The case of blurry vision has been cited by many as a counterexample to representationalism in the theory of perception. Specifically, it is claimed that the phenomenon of blurry vision is incompatible with the supervenience thesis which is at the root of representationalism. Michael Tye (2002), a leading representationalist, has responded to such objections by giving an account of blurry vision in a way that, allegedly, renders it compatible with representationalism. In this paper I argue that Tye’s account of blurry vision, though blocking one line of objection, cannot save representationalism. I then assimilate cases of blurry vision as well as similar cases to the more general category of indeterminate experiences.

1. Representationalism and Blurry Vision

Representationalism, or intentionalism, is the view that visual experiences, much like beliefs and thoughts, are mental representations: they are content-laden mental states that can be either correct (veridical) or incorrect (non-veridical). Besides having representational properties, which are the properties visual experience represents an object as having, experiences also have phenomenal properties, or phenomenal character. The phenomenal character of experience is “what it is like” to have the experience, or its “immediate subjective feel” (Tye 2002, 137). Representationalism differs from other theories of perception – specifically theories that assert the existence of qualia – in that it asserts the supervenience of the phenomenal properties of experience on representational properties.

The supervenience thesis (henceforth ST) is that any difference in the phenomenal character of experience necessarily entails a difference in the representational content of that experience. The minimal version of

representationalism involves a commitment to ST: ST expresses the idea that the representational content of experience determines its phenomenal character. Stronger theories of representationalism – such as Tye’s – are committed to more than ST. However, I will not go into such stronger theories here, since, as I will show, a clear picture of the phenomenon of blurry vision is sufficient to show that ST is false, which in turn is sufficient to undermine representationalism.

Some stronger versions of representationalism, for instance, are committed to the thesis of transparency. According to the transparency thesis, when you turn your attention to intrinsic features of your visual experience, you will find only external features, only the representational features of your experience – namely, how the world is according to your experience. Recently, A. D. Smith (2008, 208ff.) showed that the transparency thesis requires a kind of determination of phenomenal character by representational content which is stronger than ST suggests. I think Smith is right. Thus, at least for the reasons Smith mentions, ST is more basic for representationalism than transparency. If ST itself is wrong, representationalism is in big trouble.

What is it about the phenomenon of blurry vision that is meant to pose a problem for representationalism? The claim is as follows: a blurred experience of objects (as when one temporarily unfocuses one’s eyes) cannot be fully described in terms of representational content alone, for even the fullest description of what such experience represents still ignores its unique phenomenal character, namely, the fact that it is blurred. Thus there are phenomenological features of the blurred experience that outstrip what is represented in it. Paul Boghossian and David Velleman (1989, 94), for instance, argue that a description of a blurred experience has to include reference to areas in the visual field that are nonrepresentational or pure phenomenal aspects of experience. In general, then, blurred vision suggests that there are special ways in which we experience objects which cannot be captured in terms of representational content.

On the face of it, a distinction should be drawn between blurred experience and another, similar form of experience. We sometimes see objects as being blurry or fuzzy. The fuzziness in such a case is a property that visual experience represents an object as having. The term “blurry” or “fuzzy” in this case does

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2 Harman (1990), Tye (2002). Kind (2003, 203) goes deeper into explaining transparency; in particular, she differentiates between strong and weak transparency.
not denote any special way of experiencing objects. One can even clearly experience, say, a paint blot as being fuzzy. Such experience is in no special way different from any other, clear experience, and is by itself no threat to representationalism. A similar case, which is also perfectly compatible with representationalism, is when one non-veridically experiences an object as being blurry (e.g., when a poorly sighted person experiences a clear object as being fuzzy, as if it really lacked specific edges). Allowing visual experience to be non-veridical, the representationalist has no problem with this case either. The intrinsic character of such experience would not be different from its veridical counterpart. Both cases involve experience that is fully described by its representational character.

The problematic case is when we do not experience an object as being blurry, but rather blurrily experience an object. A representationalist may insist that such a way of experiencing objects does not exist: this is Fred Dretske’s position (2003). Of course, no one denies that we do sometimes refer to visual experience itself as being blurred. However, on Dretske’s account, what we mean in such cases is that visual experience misrepresents objects as being fuzzy: it represents fuzziness where there is none. Blurred experience thus amounts to a kind of visual illusion. The object’s represented fuzziness, which does not really exist, is possibly due to some malfunction of the visual system, and therefore the description “blurred” is ascribed to the experience itself.

The difficulties with this account have been discussed by others.\(^3\) Denying that there is a way of seeing blurrily, or that seeing blurrily and seeing blurred do not intrinsically differ, is, at the very least, highly counterintuitive. As Smith says:

\[^3\] See, e.g., Smith (2008, 201–205); Pace (2007, 336ff.).
Smith discusses several more problems that arise in Dretske’s view.4

More plausibly, then, a representationalist can try to account for blurred experience in terms of representational content. Arguably, a blurred experience has representational content with a certain structure. Following this line, even if the distinction between blurred and clear experiences is drawn by first making a reference to the phenomenal character of experience, at the end of the day the distinction can be captured in terms of representational content only.5 Recall that at the very minimum, to avoid a challenge to ST, what representationalists need to show is that experiencing blurrily does not involve variation in phenomenal character without a difference in representational content.

This is Tye’s response. It turns on the structure of representational content. Tye argues that in experiencing blurrily, “one’s visual experience […] makes no comment on where exactly the boundaries [of the object] lie” (2002, 148). Of course, there are cases in which one clearly sees (or experiences) an object as being blurry, namely, as having inaccurate boundaries: in this case the experience says that there are no clear boundaries. But when one experiences blurrily, the experience has indeterminate representational content: it does not say where the boundaries are or what their nature is; it only says that they exist between spatial regions A and B.6 As Smith sums up this idea, the difference is “between a representation of indeterminacy and the indeterminacy of representation” (Smith 2008, 207).

Clearly, then, there is a difference in representational content, and in this way Tye’s reply seems to remove the difficulty for ST. To have blurry vision entails having representational content with a certain structure: unlike clear experience, it represents the world while “being silent” on the specificity of the edges. Other experiences, and specifically clear experiences of objects as being blurry, do not have this kind of representational structure.

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4 See also Pace (2007).
6 Tye also argues that in experiencing blurrily, the experience tells one that the object’s boundaries fall between spatial regions A and B, but it is indefinite on exactly where between A and B the boundaries fall (2002, 149). But as Smith mentions (2008, 206), this is also true of representing fuzziness. The difference in representational content is not with regard to where exactly the boundaries are, only with regard to whether the fuzziness is in the world: experience of blurriness represents the object as having no specific boundaries (i.e., as being fuzzy), whereas blurrily experiencing makes no comment on the boundaries’ specificity.
I accept this structural account of blurry vision; nevertheless, I maintain that a consideration of blurry vision still entails conclusions which are incompatible with ST. Unlike what both defenders and opponents of representationalism assume, blurred experience is a counterexample to representationalism not because its phenomenological and representational properties are to be compared to those of clear experience – for Tye’s reply clearly shows that there is a difference in content between these two experiences (i.e., it should be allowed that blurred experience does indeed involve some loss of information when compared to experiencing clearly). The point about blurry vision is that the indeterminacy it involves allows, in each case, purely phenomenal changes. Once you are experiencing blurrily, certain changes in your blurred experience are possible while its representational content remains invariant: you will still experience blurrily, but your experience will be blurred in a different way, a way that cannot be captured in terms of content. This is true not only of blurred experience, but of other kinds of indeterminate experiences as well. I will now explain and defend this claim.

2. Experiences with Indeterminate Content

There is more than one way to see something blurrily. The differences between these ways, however, are not necessarily in representational content. Suppose you’re looking at a coin and see it clearly; you see it, for instance, as being specifically circular. Seeing a coin in this way is a typical case of clear experience; call this experience CE.

You then unfocus your eyes and start to see the coin blurrily: you do not experience the specific location of the edge, nor that the coin has a fuzzy edge; your experience is silent on where exactly the edge is located as well as on the edge’s degree of specificity. It says only that the edge is located between regions A and B. Suppose also that the phenomenal character of your experience includes, because of your blurred vision, a somewhat hazy area. Call this experience BE. I will argue that this phenomenal property – namely, the hazy aspect – can change in a certain way without changing BE’s representational content. Arguably, there has to be a specific aspect of this haziness that is nonrepresentational.

Compare BE to a different, falsidical experience, one that represents the coin as being fuzzy, namely, as having a proper fuzzy edge. In this
case you (nonveridically) experience the coin clearly: your experience “comments” that the coin’s edge is fuzzy. Call this experience EF. We can thus distinguish three experiences, CE, BE and EF, which differ from each other in representational content. Specifically, whereas BE’s haziness represents the edge without commenting on its specific location and nature, EF’s haziness represents the edge as being fuzzy. More specifically, suppose the phenomenal hazy area has a certain texture, say, a slightly coarse-grained one (the texture simply includes an array of small dots). Again, whereas BE’s hazy aspect represents the coin’s edge as merely located between regions A and B, EF, qua being a clear experience, represents the coin as having a fuzzy edge that has, in particular, a certain dotted texture, as the phenomenal haziness suggests (note that such a visual representation may be generated by simple graphic software).

If CE, BE and EF differ in representational content, how is BE a counterexample to ST? Recall that BE is just one blurred experience you may have. There can obviously be a similar blurred experience of the coin, one that has a hazy aspect with a different coarse-grained texture – one in which, say, the small dots are simply located differently (with no other phenomenal difference). Call this experience BE’. Much like BE, BE’ is silent on the edge’s location. Both BE and BE’ indeterminately represent the coin: they both seem to represent it as having its edge between areas A and B while being silent on the edge’s location or degree of specificity. Also, neither represents the coin as having one or the other dotted texture, for they differ precisely in this respect from the two correspondent clear experiences (those that represent the coin as having differently-dotted fuzzy boundaries, as the phenomenal difference between the arrays of dots suggests). Thus, BE and BE’ have the same, indeterminate, content, whereas they differ phenomenologically.

The point of this example is not to show how tiny phenomenal changes might or might not be representationally significant. Clearly, minor changes in phenomenology can easily affect what visual experience represents (e.g., when viewed on the computer screen at slightly different pixel settings, a word might sometimes look completely different). The point here is that, since the phenomenology of BE is specific enough to represent the coin’s edge as having a dotted texture (as with EF), once your experience is blurred, hence silent on the edge’s nature and location, the specific array of dots is not representational anymore: it can change to some different texture without
changing the content. Thus, following Tye’s account, where the hazy area does not comment on the edge’s precise nature, there can be nothing in the difference between the phenomenal aspects of BE and BE’ that entails a difference in their representational content.

Representationalists might still insist that necessarily, there is a representational difference between BE and BE’; for there is nothing in the logical relationship between determinables and determinates that rules out this necessity. Although BE and BE’ are not different in representing determinates (since neither represents the edge’s specific location), they may nevertheless be different in representing determinables, and the representationalist can insist that they have to differ in this way. While BE, for instance, merely represents the edge as located between areas A and B, BE’ may also represent the edge determinably – but as located between two different areas, A’ and B’. Every phenomenal difference between two blurred experiences such as BE and BE’ entails in this way a difference in content, which would be a difference between two determinables, namely, two differently nonspecific locations of the edge.

This formal reply, however, is undermined by examining BE/BE’ more closely. What reason is there to argue that a difference in the array of dots entails a difference in the edge’s nonspecific location? The only premise was that the array of dots is arranged differently; hence, it can basically represent the same indeterminate content, despite the difference in the dots’ location: the dots’ location has simply no role in this experience. Moreover, given that the dots themselves do not represent any dots on the edge’s surface, at least some of them can change even to squares, diamonds, or other shapes that may thus induce a hazy texture with the same boundaries, thus they will still represent the same sparse content, namely, that the edge is located between areas A and B. Again, if the texture were fully representational (EF), it would represent a fuzzy edge covered with dots, squares, or diamonds, and the content would then be different. But once we assumed that BE merely represents the edge’s nonspecific location, the information embedded in the hazy aspect is sufficiently indeterminate to be embedded in other kinds of hazy aspects. In our example, a simple difference in the dots’ location does not involve new information with regard to the areas between which the edge exists.
3. Other Examples

Without committing oneself to any thesis with regard to pictorial perception, the argument can be clarified by an analogy to viewing an indeterminate picture. Suppose, for the argument’s sake, that we can visually experience an object by looking at a picture of it. You are looking at a black-and-white picture of, say, a garden (or, likewise, at a black-and-white television screen), and visually experience a garden. You do not experience the garden as having grey shades, nor as having any other specific hue; you experience the garden indeterminately, as merely having a hue (with a certain degree of brightness). The important point here is the structure of the indeterminate experience: the fact that you experience the garden indeterminately means that the picture’s hue could change to a different hue, for instance, to sepia, without necessarily changing any property that the garden is experienced as having.

As with blurred experience, the idea is that once your experience represents something indeterminately, a certain aspect in its phenomenology can change without changing the representational content of your experience. Whether or not we really experience objects by looking at their picture, this case explains how indeterminacy is incompatible with ST: the indeterminacy of representational content entails that the state’s phenomenology is open to change without changing the content.

It would thus not be surprising that pure phenomenal differences is typical not only of blurry vision (or indeterminate pictorial experience – for intentionalists who accept that we experience pictured objects), but of other cases of indeterminate experience.

Here is another example. Suppose the above-mentioned clear experience of the coin (CE) is somehow distorted, so that the phenomenal circular aspect that represented the coin’s shape clearly becomes somewhat wiggly. The new experience’s phenomenology simply includes a certain “curve” that partly looks like, say, the tilde sign: ~. As with BE/EF, the case may involve two different experiences: First, you may start to experience the coin as having a wiggly, tilde-like edge, as if someone has actually distorted the coin’s shape. Alternatively, similar to what Tye says of blurred experience, such a distorted phenomenology can represent the coin indeterminately, namely, without having the experience say anything specific about the edge’s location. Call the latter experience DE.
Much the same as BE’s hazy aspect does not represent a fuzzy, dotted edge, DE’s tilde-like aspect does not represent a tilde-like, twisted edge. Both experiences represent the coin’s boundaries merely as located between regions A and B. Indeed, I take it for granted that an indeterminate experience does not need to have a hazy phenomenal aspect, but may also be exemplified by other phenomenal aspects, such as this kind of distortion. Now if we compare DE either to CE or to clearly experiencing the coin as having a tilde-like edge, we have to admit that DE involves some loss of representational content. DE (like BE) differs in representational content from any determinate experience, because qua being indeterminate, DE does not represent the edge’s specific location or specificity.

But in order to see whether DE’s tilde-like phenomenal property is representational, DE should be compared to a differently distorted experience. Let DE’ be identical to DE in all phenomenal aspects but one: it has DE’s mirrored tilde-like aspect. DE’ also represents the coin indeterminately, namely, without commenting on the edge’s specificity and location. It may thus represent the coin with the same degree of indeterminacy as DE does. Yet the phenomenology of DE’ includes a different distortion, namely, a reflected tilde. Thus, DE and DE’ have the same representational content, although they differ in their phenomenal properties.

As with BE/BE’, representationalists may respond that DE and DE’ have to differ in content as well, since their tilde/reflected-tilde phenomenal aspects necessarily capture differently nonspecific areas. Yet this can hardly be the case: how can having the mirrored tilde-like aspect entail a difference in representational content? There is nothing in such a phenomenal difference that suggests that the regions between which the edge is located are A’ and B’ and not A and B. Suppose that when you have DE, or alternatively DE’, you attend carefully to the representational content of experience, especially to the specificity and the location of the coin’s edge. Equipped with a sufficient conceptual repertoire, you actually form the beliefs about the edge’s location that can be drawn on the basis of your visual experience. You simply try as hard as possible to reveal the contents of your experience with regard to the edge’s nature. Is there any difference between the evidence provided by DE and DE' that might bring you to different conclusions in each case? Given that one experience includes a wiggly area, the reflected area cannot possibly contribute anything to your knowledge. More specifically, DE’s tilde-like phenomenology is determined by the fact that the actual edge is between
the tilde’s upper and lower limits. But this is true also of the mirrored tilde-like aspect! Recall that in both experiences the specific curve-ness does not represent the edge’s curve (only that its boundaries are between two areas); hence, the phenomenal aspects of DE and DE', although different, cannot be said to denote any difference in information. In both cases we experience the coin in the same indeterminate manner.

Distorted, blurred, and probably other forms of indeterminate experience are all counterexamples to ST for the same reason: they can all be compared to a possible, differently indeterminate experience, one that differs in phenomenal character but not in representational content. Obviously, in experiences of indeterminacy, e.g., EF, the phenomenal aspects – the hazy or wiggly areas – are representational, as they are determined by a difference in content which is the difference between the represented properties of having either one or the other coarse-grained texture, and likewise, either a tilde-like edge or the mirrored-tilde one. Yet BE and DE, contrary to EF, can change in their phenomenal character, since they represent merely “rough,” indeterminate properties.

4. Generalization

What special characteristic does indeterminate experience have that makes it different from determinate experience with respect to ST? The answer is probably that one is indeterminate and the other is not. But recall that simply being indeterminate in the sense of not representing determinate properties is true also of clear experience of an object as being fuzzy. The modification (suggested by Tye) was that such experiences represent in an indeterminate manner because they are silent on the edges’ locations and specificities, whereas clear experience is not (i.e., it represents the degree of indeterminacy, and therefore it is not indeterminate experience per se).

But this modification is still insufficient. For being indeterminate is always relative to a given degree of determinacy. In general, the relation between determinables and determinates holds between more than two levels of a set of properties. For instance, “red” is a determinate of “color,” but it is a determinable of “red-27”; likewise, “round” is a determinate of “shape,” but a determinable of “ellipse.” In the same way, every experience is indeterminate with regard to some other experience: if you looked at a
coin through a magnifying glass or microscope, you would quickly conclude that your “ordinary” experience of it is indeterminate – because it doesn’t comment on the more precise location of the edge, which is revealed by the other, clearer experience. Nevertheless, you typically won’t regard your ordinary experience as indeterminate in the above sense: your ordinary, everyday experience is certainly not blurred, and cannot be used as a counterexample to ST just because you can have clearer experience.

Thus, it is, specifically, indeterminacy with a certain structure due to which ST is refuted. Some, but not all, experiences have a certain characteristic that makes them indeterminate with regard to other experiences in a special sense. If this special sense cannot be found in how experiences represent the world (again, because most or all everyday experiences represent the world indeterminately with regard to some other experiences), we should look for this aspect at the phenomenal level.

The special sense in question can be easily identified by consideration of the above examples. I argued that blurred or distorted experiences are different from other experiences that are possibly blurred or distorted in phenomenal aspects only. The presence of such an aspect is what constitutes their indeterminacy: without it, the experience would be clear, or fully determinate in the above sense. Indeterminacy here simply follows from having a phenomenal, nonrepresentational (or nonintentional) property. In general, a phenomenal property P of visual experience E is nonrepresentational (or nonintentional) just in case there can be visual experience E’ that does not differ from E in representational content, yet differs from it in not having P. E is then either blurred, distorted or, generally, indeterminate (i.e., in the above sense). Its indeterminacy follows from the fact that it has P.

Obviously, there can also be experience in which P is representational (e.g., when we experience the object as having what P represents, as with EF); such experience would be determinate in this sense, because it clearly represents indeterminacy. The intrinsic structure of blurred or distorted experience thus guarantees its unique sort of indeterminacy: it is indeterminate because it does not specify what a fully representational experience – an experience in which P is representational – would specify.

7 The internal differences between blurred and distorted experience are probably based on the nature of P: a hazy aspect constitutes blurred experience, a wiggly aspect a distorted one, and so on.
Note that in pointing to the phenomenal level of visual experience, I am not denying that there might also be a higher-order cognitive process, external to visual experience, which is part of what makes experience indeterminate. Perhaps even a certain belief about the way one perceives the world is necessary in order to be capable of experiencing things blurrrily, perhaps not. It might be that one has to realize that with regard to one’s everyday perceptual capability, one’s current experience is indeterminate, and only in this way can a phenomenal property P be constituted. This would be strange, but not incompatible with my account. My point is that even if there is such a cognitive, non-experiential process, there has also to be an intrinsic, phenomenal characteristic of experience that constitutes the indeterminacy at issue. There is simply no consideration external to visual experience that by itself makes experience blurred, distorted, and so on.

As with the above examples, this generalization is incompatible with ST. Indeed, if ST were true, we would face two extreme options: either (1) no indeterminate experience per se is possible (i.e., only the experience of indeterminacy – namely, fuzziness – is possible); or (2) all possible experiences are indeterminate (i.e., given that “indeterminate experience” means being silent on what some other, clearer experience specifies). The account here, much like Tye’s account, rejects option (1), but shows that there is a subset of experiences that are indeterminate in a special sense. These experiences do not specify what we expect other – perhaps all – of our experiences to specify: they do not specify what their “loose,” P-like, phenomenal property could represent. Once all their phenomenal properties become representational, they would become clear, “normal” experiences, and their indeterminacy would amount only to the sense suggested in option (2).

On this account there has to be a phenomenal difference between clear and blurred experience, since having a phenomenal nonrepresentational property is constitutive of indeterminacy. This might seem too strong. Tye, for instance, asks whether there is any inherent phenomenal difference “between the states of seeing a clear thing blurrrily and seeing a blurry thing clearly” (2002, 148). He replies that although some blurred experiences are phenomenally different from their experiences-of-blurriness counterparts, “an experimental set-up could be devised that would leave one without any way of telling from the phenomenal character of one’s visual experience … whether one had shifted from seeing a sharp screen image through a blur to
seeing clearly a suitable blurred version of that same screen image in at least some cases” (ibid.).

Tye does not go on to explain this set up. I think, first, that the case of seeing images, or seeing things through a blur, and likewise “seeing” through pictorial representations, is complicated enough, requires its own theory, and cannot straightforwardly be considered as a counterexample to the suggested account. Without going into details, the fact that we can visually experience an image or a picture itself, and alternatively experience what is in the image or what the picture represents, makes this case problematic enough to offer us an example of what Tye gestures towards in his thought-experiment.8 Second, even if Tye’s claim was intended to be generalized to ordinary cases, all he says is that sometimes one cannot tell whether one has shifted from experiencing blurrily to experiencing clearly. This by itself is not incompatible with having a nonrepresentational phenomenal property. Arguably, one can have indeterminate experience, namely, experience with a certain phenomenal property that is not determined by what the experience represents and is therefore nonrepresentational, yet without being aware of this fact.

One thing is clear: when we recognize that we experience blurrily, it is not, or not merely, by way of comparing it to more precise, determinate experiences; it is rather by noticing an intrinsic feature of experience. The account of blurriness suggested by Tye forces us, at the end of the day, to give up ST. The “loss of information” that is typical to blurred experience on such an account does not result in us experiencing less information than what is embedded in clear experience, but delves deep into the structure of experience, leaving some of its phenomenal aspects undetermined by representational content.

5. Conclusion

Tye’s account of blurred experience as neither an illusion nor a partly-nonrepresentational experience was probably motivated by the desire to preserve the tenet that – in sense experience – the world appears as being

8 Seeing something through a picture might be interpreted, e.g., according to Ken Walton’s theory of transparent pictures, on which we actually see things through binoculars, televisions, as well as photographs (Walton 1984; cf. Zemach 1999 and Newall 2009).
open to, or in direct contact with, the perceiver. Tye tried to show that this is true even in the case of seeing blurrily. I showed, however, that his account of blurry vision is inadequate. Although Tye describes correctly the phenomenon of blurred experience, it still involves the purely phenomenal haziness or distortion that Tye attempts to remove.

Bar-Ilan University

Bibliography


