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The road to ideelle Verähnlichung

Anton Marty’s Conception of Intentionality in the Light of its Brentanian Background

Es ist wohl sicher, dass wer ein B-denkendes-A
denkt, ausser dem B-denkenden auch B denkt.
Ob er aber außerdem auch von-A-gedachtes-B
denkt, das ist die Frage.¹

The development of philosophical ideas in the school of Brentano was not structured like the neo-platonic emanatory process: from the One (Brentano) to the multiplicity (the pupils). In fact, some pupils clearly distanced themselves from the master and took proper theoretical positions. But when it comes to the name of a slavish pupil, Marty is invariably mentioned. In our view, this common place among Brentanians (pupils and historians of austro-german philosophy) should be reconsidered.

In that respect, a study of Marty’s theory of intentionality seems quite appropriate. As we shall see (section 2, below), the final version of this theory makes of intentionality a potential or actual sui generis relation of similitude, called ideelle Verähnlichung (mental assimilation, MA)², holding between the thinking subject and the object tout court (Gegenstand schlechtweg). The concept of MA has a long genesis, since it follows from discussions Marty had with Brentano but also with Husserl about the status of intentional objects and intentional relations. These discussions have lead to important modifications in Marty’s first theory of intentionality. We will present these different modifications and the progressive emergence of the concept of MA. Before formulating his definitive position, Marty already worked with the concept of a sui generis relation in his theory of intentionality, but this relation was a relation of quasi-equality (Quasigleichheit), and it was holding between the intentional object and the object tout court, not between the subject and the object tout court. Marty, on his way to MA, has been profoundly influenced by Husserl in his acknowledgment of potential relations. After discussions with the reistic Brentano and Husserl, Marty decided to drop the intentional object. This last move lead him to share out the functions he attributed to the intentional object between the remaining elements of the intentional structure, namely the subject, its acts and the object tout court, a crucial move which eventually yielded his mature theory of intentionality.

The elucidation of Marty’s last theory will help us to achieve the main goal of this paper: clarifying the degree of dependence of Marty upon Brentano with respect to intentionality. Nevertheless, we do not want to compare only the “mature” Marty to Brentano. Indeed, on the base of our “genetic” considerations, we shall also be able to describe the interaction between Marty and Brentano before the so-called Brentanian reistic period, namely before 1904³.

¹ F. BRENTANO, Relationen, ms. Ps 34 [partly undated], n°51070, Franz Clemens Brentano Compositions (MS Ger 230), Houghton Library, Harvard University. Many thanks to Mauro Antonelli, Guillaume Fréchette and Alain de Libera for their comments on a first draft of this paper.

² For the translation of ‘ideell’ with ‘mental’, see below, section 2, n. 130.

³ The recent publication of Marty’s Deskriptive Psychologie will help us to determine more precisely Marty’s positions around 1894/1895 (A. MARTY, Deskriptive Psychologie, hrsg. v. M. Antonelli und J.-Ch. Marek, Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 2011 (« Studien zur österreichischen Philosophie », 43)).
This point, however, calls for some detailed explanations. As a matter of fact, some scholars have recently contested the canonical interpretation of Brentano’s pre-reistic theory of intentionality. One of these scholars, Mauro Antonelli, the coeditor of Marty’s _Deskriptive Psychologie_, even accused Marty of being the source of this canonical, and according to him, erroneous interpretation of Brentano: Marty’s early theory cannot be dependent on the one of Brentano, simply because Marty did not understand Brentano correctly. In other words, if we are to establish the degree of dependence of Marty on Brentano, we first have to clarify the two standard interpretations of Brentano’s concept of intentionality and see what confusion Marty could be charged with (provided he did confuse anything at all). Accordingly, in section 1, we introduce the canonical interpretation of Brentano’s theory of intentionality (the discontinuist interpretation, DI), and see on what bases Antonelli and other scholars propose a divergent reading (the continuist interpretation, CI). The comparison between these two interpretations also serves a heuristic purpose since it requires an explanation of the main concepts used in the Brentanian school for theorizing intentionality, namely: intentional object, immanent object, object _per se_ or _tout court_ (Gegenstand schlechtweg), mental correlate, inner perception, relative determination, existence, the real, and the non-real. All these concepts will be introduced and discussed in section 2, devoted to the evolution of Marty’s position. By way of a conclusion, we shall suggest an interpretation of Brentano’s theory of intentionality. At the end of the day, the following pages point toward something like a rehabilitation of Marty with respect to philosophical originality.

1. Brentano’s position(s)

1.1. Two opposed interpretations of Brentano

What exactly is «the part of a seen-colour obtained through modifying distinction»? This point of detail in the psychology of Brentano is currently the core of a debate about his whole theory of intentionality. The textual basis of the problem is to be found in a lecture of 1890/1891 edited in the volume _Deskriptive Psychologie_. After having established that every intentional relation has two members, namely an act of consciousness and a non-real correlate (a «seen-x», a «presented-x», a «wanted-x», etc.), Brentano says the following regarding the second member of this relation:

‘Seen colour’ contains, in a manner of speaking, colour, not as a distincional part in the strict sense, but as a part to be obtained from it by modifying distinction.4

[transl. Müller]

So, there is a difference between the seen-x and x itself, the latter being somehow contained in the former, and the access to x is given through a modifying distinction.

One way of interpreting this text is to say that the seen-colour (i.e. the non-real correlate of the mental act) is the intentional object, something _internal_ to the subject, existing besides each of his mental acts. Such a seen-colour is of course not a «real» colour, for a real colour would be something which would exist «outside». The consequence is that colour can come in two modes of being: a proper mode of being which concerns the colour «outside»; and an improper mode of being, called «being*»,

which concerns the colour as an intentional object (i.e. not a colour strictly speaking). It is thanks to inner perception that the perceiver realizes that the intentional object, which seems to be a transcendent entity when grasped by outer perception, is in fact a non-real subject-dependent entity, a being*. According to this reading, Brentano seems to be the defender of a kind of indirect realism. He would have established intermediary mental target-objects between the subject and reality. Associating Brentano with a well-known philosophical position (manely that of representationalism), this interpretation is quite clear.

Another way of interpreting this text consists in saying that the seen-colour (i.e. the non-real correlate of the mental act) is not the intentional object, but is the intentional correlate. As for the intentional object, the advocates of this second interpretation identify it as a pure object (object per se or tout court): it is simply what is presented, without considerations about being or not being. The correlate of the act is now nothing but a modified intentional object, grasped by inner perception as accompanying every mental act. Thus, the « seen-colour » is a modified colour grasped by inner perception as the non-real correlate of one’s act of seeing. The colour, by contrast, is the intentional object grasped by one’s act of seeing. This understanding makes it difficult to subsume Brentano under any well-known philosophical position. It leads to admit two bizarre entities for every mental act, namely a "pure object" and a "non-real correlate". Neither of them seems to be something in the outer world, since the object can be non-existent and since the correlate is a mental entity. There is another peculiarity: the target-object and the correlate of the act are distinct. This interpretation is quite odd.

To summarize: i) on the first interpretation, the correlate is the intentional object and it has a particular mode of being; ii) on the second interpretation, the correlate is not the intentional object, and the intentional object does not have a particular mode of being⁵.

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The first (discontinuist) interpretation (DI)

A subject’s thinking

The second (continuist) interpretation (CI)

A subject’s thinking

These two interpretations have a common historical genesis. The first one has emerged in the school of Brentano, since Brentano himself, writing to Marty, explained that he never considered the
mental correlate ("thought-about-horse") and the intentional object ("horse") as identical, defending himself against Höfler’s accusations of confusion between content and object. In spite of this letter, the first interpretation, as we will see, has been widespread, and it still is. The second interpretation resembles Brentano’s interpretation of his own work as presented in the aforesaid letter against Höfler’s reading. Brentano clearly rejects the idea that the intentional (or immanent) object is something relative to the act. He says in this letter that the object and the correlate should be absolutely distinguished, in other words that "it has never been [his] view that the immanent object = \"presented-object\" (vorgestelltes Objekt)\". However, the second interpretation has not been defended by scholars until recently, and only by a minority.

Now, as we said above, Antonelli, in his introduction to Marty’s Deskriptive Psychologie, accuses Marty of having misunderstood Brentano’s theory of intentionality. Antonelli considers that Marty has erroneously identified the Brentanian intentional (or immanent) object with an entity relative to the mental act, a non-real correlate. In other words, Marty would consider that the “terminus” of the intentional relation is a correlate, defending exactly the interpretation Brentano rejects. Indeed, in the aforementioned letter, Brentano’s explicit criticism is directed against Höfler’s accusations; but Antonelli considers that this letter is in fact directed against Marty: the confusion between object and correlate is Marty’s work, and Brentano is reminding him the right doctrine. We will ask in our conclusion whether Marty is rightly accused by Antonelli of having invented a false interpretation of Brentano. This, however, will only be possible after having studied carefully Brentano’s and Marty’s theories of intentionality. In this section, our purpose is to present in detail the two opposed interpretations of Brentano’s theory.

1.1.1. The traditional discontinuist interpretation (DI)

As we saw above, the first interpretation considers that the correlate is the intentional object and that it has a particular mode of being. We will now present the two theses involved here, namely: a) the correlate of a mental act and the intentional object are the same entity; b) this entity has a particular mode of being.

The first thesis follows from the relational aspect of Brentanian intentionality. Indeed, in the famous text of the Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint in which Brentano gives his definition of mental

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7 F. BRENTO, Wahrheit und Evidenz, p. 87 (transl. CHISHOLM, POLITZER, FISCHER, p. 52, modified).

8 M. ANTONELLI, Die Deskriptive Psychologie von Anton Marty. Wege und Abwege eines Brentano-Schülers, in A. MARTY, Deskriptive Psychologie, pp. XXX-XXXIII, p. XLV.
phenomena, he talks of a « relation to a content » and a « direction toward an object » (Beziehung auf einen Inhalt; Richtung auf ein Objekt). But he says also, in the Psychology, that this relation is a relation to an object (Beziehung auf etwas als Objekt). The relational aspect of intentionality is constantly present in Brentano’s philosophy and is more and more developed over the years. Thus, in the lecture of 1890/1891 published in the volume Descriptive Psychology, Brentano develops his theory of the intentional relation, saying that consciousness always involves « a certain kind of relation, relating a subject to an object »:

As in every relation, two correlates can be found here. The one correlate is the act of consciousness, the other is that <thing> which it is directed upon. Seeing and what is seen, presenting and what is presented, [...] etc. [transl. Müller]

These correlates are epistemically and also ontologically interdependent. If there is a thinking-about-x, there has to be a thought-about-x as the former’s correlate. As a consequence, and given that the relation is a relation to an « object », the object is considered as the correlate ex parte rei; and given that this correlate is a « thought-about-x », we have the equivalence « object = thought-about-x »; this equivalence is defended in particular by Kastil, Kraus, Chisholm, Mulligan, Smith and Chrudzimski.

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10 F. BRENTANO, Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt, p. 137 (transl. RINCIURRELLO, TERRELL, MCAULIFFE, p. 74). The relation to an object is also to be found in the table of contents (F. BRENTANO, ibid., p. VI (transl. RINCIURRELLO, TERRELL, MCAULIFFE, p. VII; and see p. 68 n. 11)).

11 F. BRENTANO, Deskriptive Psychologie, p. 21 (transl. MÜLLER, p. 23).


13 A manuscript from the Nachlass shows it clearly: « Korrelative Begriffe sind solche, welche ohne einander nicht gedacht werden können, und von welchen die Gegenstände ohne einander nicht bestehen können, obwohl keiner dem anderen einschliesst und keiner dem anderen inhaltlich gleich ist. (...) Da die Gegenstände korrelativer Begriffe nicht ohne einander sein können, so ist offenbar, dass keiner etwas für sich, jeder, was es ist, nur in Verbindung mit dem anderen ist. So ist es in der That bei Sehendem und Gesehenem, Liebendem und Geliebtem, Glaubendem und Geglaubtem, Grenze und Begrenztem, Grund und Folge u.s.w., Zweck und Mittel u.s.w. » (F. BRENTANO, Von Relativein, ms. M 32, 1889, n°30285-30286, Franz Clemens Brentano Compositions (MS Ger 230), Houghton Library, Harvard University).

Thus, we should read the text of the *Descriptive Psychology* as a more developed theory of the «relation to an object», which was inchoative in the *Psychology*. Now, the consequence of this thesis is that the object is said to be non-real, given that Brentano considers the correlate, the thought-about-x, as a non-real entity. Thus, we have a particular kind of entity, namely a non-real one, as object. This leads us to the second thesis.

It is well known that Brentano’s concept of intentionality has medieval sources. Now, when Brentano introduces his famous definition of intentionality in the *Psychology*, he talks, using a medieval vocabulary, of the «intentional (or mental) non-existence of an object» (*intentionale auch wohl mentale Inexistenz eines Gegenstandes*). This isn’t a mere «façon de parler». According to the defenders of the first interpretation, non-existence is a particular kind of existence, something between being and non-being; in other words (medieval ones, again), a diminished mode of being. As Chisholm says, the intentional object is «short of actuality but more than nothingness». This lack of actuality is often considered as another way to express the non-reality of the object. For example by Smith:

> The intentionality of outer perception is in fact a relation between two mental entities, the (real) act of sensation and the (non-real, non-causally efficacious, abstract) quality sensed. The latter, for example experienced sounds and colours, have a diminished sort of existence, an existence ‘in the mind’. Certainly they are not real, but this does not mean that they are merely nothing. Rather, they are entia rationis, non-real parts of a real, mental substance.

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**Brentano, Wahrheit und Evidenz**, pp. 167-220, p. 177, p. 183 and p. 192. Thus, originated by two pupils of Marty, this interpretation has been confirmed in the introduction of the *Descriptive Psychology* by Chisholm and Baumgartner and in the review of Mulligan/Smith, and widespread by Smith and Chrudzimski’s influential books.

15 This kind of crescendo reading is defended by Chrudzimski (A. CHRUDZIMSKI, *Intentionalitätstheorie beim frühen Brentano*, p. 21).

16 F. BRENTANO, *Deskriptive Psychologie*, p. 21 (transl. MÜLLER, p. 24): «[...] these correlates display the peculiarity that the one alone is real, <whereas> the other is not something real [nichts Reales]».


22 B. SMITH, *Austrian Philosophy*, p. 44.
If we consider carefully this quotation, we see that we have here a combination of two different sorts of ontological modifications, namely a modification regarding things (a « non-real » thing), and a modification regarding modes of being (a « diminished sort of being »)²³.

Chrudzimski explicitly discusses these two sorts of modifications²⁴. He makes a distinction between the modification of the variable (∃x*), which leads to accept modified objects, and the modification of the quantifier (∃∀x), which leads to accept modified modes of being. This distinction leads Chrudzimski to ask whether the presence of the intentional object (which is for him identical to the correlate) should preeminently imply a modified variable or a modified quantifier. At the end of the day, he considers that the non-reality of the Brentanian modified objects leads to accept a kind of modified « mode of being » (Seinsweise), different from the one of « ‘normal’ real objects »²⁵. The hypothesis of Chrudzimski is that « Brentano’s theory postulates in most cases both modifications », so that these modifications are « correlative »²⁶. Therefore, Chrudzimski reads Brentano as follows: an intentional object, which is the non-real mental correlate, is the bearer of a colour property. But being coloured as an intentional object is being coloured in an improper way. Thus, the intentional object is* coloured. Only a coloured object in the outer world, if it existed, would be coloured in a proper way²⁷. This point has already been affirmed by Smith, who thinks that « [the] immanent objects are not (except in a modifying sense) red or green or warm or cold »²⁸.

We can now come back to the text of the Descriptive Psychology about modified parts. It is important to notice that this text is concerned with the description of mental phenomena, which means that his analyses are principally made from the point of view of inner perception. Unlike outer perception, which provides doubtful knowledge, inner perception is always correct²⁹. Thus, it shows the elements involved in psychic life as they are, in particular the act and its correlate. A way to interpret this is to say that outer perception shows (« wrongly ») the intentional object as « transcendent », that is to say: as something being coloured, not being* coloured³⁰. Now, the object is not really coloured; it is coloured in a modified way. Thanks to inner perception, it appears as it is, i.e. as something modified. In other words, the point of view of inner perception shows the correlate as correlate: it shows it as non-real, as being* coloured³¹. As we saw, Brentano says that the colour is « a part to be obtained from [the seen-

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²³ We will see that the defenders of the second interpretation consider that this combination is one of the mistakes of the first interpretation.

²⁴ It is important to notice that Chrudzimski is today the principal opponent of the second interpretation. He is the only advocate of the first interpretation who rejects the second explicitly (see A. CHRUZDZIMSKI, Intentionalitätstheorie beim frühen Brentano, p. 22, n. 15 and A. CHRUZDZIMSKI, Die Ontologie Franz Brentanos, p. 155 n. 150), saying, as one can guess, that the intentional object and the correlate are identical. Given that the second interpretation is partly based on a criticism of the first, we want to preserve the « equality of arms » by emphasizing during the presentation of the first interpretation the only defender of it who discusses and rejects the second.

²⁵ A. CHRUZDZIMSKI, Intentionalitätstheorie beim frühen Brentano, p. 45-46. Schuhmann also considers that the correlate (which is identical with the immanent object) has a different « mode of being » (Seinsweise) (K. SCHUHMANN, Der Gegenstandsbegriff in Brentanos ‘Psychognosie’, « Brentano Studien », 5 (1994), pp. 167-176, p. 171).

²⁶ A. CHRUZDZIMSKI, Intentionalitätstheorie beim frühen Brentano, p. 119-120, underscored by the author.

²⁷ A. CHRUZDZIMSKI, Intentionalitätstheorie beim frühen Brentano, p. 47-48, p. 106. See also A. CHRUZDZIMSKI, Die Ontologie Franz Brentanos, p. 157-158. This is only a brief summary of the long discussions Chrudzimski devotes to quantification and the modes of being of the intentional object.

²⁸ B. SMITH, Austrian Philosophy, p. 58. Here, « immanent » and « intentional » are synonymous.

²⁹ For a presentation of the concept of inner perception in Brentano’s work, see M. TEXTOR, Brentano (and some neo-Brentanians) on inner consciousness, « Dialectica », 60 (2006/4), pp. 411-432.

³⁰ A. CHRUZDZIMSKI, Intentionalitätstheorie beim frühen Brentano, p. 106.

³¹ A. CHRUZDZIMSKI, Intentionalitätstheorie beim frühen Brentano, p. 104: « dieses Korrelat wird im Urteil der inneren Wahrnehmung, das doch unfehlbar ist, natürlich als irreal anerkannt » (all underscored by the author).
colour] by modifying distinction». According to Smith, this part is the real colour: «the seen colour contains a real colour».

To gain knowledge of it, the subject has to proceed to a «demodifying» noticing (Bemerkten). It is only through such a mediation that a kind of access to the outer world is given.

It is worth noticing that an interpretation holding that the intentional object has a sui generis ontological status does not constrain to consider that this object is the only «target object» of the intentional relation. Indeed, Chrudzimski thinks that the act/object theory in Brentano’s work is twofold. We would have a first theory with an intentional object as a target object, and a second theory with two target objects, namely the intentional object and the transcendent object. This second theory would have emerged in the years 1885-1891. Admittedly, the Psychology seems to establish a theory with only one object, since the immanent object of a presentation (Vorstellung) is not something which re-presents another object, but is a phenomenon understood as a kind of terminus ad quem: «as we use the verb ‘to present’, ‘to be presented’ means the same as ‘to appear’». By contrast, some manuscripts of Brentano quoted by Chrudzimski show that Brentano is using a new meaning of the word ‘presentation’ (Vorstellung), namely something like “re-presentation”, which seems to introduce a three-places structure with a transcendent object: in the Psychology the immanent object was represented (Vorgesteltes) whereas in these manuscripts the immanent object is representing (Vorstellendes). For example, a well-known passage from the manuscript EL 80 could be read as leading to this kind of structure:

In a certain way, the name indicates the content of a re-presentation [Vorstellung] as such, the immanent object [Gegenstand]. In a certain way, that, which is re-presented through the content of a re-presentation. The first is the meaning of the name. The second is that which the name names. We say of it that the name befits it. It is that which, if it exists, is the outer object [Gegenstand] of the re-presentation.

Sofar, we have gathered the main elements of the first interpretation of Brentano. The reader could now ask: «but why call it ‘the discontinuum interpretation’?». Response: the defenders of this interpretation think that the adoption of the so-called reism by Brentano leads to the abandonment of the

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32. F. BRENTANO, Deskriptive Psychologie, p. 27 (transl. MÜLLER, p. 29).
34. F. BRENTANO, Deskriptive Psychologie, p. 27, p. 19 et p. 31 sq. (transl. MÜLLER, p. 29, p. 22 and p. 34 sq.). Chrudzimski seems to say that the demodification is done through a judgement, which leads to the acceptance of a being coloured, i.e. the intentional object is demodified from being* to being before acceptance, so that we eventually judge about real things (A. CHRUDZIMSKI, Intentionalitätstheorie beim frühen Brentano, p. 82 and p. 106).
35. A. CHRUDZIMSKI, Intentionalitätstheorie beim frühen Brentano, p. 37. We will not discuss here Chrudzimski’s interpretation of the intentional object as a «mediator» between the subject and the transcendent object. See in particular A. CHRUDZIMSKI, Intentionalitätstheorie beim frühen Brentano, p. 26 sq.
38. F. BRENTANO, Logik, hg. v. R. ROLLINGER, 2011, p. 35: «Der Name[n] bezeichnet in gewisser Weise den Inhalt einer Vorstellung als solcher, den immanenten Gegenstand. In gewisser Weise das, was durch den Inhalt einer Vorstellung vorgestellt wird. Der erste ist die Bedeutung des Namens. Das zweite ist das, was der Name nennt. Von ihm sagen wir, es kommt der Nam ihm zu. Es ist das, was, wenn es existiert, äusserer Gegenstand der Vorstellung ist». Quoted in A. CHRUDZIMSKI, Intentionalitätstheorie beim frühen Brentano, p. 33. See also the quotation of the manuscript Ps 21 (1889, or 1899), in A. CHRUDZIMSKI, Intentionalitätstheorie beim frühen Brentano, p. 38. See F. BRENTANO, Die Lehre vom richtigen Urteil, hg. v. F. MAYER-HILLEBRAND, mit einer Einleitung von F. MAYER-HILLEBRAND, Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg, 1956/1978 («Philosophische Bibliothek», 311), p. 47.
ontologically peculiar intentional (i.e. immanent) objects\textsuperscript{39}. Reism is a theory which affirms, from an ontological point of view, that only concrete individual entities (things, \textit{Dinge}, \textit{res}) exist, and, from a psychological point of view, that only concrete individual entities can be presented\textsuperscript{40}. The \textit{locus classicus} for the so-called abandonment of the intentional object is Brentano’s first chapter of the 1911 Appendix to the second volume of the \textit{Psychology}\textsuperscript{41}. In this text, Brentano says that unlike standard relations, which require the existence of both of their « members », the intentional relation requires only the existence of one of them, namely the thinker’s:

> It is entirely different in the case of psychic relation. If someone thinks of something, the one who is thinking must certainly exist, but the object of his thinking need not exist at all.\textsuperscript{42} [transl. Runcurello, Terrell, McAlister, slightly modified]

We said before that correlates are epistemically and above all ontologically interdependent. So, the peculiar ontological status of the intentional object allowed preserving the relational aspect of intentionality in Brentano’s theory: even if there is nothing existing which corresponds to the object of presentation, nevertheless the ontological non-reducible status of the latter makes the intentional relation have its two correlates\textsuperscript{43}. Now, since he adopted reism, Brentano considered that \textit{irrealia} cannot be taken seriously from an ontological point of view. Loosing one of the correlates, Brentano has to give up the relational aspect of intentionality. This is why he calls it something « quasi-relational » (\textit{etwas Relativliches})\textsuperscript{44}. He consequently admits that for intentionality to occur, a particular non relational property – that of « thinking x-ly » – is sufficient. In other words, Brentano switches from a relational to an adverbial theory of intentionality\textsuperscript{45}. Even if, from an ontological point of view, intentionality is not a relation anymore, it still has to be relationally described:


\textsuperscript{40} For the twofold aspect, psychological and ontological, of reism, see M. ANTONELLI, \textit{Seiendes, Bewusstsein, Intentionalität im Frühwerk von Franz Brentano}, Karl Alber, Freiburg, München 2001 (« Phänomenologie: 2, Kontexte », 10), p. 267.


\textsuperscript{43} A. CHRUDZIMSKI, \textit{Intentionalitätstheorie beim frühen Brentano}, p. 21-22 and p. 234.

\textsuperscript{44} F. BRENTANO, \textit{ Von der Klassifikation der psychischen Phänomene}, p. 134 (transl. RUNCURELLO, TERRELL, MCALESTER, p. 212).

The solution that we propose is to assume that the true Brentanian ontology of intentionality is indeed an adverbial ontology as outlined above, but to insist at the same time that the only specification of the meaning of the corresponding adverbial determinations which a human being would be able to give is in terms of putative objects of presentation. According to this interpretation, the ontology of intentionality is at bottom adverbial, but the ‘ideology’ of intentionality must for cognitive agents like ourselves refer to the putative objects of intentions.  

This would be the reason why Brentano says that for intentionality to be the case, besides the presentation and existence of a subject in modo recto, a presentation (not the existence) of an object is needed in modo obliquo.  

To conclude, then, we can take a look at the famous letter to Marty (17 March 1905). Brentano explicitly says that «it has never been [his] view that the immanent object = ‘presented-object’ (vorgestelltes Objekt)» . In other words, he expressly says, in advance, that the interpretation of Kastil, Kraus, Chisholm, Mulligan, Smith and Chruždžimski is false. The strategy of the defenders of the first interpretation consists in saying that Brentano did in fact once admit this equivalence, but that he somehow forgot it since he eventually adopted reism and thus abandoned the ontology of the intentional object. But the problem is that Brentano is very precise about this point. He not only says that he never considered the intentional object as something equivalent to the «presented-x», but he also stresses that the «presented-x» is the correlate of the mental act whereas «x» is the intentional object. In other words, he clearly rejects the first interpretation by dissociating the correlate and the intentional object. He likens the «presented-x» to the secondary object, i.e. the object of inner perception, in opposition to «x» which is the primary object of presentation. In short: his self-interpretation tallies with the aforementioned «second interpretation».

1.1.2. The minority continuist interpretation (CI)

According to the advocates of the second interpretation, principally Werner Sauer, Mauro Antonelli and Guillaume Fréchette (but also on some points Klaus Hedwig, Linda McAlister and Otis T. Kent), the correlate and the intentional object are distinct, and the intentional object does not have a particular mode of being.

The difference between the correlate and the intentional object is grounded on at least two passages in Brentano’s Psychology. They both concern the problem of the attribution of the relational

46 A. CHRUDZIMSKI, B. SMITH, Brentano’s Ontology: From Conceptualism to Reism, p. 216.
48 F. BRENTANO, Wahrheit und Evidenz, p. 87 (transl. CHISHOLM, POLITZER, FISCHER, p. 52, modified).
predicate « being-perceived » to objects.

In the first passage, Brentano discusses an opinion of Alexander Bain, who considers that outer perception yields only knowledge of things as perceived, because one cannot get any knowledge of a thing through outer perception without having perceived it. In other words, it would be contradictory to say that knowledge acquired through perception is not a knowledge of perceived things. Brentano does not agree, principally because he considers that physic phenomena do not contain « being-perceived » as one of their moments (Moment):

Only if the state of being presented were contained in the colour as one of its moments, as a certain quality and intensity is contained in it, would a colour which is not presented imply a contradiction, since a whole without one of its parts is indeed a contradiction. But this is obviously not the case.\(^{52}\) [transl. Runcurello, Terrel, McAlister, slightly modified]

Physical phenomena, like colours, etc., even though they are perceived, are not perceived as perceived. Therefore, it is not contradictory to consider them as existing in themselves, even if one denies, as Brentano does, that they exist\(^ {53}\). The consequences of this passage for the object/correlate problem are important. Indeed, colours, being physical phenomena, are, according to the Psychology, immanent or intentional objects of outer perception\(^ {54}\). As for the correlates, we saw above that they are always described as « seen-x », « presented-x », etc. So, if colours do not have « seen », « presented », « perceived » as moments, these objects of outer perception are not correlates\(^ {55}\).

The second passage is even more explicit. Brentano says, concerning sound (which is a physical phenomenon and so an intentional object of outer perception):

The concept of sound is not a relative concept.\(^ {56}\) [transl. Runcurello, Terrel, McAlister]

Besides being apparently sufficient to confirm the difference between object and correlate, this affirmation is supported by a systematic argument about inner perception. As is well known, Brentano considers that every mental act of outer perception is accompanied by a concomitant inner perception. Now, in this complex structure, two objects have to be considered. The primary object is the physical phenomenon, which is object of the act of outer perception; the secondary object, the object of inner perception, is the whole structure, namely the act of outer perception, its correlate and the inner

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\(^{53}\) F. BRENTANO, Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt, p. 132 (transl. RUNCURIELLO, TERRELL, MCAULISTER, p. 71).

\(^{54}\) F. BRENTANO, Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt, p. 205: « (...) with the immanent object of sensation, with the physical phenomenon toward which the act of sensation is directed as toward its primary object » (transl. RUNCURIELLO, TERRELL, MCAULISTER, p. 71); where, again, ‘immanent’ and ‘intentional’ are considered as synonymous. For a criticism of this reading, see G. FRÉCHETTE, Deux concepts d’intentionnalité dans la Psychologie de Brentano, p. 81 and G. FRÉCHETTE, Brentano’s Thesis (Revisited).

\(^{55}\) See on that topic M. ANTONELLI, Die Deskriptive Psychologie von Anton Marty, p. XXXIV-XXXV and W. SAIER, Die Einheit der Intentionalitätskonzeption bei Brentano, p. 12 n. 10.

perception itself\textsuperscript{57}. Evidently, the act of outer perception is not object of outer perception, otherwise the use of the word ‘outer’ would be meaningless:

The act of hearing appears to be directed toward sound in the most proper sense of the term, and because of this it seems to apprehend itself incidentally and as something additional.\textsuperscript{58} [transl. Runcurello, Terrel, McAlister]

The aforesaid Brentanian argument against the relativity of the intentional object concerns this problem, i.e. the problem of the act of outer perception becoming its own object: if sound were a relative concept, Brentano says, « the act of hearing would not be the secondary object of the mental act, but instead it would be the primary object along with the sound »\textsuperscript{59}. This argument has been precisely developed by Werner Sauer, so that we propose to follow his reformulation. If the sound is considered as something relative, the proposition ‘the sound is the primary object of the psychic act hearing-of-the-sound’ would mean ‘the heard-sound is the primary object of the psychic act hearing-of-the-sound’. And since correlates are epistemically interdependent – which means that one cannot be cognized without the other\textsuperscript{60} –, the consequence would be: ‘the hearing-of-the-sound is the primary object of the psychic act hearing-of-the-sound’\textsuperscript{61}. This consequence is not acceptable for Brentano, and this would be the reason why he denies that the intentional objects of outer perception, i.e. the physical phenomena, are relatives. This point is reaffirmed in the letter to Marty:

The ‘thought-about-horse’ considered as object would be the object of inner perception, which the thinker perceives whenever himself forms a correlative pair with the thought-about-thing; for correlates are such that one cannot be perceived without the other. But what are experienced as primary objects, or what are thought universally as primary objects of reason, are never themselves the objects of inner perception.\textsuperscript{62} [transl. Chisholm, Politzer, Fischer, modified]

Therefore, the intentional object is apparently not the « seen-x », the correlate Brentano talks about in the Descriptive Psychology – as Fréchette says, the words “object” and “correlate” are not co-extensive\textsuperscript{63}. But what is the object, then? In other words, if it is not the non-real entity about which Brentano is talking in the Descriptive Psychology, i.e. if it is not a modified entity (\( \exists x \)), does it at least

\textsuperscript{57} See M. ANTONELLI, Franz Brentano et l’‘inexistence intentionnelle’, p. 477. See M. TEXTOR, Brentano (and some neo-Brentanians) on inner consciousness, p. 425-430 concerning the grasping by inner perception of the whole of which inner perception itself is a part.

\textsuperscript{58} F. BRENTANO, Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte, p. 180: « Dem Tone erscheint das Hören im eigentlichsten Sinne zugewandt, und indem es dieses ist, scheint es sich selbst nebenbei und als Zugabe mit zu erfassen » (transl. RUNCURELLO, TERRELL, MCAISTER, p. 98).

\textsuperscript{59} F. BRENTANO, Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte, p. 185 (transl. RUNCURELLO, TERRELL, MCAISTER, p. 101).

\textsuperscript{60} F. BRENTANO, Vom Relativen: « [sie können] ohne einander nicht gedacht werden »; see also F. BRENTANO, Versuch über die Erkenntnis, p. 45: « das Eine [kann] nicht biss nicht ohne das Andere sein, sondern auch nicht ohne dasselbe erkannt werden » (quoted in Sauer 2006, p. 5).

\textsuperscript{61} W. SAUER, Die Einheit der Intentionalitätskonzeption bei Brentano, p. 11. See also M. ANTONELLI, Die Deskriptive Psychologie von Anton Marty, p. XXXIV.

\textsuperscript{62} F. BRENTANO, Wahrheit und Evidenz, p. 88-89 « Das ’gedachte Pferd’ als Objekt genommen, wäre Gegenstand der inneren Wahrnehmung, die das Denkende wahrnimmt, wenn dies mit dem Gedachten ein Paar Korrelative bildete, da Korrelative ohne einander nicht wahrnehmbar sind. Das, was als primäres Objekt empfunden oder vom Verstand universell als primäres Objekt gedacht wird, ist aber doch nicht Gegenstand der inneren Wahrnehmung » (transl. CHISHOLM, POLITZER, FISCHER, p. 53).

\textsuperscript{63} G. FRÉCHETTE, Brentano’s Thesis (Revisited).
have a particular mode of being (\( \exists^*x \))? The answer of the defenders of the second interpretation is negative. The reason is that they defend the thesis of the Brentanian « univocity of existence »\(^{64}\). « Existence » is a concept elucidated by Brentano in the frame of his theory of judgement. The affirmative judgement « A is » means that a subject accepts A\(^{65}\). The acceptance of A can either be correct or not. If it is correct, A is said to be existent. Thus, « existent » means « something which is correctly accepted » (richtig Anerkanntes). ‘Existent’ is a relational word:

If 'existent' is a name in the logical sense, i.e. a word which names a reality, something that is judged affirmatively, it is a relational word. I use it to indicate that I am thinking of a reality as corresponding to my thinking (and also, naturally, that I am thinking of myself as thinking correctly).\(^{66}\) [transl. Chisholm, Politzer, Fischer, modified]

According to the defenders of the second interpretation, there is no other sense in which existence could be understood in Brentano’s work. A Brentanian « half existence » would be untraceable, in spite of the first interpretation\(^{67}\).

But we still do not know what the intentional object is. If it is not a non-real « half existing » thing, should we say that it is real and existing?

To answer this question, the difference between real and existent has to be noticed in Brentano’s philosophy. Indeed, according to the defenders of the second interpretation, reality and existence are absolutely separated\(^{68}\). As Antonelli says, « the real isn’t opposed to the non-existent, but to the non-

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\(^{65}\) F. BRENTANO, Von der Klassifikation der psychischen Phänomene, p. 49 (transl. RUNCIRELLO, TERRELL, MCALISTER, p. 161).

\(^{66}\) F. BRENTANO, Wahrheit und Evidenz, p. 79: « der Name [Existierendes] im logischen Sinn, d. h. der das Reale nennt, das hier positiv gedacht wird, ist ein relater. Ich zeige an, dass ich ein Reales als meinem Denken korrespondierend (und natürlich zugleich, dass ich mich als richtig positiv denkend) denke » (transl. CHISHOLM, POLITZER, FISCHER, p. 47). F. BRENTANO, ibid., p. 24: « Das Gebiet, für welches die bejahende Beurteilungsweise die passende ist, nennen wir nun das Gebiet des Existierenden, ein Begriff, der also wohl zu unterscheiden ist von dem Begriffe des Dinglichen, Wesenhaften, Realen; das Gebiet, für welches die verneinende Beurteilungsweise die passende ist, nennen wir das des Nichtexistierenden » (transl. ibid., p. 14: « Let us say that the area to which affirmative judgement is appropriate is the area of the existent, a concept to be sharply distinguished from that of thing; and that the area to which the negative judgement is appropriate is the area of the non-existent », modified). See W. SAIER, Die Einheit der Intentionalitätskonzeption bei Brentano, p. 10, M. ANTONELLI, Die Deskriptive Psychologie von Anton Marty, p. XXXIX. This does not mean that existence is reduced to psychology: « Das Gebiet des Existierenden, worunter die Urteilsinhalte als Wahrer der jeweiligen Urteile fallen, ist natürlich ontologisch von der Urteilsfunktion als solcher unabhängig. Der Begriff des Existierenden kann allerdings nur durch Reflexion auf ein wahres affirmatives Urteil gebildet werden » (M. ANTONELLI, Seiendes, Bewusstsein, Intentionalität im Frühwerk von Franz Brentano, p. 411, n. 149). In this paper, we won’t discuss the Brentanian theory of truth. See on that topic J. T. J. SRZEDNICKI, Franz Brentano’s Analysis of Truth.

\(^{67}\) See G. FRÉCHETTE, Deux concepts d’intentionnalité dans la Psychologie de Brentano, p. 72-77, who explicitly admits Sauer’s interpretation of Brentano but seems nevertheless to consider that the concept of existence has two different meanings. This last point is abandoned in G. FRÉCHETTE, Brentano’s Thesis (Revisited).

\(^{68}\) See W. SAIER, Die Einheit der Intentionalitätskonzeption bei Brentano, p. 8-9, M. ANTONELLI, Die Deskriptive Psychologie von Anton Marty, p. XXXVIII, G. FRÉCHETTE, Deux concepts d’intentionnalité dans la Psychologie de Brentano, p. 67, G. FRÉCHETTE, Brentano’s Thesis (Revisited). The Brentanian difference between reality and existence is said to be inspired by the medieval distinction between Quid sit ? (« what is it ? ») and An sit ? (« does it exist ? »), originally founded on the Aristotelian distinction between ὃν κατὰ τὰς καταγραφὰς (being in the sense of the categories) and ὃν ὡς ἀληθεῖς (being as true). Whereas the quid question concerns the reality in the sense of the quiddity or essence of something, the an question asks about the existence of something. See also, on the Brentanian difference between reality and existence, J.-F. COURTINE, Aux
real». A reality, also named « thing » (Ding), is a « concrete, individual entity », for example a man, a horse or a centaur; a non-reality is everything which is not this kind of entity, for example « a privation, a state of affairs or an ens rationis ». For the pre-reist Brentano, realities as well as non-realities can exist. For example: just like a horse (which is an individual concrete thing) can exist, a thought-about-horse (which is an ens rationis) can exist. They both exist in the same way. Thus, Brentano admits altered objects (∃x*), even if he allegedly does not, as we saw, admit altered quantifiers (∃*x)71.

So, what about the intentional object according to the second interpretation?

First, the reality: For Brentano (before reism), both realities and non-realities can be intentional objects. Just like a centaur (an individual concrete thing) can be an intentional object, a thought-about-centaur (an ens rationis) can be an intentional object75. When you think of a centaur, you do not have a thought-about-centaur as object, but a centaur. The thought-about-centaur is your correlate. Having a thought-about-centaur as object occurs when you think of a thought-about-centaur of someone else’s thinking. Here, the correlate of this someone else’s thinking is your primary object of thought, whereas the correlate of your thinking is a « thought-about-thought-about-centaur »76.

Second, the existence: For Brentano, an intentional object does not need to exist. Indeed, one can have non-existent things as objects, for example a centaur. As Kent says, the intentional object is an « object ‘per se’ »:

Whenever we mentally refer to something, we refer to it as an object. We are in a sense referring thereby to neither an existent object nor a non-existent object. To have an object before the mind, as Brentano suggests, is for something to be presented independently of its existent status. In itself this is merely a contingent fact about our epistemic powers. The world is so constituted that we are able to perceive and think about things independently of perceiving or thinking about them.


M. ANTONELLI, Franz Brentano et l’inexistence intentionnelle, p. XXXIX. W. SAIER, Die Einheit der Intentionalitätskonzeption bei Brentano, p. 6-7 and p. 9 apparently admits the reality of the centaur too. G. FRÉCHETTE, Deux concepts d’intentionnalité dans la Psychologie de Brentano, p. 67, says that the unicorn is a reality (see also G. FRÉCHETTE, Brentano’s Thesis (Revisited)); this is also affirmed in R. M. CHISHOLM, W. BAUMGARTNER, Einleitung der Herausgeber, p. XIV (transl. Müller, p. XX).

M. ANTONELLI, Franz Brentano et l’inexistence intentionnelle, p. 479.

W. SAIER, Die Einheit der Intentionalitätskonzeption bei Brentano, p. 7 et p. 9, M. ANTONELLI, Die Deskriptive Psychologie von Anton Marty, p. XXXIX.


By the way, the mistake of the first interpretation would be to superimpose reality and existence and to believe that an alteration of the object implies an alteration of the quantifier (See O. T. KENT, Brentano and the Relational View of Consciousness, p. 32, W. SAIER, Die Einheit der Intentionalitätskonzeption bei Brentano, p. 7-8, G. FRÉCHETTE, Deux concepts d’intentionnalité dans la Psychologie de Brentano, p. 73-74). As we saw, even Chrudzimski, who is perfectly aware of the difference between modified objects and modified modes of being, concludes nonetheless that Brentano’s intentional object implies both of them.

M. ANTONELLI, Franz Brentano et l’inexistence intentionnelle, p. 479.

For a distinction between the ontological and the psychological point of view in Brentano’s philosophy, see M. ANTONELLI, Seinendes, Bewusstsein, Intentionalität im Frühwerk von Franz Brentano, p. 267.

See F. BRENTANO, Wahrheit und Evidenz, p. 31 (transl. CHISHOLM, POLITZER, FISCHER, p. 18-19), discussed specially in O. T. KENT, Brentano and the Relational View of Consciousness, p. 29-31, but also in W. SAIER, Die Einheit der Intentionalitätskonzeption bei Brentano, p. 2 and M. ANTONELLI, Die Deskriptive Psychologie von Anton Marty, p. XXXVIII. A similar analysis is to be found in L.L. MCALISTER, Brentano’s Epistemology.

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as existing or not existing. [Therefore, ‘intentional inexistence’ and ‘immanent objectivity’ do not denote an ontological category. They are used as ontologically neutral ways of saying that something is an object of a mental act.]

Thus, according to the defenders of the second interpretation, the initially quoted text from the Descriptive Psychology is not about a non-real intentional object containing a real transcendent thing, but about a non-real correlate containing a real intentional object. The intentional object of the presentation is the real colour; the correlate is the non-real seen-colour given through inner perception and containing the real intentional colour « as a part to be obtained from it by modifying distinction ». According to Antonelli, with outer and inner perception, we have two different « perspectives » of consciousness. Outer perception is « transitive » and is « directed toward the intentional object », whereas inner perception is « reflexive » and is « directed toward itself ». From the transitive point of view, an object, for example a colour, is given as independent of consciousness (although this independence does not imply its existence). From the reflexive point of view, a correlate, for example a seen-colour, is given as dependent on consciousness. Since it is correlative to the act, it always exists with it, and as a non-real entity. This twofold perspectival structure is inspired by Aristotle. In the Metaphysics, Aristotle says enigmatically that sight is not related to « that of which it is the sight » (i.e. it is not related to a seen-x) — « though of course it is true to say this » —, but to « colour »

Brentano would have taken this text and reinterpreted it in the context of his theory of outer and inner perception. As Hedwig, Antonelli and de Libera noticed, Brentano’s interpretation of the Aristotelian relatives is inspired by Aquinas’ reading of the Stagirite. Aquinas considers that knowledge and sensation are really related to things, whereas the things are not really related to them. Nevertheless, the intellect « apprehends [things] as the terms of the relation », so that, considering them as relata, it establishes a relation of reason from them to knowledge and sensation. According to de Libera, the relation of reason is not intrinsic to the things toward which knowledge or sensation are directed, but extrinsic. Brentano’s twofold perspectivist theory is similar: in inner perception, consciousness is acquainted with a mental act and a correlate. The correlate is not the primary object. It is a modified object, the extrinsic relational product of a reflexive modifying apprehension of the object (just as for Aquinas the relation of reason is extrinsic to the thing, distinct from it, and is a product of an intellective apprehension). In spite of the fact that the primary object is given as independent from the point of view of outer perception, the psychologist has to demodify the correlate in order to get access to the independent object, since descriptive psychology is done through inner perception.

Such an interpretation is continuist. It does not consider reism as an abandonment of the « half

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77 O. T. KENT, Brentano and the Relational View of Consciousness, p. 44 and p. 33. See M. ANTONELLI, Franz Brentano et l’”inexistence intentionnelle”, p. 483-484, who agrees with this interpretation. We think that this interpretation is close to Sauer’s.

78 W. SAUER, Die Einheit der Intentionalitätskonzeption bei Brentano, p. 12-14, M. ANTONELLI, Die Deskriptive Psychologie von Anton Marty, p. XLI-XLIII.


83 THOMAS AQUINAS, S. Th. I’, q. 13, a. 7.

existing » intentional objects, since this kind of objects has never existed. According to the second interpretation, in order to understand what reism entails with respect to the Brentanian theory of intentionality, it is important to consider Brentano’s theory of relatives. For Brentano, relations are not polyadic predicates \((aRb)\). When \(a\) and \(b\) are related, it means that two correlatives occur, namely \(r, b\) and \(r, a\) (for example bigger-than-\(b\) and smaller-than-\(a\)), which are ascribed to the respective relata \(a\) and \(b\).

In the case of the intentional relation, Brentano understands the situation differently. He follows Aristotle, who says that the knowable and the sensible are not related by themselves to knowledge and sensation, but are so because knowledge and sensation are related to them. For Brentano, this would mean that in the case of intentionality, the correlatives are not \(\text{thinks-of-} b (r, b)\) and \(\text{thought-of-by-} a (r, a)\), but \(\text{thinks-of-} b (r, b)\) and \(\text{b-is-thought-of-by} (br, a)\), which means that both these predicates are ascribed to \(a\), the thinker, the only thing necessary for the thinking to occur \((br, a)\).

De Libera remarks that since, even before reism, the thinking of \(A\) and the thought-\(A\) didn’t imply the existence of \(A\) or of a » half existing » \(A\), adverbialism has always been at work in Brentano’s theory of intentionality (see ibid., p. 21-22).

Ordinary correlation

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{COR.} & : r, b \\
\text{RELATUM} & : a \\
\text{COR.} & : r, a \\
\text{RELATUM} & : b
\end{align*}
\]

Intentional correlation

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{COR.} & : r, b \\
\text{RELATUM} & : a \\
\text{COR.} & : br, a \\
\text{RELATUM} & : b
\end{align*}
\]

Figure 3

When \(a\) \text{thinks of} \(b\) and \(b\) \text{is thought of by} \(a\), it does not mean that \(b\) exists. In other words, it is possible to think of objects which do not exist. And this has always been the case in Brentanian psychology, since, just as the centaur does not exist, there is » for the Brentano of 1874 no sense-qualities, no colours, sounds etc. in the physical world ». The only difference is that reism entails the abandonment of the existence of the non-real correlate \(b\)-is-thought-of-by \((br, a)\). Since reism does not admit the existence of non-real entities, this correlate cannot exist anymore. This would be the reason why Brentano says, during a certain period, that the intentional relation is not a relation in the strict sense.

Thus, for the discontinuist interpretation, the relational aspect of intentionality is lost because the » half existence » of the intentional object is denied. By contrast, the continuist interpretation considers that the relational aspect is lost because the existence of the correlate \((a\) part of the secondary object), is denied; as for the primary, intentional object, it has always been the case that it could be non-existent. Nevertheless, according to the continuist interpretation, the later theory of the » etwas Relativliches » is not the last Brentanian theory of the intentional relation. Indeed, in a text of 1915 published in The Theory of Categories, Brentano admits relatives without correlatives. He considers that just as for all

85 We will here follow the analyses of W. SAUER, Die Einheit der Intentionalitätskonzeption bei Brentano, p. 21-25. See also L.L. MCALISTER, Brentano’s Epistemology, p. 152-153.


87 A. DE LIBERA, Le direct et l'oblique: sur quelques aspects antiques et médiévaux de la théorie brentanienne des relatifs, p. 6, p. 13. De Libera remarks that since, even before reism, the thinking of \(A\) and the thought-\(A\) didn’t imply the existence of \(A\) or of a » half existing » \(A\), adverbialism has always been at work in Brentano’s theory of intentionality (see ibid., p. 21-22).

relative determinations (relative Bestimmungen), which are real accidents of their subjects, the relative determination thinks-of-b \((r,b)\) can occur even when nothing else exists. The only constraint is to co-present \(b\) **in modo obliquo**\(^{89}\).

2. Marty: from “immanent objects” to “mental assimilation”

Marty is a philosopher of language and his contribution to the field is known as a descriptive theory of meaning (deskriptive Bedeutungslehre). For its essential part, however, the elucidation of linguistic meaning pertains to the philosophy of mind. Meaning is analysed in terms of speakers’ intentions primarily aimed at triggering psychic phenomena in hearers\(^{90}\). Under normal circumstances, when you say “Socrates exists”, you primarily intend that a hearer judges that Socrates exists; which means, according to the Brentanian-Martyian non-propositional theory of judgment\(^{91}\), that a hearer accepts the object presented in the presentation “Socrates”. Consequently, at the core of the elucidation of linguistic meaning lies the question of what it means for a subject to think of an object, or to form a judgment about it — in short: the theory of intentionality plays a crucial role in Marty’s philosophy of language.

Marty changed his mind on the question of how exactly intentionality (or the so-called intentionale Beziehung) is to be accounted for\(^{92}\). He began by holding a theory which, he believed, was faithful to Brentano’s conception as exposed in the Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint of 1874 as well as in the lectures given in the years 1887-1891 and published only in 1982 under the title Descriptive Psychology\(^{93}\). Partly following Brentano’s early insight that one should get rid of all non-real entities\(^{94}\), he progressively came to the conclusion that the category of the so-called “immanent objects” of psychic phenomena generated more difficulties than it was supposed to resolve, and thus should be eliminated.


\(^{92}\) On Marty’s theory of intentionality, see A. CHRIUDZIMSKI, Die Intentionalitätslehre Anton Marty’s, Grazer Philosophische Studien 57 (1999), pp. 175-214.


\(^{94}\) See the letter to Marty bearing the date of the 24.11.1893, quoted in A. CHRIUDZIMSKI, Die Ontologie Franz Brentanos, p. 199. In this letter, Brentano speaks of his own “former doctrine” as well as of an “essential reform of ‘his’ former psychologistic views” regarding the existence of entia rationis (i.e. non-real entities cum fundamento in re). Brentano’s new – i.e. post 1903 – psychology is founded on the abandonment of entia rationis. Now, in this letter, entia rationis are described as all having an “intentional moment”, for example “thought-about”. 
This change of mind certainly occurred before March 1906, and possibly as early as 1905. We shall give a more detailed chronology of the interrelatedness of Marty’s philosophical evolution under the combined influence of Brentano and Husserl at the beginning of section 2.2, below.

The rejection of non-real, mental entities subsisting over and above the mental acts and functioning as their correlates—what he will call immanent objects—is the essential feature of Marty’s later philosophy. Against Brentano’s radical rejection of *irrealia* altogether, Marty insists that some of them (e.g., relations, states of affairs or *Urteilsinhalte*) must be acknowledged for the sake of scientific objectivity: the *Abkehr vom Nichoreal* was total or exhaustive on Brentano’s side, but only partial or selective on Marty’s. Thus, the ontology of the later Marty divides the existant into two realms: what exists and is real (substances and their accidents), and what exists without being real (states of affairs, relations, collectives, *possibilia*); but nothing of what exists and is non-real is an immanent object.

The post-1906 Marty maintains that intentionality is a kind of relation (a relation he calls *ideelle Verähnlichung* or mental assimilation), and that relations have to be taken ontologically seriously as existing, non-real entities. In spite of the talk (“… wie man sich ausdrückt…”) of relations subsisting “between” their terms, however, relations are not to be conceived of as “bridges”: if A and B exist and are both blue, the relation of equichromy of A and B is nothing existing between A and B; rather, there are two relational determinations, one in A and one in B. In what follows, we shall describe Marty’s

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95 See Marty’s letter to Brentano of the 02.03.1906, in F. BRENTANO, Die Abkehr vom Nichoreal, p. 148-151 (the passage is discussed below, section 2.2, n. 103). For the possible date of 1905 as *terminus ante quem*, see A. MARTY, Ober Annahmen (Ein kritischer Beitrag zur Psychologie, namentlich der deskriptiven), in J. EISEMEEER, A. KASTIL, O. KRAUS (Hrsg.), Anton Marty. Gesammelte Schriften, II.2, Max Niemeyer, Halle a. S., 1920, pp. 3-56 (p. 21).

96 See for example the following passage taken from Marty’s last work, Raum und Zeit, Aus dem Nachlass des Verfassers herausgegeben von J. EISEMEEER, A. KASTIL, O. KRAUS, Niemeyer, Halle a. S., 1916, I, § 26, pp. 155-156: “Die Objektivität ist hier – wie auch Brentano zugebt – identisch mit dem, was man Richtigkeit des psychischen Verhaltens zum Gegenstand oder der Behandlung desselben nennt, und davon ist keine andere Erklärung möglich als: sie bestehe in einer ideellen *Adäquation* zu etwas (nicht bloß mental und subjektiv, sondern objektiv, d.h. unabhängig von dem Bewusstsein Gegebenen), und dies ist eben beim Urteil der Sachverhalt […] beim Interesse der Wert bzw. Unwert des Gegenstandes, auf welchen das Urteil bzw. Interesse sich bezieht und welcher zugleich der Gegenstand des dem einen und andern Verhalten notwendig zugrunde liegenden Vorstelldienst ist. Indem aber dem unabhängig vom Bewusstsein Gegebenen diese wirkliche oder mögliche *Adäquation* zu einem gewissen Urteil zukommt, ist etwas gegeben, was zwar ist, aber m. Er. nicht real ist. Ich sage wirkliche oder mögliche *Adäquation*, denn der Sachverhalt […] ist ja nicht bloß gegeben, so lange ein Urteil darüber gefällt […] wird (sonst stecken wir wieder im vollsten Subjektivismus), sondern auch, wenn diese psychischen Beziehungen fehlen. Genug, dass sie möglich und, wenn sie da sind, ihrerseits in ideeller Übereinstimmung mit jenem objektiv Gegebenen stehen.”

97 See A. MARTY, Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie. Erster Band, Niemeyer, Halle a. S., 1908, § 66, pp. 317-321. On Marty’s ontology, see B. SMITH, Austrian Philosophy, ch. 4. Formally, the real is characterized as something which is causally active and comes into being and passes away autonomously, whereas the non-real is causally inert and is existentially dependent of the real (it has a mere *Mitwirken* and *Mitgehen*).

mature conception of intentionality by considering successively the following two questions: i) What is the gist of Marty’s later theory – in other words: what does ‘ideelle Verähnlichung’ exactly mean? ii) Which is the place of this theory within Marty’s philosophical development (in particular, with respect to the influence of Brentano and Husserl)?

2.1. What does ‘ideelle Verähnlichung’ mean? (1908)

Before tackling the question of the exact meaning of the expression ‘mental assimilation’ (MA), we shall briefly comment two paradigmatic texts expressing Marty’s earlier and later conceptions of intentionality. The first is taken from the Deskriptive Psychologie, a text recently published on the base of a Mitschrift by Alfred Kastil of the eponymous lecture given by Marty in the winter term of 1893-1894:

The psychic events or states all have in common, and spectacularly diverge from the physical ones, in that each of them has an object, in other words, in that they are a consciousness. When a psychic act occurs in us, something different from it is present to us in a totally peculiar way which the Scholastics called ‘objective inexistence’ or ‘mental inexistence’ (we shall use the latter expression). E.g. in hearing, a sound is present to us, etc. Every psychic act thus has an object as its correlate. An object of consciousness belongs to consciousness as a correlate, something of which one becomes conscious, and such an immanent object is found in every psychic act.99

This is a clear expression of a correlational theory of intentionality: thinking always involves a correlation between a mental act or state and an immanent object: whenever a presentation, a judgment, or an emotion exists, there also exists an immanent object which is its correlate. Such is Marty’s understanding of the motto “kein Vorstellen ohne ein Vorgestelltes”100.

As for a square formulation of Marty’s later position, one can consider the following passage from the Untersuchungen of 1908 as exemplary:

We discovered the true meaning of the theory according to which every presenting (or every consciousness whatsoever) is a respect to an object in that, that each <consciousness> is an actual or possible mental assimilation to something (which is precisely called an object).101


101 A. MARTY, Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie, § 101, p. 421: “Wir fanden den wahren Sinn der Lehre, dass jedes Vorstellen (resp. Bewusstsein überhaupt) eine Objektsbeziehung sei, darin, dass jedes eine wirkliche oder mögliche ideelle Verähnlichung mit etwas (was eben Objekt genannt wird) sei.” This passage – as well as many others in the Untersuchungen – entails that MA does not only apply to presentations, but also to the (only) two
No more talk about an immanent object or a correlation as essential elements in the description of what it means for a mental act to have an object. The newcomers in this later theory are the concept of mental assimilation and the modality of the merely possible (the conditional or counter-factual): ‘having an object’ does not mean anymore something like ‘having an immanent object as correlate’, but rather ‘being (possibly or actually) mentally assimilated to an object’.

In section 2.2, we shall sketch the way which, according to us, lead from the theory of the Deskriptive Psychologie to the one of the Untersuchungen. For the time being, though, we shall see how Marty introduces and understands the intriguing notion of mental assimilation (henceforth ‘M.A.’).

To the best of our knowledge, the first occurrence überhaupt of the expression ‘ideelle Verähnlichung’ (although in a disjoint form) is to be found in Marty’s letter to Brentano of March, 2nd, 1906:

What really exists is the real psychic process and, as a non-real consequence, a certain mental similitude (a being-equated, an adequation, a conformity) of the soul. Therefore in a certain sense one can call this psychic process a possible or actual assimilation. [Italics ours]

At that time, the manuscript of the first volume of the Untersuchungen (to be published in 1908) was practically achieved – the lecture of 1904 entitled Grundfragen der Sprachphilosophie is a faithful abstract of the first 300 pages of the book, and the letter Marty wrote to his editor at the end of Fall 1906 clearly shows that the totality of the opus (eventually comprising some 764 pages) had been achieved by then. Nonetheless, the letter of 1906 remains silent on the nature of M.A and, in particular, on the relation between M.A and what one commonly understands under ‘similitude’ (Ähnlichkeit). Things look different in the opus of 1908.

Marty introduces the notion of M.A in the part of his Untersuchungen dedicated to a description of the “matter” (Stoff) of the meaning of so-called “autosemantic” linguistic means, and more precisely, of “names” (or Vorstellungssuggestive). The central part of this section of the Untersuchungen consists in other classes of psychic phenomena acknowledged by Brentano and Marty, namely judgments and emotions (or phenomena of interest).

Note that Marty uses here ‘Beziehung’ and not ‘Relation’ (or ‘Korrelation’). We translate ‘Beziehung’ by ‘respect’, for there is a systematic distinction to be made between the meanings of ‘Relation’ and ‘Beziehung’: the former has a narrow sense, and refers to a correlation; the latter has a broader sense (a Relation is a Beziehung) which extends to looser kinds of connections than correlations (typically, as we shall see, to what the later Marty calls ‘relative determinations’, ‘relative Bestimmungen’).

The letter is published in O. Funke, Planskizzen und Entwürfe. Zur Genesis von A. Martys “Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie”, I, A. Franke, Bern, 1940, pp. 75-117. According to Marty, language can be analyzed in terms of matter and form at different levels. At a first level, linguistic means have a matter (their meaning) and a form (internal, i.e. intelligible, or external, i.e. sensible) which consists in all the elements “containing” the meaning (or matter), just like a jar is said to be the form of the liquid matter it contains. At a second level, meaning itself can be hylemorphically analyzed: the matter of meaning is expressed by so-called “autosemantic” linguistic means (sentences and names, i.e. means which are capable of expressing complete psychic phenomena), whereas the form of meaning is expressed by so-called “synsemantic” expressions (linguistic expressions which are uncapable to express complete psychic phenomena) – see L. Cesalli, Marty’s philosophische Position innerhalb der österreichischen Tradition, section 1.
virulent criticisms against the thesis – formerly held by Marty himself, prominently in his *Deskriptive Psychologie* – that psychic phenomena have immanent objects. Having distinguished the three linguistic functions of names – indicating, steering, and naming\(^\text{109}\) – Marty dismisses the attempt to account for the distinction between what names mean and what they name by stating that names mean immanent objects, and name transcendent objects\(^\text{110}\). There simply are no immanent objects, therefore such fictions cannot possibly be what names mean. Nonetheless, some philosophers, as Carl Stumpf or the pre-1906-Marty accept (or accepted) their existence. How can this be?

The post-1906-Marty gives a twofold explanation for such a philosophical mistake. On the one hand, it has to do with semantics: it is a manifestation of what Marty calls the “figurative inner linguistic form” or *figürliche innere Sprachform*; on the other, it is linked with a fundamental feature of our inner life: the fact that psychic phenomena are indeed relational. Before turning to this explanation, however, we shall quickly mention the arguments Marty gives in 1908 (and later) against the existence of immanent objects.

Marty begins by showing that if there are immanent objects, they can only be mental entities truly existing besides transcendent ones: the concept of existence is univocal and it makes no sense to say that the very same entity has two ways of existing, one transcendent and the other immanent\(^\text{111}\). This being said, the existence of immanent objects turns out to be highly problematic\(^\text{112}\); first, it would entail that whatever is presented, judged or loved/hated is something immanent\(^\text{113}\); second, it would lead one to accept any statement as being necessarily true, since any judgment would be correlated to an existing immanent object\(^\text{114}\); third, even if one would conceive of immanent objects as not being the targets of mental acts, but only a kind of mediators towards transcendent objects, one would face the difficulty of explaining how a merely presented \(X\) (i.e. an immanent \(X\)) could plausibly lead to a real \(X\) (i.e. a transcendent \(X\)) since those two objects would not have anything in common, besides a (thoroughly equivocal) name: the immanent object would be a non-real entity existentially depending not on the transcendent object it is supposed to represent, but on the thinking subject’s mental acts\(^\text{115}\). For all those reasons, then, immanent objects should be rejected.

\(^{109}\) The §§ 89-99, pp. 385-417.

\(^{110}\) A name indicates a presentation in a speaker (this is *Klanggabe*) and thereby steers the inner life of a hearer so that he forms an analogue presentation (this is *bedeutung*), a presentation by means of which an object is named (this is *Nennung*). Names share their first two semantic functions with the other types of autosemantic expressions, namely statements and expressions of interest (*Emotive*) – see L. CESALLI, F. GÖIBIER, Anton Marty on Naming (Nennen) and Meaning (Bedeutung). *A comparison with Medieval Supposition Theory*, in C. KANN, B. LöWE, C. RODE, S. UICKELMAN (eds.), *Modern Views of Medieval Logic* [forthcoming in the Bibliotheca of the "Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales"].

\(^{111}\) For Marty ‘to be a transcendent object’ means \(i\) ‘to be the target object of a mental act’, and \(ii\) to exist (or not) independently of any mental act. In other words, ‘to be a transcendent object’ means ‘to be an object tout court’, what Marty, as we will see, often calls *ein Gegenstand schlechtweg*. This is how Twardowski introduces his concept of *Gegenstand* (as opposed to *Inhalt*) – see K. TWARDOWSKI, *Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen*, Alfred Hölder, Wien, 1894, p. 40 (see as well O.T. KENT, *Brentano and the relational view of consciousness*, p. 11, n. 50).

\(^{112}\) See A. MARTY, *Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie*, § 92, pp. 392-394. According to Marty, ‘to exist’ means ‘to be acceptable in a true judgment’ which, in turn, means something like ‘to be what is presented by the presentation expressed by the grammatical subject of a possible true statement’.

\(^{113}\) Marty’s argumentation is reconstructed and discussed in A. CHRUDZIMSKI, *Die Intentionalitätstheorie Anton Martys*, op. cit.

\(^{114}\) See A. MARTY, *Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie*, § 93, pp. 394-395.

\(^{115}\) See A. MARTY, *Raum und Zeit*, § 12, p. 57.

\(^{116}\) A. MARTY, *Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie*, § 93, p. 395: “Aber ist es nicht ebenso eine Täuschung, zu meinen, dass der sog. mentale Gegenstand das Bewusstsein vom wirklich vermittle? Ist doch der Gedanke an eine solche stellvertretende oder vermittelnde Rolle von Hause aus von der Voraussetzung getragen, dass der ein wahrhafter Doppellänger des andern sei, während eben der mentale Gegenstand, wenn er wahrhaft existierte, etwas wesentlich anderes wäre als der wirkliche, etwas, was nur äquivok dessen Namen trüge. Auch soll er ja gegeben sein können, während der wirkliche fehlt, wo also kein Bewusstsein des wirklichen im Sinne einer Korrelation der Seele zu ihm
As for the explanation of the fact that many philosophers were nonetheless tempted to (and did) accept immanent objects, it runs as follows: one is mislead to such a position by the (semantic) fact that in order to understand the true sentence ‘an object is presented in a presentation’, a presentation of a subject-object correlation is required; not as what is meant by the sentence though, but only as an auxiliary, figurative presentation whose function is merely to facilitate the link between the pronounced words and the intended meaning. What the sentence does mean, by contrast, is the (psychological) fact that whenever a subject has a presentation of an existing object, there is indeed an actual correlation between the thinking subject and that object. But the whole point is that such an actual correlation is the case only when the object exists, and thus, (by far) not always:

It is an old popular way of speaking to say that the similar is contained in what is similar to it according to the similitude. […] In this metaphorical sense, one may also say that the presented is in the presenting subject, and one may use the talk of a mental or immanent existence of the object in the mind of the thinking subject as an image of the inner linguistic form, <an image> for the fact of this mental similitude of the thinking subject with his object, <a mental similitude> which is the case whenever this <object> exists. […] What truly exists is not a peculiarly modified duplicate of the real object which would inhabitate us, but only the real psychic process from which, as a consequence, and under certain circumstances, follows the correlation of a mental similitude with something else, something which exists independently of this process; under certain different circumstances, however, only a relative determination <which is> akin to this correlation <follows from this real psychic process>. […] In that sense, but in that sense only, one can speak of a ‘pseudoexistence’ of the immanent object. We do not have to do with another way of existing, but only with another way of apprehending <things> linguistically […]

To sum up: Marty gives several arguments against the existence of immanent objects, and also offers an explanation for the origin and tenacity of this philosophically pernicious idea. The explanation has to do with our way of talking about what effectively goes on in a thinking subject. When you present a tree,
you are having a tree as object of your act of presenting, that is, according to Marty: you are getting mentally assimilated to a tree – a situation in which, as a matter of fact, no immanent object is involved. Another way to express this idea consists in saying that intentionality is indeed a relational phenomenon, but not an essentially correlational one:

In spite of the fact that, contrary to what one used to believe, it is not always the case that every consciousness is a subject-object relation in the sense of a correlation, <one can ask> nonetheless whether something akin to it does indeed exist, which offered the occasion to believe that such a correlation exists in any case?118

As we know by now, the answer to this question is a clear ‘yes’:

In the subject, there only exists the real process of presenting or a presenting as such. But, under certain circumstances, this mental similitude with the presented <object> can be attributed to this <real process or presenting as such>, and in that respect, one may precisely call the presenting a process of possible or actual mental assimilation or mental adequation to an object.119 [Last italics ours]

“An object is in me as presented” or “is immanent to me” means; there exists a mind presenting this object, that is: a mind which, if this <object> exists, is mentally assimilated to it.120

Having established why Marty rejects immanent objects and how he introduces his later notion of intentionality, let us now turn to the essential features of MA. Four key points can be extracted from Marty’s text. (i) MA is a relation, i.e. an existing non-real entity.121 (ii) MA is holding between a thinking subject and an object, and we should then say that the subject and the object are the extremes or “terms”

118 A. MARTY, Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie, § 95, p. 406: “Wenn auch eine Subjekt-Objektsbeziehung im Sinne einer Korrelation nicht – wie man glaubte – bei jedem Bewusstsein gegeben ist, ist nicht doch vielleicht etwas dem Verwandten gegeben, was den Anlass bot, an die Existenz einer solchen Korrelation in allen Fällen zu glauben?”


120 A. MARTY, Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie, § 99, p. 416: “Ein Gegenstand ist als vorgestellt im mir’ oder ‘mir immanent’ heißt: es existiert ein diesen Gegenstand Vorstellendes, d.h. ein ihm wenn er existiert, ideell Verähnlichtes.” Note the similarity of this last formulation with Brentano’s own way of presenting his “new” doctrine in 1911: “Denkt einer etwas, so muss zwar das Denkende, keineswegs aber das Objekt seines Denkens existieren […]. So ist denn das Denkende das einzige Ding, welches die psychische Beziehung verlangt. Der Terminus der sogenannten Relation muss gar nicht in Wirklichkeit gegeben sein. Man könnte darum zweifeln, ob hier wirklich etwas Relatives vorliege, und nicht vielmehr etwas in gewissem Betracht einem Relativen Ähnliches, was man darum als etwas ‘Relativliches’ bezeichnen könnte.” (F. BRENTANO, Von der Klassifikation der psychischen Phänomene, p. 134.

121 On the necessity to acknowledge the existence of the intentional relation, see A. MARTY, Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie, § 70, p. 333: “Eine nichtreale Relation ist zweifellos auch die, der Relation der Gleichheit entfernt verwandte, intentionale Relation, die eigentümliche ideelle Gleichheit oder Adäquation zwischen dem psychischen Vorgang und seinem Inhalt. Zu den Gründen, die wir schon bezüglich der Gleichheit im eigentlichen Sinne geltend machten, kann man hier noch die Frage hinzugesellen, zu welcher Klasse des Realen denn die ideelle Konformität zwischen der psychischen Funktion mit ihrem Inhalt zu rechnen wäre, falls sie als eine reale Bestimmung gelten sollte: ob zu der des Physischen oder zu der des Psychischen? Keine dieser Alternativen wird man ernstlich verteidigen wollen.”
of MA. (iii) MA is what Marty calls a "grounded relation" R, i.e. a relation which holds between the subject and the object in virtue of fundaments existing in both terms, for example: when I have a presentation of a red thing, I stand in a relation of MA to a red thing (the feature of my presentation which makes of it a presentation of a red thing and the individual redness of that thing are the fundaments of the MA in this precise case); note that MA is a symmetrical relation: it is perfectly true as well to say that the red thing stands in a relation of MA to me. (iv) Like any other grounded relation, MA can exist in the form of an actual correlation (when both fundaments coexist), or in the form of a mere possible correlation or "relative determination", when only one of the fundaments exists:

For whom acquired the concept of an actual correlation by experiencing it, it is also possible to acquire on this base the concept of a possible or hypothetical one, <a correlation> which would subsist if the fundaments were given; and also <to acquire> the <concept> of the contribution which one or the other of the fundaments would pay to the relation, when it actually exists; and the <concept> of the ability to co-found and to ground a relation in this way, <an ability> which pertains to each of the fundaments, even if the further conditions and thereby the grounded relation they condition <together> are not actually given. Such an ability is of course only something hypothetical or negative and as such, something thoroughly non-real. This means only that if besides the subsisting fundament the others exist as well, a certain relation necessarily is given with <them>; in other words: that the existence of the actually given fundament and that of certain other fundaments cannot be the case simultaneously without the relation being a fact as well. But this negative or hypothetical predicate truly and by all means pertains to the subsistent fundament, even when the other fundaments do not exist; and we shall call this – with an expression we occasionally used earlier – a relative determination.

122 See A. MARTY, Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie, § 97, pp. 408-409; on Marty’s theory of relations, see J. JOHANSSON, External, Internal and Grounded Relations, in Id., Ontological Investigations. An Inquiry into the Categories of Nature, Man and Society, Ontos, Frankfurt, 2004, pp. 110-123. Marty distinguishes "grounding" and "grounded" relations. The former are deprived of fundaments and hold between fundaments and their bearers or subjects (for example between you and your presentation of a red thing, between that thing and its particular redness); the latter hold between bearers of fundaments (between you and a red thing, in our example). The fundaments of grounded relations are "absolute determinations" (the fact that a thing is red is not relative to anything else), and they are real determinations as well (even if the red colour does not exist out there as I present it, there exists a real determination of the thing such that I perceive it as being red).


124 A. MARTY, Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie, § 97, p. 410-411: "Wer aber aus der Erfahrung einer wirklich korrelieren beide Begriff derselben gewonnen, der vermag sich auf Grund dessen auch denjenigen einer möglichen oder hypothetischen zu bilden, die bestände, wenn die Fundamente gegeben wären. Ebenso den Begriff des Beitrags, den das eine oder andere der Fundamente zur Relation, wenn sie wirklich ist, leistet, und den der Fähigkeit, eine Relation in dieser Weise mit zu bedingen und zu begründen, welche jedem der Fundamente zukommt, auch wenn die übrigen Mitbedingungen und damit die durch sie bedingte Relation nicht wirklich gegeben sind. Diese Fähigkeit ist freilich nur ein Hypothetikum oder Negativum und als solches etwas durchaus Nichttaires. Es ist ja damit bloß gesagt, dass, wenn außer dem bestehenden auch die anderen Fundamente gegeben sind, eine gewisse Relation notwendig mit gegeben ist, oder mit anderen Worten, dass die Existenz des tatsächlich gegebenen Fundaments und die gewisser anderer Fundamente nicht zugleich bestehen kann, ohne dass die Relation gleichfalls Tatsache ist. Aber dieses negative oder hypothetische Prädikat kommt dem bestehenden Fundament doch in aller Wahrheit zu, auch wenn die anderen Fundamente nicht existieren, und wir wollen es (mit einem schon früher gelegentlich verwendeten Terminus) eine relative Bestimmung nennen." A relative determination is a negative predicate because it only exists when there is no correlation; it is hypothetical because it involves the taking into account of a hypothesis: a relative determination exists because if both fundaments were to exist, then, necessarily,
For example, let us assume that a thinking subject (say, you), its act of presenting an object (say, Socrates), and Socrates all exist, such that you are now in a state of \( MA \) to Socrates (and this \( MA \) is \textit{de facto} an actual correlation, something which automatically follows from the coexistence of your act of presenting Socrates and the existence of Socrates). Suppose, however, that a year later, you have a presentation of Socrates again, but that in the meantime, Socrates disappeared: you then stand in a state of \( MA \) to a merely possible object, which means that your state of \( MA \) is a merely possible \( C \). In other words: \textit{Socrate non existente}, your state of \( MA \) is not an actual correlation anymore, but a relative determination. The gist of this idea is that \textit{even if} the object does not exist, an actual presentation of the object is actually conditioned by it: even if Socrates does not exist anymore, your presentation of Socrates is a presentation of Socrates and of nothing else. Consequently: just as a relation exists if it can be correctly accepted (remember: ‘to exist’ means ‘to be accepted in a possible true judgment’), a relative determination exists if it can be correctly accepted; but the correlation between you presenting Socrates and Socrates (when Socrates exists), and the relative determination of you presenting Socrates to Socrates (when he does not exist) \textit{can} be correctly accepted; therefore, in both situations, the intentional predicate (correlation / relative determination) \textit{exists} over and above the thinking subject (i.e., you) and the object. Schematically – N.B.: whatever is drawn in the following schematas \textit{exists}; continuous lines represent real, discontinuous lines, non-real entities (\( P = \) the presenting of; \( C = \) correlation; \( O = \) objects; \( Y = \) you; \( RD = \) relative determination)\textsuperscript{125}:

**Case 1 – Socrates exists**

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{P (Socrates)} \\
\text{Y} \\
\text{Socrates (O)} \\
\text{MA (C)} \\
\end{array}
\]

**Case 2 – Socrates does not exist**

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{P (Socrates)} \\
\text{Y} \\
\text{MA (RD)} \\
\end{array}
\]

\textbf{Figure 4}

In what sense exactly does a thinking subject become similar to its object? In other words: how are we to understand ‘assimilation’ in ‘\( MA \)’ (or ‘similitude’ in ‘mental similitude’)? The reason why Marty chooses to call the intentional relation a relation of similitude or assimilation is that both relations, i.e. standard similitude and \( MA \), are grounded relations: The thinking subject’s relation to Socrates in case 1 or 2 (it does not matter which) is analogue to the relation holding between a red thing and any other red thing with respect to colour; furthermore, standard similitude as well comes in two kinds, namely as a correlation and as a relative determination, a typical example of the latter being the one of a (good) picture of a dead person and its manifest similitude to an entity which does not exist anymore\textsuperscript{126}. But

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\textsuperscript{125} Just as the talk of relations existing "between" their terms is a mere \textit{façon de parler}, so are the graphical representation of relations in our schemes. The lines drawn represent the relational character of the mental acts involved, and not the existence of a "bridge" between the subject and its actual or possible object.

\textsuperscript{126} See A. MARTY, \textit{Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie}, § 97, p. 408.
Four differences with respect to standard similitude are identified. (i) \( MA \) is a positive
determination, whereas standard similitude is a negative one. (ii) Unlike standard similitude, \( MA \) does
not come in degrees – that is to say: \( MA \) displays something vaguely analogue to degrees in the sense that
there is a qualitative jump in similarity between a perceptual and a conceptual presentation (i.e. between
an \textit{Anschauung} and a \textit{Begriff}): since there are no universal entities to which a presentation could be
mentally similar (Marty is a militant nominalist with respect to universals), \( MA \) in the case of a
conceptual presentation necessarily is of a lesser “degree” than in the case of a perceptual presentation.
(iii) \( MA \) does not belong to one of the two possible types of standard similitude, namely mereological
similitude (two complexes have some equal parts) and logical similitude (two close species within the
same genus): your presentation of Socrates and Socrates are complexes, but they do not have any equal
parts (compare: two organisms and their organs, for example); your presentation of Socrates and
Socrates are both real entities, but it is clearly not sufficient for two entities to be real in order to be
significantly called similar. (iv) The way in which \( MA \) is grounded fundamentally differs from the way in
which standard similitude is: in the case of the latter, the bearer and the fundament of the relation (e.g. a
house and its colour) “stand on an equal foot” (\textit{sind ebenbürtig}), something which does not hold in the case
of the former. Take the relation of standard similitude holding between two yellow houses A and B.
There is a perfect symmetry here: no term of this relation is in a “dominant” position (A is similar to B in
exactly the same sense as B is to A). Compare with the \( MA \) holding between your presentation of
Socrates and Socrates: here, there is a clear asymmetry, for the very nature of \( MA \) entails that your
presentation of Socrates is in a dominant position with respect to Socrates (your presentation of Socrates
is a \textit{mental} similitude, whereas the similitude between A and B is not an “\( A \)-similitude” or a “\( B \)-similitude”,
but a similitude \textit{tout court}).

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127 A. MARTY, \textit{Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie}, § 96, p. 408: "Und so ist <die ideelle Ähnlichkeit> denn offenkundig durch so wesentliche Züge von der gewöhnlich sog. Übereinstimmung verschieden [...], dass man sie unweigerlich als ein Verhältnis sui generis bezeichnen muss, welches nur um einer gewissen Analogie willen [...] passend so genannt wird." Marty also talks of \( MA \) as being a relation of similitude in a modified sense (for example \textit{ibid.}, § 95, p. 407).

128 The first three differences are exposed and discussed in A. MARTY, \textit{Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie}, § 96, pp. 407-408; the fourth one, in § 98, pp. 413-415.

129 In 1901, Marty presented a short paper entitled "Über die Ähnlichkeit" to the 4\textsuperscript{th} International Congress of Philosophy in Paris. Only standard similitude is discussed and \( MA \) not even mentioned. Marty gives the following definition of standard similitude: “Ähnlich ist das voneinander Verschiedene, wenn dessen Verschiedenheit nicht so gross ist, dass es gar nicht mehr aneinander zu erinnern vermag.” – A. MARTY, \textit{Über die Ähnlichkeit}, in J. EISEMEIER, A. KAST, O. KRAIS (Hrsg.), Anton Marty. Gesammelte Schriften, II.2, Max Niemeyer, Halle a. S., 1920, pp. 107-111 (p. 110). The negative character of standard similitude thus lies in the fact that the notion results from a twofold negative delimitation: A is similar to B if A is not identical to B, and if A is not so different from B that it is unable to remind of it.

130 Thus ‘ideell’ in ‘ideelle Verähnlichung’ does not mean ‘ideal’ in a Platonic sense, nor does it mean ‘aspiring’ or ‘hopeful’, as suggested by B. Smith, but only ‘mental’ in the sense that \( MA \) holds only with respect to at least one mental term. This correction has already been made by R. Rollinger – see A. MARTY, \textit{Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie}, § 95, pp. 406-407; B. SMITH, \textit{Austrian Philosophy}, p. 112 and R. ROLLINGER, \textit{Husserl’s Position in the School of Brentano}, Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1999, p. 217.
Coming back on all the relevant features of intentionality conceived as *MA* – its character of grounded, *sui generis* relation, its non-reality and thus, its dependence on a real mental process, and finally, its merely relational and non-correlational nature –, Marty summarizes his new (and definitive) theory of intentionality as follows:

What is important for us is that all what we just said about grounded or conditioned relations and the most obvious examples thereof (such as the usually so-called equality, difference and similitude) holds for this peculiar relation as well, which we presented as being remotely akin to the ones mentioned above and whom, in virtue of this affinity, we also called similitude or correspondence, although with the modifying clause: ideal or mental. Insofar as a relation […] is at play in our states of consciousness, for example in presenting, we undoubtedly have to do with a conditioned or grounded <relation>. It is grounded first of all in a certain real process in the soul, which is different when I present red or blue, or <when I present> a sound. It follows from this change in the soul that, as a non-real consequence, the presenting <subject> becomes actually or possibly conform with the so-called object in a peculiar way, for example with the red or blue, with a colour or a sound; actually conform when the red or blue exists, merely possibly or hypothetically in case it does not exist. In that sense, one may refer to the presenting as a possible or actual mental assimilation or adequation to something which we call its object. If the object exists, this similitude subsists in the sense of an actual correlation; if it does not exist, it subsists merely in the sense of a relative determination. <And> one of the reasons for the fiction of the immanent object was that […] one believed that in such a case a<n actual> correlation was given as well.131

The last sentence of this long quotation also recalls how the theory of *MA* is to be situated within a broader systematic context. With the discovery that intentionality is not essentially correlational – more precisely: that it is not necessarily correlational with respect to the objects of psychic phenomena – one eliminates one of the main reasons to accept problematic immanent objects, and one can maintain the relational character of intentionality, that is: secure the objectivity of knowledge. Such a theory can be legitimately labelled as a philosophical *tour de force*, for it succeeds in accounting for the truth of the sentence ‘every presentation has an object’ (or ‘every presentation is a presentation of an object’) *without* having to assume one of the two problematic alternatives to “immanentism”, namely Platonism and Meinongianism132.


132 Indeed, once one rejects immanent objects, possible ways out, if one sticks to the correlational nature of intentionality, consist in *i*) embracing an ontology *à la* Meinong (there are non-existing entities), or *ii*) accepting an ontology *à la* Bolzano-Frege-Husserl (there are ideal, abstract entities) – two positions which are incompatible with Marty’s ontology (there isn’t anything which does not exist) and with his nominalism (abstract, ideal entities are mere fictions). For critical stance towards
2.2. The emergence of intentionality as MA along Marty’s philosophical way (1894-1906)

As we have seen at the beginning of the previous section, Marty seems not to have come to the idea of intentionality as MA before March 1906. This does not mean, however, that one cannot find systematic elements in Marty’s earlier works which prefigure the later theory, and thereby contribute to a better understanding of it. In this section, we shall attempt to identify some relevant hints within the philosophical development which took place from the time of the Descriptive Psychology onward to (roughly) the Untersuchungen. We shall begin by reconstructing a general (and brute) chronology of facts (section 1); we shall then give some systematic details regarding the main stages of such a development (sections 2 to 4); finally (section 5), we shall suggest an explanation for what we believe happened between the late eighties and 1906.

2.2.1. Chronological elements

Before coming to the conclusion (reached probably as early as 1905 but certainly after March 1906) that immanent objects are linguistic fictions, Marty started to work on his theory of relations in general, and of psychic relations in particular\textsuperscript{113}. This took place during the time he lectured on descriptive psychology, and thus between 1889 and 1894. In the Descriptive Psychology, Marty wrestles (among other things) with the notion of “quasi-equality” (Quasigleichheit) in the field of psychic relations. On November 24\textsuperscript{th} 1893, Brentano writes to Marty that he intends to get rid of non-real entities\textsuperscript{114}. By June 7\textsuperscript{th} 1901, Marty had read both volumes of Husserl’s Logische Untersuchungen and the two philosophers entertain an epistolary exchange pertaining mainly to the question of the existence of immanent objects, still accepted by Marty, and strongly rejected by Husserl. In a draft of a (lost) letter that was sent to Marty after July 7\textsuperscript{th} 1901 (and which was read by Marty before August 17\textsuperscript{th} 1901), a draft which is thematically and systematically very close to his 1894 tract entitled Intentionale Gegenstände (published only in 1979), Husserl introduces the idea of the intentional relation as being a merely hypothetical relation. On January 7\textsuperscript{th} 1903, Brentano still hesitates to reject all non-real entities\textsuperscript{115} – an hesitation which will have disappeared in September of the same year\textsuperscript{116}. In a dictation of May 13\textsuperscript{th} 1904, Brentano says that the subject’s being directed towards an object (or content) is not to be understood in terms of a subject-object correlation, but that when both subject and object exist, there is a kind of modified relation of similitude holding between the subject and its object; furthermore, what Brentano calls das Gedachte als Gedachtes (and what Marty would call an immanent object) has to be dismissed as a mere fiction\textsuperscript{117}. A letter of Marty from September 18\textsuperscript{th} 1904 shows that he has obviously integrated Husserl’s idea of merely hypothetical psychic relations, but that he still holds on to the existence of immanent

\textsuperscript{113} It is worth noticing that Brentano’s Psychologie of 1874 does not address the topic of psychic relations as such. In his Descriptive Psychologie of 1889, by contrast, the topic is dealt with in the section of part I.2 entitled “Parts of the intentional pair of correlates”. This section contains materials to which Marty’s treatment of psychic relations in his own Deskriptive Psychologie of 1893/1894 are clearly related, although Brentano remains extremely brief and concise, while Marty gives a more explicit account of those relations. As for the appendix dated from September 1901 and entitled “Über die Relationen der Seele”, its content is quite different. There, Brentano is mainly interested in establishing a typology of relations according to their objects and to their ways of being related to them, as well as in describing the many differences existing among relations of judgment and among emotional relations.

\textsuperscript{114} See above, n. 94.

\textsuperscript{115} F. BRENTANO, letter to Marty of January 7\textsuperscript{th} 1903, in Id., Die Abkehr vom Nichtrealen, pp. 106-108.

\textsuperscript{116} F. BRENTANO, letter to Marty of September 10\textsuperscript{th} 1903, in Id., Die Abkehr vom Nichtrealen, pp. 108-109.

\textsuperscript{117} F. BRENTANO, “Vom ens rationis”, in Id., Die Abkehr vom Nichtrealen, p. 324 (text quoted below, note 171).
objects. In his reply to this letter, Brentano insists that all relations are fictions. In his 1905 long review of Meinong’s first edition of Über Annahmen (1902), Marty seems to have rejected the idea of immanent objects. Sometimes between 1904 and 1906, Marty adopts the theory of relations according to which relations are primarily divided in grounded and grounding relations. On March 2nd 1906, Marty formulates his new theory of intentionality as mental assimilation (MA). In a text dated from 1907/1908, Brentano says that the psychic relation (psychische Beziehung) is not a relation proper, but only something similar to a relation. In 1908, Marty presents his Untersuchungen to Brentano at the occasion of his 70th birthday. In March 1910, Brentano writes a sketch of what will become the appendix of his 1911 Zur Klassifikation der psychischen Phänomene and sends this draft to Marty: the first point in the sketch reads “psychische Beziehung und eigentliche Relation”. In 1911, Brentano publishes his Zur Klassifikation and presents the intentional relation as something merely relation-like (etwas Relativliches).

2.2.2. The relation of quasi-equality (1893-1894)

With respect to Marty’s final theory of intentionality as a relation of MA, two remarkable anticipations are present in the Deskriptive Psychologie of 1893/1894. First, the description of a certain kind of modified relation of equality (quasi-equality) holding between the immanent and transcendent objects; second, the idea that a relation which is to some extent analogue to quasi-equality holds between a true judgment and its immanent object. The anticipating character of the Deskriptive Psychologie consists in the fact that from 1906 onward, the relation of MA (i.e. the intentional relation) will partly display features, and assume roles, which, for the early Marty, were clearly identified, but not yet identified as being the roles and features of the intentional relation.

In the paragraphs of section 2 of the Deskriptive Psychologie dealing with relations as they are given in acts of presenting, Marty discusses separately “synechological” relations (holding between a continuum and its parts), relations of equality and difference, and relations of similitude, identity and opposition. At this occasion, he introduces the notion of quasi-equality as the relation holding between the thing X and the presented thing *X:

Besides the true equality, one has to pay attention to what one may call quasi-equality. Such <a quasi-equality> subsists e.g. between a real and a “presented Taler”, a real and a “past king”. It is clear that a “past king” is not a king, a presented Taler, not a Taler. How is it, then, that one nonetheless calls this a “Taler” and a “King”? There subsists not equality, but quasi-equality, something totally peculiar, which cannot be described. Everyone must experience it in himself, and notice it. This is something to which attention has not always been paid.
Here, we have the idea of a modified relation of equality, something which somehow (anticipatively) reminds of the notion of a modified relation of similitude which Marty will use from 1906 onward to characterize the MA; also, the modified equality of 1893/1894 holds between something mental (*X) and something extra-mental (X), just as the MA of 1906 and later will hold between a thinking subject and its object. However, the modified relation of equality described by Marty in this section of the Deskriptive Psychologie is not the intentional relation, but only a kind of relation which is given in our acts of presenting (one of the “presentable” relations). Similitude (Ähnlichkeit), for its part, as discussed in 1893/1894, does not come in a modified kind, neither does it hold between something mental and something extra-mental. There is only standard similitude and it only holds between extra-mental entities.

2.2.3. The intentional relation and the relation of truth (1893/1894)

In the Deskriptive Psychologie, Marty distinguishes relations which hold i) between extra-mental entities only (similitude), ii) between either mental or extra-mental entities (equality, difference, opposition), iii) between mental entities only (the intentional relation, the relation of truth and goodness), and iv) between a mental and an extra-mental entity (quasi-equality). In accordance with Marty’s acceptance of immanent objects at that time, the intentional relation is described as follows:

The intentional relation is totally alien to the physical realm and exclusively characteristic for the psychic <realm; it is> the respect of the consciousness to the immanent object.

This intentional relation has the peculiarity to be a real relation of whose terms only one is real and the other non-real. For the first term, we do not have another name than precisely judging, loving, hating or, most generally speaking, consciousness, self, I. The other term is the object, what is accepted, loved, etc. This second term is non-real, for thereby the real object is not meant, but merely the intentional <object> which inhabitates me, and that, <namely> what is presented, loved, judged as such is non-real.

This identification of the object (i.e. what is presented, etc.) with the immanent object seems to conflict with a passage from Marty’s 5th article Über subjectlose Sätze (1894). There, curiously anticipating the famous letter Brentano (!) will address to him on March 17th 1905, Marty writes the following:

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142 Marty distinguishes three types of similitude. A and B are similar if: i) they display minimal specific differences (as do two nuances of the same colour); ii) they are unequal but display equal relations (this is the case of analogy: the relation a/b is equal to the relation c/d); iii) they are complexes comprising equal and non-equal parts.

143 The criteria for this typology are not all explicitly spelled out in one place in the Deskriptive Psychologie. However, the (repeated, and partly overlapping) treatment of relations in this work (II, §§ 18-22 and V), as well as what Marty says when introducing and characterizing the different types of relations clearly shows that such criteria are at work. A key passage in that respect is the beginning of part V, Von den Relationen auf psychischem Gebiete.

144 A. MARTY, Deskriptive Psychologie, V, § 3, p. 165: "Dem physischen Gebiete ganz fremd und nur für das psychische charakteristisch ist die intentionale Relation, die Beziehung des Bewusstseins zum immanenten Objekte.”

145 A. MARTY, Deskriptive Psychologie, V, § 3, p. 166: "Diese intentionale Relation hat das Eigene, dass sie eine reale Relation ist, wovon aber nur ein Terminus real ist, der andere nicht real. Für den einen Terminus haben wir keinen anderen Namen als eben Urteilen, Lieben und Hassen oder, im allgemeinsten Ausdruck, Bewusstsein, Selbst, Ich. Der andere Terminus ist das Objekt, das Anerkannte, das Geliebte usw. Dieser zweite Terminus ist nun nicht real, denn es ist damit nicht das wirkliche Objekt gemeint, sondern eben nur das intentionale, das mir innenwohnende, und dieses, das Vorgestellte, das Geliebte, das Beurteilte als solches ist eben nicht real.”
The immanent object exists whenever the relevant act of consciousness really exists. For there is no consciousness without an object immanent to it; the one is a correlate of the other. The object *tut court* [der Gegenstand schlechtweg], by contrast, e.g. what is presented *tut court* [das Vorgestellte schlechtweg] can exist or not exist. Is my presentation, say, the concept “horse”, so the object exists. Is it a presentation of a centaur, so what is presented does not exist; although in this case, of course, it has to be acknowledged as presented – otherwise, we precisely would not have “the presentation of a centaur”, by which nothing is meant but that the centaur exists in us as presented. […] When I say: a horse, a circle exists; what is acknowledged is not a presented horse, but a horse – not the object presented as such <i.e. as presented>, but the object *tut court*.¹⁴⁶

The apparent conflict disappears as soon as one takes into account the fact that around 1894, Marty distinguishes between two senses of the expression ‘what is presented’ (das Vorgestellte) and the like: what is presented as presented (das Vorgestellte als Vorgestelltes, our *X*) is the immanent object, whereas what is presented *tut court* (das Vorgestellte schlechtweg) is a transcendent object (our X). In other words: when, in the *Deskriptive Psychologie*, Marty says that what is presented *is* the immanent object, it means that what is presented *als Vorgestelltes* is the immanent object; when, in his article of 1894, he insists that what is presented *is not* the immanent object, it means that what is presented schlechtweg is a transcendent object.¹⁴⁷ Accordingly, although it is indeed true that i) the Marty of 1894 identifies the intentional correlate with the intentional object, and ii) that the immanent object is taken ontologically seriously as being an existing, non-real entity, it does not follow that Marty makes of the immanent object the target object of presentations: the immanent object, the *Gegenstand als Vorgestelltes*, is sharply distinguished from the target object, the *Gegenstand schlechtweg*.

What about the relation of truth as the (only) second type of relation holding exclusively between mental entities according to the *Deskriptive Psychologie*? Regarding truth and its classical definition as *adaequatio rei et intellectus*, Marty observes that this definition has been misunderstood because some philosophers did not realize that *what was meant* by the definition is an adequation as a relation of quasi-equality holding between an immanent and a transcendent object.¹⁴⁹ However, Marty advocates another interpretation of it: “[…] the *adaequatio rei et intellectus* is not to be understood as a quasi-equality.”¹⁵⁰


¹⁴⁸ The relation of truth (and the same holds for the relation of goodness) differs from the intentional relation in that judging is a polar phenomenon (there is nothing analogue, on the level of *presentations*, to the accepting/rejecting polarity proper to judgments, or to the loving/hating polarity proper to emotions). With respect to the nature of their terms, however, the intentional relation and the relation of truth do not differ: in both cases, the terms are a real mental act and a non-real (immanent) object.

¹⁴⁹ A. MARTY, *Deskriptive Psychologie*, V, § 3, pp. 166-167: “Diese Definition [i.e. *veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus*] ist von manchen gänzlich missverstanden worden, da sie nicht bemerkten, dass damit nur eine Quasigleichheit zwischen dem
The reason for such a reading (and subsequent reinterpretation) of the classical definition of truth has to do with the different conceptions of judgment defended which are at play here. Traditionally, judging was conceived of as an act of composing or dividing concepts (this is the propositional theory of judgment); by contrast, Marty (like Brentano) claims that judging is a non-propositional act consisting in accepting or rejecting a presented object\textsuperscript{151}. Now, if one conceives of judgments as compositions or divisions, one can understand why a relation of adequation or quasi-equality was thought to hold between the immanent object of judgment and its transcendent object. Suppose that Socrates is white. A classical and standard metaphysical analysis of this fact would say that whiteness inheres in Socrates, and thus, that Socrates and his whiteness are two parts of the same complex; as a consequence, when, in an act of judging, the subject “Socrates” is composed with the predicate “white”, the resulting, complex immanent object and Socrates are quasi-equal with respect to their composition. However, such a view cannot satisfactorily account for the truth of negative judgments:

Above all, one cannot say in the case of a negative judgment that its truth consists in a quasi-equality of the intentional with the real object. On the contrary, what one should rather say is that those judgments are true in which what is thought does not correspond to the real object. The old conception is obviously linked with the opinion that judging is a composition or division of presentations (Aristotle) and that it is true when it composes what is composed in reality, etc. But such is not the case. A judgment is not a composing or dividing, but an accepting or negating [i.e. rejecting], which is something totally different.\textsuperscript{152}

Moreover, the failure of the “old conception” is general since it is unable to account for the truth of a large class of affirmative judgments:

However, the old conception is problematic in the case of affirmative judgments as well. Can one say that what is accepted as such is always equal to what is real? At most, this can hold in cases where we have a proper presentation of something.\textsuperscript{153}

The cases of true negative judgments and of true affirmative judgments based on improper presentations show that truth cannot be accounted for in terms of a relation of quasi-equality holding between an immanent and a transcendent object. Thus, the old conception is guilty of abusive generalization. Nonetheless, one is in search of something like an \textit{adaequatio rei et intellectus}:

\begin{quote}
intentionalen und dem wirklichen Objekt gemeint ist. Es fragt sich aber, ob tatsächlich auch nur diese Quasigleichheit gegeben sei, denn mancher würde gewiss dagegen protestieren.”
\end{quote}
\textsuperscript{150} Anton Marty, \textit{Deskriptive Psychologie}, V, § 4, p. 169.
\textsuperscript{151} See for example A. MARTY, \textit{Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie}, §§ 45-47, pp. 229-232. Marty always defended the non-propositional (or “idiopathic”) theory of judgment.
\textsuperscript{152} A. MARTY, \textit{Deskriptive Psychologie}, V, § 4, pp. 168: "Vor allem kann man beim verwirrenden Urteile nicht sagen, seine Wahrheit bestehe in einer Quasigleichheit des intentionalen und wirklichen Gegenstandes. Da müsste es vielmehr umgekehrt heißen, wahr seien diejenigen Urteile, wo das Gedachte dem wirklichen Gegenstande nicht entspricht. Die alte Auffassung hänge offenbar mit der Meinung zusammen, dass das Urteilen ein Verbinden oder Trennen von Vorstellungen sei (Aristoteles) und dann wahr sei, wenn es verbinde, was in Wirklichkeit verbunden ist usw. Dem ist aber nicht so. Ein Urteil ist kein Verbinden oder Trennen, sondern ein Anerkennen oder Leugnen, was total etwas anderes ist.”
\textsuperscript{153} A. MARTY, \textit{Deskriptive Psychologie}, V, § 4, pp. 168-169: “Allein auch beim anerkennenden Urteile ist die alte Auffassung bedenkenlich. Kann man sagen, dass das Anerkannte als solches immer dem Wirklichen gleich sei? Das wird höchstens da gelten können, wo wir die eigentliche Vorstellung von etwas haben.” For example, in what sense can one say that the immanent object of the true judgment “a molecule of water exists” is quasi-equal to an existing molecule of water?
Thus there must certainly be a sense in which there is an *adaequatio rei et intellectus*, but the question is only in what sense one can talk of such *<an adequation>*. Is it really a quasi-equality of the intentional with the real object, or is it something else? At any rate, I believe that one cannot maintain the former.\footnote{A. Marty, *Deskriptive Psychologie*, V, § 4, pp. 168: “Also in irgendeinem Sinne muss ganz gewiss eine *adaequatio rei et intellectus* gegeben sein, und es fragt sich bloß, in welchem Sinne von einer solchen die Rede sein kann. Ist es wirklich eine Quasigleichheit des intentionalen und des wirklichen Objektes oder ist es etwas anderes? Und da glaube ich allerdings, dass man das Erstere nicht aufrechterhalten kann.”}

Here is Marty’s answer:

Truth is not at all correspondence or *adaequatio* in the sense of any identity, equality or similitude, but rather *<in the sense>* of a fitting and thus adequate behaviour of the judging *<subject>* with respect to what is judged. One may also call this a harmony between the judgment and what is judged, and this holds for all judgments.\footnote{Anton Marty, *Deskriptive Psychologie*, V, § 4, p. 169: “Die Wahrheit ist überhaupt nicht Übereinstimmung oder *adaequatio* im Sinne irgendeiner Identität, Gleichheit oder Ähnlichkeit, sondern eines passenden und in diesem Sinne äquivalenten Verhaltens des Urteilenden zum Beurteilten. Das kann man auch eine Harmonie nennen zwischen Urteil und Beurteiltem, und das gilt für alle Urteile.” In the *Untersuchungen*, Marty will distinguish between das *Geurteilte* and das *Beurteilte*, the former referring to a *content* of judgment (i.e. the non-real, existent, and transcendent entity “the existence of Socrates” for the judgment “Socrates exists”), the latter to its *object* (here, the real, existent, and transcendent entity Socrates). In the *Deskriptive Psychologie*, however, the immanent object is called das *Beurteilte*, see Anton Marty, *Deskriptive Psychologie*, V, § 3, p. 166, text quoted above, n. 145.}

In short, then, the relation of truth is an *adaequatio rei et intellectus*, however: *i)* not in the sense of an identity, equality or similitude; and *ii)* it does *not* hold between an immanent and a transcendent object. Therefore, truth is not a relation of quasi-equality, but a kind of harmony\footnote{Regarding the terminology used by Marty in the *Deskriptive Psychologie* and the *Untersuchungen*, one can underscore that the terms used in 1893/1894 to characterize the *adaequatio* of the classical definition of truth (*Übereinstimmung, Adäquation, Gleichheit, Ähnlichkeit*) are precisely the ones he will use in the *Untersuchungen* when introducing intentionality as a kind of MA.}, and it holds between the act and the immanent object. Schematically, we can summarize the situation as follows (the box represents the thinking subject; ‘\(T\)’ reads: ‘truth’; ‘\(ARI\)’: ‘*adaequatio rei et intellectus*,’ ‘\(IR\)’: ‘intentional relation’, and ‘\(QE\)’: ‘quasi-equality’, ‘\(H\)’: ‘harmony’; a dotted line represents a relation which can – or can not – obtain; the first schema shows how, according to Marty, the classical definition of truth as \(ARI\) was supposed to be understood):

### The “classical” understanding of truth as \(ARI\)

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<th>ACT</th>
<th>(IR)</th>
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### Marty’s reinterpretation of truth as \(ARI\)

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<th>ACT</th>
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\[\text{Figure 5}\]
It is not the place to go into the details— and the weaknesses— of such a conception of truth. For our purpose, it is sufficient to note that Marty’s reinterpretation of the classical definition of truth dissociates the relation of truth from the relation of quasi-equality. Such a dissociation also entails a kind of analogical transposition: the place to look in order to understand what truth is has just been “moved to the left”. The very powerful, but non-generalizable feature of quasi-equality gets lost on the way and is replaced by the intriguing notion of harmony. In this respect, the later relation of MA appears to have inherited a feature analogue to quasi-equality (MA is a modified similitude): just as according to the “old” or traditional conception of truth, the immanent object was supposed to be quasi-equal to a transcendent object, in Marty’s later conception, the thinking subject will be said to be mentally assimilated (i.e. similar in a modified sense) to a transcendent object.

In dissociating the relations of truth and quasi-equality, the reinterpretation of the classical definition of truth in the Deskriptive Psychologie remedies to the shortcomings of the “old conception” (true negative judgments, true affirmative judgments based on improper presentations), but it also loses the essential “transcending” character of a relation like quasi-equality as it holds between the mental and the extra-mental— after all, truth, if it is supposed to be an objective notion, simply requires some kind of bridging between the mental and the extra-mental. In that sense, the position at which Marty will arrive in 1906, not only with respect to truth, but to intentionality in general, represents a synthesis of elements already present in 1893/1894. A further element of central importance for the later theory is still missing, though. It is the notion of potential relation, a notion which, eventually, will lead Marty to his conception of merely possible correlations or relative Bestimmungen. As suggested in the brute chronology sketched above, this idea has its origin in Marty’s correspondence with Husserl in the summer of the year 1901.

2.2.4. Hypothetical relations (1901)

The letters Husserl and Marty exchanged in summer 1901 played a crucial role— one might even want to say the key role— in the transition from Marty’s early to his later conception of intentionality. The reading of Husserl’s Logische Untersuchungen lead Marty to discuss several topics with his colleague of Halle, and among them, the question of the immanent objects. At that time, Marty clearly sticks to the thesis that there cannot be a psychic phenomenon without an immanent object:

[…] there <can> be no meaning [Meinen] […] without an object which is immanent to the presentation. […] in authentic presenting there is in my view a consciousness’s mode of behaving with respect to something, an ‘intention’ directed to something (not of course in the sense of an intention [Absicht] but rather in the sense of another peculiar relation) which has the immanent object as its counterpart, as a necessary correlate, as the other term of the relation. [transl. Mulligan and Schuhmann, slightly modified].

157 A very clear sign of such an analogical transposition is the fact that Marty insists on keeping the denomination of ‘adaequate rei et intellectus’ for both the classical account and his own. This anticipates the new formulation found in the Untersuchungen: “Veritas est adaequatio cogitantis et cogitati” — A. MARTY, Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie, § 102, p. 426.

158 For an edition and translation, as well as an introduction and commentary of those letters, see K. MULLIGAN, K. SCHUHMANN, Two Letters from Marty to Husserl, pp. 225-236.

159 A. Marty, letter to Husserl of June 7th 1901, in K. MULLIGAN, K. SCHUHMANN, Two Letters from Marty to Husserl, p. 227: “[…] es <kann> kein ‘Meinen’ geben […] ohne einen einer Vorstellung immanenten Gegenstand. […] Beim eigenen Vorstellen […] ist m.E. eine Weise des Verhaltens des Bewusstseins zu etwas, eine “Intention” auf etwas (natürlich nicht im
Note that the intentional relation is now labelled as a kind of behaving (Verhalten), a term which, in 1893/1894, was used only with respect to the relation of truth as a kind of harmony\textsuperscript{160}; furthermore, this way of psychic behaving is qualified as a peculiar relation (eigentümliche Beziehung). In sharp opposition to Marty, Husserl takes immanent objects to be superfluous “psychological hypostatizations”, a charge which Marty accepts, thereby confirming that he takes immanent objects ontologically seriously:

\[\text{[\ldots] there seems to me to be no alternative to the doctrine of the ‘psychological hypostatization’ of what is general. Of course, I would never want to call an immanent object ‘real’.\textsuperscript{161}} \text{[transl. Mulligan and Schuhmann]}\]

Marty’s position is linked to the fact that he is (still) convinced that the intentional relation must be a correlation, and nothing else:

\[\text{[\ldots] the nature of every relation entails, in my opinion, that if one term of the relation exists, the same necessarily holds also of the other term. The intentional object must therefore exist as often as the ‘intention’ exists.\textsuperscript{162}} \text{[transl. Mulligan and Schuhmann]}\]

In his reply to Marty’s letter of June 7\textsuperscript{th} 1901, Husserl formulates a thesis which can be found already in his long (and only recently published) tract Intentionale Gegenstände of 1894, and which, we believe, definitely put Marty on the way to his own solution of the problem of intentionality. The idea is that relations can be merely hypothetical, and its key character consists in that it allows to maintain the relational nature of intentionality without having to maintain the existence of immanent objects:

\[\text{What is presented in a presenting is what a corresponding adequate perception itself would put in front of the eyes exactly as it was presented.\textsuperscript{163}} \text{[Italics ours]}\]

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[160] On the characterisation of intentionality as a kind of behaviour, see F. BRENTANO, \textit{Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis}, Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg, 1955, p. 16: “Der gemeinsame Charakterzug alles Psychischen besteht in dem, was man häufig mit einem leider sehr mißverständlichen Ausdruck Bewußtsein genannt hat, d. h. in einem subjektiven Verhalten, in einer, wie man sie bezeichnete, intentionalen Beziehung zu etwas, was vielleicht nicht wirklich, aber doch innerlich gegenständlich gegeben ist.”
\item[163] E. HÜSSELI, draft of a letter to Marty of July 7\textsuperscript{th} 1910, p. 422: “Vorgestellt in einer Vorstellung ist dasjenige, was eine entsprechende adäquate Wahrnehmung selbst und genauso, wie es vorgestellt war, vor Augen stellen würde.”
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
This is a quite laconic formulation, and it may seem too weak to support the claim that Marty found in Husserl the idea of hypothetical relations. If one turns to the text which constitutes the background of Husserl’s reply to Marty, however, one finds a very clear and detailed account of the idea:

Accordingly, the talk of any presentation having a comprehension (Umfang), of any presentation presenting an object, should be interpreted as a merely improper one. Its proper meaning would be expressed, or indirectly indicated, in the following: provided that the affirmative judgment concerning it would hold, every presenting would have a comprehension, present one or several objects. The aim and foothold of such an improper character could only lie in its practical utility, namely: in that every presentation can enter hypothetical relations of the forms described; that one can operate with the comprehensions considered under the assumption of such existential judgments in a wide, as well as in a strictly limited domain, exactly as one would operate with real comprehensions; moreover, that the equivalence has exactly the formal features of a relation of equality, the subordination the formal features of a relation of inclusion, etc., to the effect that, insofar as one does not step out of the domain of hypothetical contexts, all judging about existence or non-existence of the objects and comprehensions at stake can be left aside, one may deal with the talk of comprehensions and relations holding among comprehensions exactly as if it were a proper and absolute way of talking. [Italics ours]

A shorter, synthetic formulation reads:

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[...] the latter sentence [i.e. ‘every presenting presents an object’] means: every presenting can function under an assumption in such a way that <it functions> as if it were an absolute presentation with respect to its objectuality.\footnote{E. HÜSSELR, \textit{Intentionale Gegenstände}, § 12, pp. 335-336: “Dagegen besagt der letztere Satz [i.e. ‘jede Vorstellung stellt einen Gegenstand vor’]: Jede Vorstellung kann unter einer Assumption so fungieren, als ob sie in gegensätzlicher Hinsicht unbedingt wäre.” [Italics ours]. Another idea of the later Marty which might come from this letter is the one according to which the intentional relation is a logical or ideal one (recall that ‘MA’ translates ‘ideelle Verähnlichung’): “Dass jede Vorstellung ihrem Wesen nach Auffassung ist und als solche aufzufassender Inhalte bedarf, habe ich selbst auszuführen gesucht. Aber die Beziehung der Auffassung zum Aufgefassten (repräsentierenden Inhalt) ist eine von Grund aus wesentlich verschiedene von der intentionalen Beziehung als Beziehung der ganzen Auffassung (des sinnebelichten Zeichens, des von der Auffassung beseelten Inhalts) zum repräsentierten oder intendierten Gegenstand. \textit{Die erstere Beziehung ist eine reale, die letztere die ideale oder logische.} Die Auffassung stellt den aufzufassenden Inhalt nicht vor, sondern indem sie ihn auffasst, stellt sie einen (allgemein zu reden) von ihm verschiedenen Inhalt vor.” [Italics ours] – E. HÜSSELR, draft of a letter to Marty of July 7th 1910, p. 425.} [Italics ours]

In his rather short reply to the extensive letter of Husserl of which only a draft has come down to us, Marty reaffirms his conviction that every psychic phenomenon has an immanent object as its correlate. This, however, does not mean that the correlate (or immanent object) itself is the target of the phenomenon at stake. To Husserl’s objection that accepting an immanent object amounts to make of it the target of one’s presentations, Marty replies:

The object of the presentation of blue is: blue, not: presented blue. But this is quite compatible with my view that there corresponds to every presentation a correlate which necessarily exists if the presentation exists. For this does not assert that this correlate \textit{as such} (that is, the presented blue) is the object of my presentation. At all events this is not the case for a \textit{primary act of consciousness}. A presented object as such is in fact the object of \textit{secondary consciousness}.\footnote{A. MARTY, letter to Husserl of August 17th 1901, in K. MULLIGAN, K. SCHUHMANN, \textit{Two Letters from Marty to Husserl}, p. 235: “[…] Der Gegenstand der Blauvorstellung ist: Blau, nicht: das vorgestellte Blau. Allein dies verträcht sich sehr wohl mit meiner These, dass jeder Vorstellung ein Korrelat entspricht, welches notwendig existiert, wenn die Vorstellung existiert. Denn damit ist ja nicht behauptet, dass dieses Korrelat \textit{als solches} (also das vorgestellte Blau) Gegenstand meiner Vorstellung sei. Wenigstens gilt dies nicht, wenn es sich um den \textit{primären Bewusstseinsakt} handelt. Das Vorgestellte als solches ist in Wahrheit Gegenstand des \textit{sekundären Bewusstseins}.” – a similar view was already defended by Marty in 1894, see the passage quoted above, n. 146.} [Transl. Mulligan and Schuhmann] [Italics ours]

This might explain why Marty does not react to Husserl’s sharp remark according to which accepting the existence of immanent objects cannot possibly resolve the difficulty it is supposed to resolve, namely to account for the fact that \textit{every} presentation (even that of a centaur) presents an object. As Husserl notes, what is wanted is a theory able to account for this phenomenological fact when there is no object \textit{at all} (not even an immanent one)\footnote{E. HÜSSELR, \textit{Über subjectlose Satze}, pp. 165-166 (passage quoted above, n. 146).}. According to the pre-1901 Marty, the immanent object is always needed as the correlate of the intentional relation (relations are \textit{correlations} and there is nothing like hypothetical relations yet), but the object \textit{tout court} (der Gegenstand schlechthin) does not need to exist\footnote{E. HÜSSELR, \textit{Über subjectlose Satze}, pp. 165-166 (passage quoted above, n. 146).}. In other words, Marty’s theory of intentionality at this stage of its development does account for the fact...
that every presentation presents an object, even when what is presented does not exist at all (the intentional correlate is not what is presented).

2.2.5. Towards the “externalisation” and “absorption” of immanent objects (1904-1906)

Marty’s letter to Brentano of September 18th 1904 contains his first reaction to his master’s new doctrine. During the summer of the same year, Kraus stayed with Brentano in Schönbühel. On this occasion, Kraus wrote down several dictations and brought them to Prag for Marty to read170. Among those texts, the short tract entitled “Vom ens rationis” (May 13th, 1904) is of remarkable significance. Here, Brentano analyses the phrase ‘to be directed towards something as an object’ in a non-relational way; further, he notes that in some accidental situations – namely when both the thinking subject and the object happen to exist – the adequate description of the situation does involve a relation, namely a kind of relation of modified similitude:

To say that every thinking subject has an object, a content, does not mean that it is a relative in front of which stands a correlative. It [i.e. the thinking subject] is directed towards something as its object. If this [i.e. the object] subsists, then a kind of relation subsists between the being which is the object and the thinking subject, <a relation> which one might call <a relation of> similitude in a peculiarly modified sense. By contrast, what is thought as what is thought appears to be a pure fiction which must be rejected.171

This theory of intentionality as a (possible) similitude will not be developed by Brentano subsequently, among other reasons because he will abandon the idea of adequation in all its variants.172 Furthermore, even when Brentano talks of an adequation of the thinking subject with its object, he considers it to be a second relation in addition to the psychic relation of presentation, whereas for Marty, there is only one relation, which is sometimes actual, and sometimes only potential.

In a reply of September 18th 1904, Marty appears to be on the verge to find what will be his proper solution to the problem of intentionality. In the following passage, Marty maintains that intentional (i.e. immanent) objects are indispensable, but only in order to distinguish two qualitatively different acts (e.g. accepting and loving) directed upon one and the same object tout court; when the object tout court varies, however, the systematic raison d’être of intentional objects disappears:

I cannot see how the intentional object [i.e. the immanent object]173 could be superfluous either. In order to account for the difference between the acceptance of A, and that of B, the real object and the relative determination to it are certainly sufficient. But when, on the base of inner perception, I try to get a clear picture of what the qualitative difference is between the acceptance of A and the love of A, etc., I can’t find anything else than that we have to do with a different way of behaving with

172 See A. Kastil’s note 1 on p. 167 of Brentano’s Kategorienlehre.
173 That the early, as well as the late Marty equates the immanent object with the intentional object is clear from the index (as well as from many passages) of his Untersuchungen of 1908, where one reads (p. 744): “Intentional: vide immanent”; see as well the Deskriptive Psychologie, V, § 3, p. 166 (text quoted above, n. 145).
respect to something; in other words: that, as long as it [i.e. the way of behaving] exists, it presupposes a correlate, and, as far as its reality is concerned, that it consists in a relation. This relation — which is always given — seems to me to be real, and different in the case of accepting and in the case of loving, whereas the hypothetical relation to the real object seems to me to be non-real, and the same in both cases (namely quasi-equality). 174

Intentionality is accounted for by means of two distinct relations differing in their nature and function: one relation \((R_1)\) holds between the act and the intentional object (it is a correlation, it varies with the quality of the act, and is a real relation); another relation \((R_2)\) holds between the intentional object and the object tout court (it is a relative determination, it does not vary with the quality of the act, it is a non-real relation, and it is a relation of quasi-equality). Schematically (\(\text{Imm.O} = \text{immanent object}; \ O = \text{object})\):

\[
\begin{array}{c|c|c|c}
\text{ACT} & \text{Imm.O} & O \\
\hline
 & R_1 & \\
 & \hline
\end{array}
\]

\textbf{Figure 6}

Let us come back to the two cases compared by Marty, namely: (1) intentional objects are superfluous in order to account for the difference between accepting \(A\) and accepting \(B\), but (2) they are required in order to account for the qualitative distinction between accepting \(A\) and loving \(A\). Two types of differences are at stake here: an object-difference \((A \text{ differs from } B)\), and what one could call a content-difference: what is correlated to the act of accepting \(A\) differs from what is correlated to the act of loving \(A\). What is correlated to the act of accepting \(A\) and what is correlated to the act of loving \(A\) are more than merely \(A\): \(A\) alone could not possibly account for the difference, for it is strictly identical in both cases. Since accepting \(A\) and loving \(A\) are different relations, they must have different correlates. So, we have to do with two different immanent contents. Thus, case (1) provides a reason to believe that immanent entities are not required to account for object-differences, while case (2) provides a reason to accept immanent entities (as contents), for they alone can account for the difference of, say, accepting \(A\) and loving \(A\).

In his reply to Marty’s letter, Brentano says that no relation (that is: no correlation to an immanent object or content) is needed to account for the distinction between, say, acts of loving \(A\) and of accepting \(A\):

What prevents one from accepting a specific unity for the acts of the A-accepting, A-rejecting, A-loving, A-hating, <a unity> which belongs, in a different order, to the

This suggests that the differentiating roles Marty attributes to contents can be (somewhat) redistributed on the side of the mental acts themselves and their objects.

By the way, this letter of Brentano also gives a very clear and concise formulation of how the central claim of reism should be understood:

*When I said that one can only think of what is real, this, of course, should not mean anything but that we can only think of something which, if it existed, would be real.*

This is in partial accordance with Marty’s conception of the object *tout court* – what is presented *tout court* (the *Gegenstand schlechtweg*) can exist (or not exist) without affecting its status of object; but it is also opposed to Marty’s view that what is presented *tout court* by no means has to be a real entity: collectives, relations and contents are genuine existing, non-real entities, and as such, they can perfectly well be presented.

That said, the way leading to the theory which Marty was to adopt from 1906 onward – that is: after his fruitful exchanges with Husserl in 1901 and with Brentano in 1904 – can perhaps be described as follows. Since i) immanent entities are not required in order to account for object-differences, since ii) what is essential for a theory of intentionality is to account for the fact that mental acts have objects, and since iii) Brentano and Husserl, in their correspondence with him, forcefully argue that one should get rid of immanent entities, Marty is lead to make the crucial theoretical move that will yield his new (and final) theory of intentionality: immanent entities eventually get out of the picture and their systematic roles are assumed by the remaining elements of the dispositive, namely the act on the one

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176 F. BRENTANO, reply to Marty’s letter of September 18th 1904, in Id., *Die Abkehr vom Nichtrealen*, p. 114: “Wenn ich sagte, man könne nur Reales denken, so sollte dies natürlich nichts anderes heissen, als wir können nur solches denken, was, wenn es wäre, etwas Reales wäre.”

177 A. MARTY, *Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie*, § 66, p. 321: “Was von den nichtrealen Relationen, das gilt auch von den weiteren Beispielen des Nichtrealen, auf die man hinzuweisen pflegt: dem Mangel, dem bloss Möglichen (d.h. dem, was nicht notwendig nicht ist) und Unmöglichen (d.h. dem notwendig Nichtseienenden) und überhaupt von den Urteilsinhalten, auch dem Seienden und Notwendigen als solchen und dem Dies- oder Jenessein.” [This passage follows immediately the one quoted above, n. 98].
side, and the object *tout court* on the other. Here takes place what we suggest to call the “absorption” and “externalisation” of the immanent object. The side of the object inherits what accounted for content-differences (recall case 2, above) to the effect that contents are now conceived as non-real, transcendent entities given only as consequences (*Folgen*) of real objects (this is the “externalisation”). The act, for its part, inherits an analogue of the relation of quasi-equality, a relation of modified similitude (mental assimilation, *ideelle Verähnlichung*) which now holds between the act and the object or what is now acknowledged as existing *a parte obiecti* (this is the “absorption”). Schematically:

The immanent object externalized and absorbed (1906 and later)

![Diagram](attachment:image.png)

In presenting, accepting, loving *A*, the thinking subject becomes mentally similar to *A* itself, the existence of *A*, the value of *A* respectively. As Marty puts it in 1908:

Indeed, I believe one can say without hesitation, that it belongs to the essence of any psychic activity to be a process which has as a consequence that through it the psychic active subject primarily becomes ideally conform to something other than itself.\(^{179}\)

While the act of presenting is essentially an adequation to the differences of the ‘what’ [i.e. the quiddity or essence] of an object, the act of judging is a conformity to its being or not being [i.e. its existence or non-existence].\(^{180}\)

Finally, the reason for calling the intentional relation a relation of mental assimilation (or *ideelle Verähnlichung*) might be the following: the parallel “externalization” and “absorption” of the immanent object creates a situation analogue to the one existing between two objects which are similar with respect to one of their features, like colour, for example: just as a yellow house *H* is similar to another yellow house *H’* with respect to colour because *H* and *H’* are bearers of qualities perceived as yellow, a subject accepting *A* becomes mentally similar to “the existence of *A*” (i.e. to a judgment content, which is a non-real consequence of *A*, existing in the outer world independently of any mental act) because of the act’s moment in virtue of which it is an accepting of *A*. The fact that the two situations are not (and

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\(^{180}\) A. Marty, *Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie*, § 102, p. 425: “Während das Vorstellen wesentlich eine Ađäquation mit den Unterschieden des Was eines Objektes ist, ist das Urteilen eine Konformation zu dessen Sein oder nicht Sein […].”
cannot be) exactly the same.\footnote{181} justifies the description of mental assimilation as a kind of \textit{sui generis} relation of similitude.

3. Concluding remarks

By way of a conclusion, and in order to present the results of this study in a synthetic perspective, we shall suggest answers to the following four questions: \textit{i)} How is Brentano’s theory of intentionality to be characterized? \textit{ii)} How is Marty’s late conception of intentionality as mental assimilation to be understood? \textit{iii)} Which is the relationship between Marty and Brentano in that respect? \textit{iv)} Beyond Brentano himself and other members of his circle, which could have been Marty’s sources for his later theory of intentionality?

\textit{i)} In section one, we discussed today’s two dominant readings of Brentano’s intentionality thesis: the Discontinuist (\textit{DI}) and the Continuist (\textit{CI}) interpretations, which diverge mainly on the pre-reicistic Brentano (i.e. before 1904). As we saw, both interpretations offer convincing arguments based on a careful analysis of the sources. Nonetheless there are problematic claims in each of them. Against \textit{DI}, some passages of Brentano’s works, from the time of the Psychology of 1874 onwards, clearly show that the mental act is directed toward something which is not relative to the act\footnote{182}; this seems to entail that the intentional object is not identical with a mind dependent entity relative to the act. Against \textit{CI}, by contrast, there are passages where Brentano says that the mental act is directed toward something which is relative to the act, which seems to imply that the intentional object is identical with a mind dependent entity relative to the act\footnote{181}. In the face of such incompatibilities, there seems to be only one possible way out. The pre-reicistic Brentano works with a \textit{phenomenological concept} of object – something like an object \textit{per se} or \textit{tout court} (\textit{Gegenstand schlechthin})\footnote{184} – which is indifferent with respect to existence and non-existence, and is not relative to the act; at the same time, Brentano acknowledges a mental correlate of the primary act which, even if it is not its target object, is nevertheless required as a means leading to the target object. Accordingly, the primary act grasps what is presented \textit{tout court} (the \textit{Objekt}), but through what is presented \textit{as presented} (das \textit{Gedachte als Gedachtes}, the correlate). The primary act and the correlate are grasped by the secondary act. The secondary act, from a synoptic point of view, grasps \textit{as a means} the...
means leading the primary act to the object. Such a reading offers the advantage to understand otherwise problematic passages where Brentano says that the primary act is directed toward the correlate. On the interpretation we suggest here, this is to be understood as follows: the primary act is directed toward the correlate in the sense that through it, it reaches its object. The correlate is able to "point-beyond-itsel" (it does what Husserl calls "über-sich-Hinausweisen").

ii) Marty’s theory of intentionality as it evolved from his articles Über subjectlose Sätze to his Untersuchungen, accounts for the intentional relation in terms of a sui generis similitude (ideelle Verähnlichung) between a thinking subject and its object. The main philosophical contribution of this theory is to qualify the kind of relation intentionality is. Such a qualification goes significantly further than saying that intentionality is a sui generis relation. By describing it as a sui generis relation of mental assimilation, Marty provides a model not only to account for the fact that psychic phenomena are linked to objects, but also and above all, to explain what ‘to be linked’ means in such a case. In his earlier theory (before 1906), the idea that intentionality is to be explained by a kind of peculiar similitude already plays a central role, but the terms of such a relation are the immanent object (das Vorgestelltes als Vorgestelltes) on the one side, and the object tout court (der Gegenstand schlechtweg) on the other. As we suggested above, the key move leading to the later theory consists in a displacement of the mental term of the relation of similitude: it now holds, directly, between the mental act itself and its object (or whatever exists as a non-real consequence of it). Furthermore, mental assimilation is what Marty calls a grounded relation (begründete Relation), a feature which leads him to suggest an elegant account of the cases where what is thought of does not exist. In such a case, the subject is linked to the object by a merely possible correlation (this is his theory of the so-called relative determination or relative Bestimmung); when the presented object exists, by contrast, the subject stands in an actual correlation with it. In both cases, the relational entities involved (the actual correlation in the former case, the relative determination in the latter) have a special ontological status: they are existing, non-real entities (irrealia).

iii) In the opening lines of this study, we announced that we would analyse the successive versions of Marty’s theory of intentionality with respect to their dependence upon, or independence from their Brentanian background. After having discussed Brentano’s and Marty’s different theories, we can now be more precise concerning the interaction between the two thinkers: we consider that Marty progressively distances himself from Brentano.

Before the latter’s reistic turn of 1904, we believe, against Antonelli, that Marty has a theory which is similar to Brentano’s. In his famous 1905 letter to Marty, Brentano denies to have ever identified the mental correlate with the object. This letter has been interpreted by Antonelli as being directed against an erroneous reading of Brentano by Marty: the latter would have identified the mental correlate and the object, and even more, he would have originated what would become the standard DI reading of Brentano. However, as we saw above, as early as 1894, Marty writes something which corresponds...
verbatim to what Brentano will write ten years later: the correlate and the object tout court are sharply distinguished. Thus, provided that Brentano understands himself correctly in 1905, it is highly implausible that Marty misunderstood Brentano at all. The suspicion of an erroneous reading of Brentano by Marty looses any ground when the following homonymy is taken into account: Marty calls “intentional object” what Brentano calls “correlate”, and he calls “object tout court” (Gegenstand schlechtweg) what Brentano calls “intentional object”. The confusion, if there is any, is only terminological. A proof for that is to be found in the very same famous letter to Marty, where Brentano says: “what you call simply ‘object’ (einfach ‘Objekt’), but what I (…) allowed myself to call ‘immanent object’ (‘immanentes Objekt’)”.

After 1904, Marty markedly distances himself from his master in that he a) maintains an ontology of non-real entities among which relations in general and the intentional relation in particular play a crucial role; and b) conceives of the intentional relation as a mental assimilation and thereby formulates a theory which, as we saw above, goes well beyond the mere statement that intentionality is a sui generis relation.

iv) As noted by Smith in his book of 1994, Marty’s late theory of intentionality has a distinctive Aristotelian flavour. In the De anima, Aristotle says that in actual sensation and knowledge, the subject, in a way, has become the object:

As we have said, what has the power of sensation is potentially like what the perceived object is actually; that is, while at the beginning of the process of its being acted upon the two interacting factors are dissimilar, at the end the one acted upon is assimilated to the other and is identical in quality with it.

As a matter of fact, the idea that cognition is to be explained in terms of a kind of similitude (similatio, assimilatio, adaequatio, etc.) is a Leitmotiv throughout the Aristotelian tradition and particularly in Scholasticism. See for example how Thomas Aquinas characterizes knowledge in the De veritate:

[…] every cognition obtains by assimilation. But there cannot be any assimilation of a mind and material things, because a unity of quality yields similitude; but the qualities of material things are corporeal accidents which cannot exist in the mind. Therefore, the mind cannot cognize corporeal things. […] one has to answer that although corporeal qualities cannot exist in the mind, nonetheless, similitudes of corporeal qualities can exist in it, and it is in that respect that the mind gets assimilated with material things.
If Aquinas is by far not the only medieval author to be considered here\textsuperscript{195}, there are good reasons to think that his own Aristotelianism played a key role in the genesis of Marty’s late theory of intentionality. It is not the place to try to go into the details\textsuperscript{196}, but we do not want to conclude this study without pointing at what could well turn out to be a piece of evidence. As a catholic theologian, Marty was trained in scholastic philosophy. There is no doubt that Aquinas was a central figure in the philosophy as it was taught to the young Marty\textsuperscript{197}, and one can reasonably take for granted that besides the works of the Doctor angelicus himself, students and scholars of that time used standard works of reference such as philosophical compendia and lexica\textsuperscript{198}. For late 19th-century readers of Aquinas, the main work of reference certainly was L. Schütz’s Thomas Lexikon, first published in 1881, and a second time in 1895 in a “zweite, sehr vergrößerte Auflage” as the title page says\textsuperscript{199}. Now the first edition does not have any entry for ‘assimilatio’ (one jumps directly from ‘articulus’ to ‘assenso’). Things are different in the second edition, where one reads: “assimilatio: Verähnlichung”\textsuperscript{200}. Of course, the Aristotelico-Scholastic idea that the soul becomes assimilated to the object is also used by Brentano in his theory of intentionality\textsuperscript{201}. Nevertheless, Brentano, contrary to Marty, never insisted on this assimilation process; consequently, the systematization of this “scholastic” idea—that is: the differentia specifica of his own theory of intentionality—is to be put on Marty’s credit. And when the late Marty gives his own interpretation of truth as adequation, he suggests a remarkable modification of the classical definition (adaequatio intellectus et rei): “Veritas est adaequatio cognitantis et cognitati”\textsuperscript{202}, a formula which undoubtedly echoes the one appearing many times in Aquinas: “Scientia dicitur assimilatio scientis ad scitum”\textsuperscript{203}.

\textsuperscript{195} See for example the works of K. TACHAU (Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham. Optics, Epistemology and the Foundations of Semantics 1250-1345, Brill, Leiden, 1988), L. SPRUIT (Species intelligibilis. From Perception to Knowledge, 2 vols., Brill, Leiden, 1994), R. PASNAU (Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle Ages, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997), D. PERLER (Theorien der Intentionalität im Mittelalter), D. PERLER (ed.), (Ancient and Medieval Theories of Intentionality, Brill, Leiden 2001 (= Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters, Bd. 76 s)), L.M. DE RIJK, A Study on the Medieval Intentionality Debate up to ca. 1350, in GIRALDUS ODONIS O.F.M., Opera philosophica, volume two De intensionibus, ed. L.M. De Rijk, Brill, Leiden 2005, pp. 19-371 and H. LAGERLUND (ed.), (Representation and Objects of Thought in Medieval Philosophy, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2007). The idea that cognition is a kind of assimilation of the mind with its object is present not only in perspectivists like Roger Bacon, but also in critiques of this theory such as John Duns Scotus. Furthermore, the notion of assimilation plays also a role in Peter John Olivi’s theory of cognition, for example, an author rejecting species intelligibiles, and with whose position Marty’s final theory (assimilation without an intermediary, representational entity) bears some affinities. One can also note that Marty’s arguments for the rejection of immanent objects remind of Ockham’s reasons for the rejection of species.

\textsuperscript{196} We plan to explore the “medieval” part in Marty’s theory in a subsequent study.

\textsuperscript{197} In 1867, during his studies of theology in Mainz, Marty wrote a (now lost) piece of more than 300 pages with the title: "Die Lehre des heiligen Thomas über die Abstraktion der übersinnlichen Ideen aus den sinnlichen Bildern nebst Darstellung und Kritik der übrigen Erkenntnistheorien". It seems that it is during the redaction of this work that Marty first came in contact with the work of Brentano (see O. KRAIS, Marty's Leben und Werke. Eine Skizze, in J. EINENMEIER, A. KÄSTL, O. KRAIS (Hrsg.), A. MARTY, Gesammelte Schriften, I, 1, p. 3).

\textsuperscript{198} It appears for example that a good part of what Marty knew about medieval logic in general and supposition theory in particular comes from C. PRANTL’S Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande, first published between 1855 and 1890 — see L. CESALLI, F. GÖHNER, Marty on Naming (Nennen) and Meaning (Bedeuten).

\textsuperscript{199} Ludwig Schütz was a pupil of Brentano during his time in Würzburg, which makes it plausible that he and Marty knew each other — see, D. FISSET, G. FRECHETTE, Le legs de Brentano, p. 24.

\textsuperscript{200} L. SCHÜTZ, Thomas-Lexikon. Sammlung, Übersetzung und Erklärung der in sämtlichen Werken des h. Thomas von Aquin vorkommenden Kunstausdrucke und wissenschaftlichen Ausdrucks, Ferdinand Schöningh, Paderborn, 1895, p. 70.

\textsuperscript{201} F. BRENTANO, Descriptive Psychologie, p. 26-27 (transl. MÜLLER, p. 29), F. BRENTANO, "Vom ens rationis", in ID., Die Abkehr vom Nichtrealen, p. 324.

\textsuperscript{202} A. MARTY, Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie, § 102, p. 426.

\textsuperscript{203} See for example THOMAS AQUINAS, De Veritate, q. 11, a. 1, arg. 11.