must contain the principle of all duty if it is to have any content. It is also clear that the division of duty must somehow constitute a determination of the content of morality. 133

If the principle of duty is the moral law, as opposed to its formula (which is a representation of law), what Kant means here is that the law determines which properties

133 Experts in analysis arguably ought to be able to disambiguate “content” into what is “contained in” and what is “contained under” the categorical imperative, but we may find it somewhat difficult to ascertain whether the principle of all duty is contained in or under the categorical imperative, especially since the principle of all duty arguably turns out to be the principle of contradiction. Since it is possible to analyze a concept in several directions at once, it may matter very little. I suggest the principle of all duty is contained in the categorical imperative, and it is the sufficient ground by which duty is divided, i.e. it is the sufficient ground of determination for the extension of morality. This interpretation works equally well whether the principle of all duty is construed as the law or as the principle of contradiction, as long as the principle of contradiction is construed so as to include the full range of contradictions.
belong to its objects, i.e. whether an activity is dutiful, and it is on the basis of this determination that we are justified in predicating the concept duty of the action. In order for us to “determine” the content or ascertain whether an activity is dutiful, the activity must embody the law that governs it, i.e. the law must determine the properties of the object itself.

It is still not at all clear how Kant thinks this would work. Based on my arguments in the last chapter, in order for the concept duty to be significant it must extend cognition without contradiction. There are two supplementary criteria Kant explains in the first Critique and his lectures on logic:

Every concept, in regard to what is not contained in it, is indeterminate, and stands under the principle of determinability: that of every two contradictorily opposed predicates only one can apply to it, which rest on the principle of contradiction and hence is a merely logical principle which abstracts from every content of cognition, and has in view nothing but the logical form of cognition. (A571/B579; see also A70/B97)

The principle [of transitivity] on which the possibility and validity of all categorical inferences of reason rests is this: What belongs to the mark of a thing belongs also to the thing itself; and what contradicts the mark of a thing contradicts also the thing itself. (JL 123)

Together the criterion of significance and the principle of determinability outline a strategy much like an indirect proof. Rather than directly employing a moral typic to show what is contained in the concept duty and thereby positively determining it directly, Kant can indirectly determine the content of morality. All he needs is a contrary predicate, contrary to duty, and an action that has this property. If he can show that the action contrary to duty somehow violates the principle of contradiction,\textsuperscript{134} it logically follows that the contrary action is practically necessary and therefore dutiful.

\textsuperscript{134}The principle of contradiction mandates that no predicate contradict its subject. The principle of determinability follows from the principle of contradiction and the law of the excluded middle. These are both philosophically uninteresting features of scholastic logic. The metaphysically interesting point is that
Applying this to the actual division/determination, the structure of each case in the division of duty is the same. Kant poses two contrary actions that together exhaust the alternative, e.g. making a false promise to repay money or not doing so. Kant then explains why one of the two actions involves a contradiction (in thought or will) and he concludes that the contrary action is therefore a practically necessary duty. Though it may seem a very weak criterion, non-contradiction turns out to be a substantive requirement since there are a variety of ways that one’s activity could fail to have this form upon universal generalization. Only activity that involves no contradiction when universalized can count as properly universal and therefore moral.

Is the division of duty adequate for a complete determination of the special content of morality and for insight? First, the scope of moral science includes only cognitive activity. The determinations one could make of this kind of object are limited to concepts that are predicable of voluntary action, intentional agency, or willing by any other name. Second, the moral metaphysics is an entirely a priori science that concerns only how intelligent beings ought to act. Moral determination is therefore also limited to a determination of what ought to be. The only possible predicates of volition that concern Kant here are the a priori moral ones. Given the analysis thus far in the Groundwork, the only available such predicate is duty. Kant need not, and indeed cannot, divide actions according to special properties of human nature or determine the principles of formal logic to which reason must adhere can be extended to principles for the real use of reason.

Kant is careful to say that the presence of contrary inclination constitutes a hindrance but not a contradiction (G 4:424). Inclinations are subjective causes that can be either in favor of or contrary to the command. When contrary inclinations weaken the universality of the ground of action to a generality that permits some exception for oneself, this is a kind of volitional friction rather than a contradiction according to Kant. There may be other kinds of contrariety and rational failures that do not constitute contradictions. I will therefore assume the strongest principle here, that there can be no contradiction of any kind involved in a maxim if it is to have the categorically necessitated universal form.
action with respect to psychological or anthropological predicates. In order to articulate moral science, Kant will need other moral predicates like right and virtue, but the initial determination need only divide between what is morally good willing and what is not. Kant therefore needs to do the following: 1) show that every possible action either accords with duty or is contrary to duty, 2) identify which is the case, and 3) explain why. In order for Kant’s determination here to be complete in the appropriate sense, he must show that for every possible activity, where activities are individuated by their maxims, FUL/FULN is an adequate ground for the predication of duty of either that activity or its contrary.

§5 Contradictions in Conception and Will

To better set the stage for the division, after formulating the categorical imperative as FUL and FULN, Kant says

“[w]e shall now enumerate a few duties in accordance with the usual division of them into duties to ourselves and to other human beings and into perfect and imperfect duties” (G 4:422 emphasis added).

The “usual division” indicates that we are to take it as given that the duties in question are duties, presumably because common understanding and the schools agree on this point, and we are to focus on how these duties follow from the first formula of the moral law. Even though the division indicated might seem to imply that the examples are distributed over the possible types of cases, perhaps exhausting the relevant conceptual sphere, Kant says in the footnote:

I reserve the division of duties entirely for a future Metaphysics of Morals, so that the division here stands only as one adopted at my discretion (for the sake of arranging my examples). (G 4:422n)

This is a reminder that the articulation of moral science is reserved for the Metaphysics of Morals, and a promise to later provide it. The examples in Groundwork II were chosen,
he says, as examples of duties “whose classification from the one principle cited above is clear” (G 4:424 emphasis added). This classification is not the division of duties.

The classification that is clear to Kant is the classification into strict duties whose contraries involve contradictions in conception and wide duties whose contraries involve contradictions in will. As Kant describes it, the universal generalization procedure FUL commands can fail in two ways. First,

some actions are so constituted that their maxim cannot even be thought without contradiction as a universal law of nature, far less could one will that it should become such. (G 4:424)

These are contradictions in conception. In the simplest case a contradiction in conception is a violation of the supreme principle of analytic judgment, a.k.a. the principle of non-contradiction: “[N]o predicate pertains to a thing that contradicts it [the thing]”, (B190). (Since the containment in/under relation requires some kind of identity or homogeneity between the relata, the supreme principle of such containment is the principle of identity/contradiction.) In this first case, Kant claims the application of the contrary concept would contradict the object itself. For example when a predicate concept is analytically contained in the subject concept of an object, Kant says the contrary of this predicate must be denied of the object on pain of contradiction of the object itself (B190-191). Since the principle in this case is an imperative, the “predicate” is that which is commanded. So a contradiction in conception occurs when contrary “predicates” are commanded of a subject.

Less obviously, though, a contradiction in conception can also arise as a violation of the supreme principle of synthetic judgment. As Kant describes it, when a maxim violates this principle,

that inner impossibility is indeed not to be found, but it is still impossible to will that their maxim be raised to the universality of a law of nature because such a will would contradict itself. (G 4:424)
As Kant explains it in the Analytic of Principles in the first Critique, when a judgment does not involve an internal logical contradiction, it may still be false because it can “combine concepts in a way not entailed by the object” or it can be groundless, meaning that no ground “is given either a priori or a posteriori that would justify such a judgment” (B189-90). Groundless and false judgments do not have the “inner impossibility” that logically contradictory judgments do, but they nevertheless violate a principle that has the same status as the principle of non-contradiction, the supreme principle of synthetic judgment:

\[\text{Every object stands under the necessary conditions of the synthetic unity of the manifold of intuition in a possible experience. (B197)}\]

We can think of this as a principle of synthetic non-contradiction. Loosely speaking, the principle requires that there be no “contradiction” involved in the possible material given through intuition that would preclude its synthesis.\(^{136}\) In the case of a (synthetic) contradiction in will, neither predicate/command is contained directly in the object, Kant says, but the application of the contrary predicate/command yields a judgment in which the predicates contradict each other rather than a judgment in which a predicate/command contradicts the object itself.

To get a better idea of how the supreme principle of synthetic judgment can be understood as a principle of contradiction, consider how synthetic propositions fit into Kant’s containment theory of truth. Recall that whenever two representations, concepts or otherwise, are related in a proposition, the two representations must somehow belong to each other, pertain to each other, or bear some containment relation to each other. These relations are possible only if the two relata are in some way homogeneous and can

\(^{136}\) This description glosses the restriction of the principle to the necessary conditions of the unity of possible experience, but it should be sufficient for my purposes.
therefore be related through identity. In the analytic case, the relata are related directly to each other through identity. In the synthetic case, the relata cannot be related directly to each other through identity, but they can be related indirectly to each other through identity with a third thing. For example, many pairs of candidate relata can be related to each other indirectly through experience, and whatever can be related in experience must obviously stand under the necessary conditions of the synthetic unity of the manifold of intuition in a possible experience (supposing there are any such conditions). This third thing, whether a concept, experience, or an a priori form of intuition, mediates between the primary relata by bearing a different containment or homogeneity relation to each of the primary relata. (Synthetic relations can be ampliative because the heterogeneity of their primary relata requires an additional thing to mediate in this way.)

In the case of a contradiction in will, then, there is no possible mediator, no possible third thing that is homogeneous in some way with each of the relata and can thereby ground their relation: Everything that is homogeneous with one candidate relatum in some way is entirely heterogeneous with the other. If reality and thought are well-connected systems, this only happens when the candidate relata contradict each other. The alternative is that there can be unconnected bits, gaps, or discontinuities in reality or thought that would allow the two things to simply not relate, as when we are ignorant of the mediating ground by which a subject and predicate can be connected. Since we are not concerned with psychological idiosyncracies, but metaphysical science, Kant is at least aiming for connectedness. In other words, the operative principle is that no possible identity (even mediate) should imply contradiction. Kant covers his bases by

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137 This is a surprisingly controversial claim. See Anderson 2001, 2005 for background and an interpretation of the analytic/synthetic distinction according to which synthetic truths are not to be understood in terms of containment or identity.
identifying failures of synthetic judgment as being either groundless (not having a ground at all) or false (alleged mediating ground fails to bridge).

Now notice that as a supreme principle of synthesis, as in the act of synthesizing, the supreme principle of synthetic judgment involves a sort of ground(s)-to-consequence relation. The justificatory ground of judgment, the mediator, is a ground of synthesis by which the judgment is generated as a consequence. Since reasoning is most generally the synthetic derivation of consequences from grounds, this supreme principle of synthetic judgment underwrites a more general principle of synthesis requiring that the relata or data of synthesis not contradict each other. When the data contradict each other, there can be no mediator and no homogeneity by which to synthesize them. Construed as a principle of reason in general, the supreme principle of synthesis would require that the various grounds to be synthesized into a consequence not contradict each other.

In the case of a logical inference of reason, the major and minor premise are the grounds that must not contradict each other. In the case of a practical use of reason, which is the case of immediate interest, the primary grounds are the subjective and objective principles of volition. The subjective and objective grounds of the will can be treated as potentially contradictory predicates of an object because they are constituents of the will. Supposing law and maxim are the only constituents of the will, it is impossible to will one’s maxim to become universal law precisely when the subjective and objective grounds/constituents of the will contradict each other, and this happens precisely when the subjective ground (maxim) cannot be universalized (universal generalization) because universality is the only homogeneity a maxim can have with universal law.

Given a better understanding of the logic behind Kant’s distinction between contradiction in conception and contradiction in will, we are in a better position to
understand how Kant applies the distinction in his examples. Since the second case is the most straightforward given the criteria I have outlined so far and it is the most prominent in the secondary literature, I will begin with the lying promise.

§5.1 The Lying Promise to Repay Money

Kant’s second duty is a strict duty against promising to repay borrowed money when one knows it will never be repaid:

Another finds himself urged by need to borrow money … he still has enough conscience to ask himself: is it not forbidden and contrary to duty to help oneself out of need in such a way? Supposing that he still decided to do so, his maxim of action would go as follows: when I believe myself to be in need of money I shall borrow money and promise to repay it, even though I know that this will never happen. Now this principle of self-love or personal advantage is perhaps quite consistent with my whole future welfare [happiness], but the question now is whether it is right. I therefore turn the demand of self-love into a universal law [attempt a universal generalization] and put the question as follows: how would it be if my maxim became a universal law? I then see at once that it could never hold as a universal law of nature and be consistent with itself, but must necessarily contradict itself. For, the universality of a law that everyone, when he believes himself to be in need, could promise whatever he pleases with the intention of not keeping it would make the promise and the end one might have in itself impossible, since no none would believe what was promised him but would laugh at all such expressions as vain pretenses. (G 4:422 emphasis mine)

According to the traditional logical contradiction interpretation,\(^{138}\) it is the exceptionality of the lying promise makes it impossible to be universalized without contradiction. The maxim is not a truly universal rule at all, on this view, but instead merely a generalization or a rule-like but indeterminate proposition that is conceptually inconsistent or in tension with itself. A lying promise cannot be conceived in a universal rule because the lying promise is purportedly a single concept that contains two inconsistent concepts. Any rule which involves both lying and promising can make at

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\(^{138}\) See Korsgaard’s *Creating the Kingdom of Ends* ch 3 for the standard interpretations.
best a generalization. Because the exceptionality of the lying promise is implicit and less extreme than the contradiction of a square circle, one might think, Kant provides a thought experiment to illustrate the exceptionality. If we universalize lying promises, the practice of promise-keeping defeats itself.

There are three serious difficulties with the standard logical contradiction interpretation. First, the procedure is vague and possibly ambiguous, leaving it open to all sorts of objections that the procedure itself is fundamentally flawed\(^\text{139}\). Second, according to proponents of the traditional logical contradiction interpretation, both contradictions in will and contradictions in conception show in essence the same problem with the maxim, though in different ways. In the contradiction in will cases, the internal logical contradiction in the major premise is shown by showing that contradictory consequences logically follow from it. This idea seems to be confirmed by the style of the thought experiment Kant uses; Kant says that such a maxim would require one to will two contradictory things at once. The problem, opponents argue, is that a contradiction in will does not entail a contradiction in conception. Third, Kant seems to rely on the necessity of an institution of property (money) and an institution of promising to generate the contradiction. Neither of these is prima facie morally necessary. In order for Kant’s derivation to work, it seems, promising practices must be mandatory rational ends or the apparent contingencies upon which the thought experiment depends must somehow be necessary features of reality, or perhaps of nature.

The interpretation I gave in chapter 6 is a logical interpretation, but it differs from the standard interpretation in three important ways. First, I contend that the

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\(^{139}\) See Hill 1992, 63-65 for a brief discussion of “level of description” problems concerning division by FUL/FULN as opposed to FKE; Herman 1993 pp. 43-44, 51-52, 75ff for an effective rejoinder; and Steinberger 1999 for a more thorough review of related problems and objections.
universalization procedure is a universal generalization of the form: \( P(c) \rightarrow \forall x \in X P(x) \). This is a far more precise conception of the procedure as an *a priori induction* like a mathematical induction. Traditional interpretations of universalization do not, or even cannot, spell out the precise inference in symbolic form. In addition, since universal generalization is a specifically logical procedure, by my earlier arguments Kant is entitled to assume those attempting to employ it are scholastic experts who fully appreciate the subtleties that may arise. Just as the employment of mechanical laws in engineering is in some cases far too complex for beginners to manage, e.g. building skyscrapers, some maxims are difficult to universalize correctly and beginners are likely to get it wrong, especially since typical maxims are quite intuitive and must first be analyzed correctly.

This lying promise case is fairly simple, a scholar should think, because it is perfectly obvious that the debtor must trade on making an exception of himself in order for his means to effect his end and this precludes universal generalization. Since means are analytically contained in their respective end according to Kant, the end is the object in this case, i.e. the property-bearer, and the contrary means are the two properties predicated of the end. Promising is the means analytically contained in the end, and lying is contrary to promising.

Second, I contend that the reason why contradictions in will do not necessarily involve contradictions in conception is that contradictions in will violate only the supreme principle of synthesis. This principle belongs to transcendental logic, not general logic. As we should now know, concepts of the understanding underdetermine our cognition. While there could be infinitely many possible systems of concepts that are logically self-consistent, some or most of them would have no consistent application to experience. Some logically possible systems of concepts may be necessarily empty and have no coherent application to possible experience, much less to material actually given
though experience. These “internally” consistent systems may have purely formal unity, but they are inconsistent with the way we are affected by things or with the way we affect things. When a maxim fails to be rational in this sense, the relation between reason and another faculty is implicated. The problem is that even though the maxim itself may be consistent, it cannot support the synthesis of practical cognition, i.e. it cannot be willed. Contradictions in will thus do not trade on contradictions in conception.

Third, I contend that the universal generalization procedure must meet the criteria of cognitive insight and empirical significance. Though universal generalization is a formal inference of understanding, its application in this case is transcendental. In determining the content of moral science Kant cannot abstract entirely from all consideration of objects. The very point of the determination is specifically to address the possibility of the object of morality. Kant’s direct appeal in the lying promise case is to whether the maxim could be conceived as a law of nature, which is an appeal to FULN rather than FUL. This shows that the contradiction in conception cannot be a purely formal contradiction. Moreover, the question Kant asks is whether it is right to act on the maxim in question. Although Kant has not given the technical definition of right he will later use in the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant has just promised in the footnote that he will write a Metaphysics of Morals. The Groundwork is intended to prepare the way for this articulation of moral science, and Kant may have already finished laying the Groundwork for the Doctrine of Right by the time he begins to derive duties from FUL/FULN. If Kant is entitled to appeal to the concept of right, he may be entitled to assume quite a bit about

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140 For example, as I explain in the next section, suicidal maxims involve contradictions in will because the faculty of desire is fundamentally constituted so as to further life. This means that our feelings, as subjective grounds of volition, have a life-continuing direction and the continuation of life is their necessary causal consequence. The presumed causal consequence of a suicidal maxim is precisely the opposite, thus the contradiction. In this case, the contradiction is a causal one, not a conceptual one.
property and the practice of promising. Money is “intellectual property” and promising money is a contract. It is the possibility of both intellectual property and contracting with each other that is at stake, and Kant thinks both must be ultimately be metaphysically possible. Even though the exceptionality of the maxim is overt here, a full evaluation of whether and why this particular maxim involves a contradiction in conception may depend upon Kant’s argument from intellectual possession to contract right in the *Metaphysics of Morals* (DV 6:245ff). Depending upon how much of the Doctrine of Right is required to show this, a full explication of the example might be quite lengthy.

§5.2 The Duty Against Suicide

The duty against suicide is quite similar. The maxim in question is “from self-love I make it my principle to shorten my life when its longer duration threatens more troubles than it promises agreeableness” (G 4:422). Kant’s cryptic explanation of the contradiction in this maxim is that “it is then seen at once that a nature whose law it would be to destroy life itself by means of the same feeling whose destination is to impel toward the furtherance of life would contradict itself” (G 4:422, emphasis added). In this case the property bearer, i.e. the object, is the feeling and the property under consideration is a “destination” or directionality. Since one direction is analytically contained in the feeling, the contrary direction contradicts the feeling.

In order to get a better idea of how this works, it helps to consider feeling in the context of life. Kant defines life in terms of the faculty of desire early the second *Critique* and again in the *Metaphysics of Morals* (KpV 5:8n, DR 6:211). In the second *Critique* note, Kant first acknowledges a complaint that he has not yet explicated the faculties of desire and pleasure, but replies that “this reproach would be unfair because this explication as given in psychology could reasonably be presupposed” (KpV
Evidently Kant expected his audience to share his understanding of life. As Kant defines it in the second Critique,

*Life* is the faculty of a being to act in accordance with laws of the faculty of desire. The *faculty of desire* is a being’s faculty to be by means of its representations the *cause* of the reality of the objects of these representations. *Pleasure* is the representation of the *agreement* of an object or of an action with the *subjective conditions of life*, i.e., with the faculty of the *causality* of a representation with respect to the reality of its object. (KpV 5:8n, emphasis mine)

To act from self-love is simply to act on the basis of the agreeable, i.e., for pleasure. Since pleasure is a representation of the *agreement* of an action with the faculty of the subject’s causality, self-love must agree with this causality. But this causality is the causality of life. So self-love must agree with life. It is *analytic*, then, that actions from self-love are destined toward the furtherance of life.¹⁴² *Feeling* is the susceptibility to representations of pleasure and displeasure, or the capacity to take pleasure or displeasure in a representation (MM 211n*). The feeling in question here, the feeling from which the subject acts when acting on the maxim in question, is a feeling of self-love. The feeling is essentially a susceptibility to the agreement of self-love and life. The important point is that feelings necessarily have direction. They are vector-like representations that can be conceived as natural mechanical forces. The direction is part of the feeling itself, so the furtherance of life is part of the very feeling in question.

Suppose now that *this* feeling which is analytically directed towards the furtherance of life is the material of the desire for suicide and the suicidal maxim is made a universal law of nature. Since the exceptionality of the maxim is not overt, the reason

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¹⁴¹ Kant wrote a very similar “transcendental definition” of life in his own copy of the first edition of the first Critique as well. See the Guyer/Wood 1998 Cambridge edition p. 535.

¹⁴² This idea is well-supported in the scholastic tradition. The concept of a living *constitution* as analytically self-sustaining and the stoic concept of *oikeiosis* both illustrate the traditional principle that the causality of a living thing is analytically directed towards self-sustenance.
why the universal generalization must fail is not so obvious. The problem is that upon universalization it would be a law of the faculty of desire for all beings that have a faculty of desire that they would destroy themselves, thereby destroying life. The problem is not that there would be no life. The problem is that the feeling must have two contrary directions, i.e. two contradictory properties or predicates. A suicidal self-love feeling would involve both susceptibility to the agreement with life and to the disagreement with life. The life-destroying direction contradicts the very feeling itself on Kant’s view because its contrary, the furtherance of life, is an essential property of the feeling. This would clearly be an analytic contradiction of the sort sought.

§5.3 The Wide Duty to Cultivate One’s Talents

In the talent cultivation example, the maxim is a maxim of neglecting natural gifts or talents in order to devote one’s life merely to idleness, amusement, procreation, and other enjoyments (G 4:423). Before explaining how the duty follows from the maxim it is important to note that the duty Kant is deriving here is not a duty to maximize talent development with complete disregard for enjoyment. It is a wide duty to develop talents. The contrary maxim is a maxim to not develop one’s talents at all. In order to show that the maxim involves a contradiction in will that generates a wide duty, Kant needs to show that the maxim in question does not simply reduce to the strict duty to preserve one’s life. To resist the reduction, Kant states that neglecting one’s talents is consistent with the natural propensity to enjoyment and he cites the South Sea Islanders as a people who were commonly thought to live a life of enjoyment at the complete expense of talent development. This shows it is possible that “a nature could indeed always subsist” with such a universal law (G 4:423). A life of complete enjoyment is perfectly consistent with happiness, which is a natural end we all have, and the maxim can be universally generalized so long as it is considered only as a law of nature.
But pursuing our natural ends is not what FUL/FULN commands. The key to the impermissibility of never developing one’s talents is that even though a natural being could be governed by such a short-sighted law of self-love, such a being could not also be a *rational* being. Animals have no duty to cultivate talents. We do insofar as we are rational. The reason Kant gives for why the maxim in question is contradictory is that “as a *rational* being he necessarily wills that all the capacities in him be [widely] developed, since they serve him and are given to him for all sorts of possible purposes” (G 4:423, emphasis added). In other words, we have a rational interest in cultivating our talents.

We can easily see from *Groundwork I* why Kant might reasonably think we must agree that reason demands, among other things, foresight in the systematic view of one’s life. Complacency and idleness are short-sighted and *imprudent*. Kant’s audience has already agreed in *Groundwork I* that prudence is rational. It is irrational, then, to completely neglect one’s talents because we have a natural rational interest in using our talents to further our happiness. In order to see why this kind of imprudence would be contrary to a moral duty, recall that Kant argued in *Groundwork I* that the telos of reason is a far worthier purpose than happiness. Kant’s audience has already agreed that prudence is better than imprudence and that the vocation of reason is still better than even happiness itself. The vocation of reason is to make the will absolutely incomparably good in itself, i.e. morally good. Since prudence is instrumentally rational, a maxim that is *entirely* opposed to prudence is contrary to reason and, at least, less good than its contrary. Rational beings necessarily ought not be so imprudent as to never cultivate any of the means that might be necessary to their happiness.

So far it seems that Kant can show that it would be irrational and less good to entirely neglect the cultivation of one’s talents, but we still need a contradiction. With a
contradiction in will, there must be a property bearer to which two contrary predicates are synthetically related. The predicate *always enjoy*, is related to the subject under a law of nature. Its contrary, the predicate *sometimes not enjoy (in order to develop a talent)*, is related to the subject under a law of freedom. Since these predicates are contrary, the natural (subjective) ground and the rational (objective) ground of action cannot be synthesized into one action. In order for the law of freedom to have empirical significance, it must be possible for the natural inclination to enjoy to be synthesized with our rational interest in developing talents so that both are constituents of the action under consideration.

To see how this would work, consider that we can generate a permissible maxim from the maxim of universal idleness by instantiating it and restricting it to a particular period of time or talent. Rather than never developing any talent at all, I can permissibly make it my maxim to develop some talents at some times and choose when and how to do so on the basis of the purposes I am likely to have. I cannot develop all talents at all times, so it is permissible for me to let some potential means fall by the wayside at times in favor of cultivating others more likely to suit the purposes involved in my life. Since I am entitled to adopt some personal ends on the basis of my natural inclinations, so long as they are consistent with the moral law, my natural inclinations can be constitutive of a permissible talent-developing maxim.

The lesson to be learned from these cases is that the form of universal law must be a principle of unity for an entire system of cognition. There are many kinds of contradiction that would undermine the unity of such a system, including analytic and synthetic contradictions in judgment, reason, and will. Ordinary moral failures, culpable and otherwise, may depend upon very subtle inconsistencies in the subject’s theory of the
world or her life and place in it, and it may take philosophical expertise to make the nature of the moral failure clear and distinct. But the ordinary activities we enjoy need not be morally defective. Enjoyment is a natural need, and it would be contrary to the life of a natural being to adopt a maxim that is opposed entirely to enjoyment of the agreeable. The categorical imperative neither categorically requires nor categorically forbids the discretionary activities that we typically assume to be morally indifferent. It merely commands that we make enjoyment and self-love subordinate to the moral law, just as our common understanding of morality prescribes. Ordinary discretionary activities can therefore be morally relevant in some circumstances but Kant’s moral science is sufficiently context-sensitive to account for this kind of dependence on circumstances.

The next question is what sort of structure it is, what “internal form” it is, that requires us to think of some objects as ends or products while others may be conceived as mere effects. According to Kant there is a striking resemblance between products of intention and organized beings that makes it a necessary maxim of reason that we think of organized beings as if they were artifactual even though we can identify no intentional cause for them. But what is this striking resemblance on which the analogy is based? What is it about organized beings that makes them seem designed, and more importantly what does this tell us about their causal exemplar, willing?

As we will see in the next chapter, the short answer is that an end, and therefore willing, must have an architectonic structure (A832/B860ff). Since architectonic structure is somewhat complex, there are several distinct criteria Kant must meet. An architectonic end has a principle of unity or identity that individuates a plurality into a totality that has a reciprocal ground to consequence causal relation between parts and
whole. The reason why this will be important is that it explains Kant’s need for three formulas. In order for practical reason to be intentional, i.e., genuinely purposive rather than, say, mechanical, willing must be a special kind of system, and systems are quantitatively total. If Kant cannot show that willing is architectonic, not only will his moral theory fail to meet several criteria of objectivity, but Kant may be unable to explain why we must think of organized beings as purposive without appeal to divine intention.

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1 Paul Guyer’s reply to H. J. Paton illustrates the initial difficulty of specifying the role of teleology in the *Groundwork* (Guyer 2002). Though Guyer and Paton identify different moments in *Groundwork II* as introducing teleology, they both take the involvement of ends to be sufficient evidence of teleology and both take Kant to introduce teleology to the moral law on the basis of a compatibilistic requirement. Their reasoning is generally that if the laws of freedom must be compatible with the laws of nature as Kant says, and the laws of nature are taken as both given and teleological, then according to Kant the laws of freedom (and thus willing and morality) must be teleological if (and by default only if) the laws of nature are teleological. The reason why the moral law is teleological according to Kant would then be (solely) because the laws of nature are teleological. The problem with this reasoning is twofold. Not only would this empirical inference blatantly violate the method Kant has consistently insisted upon, as I will explain in this chapter Kant argues that we are in no position to judge that nature is teleological.

2 Kant says here that the “transcendental determinations” are the cause of the end. This may seem odd given that Kant says that the transcendental idea of a highest being cannot be determined at all. Unlike God, though, the highest good is in part a product of human activity (see the Canon section 2: “The Ideal of the Highest Good, as a Determining Ground of the Ultimate End of Pure Reason”). There is a sense in which we can and do productively determine it somewhat, at least via the progress of history. Freedom, on the other hand, is not determinable in this way. This difference between transcendental objects given only in the idea strictly speaking and ideal objects that are in part made through their idea presents yet another subtlety Kant must negotiate, but one that lies beyond the scope of this dissertation.

3 As Kant defines it “theoretical cognition is speculative if it pertains to an object or concepts of an object to which one cannot attain in any experience. It is opposed to the cognition of nature, which pertains to no objects, or their predicates, except those that can be given in a possible experience” (A634-5/B662-3). Natural theology is cognition of the original being through a concept borrowed from nature, i.e. the nature of our soul, as the highest intelligence and author of the world, where the properties and existence of an author of the world is inferred from the constitution, the order and unity, that are found in this world by ascent from this world to the highest intelligence as the principle of natural order and perfection (A632/B660). (Moral theology is the same as natural theology except that the world is considered with regard to moral order and perfection under laws of freedom.)

4 It is worth noting that Kant’s most extensive explanation of the difference between the reflective power of judgment (thinking of things without judging) and the determinate power of judgment (judging that in a predicative way and holding to be true) takes place in his *Critique of Aesthetic Judgment*. The paradigm of reflection is aesthetic contemplation of art. The *Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment* follows this, and Kant takes great advantage of this distinction in his treatment of the purposiveness of nature.

5 Kant argues that teleological ideas like the purposiveness of living things are necessary maxims of reason in that they are conditions of the possibility of certain kinds of experience. The argument he suggests is that
because we can distinguish organic from inorganic beings (life from non-life) and because we can do so only according to the idea of organic purposiveness, the principle of organic purposiveness is a condition of our experience of organisms and thus a condition of our experience of nature. As a condition of the possibility of something certain to be actual, namely our experience of the organic, the principle of organic purposiveness is necessary and a priori (though not pure a priori or general). This is a transcendental sort of argument. Kant uses an argument of the same form to establish the transcendental status of space, time, and the categories. He argues in each case that there is something certain to be actual, e.g. experience, which we can call fact or data (Bxxi). He then argues that there is a condition of the possibility of this fact, e.g. that time is the a priori form of inner sense. Any condition of the possibility of a fact, where the fact is certain, is itself necessary and thus a priori. This form of argument is a signature method for establishing necessity for Kant.

vi Kant’s understanding of the relation between the analogies of experience, the teleology of nature, and ideas of reason could be used to explain the “proportionality” of the highest good. This is a very complex and subtle issue that is not needed to understand the Groundwork, but it illustrates the broader relevance of Kant’s logic - a logically informed understanding of the analogy with nature helps explain what it means for happiness to be proportioned to virtue in the highest good as follows. Very briefly, an analogy is a pair of proportions that are equivalent in some regard. The analogy with nature introduced in Groundwork II is an analogy between the realm of what is, i.e. nature, and the realm of what ought to be, i.e. a kingdom of ends. The basis of the analogy is the legality of the realm in question – this is the regard in which the two are equivalent. Thus nature is to its objects as the kingdom of ends is to its objects, or \( n/N = e/KE \). Both \( n \) and \( N \) are presumed to be fairly well known. The idea of a kingdom of ends is defined in Groundwork II in such a way as to lead one to fill in \( e \) with personal ends that fit the type (as in archetype) of the moral law (BL 47). In the second Critique where the highest good is introduced, it is no longer the object to realm relation at issue. Instead the issue is something we might describe as the characteristics of a human being in relation to the world. These can also be understood through an analogy between the legality of nature and morality. Happiness is the natural characteristic of goodness, or at least of the agreeable, for sensible beings (or for human beings insofar as they are empirical beings). Virtue is the moral analog of happiness. Virtue is the characteristic of moral goodness for rational beings (or for human beings insofar as they are free). So we may posit either \( h/N = v/KE \) or \( h/v = N/KE \). The latter is the most useful form of the analogy if the ought is considered as a possible ground of what is: The relation between nature and a kingdom of ends should be the same as the relation between happiness and virtue, so just as nature ought to take the form of a kingdom of ends, roughly speaking, happiness ought to take the form of virtue. This logical interpretation of the proportion is useful in avoiding the simple-minded impression that Kant is concerned with the distribution of happiness, as if we (or God) should occupy ourselves with doling out empirical goods to individuals in proportion to the number and kind of their good willings. The logical understanding of the proportion lends itself better to Kant’s description of a general historical progress towards the ideal that neither advocates inducements to virtue nor specifies God’s role in the process.

vii Kant’s distinction between psychology and psychological science illustrates how the will could be subject both to a priori moral science and to moral anthropology without contradiction. Psychological science is an empirical science. As a transcendental idea of the soul, in contrast, psychology is an idea of a thinking substance that gives unity to the variety of appearances found in psychological science. Both psychology and psychological science are ultimately about this same substance: The soul is the transcendental “special content” of psychological science as well as the object of psychology. The two are co-extensive in that they are about the same object, but they treat the object in different ways and as subject to different principles. The human being is the empirically determinable special content of psychological science, which Kant thinks metaphysically presupposes the thinking substance. The empirical significance of psychology as a transcendental idea of the soul can only be deduced through its regulative use in psychological science, Kant argues, because transcendental ideas are not possible grounds of insight.
The natural necessity of self-love is a complex and controversial topic, but it bears mentioning. I take it that any rational being of our sort, with sensibility and desire, is governed by a natural necessity (natural needs) that can be construed as self-love or as prudential. The (conditional) practical necessity of prudence is not something we may abandon wholesale, in part because it depends on the analytic relation between ends and means. Insofar as we are end-pursuers, we are also means-users. To declare an entire class of means unavailable for one’s use is deeply irrational (see Kant’s argument for the necessity of intellectual possession DR 245ff). As Herman argues in “Mutual Aid and Respect for Persons”, the wide duty of beneficence depends on the conditional rationality and practical necessity of prudence as well: It is the “ubiquity (inescapability) of the possibility of needing help” or our “dependency” that makes beneficence a wide duty (Herman 1993, 52, 60, 67).

Judgment in general is developed over one’s lifetime. Prior to birth there is very little variety or change in the womb and thus very little material to be understood, so the concepts of the understanding are largely empty and have no use for a fetus. Birth brings an abundance of external effects that exercise the senses and generate highly manifold material for the recently dormant understanding. Birth creates the first real opportunity for the fetus to use non-trivial concepts. Babies first use low-level concepts by learning to judge and thus understand what happens to them at a basic sensory level. They learn to act, or at least to move voluntarily, by means of a sensorimotor feedback loop with some aid from short-term memory. As they continue to develop babies learn to make what we might call higher level judgments whereby the initial representations of this and that are brought under less and less basic concepts. For example they come to recognize this recurring unpleasant wet diaper feeling as to-be-cried-about, and that moving thing as mom.

*Worldliness* is good for the development of judgment because it provides variety of experience for the employment of finer and more sophisticated concepts which challenge the acuteness of one’s judgment. Adults have typically internalized a great many of the most highly applicable concepts over the course of their lives, so reflection is not always required in order to bring a generalized unity to their experience and their lives. Internalization is a convenience that minimizes the need for reflection, but it is not a rational demand.

By virtue of being rational beings, beings who have a faculty of reason, we necessarily strive to close and complete a unified system of concepts. Inconsistency, contradiction, incompleteness and lack of closure are fundamentally irrational. The demand for systematicity requires that we discover and correct inconsistency and contradiction. The demand for closure and completeness, for unity, requires that we extend our grasp of things to its limit.

All of this and more is required for the development of moral expertise. See Herman’s “The Practice of Moral Judgment” (Ch 4) on the development of sensitivity to moral salience and its relation to acting dutifully (Herman 1993).

“In order to remain strictly within its own boundaries, physics abstracts entirely from the question of whether the ends of nature are intentional or unintentional; for that would be meddling in someone else’s business (namely in that of metaphysics). It is enough that there are objects that are explicable only in accordance with natural laws that we can think only under the idea of ends as a principle [Princip as ground], and which are even internally cognizable, as far as their internal form is concerned, only in this way. In order to avoid even the least suspicion of wanting to mix into our cognitive grounds something that does not belong in physics as all, namely a supernatural cause, in [natural] teleology we certainly talk about nature as if the purposiveness in it were intentional, but at the same time ascribe this intention to nature, i.e. to matter, by which we would indicate (since there can be no misunderstanding here, because no intention in the strict sense of the term can be attributed to any lifeless matter) that this term signifies here only a principle of the reflecting, not of the determining power of judgment, and is thus not meant to add to the use of reason another kind of research besides that in accordance with mechanical laws…rather, such talk is only meant to designate a kind of causality in nature, in accordance with an analogy with our own causality in the technical use of reason, in order to keep before us the rule in
accordance with which *research* into certain products of nature must be conducted” (5:382-3 emphasis mine).
Chapter 8  The Progression of the Formulas: Meeting Touchstones of Real Objectivity and Intention

The issue for this chapter is a textual puzzle involving the progression of the three formulas in \textit{Groundwork II}, more specifically the relation between quantity, reality, intuition and feeling. As the quote below indicates, Kant says there are three formulas of the moral law in \textit{Groundwork II} and the subjective difference between them somehow brings an idea of reason closer to intuition and feeling via some analogy. The stages of the progression are characterized in two ways, from form to matter to complete determination and then from unity to plurality to totality.

The above three ways of representing the principle of morality are at bottom only so many formulae of the very same law [coextensive representations], and any one of them of itself unites the other two in it [analysis of one can generate any other]. There is nevertheless a difference among them [which features are most distinctly represented], which is indeed subjectively rather than objectively practical [concerns maxim rather than law itself], \textbf{intended namely to bring an idea of reason closer to intuition (by a certain analogy) and thereby to feeling}. All maxims [subjective principles of volition] have, namely,

4) a \textbf{form}, which consists in universality; and in this respect the formula of the moral imperative is expressed thus: \textit{that maxims must be chosen as if they were to hold as universal laws of nature} [FUL/FULN];

5) a \textbf{matter}, namely an end, and in this respect the formulas says that a rational being, as an end by its nature and hence as an end in itself, must \textit{in every maxim serve as the limiting condition} of all merely relative and arbitrary ends [FOH];

6) a \textbf{complete determination of all maxims} by means of that formula, namely that \textit{all maxims from one’s own lawgiving are to harmonize with a possible kingdom of ends as with a kingdom of nature} [FOA/KE].

A \textbf{progression} takes place here, as through the \textbf{categories} of the \textbf{unity} of the form of the will (its universality), the \textbf{plurality} of the matter (of objects, i.e. of ends), and the allness or \textbf{totality} of the \textbf{system} of these. But one does better always to proceed in moral \textbf{appraisal} by the strict method and put at its basis the universal formula of the categorical imperative: act in accordance with a maxim that can at the same time make itself a universal law. If, however, one wants also to provide \textbf{access} for the moral law, it is very useful to bring one and the same action under the three concepts mentioned above and thereby, as far as possible, \textbf{bring it closer to intuition}. (G 4: 436-7 emphasis mine)
How precisely this progression is supposed to work is quite mysterious. Kant does not identify the analogy, nor does he explain why one ought to bring an idea of reason closer to intuition or feeling. The relation between the two characterizations of the stages is unclear. Moreover, neither seems to have anything to do with analogy, intuition, or feeling. The quote clearly indicates that Kant has some method in mind here, but the nature of the method and how it would contribute to determining the special content of moral science is obscure.

Traditional interpretations work from the purpose of the progression, to bring the moral law closer to intuition and/or feeling, and attempt to explain how the progression could do that. To bring something closer to intuition is prima facie to make it easier to grasp. According to the scholastic tradition, this could mean either to make the moral law more concrete or to make it clearer. The current interpretive tradition elides the logical distinction between healthy common understanding in concreto and cognitive grasp from clear and distinct philosophical understanding in abstracto. Traditional interpretations consequently elide two purposes Kant might have in mind here, an appeal to the concrete as a touchstone of correctness or an appeal to the logical perfection of clear and distinct understanding. Most interpretations tend strongly towards the former, arguing in some manner or other that the formulas bring the moral law closer to intuition in the sense that they somehow bring it closer to common understanding or make the moral law more concrete to us.

Rawls, for example, does not distinguish between whether the progression makes the moral law more concrete or clearer. Rawls thinks the three formulas represent three points of view (Rawls 2000). Kant makes the moral law more intuitive by presenting the moral law from the point of view of the individual agent, the point of view of everyone, and a legislative point of view in turn. He does not explain precisely what the connection
is between such triangulation and intuition, or explain how a method of triangulation
could be expected to accomplish Kant’s goals.

Korsgaard represents a faction of the tradition who emphasize that the second and
third formulas bring the moral law not merely closer to intuition, but to feeling, where
they interpret this to mean that these formulas gain us better access to moral motivation
(Korsgaard 2002; see my Introduction endnote ii). The idea is that a better grasp of the
moral law must move us more strongly to act accordingly. Again these interpretations
are typically ambiguous between whether it is clarity or concreteness that gives us
“access” to the moral law.

If we assume that additional points of view contribute to our understanding of the
moral law in much the same way that having more data, examples or illustrations would,
according to Kant’s logic lectures triangulation could make the moral law more concrete.
This might be useful in at least three ways. Kant indicates in his logic lectures and
elsewhere that common understanding is an important touchstone of correctness.
Examples and such could therefore be useful in demonstrating that the analysis has not
gone astray and come to contradict common healthy understanding in concreto.
Examples could also be useful in showing the extensive import of the moral law
(extended subjective clarity), which Kant has largely taken for granted. This might show
the aesthetic universality or aesthetic distinctness of moral cognition (JL 39). Most
interestingly, because concrete understanding is livelier than abstract understanding,
examples can even bring a cognition closer to feeling. Since the famous progression
quote above takes place in a passage that clearly connects the formulas back to the
Groundwork I analysis concerning the value of a good will and respect, and a return to
the concrete might serve the purpose Kant indicates, the progression of the formulas
might bring the moral law closer to intuition by making it more concrete.
None of this is necessary to determine the special content of morality. Kant began from common understanding and he is an expert in analysis. It would therefore be inappropriate to interpret *Groundwork II* such that a return to the common is a criterion he must meet in order to have successfully established his *Groundwork* of the metaphysics of morals. Kant takes the extensive import of the moral law for granted because common understanding requires it. Doubt arises only from philosophical subtleties that bring the possibility of morality itself into question. With regard to feeling, concrete representations are lively because they are closely connected to pleasure and pain, which are not moral feelings. Since Kant takes pains to argue that such non-moral feelings are irrelevant, he cannot be arguing in *Groundwork II* that the progression somehow makes the moral law pleasing to us (as opposed to making distinct its respect-worthiness).

Though the statement of the progression takes place in an overtly methodological passage that connects directly to the common analysis, the formulas themselves are presented in an explicitly metaphysical context that does not. Metaphysics is supposed to be far more profound, and therefore removed from, common understanding and feeling. Formulas are precise determinate representations of the moral law in abstracto. Triangulation makes these abstract laws no less precise, no less profound, and no less abstract. If the real point of the second and third formulas is a return to the concrete, say, to confirm that the analysis has not strayed too far from common understanding or show how deeply the moral law moves us, Kant would have done far better to present lots of new and different examples rather than presenting two new formulas and recycling the same four examples. In short, while some traditional interpretations are insightful with
respect to how Kant’s metaphysics relates to our common cognition, all return-to-the-concrete interpretations tend to make Kant’s strategy seem rather misguided.\footnote{143}

To elaborate this point a bit, notice that recycling the same four examples is not well suited to bringing the moral law closer to aesthetic perfection (JL 38-9). Aesthetic universality and aesthetic distinctness are the two perfections of cognition that concern the use of examples according to Kant.\footnote{143}

\textit{Aesthetic universality}

consists in the applicability of a cognition to a multitude of objects that serve as examples, to which application of it [the cognition] can be made, and whereby it becomes useful at the same time for the end of popularity. (JL 39 emphasis mine)

Kant says that a descent to the popular is highly desirable in the end:

\begin{quote}
The ability to descend to the public’s power of comprehension and to the customary expressions, in which scholastic perfection is not slighted, but in which the clothing of thoughts is merely so arranged that the framework, the scholastically correct and technical in that perfection may not be seen (just as one draws lines with a pencil, writes on them, and subsequently erases them) - this truly popular perfection of cognition is in fact a great and rare perfection, which shows much insight into the science. It has this merit, too, in addition to many others, that it can provide a proof of complete insight into a thing. (JL 48, se also JL 100)
\end{quote}

But if Kant were really attempting to use the progression of the formulas to address the aesthetic universality of the moral law, he should have given as broad a range of examples as possible. Kant’s attempts to reach popular perfection are more likely to be found in the articulation of moral science in his \textit{Metaphysics of Morals}, or even in his \textit{Anthropology}.

\textit{Aesthetic distinctness} is “distinctness in intuition, in which a concept thought abstractly is exhibited or elucidated \textit{in concreto} through examples” (JL 39). A progression towards aesthetic distinctness should at least make the same four examples

\footnote{143}{Since traditional interpretations of the progression like Rawls’ and Korsgaard’s are vague or ambiguous on this point, a satisfactory account of how this would work might neither favor nor count against them in the end.}
progressively more concrete. Since aesthetic distinctness is sensible distinctness, Kant should ideally show us the moral law in action to make it aesthetically distinct (JL 35). Since there are no certain examples of acting solely from duty, this is arguably not even possible. Suppose instead that FOH itself is somehow more particular than FUL/FULN, which is certainly not obvious. The examples Kant uses are still no more particular in the division of duty according to FOH than they were in the division according to FUL/FULN. Given that the method by which aesthetic distinctness is perfected is by example and Kant provides no such examples for FOA/KE, the progression is not best interpreted as a progression towards aesthetic distinctness.

If my argument against the progressive aesthetic perfection of the moral law is unsatisfying, consider that return-to-the-concrete interpretations of the progression give us no obvious reason to think that the matter/form distinction or the categories of quantity should be in any way privileged among the many concepts and distinctions available to Kant. According to the first Critique, a progression from unity to plurality to totality is a progression of the categories of quantity. As I explained in chapter 7, these are ancestral categories of the understanding that are conditions of the intellectual possibility of theoretical cognition of objects. As I will explain in this chapter, a progression from form to matter to complete determination is a progression from of the concepts of reflection presupposed by all judgment to the principle of determination presupposed by judgments concerning systems. Both sets of concepts are far removed from common understanding in concreto. If Kant actually has a strategy in presenting three formulas by means of which the moral law can be brought closer to intuition and feeling, the concepts

144 Keep in mind that since the quantities in question are categories of understanding rather than logical forms of judgment, it is not the quantity of the formula insofar as it is a proposition that is at issue. The progression is not, for example, from the universal form of FUL to its instantiation.
employed in the progression cannot be ad hoc. Even supposing that concepts of reflection and categories of understanding are in general strategically well-chosen to bring the moral law closer to intuition and perhaps thereby to feeling, there is no evident reason why these particular choices among them would be best. There are four dimensions of reflection and four dimensions of the categories. Kant might better have used the identity/diversity distinction from reflection and the modal categories of understanding. These particular ways of describing the difference between the formulas must have some metaphysical significance that relates to an identifiable analogy.

Having ruled out interpreting Kant’s progression of the three formulas as a progressive aesthetic perfection of cognition via examples, it might seem we are left with nothing. To bring the moral law closer to intuition and thereby to feeling, prima facie must be to increase its aesthetic perfection. What I want to argue in this chapter is that there is an alternative, and this alternative makes better sense of all the methodological data we have so far. As I argued in chapter 6, *Groundwork II* is the *Groundwork* of a transcendental analytic, concerned specifically with the logical perfection of moral cognition. A transcendental aesthetic, in contrast, would concern the faculty of feeling and its a priori form, respect. *Groundwork II* does not. What I will argue in this chapter is that the progression of the formulas brings the analytic closer to the aesthetic by showing that the moral law satisfies the conditions of the possibility of intuition, and these conditions involve the matter/form distinction and the categories of quantity.

Suppose, then, that the progression of the formulas must bring the moral law closer to intuition and feeling without necessarily making it more concrete. The alternative is that the progression brings the moral law closer to intuition and feeling via the kind of cognitive insight or cognitive grasp we get from clear and distinct cognition in abstracto (recall chapter 2). The objective is now to see how this could work and why it
should be required for *Groundwork II*, where the purpose of *Groundwork II* is to determine the special content of moral science adequately to its purpose in the broader context of establishing moral metaphysics as a science (i.e. to establish the supreme principle of morality as a necessary presupposition of all possible practice in *Groundwork III* in preparation for a critique of practical reason).

To deepen the interpretive issue just a bit, Kant emphasizes neither the reflective nor the categorical progression when he actually presents the second and third formulas of the moral law. Just after the division of duty according to the first formula Kant says that he has not yet proven a priori that “there really is” a categorically imperative practical law that commands “absolutely of itself”, and he has not yet proven that “the observance of this law is duty” (G 4:425). The argument that follows is an argument that the moral law is *objectively valid* for all rational beings. Since we are presumably real and rational, we might well take this to be Kant’s proof that the moral law is real. The result of Kant’s efforts seems to be the second formula of the moral law, traditionally called the Formula of Humanity:

[FOH:] So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means. (G 4:429)

This formula of the moral law would then serve to make distinct its reality by making distinct its validity for real objects. The division of duty that follows this formula presumably shows that observance of the moral law is duty, thereby completing the task list.

The problem is that when this passage concerning FOH is complete, Kant says he does not prove that there are practical propositions that command categorically *anywhere* in *Groundwork II* (G 4:431). What has Kant been doing here if not proving that there
really are categorical imperatives that command us as rational beings? Moreover, whatever does any of this have to do with the quantitative or reflective progression towards intuition and/or feeling?

Following the passages concerning the objective validity of the moral law, FOH, and the second division of duty, Kant introduces a third formula of the moral law traditional known as the Formula of Autonomy (FOA), the idea of a *kingdom of ends*, and the concept of *autonomy*:

[FOA]:] The supreme condition of the will’s harmony with universal practical reason is [autonomy:] the idea of the will of every rational being as a will giving universal law. (G 4:431)

Morality consists, then, in the reference of all action to the lawgiving by which alone a kingdom of ends\(^ {145} \) is possible. (G 4:434)

Autonomy is therefore the ground of the dignity of human nature and of every rational nature. (G 4:436)

The apparent progress Kant makes here is to distinguish between being subject to law and being a legislator, and to emphasize that our giving *universal law*, i.e. our autonomy, would make possible a kingdom of ends and would ground the dignity of humanity.

The idea of a kingdom of ends makes it reasonably clear how the third formula of the moral might command that a maxim ought to completely determine a totality, but it is difficult to see how any of this could provide a touchstone by which Kant might hope to show that morality is not real. Referring morality to the idea of a kingdom of ends, which is explicitly a mere *ideal*, seems to be of little use. The dignity of a rational nature, which is “beyond price”, is likewise no help. Perhaps this part of the text is not at all concerned with reality. Since the dignity of autonomy clearly refers back to the opening

\(^ {145} \) “By a kingdom I understand a systematic union of various rational beings through common laws…a whole of all ends in systematic connection (a whole of both rational beings as ends in themselves and of the ends of his own that each may set himself), that is, a kingdom of ends, which is possible in accordance with the above principles” (G 4:433).
analysis of the goodness of a good will, the simplest interpretation is that Kant means to bring the moral law closer to intuition and feeling by referring the results of analysis back to the common understanding with which he began. But then the progression appears to be from FUL/FULN directly to FOA/KE and FOH is merely an odd digression between them. The discontinuity implicit in this interpretation makes it unclear how the three formulas constitute a progression.

I will argue in this chapter that the three formulas together bring the moral law closer to intuition and feeling but Kant’s primary agenda is not to bring the moral law closer to common understanding and feeling. Kant’s agenda is to provide us better access to a cognitive grasp of the moral law that 1) brings the moral law closer to intuition in the sense that it makes distinct how the moral law conforms to the possibility of intuition and 2) brings the moral law closer to feeling in the sense that it makes distinct how the moral law conforms to the possibility of desire (if reason is both intellectual and practical, cognitive grasp of the moral law is a grasp of our own causal power). The advantage of the interpretation I will construct in this chapter is that it makes better use of all the methodological data mentioned. It is a specifically metaphysical interpretation, therefore suitable to the context Kant identifies; and by relating objective validity, reality, matter/form, quantity, intuition and feeling in this context it reveals reasons why Kant should present three formulas that have the features he indicates.

I will begin by arguing that the text concerning the reality of the moral law, including the formula of humanity and the second division of duty that follows, is intended to address one of the most central theses of the first Critique, the metaphysical
criterion that \textit{experience is the touchstone of all our cognition}.\textsuperscript{146} Since the objects of moral science (the objects for which the moral law is valid) are purportedly real objects of intention that we make actual, Kant’s treatment of the reflective empirical significance of the moral law discussed in the last chapter does not clearly connect the moral law to any touchstone of reality. It could still be the case that the moral law is constitutive only of an ideal will. In such case the moral law might constitutively determine epiphenomenal conduct and be reflectively significant only for inner experience. In order to explain how practical cognition is \textit{really} possible, I contend, Kant must explain how practical cognition meets the touchstone criterion. It must be \textit{possible} for our conduct to appear in experience, for our actions to have objectively real effects, and for the moral law to be significant for outer experience.

It is important for Kant to somehow address this problem because the problem of interaction was widely advertised to be the downfall of Cartesian dualism. \textit{Mind} is essentially \textit{thinking}, on this view, and \textit{matter} is essentially \textit{extended}. Since these are fundamentally heterogeneous, interaction seems impossible. Simply put, if mind is ever to affect matter, it seems that one must make sense of the absurd idea that thought can become extended. (This problem was difficult enough for Descartes that it led him to some surprising speculations about the pineal gland as a possible location of interaction.)

Applying the problem to Kant, it follows directly from Kant’s definition of practical cognition as the capacity to make objects actual, that it \textit{is possible} that \textit{some} actual willing \textit{sometime} have an empirical effect. In other words, it must be possible for

\textsuperscript{146} Notice that since the objects of moral science are purportedly real objects of intention that we make actual, Kant’s treatment of the reflective, ideal empirical significance of the moral law discussed in the last chapter is insufficient. It could still be the case that the moral law is constitutive of an ideal will. In such case the moral law might constitutively determine epiphenomenal conduct and be reflectively significant only for inner experience.
some thought to become extended. Kant is not a Cartesian dualist, but a transcendental idealist, so his problem of interaction is framed differently because his concept of space is quite different. Extension in Cartesian metaphysics is only the pure a priori form of outer intuition in Kant’s. So in order to solve his own version of the problem of interaction Kant needs to explain how a modification of mind, specifically a ground of volition, can have consequences that conform to the “spatial” categories. This is still a difficult problem for Kant, but perhaps a solvable one.

As I will explain in §1, the transcendental criterion of reality relevant to each of these ways of describing the issue at hand is the touchstone criterion that practical cognition must conform to the a priori conditions of the possibility of outer, sensible intuition. More specifically, I will argue in §2 that practical cognition must conform to the categories of quantity which are in turn supported by the hylomorphic concepts of reflection. The passages in which Kant presents FOA then extend the touchstone of real objectivity to a touchstone of real intention: The distinctive form of intention on which the analogy to purposiveness in nature is based – which was discussed but not identified in chapter 7 - is a touchstone of real intention (see §3). This form, I will argue, is the reciprocal form of a causal community and it presupposes the complete determination of a totality. In short, matter and plurality are required for real objectivity, while complete determination and totality are required for intention (genuine purposiveness).

Given that the relation between the matter/form distinction, quantity, intuition and reality in Kant’s metaphysics is quite complex, my aim is not to fully explain these relations but only to demonstrate how they can be used to gain insight into Kant’s strategy in this part of Groundwork II. While I cannot show that the first Critique makes Kant’s strategy predictable, I do hope to show that there is a method underlying Kant’s presentation, that this method is reasonably well grounded in the scholastic tradition, and
a better understanding of Kant’s first *Critique* metaphysics allows us to follow along less blindly. The primary disadvantage of such a metaphysical interpretation is that relying heavily on Kant’s technical theoretical metaphysics makes the interpretation less accessible to the typical Kantian ethicist. We should nevertheless take seriously that Kant is doing metaphysics here and acknowledge that practical metaphysics is at least as complex, subtle and difficult as theoretical metaphysics. Simplicity is not always to be preferred, especially in philosophy.

§1 Identifying the Touchstone of Moral Reality

The basic problem with speculative metaphysics, Kant argues in the first *Critique*, is that speculative metaphysical theses exceed the bounds of possible experience altogether, and such “wild” speculation is not objectively valid for real objects of cognition. This is an important criterion for the *Groundwork* because we might reasonably be in doubt as to whether a rational will is really possible, despite our healthy common understanding that we are rational agents. As we will see, Kant’s analysis reveals that a rational will would have to be self-determining and thereby self-actualizing. This ontological bootstrapping aspect of morality is metaphysically suspect. In order to vindicate our common understanding, then, Kant should explain how it is possible for the will of a rational being to make itself, as its own end, actual, or to self-realize. If a proof of this is premature, i.e. should such a proof require critique, Kant should at least show in a groundwork of the metaphysics of morals that it is not really impossible for a rational will to be an end in itself.

As part of his project to explain precisely how it is that experience serves as a touchstone for theoretical cognition, Kant argues that there are two very general metaphysical criteria for the employment of a concept. The first criterion is that the logical form of the concept must conform to the possibility of thought. This is a logical
criterion, not specifically a metaphysical criterion, because it abstracts entirely from all consideration of the objects that might fall under the concept; it requires no appeal whatsoever to whether or how the concept might have an extension. The second criterion, however, concerns the possibility of the concept’s application to an object in general, or to an arbitrary possible object. This is a criterion of determination. The following quotes both state the two criteria:

To cognize an object, it is required that I be able to prove its possibility (whether by the testimony of experience from its actuality or a priori through reason). But I can think whatever I like, as long as I do not contradict myself, i.e., as long as my concept is a possible thought, even if I cannot give any assurance whether or not there is a corresponding object somewhere within the sum total of all possibilities. But in order to ascribe objective validity to such a concept (real possibility, for the first sort of possibility was merely logical) something more is required. This “more”, however, need not be sought in theoretical sources of cognition; it may also lie in practical ones. (Bxxvii* emphasis mine)

“For every concept there is requisite, first, the logical form of a concept (of thinking) in general, and then, second, the possibility of giving it an object to which it is to be related…Now the object cannot be given to a concept otherwise than in intuition, and, even if a pure intuition is possible a priori prior to the object [where the object in general is thereby made from the concept], then even this can acquire its object, thus its objective validity, only through empirical intuition, of which it [pure intuition] is the mere form. Thus all concepts and with them all principles, however a priori they may be, are nevertheless related to empirical intuitions, i.e. to data for possible experience. (A239/B298 emphasis mine)

The criterion of objective validity requires that the intellectual component of a cognition conform to data of possible experience, or as we will see, to conditions of the possibility of experience in general. In the standard theoretical case the relation is relatively straightforward. Objects are given to concepts and principles as matter to form through intuition. The matter is prior in this case, and Kant departs little from tradition here.

In the practical case, however, it might be necessary to interpret the touchstone in a slightly different way. Practical objects are made through volition rather than given through intuition. The form, e.g. design, must be prior and its matter must be generated, constructed or produced to make the object actual. One might think, then, that the
touchstone criterion for moral metaphysics should be that practical cognition must conform to data for possible practice rather than data of possible experience. The transcendental touchstone could then be either that practical cognition must conform to the pure a priori conditions of the possibility of volition, or that it must conform to the pure a priori conditions of the possibility of intuition.

If I am right that respect or something like it is the pure a priori form of desire, then the volitional touchstone criterion of moral metaphysics might turn out to be just that practical cognition necessarily conforms to respect for law, which Kant clearly argues. If this touchstone criterion were the primary concern for Kant in *Groundwork II*, though, the progression of the quantitative categories should have explicitly identified the quantitative categories of freedom rather than the corresponding categories of understanding. In the second *Critique* Kant presents a table of the categories of freedom with respect to the concepts of the good and evil. There he lists the following “quantities”:

- **Subjective**, in accordance with maxims (*intentions of the will* of the individual)
- **Objective**, in accordance with principles (*precepts*)
- **Both** A priori objective as well as subjective principles of freedom (*laws*). (KpV 5:66 emphasis and bulleting mine)

Very briefly, these categories correspond roughly to the Rawlsian “three points of view” interpretation of the formulas. Taking them in order, FUL/FULN is subjectively precise, commanding that we act only on *maxims* that could be willed universal laws, where maxims are subjective principles of volition that express the intentions of the will of an individual. So FUL can be considered to involve an agent-centered point of view as Rawls posits. FOH is instead objectively precise. It commands us to treat rational nature as an *end* in itself, never merely as a means, where ends are practical objects. What FOH
commands is that we act under the precept that rational nature is an end in itself, not merely our own, but everyone’s. Thus FOH can be interpreted to take the point of view of everyone as Rawls says. Finally, FOA distinctly represents the combination of the subjective and objective principles. An autonomous will as an objective end in itself authors its own law, and is thereby first subject to it. Because FOA emphasizes the giving of law, it can be interpreted to take the point of view of a legislator.

Kant clearly indicates in the first Critique and the Groundwork that he is already planning the articulation and critique of moral metaphysics, so he almost certainly does have the categories of freedom in mind when he presents the three formulas in Groundwork II. If there is any reason to think practical cognition must conform specifically to the quantitative categories, then surely it must conform to both sets, i.e. both the quantitative categories of understanding and the quantitative categories of freedom. There is reason, then, to think that the progression of the formulas is calculated to at least foreshadow a relation between the moral law and the quantitative categories of freedom.

The question is why. There is no apparent reason why Kant should think these categories are at all relevant to determining the content of moral science. Even supposing Kant will ultimately need respect and the categories of freedom to solve the central problem of moral metaphysics (how synthetic a priori cognition is possible), he is in no position to use them effectively at this point and as of yet we have no reason to think quantity is at all relevant. Respect is not well-developed in Kant’s critical work up to this point, and the quantitative categories of freedom do not even appear until the second Critique. Most importantly for my purposes it is unclear whether either respect or the quantitative categories of freedom could reign in any “wild” ideas we might have about morality. Practical cognition clearly must conform to whatever conditions of the
possibility of volition that might be revealed through analysis, but this would not necessarily tie them to any useful touchstone of reality. Conformity to respect for law, even from three points of view, does not gain Kant any traction against the charge that morality is ideal or epiphenomenal.

On the other hand, Kant’s intuitive touchstone criterion is meant to apply to metaphysics generally, not only to theoretical metaphysics. If Kant’s project to establish moral metaphysics as a science is to succeed, morality cannot be unavoidably epiphenomenal and causality cannot be unavoidably dualistic. It must be possible for us to make objects of our own (possible) experience actual, or to make actual objects that can appear to us through intuition (see for example KU 5:181-2). To put the point in common terms, it must be possible for the effects of our willing to show up in experience. To put the point in more metaphysical terms, in order for practical objects to be real in just the sense that objects of experience are real, practical cognition would have to be consonant with the conditions of the possibility of experience, and these conditions include among other things the pure a priori spatiotemporal forms of intuition and the categories.iii

Suppose for the time being that there are two transcendental criteria relevant to how the moral law determines conduct entirely a priori. On the one hand, practical cognition ought to conform to the pure a priori condition of possible volition, respect for law, which might somehow relate to the quantitative categories of freedom. This is a constitutive criterion of determinate practical cognition, but not much use as a touchstone of reality. On the other hand, if practical cognition meets the intuitive touchstone, then it necessarily conforms to the pure a priori condition of sensible intuition, plurality, so its objects can appear as informed matter. This would be useful to establish in a groundwork of a metaphysics of morals, perhaps even necessary.
The interesting aspect of the touchstone criterion of moral reality is that practical objects, i.e. ends, must conform to the conditions of possible experience, including the pure a priori form of sensible intuition. As I will explain in the next section, according to the first Critique the relevant conditions of sensible intuition are called the axioms of intuition. Kant argues that these are the axioms of geometry, which are synthetic a priori principles for the determination of appearances according to the categories of quantity: unity, plurality and totality (A161/B200, A164/B205). In order for the synthetic a priori principle of morality to have real objective validity, where the objects produced through practical cognition belong to the same order of reality as the objects of experience, it will turn out that products of the will must be sensibly constituted as informed matter, i.e. they must be quantitatively aggregate. The plurality of rational beings will be the determinable (matter) whose determination (information) is given by the moral law insofar as the moral law governs this domain as its extension. Since the principle that real objects are constituted as informed matter is a traditional scholastic principle, I will try to make Kant’s quantitative thesis more plausible by beginning from its hylomorphic scholastic roots before getting into the more technical Kantian metaphysics.

§2 From Scholastic Hylomorphism to the Metaphysical Touchstone of Morality

Hylomorphism has been interpreted in a wide variety of ways, some of which may in the end be unintelligible. What is important for my purposes in this section is

147 Quantity in general is “composition of the homogeneous…in accordance with all three moments suggested by space” (MFNS 4:495).

that Kant takes some version of this genetically Aristotelian principle as a basic criterion of reality, and that he interpreted the distinction between matter and form to be at least in part a categorically quantitative distinction. In this section I will focus on the relation between the matter/form distinction and quantity in order to explain why it would be natural for Kant to think quantity is metaphysically relevant to the reality of a thing, given his general philosophical upbringing. Kant’s more technical metaphysical arguments will follow.

Though Kant never states them clearly, there are two quantitative criteria of real objectivity that he takes to be employable over a wide range of objects, e.g. mathematics, natural science, the architectonic of pure reason (e.g. A266-8/B322-4).

Hylomorphic Criterion of objective reality: *Real* objects are constituted as (aggregate or total) informed matter.

Intentional Criterion of completely determinate objects: Fully *determinate* objects (systems) are totalities.

The first criterion is a genetically scholastic criterion of reality for cognition. The second criterion is more specifically a criterion for systems. Since sciences and intention are systemic, Kant will ultimately need to explain how his moral theory meets both criteria. This section will primarily concern the hylomorphic criterion of real objectivity.

The first principle of determination above is a genetically Aristotelian principle of hylomorphism that objects capable of undergoing change must be constituted as informed matter. Most generally, the scholars conceived of causality as alteration, movement or change. In any alteration, movement or change there must be a thing that alters, moves or changes. Paradigmatically the thing that undergoes alteration is a substance or the subject of causality, while the alterations themselves are differences in the properties of the substance or subject over time. This very general way of understanding causality is
hylomorphic: Matter is that which undergoes change, while form is that which changes. The form of a thing can be its principle, its definition, its essence, what it is, or what form the thing takes. The matter of a thing is what it is made of, composed of, or what it is that can or does take a form. For example, physical matter can take various chemical forms like water, or it can take artifactual forms like the form table. In a more Kantian vein, modifications of mind can take conceptual, intuitive, imperative, and other representational forms.

Since reality is the realm of causality according to Kant, any doctrine of hylomorphism would imply that real things must be constituted as informed matter, or at least cognizable as informed matter. Kant more specifically identifies matter as the determinable and form as its determination, and his metaphysics is Humanist, but the basic idea is hylomorphic. This is important for my purposes only in that it provides a historical context for Kant’s concern with matter and form that makes his technical use of the distinction seem far less ad hoc.

Now according to both Kant and the scholastic tradition, matter is quantitatively plural, while form is quantitatively a unity. A thing can be a single thing, an aggregate, or a system. Putative disjunctive forms, like “this boot and the number 2” are not properly things because there is no unity of form, i.e. no principle of identity, aggregation, or organization. Since a form must be a unity even according to scholastic logic, Kant would have no reason to make an issue of the relation between form and unity. The plurality of matter is a bit more obscure, but since matter had more recently come to be closely associated with extension or the extended, c.f. Descartes’ and Leibniz, Kant’s audience should have easily agreed that matter can only be plural. The

149 Teleology adds first and final causes to the picture, but they need not be considered here.
combination of matter and form indicated in *Groundwork II* is complete determination, which must be quantitatively total.

There is a complication, though. Not every combination of unity with plurality succeeds in yielding a totality according to Kant. When the combination falls short, the result is an aggregate. When matter is informed, then, it could be either incompletely determined as an aggregate or completely determined as a totality. The hylomorphic principle thus has a quantitative corollary in Kantian metaphysics, that real objects are either aggregates or totalities. This is a criterion not only of physical objects, but also for bodies of knowledge, mental capacities, ends, and so on.\(^{150}\)

In order to explain why some objects of cognition need only meet the more general hylomorphic criterion, that real objects are constituted as informed matter, it will help to elaborate the distinction between aggregates and systems. According to scholastic logic, matter is plural, as in some or much or little; but plurality is not therefore multiple, as in many or few or a countable quantity, because multiplicity requires delimitation or individuation of the plurality. Objects like water, dirt and other mass-objects are aggregates. This means in part that like all other real objects they are pluralities divided from other things by a principle and thereby determined as possibly real objects. What is distinctive of proper aggregates is that their matter and form, or their unity and plurality, cannot be combined in a way that yields a totality. In order for a plurality to yield a totality, the principle of unity or form must also be a principle of individuation, not merely a principle that divides the given thing from other things. The principle must individuate singular objects, e.g. Socrates or this chair, according to a

\(^{150}\) Etiquette, imagination, and happiness are examples of mere aggregates. Etiquette is a body of knowledge that cannot be made a science according to Kant. Imagination is a mental ability with no pure a priori form or principle and thus cannot be critiqued. Happiness is an unavoidably indeterminate end. In contrast, sciences, reason and the kingdom of ends are totalities.
non-arbitrary principle of *delimitation*. These totalities are *systems* and their parts are multiple.

To make this a bit more concrete, water is an aggregate. The plurality of its matter has a principle that makes it possible to identify water and distinguish it from dirt, but there are no *waters* or *dirts*, only puddles and heaps. Tables, in contrast, are systems. We can make heaps of tables, just as we can make heaps of dirt, but a heap of tables must nevertheless contain a specific number of tables. We cannot make a heap of *table*.

What this means for the *Groundwork* is that in order for the synthetic a priori principle of morality to be objectively real, where the objects produced through practical cognition belong to the *same* order of reality as the objects of experience, products of the will must be sensibly constituted as informed matter, i.e. they must be quantitatively aggregate (or total). If practical objects were to necessarily fail the conditions of the possibility of outer experience, either they would be unavoidably ideal rather than real, or there would be an unavoidable dualism of theory and practice. Given the prevalence of idealism and other radical philosophical revisions of our common understanding at the time, Kant should have been concerned with whether and how conduct could be metaphysically real and this topic is appropriate for *Groundwork II*. In order for us to construct artifacts as we commonly do, it must be possible for practical objects, i.e. ends, to *appear* in space. This does not mean that practical objects must *be* outer appearances, but only that it must be possible for them to appear not only through inner intuition but through outer intuition as well. Perhaps the most basic criterion of the reality of moral conduct, then, is that in order for practical objects or ends to have possible outer appearance, morality must be quantitatively at least aggregate, and perhaps total.
§2.1  The Critical Roots of the Moral Touchstone

Kant does not straightforwardly appeal to the quantitative criteria of reality described thus far. Since Kant’s metaphysics is specifically Humanist, while scholastic hylomorphism is not, there is reason to doubt whether these criteria are correct. We have little reason thus far to concede that ideal objects cannot be conceived as informed matter and less reason to think any hylomorphic criterion should be a touchstone of reality for Kantian metaphysics. Textual support is therefore necessary. In this section I will briefly explain how matter and form relate to the categories of quantity in the first *Critique* and how they can serve as a *transcendental* touchstone of reality.

Most generally, matter and form are concepts of transcendental reflection according to Kant. Prior to making *any* objective judgment, Kant says, we must make an *objective comparison*. We must compare the *content* of the concepts that are to be related in the judgment, using four concept pairs: identity and difference, agreement and opposition, inner and outer, and/or *determinable* and *determination* (matter and form) (A261/B317, A266–8/B322–4). For example, in order to make a universal judgment, one must conceive the sameness of the content, i.e. one must conceive the *identity* of many things under one concept.

Every judgment requires a reflective comparison, but every comparison in turn requires a context. According to Kant the objective comparison one must make depends upon whether the objects are connected to each other in understanding or sensibility. If, for example, one fails to distinguish whether two water drops are being compared intellectually or sensibly, one might mistakenly judge that two drops with distinct locations are numerically identical because they are indiscernible with respect to understanding. Location is a criterion of sensible identity, but not intellectual identity. If
we confuse the pure object of the understanding with its appearance, Kant says we can make only a very insecure objective comparison (A270/B326).\footnote{Kant is responding here to Leibniz’s identity of indiscernibles. This is a key move in Kant’s refutation of monadic pre-established harmony.}

In order to avoid such mistakes we must attend to the source of cognition, or in other words, we must transcendently reflect. Transcendental reflection, Kant says, is

[T]he state of mind in which we first prepare ourselves to find out the subjective conditions under which we can arrive at concepts [and therefore judge correctly]. It is the consciousness of the relation of given representations to our various sources of cognition [sensibility or intellect], through which alone their relation among themselves can be correctly determined...[The question upon which we reflect is] In which cognitive faculty do they belong together...[A]ll judgments, indeed all comparisons, require a reflection. (A260/B316)

This reflection is a condition of judging correctly, again, because the correct determination of the relation between two concepts depends upon the cognitive power in which the concepts to be compared subjectively belong to each other.

Of the four pairs of concepts of reflection, matter and form are an especially important pair according to Kant:

[Matter and form] are two concepts that ground all other reflection, so inseparably are they bound up with every use of the understanding. The former signifies the determinable in general, the latter its determination. (A266/B322)

In every being, for example, the essential properties are the matter, and the way in which they are connected in the thing is the essential form. In a judgment, the concepts to be related are the logical matter, while the relation given by the copula is the form. Most interestingly Kant says that “unbounded reality is the matter of all possibility”, and its limitation or negation, i.e. a distinction, is the form through which one thing is distinguished from another (A266-7/B323). The important point for the moment is that the matter and form relation is a criterion of objectivity that is as fundamental and ubiquitous as identity and difference, and in order to use these concepts correctly in an
An objective comparison that supports objective cognition, we must first ascertain whether we are comparing objects of pure understanding or appearances.

Matter and form are not merely criteria of objective judgment, but also criteria of objective reality, though this will take more work to develop. The objective reality of a concept, principle or cognition is constituted by the relation of that concept or cognition to something that possibly appears. Objective reality is the whole of possible experience, which is the realm of appearance. Even though appearances are not objects of pure understanding as things in themselves, Kant says, “they are nevertheless the only things by means of which our cognition can have objective reality” (A279/B335). This is a touchstone claim. In order for a cognition to be objectively real, it must correspond to possible intuition and have an empirical use. Since the only kind of intuition humans have is “sensible intuition” (as opposed to the sort of intellectual intuition God might have), this implies that an objectively real cognition must conform to the a priori conditions of the possibility of sensible intuition:

It is requisite to make an abstract concept sensible, i.e. display the object that corresponds to it in intuition, since without this the concept would remain (as one says) without sense, i.e. without significance. (A240/B299)

If a cognition is to have objective reality, i.e. to be related to an object, and is to have significance and sense in that object, the object must be able to be given in some way...The possibility of experience is therefore that which gives all of our cognitions a priori objective reality. (A156/B195, see also A220/B268, A266/B322)

If we reflect merely logically, then we simply compare our concepts with each other in the understanding, seeing whether two of them contain the very same thing [identity (co-extension) or difference], whether they contradict each other or not [agreement or opposition], whether something is contained in the concept internally or is added to it [inner or outer], and which of them should count as given [determinable/matter] and which as a manner of thinking of that which is given [determination/form]. But if I apply these concepts to an object in general (in the transcendental sense), without further determining whether this is an object of sensible or intellectual intuition [divine intuition], then limitations (which do not flow from this concept) immediately show up, which pervert all empirical use of them… if one assumes an object, then one must think it under conditions of sensible intuition. (A279/B335 emphasis mine)
Kant’s substantive claim here is the touchstone requirement that objectively valid representations have a possible empirical use, thus the relation between a concept and its objective domain must be possible through sensible intuition. Significant concepts of cognition (not merely of reflection) must ultimately conform to the possibility of experience, which implies that they must conform to the a priori conditions of the possibility of sensible intuition (A239-40/B298-99).

Among these fundamental conditions of the possibility of cognition, the categories of quantity are somewhat privileged conditions of the possibility of objects of outer intuition. The conditions of the possibility of sensible intuition most relevant to objective reality are the mathematical quantitative conditions of outer intuition:

It is therefore clear that the **first application of our concepts of quantity to matter**, through which it first becomes possible for us to transform our outer perceptions into the empirical concept of a matter, as object in general, is grounded only on that property whereby it fills a space – which, by means of feeling [Gefühl], provides us with the quantity and figure of something extended, and thus with the concept of a determinate object in space, which forms the basis of everything else one can say about this thing [empirically]. (MFNS 4:510 emphasis mine)

In other words, the conditions of sensible intuition in question turn out to be the “axioms of intuition”. These synthetic principles of the pure understanding are rules for the objective use of the categories (A161/B200). More specifically, the axioms of intuition are **synthetic a priori principles for the determination of appearances according to the categories of quantity**:

152 unity, plurality and totality (A161/B200, A164/B205).

The obvious question is why. To paraphrase Kant’s explanation closely, the axioms of intuition pertain to the mere possibility of appearances, teaching us how the intuition of appearances can be generated [synthesized] in accordance with rules of a

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152 Quantity in general is “composition of the homogeneous…in accordance with all three moments suggested by space” (MFNS 4:495).
mathematical synthesis, hence how numerical magnitudes and with them the
determination of the appearance as magnitude could be used *constitutively* (A178/B221,
see also A165-6/B206-7). Thus all intuitions are extensive magnitudes, Kant says,
because as intuitions in space or time they must be represented through the same
operation or function, synthesis, as that through which space and time in general are
determined (A161/B203). All appearances are therefore intuited as aggregates, i.e.
multitudes of antecedently given parts [informed matter], which are then cognized
through successive synthesis from part to part in apprehension (A163/B204). The
representation of the parts thus makes possible the representation of the whole
(A162/B203). The upshot of the argument in this part of the first *Critique* is that the
axioms of geometry *are* axioms of intuition in that they express conditions of sensible
intuition, and they are therefore conditions of outer appearance.

Now in the practical case, the object in question is an end. If an end is actually
given through experience, then obviously it conforms to whatever conditions of possible
experience there might be. The easy way to prove the objective reality of a practical
concept or cognition would be to relate it to an end that we know to be real because it is
actual. This would be an empirical demonstration. For example, one might try to prove
the objective reality of a hypothetical imperative by showing how it relates to the
production of ends given through experience, e.g. by producing an artifact.

Though Kant might be able to prove the reality of impure practical cognition this
way, he cannot prove the objective reality of the categorical imperative this way. He has
argued, and he argues again in this passage of *Groundwork II*, that all natural ends that
are “given” through inclination or self-love are disqualified. The moral law must be
*categorically* imperative, he reminds us, so the end to which it must be related cannot be
in any way “borrowed from experience”, based on any “special property of human
nature”, or restricted to subjective inclinations. Kant needs a different strategy for
*Groundwork II.* He needs an end that is not borrowed from experience, that has absolute
worth, and so on. When the objective reality of a cognition cannot be exhibited in
intuition or related directly to actual experience, according to the first *Critique* the
objective reality of the cognition may still be shown by relating it to the conditions of the
possibility of an object in general. These are conditions of the possibility of experience.
The special conditions of the possibility of experience for which Kant argues in the first
*Critique* are the two pure a priori forms of intuition (space and time) and the categories of
the understanding. Among these, the quantiative categories are privileged because their
mathematical relation to space makes them criteria of the possibility of outer intuition.

Even though it involves *sensible* intuition, this touchstone criterion is a
metaphysical, transcendental one. It concerns the *pure a priori conditions of the
possibility* of cognition (and therefore of its objects). Kant gives a fairly succinct and
enlightening statement in the Preface to the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*
concerning what it would take to prove the possibility of determinate cognition a priori:

> Now to cognize something a priori means to cognize it from its mere possibility. But the possibility of determinate natural things cannot be cognized from their mere concepts; for from these the possibility of the thought (that it does not contradict itself) can certainly be cognized, but not the possibility of the object, as a natural thing that can be given outside the thought (as existing). Hence, in order to cognize the possibility of determinate natural things and thus to cognize them a priori, it is still required that the intuition corresponding to the concept be given a priori, that is, *that the concept be constructed.* Now rational cognition through construction of concepts is mathematical. Hence although a pure philosophy of nature in general, that is, that which investigates only what constitutes the concept of a nature in general, may indeed be possible even without mathematics, a pure doctrine of nature concerning determinate natural things (doctrine of body or doctrine of soul) is only possible by means of mathematics. (MFNS 4:470)

As Kant says here, we can always cognize the *possibility of a thought* a priori because the
possibility of a thought depends only on the principle of contradiction. We can cognize
the possibility of a thought through mere concepts because there is nothing more to the possibility of a thought than that the thought not contradict itself. We may think of this first requirement of conceptual non-contradiction as a criterion of the logical possibility of cognition.

The possibility of an object, however, is not so easy to cognize a priori because according to Kant we can cognize a priori of things only what we ourselves put into them. The spatiotemporal form of natural objects is given in a priori intuition, Kant argues, so we can cognize natural objects a priori from their mere possibility with respect to space and time, though these forms are not precisely concepts. We can also cognize natural things a priori from their mere possibility with respect to some general concepts, where general concepts are abstracted from particulars. For example, we can cognize a priori that every determinate natural thing must be located, but we cannot cognize a priori the locations of determinate natural things. The principle at work here is that we can cognize the general possibility of determinate objects in the abstract, but we cannot concretely cognize a priori the particular determinations of objects unless they are objects that we make (ends or artifacts).

On a cursory overview of this work, one might believe that one perceives it to be only of negative utility, teaching us never to venture with speculative reason beyond the boundaries of experience; and in fact that is its first usefulness. But this utility soon becomes positive when we become aware that the principles with which speculative reason ventures beyond its boundaries do not in fact result in extending our use of reason, but rather, if one considers them more closely, inevitably result in narrowing it by threatening to extend the boundaries of sensibility, to which these principles really belong, beyond everything, and so even to dislodge the use of pure (practical) reason. Hence a critique that limits the speculative use of reason is, to be sure, to that extent negative, but because it simultaneously removes an obstacle that limits or even threatens to wipe out the practical use of reason, this Critique is also in fact of positive and very important utility, as soon as we have convinced ourselves that there is an absolutely necessary practical use of pure reason (the moral use), in which reason unavoidably extends itself beyond the boundaries of sensibility, without needing any assistance from speculative reason, but in which it must also be made secure
against any counteraction from the latter, in order not to fall into contradiction with itself. (Bxxiv-v emphasis mine)

What all this implies for *Groundwork II* is that in order for conduct to be real as common understanding requires, it must be possible for it to appear and therefore it must conform to the a priori conditions of sensible intuition, specifically the axioms of intuition. This is in part because as a synthetic a priori (productive) activity, Kant thought our philosophical understanding of practical cognition could be modeled on mathematical construction in intuition. Since the axioms of intuition are synthetic a priori principles for the determination of appearances according to the quantitative categories of understanding, the categories unity, plurality and totality are criteria of the possibility of practice that concern how the synthetic constitution of conduct can conform to the possibility of its appearance.

There is an important difference, though, between the conditions of the possibility of theoretical and practical appearance. Theoretical appearances must be intuited as aggregates, where their matter precedes and the synthesis from part to part takes place in apprehension. The appearances of conduct are effects produced through volition. In volition, Kant argues, form precedes matter and the whole makes possible the parts. As we will see in the next section, this is one of the distinctive features of intention.

§3 The Distinctive Form of Intention: Reciprocity, Community, and Willing as the Self-Synthesis of Intention

So far the criteria of real objectivity discussed in this chapter have been quantitative. Now that we have some idea of how a progression from form and unity to matter and plurality might be relevant to the reality of the moral law, we may consider the next step of the progression. The third formula is supposed to make distinct complete determination and totality. Our question is why. As I will argue in this section, the “internal form” that is the distinctive feature of intentionality is more specifically a
relational part/whole form that can only hold of a totality (KU 5:382-3). Only a totality can have the reciprocal community between parts and whole that is distinctive of intention, so totality is itself a touchstone criterion of real intention.

If we investigate the relevance of totality to *Groundwork II* without careful attention to method, it should be obvious that though totality is a category of quantity, according to the first *Critique* it is also a criterion of science. In order for a body of knowledge to be a science according to Kant, it must be possible to clearly delimit it from other bodies of knowledge (JL 21). This is part of what it means for a science to have an architectonic structure:

By an architectonic I understand the art of constructing systems. As systematic unity is what first raises ordinary knowledge to the rank of science, that is, makes a system out of a mere aggregate of knowledge, architectonic is the doctrine of the scientific in our knowledge, and therefore necessarily forms part of the “Doctrine of Method”. … By a system I understand the unity of the manifold modes of knowledge under one idea. This idea is the concept provided by reason - of the form of a whole - insofar as the concept determines a priori not only the scope of its manifold content, but also the positions which the parts occupy relatively to one another. The scientific concept of reason contains, therefore, the end and the form of that whole which is congruent with this requirement. The unity of the end to which all the parts relate and in the idea of which they all stand in relation to one another, makes it possible for us to determine from our knowledge of the other parts whether any part be missing, and to prevent any arbitrary addition, or in respect of its completeness any indeterminateness that does not conform to the limits which are thus determined a priori. The whole is thus an organised unity (articulatio), and not an aggregate (coacervatio).

(A832/B860 emphasis mine; see also JL 24)

We may infer that the architectonic structure of a scientific system can only arise from content that itself has this systematic structure. In corollary, if an object is not completely determinate, e.g. merely aggregate, there can be no science of that object.
The idea here is that if the object of some body of knowledge is not fully quantifiable and subject to clear delimitation, then neither is the body of knowledge itself.\textsuperscript{153}

If Kant is to determine the object of a science in \textit{Groundwork II}, then, the object of morality would have to be completely determinate, allowing for the individuation singular objects, and therefore total. This means that in order for Kant to prove that the object of morality is candidate for the real object of a moral \textit{science}, he must be able to show that the principle of unity (formula of the moral law) individuates the plurality (humanity as an end in itself) and thereby yields a totality of singular objects (a kingdom of ends).

Though totality is an appropriate criterion for \textit{Groundwork II} in general, Kant’s agenda to establish moral metaphysics as a science does not make totality a suitable \textit{touchstone} for morality. Morality is not necessarily a science at all according to common understanding. To use totality as a touchstone for morality because totality is required for science would beg the question. I contend that it is not only Kant’s aim to establish moral metaphysics specifically as a science that motivates Kant to show the moral law governs a quantitatively total object. The strategy behind the \textit{progression} of the formulas will make much more sense if Kant’s appeal to totality is an appeal to a touchstone of \textit{real intention} that builds on the touchstone of real objectivity.

As we saw in chapter 7, practical cognition is intentional according to Kant. Human willing is in fact teleological. We have purposes and ends. We make objects

\textsuperscript{153} For example, dirt is quantitatively a mere aggregate, so there can be no science of dirt. A science of dirt would be a body of knowledge that is all and only about dirt, and that has a first principle or law from which one could derive everything one might wish to know about dirt without appeal to any extraneous principles or hypotheses. There could be a science with a broader object that involves or includes dirt, e.g. physics, but no science of dirt per se. To take another example, psychology is possible as an empirical science only under the reflective presupposition of a unifying soul according to Kant. In other words we must take the object of psychology to be a system in order for it to be cognizable as a system.
actual. Even according to common understanding and the scholastic tradition, any so-called moral science that cannot explain the possibility of intention (or explain the delusion it involves) would be a failure. I will argue in this section that the distinctive form of intention upon which the analogy with the purposiveness of nature is based is the form of a reciprocal community. The reciprocity criterion of a real end specifies that the relation involved in its totality is a causal reciprocal community. This is a criterion of intention and meeting it will show that unlike nature, morality is teleological. Causal reciprocity is thus a touchstone of real intentionality. Since this causal reciprocal community can only hold of real objective systems, the criterion of intention can only be met if the criteria of objectivity it presupposes are met. This distinctive form of intention presupposes a quantitative form, the totality of a system, so totality is thus an even more basic touchstone criterion for *Groundwork II*. Together these criteria of objectivity and intention will explain why Kant must posit a realm of ends as a completely determined totality that involves a reciprocal relation between author and subject (A572/B600, KU 5:372-3).

One of the most striking features of teleology is that it invariably involves reciprocity of some sort. The distinctive feature of reciprocity is mutual dependence or mutual priority - there is a sense in which each relatum is prior to the other. In scholastic teleology, for example, the first and final causes have a reciprocal relation to each other. The first cause effects the final end, but yet it occurs for the sake of this end. The problem of reciprocity is that mutual dependence may be contradictory. For example, the first cause is temporally prior to its effect, the end, but the end must also be temporally prior as part of the intention that generates the first cause. Despite this prima facie problem, teleology in general was an accepted doctrine in Kant’s time, and even those philosophers who rejected teleological explanations did not do so because its reciprocity
was thought to be circular. The relation between first cause and final cause is reciprocal but not circular because there is one sense in which the first cause precedes the final cause, but another sense in which the final cause is prior.¹⁵⁴

If reciprocal priority does not in general make teleology circular, Kant’s concern should be whether pure practice might pose a special problem. If we are to understand how a will can be self-realizing, as we must for *Groundwork II*, the problem is not temporal because we are concerned with the a priori constitutive determination of conduct rather than any empirical effects it may have. The problem is would instead be how a will could be both its own objective ground and its own objective consequence.

Kant’s answer to this sort of concern depends upon the fact that practice is not an aggregation of atomic representation-object pairs. Representations and their objects are elements of a complex system with multiple faculties that have supreme principles, and which are transcendentally unified in apperception.¹⁵⁵ A will is a causal *nexus*, not a Humean collection of mental atoms. Representation-object pairs *cannot* be considered entirely in isolation without distortion because, as we have seen, the nature of the object depends on its cognitive sources. As we will shortly see, the will as a causal system can be self-realizing because the causal community involved in this totality holds not merely from parts to whole but also from whole to parts.

Now there are two relations involved in a totality that we might think of as reciprocal: the interrelation between parts or the relations between parts and whole. The

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¹⁵⁴ Kant uses this standard scholastic maneuver, for example, to avoid an outright contradiction between two propositions – that the human soul is free and that the human soul is subject to natural necessity – by taking the soul in two different meanings: The human soul is free as noumenon, but subject to natural necessity as phenomenon (Bxxvii).

¹⁵⁵ “[T]he proposition ‘I think,’ insofar as it says only that I exist thinking, is not merely a logical function, but rather determines the subject (which is then at the same time an object) in regard to existence” (B429 emphasis mine).
The interrelation between parts is paradigmatically *logically* reciprocal for relational properties like hot/cold or light/dark or left/right,\(^1\) for contrary predicate pairs (p/\neg p) and for disjunctions (p \lor \neg p). Scholastic logic presupposes the possibility of these sorts of reciprocal relations between divisions, parts, members, or equivalence classes. The alternative is that reciprocity or community might properly hold between a whole and its parts or between a sphere and it members. Likely in this case we might take the reciprocity between parts to be derivative from or parasitic upon the relation between parts and whole, i.e. the relation between two members of a community would be given only mediately through their *membership* in the whole.

We might expect Kant to identify one of these two relations as the relation of reciprocity. Strikingly, Kant implicates *both*. In the organization of natural ends, Kant says:

An organized product of nature is that in which *everything* is an end and *reciprocally* a means as well. (KU 5:376 emphasis mine)

In such a product of nature each part is conceived as if its exists only through all the others, thus as if existing for the sake of the others and on account of the whole...it must be thought of as an organ that produces the other parts (consequently each produces the others reciprocally)...only then and on that account can such a product, as an organized and self-organizing being, be called a natural end. (KU 5:373-4)

The concept of an organized being is this: that it is a material being which is possible only through the interrelationship as end and means of all that which is contained in it (as indeed any anatomist, as physiologic, proceeds from this concept). (KU 8:181)

Pure speculative reason is, in respect of principles of cognition, a unity entirely separate and subsisting for itself, in which, as in an organized body, every part exists for the sake of all the others as all the others exist for its sake, and no principle can be taken with certainty in one relation unless it has at the same time been investigated in its thoroughgoing relation to the entire use of pure reason. (Bxxiii emphasis mine, see also Bxxxvii-viii)

\(^1\) The extremes have a reciprocal relation to each other even if there is no sharp division.
It is not the logical opposition or distinctness of each part from each other that makes their relationship to each other reciprocal, then, according to Kant. It is neither their mutual exclusion according to some division nor their mutual membership in a whole that constitutes the reciprocity relation. What makes an organization, i.e. the relation involved in a “product of nature”, reciprocal and communal is the fact that the relation between parts within the whole makes it possible or even necessary to i) conceive each part as a means to the whole, ii) conceive each part as a means to each other part, iii) conceive each part as the end of each other part. When we consider aspects of a community pair-wise, we are considering a reciprocal relation in the context of its communal whole. When we consider all the relations involved in the totality together, we are considering the community of all the relata with no special attention to a particular pair.

The involvement of a whole in the relations between its parts is rather important by scholastic standards. The second criterion of an organized end above implies that a natural product must be conceivable as if self-caused, i.e., the parts and whole must be conceived as if they are reciprocal causes of each other. Since causality is an asymmetric priority relation, it might seem that reciprocity between parts in isolation from the whole would unavoidably involve an outright contradiction. The traditional scholastic way to avoid this sort of contradiction, again, is to show that the two priority relations differ in some way, which can be done by showing that each part is a means to the other in a different way. Since the reciprocity between parts involves the whole according to Kant, the way in which each part is a means to the other depends upon and is informed by its

157 In the third Analogy Kant says community connotes not only membership in a common whole but also interaction between its parts (A213-14/B260-1; see also B112).
particular place within the whole.\textsuperscript{158} Two parts are not even conceivable as \textit{parts} except in relation to the whole to which they belong, because the whole must contain a principle of individuation that \textit{makes} them proper parts. Since the relation to the whole informs the interdependence, each part will be dependent upon the other in a different way.

I contend that this special sense of reciprocity involving both the interrelation between parts and the relation between parts and whole is the distinctive feature of purposiveness. This is the \textit{form} – which was discussed but not identified in the last chapter - on which the reflective analogy is based. It is specifically this feature, the form of a reciprocal community, that makes it a necessary maxim of reason that we think of natural ends as if they were actually designed (KU 5:369, 375-6). Since the above quotes concern organization rather than real intention per se, some further support is in order.

First, since reality is the realm of causality, \textit{causal} reciprocity is a criterion of purposiveness. The reciprocal community distinctive of intention is not merely the logical or formal reciprocity that any totality must have. It is a specifically causal relation of reciprocal community. As for the textual support, according to Kant there are two criteria a natural thing must meet in order for it to be a natural end: The existence of the parts (as material) must be conceived as possible only through their relation to the whole (as form), and the parts must be combined into a whole by \textit{being reciprocally the cause and effect of their form}.

\[F\]or a thing as a \textit{natural end} it is requisite, \textbf{first}, \textbf{that its parts (as far as their existence and their form are concerned) are possible only through their relation to the whole}. For the thing itself is an end, and is thus comprehended under a concept or idea that must determine a priori everything that is to be contained in it. But insofar as a thing is conceived of as possible only in this way it is merely …the product of a rational cause distinct from the matter (the parts),

\textsuperscript{158} Kant was not the first to posit this kind of multiplace relation. Leibniz’s monadism involves a structurally similar relation between things.
the causality of which (in the production and combination of the parts) is
determined through its idea of a whole that is thereby possible (thus not through
nature outside of it)...[I]f a thing, as a natural product, is nevertheless to contain
in itself and its internal possibility a relation to ends, i.e., is to be possible only as
a natural end and without the causality of the concepts of a rational being outside
it, then it is required, second, that its parts be combined into a whole by being
reciprocally the cause and effect of their form. For in this way alone is it
possible in turn for the idea of the whole conversely (reciprocally) to determine
the form and combination of all the parts: not as a cause – for then it would be a
product of art [external rational cause] – but as a ground for the cognition of the
systematic\textsuperscript{159} unity of the form and the combination of all of the manifold that is
contained in the given material for someone who judges it. (KU 5:373 emphasis
mine)

In contrast, the causal ground to consequence relation for natural mechanical causation
has a strict direction from ground to consequence. There is no reciprocity of effective
cause and effect, and the effect does not “contain” its effective cause. Teleology,
however, requires a causal community. When we think of natural things as organized
beings, we think of them as involving a causal reciprocity:

Things, as natural ends, are organized beings...the causal nexus, insofar as it is
conceived merely by the understanding, is a connection that constitutes a series
(of causes and effects) that is always descending; and the things themselves,
which as effects presuppose others as their causes, cannot conversely be the
causes of these at the same time. This causal nexus is called that of efficient
causes (\textit{nexus effectivus}). In contrast, however, a causal nexus can also be
conceived in accordance with a concept of reason (of [intentional] ends), which, if
considered as a series, would carry with it descending as well as ascending
dependency, in which the thing which is on the one hand designated as an effect
nevertheless deserves, in ascent, the name of a cause of the same thing of which it
is the effect. In the practical sphere...such a connection can readily be
found...Such a causal connection is called that of final causes (\textit{nexus finalis}).
(KU 5:372)

\textsuperscript{159} Notice that only systems can have this structure. Every whole must have a principle of unity, its parts or
members must be plural, and the community itself must be quantitatively total. As we saw in the last
section, not every plurality is a system. Piles of dirt are aggregates, not systems or wholes. When we
divide piles of dirt, they divide into smaller aggregates, not into parts, because our principle of
individuation can only be arbitrary for dirt. In order for an informed plurality to be a whole, the plurality
must be informed by a principle of unity that makes it a totality with non-arbitrarily individuated parts
(A526/B554).
For natural products or organized beings, Kant argues that we must conceive the object as if this reciprocal community were causal, as if the parts and whole are means and ends to each other, even if we cannot judge that they actually are means and ends (as we could for mechanical artifacts). The principle of an organized being not only individuates parts, it assigns roles or purposes to the parts based upon their membership in the whole and its purpose.

Now in order for something to be a natural product \emph{rather than a rational product}, the idea of the whole must be a theoretical ground of cognition but not a practical ground (cause) of the thing (KU 5:382-3). This implies that the two criteria as specified above are criteria for \emph{all ends}, not just for natural ends. More importantly, though, it implies that rational products must actually be \emph{constituted as causal communities} rather than merely \emph{conceivable} as causal communities. In other words, we must be able to determinately judge them to be communally caused rather than merely reflecting or thinking of them as causal communities. The difference between natural and rational products is that natural products are merely conceivable as communally caused, which only requires that they be totalities, while rational products must actually be such that every \emph{constituent} is a means to every other and to the totality as well. Rational products are not merely constituted as informed matter. They are constituted as synthetic wholes. The “parts” of practice must be constituents of the whole that are actualized through the production or synthesis of the whole.

Kant has made his reasons for insisting that morality is a priori quite clear throughout his work, but a better understanding of the architecture of willing places us in a position to see why Kant thinks willing must be \emph{synthetic} a priori. Recall that Kant describes practical reason as the “derivation” of an action from law by means of a representation and claims that will is nothing other than this. Since the context in which
this claim appears is that of error-riddled popular philosophy (GII ¶12), it is not initially clear how much credence we should give it. We now have more reason to think Kant meant it and that the derivation is an a priori synthesis.

As a final cause or an end in itself, the activity of willing must encompass all its parts or aspects including its form, its matter, its grounds, and even its empirical effects (with some qualifications). As the subjective and objective principles of volition, both maxim and law are grounds or efficient causes and therefore parts of the activity of willing as a whole, or in other words. These two constituents of willing are heterogeneous. In order for the heterogeneous relata to both be principles of the will, they must somehow be synthesized such that their consequence, the action or willing itself, is a whole constituted by and from them. The action, i.e. the willing, is not merely the result or effect of its principles, but the synthesis of activity from them. Since reason is the only faculty whereby such a synthesis is possible and willing must be constituted by heterogeneous relata, according to Kant reason must be the “source” of willing. The activity of willing can be conceived as the “constituted result” or end or product of the synthesis – willing is practical cognition. Since willing is itself an activity, like reasoning, the distinction between practical reason as the spontaneous source of will, and the will as the activity constituted by the synthesis is rather subtle. Practical reason and will are distinct conceptions of the same causality.

The fact that all aspects or parts of willing are encompassed in the activity as a whole architectonic end is actually a rather elegant result for Kant. If our willing is to

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160 Recall that respect is our common understanding of the pure a priori form of feeling. When we act from duty alone, we act from respect for law alone. When we act merely according to duty, respect must mediate between the law as objective ground and the maxim as subjective ground, where the maxim in this case contains inclination or feeling. Inclination and law are heterogeneous just as intuition and pure concept are heterogeneous.
actually be a product of itself, self-caused, or autonomous, we should be able to make such second-order ascriptions of intentionality to our voluntary activity. We should be able ascribe the distinctive feature of intention, the causal community of an architectonic end, to ourselves insofar as we are rational agents. Kant’s conception of willing as an architectonic product of synthesis makes it possible for us to see our own willing as purposive in just the sense we ascribe to organized beings in nature. In other words, we can theoretically cognize our own activity as intentional because it is intentional.

Moreover, it should also be possible for us to theoretically cognize willing as something we do, not merely something that happens to us. A synthesis is no mere combination or aggregation. A synthesis must produce an ordered whole. In the context of practice what this means according to Kant is that the subjective principle of volition ought to be subordinated to the objective principle. By conceiving an act of will as something we synthesize a priori from multiple heterogeneous principles, in a way that is very similar to the way we reach conclusions in theory, we conceive willing as something that we prescribe to ourselves as rational beings rather than, say, a dot product of independent mechanical forces. To relate this back to the *Groundwork*, the subordination involved in synthesis implies a sort of self-control or self-legislation that we commonly take to be distinctive of morality according to *Groundwork I*, and it underwrites Kant’s conception of transcendental freedom as a sort of necessary presupposition of autonomy. Insofar as we conduct ourselves rationally, our rational causality is its own cause.\(^{161}\)

In addition to the more obviously metaphysical ramifications of the objective criteria, the criterion of empirical significance from the last chapter and the metaphysical touchstone of experience have ramifications that more directly involve the articulation of

\(^{161}\) See also A547/B575 and 5:383 for passages that contrast the fundamental properties of nature and reason or will.
moral science. Most obviously, consider that without a criterion of empirical significance or a touchstone of experience Kant would have no metaphysical basis for a Doctrine of Right\textsuperscript{162} or even for common cooperation. The specific kind of criteria Kant employs also have their own ramifications. The effects and appearances of willing taken separately are not required to have an architectonic form. It is not contrary to duty to make piles of dirt rather than sculptures or pueblos, at least not in ordinary circumstances. What the moral law commands is that the effects of our will and the appearance of our conduct necessarily ought to have the form of a whole architectonic end \textit{when taken together}, \textit{when taken together with nature}, and \textit{when taken together with the effects of other rational beings}. This is an extremely important criterion for moral theory generally.

To illustrate how powerful this criterion of empirical significance can be, consider that according to Kant it is a necessary maxim of reason that we think of dirt as having natural purposes, even though dirt is not itself an organized being, because dirt is \textit{natural} and nature is an \textit{organized} realm of legally determined effects. Consequently the effects that I have and that other rational beings have on dirt \textit{morally} ought to be taken into account as \textit{part} of what I will and what others will \textit{taken together}. This underwrites a wide \textit{environmental} duty to the \textit{commons} not to undermine the natural purposes of dirt and the uses others may have for dirt.

Perhaps more importantly for the Kantian tradition, the metaphysical criterion that our conduct must \textit{possibly} appear and the moral mandate that we must always act \textit{as if} our actions \textit{shall} have empirical effects may also explain Kant’s rather strict views on punishment. Kant takes a very “eye-for-an-eye” attitude to punishing transgressions of

\textsuperscript{162} See the Preface to the \textit{Metaphysics of Morals} 205 and DV 6:380.
right, allowing for incarceration and even capital punishment (DR 6:333). This may well seem to undermine his insistence that the moral law commands we never transgress dignity of autonomy. If we must choose between deterrence and vengeance as justifications, it is difficult to see how Kant could support such view. If, however, Kant views punishment as a civil reinforcement of the laws of free causality, then punishment cannot infringe upon autonomy. Civil punishment ensures that individuals may not avoid the necessary consequences of their own willing by taking advantage of the friction or the slip between pure practical reason and nature. The laws of civil society ideally only ensure that each actually reaps what he really, freely sows. By making nature better conform to pure practical reason, civil punishment should better enable us to each do our part in realizing the kingdom of ends because it makes the actual empirical consequences of our actions more predictable.

Again, I must emphasize that I do not claim that Kant is correct. My point here is that the relation between conduct and its appearance is a long-neglected and quite important aspect of Kant’s metaphysics. If we attend more carefully to Kant’s method and consider the reasons he might have had for the particular criteria he seems to employ, we may make progress and gain insight that extends into other areas of Kant’s work. We should expect that the Groundwork of moral metaphysics will have identifiable ramifications in the articulation of moral science, including issues of right, punishment, and more. A better understanding of why Kant formulates the moral law in terms of

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163 Karl Ameriks addresses this issue, though not in a specifically practical context (Ameriks 2003). He contends that the empirical is part of a metaphysical whole (ibid, 37-38). This is another, and perhaps more useful, way of describing the fact that effects or appearances are necessary consequences of their grounding causes. Ameriks’ description usefully avoids the mistaken impression that only cause-effect pairs in isolation are at issue. Any ground may have a multitude of consequences, and interaction is mutual according to Kant (see Watkins 2005), so the totality must be consistent as well as the pairs it involves.
autonomy and introduces the idea of a kingdom of ends as the complete determination of a totality can be expected to help us identify these ramifications.

§4 The Formula of Humanity (FOH) and the Second Division of Duty

The criteria of real objectivity and intention described so far should make the remainder of *Groundwork II* somewhat more predictable, or at least less opaque. In this section and the next I will explicate the text so as to bring out the relevance of the first *Critique* metaphysics to the details of the progression.

Recall that according to the first formula, the moral law commands that our subjective principles of volition (maxims) have the form of universal law. The division of duty shows this is an adequate principle of appraisal for all possible actions. For each maxim upon which one might act, one can ascertain whether the action would be contrary to duty by attempting a universal generalization, the results of which reveal whether the maxim accords with universal law as the moral law commands.

Notice that the form Kant used in the initial division of duty using FUL/FULN was a priori, but the matter was not. The determinable was practice in general, not pure practice. Kant has not yet distinguished what is pure a priori in the determinable, if anything, and he must. If the moral law is to determine conduct *entirely* a priori as Kant argues, then to determine the special content of moral science Kant must not only show how the moral law determines practice in general but also how the moral law determines *pure* practice, i.e. *pure* practical cognition. This means that both the determination (form) and its determinable (matter) must be a priori. If no pure a priori matter can be identified as the determinable, the second step of establishing moral metaphysics as a science will fail. Given a clear understanding of what it would take to determine the content of morality entirely a priori (both form and matter must be a priori), we should
expect Kant to identify the pure a priori determinable and present another division that makes distinct the role of the pure a priori determinable. Moreover, since the form and matter must also be related a priori, we should expect Kant to identify the intellect or reason as the context of transcendental reflection.\footnote{Respect is (I argue) a pure a priori form of feeling, which is not intellectual. \textit{Groundwork II} is the groundwork of a transcendental analytic, which is logical and therefore intellectual. Kant must, and does, follow up on the relation between respect and reason in his \textit{Critique of Practical Reason}, but it would be inappropriate to do so here. What he needs is the logical form of the matter of practical reason, i.e. the formal end that is given through reason alone, not the form of the faculty of feeling. Consequently it is not quite correct to conceive the Formula of Humanity as a formula commanding respect for persons.}

Kant sets the agenda for this phase of argument in §41:

\textit{to prove a priori that there really is} such an imperative [a categorically imperative “principle of all duty”], that there is a practical law, which commands absolutely of itself and without any incentives, and that the observance of this law is duty. (G 4:425 emphasis mine)

In the following three paragraphs he sets some negative criteria for this proof. First Kant argues in §42 that
duty is to be practical unconditional necessity of action and it [the principle/law of duty] must therefore hold for all rational beings (to which alone an imperative can apply at all) and \textit{only because of this} be also a law for all human wills. (G 4:425)

Suppose the moral law is real if and only if FUL is necessarily valid for all rational beings and rational beings are real. In order to show there really is a moral law, Kant first needs an a priori connection between rational will and law, i.e. the validity relation between rational will as a determinable and law as its determination. If we take the analysis up to this point to be cumulative, Kant need not argue for this claim here. He need only remind us of the reason why the domain of the moral law is rational beings rather than human beings: As an \textit{unconditional, prescriptive} principle, the principle of duty or moral law must be an objective principle

on which we would be \textit{directed} to act even though every propensity, inclination, and natural tendency of ours were against it – so much so that the sublimity and
inner dignity of the command in a duty is all the more manifest the fewer are the subjective cause in favor of it and the more there are against it. (G 4:425)

In other words, we are concerned with the objective ought. Kant’s expert audience should be quite able to reconstruct the supporting analysis: If duty is the necessity of an action from respect for law and this is practical reason understood as the derivation of an action from law by means of a representation, clearly the scope of duty includes all rational beings. If the non-rational capacities of human beings (sensibility and desire) detract rather than contribute to the worth of an action, and the good is the practically necessary, then the scope of duty must prescriptively exclude any contributions from these faculties, and so on.

In ¶43-44 Kant says that by insisting upon the independence of reason from sensibility and desire, philosophy is put in a precarious position. Philosophy must be “firm”, i.e. certain, even though duty cannot be exhibited empirically in experience. As Kant explains,

philosophy is to manifest its purity as sustainer of its own laws…that must have their source entirely and completely a priori and, at the same time, must have their commanding authority from this: that they expect nothing from the inclination of human beings but everything from the supremacy of the law and the respect owed it, or failing this, condemn the human being to contempt for himself and inner abhorrence…One cannot give too many or to frequent warning against this laxity, or even mean cast of mind, which seeks its principle among empirical motives and [empirical] laws; for, human reason in its weariness gladly…substitutes for morality a bastard patched up from limbs of quite diverse ancestry, which looks like whatever one wants to see in it but not like virtue. (G 4:425-6)

Recall that Kant argued in the Preface and ¶1-10 of *Groundwork II* that the popular tendency to mix empirical with a priori is the primary historical obstacle to establishing moral metaphysics as a science. Since experience is the touchstone of reality, we cannot help but be tempted to resort to empirical appeals to shore up an argument for the reality of the principle of duty, but this is an enormous mistake according to Kant. Even though experience is the touchstone of reality, the first *Critique* should have made clear that it is
more precisely conditions of the possibility of experience, which are themselves a priori, to which we should properly appeal here. The a priori conditions of the possibility of experience are the transcendental touchstone of reality for metaphysics.

When Kant is finished cautioning once again against attempts to prove the reality of the moral law by means of non-rational features of humanity or empirical touchstones, he lays out the issue at hand more explicitly:

The question is therefore this: is it a necessary law for all rational beings always to appraise their actions in accordance with such maxims as they themselves could will to serve as universal laws [Is FUL valid for rational beings]? If there is such a law, then it must already be connected (completely a priori) with the concept of the will of a rational being as such. But in order to discover this connection [relation of law to will as object] we must, however reluctantly, step forth, namely into metaphysics, although into a domain of it that is distinct from speculative philosophy, namely into metaphysics of morals…where we have to do …with…laws for what ought to happen even if it never does. (G 4:427 emphasis mine)

As we saw in chapter 6, a precise formulation of the moral law required a step from popular philosophy to metaphysics, but now another step into moral metaphysics is required in order to address the reality of the law at hand. While we were concerned primarily with the logical form of the representation of the moral law it was not necessary to delve into transcendental issues. The context is now metaphysics, which Kant understands as transcendental philosophy.

To connect the relata here completely a priori requires a comparative transcendental reflection, as we saw in §2.1. The content of the two concepts must be compared. The two concepts at hand are FUL and the concept of the will of a rational being as such. The contents of these two concepts are the law (of the will of a rational being as such) and the will (of a rational being as such). Since we are concerned with the objective ought, the context of reflective comparison is intellectual and the object is an end. (Transcendental reflection identifies reason rather than sensibility as the source of
cognition in which law and will are connected.) So the metaphysical concern is the a priori determination of the will, where this is a matter to form relation that must be given entirely through reason. Since it is specifically the subjective principle of the will (maxim) that must have this matter according to the progression quote, we should be interested in what matter the moral law commands our maxims to have.

Kant then somewhat mysteriously reiterates the question, but this time the content to be related is the will to itself:

[I]t is a question of objective practical laws and hence of the relation of a will to itself insofar as it determines itself only by reason; for then everything that has reference to the empirical falls away of itself, since if reason entirely by itself determines conduct (and the possibility of this is just what we want now to investigate), it must necessarily do so a priori. (G 4:427 emphasis mine)

As we saw earlier, the concept of a will and the concept of its principle are coextensive from a scholastic point of view (i.e. the inner principle of a thing is the thing, or the law is the essence of the will), so the content to be compared might be identical. This is one reason why Kant might prima facie think the relation at issue is one of a will to itself.

What Kant actually argues, though, is that since the moral law cannot borrow anything from an empirical doctrine of the soul or from natural philosophy, if will as practical reason is to exist at all, nothing outside it can determine it. Since any real thing must be determined by something according to Kant, such a will could by default only be determined by itself. If there really is such a thing as morality, then there really is such a thing as the will of a rational being, and such a will can only be self-determining.

Now the idea of an inner principle of self-determination was fairly matter of course for scholastic philosophy. The complaint Kant and his peers had against such inner principles was primarily that they tended to be quite vague occult properties. As a precisely formulated inner principle that is subject to analysis, FUL presumably does not have this fault. So there is no immediate problem with the idea of self-determination in
general, but there might yet be a problem with particular features of self-determination involved in will. Given our common conviction that we are rational agents, there is a strong presumption in favor of the existence of self-determining rational wills. Consequently, Kant may only need to prove that the self-determination involved in the will of a rational being as such is not impossible in order to adequately shift the burden of proof in his favor. Since will is a practical capacity, Kant must investigate how a will can produce itself, as its own object, by means of a representation. In other words, the question is whether reason can entirely by itself determine conduct, i.e. how rational beings ought to act (and therefore can act), objectively and a priori.

The analysis begins in §45 (G 4:427). Here Kant begins to answer the question he has been clarifying for several paragraphs. He first defines the concept of a will as a concept of a “capacity to determine itself to acting in conformity with the representation of certain laws” (G 4:427). This follows easily from the self-determination of the will just introduced combined with the §12 definition of will as a capacity to derive actions from laws by means of representations. The analysis concerns which of the elements of willing could serve as a principle or ground of self-determination:
There are two candidates Kant first considers as possible principles of self-determination, means and ends.\textsuperscript{165} A means is a principle of action in the loose sense of principle. A means contains a ground of the \textit{possibility} of an action, i.e. it contains something whereby an end \textit{might} be made actual as the effect or consequence of this ground (G 4:427). Since means are only hypothetically imperative, these can be ruled out on pain of infinite regress. Assuming Kant has identified the proper conceptual sphere to begin with, this leaves only ends as candidates for the principle of self-determination.

The first distinction between kinds of ends to be considered is the distinction between subjective and objective ends. Subjective ends rest on incentives, Kant says, which are merely subjective grounds of desire. These are again only hypothetically

\textsuperscript{165} Kant’s reasons for choosing this conceptual sphere are obscure. If Kant planned his strategy as carefully as I believe, there must be reasons why this conceptual sphere is correct for the kind of analysis being given. If self-determination is understood as a genetically scholastic self-sustaining constitution, the conceptual sphere is at least plausible. As constitutions, ends plausibly have the structure required for self-sustenance or self-determination. The obvious constituents of ends are means. Constituents are paradigmatically not constitutions. Though a constituent may be a ground of the self-determination of something else, constituents are typically not plausibly grounds of their own self-determination. (If law and maxim are both grounds of the possibility of an action, they are means according to Kant’s definition.)
imperative so they cannot be principles of self-determination. Objective ends, in contrast, rest on motives, which are objective grounds of volition. These could potentially be principles of the self-determination of practical reason. However, since some ends are somewhat rational and objective, e.g. prudential ones, Kant must further distinguish between formal and material ends. A material end can be objective insofar as it involves instrumentally rational prudential motives, but because material ends are by definition based on incentives to some extent, they cannot hold for rational beings that happen to not have the incentives in question:

The ends that a rational being proposes at his discretion as effects of his actions (material ends) are all only relative; for only their mere relation to a specially constituted faculty of desire on the part of the subject gives them their worth, which can therefore furnish no universal principles...that is, no practical laws. Hence all these relative ends are only the ground of hypothetical imperatives. (G 4:427)

A formal rational end, on the other hand, is an objective end given by reason alone: “what serves the will as the objective ground of its self-determination is an end, and this, if it is given by reason alone, must hold equally for all rational beings” (G 4:427). A formal rational end abstracts entirely from all subjective ends, and therefore from all incentives and other “special properties” of the faculty of desire.

In the final step of analysis here Kant claims that the objective ground of the self-determination of the will is an end. I hope to have already made this idea somewhat plausible. Recall that to practically cognize an object is to produce the object by means of a representation. An end is an object that is made actual or produced by means of a

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[166] Though it is traditionally translated as “end”, the German Zweck can be equally well translated as “purpose”. Kant’s most general term for teleology is Zweckmäßig, literally “having to do with purposes” (or ends). It is tempting to think of a purpose as a representation of why one wills something, as in the purpose of an activity. We often speak of purposes as if they are reasons, representations of practical justification, or representations of the value of an outcome. According to Kant, purposes are not merely representations. Purposes include also the products representations.
representation (as opposed to objects that are given through theoretical cognition). If the will as a self-determining cognitive capacity, and that which is determined by this kind of capacity is an end, what the will must produce is itself as its own end. In other words, the will must be an end in itself. If no incentive or interest or anything other than the will itself could determine it, the will must self-determine. Then what the will determines its own activity, implying that the will is its own object.

Kant has repeatedly employed these distinctions in prior analysis, so this analysis should all have a very familiar ring. The new twist is that the analysandum this time is end rather than will or law. According to prior analysis, the objective ground of the will is law. But now Kant says that what serves the will as its objective ground is an end. To elaborate the problem, we might have thought up until now that the will as practical reason was relatively clear. Will as practical reason is a capacity to derive action from law, where this derivation is mediated by a representation. The objective ground of the will is the law, which is like a major premise. The maxim is the subjective ground, which is like a minor premise. The action derived is the consequence or conclusion. Willing is the inference or derivation as a whole. But now Kant claims that the objective ground of this capacity, i.e. the law as major premise, must somehow be the capacity itself. This doesn’t square with our understanding of reason or with our understanding of faculties. A major premise and a mediate inference are distinct things. A capacity and its law are distinct as well. We have seen that the moral law is an objective ground of the will in the sense that it categorically determines, governs, or legislates the will as its object. An end is an object. Since an end is not a law, at least not prima facie, it seems Kant may have contradicted his own analysis.

If a will is an end that determines itself through its own law, though, then a will and its law can both be objective grounds. The will as object is produced through a
representation, specifically a representation of law. The law is the objective constituent (ground) of the capacity. The maxim is the subjective constituent. The will is a self-grounding objective constitution: The will makes itself actual by representing itself, through its own law, as its own object.

Now the will is not merely a self-determining object according to Kant, it is a self-determining end, and ends ground and thereby determine our actions as conditions of means. In acting for the sake of an end, to bring an end about, etc. we take the end as an objective precept of the will (KpV 5:66). If the objective precept is contingent, the imperative is merely hypothetical. If the objective precept is instead a necessary precept of all willing, a formula that makes this necessary precept distinct would in a sense reformulate the categorical imperative as a hypothetical imperative for which the antecedent necessarily obtains. This necessary antecedent would present a supreme limitation or constraint on willing (G 4:431). In a sense, then, FOH makes precise the hypothetical imperative that is contained in the categorical imperative without undermining the categorical command of the law it represents because the hypothetical imperative here is analytically contained in the categorical one.

So in formulating the moral law so as to make distinct its objective validity, Kant’s analysis shows that it is more specifically self-determination that must be distinctly represented and the ground of any such self-determination must be a formal objective end. FUL made distinct the form that the moral law commands our maxims to have. The next formulation must make distinct this formal objective end and how it governs the matter of our maxims. In other words, we will need to know what this special end is and what impact it has on our subjective ends and the means to them.

In order to identify what this formal objective end must be, Kant returns to the issue of value. When an end is represented merely as an effect of the activity of the will,
Kant says it is the effect of the will and not the will itself that is represented as having value. In this case, the will contains the ground of the possibility of an action whose effect is an end, and the will is used as a means to the effect. When the will is used as a means to an effect the end is discretionary and material, the practical ground of the will is merely subjective, and the necessitation of the will is merely hypothetically imperative because the command and value are contingent upon the effect. Since the value of effects is necessarily merely contingent (upon the goodness of a will), ends that are mere effects cannot ground value. On the other hand, if it is instead the activity of the will itself that is represented as valuable, then this representation of the value (dignity) of the will is what necessitates the will, the principle of the will is categorically imperative, objective, and holds for all rational beings.

The point of the distinction between a mere means and an end in itself is that effects cannot be absolutely, incomparably good in themselves but a will could. Kant argues here that since effects can have only contingent worth, they must get their worth from elsewhere and the regress of value must end with something that has absolute value if there is to be any such thing as value at all. If Kant’s analysis in *Groundwork I* succeeded, he has already elicited the reader’s agreement to this. According to common cognition, the only thing that could conceivably be absolutely, incomparably good in itself is a good will and good will is the condition of the goodness of every other good thing. Unless this idea of a good will turns out to be chimerical, we presume it to be actual. The regress on value here in *Groundwork II* pushes us to agree that there must actually be such a thing as a good will in order for anything in the world to have value at

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167 It is tempting to think of a means as an object or an effect because we ordinarily think of physical tools as paradigmatic means. Kant defines a means here as “that which contains the ground of the possibility of an action whose effect is an end” (G 4:427). Since the will can be both a means and an end in itself according to Kant, a means in Kant’s sense can be an object or end, but it need not be.
all. Together with Kant’s understanding of a will as an end in itself, the conclusion at this point is that only a good will could conceivably be the objective ground, not only of its own possibility, but of its own actuality.

If Kant is right so far, it should follow that:

If, then, there is to be a supreme practical principle and, with respect to the human will, a categorical imperative, it must be one such that, from the representation of what is necessarily an end for everyone because it is an end in itself, it constitutes an objective principle of the will and thus can serve as a universal practical law. The ground [precept] of this principle is: rational nature exists as an end in itself. (G 4:428)

The key to proving that the scope of the validity of the moral law includes all rational beings is to find an object that is a necessary end a priori for all rational beings. If the object is one that all rational beings necessarily ought to produce, the law governing this object is one that holds for all rational beings. If the object is real, then so is the moral law. Since analysis has allegedly shown that a good will is the only contender for an absolutely, incomparably good end in itself, it is also the only possible end that every rational being necessarily ought to produce.

Before he can address the touchstone criterion, though, Kant still needs to show that observance of the law is duty. In order to do this, Kant needs a new formula of the law and a new division. The law of a self-determining will must be formulated so as to make distinct the feature Kant has just revealed through analysis, that a will is an end in itself. FUL/FULN did not overtly concern ends, so it is not adequate for this purpose.

\[168\] Kant says here that only a rational being can have a will, since a will is a capacity to make objects by means of representations, but all rational beings must have a will in some sense as well. Reason is a spontaneous cognitive capacity, so it necessarily provides or contains the objective grounds of causal relations. Since Kant thinks even a perfectly good will works by means of representations, even a divine will would arguably fit the model here. Even supposing, however, that we do not grant Kant the claim that all rational beings are practically rational, the validity argument is based on an end that rational beings may not act against. Humanity is a limiting end according to Kant, so he may still be entitled to the claim that no rational being may act against it.
Kant needs a formula that represents the same law as FUL/FULN, but which does so in a way that makes the ground of the reality of the will distinct by commanding that the will make itself its own end and thereby make itself actual.

The formulation is complicated by the fact, once again, that human wills are subject to non-rational influences. If this were not the case, the new formula could simply be “Act such that you always treat rational nature as an end in itself”. Kant notes that it is a subjectively necessary principle of human action that we each necessarily represent our own existence as an end in itself, but it does not obviously follow that we each represent all rational nature this way: It is not subjectively necessary that our actions represent the rational nature of others as an end in itself. One may well be inclined to use others as means to one’s ends without any consideration or concern for their self-determination, dignity or autonomy.

But the alternatives here are not mutually exclusive. Recall that a means contains a ground of the possibility of an action, the effect of which is an end. An end in itself should obviously be its own means, so it would be a mistake to entirely exclude any representation of the will as means in the new formulation. It is important, though, to include this representation in a way that does not undermine the representation of the will as end in itself as the source of value. Kant’s solution is the formula of humanity:

[FOH:] So act that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means. (G 4:429)

Kant’s treatment of status relations in the Doctrine of Right and his notion of sharing an end (or having a concept in common) in the third Critique are useful to tease out how this formula of the moral law is confirmed by common understanding in some paradigmatic cases. Assume that when I treat someone as a means, I use that person, call her my patient, to effect some end. Though Kant does not, we could divide activities
according to the ends we might adopt besides rational nature itself. Whenever we share an end, e.g. morally permissible cooperative enterprises, we may treat each other as both means and as ends in ourselves without complication. The more interesting cases arise when we do not share arbitrary ends.

1. The ends that cannot be shared are ones that would require the patient to act on a maxim that is contrary to duty, e.g. a maxim that would be a maxim of self-destruction or self-deception for her. If my end is one that my patient cannot share, then clearly I am treating her as a mere means to some subjective end of mine as if my subjective end were practically necessary (good) and her rational nature were not. In such case my will is actually not good and my end has no value.

2. Suppose the end is one that my patient could share but perhaps does not. For example, were I to attach myself to a beautiful or famous or wealthy acquaintance solely for the sake of reaping the benefits of an increased social consequence (to which I am inclined), I would be using her as a mere means and disregarding her worth as a person. Even if this acquaintance were herself inclined to help increase my social consequence, say because she enjoys exercising her own social power, if her inclinations and interests are no concern of mine then I am nevertheless treating her as a mere means to my end. When a potential patient could share my end (her pursuit of the end would not require her to act contrary to duty) but lacks any relevant inclination to adopt it, she can still be interested or take an interest in my end. She may be interested in my end and therefore share it, say, in the event that she heartily dislikes me but sees some advantage to herself. This is a prudential interest. She can also take an interest and thereby share my end out

169 My examples here are intended to illustrate how one might begin to divide duty according to whether and how an end can be shared. See Herman’s “Mutual Aid and Respect for Persons” for a broader view of how we may and must adopt and share ends.
of respect for me as a rational being; she may then help me bring my end about even if she does not like me, finds helping me entirely disagreeable, and sees no advantage to herself whatsoever. Whether I treat someone as a mere means in these cases depends not on whether the patient actually does share my contingent end (from inclination, being interested, or taking an interest), but whether her actually sharing my end is a condition of my action.\textsuperscript{170}

3. Suppose finally that the end is one the patient ought to share, e.g. an obligatory rational end. In treating someone as a means to this kind of end, I do not necessarily treat her as a mere means even if she does not actually share the end.\textsuperscript{vii} For example, if suicide is strictly contrary to duty and the patient is suicidal, preventing her suicide contrary to her will does not constitute using her as a mere means. Though it is a less congenial example, if punishment is construed as a morally necessary consequence of wrongdoing and capital punishment can be mandated as Kant indicates, killing someone need not constitute treating her merely as a means (See Hill 1992, 51).

Kant does not divide duty quite this way. Recall that Kant says there is no objective difference between the formulas, but the subjective difference brings the moral law closer to intuition by means of an analogy with nature. By claiming that there is no objective difference, what Kant means is that the same duty is determined in general by each formula and the determination employs the same division. As we have seen in this

\textsuperscript{170} Interestingly, a person can actually take an interest when she morally ought not, e.g. when I am impermissibly using her, but then the interest arguably cannot be adopted out of respect. Consider the extension of Herman’s art thief example (Herman 1993, 4-5). I can help the art thief carry the Rembrandt to her car out of an immediate sympathetic inclination. If I find helping her entirely unpleasant, I could still be prudentially interested in helping her, e.g. in expectation of a cut of the profit. I could not, however, take an interest in Kant’s sense without error. In order to construe my action as taking an interest, it would be necessary for me to mistakenly construe the removal of the Rembrandt as a morally legal end rather than a theft so that respect could follow from my representation of the end. It is not clear precisely how Kant would describe this sort of case.
chapter, the subjective difference is a quantitative difference in how the moral law is represented, and therefore in what it distinctly commands. This brings the moral law closer to intuition by showing how it conforms to the a priori conditions of possible experience. The division that would best make Kant’s point here is a division of duty according to the second formula of the moral law that will “keep to the preceding examples” (G 4: 429). Recycling the examples should make it obvious whether the new formula yields the same division, or whether the moral law and its object have somehow been compromised by the reformulation.

Keeping to the same examples, in suicide one quite obviously fails to treat one’s own rational nature as an end in itself. If a will is self-determining, surely it is self-sustaining. As for the second example, if I make a false promise to repay money, Kant says, “he whom I want to use for my purposes by such a promise cannot possibly agree to my way of behaving toward him, and so himself contain the end of this action” (G 4:429-30). Presumably one cannot agree to be deceived because reason is fundamentally a capacity of understanding. These two examples are both cases in which the action contrary to duty is contrary to a strict duty because the will as end in itself, the agent or the patient, cannot at the same time contain the proposed end.

The second pair of examples is more interesting, but a brief gloss should be sufficient to confirm Kant’s method. For the third example, Kant says that to treat humanity as an end in itself is in part to further our natural predispositions to greater perfection. In other words, we have a wide duty to develop or perfect our talents because they are the necessary means to our natural ends. Fourth, happiness is a subjectively necessary end for every human, Kant indicates, so it would be contrary to a wide duty to others to never take an interest in the ends of others or act so as to further them. With
respect to these examples Kant says “it is not enough that the action does not conflict
with humanity in our person as an end in itself; it must also harmonize with it” (G 4:430).
This harmonization requirement is the distinctive feature of wide duties. Since human
beings are natural as well as rational, necessary natural ends are in a sense contained in
humanity as an end in itself. A failure to harmonize with subjectively necessary natural
ends would presumably involve a contradiction in will. We may now understand this as a
failure of synthesis.

Given that the moral law must determine conduct entirely a priori and this implies
that the determinable aspect of conduct must be given a priori, we might have expected
the moral law to positively command that our maxims have some specific a priori matter
and only this specified matter. The moral law positively determines only one end, and it
negatively determines the remainder of the matter of will because this end is a supreme
limiting condition on all other matter of the will. What FOH makes distinct is that any
subjective end one might propose must harmonize with the dignity of rational nature.
Rational nature as an end in itself does not exclude the adoption of all other ends; it only
excludes the adoption of private ends that are incompatible with the practically necessary
end. As we will see in the next section this implies that the content of the private ends we
set for ourselves and the necessary means to them must conform to autonomy and the
possibility of a kingdom of ends.

§5 Autonomy and the Idea of a Kingdom of Ends

Assuming Kant’s four examples succeed in confirming that the observance of the
moral law represented by FOH is duty and the a priori matter of moral determination is
now clear enough, we are ready for the transition to the third and final formula which will
complete the agenda for *Groundwork II*. After the four examples Kant indicates the tripartite structure of the local argument:

> [T]he ground of all practical lawgiving lies (in accordance with the first principle [FUL/FULN]) objectively in the rule and the form of universality which makes it fit to be a law (possibly a law of nature); subjectively, however, it lies in the end; but the subject of all ends is every rational being as an end in itself (in accordance with the second principle [FOH]) [and so this end is objective]; from this there follows now the third practical principle of the will, as supreme condition of its harmony with universal practical reason, the idea of the will of every rational being as a will giving universal law. (G 4:431)

The third practical principle of the will is this:

Formula of Autonomy (FOA): The supreme condition of the will’s harmony with universal practical reason is the idea of the will of every rational being as a will giving universal law (G 4:431).

What does this third formula really contribute? Kant says that because this principle requires that one reject all principles that are inconsistent with the will’s giving universal law, the will is “not merely subject to the law, but subject to it in such a way that it must be viewed as also giving law to itself and just because of this as first subject to the law (of which it can regard itself as the author)” (G 4:431 emphasis mine). In order to see what Kant has in mind, recall that Kant began in *Groundwork I* with a strong presumption in favor of the reality of morality, our common understanding. Analysis revealed the concept of duty, which in turn presupposes a categorical imperative. Even though the analysis of duty revealed *by elimination* that a moral imperative *would* have to be categorical, analysis cannot prove that there *is* such a thing. A categorical imperative could be an absurdity, in which case the analysis would amount to a reductio ad absurdum of morality. Common understanding can be mistaken and analysis is the instrument by which we reveal its flaws. What the third formula contributes is a mark of autonomy that helps Kant avoid this result:

> Imperatives as they were represented above – namely in terms of the conformity of actions with universal law similar to a natural order [FUL/FULN] or of the universal supremacy as ends of rational beings in themselves [FOH] – did exclude
from their commanding authority any admixture of interest as incentive, just by their having been represented as categorical; but they were only assumed to be categorical because we had to make such an assumption if we wanted to explain the concept of duty. But that there are practical propositions which command categorically could not itself be proved, any more than it could be proved either here or anywhere else in this section; one thing, however, could still have been done: namely to indicate in the imperative itself the renunciation of all interest, in volition from duty, by means of some determination the imperative contains, as the specific mark distinguishing categorical from hypothetical imperatives; and this is done in the present third formula of the principle, namely the idea of the will of every rational being as a will giving universal law. (G 4:431-2 bold mine)

As the quote indicates, the third formula explicitly contains a mark that the previous formulas do not. This mark is a “determination” that is “contained in” the imperative and which specifically distinguishes the imperative as categorical rather than hypothetical, namely the authorship or autonomy involved in the idea of the will of every rational being as a will giving universal law (G 4:431-2). In other words, in order for morality to be real, we must autonomously legislate ourselves.

Kant reasons along the following lines. We might possibly be subject to a law only insofar as some interest provides an incentive that binds us to it. Whenever we are subject to a law only given such an incentive, the imperative to which we are subject commands only hypothetical because it commands only on condition of the incentive. For example, one might think we are necessarily subject to the moral law because divine or civic retribution makes it imprudent to allow our self-love reign to violate FUL/FULN. When the will is dependent upon an incentive in this way, Kant says, it is only some further law, e.g. the divine one promising retribution, that “would limit the interest of its self-love to the condition of a validity for universal law” (G 4:432).

If there is a categorical imperative that really commands us, we must be subject to it without any such incentive or interest, which might seem absurd. The apparent absurdity of being subject to a law without any incentive is the reason why all previous
efforts to discover the supreme principle of morality have failed (G 4:432). As Kant puts it,

if one thought of him only as subject to a law (whatever it may be), this law had to carry with it some interest by way of attraction or constraint, since it did not as a law arise form his will; in order to conform with the law, his will has instead to be constrained by something else to act in a certain way. By this quite necessary consequence, however, all the labor to find a supreme ground of duty was irretrievably lost. For, one never arrived at duty but instead at the necessity of an action from a certain interest…one’s own or another’s. But then the imperative had to turn out always conditional [hypothetical]. (G 4:433 emphasis mine)

To the contrary, Kant claims that a will could command itself. Presumably a will is bound to act in conformity with itself, so “a will that is itself the supreme lawgiver cannot possibly, as such, depend upon some interest” (G 4:432). If it is the will’s own authorship of the law that makes the will subject to it, i.e. if we are first subject to the moral law only because we are ourselves its author, then the law would thereby command us categorically.

Returning to the issue of the progression, recall that the first formula of the moral law explicitly identified maxims, which are subjective principles of volition, as that which must conform to the universality of law. This formula makes distinct both the form of the will and a subjective aspect of the moral command. FULN complements FUL by making distinct a further feature of this subjective aspect of the categorical imperative, namely that moral deliberation must reflect the empirical effects of our actions. The second formula, FOH, explicitly refers neither to maxims nor to the universality of law, so it is less distinct with regard to the form and the subjectivity of the moral law. FOH instead explicitly identifies the matter that the moral law commands us to take as a precept of the will, namely that rational nature must be treated as an end in itself. FOH thus more distinctly represents the a priori determinable and how this plurality is positively and negatively determined or informed.
The concept of the will’s giving universal law is the result of coordinating the results of prior analysis. FOA explicitly refers neither to maxims nor to ends, but the idea of a will giving universal law nevertheless contains the conformity of one’s maxim to the universality of law and the precept that rational nature is an end in itself. It represents the synthesis of the subjective and objective grounds of volition as the conformity of one’s maxims to the universality of law under the precept that rational nature must be treated as an end in itself. Under this conception, the will is constituted as a totality.

In identifying this particular combination or constitution as autonomy, Kant makes explicit the self-authorship of the moral law in a way that may allay some of our worries about its potential ontological bootstrapping. Common and scholastic conceptions of life, self-sustenance, growth, and so on provide Kant with a presumption in favor of the possibility of some kind of bootstrapping (though not creation ex nihilo). Consider the constitution of a living being. Organs, cells, etc. are constituents of living organisms that constitute a self-sustaining whole when properly synthesized into a living organism. Kant’s conception of autonomy also involves multiple constituents that constitute willing when they are properly synthesized into a self-sustaining whole. If we think of the self-authorship of the will as involving a kind of recursion and take its existential origin as given (e.g. its scholastic potentiality or first actuality), autonomy is at least an intelligible notion. If what Kant needs here is merely to show that a categorically imperative moral law is not impossible, he has not yet obviously failed.

§5.1 The Kingdom of Ends

The next obvious challenge to the possibility of morality requires Kant to make distinct the totality made possible by the moral law, which he does by explicitly identifying the idea of a kingdom of ends. Once Kant has clarified how the idea of a will’s giving universal law is an idea of authorship and therefore the third principle is a
principle of autonomy, he moves on to the “fruitful” idea of a “kingdom of ends” that depends upon the third formula insofar as it is a principle of “appraisal” (G 4:433). A kingdom, he says, is “a systematic union of various rational beings through common laws” (G 4:433). Since it is only the universal validity of an end that is determined by moral law,

if we abstract from the personal differences of rational beings as well as from all the content of their private ends we shall be able to think of a whole of all ends in systematic connection (a whole both of rational beings as ends in themselves and of the ends of his own that each may set himself), that is, a kingdom of ends, which is possible in accordance with the above principles. (G 4:433 emphasis mine)

The first point I want to make is that the abstraction from the differences between rational beings is the same kind of abstraction as the abstraction from objects given through experience to the conditions of the possibility of an object in general.171 Reason is identical in each of us, so all differences between us concern sensibility or desire. Moreover, the pure a priori forms of sensibility and desire are the same in each of us. All differences between rational beings concern the diversity of our actual experiences, i.e. the matter of intuition, or the diversity of our inclinations, i.e. the matter of volition. To abstract from the difference between rational beings, then, is to think of them as rational, sensible, willers in general. The second point I want to make is that it is specifically the content of private ends from which are to abstract. We certainly cannot abstract entirely from the fact that rational beings are setters of ends or makers of ends. We can attend to the fact that our ends need not be given solely by reason. Some ends may be private. The abstraction should then leave us with the idea of a rational, sensible end-maker in general.

171 According to the Jäsche Logic, there is a difference between not knowing something and ignoring it, but to abstract from something is neither of these – to abstract from something is to ignore application to it (JL 45).
Now a “whole” of something “in systematic connection” is a totality. As we have seen, only a totality can be a community and the reciprocity of a causal community is the distinctive feature of intention. The interesting issue here is that Kant is not claiming that each will is a totality or that each product of will must be a totality. He is claiming that practical reason per se is a totality that encompasses even private ends in general. In order to see why Kant would want to make such an odd claim, consider the principle of complete determination. This principle requires that none of the predicates of a thing contradict each other. This is a criterion of totality. If a thing is to be a systematic whole, i.e. a single thing, then none of its predicates may contradict each other. Notice that this principle can be applied not only to inherence relations but also to dependence relations like causality. In order for something to be a cause, none of its consequences may contradict each other. There could be friction between consequences and predicates can change over time, but the predicates of a thing, including its consequences, must meet the principle of complete determination in order to be real.

If Kant were satisfied with heteronomy of the will, he might only need to show that each will meets the principle of complete determination insofar as it conforms to the moral law. If inclination, incentives, or the idiosyncratic contributions of self-love were necessary conditions of volition, our wills might well be unavoidably in potential conflict and morality might be egoistic or subjectivist. In other words, if morality were to be merely subjective, then the community it requires might be limited to a community of individual intention, e.g. community between local and global ends the agent actually has. Taken to its extreme this might imply an infinite variety of private worlds that are fundamentally incommunicable, unshareable, and completely within the control of the individual. This would be no morality at all, but egoism, hedonism, or fantasy.
If morality is objectively necessary, then the real objects of practice are the same for everyone, and our practical representations and willings are normatively constrained by this. The objective *ought* is no more subject to personal whim than the objective *is*, *was*, or *shall be*. In order for the plurality of rational nature, i.e. of intention, to be a formal and objectively necessary end in itself, the various representations of objects, including private ends, must form a system not merely for each individual independently, but an objective realm of what *ought to be* that all participate in equally. Furthermore, if Kant is to show that reason determines moral conduct entirely a priori, he must show that rational conduct in general meets the principle of complete determination *even if private ends in general are admitted*. Only a sovereign independent being, he says, can be assumed to have no private ends at all. *Members* of the kingdom of ends, like us, must be able to set ends for ourselves apart from rational nature itself. What Kant needs to show is that moral intention can be universal and united under the moral law *even if* we each have some private projects and plans.\(^8\)

This requires, of course, that form precede matter in our reflective deliberation.\(^{172}\)

The content or matter of our private ends must conform not only to the universality of law in general, but also to the consideration that each of us is entitled to have private projects and plans, personal goals, and so on. *Which* projects, plans and goals we may have is the issue we must consider and negotiate under the moral law. Just as FULN required us to consider the empirical effects of our actions as if they shall come about as necessary consequences of our actions (though they may in fact fail to come about as we plan), appraising our actions with regard to an ideal kingdom of ends requires that we

\(^{172}\) Kant notably describes analogical inferences of reflective judgment as inferences from particular to total similarity of things (JL 131-3). In order for two things to be totally similar, it may be that the two must each be totalities. This may provide Kant with yet another reason to posit a totality that is analogous to nature.
consider the effects of our possible private ends on others. The content of private ends is something to be coordinated among us. If we all will as we ought, God and nature willing, it should be possible for all of us to set private ends that allow us to flourish together. If God or nature do not cooperate, we must nevertheless plan as best we can to coordinate our private ends even though we know they will likely conflict and we will need to continually negotiate such conflicts. Kant appears to define morality, for the first time, in terms of this idea:

Morality consists, then, in the reference of all action to the lawgiving by which alone a kingdoms of ends is possible. (G 4:434)

Reason accordingly refers every maxim of the will as giving universal law to every other will and also to every action toward oneself. (G 4:434)

The final formula of autonomy and the idea of a kingdom of ends (FOA/KE) help bring the moral law closer to intuition by showing that we can ascribe the distinctive feature of intention, the reciprocal causal community of an architectonic end, to ourselves insofar as we are rational agents. By conceiving an act of will as something we synthesize a priori from multiple heterogeneous principles, in a way that is very similar to the way we reach conclusions in theory, according to Kant we conceive willing as something that we prescribe to ourselves as rational beings, i.e. something we do, rather than an effect of mechanical forces. The subordination of the subjective involved in this synthesis implies a sort of self-control or self-legislation that we commonly take to be distinctive of morality according to *Groundwork I*, and it underwrites Kant’s conception of transcendental freedom as a sort of necessary presupposition of autonomy.

The last issue is how the progression of the formulas brings the moral law closer to feeling. Once Kant has presented the third formula and the kingdom of ends, he again connects the results of analysis back to the common understanding with which
Groundwork I began, the value of a good will. He explains that the dignity of an autonomous rational being is the incomparable value for the sake of which such a rational being obeys the moral law.

Nothing can have a worth other than that which the law determines for it. But the lawgiving itself [autonomy], which determines all worth, must for that very reason have a dignity, that is, an unconditional, incomparable worth; and the word respect alone provides a becoming expression for the estimate of it that a rational being must give. Autonomy is therefore the ground of the dignity of human nature and of every rational nature. (G 4:436 emphasis mine)

This evaluation of autonomy with respect to the initial analysis of good will in Groundwork I may well show that Kant does in fact want to confirm that autonomy is consistent with common understanding. However, since the value of autonomy is independent of common feeling, i.e. pleasure or pain, this concern with dignity is better interpreted as an indication that autonomy conforms to the a priori conditions of the possibility of volition. As we saw in §1, the progression of the formulas at least foreshadows an explanation of how pure practice conforms to the quantitative categories of freedom. If these categories are to be understood as conditions of the possibility of practical cognition as I suggest, the progression would bring the moral law closer to feeling by connecting the moral law to the possibility of volition.

Since the categories of freedom can be little more than foreshadowed here, the connection to feeling via respect is stronger. Kant identifies respect as a kind of feeling engendered in us by the clear and distinct conception of the moral law. Kant says that “the mere clear exposition of our duties in opposition to all claims of the inclinations” leads to “the consciousness of freedom” (Bxxxiii). Clear and distinct understanding of the moral law is the logically perfect, abstract grasp of our own causal power. Cognitive grasp is a kind of intellectual control. If the intellect is practical, i.e. if pure reason is practical as Kant argues, then this grasp of our autonomy should be empowering because it is abstract. The formulas make distinct our autonomy and thereby ground self-respect.
Respect is the moral feeling by which we exercise this grasp. The formulas do not incline us to act, nor do they necessarily make it pleasant to act from duty, and it is certainly not their concreteness that moves us.

I hope to have shown that one of the broader purposes of the progression of the formulas in *Groundwork II* is to begin to relate the categories of understanding and freedom to the pure a priori forms of intuition and volition. As we have seen, the central problem of metaphysics concerns how the entirely abstract and general representations of intellect (categories) can possibly be synthesized with the entirely concrete and particular representations of sensibility and desire (intuitions and feelings) so as to constitute cognition. The fundamental heterogeneity of the relata makes it necessary to relate them through a third thing with which each relatum has a different homogeneity. Kant’s mediating third thing in the first *Critique* is the pure a priori forms of intuition (space and time). I have argued that the corresponding pure a priori form of volition is respect. If morality is to be real, then both sets of categories will ultimately need to be related to both pure a priori forms. This is a more specific way of claiming that Kant must ultimately prove the unity of reason and the unity of cognition. The progression of the formulas in *Groundwork II* is a useful step in this direction because it concerns how the quantitative categories of understanding relate to practice in general, moral practice and respect. The progression less clearly indicates how the quantitative categories of freedom relate to practice and respect, but it sets some of the basic elements in place and this is also worth some attention.

If I have succeeded in Part II of this dissertation, the following plan Kant describes in the first *Critique* should now make sense as an outline for how one might determine the special content of the science of moral metaphysics:
Suppose there subsequently turned up – not in experience but in certain (not merely logical rules but) laws holding firm a priori and concerning our existence – the occasion for presupposing ourselves to be legislative fully a priori in regard to our own existence, and as self-determining in this existence; then this would disclose a spontaneity through which our actuality is determinable without the need of conditions of empirical intuition; and here we would become aware that in the consciousness of our existence something is contained a priori that can serve to determine our existence…in regard to a certain inner faculty in relation to an intelligible world (obviously one only thought of)…through this admirable faculty, which for the first time reveals to me the consciousness of the moral law, I would indeed have a principle for the determination of my existence that is purely intellectual, but through which predicates? Through none other than those that would have to be given to me in sensible intuition…Meanwhile, I would still be warranted in applying these concepts in regard to their practical use, which is always directed to objects of experience, according to their analogical significance in their theoretical use, to freedom and the free subject, since by them I understand merely the logical functions of subject and predicate, ground and consequence, in accordance with which actions or effects are determined in conformity to those laws in such a way that they can at the same time always be explained conformably to the laws of nature and the categories of substance and cause, although they arise from a wholly different principle. (B430-432)

i Examples increase aesthetic distinctness, which is distinctness in intuition, by exhibiting or elucidating a concept in concreto (JL 39). There are tradeoffs between the benefits of the concrete and the abstract. The stimulating or exciting character of aesthetically (intuitively) more perfect representations can be disadvantageous, Kant says, because it “can spoil the logical perfection in our cognitions and judgments” (JL 37). This disadvantage can be avoided in part by attending to the fact that “logical perfection is the basis of all other perfections” and looking “principally to formal aesthetic perfection, the agreement of a cognition with the laws of intuition” (JL 38).

ii Aesthetic truth and aesthetic certainty can be ruled out more easily. Aesthetic truth is subjective truth, or “the agreement of cognition with the subject and the laws of sensory illusion” (JL 39). Kant is clearly concerned in Groundwork II with the objectivity of morality and he makes no appeal to sensibility. Aesthetic certainty “rests on what is necessary in consequence of the testimony of the senses, i.e. what is confirmed through sensation and experience” (JL 39). Kant does not point to historical examples and his examples are not experiments.

iii Since natural science is on better footing than moral science, Kant thought, the burden of proof here rests on the moral metaphysician to show that morality is no chimera or phantom and that morality is really valid for the domain of possible experience rather than vice versa. Since these conditions of the possibility of cognition are transcendental criteria of objective reality, though, their employment does not reduce morality to an empirical science. The touchstone of experience can be a touchstone for the reality of moral metaphysics.

iv One of Kant’s central metaphysical agendas was to negotiate between the idealism and dualism of the rationalist Leibnizean-Wolffian tradition espoused in Prussian and Germany at the time (e.g. the pre-established harmony involved in Leibniz’s monadism, Cartesian dualism) and the empiricist materialism more broadly espoused in Europe (e.g. physical influx accounts of causation – Locke, Hume). The primarily scholastic methodology for the Groundwork does not depend on Kant’s primary arguments concerning the reality of causality in the first Critique. For an adequate understanding of the method it is sufficient to note that we really make things happen according to common understanding, so the primary
task for philosophy is to explain how this is possible. If Kant succeeds in this, alternative theories will be irrelevant. For a detailed explanation of the deeper seventeenth and eighteenth century metaphysical controversies concerning causation and Kant’s arguments for the reality of causation, see Watkins’ *Kant and the Metaphysics of Causality*.

v As a sketch of how one might come to concur apart from the association with extension, it should be obvious that *that which is to be unified* by a form cannot already be a unity, at least not with respect to whatever aspect of the matter is to be informed. So matter should be either plural or total. Totality is the result of combining unity with plurality. Since matter *per se* has no unity without form, it cannot be total. Therefore the quantitative category of matter must be plurality.

vi See Hill for a useful discussion of psychological difficulties concerning what it would be to treat someone else as an end in herself (Hill 1992, 41ff). Since it seems obvious that we cannot constitute each other’s wills as we each do our own, Kant will need something like the kingdom of ends to explain how, metaphysically, we can each contribute to the constitution of others in some sense. Kant’s answer to this problem, I think, is that since reason is literally identical in each of us and it is our reason that makes us legislative members of a kingdom of ends, insofar as we are rational, one person’s *rationality* can be substituted for another’s without qualification. Reason constitutes each of us in precisely the same way; sensibility and desire are what individuate us because these constituents materially differ for each of us. Given Hill’s antipathy to metaphysical interpretation of the *Groundwork*, he is unlikely to be at all sympathetic to this view. In sympathy to Hill, it is both difficult and important to cash out in psychological terms just what such a metaphysical position would entail. My examples in this chapter of sharing an end offer an approach similar to Hill’s that takes greater advantage of Kant’s metaphysics and, I think, better reflects or better explains the basis of common understanding in some cases (see Hill 1992, 44 point 7ff).

vii The brief division I give here based on whether and how it is possible to share an end, I contend, is also the basis of Kant’s distinction between right and wrong status relations. The minor party of a status relation (e.g., a child) need not actually share the end of the major party (e.g., a parent) in order for actions taken by the major party with respect to the minor party to be right (e.g., whether a parent may rightly punish a child does not depend on whether the child consents to the punishment). This is enormously important given the ubiquitous historical reliance on consent in the justification of matters of right, including the authority of the state. According to Kant, contractual relations are grounded in consent, but status relations are not. Lacking any clear way of differentiating right from wrong status relations apart from actual, idealized, or hypothetical consent, status relations have virtually always been reduced to contract relations. The possibility of sharing ends may provide a workable alternative that can better handle political and familial status relations. If the citizen-state relation is metaphysically a status relation rather than a contractual relation, Rawls theory of justice is ironically deeply unKantian.

viii Kant’s abstraction to the idea of a kingdom of ends is most notable historically as the inspiration for John Rawls’ famous *Theory of Justice* in which he develops an idea of the original position from which the basic laws of the ideal state could be derived. Rawls’ student Thomas Hill concisely explains why one might think that an abstraction from personal ends might position one well to discover the rules we would make as legislating members of a kingdom of ends:

[T]he formula of the kingdom of ends *enjoins us to follow those rules* that we would make as legislating members of such a kingdom. *It requires us to work out a set of rules* that would legislate if we were doing so from a certain ideal point of view. Before we can apply the formula, we must reconstruct those ideal legislative conditions from Kant’s description of the kingdom. (Hill 1992, 59 emphasis mine)

The underlying idea is that Kant’s project is to correct origin of the state arguments like Hobbes’ and Locke’s that assume some universal sentimental character for humanity, e.g. diffident or sympathetic; if reason is the moral faculty then these non-rational characteristics belong to anthropology or psychology.
rather than morality. Hill is concerned with primarily with deliberation, not metaphysics, and to be practically rational according to Hill is to be a rational rule-follower (Hill 1992, 66 and 123ff). Given this context it is most natural for Hill to construe Kant’s positive project concerning the kingdom of ends to be the articulation of civil legislation to which all members of a state are bound by their rational natures. Hill is correct to the extent that the *Groundwork* is at least in part a groundwork for a doctrine of right, which does concern the moral basis of the state, so there is good reason to think this sort of project is on Kant’s mind. Exegetically, however, the connection between the kingdom of ends in the *Groundwork* and the articulation of right in the *Metaphysics of Morals* does not unfold as it should if Hill is correct (Rawls’ entire *Theory of Justice* is designed to fill this gap, with very little textual support). Hill tacitly acknowledges this, but takes it to count against Kant’s articulation rather than his own interpretation (ibid, 65-6). I submit that the historical context and the surrounding text, both in *Groundwork II* and further afield, better support the interpretation that Kant is primarily concerned with metaphysical criteria for the reality of intention. To make a more substantive point, Hill denies that the harmonious system of ends analogous to nature is “important” for Kant’s model of moral legislation (ibid, 59). As I have been arguing, Kant must explain both how the moral law is constitutive of conduct and how it can regulate subjectively contingent effects. The latter requires an *ideal* like a kingdom of ends because the objective *ought* and the objective *was/is/shall be* must be systematically united in *one reality* despite the subjective contingency of the objective ought. Non-metaphysical interpretations like Hill’s cannot accurately reflect this distinction and thereby explain why an ideal based on an analogy with nature is *required* for *Groundwork II* even apart from considerations regarding the civil state.

As for the narrow focus on rule-following, Kant’s introduction of the idea of a kingdom of ends does not enjoin us to discover, make, and follow *rules* at the psychological level (see Herman 1993, 74ff). Rule-following may be central to civil legislation, but matters of right are only one of Kant’s downstream concerns. The personal ends, projects and relationships that we take to constitute our personal identities, our characters or the character of our lives at the psychological level are not well-construed as sets of rules we adopt and follow. These matters of *virtue* are at least as important as matters of *right*, and they are equally grounded in the kingdom of ends (see DV 391-2). Kant’s abstraction to the idea of a kingdom of ends requires that we abstract from the material of personal ends but not from the fact that we are essentially setters of *ends*, including personal ends. The kingdom of ends thus makes room for Williamsonian “ground projects” whose value is *conditional* upon the moral worth of actions to be taken in their pursuit, and to which we accordingly ought to be attached only conditionally. The value of these projects and our attachments to them, however, need not be *entirely derived* from pure reason: Our conditional attachments to ground projects and personal relationships may be natural. We may adopt and pursue the ground projects to which we are most inclined and we may form special attachments to individual people out of love or natural attraction, so long as our pursuit of these ends and relationships does not require us to violate the moral law. If our attachments *require* something immoral, we are morally required to revise or abandon them – this is what it means for attachments to be conditional in the appropriate sense. Genocide and enslavement are naturally possible ground projects, ones that people have in fact adopted and pursued, but they are not morally possible ends. (See Herman 1993: “The Practice of Moral Judgment” (Ch 4) for a less simple-minded view of the role of rules in moral judgment; “Integrity and Impartiality” for an accessible explanation of how moral worth in the central cases of action extends to the moral value of policies, ground projects, character, integrity, etc.; “Mutual Aid and Respect for Persons”, especially p.63n27 for a compelling view of how inclinations may contribute to choices among personal ends and ends associated with wide duties.)
REFERENCES


