Grading Modal Judgment

Nate Charlow

Abstract This paper provides a model of graded modal judgment. It begins by problematizing the phenomenon: given plausible constraints on the logic of epistemic modality, it is impossible to model graded attitudes toward modal claims as judgments of probability targeting modal propositions. This paper considers two alternative models, on which modal operators are non-proposition-forming operators: (1) Moss (2015), in which graded attitudes toward modal claims are represented as judgments of probability targeting a "proxy" proposition, belief in which would underwrite belief in the modal claim. (2) A model on which graded attitudes toward modal claims are represented as judgments of credence taking as their objects (non-propositional) modal representations (rather than proxy propositions). The second model, like Moss' model, is shown to be both semantically and mathematically tractable. The second model, however, can be straightforwardly integrated into a plausible model of the role of graded attitudes toward modal claims in cognition and normative epistemology.

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1   Introduction

Agents can bear graded attitudes (e.g., intermediate or high credence) towards epistemic modalities.[1] Sentences expressing such graded attitudes are commonplace; consider the following triad (adapted from Moss 2015: 4):

(1)   It is probably the case that Trump might be impeached.

(2)   It is probably the case that Trump will be impeached.

(3)   Trump might be impeached.

Moss remarks that "our judgments suggest that [(1)] is weaker than either [(2)] or [(3)]." Believing (2) "is intuitively sufficient reason to bet at even odds" that Trump will be impeached, "whereas merely believing [(1)] is not" (Moss 2015: 4). Meanwhile, asserting (3) represents the speaker as believing that Trump might be impeached; (1) does not.[2]

The basic data point can be established in various ways. Consideration of (1)–(3) suggests the existence of sentences of natural language serving to express graded attitudes towards epistemic modalities. Graded attitudes towards epistemic modalities also appear to be presupposed by platitudes about the conversational role of epistemic modalities. Willer (2013), for instance, observes that assertions of epistemic modalities are understood as non-trivial proposals to add information to—that is, address a question within—a discourse. Assertion of a sentence like (3) addresses a question about whether Trump might be impeached:

(4)   Might Trump be impeached?

But the notion of such a question seems to *presuppose* the possibility of a graded attitude (i.e., a degree of confidence greater than 0 and less than 1) toward a sentence like (3). Such an attitude typically forms at least part of the cognitive basis for entertaining (or explicitly posing) such a question; the question is generally occasioned by the questioner's bearing a graded attitude toward an epistemically modal representation.

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[1]By 'epistemic modality', I will mean a sentence (or sometimes the content of a sentence) of the form $O\phi$, where O is an autocentrically interpreted epistemic operator and ϕ is its sentential prejacent. An autocentric interpretation of a sentence of the form $O\phi$ is an interpretation according to which the speaker is interpreted as making an epistemic claim, "based on", or from the "vantage" of, their own information/evidence (cf. Lasersohn 2005). Epistemic operators are here understood to encompass genuinely modal operators ('must', 'might'), epistemic or probabilistic adverbs ('probably', 'certainly', 'possibly'), numerical probability operators ('it is n-likely that'), and more.

[2]Yalcin (2009) argues (in service of a more general skepticism about the semantic productivity of iterating epistemic vocabulary) that a speaker who asserts that it might be the case that Trump might be impeached is *committed to allowing that* Trump might be impeached. I deny this (and its relevance to the target phenomenon for this paper). Claim: in a context c, the truth (or assertability) of a sentence of the form $\diamond\phi$ implies that ϕ is a relevant epistemic possibility in c (and vice versa). Therefore, a speaker who asserts this claim at c has *not* made a mistake, if Trump's being impeached is not a relevant epistemic possibility at c (i.e., it would be improper to assert (3) in c). This suggests the content of the speaker's assertion is weaker than with (3). In any case, Yalcin's argument fares poorly, if extended—as it must be, if the aim is to deny the semantic productivity of iterating epistemic vocabulary—to possibility modals scoping over 'probably'—someone who says that it's possible that Trump will probably be impeached is not committed to allowing that Trump will probably be impeached (cf. Moss 2018: 46). Finally, even if successful, arguing that a speaker who asserts that it might be the case that Trump might be impeached is *committed to allowing that* Trump might be impeached is insufficient to establish that the content of the speaker's assertion entails that Trump might be impeached—particularly in the context of strong arguments that the content of the speaker's assertion is weaker than the content of (3).

This paper proposes a model of graded modal judgment. It begins (§2) by problematizing the phenomenon for propositional (really, classical truth-conditional) accounts of the semantic content of epistemic modalities: given plausible constraints on the logic of epistemic modality, it is actually *impossible* to model graded attitudes toward modal claims as judgments of *probability* taking modalized propositions as their objects [REDACTED]. In response to this problem, this paper considers two alternative models, on which modal operators are *non-proposition-forming* operators:

- §3: Moss (2015), on which a graded attitude toward a modal claim is represented as a degreed belief taking a "proxy" proposition, belief in which would underwrite belief in the modal claim, as its object.
- §4: A model on which a graded attitude toward a modal claim is represented as a degreed belief taking as its object a (non-propositional) modal representation (rather than a proxy proposition).

The second model is shown to be theoretically tractable—a feature that does *not* ultimately distinguish it from Moss' model. Since, however, Moss argues extensively against accounts of the second type, such a model is worth developing, even if only as a proof of concept. In §5, I argue that such a model deserves attention, not only as a proof of concept, but also because it is straightforwardly integrated into a plausible understanding of the functional role of graded attitudes toward modal claims in both cognition and normative epistemology. A view of this shape has some claim to being regarded as the null hypothesis about the target phenomenon.

2 No Uncertainty?

Most everyone would agree that the base semantic clause for the epistemic possibility modal $\diamond$ (and its dual operator $\square$) is information-sensitive—i.e., involves reference within the semantic metalanguage to a state of information—and that, relative to a "base" state of information—for present purposes, this is modeled as a (possibly constant and/or partial) function from worlds of evaluation into sets of possible worlds—epistemic possibility modals quantify existentially over possibilities compatible with that state. Relative to a choice of information state σ and a choice of index of evaluation w, the appropriate semantic clause for $\diamond$ is as follows:

$$\llbracket \diamond \phi \rrbracket^{\sigma,w} = \mathsf{T} \Leftrightarrow \exists v \in \sigma_w : \llbracket \phi \rrbracket^{\sigma,v} = \mathsf{T}$$

A sentence of the form $\diamond\phi$ thus expresses a possible worlds proposition, namely:

$$\llbracket \diamond \phi \rrbracket^{\sigma} = \{w : \exists v \in \sigma_w : \llbracket \phi \rrbracket^{\sigma,v} = \mathsf{T}\}$$

Such a proposition is the sort of thing to which a probability function can, in principle, assign a probability, and is the sort of thing toward which agents can, in principle, bear graded attitudes (e.g., being 10% confident in this proposition).

On the other hand, there is apparently strong evidence that sentences of the form $\diamond\phi$ *cannot* generally express possible worlds propositions with these sorts of characteristics. First, assume that, for any w and σ, $\llbracket \square\phi \wedge \neg\phi \rrbracket^{\sigma,w} = \mathsf{F}$ and $\llbracket \diamond\phi \wedge \neg\square\diamond\phi \rrbracket^{\sigma,w} = \mathsf{F}$.

(5)   #It must be raining, but it isn't.

(6)   #It may be raining, but maybe it can't be.

In the present setting, this is equivalent to assuming that σ is governed by constrains of Reflexivity and Euclideanness.[3]

Reflexivity: $w \in \sigma_w$ $\qquad\qquad$ $\forall w, \sigma : [\![\Box\phi \supset \phi]\!]^{\sigma,w} = \mathsf{T}$

Euclideanness: $v \in \sigma_w \Rightarrow \sigma_w \subseteq \sigma_v$ $\qquad$ $\forall w, \sigma : [\![\Diamond\phi \supset \Box\Diamond\phi]\!]^{\sigma,w} = \mathsf{T}$

These constraints imply that information states are epistemically transparent:

Transparency: $v \in \sigma_w \Rightarrow \sigma_w = \sigma_v$

$$\forall w, v, \sigma : v \in \sigma_w \Rightarrow [\![\Diamond\phi]\!]^{\sigma,w} = [\![\Diamond\phi]\!]^{\sigma,v}$$

Given Transparency, epistemic modalities are "rigid" relative to a choice of σ and w: if ϕ is a sentence of the form $\Diamond\psi$ or $\Box\psi$ and $[\![\phi]\!]^{\sigma,w} = \mathsf{T}$, then, for any $v \in \sigma_w$, $[\![\phi]\!]^{\sigma,v} = \mathsf{T}$. Hence, whenever $[\![\phi]\!]^{\sigma,w} = \mathsf{T}$:

$$\sigma_w \subseteq [\![\phi]\!]^{\sigma}$$

The basic difficulty this gives rise to is this: like an agent's degree of belief in any proposition, an agent's degree of belief in an epistemically modal proposition *ought to be* a probability. And yet it provably *cannot* be. (Conclusion: a graded modal judgment is not to be understood in terms of a degree of belief in an epistemically modal proposition.) To illustrate, consider a probabilistically coherent agent[4] A bearing a graded attitude—confidence $\in (0,1)$—towards $\Diamond p$ (alternatively, $\Box p$). Although this may already be apparent to some readers, it is worth underlining that (as well as why) such an agent is impossible to represent within the present framework.

Let σ_w^A represent A's information at w. If p is possible (alternatively, necessary) for A at w, then $[\![\Diamond p]\!]^{\sigma^A,w} = \mathsf{T}$ (alternatively, $[\![\Box p]\!]^{\sigma^A,w} = \mathsf{T}$). But then, in view of Transparency, $[\![\Box\Diamond p]\!]^{\sigma^A,w} = \mathsf{T}$ (alternatively, $[\![\Box\Box p]\!]^{\sigma^A,w} = \mathsf{T}$). The difficulty is this: if A is probabilistically coherent, and A's information entails $\Diamond p$ (alternatively, $\Box p$), then A must assign $\Diamond p$ (alternatively, $\Box p$) probability 1. It follows that A's confidence in $\Diamond p$ or $\Box p$ must be extremal (0 or 1).[5]

Proof. Consider any probabilistically coherent agent A; let σ_w^A be A's information at w and Pr_w^A be a probability measure for A at w. Either $\exists v \in \sigma_w : [\![p]\!]^{\sigma,v} = \mathsf{T}$ or $\forall v \in \sigma_w : [\![p]\!]^{\sigma,v} = \mathsf{F}$. If $\exists v \in \sigma_w : [\![p]\!]^{\sigma,v} = \mathsf{T}$, then $[\![\Diamond p]\!]^{\sigma,w} = \mathsf{T}$, in which case $\sigma_w \subseteq [\![\Diamond p]\!]^{\sigma}$ and $Pr_w^A([\![\Diamond p]\!]^{\sigma}) = 1$. If

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[3]On Euclideanness, see Appendix B.1, and [REDACTED]. These are standard assumptions in the semantics/logic of epistemic modalities (see, e.g., Holliday & Icard III 2010; Gillies 2010; von Fintel & Gillies 2010, 2011, 2018). The phenomena of interest in this paper will also arise for modalities of belief (axiomatized by KD45, rather than S5).

[4]A probabilistically coherent agent is one whose degrees of belief in some σ-algebra of some subset of W are representable with a probability function.

[5]Worth underlining: this is *not* an artifact of the use of sets of possibilia to model states of information. So long as the class of models for an epistemically modal language is required to satisfy object language analogues of Reflexivity ($\Box\phi \supset \phi$) and Euclideanness ($\Diamond\phi \supset \Box\Diamond\phi$)—and logical consequence is closed under modus ponens, i.e., $\Gamma \vdash \phi \supset \psi$ implies that $\Gamma \cup \{\phi\} \vdash \psi$—the logic of epistemic modality will be constrained by the following entailments:

$$\Box\phi \dashv\vdash \Box\Box\phi$$
$$\Diamond\phi \dashv\vdash \Box\Diamond\phi$$

(To preview, on the account defended here, these entailments will fail in the left-to-right direction, even though for any context c, $[\![\Box\phi \wedge \neg\phi]\!]^c = \emptyset$ and $[\![\Diamond\phi \wedge \neg\Box\Diamond\phi]\!]^c = \emptyset$; on this point, see Appendix B.1.) Let I_w^A designate A's information at w; we will *not* assume that I_w^A is a set of possible worlds. Now either $[\![\Diamond p]\!]^{I^A,w} = \mathsf{T}$ (if I_w^A is compatible with p) or $[\![\Diamond p]\!]^{I^A,w} = \mathsf{F}$ (otherwise). If $[\![\Diamond p]\!]^{I^A,w} = \mathsf{T}$, then $[\![\Box\Diamond p]\!]^{I^A,w} = \mathsf{T}$, in which case I_w^A is incompatible with $\neg\Diamond p$ (i.e., I_w^A entails $\Diamond p$). Since A is probabilistically coherent, $Pr_w^A(\Diamond p) = 1$. If, on the other hand, $[\![\Diamond p]\!]^{I^A,w} = \mathsf{F}$, then $[\![\Box\neg\Diamond p]\!]^{I^A,w} = \mathsf{T}$, in which case I_w^A is incompatible with $\Diamond p$ (i.e., I_w^A entails $\neg\Diamond p$). Since A is probabilistically coherent, $Pr_w^A(\Diamond p) = 0$. Thus, again, either $Pr_w^A([\![\Diamond p]\!]^{\sigma}) = 1$ or $Pr_w^A([\![\Diamond p]\!]^{\sigma}) = 0$.

$\forall v \in \sigma_w : [\![p]\!]^{\sigma,v} = \mathsf{F}$, then $[\![\Diamond p]\!]^{\sigma,w} = \mathsf{F}$, in which case $\sigma_w \cap [\![\Diamond p]\!]^\sigma = \emptyset$ and $Pr_w^A([\![\Diamond p]\!]^\sigma) = 0$. Thus, either $Pr_w^A([\![\Diamond p]\!]^\sigma) = 1$ or $Pr_w^A([\![\Diamond p]\!]^\sigma) = 0$. □

Within the "classical" semantic setting presupposed in this section, it seems that we confront a hard choice: between a revisionary logic of epistemic modality, and a revisionary understanding of the attitudes it is possible to bear toward sentences expressing subjective uncertainty. Given this sort of "classical" setting, if we maintain the assumption that (5) and (6) are inconsistent, the phenomenon of degreed belief in epistemic modalities is mystified: such a degree of belief cannot be represented as a judgment of probability targeting an epistemically modal proposition.

Nor, therefore, can we represent degrees of belief toward epistemic modalities using *sets* of probability measures taking epistemically modal propositions as their objects. According to the "Bayesian" proposal for representing such attitudes (Yalcin 2012; Rothschild 2012), "Where an agent assigns a determinate probability to a proposition, every measure in their credal set [i.e., the set of probability measures compatible with their information] assigns that probability to it. A probabilistic claim is true of a credal set just in case it is true on every probability measure in the set" (Rothschild 2012: 110). The difficulty is that, given the arguments of this section, a set of probability measures S is constrained so that, if ϕ is epistemically modal:

$$\forall Pr \in S : Pr(\phi) = 0 \text{ or } Pr(\phi) = 1$$

Attitudes of intermediate confidence (e.g., confidence n) toward a sentence ϕ are represented, according to the Bayesian proposal, with sets of probability measures, all of which assign probability $\geq n$ to ϕ. No probability measure assigns intermediate confidence to ϕ if ϕ is epistemically modal. And so, given the Bayesian proposal, no set of probability measures can represent attitudes of intermediate confidence toward epistemic modalities.

3   Linguistic Gradability and Gradability of Content

Moss (2015) provides a semantics for epistemic operators, including a sentential operator $\triangle$ expressing high confidence in its complement. On Moss' semantics, a sentence of the form $\triangle\phi$ (read: it is probable that ϕ) expresses a constraint on probability measures, namely, the constraint that a probability measure satisfies just if it is in the following set:

$$[\![\triangle_1\phi]\!]^c = [\![\triangle_1]\!]^c([\![\phi]\!]^c) = \{m : m(\bigcup\{p \in g_c(1) : m|_p \in [\![\phi]\!]^c\}) > .5\}$$

Epistemic operators are, in general, interpreted relative to contextually salient partitions (i.e., contextually relevant questions); numerical indices (e.g., subscripted '1') are mapped to contextually salient partitions by a contextual variable assignment g_c. Thus, $\triangle\phi$ expresses a constraint on probability measures that m satisfies iff m assigns this proposition a value exceeding .5:

$$\bigcup\{p \in g_c(1) : m|_p \in [\![\phi]\!]^c\}$$

The object that receives a probability value (according to a probability measure m satisfying the constraint semantically expressed by the sentence) is the disjunction of those propositions in the salient partition that confirm ϕ—i.e., the disjunction of those propositions p such that, if m were conditionalized on p, m would satisfy the constraint expressed by ϕ.

Moss' account handles iterated epistemic operators with ease. To illustrate, suppose $\phi = \Box_2 p$. Then $\triangle_1\phi$ expresses a constraint on probability measures that m satisfies iff m assigns this

proposition a value exceeding .5:

$$\bigcup \{q \in g_c(1) : m|_q \in [\![\Box_2 p]\!]^c\}$$

This is, roughly, the constraint that m satisfies just if m regards a salient propositional disjunction as probable: in particular, the disjunction of those answers q to the contextually salient question $g_c(1)$ such that conditioning m on q would make it the case that m regards p as necessary. In shorthand, it is the constraint that m satisfies just if m regards as likely some disjunction such that any way of m's coming to accept that disjunction would amount to m's regarding p as necessary. It is obvious why, on this model, it is sensible for a probabilistically coherent agent to think (as well as to express the thought) that p is probably necessary, without at the same time thinking (or being committed to expressing the thought) that p is necessary: $[\![\Box_2 p]\!]^c$ encodes a stronger constraint on measures—in Moss' system, it is the constraint that m satisfies just if, for any way r of answering $g_c(2)$, $m|_r([\![p]\!]^c) = 1$ (Moss 2015: 27). Of course, this is a constraint that a measure satisfying the constraint encoded in $[\![\triangle_1 \Box_2 p]\!]^c$ will not generally satisfy.

3.1 Worldly Representation

Moss' semantics does not—contrary to what we might have expected—analyze $\triangle \phi$ as expressing a constraint on the numerical value a measure assigns *the semantic content of the probability operator's sentential complement*. For Moss, $\triangle \phi$ semantically rules out probability measures that do not regard as likely the disjunction of the propositions conditionalization on which is sufficient for believing ϕ. Strictly speaking, $[\![\triangle \phi]\!]^c$ does *not* rule out measures according to which $[\![\phi]\!]^c$ is not likely; when ϕ is epistemically modal, Moss denies that $[\![\phi]\!]^c$ is the sort of thing that over which a measure is defined (since it is not, on Moss' semantics, a possible worlds proposition).

To be clear, a view like this certainly makes sense—indeed, given what I argued in §2, would be *forced*—if probability measures—qua devices for representing agential degrees of belief—were assumed to be defined only over σ-algebras of sets of possible worlds. And—given that the theoretical purpose of invoking probability measures (for this application) is to model an agent's degree of belief *in some representation*—assuming that probability measures are defined only over σ-algebras of sets of possible worlds makes sense, too, if the cognitive state of representation were to be understood in terms of representing some way the actual world could (not) be (as, e.g., in Stalnaker 1984).

In the next section, however, we will see considerations that seem to recommend *generalizing* this "worldly" notion of representation. Given that the theoretical function of invoking probability measures (for this application) is to model an agent's degree of belief in some representation, developing a generalized notion of representation provides a theoretical rationale—or at least theoretical cover—for introducing a way of modeling degrees of belief that does not assume that degrees of belief, fundamentally, must target representations of the actual world.

3.2 Pressures to Generalize Representation

Moss' system smoothly accounts for the semantics of constructions in natural language that *express* graded attitudes towards epistemic modalities. Spotting ourselves the requisite compositional bells and whistles, the system can be extended to account for the semantics of constructions that *ascribe* such attitudes:

(7)   Marcy thinks it is probably the case that Trump might be impeached.

A sentence like (7) will say, roughly, that Marcy is representable as satisfying the constraint expressed, on Moss' semantics, by (1). More roughly still, (7) attributes to Marcy the attitude of thinking it probable that at least one of the propositions p, such that belief in p is sufficient for thinking Trumping might be impeached, is true.

This account of the semantics of belief-ascriptions like (7) also suggests a model of *graded attitudes* towards epistemic modalities: on the intended model, the cognitive structure of such attitudes can be read off from the semantic structure of sentences ascribing such attitudes. That is to say, on the intended model, such attitudes are represented, not with assignments of probability-like values to epistemically modal representations, but rather with assignments of bona fide probabilities to "proxy representations" (modeled as possible worlds propositions) that cognitively underwrite epistemically modal quasi-representations.

If we read Moss this way, however, we read her as committed to a specific thesis about the structure of epistemically modal cognition—one that is in prima facie tension with commonplaces like the following.[6] Like ordinary propositional representations, epistemically modal representations *appear* to:

- Serve as possible objects of *attitudes* like full belief, knowledge, and (in particular) partial or degreed belief.[7]
- Constrain rational belief and action: what is rational for an agent to believe or do can depend, in a familiar way, on her believing, knowing, or (in particular) having a certain degree of belief in an epistemically modal representation. (We will see examples below.)

A natural first move in accounting for facts like these would be to posit that a state of degreed belief in a representation is a natural cognitive kind, unified (very roughly) by the role that such a state plays in cognition—a role that does not require that the object representation be of a specific semantic type. According to this sort of picture, graded attitudes (e.g., being 50% confident that ϕ) are attitudes with a unified type of cognitive realizer—namely, the representation that ϕ being mapped to a middle point on a bounded scale whose endpoints represent outright acceptance and outright rejection. Moss, on this reading, appears to be working with a different understanding of these attitudes—one that is revisionary with respect to this sort of natural cognitive model.

The worry must be stated with care. For Moss, sentences expressing graded attitudes (e.g., the attitude of thinking ϕ probable) do clearly form a semantic natural kind: for any ϕ, $\triangle_1 \phi$ expresses a constraint that someone satisfies iff *they assign a proxy representation a high probability* (recall Moss' proposal for $[\![\triangle_1 \phi]\!]^c$ above). When ϕ is non-modal, the proxy representation is (effectively) the possible worlds proposition expressed by ϕ; when ϕ is modal, the proxy representation is a disjunction of possible worlds propositions, conditionalization on which is sufficient for believing ϕ. In *every case*, thinking ϕ probable—in the sense of satisfying the constraint semantically expressed by a sentence of the form $\triangle \phi$—is analyzed as thinking p probable, for some possible worlds proposition p such that conditionalizing on p suffices for belief that ϕ.[8]

Nevertheless, gradability—in the relevant sense, of being the sort of thing that is assessable as more or less likely—is, strictly speaking, *not* a uniform feature of the contents (i.e., the

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[6]Commonplaces like these play a similar role in Schroeder (2011a); Staffel (forthcoming).

[7]An abiding aim of Moss (2013, 2018) is to develop an generalized understanding of knowledge on which it does not consist in a subject's standing in some (epistemically distinguished, representational) relation to a proposition. This section argues that developing a corresponding generalized understanding of partial or degreed belief provides reason to consider an account of the semantics of epistemic modalities like the one this paper proposes.

[8]I will later raise some tentative doubts about whether this is really a plausible condition on thinking ϕ probable—as opposed to a condition on the prima facie more complicated state of thinking ϕ probable *on the basis of* believing (i) p is probable, (ii) $p \rightarrow \phi$.

representations semantically encoded in) sentences of natural language, on Moss' view: although sentences expressing epistemically modal representations can be embedded under epistemic operators, epistemically modal representations are, on Moss' model, not *themselves* assessable within the metalanguage as more or less likely. This is a cost, prima facie, since it seems that the theorist will require some way of talking, within the metalanguage, about an agent's degree of belief in the content of a sentence like (3). The (at least, this) theorist would like to be able say that (1) expresses, and (7) ascribes, a high degree of belief in the content of (3)—and that facts about how such attitudes rationally constrain downstream belief and action are, indeed, most directly accounted for by availing ourselves of this type of theoretical description.

Here is a more concrete illustration. It appears that graded attitudes towards representations of any type are subject to a *single set of rational norms*. Why is this? Why, e.g., is it a rational mistake to believe either of (8) or (9)?[9]

(8)   It is probably the case that Trump might be impeached, and it's probably the case that he can't be impeached.

(9)   Trump will probably be impeached, and he probably won't be impeached.

A natural explanation is that, for *any* way of representing R, an agent's degree of belief in R summed with her degree of belief in $\neg R$ should never exceed a designated value representing outright acceptance (i.e., 1). On the face of things, this sort of explanation requires countenancing degrees of belief as properties of representations of any type, (ii) describing (and motivating) rational norms that govern the suite of graded attitudes agents can bear toward representations of any type.

Similarly, it would be desirable to account for how graded attitudes towards representations of any type *constrain rational action*. Suppose there is a 2% chance that there is a small possibility that the well water is non-potable. If there's a small possibility that the well water is non-potable, I don't want to drink it; otherwise, I do want to drink it. My decision in this situation appears to depend on what I have been calling a graded epistemically modal representation.[10]

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[9]This type of issue also receives discussion in Schroeder (2011b); Staffel (forthcoming). It is worth noting that Moss can account for why a sentence like (8) is *marked*—like (9), it is, on her view, inconsistent. But accounting for why sentences like (8) and (9) are marked is different from accounting for why someone who represents as according to (8) or (9) is making a rational mistake. To preview, on the account defended here, such an agent is making a specific kind of rational mistake (in addition, perhaps, to contradicting themselves): they are subject to (Generalized) Dutch Books. Interestingly, as we will see, such an agent—unlike an agent who represents as according to (9)—is *not* subject to having Accuracy-Dominated credences—a result that sits quite comfortably with a generally "non-factualist" or "Bayesian" perspective on probabilistic thought and talk (cf. Yalcin 2011). Taking a more general view, I do not claim that Moss' view is, in the end, *incapable* of scratching the sorts of theoretical itches that prompt the alternative proposed in this paper. (Indeed, one thing that is striking about Moss' work is its ability to replicate accounts of how, e.g., knowledge of probabilistic content governs rational action, while jettisoning standard assumptions about the structure of allegedly "propositional" attitudes like knowledge (here see esp. Moss 2013, 2018).) I claim only that there is a theoretically immediate way to scratch those itches.

[10]An alternative explanation: my decision in this situation depends on how likely I regard some ordinary proposition p (e.g., that a nearby aquifer is contaminated) such that updating on p implies thinking there is a small chance that the well water is non-potable. But this seems to misconstrue the nature of the decision situation—by stipulation, my decision in this situation depends on how inclined I am to think *there's a small chance that the well water is non-potable*. We might even suppose that my inclination in this regard is a *prior*, in the sense that there is no salient proposition p such that (i) I am 2% confident in p and (ii) if I update on p, I'll think there is a small chance the well water is non-potable. Even if my inclination in this regard is a prior, in this sense, I can still confront the decision situation described here. So it seems that practical reasoning can depend on an agent's degree of belief in an epistemically modal representation (without thereby depending on their degree of belief in some proposition).

	2%	98%
	small chance non-potable	¬small chance non-potable
Drink	☹ ☹	☺ ☺
Don't	☺	☹

Suppose I drink the well water, since I think it's basically certain (98% probable) there's no chance the well water is non-potable. It would be nice to be able to offer at least a schematic account of the norms governing this kind of practical reasoning (e.g., to explain why drinking the well water will tend to become irrational as my estimate of the likelihood that there is a small chance it is non-potable increases). The most immediate way to effect such a generalization would be to (i) countenance degrees of confidence as properties of representations of any type, (ii) describe (and motivate) rational norms that govern the relations between the suite of graded attitudes agents can bear toward representations of any type, and action. (Ideally, this would be realized by way of a generalization of the theory of Expected Value to decision problems whose "payoff" cells are represented as dependent on a non-worldly representation.)

4 Credence in a Representation

As we saw in §2, on "classical" (i.e., ordinary truth-conditional) accounts of the semantics of epistemic modalities, the content of an epistemic modal ϕ, relative to a designated agent A's information, is unfit for being the object of graded attitudes for A (e.g., A being 10% confident that ϕ), according to standard "Bayesian" techniques for modeling those attitudes (and the semantics of sentences ascribing those attitudes).

Moss provides an account of sentences that express and ascribe graded attitudes towards epistemic modalities. But this account suggests that epistemically modal representations, as such, are not the objects of attitudes like degreed belief. This complicates the project of accounting for how a degreed belief in a epistemically modal representation might regulate belief and action.

Such complications might be easy to justify—by appeal, for example, to a philosophical argument about the nature of representation (recall §3.1). In lieu of such an argument, they could be justified, very simply, by appeal to the absence of any workable alternative. The next sections will formulate a workable alternative, then argue that there is a sensible, generalized notion of representation that undergirds it.

4.1 Introducing Credence

On the alternative I have in mind, we define a new quantity, call it *credence*, for probability operators of natural language to uniformly express. To utter a sentence like (1) is simply to express high credence in the content of (i.e., representation semantically encoded in) (3).

$$\llbracket \triangle \phi \rrbracket = \llbracket \triangle \rrbracket(\llbracket \phi \rrbracket) = \{Cr : Cr(\llbracket \phi \rrbracket) > .5\}$$

Here is how I prefer to conceptualize this idea (at a very high level of abstraction). Some credences are *probabilities*: subjective estimates of objective chance of the truth of a worldly representation (alternatively, subjective estimates of actual-worldly truth value). Some credences are *not probabilities* (when a subject's credence cannot be understood as their estimate of objective chance of the truth of a worldly representation, or as a subjective estimate of actual-worldly truth value). There is, nevertheless, no obstacle in principle to defining credences so that they *behave like* probabilities, whether or not the object of credence is a worldly or non-worldly

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representation.[11]

Begin by assuming that a *representation* is a set of objects of any semantic type—*a set of alternative possibilities*.[12] In general, sets of alternative possibilities represent sets of "candidates" for different ways of representing; only some sets of alternative possibilities (i.e., sets of possible worlds) represent candidates for actuality (i.e., sets of alternative ways the world could be); other sets of alternative possibilities (e.g., sets of sets of possible worlds) represent candidates for ways of representing a set of candidates for actuality; and so on .[13]

Definition 1. *Let $\mathcal{R}$ be a representation. Then a set of representations $\{\mathcal{R}_1, ..., \mathcal{R}_n\}$ **partitions** $\mathcal{R}$ iff, for all $1 \leq i \neq j \leq n$:*

$$\mathcal{R}_i \cap \mathcal{R}_j = \emptyset$$
$$\bigcup_{i=1}^{n} \mathcal{R}_i = \mathcal{R}$$

Definition 2. *An **alternative set** for $\mathcal{R}$ is any set $\mathfrak{R}$ that partitions $\mathcal{R}$.*

Definition 3. *If $\mathfrak{R}$ is an alternative set for $\mathcal{R}$, $\mathfrak{R}$'s σ-**closure** Σ is $\mathfrak{R}$'s closure under $\cap$, $'$.*

Consider any base representation $\mathcal{R}$, alternative set $\mathfrak{R} = \{\mathcal{R}_1, ..., \mathcal{R}_n\}$ for $\mathcal{R}$, and $\mathfrak{R}$'s σ-closure Σ. We will say that a representation $\mathcal{S}$ is based on $\langle \mathcal{R}, \mathfrak{R}, \Sigma \rangle$ iff $\mathcal{S} \in \Sigma$. We introduce the notion of a credence function that is based on $\mathcal{R}$, $\mathfrak{R} = \{\mathcal{R}_1, ..., \mathcal{R}_n\}$, and Σ, by requiring that credence functions be normalized to the base representation $\mathcal{R}$, and that it be additive over disjoint elements of Σ.

Definition 4. *A **credence function** based on $\mathcal{R}$, $\mathfrak{R}$, and Σ is a function $Cr : \Sigma \mapsto [0, 1]$ such that:*

$$Cr(\mathcal{R}) = 1$$
$$Cr(\bigcup_{i=1}^{n} \mathcal{S}_i) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} Cr(\mathcal{S}_i) \quad (i \neq j \Rightarrow \mathcal{S}_i \cap \mathcal{S}_j = \emptyset)$$

Possibly, $n = \infty$, in which case Cr is constrained by Normalization and Countable Additivity $[Cr(\bigcup_{i=1}^{\infty} \mathcal{S}_i) = \sum_{i=1}^{\infty} Cr(\mathcal{S}_i)]$. Ordinarily, however, $n \in \mathbb{N}$, in which case Cr is constrained by Normalization and Finite Additivity $[Cr(\bigcup_{i=1}^{n} \mathcal{S}_i) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} Cr(\mathcal{S}_i)]$.

Definition 5. *Given a credence function Cr based on $\mathcal{R}$, $\mathfrak{R}$, Σ, and $\mathcal{T} \in \Sigma$ the **conditionalization** of Cr on $\mathcal{T}$ is a function $Cr|_{\mathcal{T}}(\cdot) : \Sigma \mapsto [0, 1]$ such that:*

    i. $Cr|_{\mathcal{T}}$ is based on $\langle \mathcal{R} \cap \mathcal{T}, \{\mathcal{R}' \cap \mathcal{T} : \mathcal{R}' \in \mathfrak{R}\}, \{\mathcal{R}' \cap \mathcal{T} : \mathcal{R}' \in \Sigma\} \rangle$

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[11]Though the details are very different, this general perspective draws inspiration from Bradley's "Multi-Dimensional" approach towards the probabilities of indicative conditionals (Bradley 2012), as well as remarks in Staffel (forthcoming) discussing how an Expressivist might model the descriptive and normative characteristics of gradable attitudes towards non-factual semantic contents. [REDACTED] (pc) alerts me to an earlier approach to higher-order probability (Hild 1998) that is similar in both spirit and certain modeling choices to the one developed here.

[12]For the purposes of this paper, representations will have a recursive (polymorphic) semantic type, constructed from the basic materials of *possible worlds* and *credence functions* (for details, see §4.4). Although nothing here will turn on this, I am pragmatic about the basic materials: agents can represent sets of (and sets of sets of, and sets of sets of) many kind of things—in addition to possible worlds and credence functions, preference orderings [REDACTED], degree thresholds for gradable adjectives [REDACTED], features of their subjective perceptual experience [REDACTED], and more besides—as candidate possibilities for some purpose (on this notion of representation, see §5.1).

[13]This is only a rough first pass at stating a functional psychological role for the representation of a set of alternatives of arbitrary semantic type. For an elaboration, see §5.

ii. If $\mathcal{R} \cap \mathcal{T} \subseteq \mathcal{U}$, then $Cr|_{\mathcal{T}}(\mathcal{U}) = 1$

iii. If $\mathcal{R} \cap \mathcal{T} \cap \mathcal{U} = \emptyset$, then $Cr|_{\mathcal{T}}(\mathcal{U}) = 0$

iv. Otherwise, $Cr|_{\mathcal{T}}(\mathcal{U}) = \frac{Cr(\mathcal{U} \cap \mathcal{T})}{Cr(\mathcal{T})}$

Definition 6. *Given a credence function Cr based on $\mathcal{R}$, $\mathfrak{R}$, and Σ, a **conditional credence function** based on $\mathcal{R}$, $\mathfrak{R}$, and Σ is a two-place function $Cr(\cdot|\cdot) : \Sigma \mapsto (\Sigma \mapsto [0,1])$ such that $Cr(\mathcal{S}|\mathcal{T}) = Cr|_{\mathcal{T}}(\mathcal{S})$.*

4.2 A Semantics of Representations

The driving semantic idea is that sentences of natural language *semantically encode representations*. Consider a language containing a denumerable stock of propositional atoms A, Boolean compounds of sentences, the indicative conditional $\rightarrow$, the 'probably' operator $\triangle$, and the epistemic possibility modal $\Diamond$.

$$\phi :: \mathtt{A} \mid \neg\phi \mid \phi \wedge \psi \mid \phi \rightarrow \psi \mid \triangle\phi \mid \Diamond\phi$$

An interpretation function for this language maps sentences into representations. The obvious clauses would be as follows:

$$[\![p]\!] = \{w : w(p) = 1\} \ (p \in \mathtt{A})$$

$$[\![\neg\phi]\!]_\tau = \mathbb{U}_\tau - [\![\phi]\!]_\tau \ (X_\tau := X \text{ is a set of objects of semantic type } \tau)$$

$$[\![\phi \wedge \psi]\!] = [\![\phi]\!] \cap [\![\psi]\!]$$

$$[\![\phi \rightarrow \psi]\!] = \{Cr : Cr([\![\psi]\!] \mid [\![\phi]\!]) = 1\}$$

$$[\![\triangle\phi]\!] = \{Cr : \sum_{\mathcal{S} \in [\![\phi]\!]} Cr(\{\mathcal{S}\}) > .5\}$$

$$[\![\Diamond\phi]\!] = \{\mathcal{S} : \mathcal{S} \cap [\![\phi]\!] \neq \emptyset\}$$

These clauses are, as it stands, nonsense. We have generalized the probability calculus to credence functions, by requiring that credence functions be specified *relative to* a (i) "base" representation $\mathcal{R}$, (ii) an alternative set $\mathfrak{R}$ that partitions $\mathcal{R}$, (iii) $\mathfrak{R}$'s σ-closure Σ. We will therefore say that the representation expressed by such sentences is determined relative to a base representation $\mathcal{R}$, alternative set $\mathfrak{R}$ for $\mathcal{R}$, and $\mathfrak{R}$'s σ-closure Σ. We will call a triple $\langle \mathcal{R}, \mathfrak{R}, \Sigma \rangle$ with these characteristics a **space**, and we will allow a context c to determine (via a contextually determined variable assignment g_c) a space (of the requisite semantic type) for each space-sensitive expression of our language.[14] Thus:

$$[\![\phi \rightarrow_1 \psi]\!]^c = \lambda Cr : Cr \text{ is based on } g_c(1) \ . \ Cr([\![\psi]\!]^c \mid [\![\phi]\!]^c) = 1$$

$$[\![\triangle_1\phi]\!]^c = \lambda Cr : Cr \text{ is based on } g_c(1) \ . \ \sum_{\mathcal{S} \in [\![\phi]\!]^c} Cr(\{\mathcal{S}\}) > .5$$

$$[\![\Diamond_1\phi]\!]^c = \lambda \mathcal{S} : \mathcal{S} \text{ is based on } g_c(1) \ . \ \mathcal{S} \cap [\![\phi]\!]^c \neq \emptyset$$

The representation expressed by $\phi \rightarrow_1 \psi$ relative to $g_c(1) = \langle \mathcal{R}, \mathfrak{R}, \Sigma \rangle$ is a property of credence functions $[\lambda Cr.Cr([\![\psi]\!]^c \mid [\![\phi]\!]^c) = 1]$ (equivalently, where types require, the set of such credence functions), which is *undefined* for any Cr not based on $\mathcal{R}$, $\mathfrak{R}$, and Σ. The idea is the same for $\triangle\phi$.

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[14] Though this notation (and the implementation via contextually determined variable assignments) is from Moss, note that our variable indices play a very different role. Note, in particular, that indices in Moss' semantics uniformly resolve to partitions of W.

$\Diamond\phi$ expresses a property undefined for any $\mathcal{S} \notin \Sigma$; for any $\mathcal{S} \in \mathfrak{R}$, $\mathcal{S}$ satisfies this property iff $\mathcal{S}$ is compatible with the representation expressed by ϕ.

4.3 Examples

Example 1. Consider the case of $\triangle$ scoping over a propositional atom:

$$[\![\triangle_1 p]\!]^c = \{Cr : \sum_{w \in [\![p]\!]^c} Cr(\{w\}) > .5\}$$
$$= \{Cr : Cr(\{w : w(p) = \mathsf{T}\}) > .5\}$$

Let $g_c(1) = \langle \mathcal{R}, \mathfrak{R}, \Sigma \rangle$. Here, semantic types require that $\mathcal{R}$ be a set of worlds, e.g., $\{w, v, u\}$; $\mathfrak{R}$ is a partition of $\mathcal{R}$, e.g., $\{\{w, v\}, \{u\}\}$; Σ is $\mathfrak{R}$'s σ-closure. A sentence of the form $\triangle p$ expresses the property a credence function (based on $\mathcal{R}$, $\mathfrak{R}$, and Σ) has when it assigns the worldly representation encoded in p a value $> .5$.

Example 2. Next consider an example involving $\triangle$ iterated over $\Diamond$.[15]

$$[\![\triangle_1 \Diamond_2 p]\!]^c = \{Cr : \sum_{\mathcal{S} \in [\![\Diamond_2 p]\!]^c} Cr(\{\mathcal{S}\}) > .5\}$$

Let $g_c(1) = \langle \mathcal{R}, \mathfrak{R}, \Sigma \rangle$. Here the types require that $\mathcal{R}$ be a set of sets of worlds, e.g., $\{\{w\}, \{w, v\}\}$; $\mathfrak{R}$ is a partition of $\mathcal{R}$; Σ is $\mathfrak{R}$'s σ-closure. As intended, $\triangle\Diamond p$ expresses the property a credence function has when it assigns the non-worldly representation encoded in $[\![\Diamond p]\!]^c$ a value $> .5$.

Example 3. Next consider the reverse iteration:

$$[\![\Diamond_1 \triangle_2 p]\!]^c = \{\mathcal{S} : \mathcal{S} \cap [\![\triangle_2 p]\!]^c \neq \emptyset\}$$
$$= \{\mathcal{S} : \mathcal{S} \cap \{Cr : \sum_{w \in [\![p]\!]^c} Cr(\{w\}) > .5\} \neq \emptyset\}$$
$$= \{\mathcal{S} : \mathcal{S} \cap \{Cr : Cr(\{w : w(p) = \mathsf{T}\}) > .5\} \neq \emptyset\}$$

Let $g_c(1) = \langle \mathcal{R}, \mathfrak{R}, \Sigma \rangle$. Here the types require that $\mathcal{R}$ be a set of credence functions; $\mathfrak{R}$ is a partition of $\mathcal{R}$; Σ is $\mathfrak{R}$'s σ-closure. As intended, $\Diamond\triangle p$ expresses the property a set of credence functions has when it contains a credence function that assigns the worldly representation encoded in p a value $> .5$.

Example 4. Finally two examples involving iterated epistemics:

$$[\![\Diamond_1 \Diamond_2 p]\!]^c = \{\mathcal{S} : \mathcal{S} \cap [\![\Diamond_2 p]\!]^c \neq \emptyset\}$$
$$= \{\mathcal{S} : \mathcal{S} \cap \{\mathcal{T} : \mathcal{T} \cap [\![p]\!]^c \neq \emptyset\} \neq \emptyset\}$$

---

[15]I will generally suppress the role of space-sensitivity for embedded modals. Strictly speaking:

$$[\![\triangle_1 \Diamond_2 p]\!]^c = \lambda Cr : Cr \text{ based on } g_c(1) \cdot \sum_{\mathcal{S} \in [\![\Diamond_2 p]\!]^c} Cr(\{\mathcal{S}\}) > .5$$

Notice: $[\![\Diamond_2 p]\!]^c$ is defined for $\mathcal{S}$ only when $\mathcal{S} \in g_c(2)$. Therefore:

$$[\![\triangle_1 \Diamond_2 p]\!]^c = \lambda Cr : Cr \text{ based on } g_c(1) \cdot \sum_{\mathcal{S} \text{ based on } g_c(2) \wedge \mathcal{S} \cap [\![p]\!]^c \neq \emptyset} Cr(\{\mathcal{S}\}) > .5$$

This starts to strain the eye, so I will generally leave it to the reader to fill in such formal details.

Let $g_c(1) = \langle \mathcal{R}, \mathfrak{R}, \Sigma \rangle$. Here the types require that $\mathcal{R}$ be a set of sets of worlds (i.e., a set of worldly propositions); $\mathfrak{R}$ is a partition of $\mathcal{R}$; Σ is $\mathfrak{R}$'s σ-closure. As intended, $\Diamond\Diamond p$ expresses the property a set of sets of worlds has when it contains a set of worlds that is compatible with p.

$$
\begin{aligned}
[\![\Diamond_1\Diamond_2\Diamond_3 p]\!]^c &= \{\mathcal{S} : \mathcal{S} \cap [\![\Diamond_2\Diamond_3 p]\!]^c \neq \emptyset\} \\
&= \{\mathcal{S} : \mathcal{S} \cap \{\mathcal{U} : \mathcal{U} \cap \{\mathcal{T} : \mathcal{T} \cap [\![p]\!]^c \neq \emptyset\} \neq \emptyset\}\}
\end{aligned}
$$

Let $g_c(1) = \langle \mathcal{R}, \mathfrak{R}, \Sigma \rangle$. Here the semantic types require that $\mathcal{R}$ be a set of sets of worldly propositions; $\mathfrak{R}$ is a partition of $\mathcal{R}$; Σ is $\mathfrak{R}$'s σ-closure. As intended, $\Diamond\Diamond\Diamond p$ expresses the property a set of sets of worldly propositions has when it contains a set of worldly propositions that is compatible with $\Diamond p$.

4.4 Compositionality and Polymorphic Types

The interesting operators of our language ($\rightarrow$, $\triangle$, $\Diamond$) uniformly take set-type meanings (representations) as arguments. This gives our system the veneer of compositionality, but, for now, only the veneer. Set-type meanings are, strictly speaking, *not* typically the semantic values of these operators' complements; the semantic values of the sentences of our language, in fact, comprise a manifold of *functional* types.[16] Here is an illustration: $\Diamond$ can semantically combine with a worldly representation $[\![p]\!] :: \langle s, t \rangle$,[17] an epistemically modal representation $[\![\Diamond p]\!] :: \langle\langle s, t \rangle, t\rangle$, an epistemically modal representation with epistemically modal content $[\![\Diamond\Diamond p]\!] :: \langle\langle\langle s, t \rangle, t \rangle, t\rangle$, and so on, *ad infinitum*.

Epistemic operators, therefore, have the (perhaps surprising) property of being *unselective* as to the semantic type of their complements, so long as that semantic type is isomorphic to a set (i.e., so long as that semantic type is of the form $\langle \tau, t \rangle$, for some type τ). This means that they will have a recursive (*polymorphic*[18]) semantic type τ^*:

$$
\tau^* ::= \langle \alpha, \langle \alpha, t \rangle \rangle \qquad\qquad \alpha ::= \langle s, t \rangle \mid \langle \gamma, t \rangle \mid \langle \alpha, t \rangle
$$
$$
\gamma ::= \langle \alpha, v_{[0,1]} \rangle
$$

One way to think about polymorphic types is this. An expression like $\Diamond$ has a semantic type, in two guises: qua *expression-type* (in which case its type is polymorphic) and qua *expression-token* (in which case its type, as tokened on an occasion of use, is a type drawn from the polymorphic type hierarchy). The semantic type of, e.g., $\Diamond$, as tokened on an occasion of use will "depend" (very loosely speaking[19]) on the semantic type of its complement (but will always be drawn from the hierarchy of types introduced here).[20]

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[16] I here assume that semantic composition is always via Function-Argument Application.

[17] Notation: s is the type of worlds, t is the type of truth values. A function of type $\langle \tau, \tau' \rangle$ is a function from objects of type τ into objects of type τ'.

[18] For another application of polymorphic types, see Charlow (forthcoming).

[19] This is no violation of compositionality: the semantic type of $\Diamond$, as tokened on an occasion of use, is not semantically *determined by*, or selected *in virtue of*, the semantic type of its complement. It is simply to say that, if $\Diamond$ occurs in a semantically well-formed expression, its semantic type must be drawn from the hierarchy of types defined above, and must be of the right type to compose, by Function-Argument Application, with the semantic value of its sister.

[20] To be compositional, our system requires a understanding of *semantic coordination*. We currently understand $\wedge$ as expressing $\cap$, but there are two reasons this will not work. First, the semantic values of $\wedge$'s arguments are functions, not sets. (This is trivial to fix, and I will continue to talk as if the difference between a characteristic function and a set is no difference at all.) Second, the semantic values of $\wedge$'s arguments are frequently sentences of different semantic type. This is less trivial to fix: we will require a generalized understanding of conjunction that allows it to coordinate constituents of different semantic type, as in Partee & Rooth (1983). To keep the main discussion maximally simple, I will ignore this

5 Two Aspects of Mental Life

The last section showed that the notion of credences *in* epistemically modal and probabilistic representations, constrained by the probability axioms, is both mathematically and semantically tractable. But—and I intend this question seriously—does it *make sense*? We have introduced a semantic hierarchy of representations with no upper bound on the complexity of the semantic type of a representation. Is this cognitively realistic? (Here, I will argue: yes.) We have assumed that objects at any level of the type hierarchy can receive credences (where credences are constrained by assumptions of Normalization and Additivity). Is this normatively plausible—do standard justifications for Normalization and Additivity apply, if credences are not assumed to be defined over worldly representations? (Here, I will argue: yes and no.)

5.1 *Cognitive*

Moss offers an argument against a proposed extension of the Bayesian proposal pursued in Rothschild (2012); Yalcin (2012) to graded modal judgments:

> [I]t is hard to imagine a reason for ruling that embeddings of epistemic vocabulary beyond a certain level of complexity are are semantically uninterpretable. In the absence of such a reason, our theory should deliver semantic values for embeddings of arbitrary complexity. Hence in order to repair the [Bayesian] proposal, we would have to model subjects as having not just sets of sets of measures as mental states, but sets of sets of sets of measures, and so on. It is difficult to independently motivate such an arcane model of our mental life. (Moss 2015: 30)

While our proposal isn't quite Bayesian in the sense of Rothschild (2012); Yalcin (2012), Moss' critique clearly applies. The charge that this is an "arcane model" does not, however, really bite. To illustrate, recall that, on the view defended here:

$$\llbracket \diamondsuit_1 \diamondsuit_2 p \rrbracket^c = \{ \mathcal{S} : \mathcal{S} \cap \{ \mathcal{T} : \mathcal{T} \cap \llbracket p \rrbracket^c \neq \emptyset \} \neq \emptyset \}$$

On our view, $\diamondsuit \diamondsuit p$ expresses the property a set of sets of worlds (i.e., a set of worldly propositions) has when it contains a set of worlds that is compatible with p. To think or call such a sentence *probable* is to express a property of credences in sets of sets of sets of worlds (i.e., sets of sets of worldly propositions)—namely, the property of assigning a credence $> .5$ to $\llbracket \diamondsuit_1 \diamondsuit_2 p \rrbracket^c$.

An agent can treat *any set of objects* as a set of alternatives **for cognitive purpose** P. An agent can represent sets of possible worlds for the purpose of representing different abstract alternatives (individual possibilia) for accurately representing the world. An agent can represent sets of sets of possible worlds (i.e., sets of propositions) in order to represent different alternatives, *not* for the purpose of accurately representing the world, instead for the purpose of representing alternative ways of representing the world (e.g., alternatives that treat p as possible *versus* those that treat p as impossible). An agent can represent sets of sets of sets of possible worlds (i.e., sets of sets of propositions) in order to represent different alternatives (sets of propositions)— *not* for the purpose of accurately representing the world, *nor* for the purpose of representing alternative ways of representing the world, instead for the purpose of representing alternative ways of representing alternative ways of representing the world.

Representations, as we understand them, have an iterative, or recursive, structure (but is that surprising?). But the cognitive state of *representing $\mathcal{R}$ for purpose P* is not arcane: it is the attitude of representing the various alternatives of $\mathcal{R}$ as candidates for fulfilling P. We have understood the

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sort of complication here (though I will address it in the Appendices). For further discussion, see [REDACTED].

attitude of representation more expansively than is traditional[21]—in particular, we have relativized representations to cognitive purposes, and have declined to assume that the functional role of representation is uniformly about representing individual possibilia as candidates for actuality. Generalizing a familiar notion need not, however, render it arcane. Indeed, given this generalized understanding of representation, representing a set of alternatives as candidates for fulfilling *P* describes a sort of familiar cognitive activity in which agents plausibly can and do engage.

5.2 Normative

Why represent agents as having credences in non-worldly representations? We cited two (related) motivations (§3.2). A theoretical motivation: to vindicate ascriptions of confidence *in* epistemically modal representations within our theoretical metalanguage. And a normative motivation: to describe and justify rational norms governing confidence in epistemically modal representations; and to describe and justify rational norms governing the relationship between confidence in epistemically modal representations, and action.

Our present account satisfies the theoretical motivation. What about the normative? This section proposes that (i) the rational norms governing the relationship between credence and action are a generalization of the theory of Expected Value; (ii) generalizations of the decision-theoretic notions of a decision problem and of the Expected Value of an action relative to a decision problem can be stated in a basically standard form.

5.2.1 Generalizing Expected Value

We begin by defining the notion of a generalized decision problem.

Definition 7. *A **decision problem** Π based on $\langle \mathcal{R}, \mathfrak{R}, \Sigma \rangle$ is a tuple $\langle \mathfrak{R}, \mathcal{A}, Cr, Val \rangle$ where:*

- *$\mathfrak{R} = \{C_1, ..., C_n\}$ is a partition of the possibilities relevant in Π.*
- *$\mathcal{A} = \{A_1, ..., A_n\}$ is a set of actions available in Π.*
- *Cr is a credence function based on $\langle \mathcal{R}, \mathfrak{R}, \Sigma \rangle$.*
- *Val is a conditional value function, such that $Val(A|C)$ is a value representing the degree to which A is desired conditional on C (for each $C \in \mathfrak{R}$).*

Decision problems can be presented in a standard tabular format, as follows. As is standard, cells of the table correspond to "payoffs", here understood as degrees of desirability conditional on the corresponding representation.[22]

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[21]The traditional view I am attempting to generalize here is, of course, that of Stalnaker (1984).

[22]Staffel (forthcoming) remarks that, in an Expressivistic system (alike in some, but not all, respects to the one proposed here), "wins and losses can't be determined by checking *what the world is actually like*" (if the relevant contingencies are not worldly propositions that can be "checked" for truth against the actual world). But if, as seems correct, the conditional value $Val(A|C)$ is like the conditional probability $Cr(A|C)$—in that both track degrees of desire or belief, under the *indicative supposition* that C—there is no immediate need for worldly matters to "determine" wins and losses in decision problems based on representations of arbitrary type. The degree to which an agent who indicatively supposes C desires to perform A will determine $Val(A|C)$—nothing worldly required, so long as the degree to which an agent desires to perform A can depend on a non-worldly representation. (Such dependence is commonplace: as seen earlier, if there's a small chance the tap water isn't potable, I prefer not to drink it; if Bob might be hired for a job requiring professional attire, Bob will prefer keeping a business suit to donating it. Etc.) There may yet be a need for worldly matters to determine wins and losses, for a theorist who wants to use the notion of conditional desirability *to run a Dutch Book argument*. More on this just below.

Π	$\overbrace{C_1}^{Cr(C_1)}$	...	$\overbrace{C_n}^{Cr(C_n)}$
A_1	$Val(A_1|C_1)$	...	$Val(A_1|C_n)$
...	...	...	...
A_m	$Val(A_m|C_1)$	...	$Val(A_m|C_n)$

Unlike in standard presentations of decision tables, we do not assume that the contingencies relevant in a decision problem Π based on $\langle \mathcal{R}, \mathfrak{R}, \Sigma \rangle$ form a partition of W (or of a subset of W). $\mathfrak{R}$, rather, partitions a salient representation—picturesquely, the base representation against which an agent's deliberation occurs. This base representation is not, however, required to be of any specific semantic type.

Having generalized decision problems, a corresponding generalization of the notion of Expected Value is easy to define.

Definition 8. *If* $\Pi = \langle \mathcal{R}, \mathcal{A}, Cr, Val \rangle$ *is based on* $\langle \mathcal{R}, \mathfrak{R}, \Sigma \rangle$ *and* $A \in \mathcal{A}$*, the **expected value** of A in* Π *is a weighted sum of credences multiplied by values:*

$$\sum_{x \in \mathfrak{R}} Cr(x|A)Val(A|x)$$

5.2.2 Justifying Credences

Why should a rational agent maximize expected value, thus defined? More specifically (and to bracket controversies about formulating a mathematical theory of rational action): why should an agent who wants to maximize expected value compute expected value *using a credence function* (the properties of which are constrained by Definition 4)?

There are two main ways of answering this type of question in the literature. First, Dutch Book Arguments, on which, roughly, agents who have incoherent credences are irrational because subject to sure losses (for an overview, see Hájek 2009). Second, Accuracy Arguments, on which, roughly, agents who want to maximize expected *epistemic* value (roughly, the proximity of one's credences to the truth), but who have incoherent credences, are irrational because coherent credences are always more proximal to the truth (originating with Joyce 1998). Let us see about the prospects of extending these answers to the present account.

Matters are, not surprisingly, less than straightforward with Accuracy Arguments. *Accuracy* is fundamentally a worldly notion: a representation is said to be accurate when it is satisfied ("true") as evaluated against a possibility taken to represent *actuality* (as also noted by Staffel forthcoming). Accuracy Arguments purport to show that subjective estimates of objective chance that violate the axioms of probability are rationally defective, since, for any such estimate, there is another way of estimating chances that (i) satisfies the axioms of probability and (ii) is guaranteed to be overall more accurate in w, for any possible world w to which the agent assigns some credence (see esp. the accuracy theorem of Joyce 1998). In order to adapt Accuracy Arguments to the framework proposed here, we would require a *non-worldly proxy for the notion of Accuracy* (as well as a non-worldly proxy for the notion of actuality). The prospects here strike me as very dim—particularly given the conceptualization of our theory suggested in §4 [REDACTED].

Dutch Books, however, do appear to generalize to this application. The constraints on generalized credence functions we have introduced, therefore, are ultimately motivated by "pragmatic" considerations (although in the case of probability measures over worldly propositions, they may still be motivated by considerations of accuracy).

The first thing to note is that nothing in the bare mathematics of the "Dutch Book Theorem" (see, e.g., Hájek 2009) appears to require that decision-theoretic contingencies are worldly

propositions. As illustration, here is a Dutch Book for an agent who commits herself to a sentence of the form $\triangle\diamond\phi \wedge \triangle\neg\diamond\phi$. (I assume, just for the sake of illustration, that $\triangle$ expresses a credence $> .6$ in its complement representation.)

	$[\![\diamond\phi]\!]^c$	$[\![\neg\diamond\phi]\!]^c$
Bet 1	-.6	.4
Bet 2	.4	-.6

For concreteness, suppose that ϕ is the proposition that the well water is non-potable. This table represents Bet 1 (e.g., drinking cost-free ice-cold well water) as undesirable to degree .6 conditional on $\diamond\phi$, and desirable to degree .4 conditional on $\neg\diamond\phi$; it represents Bet 2 (e.g., purchasing bottled water) as desirable to degree .4 conditional on on $\diamond\phi$, and undesirable to degree .6 conditional on $\neg\diamond\phi$. The agent of this decision problem regards as fair a series of "bets" that, taken together, logically guarantee a "loss" (from the vantage of her own conditional degrees of desirability).[23]

  This is, I claim, a rational defect. In general, an agent imposes a partition on a base representation $\mathcal{R}$, thereby generating an alternative set $\mathfrak{R}$ for $\mathcal{R}$, for the sake of representing alternatives whose adoption is relevant for a cognitive purpose P. However this agent fulfills P, she will be subject to a loss (from the vantage of her own conditional degrees of desirability) in a Dutch Book. Whether or not, that is to say, our agent concludes that the well water might be non-potable, her incoherent credences have made her such that she regards both drinking the well water and purchasing bottled water as good bets in the Dutch Book presented above. Roughly speaking, in such a Dutch Book, such an agent regards it as okay to spend money on bottled water to avoid drinking well water that she regards as okay to drink. And that is irrational.

5.2.3 Nailing Down Dutch Books

Staffel (forthcoming) develops both Accuracy-style and Dutch Book-style arguments for coherent credences in non-worldly representations (while also registering doubts that such arguments actually meet the theoretical needs that prompt them). In Staffel's Expressivistic Dutch Book—which is in certain respects similar to the one advanced here—an "underconfident" agent (e.g., one who assigns both $\diamond p$ and its negation $\neg\diamond p$ credence .4)...

> can avoid a sure loss by not becoming opinionated. The fact that the underconfident agent *would lose money if she became opinionated* does not point to any obvious rational defect. There are many things I might do that would put me at a great disadvantage in particular circumstances. But *if I have no reason to think I'll find myself in those circumstances, then I have little or no reason to avoid those actions*. (PAGE)

This difficulty certainly does threaten Staffel's Expressivistic Dutch Book (see esp. Staffel forthcoming: PAGE). It might also seem to threaten the version I have pursued here. The "irrationality" that, I claimed, characterizes an incoherent agent is as follows: relative to an alternative set $\mathfrak{R}$ that

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[23] As noted above, once we generalize the notion of a decision problem, words like "bet" and "loss" lose their normal connotations: typically agents can't bet—in the sense of making a cash wager, which they will lose if they are wrong—on whether it might be the case that ϕ. (How, after all, would winning or losing wagers be *determined*—particularly given the broader nonfactualist setting of this paper?) In the present context, when a package of "fair" "bets" is said to guarantee a "sure loss" for an agent, this means that (i) there is a set of actions $\mathcal{A}$ such that for each $A \in \mathcal{A}$, the Expected Value of doing A for the agent is at least as great as the Expected Value of not doing A for the agent (roughly, there is a set of actions all of which the agent regards as "fair" or "worth doing"); (ii) the Expected Value of the complex action *doing everything in $\mathcal{A}$* is less than the Expected Value of not doing everything in $\mathcal{A}$ (roughly, the agent does not regard the complex action *doing everything in $\mathcal{A}$* as "fair", even though she regards all of the actions in $\mathcal{A}$ as "fair").

represents various candidate representations for fulfilling purpose P, the agent would be subject to a loss *if* she selected an alternative from $\mathfrak{R}$ to fulfill P. However, if she is not in a position to select an alternative from $\mathfrak{R}$ to fulfill P—if she is unable to settle on any particular way of resolving the relevant question (e.g., whether the water might be non-potable)—the negative conditional desirability (of, e.g., Bets 1 and 2 conditional on $\Diamond p$) is never "actualized". The "loss" to which the agent is subject in a Dutch Book is of a hypothetical character: if the agent does this or that, she'll lose; if, however, she declines to do this or that, she won't. What is irrational about that?

In reply: we said that, in the above Dutch Book:

- An agent entertains a set $\mathcal{R}$ of type $\langle\langle s, t\rangle, t\rangle$ (a set of $\langle s, t\rangle$-type objects).
- She partitions $\mathcal{R}$ into: (i) a cell of $\langle s, t\rangle$-type objects compatible with the well water being non-potable; (ii) a cell of $\langle s, t\rangle$-type objects incompatible with the well water being non-potable.

The purpose the agent tries to achieve in partitioning $\mathcal{R}$ as in $\mathfrak{R}$ is, we said in the prior section, to represent alternative ways of representing the world (e.g., alternatives that treat the well water's non-potability as possible *versus* those that treat it as impossible). Conditional on *either* way of representing—i.e., conditional on representing the water's non-potability as possible *and* conditional on representing it as impossible—the agent is subject to a loss (from the vantage of her own conditional degrees of desirability) in a Dutch Book.

The irrationality here is, I submit, manifest: the agent is trying to achieve goal g (e.g., figuring out how to represent the possibility that the water is non-potable—as possible or impossible), but her credences are such that any way of achieving g presents her with a deficit in desirability in a Dutch Book. That is to say, her credences are structurally such that, conditional on *any way of achieving what she is trying to achieve*, she is subject to a deficit in desirability (from the vantage of her own conditional degrees of desirability) in a Dutch Book. Claim: if your credences in context c are structurally such that they prevent you from doing what you're trying, in c, to do without being subject to a sure loss in a Dutch Book, your credences in c are irrational in c.

6   Conclusion

This paper began by observing that standard models of the semantics of epistemic modals render the phenomenon of graded modal judgment, whether in thought and language, unintelligible. In response, this paper developed a model of graded modal judgment, in both thought and language—one that represented graded modal judgment as a generalization of our cognitive capacity for reasoning with hypotheses about objective chance (i.e., our cognitive capacity for probabilistic reasoning). The generalization was developed as a package of interrelated semantic, cognitive, and epistemological theses:

- **Semantic:** modals compose with representations of arbitrary type. (§4.2)
- **Cognitive:** agents entertain representations of arbitrary type for specific cognitive purposes; the state of *bearing a graded attitude toward a representation of arbitrary type* is a natural cognitive kind (instances of which are, broadly, governed by the purpose for which the agent is entertaining the relevant representation). (§5.1)
- **Epistemological:** part of the functional role of credences in representations of arbitrary type (entertained for cognitive purpose P) is to determine fair "prices" for bets against ways of representing that fulfill P. Agents whose credences violate Normalization or Additivity are thus subject to Dutch Books. (§5.2)

On the model of graded modal judgment developed here, modal sentences are semantically

evaluated against complex constructions out of possibilia. But various sentences of our language are not semantically evaluated relative to *individual possibilia*. And so our model exhibits the characteristic insensitivity of logics axiomatized by S5 to a choice of possible world taken to represent "indicative actuality" (as in Kaplan 1989), or to a choice of possible world taken to represent a non-actual circumstance of evaluation. I take this to be one of the main virtues of the present theory: it can accommodate many of the intuitions that motivate axiomatizing the logic of epistemic modality with S5, without rendering the notion of graded modal judgment, whether in thought or in language, unintelligible (for a bit more detail, see Appendix B.1).

A polemical note to conclude. Notice that "non-factual" theories—theories that do not take modalities of the relevant type to be proposition-forming operators, a description satisfied by both our theory and Moss'—offer the theorist at least two broadly workable models of the cognition, semantics, and epistemology of graded modal judgment. "Factual" accounts of these modalities, so long as they are constrained by S5—and, indeed, even a weaker logic like KD45— are able to offer none of these attractions (see Appendix B.1). It is probably time to move past the philosophical preoccupation with the ability of non-factual theories of operators in natural language to account for environments *embedding* these operators. If anyone has such problems, it seems to be the theorists who have pushed such objections, rather than their targets.

A   Indicatives

A.1   Scope-Taking and Type-Raising with Indicatives

As intended, $\triangle(p \rightarrow q)$ expresses the property a credence function has when it assigns the non-worldly representation encoded in $p \rightarrow q$ a value $> .5$.

$$
\begin{aligned}
[\![\triangle_1(p \rightarrow_2 q)]\!]^c &= \{Cr' : \sum_{Cr \in [\![p \rightarrow_2 q]\!]^c} Cr'(\{Cr\}) > .5\} \\
&= \{Cr' : \sum_{Cr([\![q]\!]^c|[\![p]\!]^c)=1} Cr'(\{Cr\}) > .5\}
\end{aligned}
$$

Handling the narrow-scope representation $p \rightarrow \triangle q$ is trickier. A first attempt:

$$
\begin{aligned}
[\![p \rightarrow_1 \triangle_2 q]\!]^c &= \{Cr : Cr([\![\triangle_2 q]\!]^c|[\![p]\!]^c) = 1\} \\
&= \{Cr : \frac{Cr([\![\triangle_2 q]\!]^c \cap [\![p]\!]^c)}{Cr([\![p]\!]^c)} = 1\}
\end{aligned}
$$

But this attempt fails, since $Cr([\![\triangle_2 q]\!]^c \cap [\![p]\!]^c)$ is undefined in the present system, as $[\![\triangle_2 q]\!]^c$ and $[\![p]\!]^c$ are of different semantic types. Following Partee & Rooth (1983), we can address this by raising the type of $[\![p]\!]^c$:

$$
\texttt{raise}X_{\langle\tau,t\rangle} = \lambda Y_{\langle\tau,t\rangle} \,.\, Y \subseteq X \qquad\qquad \textbf{(Raise)}
$$

$$
{}_\texttt{p}X_{\langle\tau,t\rangle} = \lambda\gamma \,.\, \gamma(\bigcup X) = 1 \qquad\qquad \textbf{(Probabilify)}
$$

If $[\![\phi]\!]^c :: \langle\tau,t\rangle$, then $\texttt{raise}[\![\phi]\!]^c :: \langle\langle\tau,t\rangle,t\rangle$. That is to say, raising the type of a worldly representation $[\![p]\!]^c$ generates a set of worldly representations (equivalently, again, a characteristic function of worldly representations). In particular, it generates the set of worldly representations that involve representing $[\![p]\!]^c$ as true. Therefore, if $[\![\phi]\!]^c :: \langle\langle\tau,t\rangle,t\rangle$, then ${}_\texttt{p}[\![\phi]\!]^c :: \langle\gamma,t\rangle$.[24]

---

[24]γ is the type of credence functions (§4.4). So a function of type $\langle\gamma,t\rangle$ is of type $\langle\langle\langle\tau,t\rangle,v_{[0,1]}\rangle,t\rangle$. Our Probabilify rule is a generalization of the Type-Shifting rule introduced at Moss (2015: 34)—i.e., Moss' Type-Shifting rule is captured as a special case of Probabilification. It is natural to assume that whatever credence someone assigns $[\![p]\!]^c$ *determines* (or

Probabilifying a raised worldly representation (`praise`-ing) p yields the set of credence functions that assign probability 1 to some way of representing that p.

Type-raising in hand, we have the following:

$$[\![p \rightarrow_1 \triangle_2 q]\!]^c = \{Cr : Cr([\![\triangle_2 q]\!]^c|_{\texttt{praise}[\![p]\!]^c}) = 1\}$$

$$= \{Cr : \frac{Cr([\![\triangle_2 q]\!]^c \cap \texttt{praise}[\![p]\!]^c)}{Cr(\texttt{praise}[\![p]\!]^c)} = 1\}$$

$$= \{Cr : \frac{Cr(\{Cr' : \sum_{\mathcal{S} \in [\![q]\!]^c} Cr'(\{\mathcal{S}\}) > .5\} \cap \{Cr' : Cr'(\bigcup_{\texttt{raise}}[\![p]\!]^c) = 1\})}{Cr(\{Cr' : Cr'(\bigcup_{\texttt{raise}}[\![p]\!]^c) = 1\})} = 1\}$$

As intended, $p \rightarrow \triangle q$ expresses the property a credence function has when the ratio of the credence it assigns the representation $[\![\triangle_2 q]\!]^c \cap {}_{\texttt{praise}}[\![p]\!]^c$ to the credence it assigns the representation ${}_{\texttt{praise}}[\![p]\!]^c$ is 1.

A.2 Domain Restriction and Triviality

It bears noting that there is another, probably preferable, possibility for representing the scopal interactions of indicatives and modal operators, on which the latter are analyzed as binary (i.e., *restrictable*[25]) operators (Kratzer 1981, 1986):

$$[\![\triangle_1(\phi)(\psi)]\!]^c = \lambda Cr : Cr \text{ is based on } g_c(1) . Cr([\![\psi]\!]^c|[\![\phi]\!]^c) > .5$$

$$[\![\Diamond_1(\phi)(\psi)]\!]^c = \lambda \mathcal{S} : \mathcal{S} \text{ is based on } g_c(1) . \mathcal{S} \cap [\![\phi]\!]^c \cap [\![\psi]\!]^c \neq \emptyset$$

$$[\![\Box_1(\phi)(\psi)]\!]^c = \lambda \mathcal{S} : \mathcal{S} \text{ is based on } g_c(1) . \mathcal{S} \cap [\![\phi]\!]^c \subseteq [\![\psi]\!]^c$$

Kratzer denies that the indicative conditional contributes its own quantificational force; rather, indicative conditionals are syntactic devices for making explicit the restriction argument of a restrictable quantifier.[26] There is no semantic distinction between the "wide scope" $\triangle(p \rightarrow q)$ and the "narrow scope" $p \rightarrow \triangle q$: both are represented using the restricted modal $\triangle(p)(q)$.

One motivation for adopting Kratzer's analysis of indicative conditionals is explaining the sorts of judgments of equivalence that Stalnaker's Thesis (Stalnaker 1970) attempts to unify—e.g., the judgment that (10) and (11) are equivalent. According to Stalnaker's Thesis, the probability that an indicative $A \rightarrow C$ is true equals the conditional probability of C on A. Supposing that probability operators in natural language semantically express degrees of conditional probability, Stalnaker's Thesis predicts, correctly, that (10) and (11) are equivalent.

(10)   Rain is likely, given that atmospheric pressure is low.

(11)   It is likely that it will rain if atmospheric pressure is low.

In line with Stalnaker's Thesis, the Kratzerian story about probability operators under consideration here renders (10) and (11) equivalent—more precisely, is able to generate equivalent logical forms for these sentences. More generally, and regardless of whether Stalnaker's Thesis holds in its full generality, no version of the Thesis—even massively restricted—can be accommodated without taking probability operators (and, by extension, modal operators) to be *binary* operators. That is because a language with only unary probability operators provably lacks the resources to

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perhaps *rationally constrains*—I do not yet have a good sense of what issues are at stake here) their credence in ${}_{\texttt{raise}}[\![p]\!]^c$: if you think of representation p as i-likely, then you are i-certain in some way of representing p (though typically there is no particular way of representing p such that you are i-certain of *it*).

[25] Restrictable quantifiers are Generalized Quantifiers, in the sense of Barwise & Cooper (1981).

[26] Except when no quantifier is provided, in which case a silent restrictable quantifier—which Kratzer (1986), e.g., took to be an epistemic necessity modal—is posited in logical form.

express a sufficiently wide range of conditional probabilities.[27]

It is difficult to overstate the importance of this idea: it allows the theorist to accommodate (a perhaps appropriately restricted version of) Stalnaker's Thesis, *without* signing onto the Thesis in the form in which it is usually presented:

$$\forall Pr : Pr(A \to C) = Pr(C|A)$$

That is because the Kratzerian analysis does *not* represent $\triangle(A \to C)$ as expressing a probability judgment whose object is a conditional proposition; rather, it expresses a *restricted probability judgment*: that C is likely (as assessed against the representation expressed by A).

> [I]n saying 'there is one chance in two that if A then C', the conditional 'if A then C' does not express any self-standing proposition. A different way to cast this observation is to go in the direction of Kratzer's analysis, namely to argue that the word 'if' does not act directly as a proposition-forming operator. However, this remains compatible with the idea that if-clauses are devices of quantifier restriction. In the scope of an operator, if-clauses do make a systematic truth-conditional contribution to the whole sentence. (Égré & Cozic 2011: 22)

This would seem to be just what is required to avoid challenges to Stalnaker's Thesis on grounds of Triviality results in the mold of Lewis (1976) (see Rothschild 2015; Charlow 2016).

The dialectic in this neighborhood of issues is, however, a great deal more vexed than this quick summary would suggest. Charlow (2016) shows that Triviality results in the mold of Lewis (1976) arise for restricted operators (and that such results do not depend on the understanding of logical form embodied in Stalnaker's Thesis). Indeed, as Charlow (2016) argues, obstacles of Triviality arise for any treatment of restricted quantification that takes $[\![A]\!]$, $[\![C]\!]$, and $[\![\triangle(A)(C)]\!]$ to be *elements of the same semantic algebra*—i.e., any treatment that takes $[\![A]\!]$, $[\![C]\!]$, and $[\![\triangle(A)(C)]\!]$ to be of the same base semantic type. *This is precisely the assumption that the analysis in this paper discards.* I take this to be another argument in favor of this paper's analysis: unlike any competitor account of which I am aware, it allows the theorist to accommodate the intuitions of equivalence that underlie Stalnaker's Thesis, while also avoiding the specter of Triviality.

B   Epistemic Contradiction

B.1   (In)validating S5

If we introduce epistemic modal operators that do not raise the semantic type of their complements, we will observe that, for such operators, the axioms of S5 are validated.

$$[\![\blacklozenge_1 \phi]\!]^c = \{\mathcal{S} \in \mathcal{R} : \mathcal{R} \cap [\![\phi]\!]^c \neq \emptyset\} \qquad (g_c(1) = \langle \mathcal{R}, \mathfrak{R}, \Sigma \rangle)$$

Either $[\![\blacklozenge_1 \phi]\!]^c = \mathcal{R}$ (if $\mathcal{R} \cap [\![\phi]\!]^c \neq \emptyset$), or else $[\![\blacklozenge_1 \phi]\!]^c = \emptyset$ (if $\mathcal{R} \cap [\![\phi]\!]^c = \emptyset$). It is clear that the logic of $\blacklozenge$ and its dual $\blacksquare$ is the logic of S5 (so long as we require, as we should—see von Fintel & Gillies (2010)—that $[\![\blacksquare_1 \phi]\!]^c \subseteq [\![\phi]\!]^c$):

$$[\![\blacksquare_1 \phi]\!]^c = [\![\blacksquare_1 \blacksquare_1 \phi]\!]^c$$
$$[\![\blacklozenge_1 \phi]\!]^c = [\![\blacksquare_1 \blacklozenge_1 \phi]\!]^c$$

---

[27]See Égré & Cozic (2011)'s adaption of the theorem of Hájek (1989) to an inexpressibility result for a language with unary probability operators. Sketch of the proof: consider a fair three-ticket lottery, with tickets numbered ONE, TWO, and THREE. The conditional likelihood of ONE winning if THREE doesn't is 1/2. But no Boolean combination of the relevant propositions (that ONE wins, that TWO wins, that THREE wins) is such that it has probability 1/2.

But, of course, no such consequences[28] hold for the type-raising modal operators of our language:

$$[\![\Box_1\phi]\!]^c \nsubseteq [\![\Box_2\Box_1\phi]\!]^c$$
$$[\![\Diamond_1\phi]\!]^c \nsubseteq [\![\Box_2\Diamond_1\phi]\!]^c$$

To illustrate, let $g_c(1) = \langle \mathcal{R}_1, \mathfrak{R}_1, \Sigma_1 \rangle$, $g_c(2) = \langle \mathcal{R}_2, \mathfrak{R}_2, \Sigma_2 \rangle$. Then:

$$[\![\Diamond_1 p]\!]^c = \lambda \mathcal{S}_{\langle s,t \rangle} : \mathcal{S} \text{ is based on } g_c(1) \, . \, \mathcal{S} \cap [\![p]\!]^c \neq \emptyset$$
$$[\![\Box_2\Diamond_1 p]\!]^c = \lambda \mathcal{S}_{\langle\langle s,t\rangle,t\rangle} : \mathcal{S} \text{ is based on } g_c(2) \, . \, \mathcal{S} \subseteq [\![\Diamond_1 p]\!]^c$$
$$= \lambda \mathcal{S}_{\langle\langle s,t\rangle,t\rangle} : \mathcal{S} \text{ is based on } g_c(2) \, . \, \forall \mathcal{S}' \in \mathcal{S} : \mathcal{S}' \cap [\![p]\!]^c \neq \emptyset$$

$[\![\Diamond_1 p]\!]^c$ is the property a sets of worlds has, when it contains a p-world; $[\![\Box_2\Diamond_1 p]\!]^c$ is the property a set of sets of worlds has when each element in this set is compatible with p.

But if—as the account presented here would have it—$\Diamond_1 p$ expresses a property utterly distinct from the property expressed by $\Box_2\Diamond_1 p$, why does a sentence like (6) (reproduced here) of the form $\Diamond_1 p \wedge \neg\Box_2\Diamond_1 p$ sound so borderline?

(12)   #It may be raining, but maybe it can't be.

Perhaps because it is Moore-Paradoxical (cf. Weatherson 2004)? Alas, it is not; note that Moore Paradoxicality dissolves in unasserted environments (see Yalcin 2007):

(13)   #Suppose it may be raining, but maybe it can't be.

(14)   Suppose it is raining, but you don't know it's raining.

Explanation: sentences of the form $\Diamond_1 p \wedge \Diamond_2 \neg\Diamond_1 p$ are predicted by the present account to be semantically defective. Notice that semantically coordinating $[\![\Diamond_1 p]\!]^c$ and $[\![\neg\Box_2\Diamond_1 p]\!]^c$ requires intersecting $[\![\Diamond_2\neg\Diamond_1 p]\!]^c$ with:

$$\texttt{raise}[\![\Diamond_1 p]\!]^c = \lambda X_{\langle\langle s,t\rangle,t\rangle} \, . \, X \subseteq [\![\Diamond_1 p]\!]^c$$

$\texttt{raise}[\![\Diamond_1 p]\!]^c$ denotes the property a set of propositions $\mathfrak{F}$ has iff each q in that set is compatible with p. As noted above, $[\![\Diamond_2\neg\Diamond_1 p]\!]^c$ denotes the property a set of propositions $\mathfrak{F}$ has iff some q in that set is incompatible with p. Obviously, no $\mathfrak{F}$ satisfies both properties:

(15) $[\![\Diamond_1\phi \wedge \Diamond_2\neg\Diamond_1\phi]\!]^c = \emptyset$

And so sentences of the form $\Diamond_1 p \wedge \Diamond_2\neg\Diamond_1 p$ are predicted, on independent grounds, to be semantically anomalous (in spite of the fact that the left conjunct expresses a property utterly distinct from that expressed by the right conjunct).

The data from natural language, therefore, *do support a version of Euclideanness*, namely, the version in (15). This represents a strong empirical edge over classical truth-conditional accounts

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[28]I am here thinking of consequence standardly, i.e., in terms of set-theoretic inclusion. Notice that consequence, in this sense, can hold only between sentences of the same semantic type—e.g., $[\![\Box_1 p]\!]^c \nsubseteq [\![p]\!]^c$. This is not difficult, however, to repair—should we decide that it is important to designate the relationship between, say, $\Box_1\phi$ and ϕ as one of logical consequence. (I think this less important than predicting (as this section does) that sentences of the form $\Box_1\phi \wedge \neg\phi$ express defective semantic contents (i.e., $\emptyset$), but your mileage may vary.) Notice that $[\![\Box_1 p]\!]^c$ is a set of p-entailing subsets of W; since each possibility consistent with $[\![\Box_1 p]\!]^c$ is a p-entailing possibility, we say that p is a "birdseye consequence" of $\Box_1 p$. More generally ψ is a birdseye consequence of ϕ in c if $\forall x \in [\![\phi]\!]^c : x \subseteq [\![\psi]\!]^c$. In general, ψ is a birdseye consequence of ϕ_0 iff there exists a sequence $\phi_1, ..., \phi_n$ such that for each $1 \leq i \leq n$, ϕ_i is a birdseye consequence of ϕ_{i-1}, and ψ is a birdseye consequence of ϕ_n. Thus, e.g., ϕ is a birdseye consequence of $\Box_n...\Box_1\phi$, as desired.

of epistemic modality. Accounts of this type cannot, on the face of things, explain why sentences like (12) are semantically anomalous: in such frameworks, regarding sentences like (12) as inconsistent is equivalent to embracing a Euclideanness constraint *on epistemic accessibility* from the "actual" world w (recall §2):

Euclideanness: $v \in \sigma_w \Rightarrow \sigma_w \subseteq \sigma_v$ $\qquad\qquad\qquad$ $\forall w, \sigma : [\![\Diamond\phi \supset \Box\Diamond\phi]\!]^{\sigma,w} = \mathsf{T}$

This makes vivid the dilemma confronting classical truth-conditional accounts of epistemic modals. Such accounts can at most do one of the following:

- Accommodate Euclideanness (at the price of rendering graded modal judgment unintelligible).
- Accommodate graded modal judgment (at the price of rendering (12) semantically impeccable).

The account defended here skirts the dilemma: it accommodates both the clear semantic intuitions motivating Euclideanness, without sacrificing an intelligible model of graded modal judgment.

B.2 Quantification

Yalcin (2015) notes the following data and observes that no standard theory of epistemic modality—including the theory of Yalcin (2007)—is able to account for it:[29]

(16)   #Some/#Every person who is not infected might be infected.

I want to work through how this data is accounted for, more or less automatically, on the present treatment (while also showing how to extend the theory of generalized quantification to the type of semantics under consideration here).

Assume a first-order version of the language defined in §4.2. Here is the natural clause for the two-place existential quantifier; the two-place universal quantifier is its dual.[30]

$$[\![\exists x(\phi(x))(\psi(x))]\!]^{g_c} = \lambda \mathcal{S}.\{d : \mathcal{S} \in [\![\phi(x)]\!]^{g_c[x/d]}\} \cap \{d : \mathcal{S} \in [\![\psi(x)]\!]^{g_c[x/d]}\} \neq \emptyset$$
$$[\![\forall x(\phi(x))(\psi(x))]\!]^{g_c} = \lambda \mathcal{S}.\{d : \mathcal{S} \in [\![\phi(x)]\!]^{g_c[x/d]}\} \subseteq \{d : \mathcal{S} \in [\![\psi(x)]\!]^{g_c[x/d]}\}$$

Roughly: $\exists x(\phi)(\psi)$ expresses the constraint that $\mathcal{S}$ satisfies iff some d of which $\mathcal{S}$ represents ϕ to hold is such that $\mathcal{S}$ represents ψ to hold of d. Picturesquely, it is the constraint of being such that there is some d such that d is represented as satisfying the quantifier's restrictor and scope. $\forall x(\phi)(\psi)$ expresses the constraint that $\mathcal{S}$ satisfies iff every d of which $\mathcal{S}$ represents ϕ to hold is such that $\mathcal{S}$ represents ψ to hold of d. Picturesquely, it is the constraint of being such that any d such that d is represented as satisfying the quantifier's restrictor is such that d is represented as satisfying the quantifier's scope.

---

[29]I ignore the question of the possible order-sensitivity of the phenomenon (i.e., whether swapping the restrictor clause for the nuclear scope affects the sentence's acceptability). Since semantic coordinability is not order-sensitive, the account here predicts that the phenomenon is not order-sensitive—which is, Yalcin (2015) agrees, probably desirable.

[30]I provide a syncategorematic semantics for quantification in lieu of a compositional version (which would make use of a polymorphic type for generalized quantifiers). In the general case, for any two-place quantifier Qx:

$$[\![Qx(\phi)(\psi)]\!]^{g_c} = \lambda \mathcal{S}.\mathcal{Q}(\{d : \mathcal{S} \in [\![\phi]\!]^{g_c[x/d]}\}, \{d : \mathcal{S} \in [\![\psi]\!]^{g_c[x/d]}\})$$

Here, $\mathcal{Q}$ is the quantificational relationship between sets expressed by Q (as in Barwise & Cooper 1981). Thanks to [REDACTED] for raising the question of generalized quantification (and for suggesting the natural clauses used here).

This understanding of generalized quantification in hand, we are in an immediate position to explain (16), using a strategy that is effectively the same as our strategy for (12). Notice that, in the case of a sentence of the form $\exists x(\neg Fx)(\Diamond Fx)$, the semantic types demand raising the quantifier's restrictor:

$$[\![\exists x(\neg Fx)(\Diamond Fx)]\!]^{g_c} = \lambda \mathcal{S}.\{d : \mathcal{S} \in {}_{\text{raise}}[\![\neg Fx]\!]^{g_c[x/d]}\} \cap \{d : \mathcal{S} \in [\![\Diamond Fx]\!]^{g_c[x/d]}\} \neq \emptyset$$

Consider any $\mathcal{S}$ that satisfies $[\![\exists x(\neg Fx)(\Diamond Fx)]\!]^{g_c}$. By assumption:

$$\{d : \mathcal{S} \in {}_{\text{raise}}[\![\neg Fx]\!]^{g_c[x/d]}\} \cap \{d : \mathcal{S} \in [\![\Diamond Fx]\!]^{g_c[x/d]}\} \neq \emptyset$$

In particular, for some $d \in \{d : \mathcal{S} \in {}_{\text{raise}}[\![\neg Fx]\!]^{g_c[x/d]}\} \cap \{d : \mathcal{S} \in [\![\Diamond Fx]\!]^{g_c[x/d]}\}$, $\mathcal{S} \subseteq [\![\neg Fx]\!]^{g_c[x/d]}$, but $\mathcal{S} \cap [\![Fx]\!]^{g_c[x/d]} \neq \emptyset$. Clearly there is no such $\mathcal{S}$.

Similarly, consider any $\mathcal{S}$ that satisfies...

$$[\![\forall x(\neg Fx)(\Diamond Fx)]\!]^{g_c} = \lambda \mathcal{S}.\{d : \mathcal{S} \in {}_{\text{raise}}[\![\neg Fx]\!]^{g_c[x/d]}\} \subseteq \{d : \mathcal{S} \in [\![\Diamond Fx]\!]^{g_c[x/d]}\}$$

By assumption:

$$\{d : \mathcal{S} \in {}_{\text{raise}}[\![\neg Fx]\!]^{g_c[x/d]}\} \subseteq \{d : \mathcal{S} \in [\![\Diamond Fx]\!]^{g_c[x/d]}\}$$

In particular, for any $d \in \{d : \mathcal{S} \in {}_{\text{raise}}[\![\neg Fx]\!]^{g_c[x/d]}\}$, $\mathcal{S} \subseteq [\![\neg Fx]\!]^{g_c[x/d]}$, but $\mathcal{S} \cap [\![Fx]\!]^{g_c[x/d]} \neq \emptyset$. Clearly there is no such $\mathcal{S}$. Thus, for any context c:

(17) $[\![\exists x(\neg Fx)(\Diamond Fx)]\!]^{g_c} = \emptyset$

(18) $[\![\forall x(\neg Fx)(\Diamond Fx)]\!]^{g_c} = \emptyset$

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