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17. CIPI, 36; also see CIPI, 129.
18. CIPI, 78.
19. Gangesa, *Tattvacintamani* with Mathuri, ed. K. N. Tarkavagisa, vol. 1 (Delhi: Motilal Banarassidas, 1974), 355.
20. SDM, 189–212.
21. For undesirable consequences see CIPI, 49–62, 78.
22. CIPI, pp. 3–9, 73, 78.
23. CIPI, pp. 71–80.
24. Ibid.
25. I disagree with PBVR that OC does not favor either induction in the green-grue case (33). Considerations of economy that may involve observation pointing to the importance of OC may also make one hypothesis preferable to the other in the green-grue case (CIPI, 78–79).
26. CIPI, 67.

PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE AND GRAMMAR

Remnants of Words in Indian Grammar

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In Indian philosophy, the import of word is intimately connected to the question, “what sort of an entity does the importation of a word stand for?” We see the principle that makes an inextricable relation between words and meanings. The word is a primary constituent that constructs a sentence, and people understand the meaning of a word throughout the sentence holism (corporate body of words). This thesis contrasts with meaning atomism, where the representation of words seems semantically atomic or relies on the particular word, not to the whole sentence. The primacy of word sets for an object, and the meaning of the particular word can be derived from the object it stands for.

Jātiśabda (the general/nominal term), the earlier trend of the Indian philosophy of language, instigates a kind of relation between two rival groups—*Vyakti-śakti-vāda* and *Jāti-śakti-vāda*—or, more precisely, a debate pertaining to the meaning particularism versus the meaning generalism from the sense of determining the reference of the general term. *Vyakti-śakti-vādin* asks for a descriptive approach of the singular term by considering that the meaning is correlated to the nominal object. In our practical purposes when we strive to fix the reference, then we always prefer to denote the individual instead of an imperceptible universal. In the context like “The horse is dying,” here the reference of the horse is metonymically recognized by the particular horse, not by its genus. The *Jāti-śakti-vādin* argues that the purport of connotation of a word lies in an individual that is determined by a universal. This riddance of the individual to comprise into a universal domain can be drawn by an example like “The dodos are becoming extinct.” We can properly understand the meaning of the whole sentence if we look over the predicate term and its coherence

relation to the subject term, i.e., “dodo” bird. The property of possession (extinction) of generic birds like “dodo” in our example is going to be extinct bird. This distributive predicate successfully merges not in the individual bird itself like a “dodo,” but collaborately encodes the genus of the bird in general. The truth value of the proposition relies on the collective value of the predicate qualified by the universalistic sense or properties.

Here, the key concern is whether the word itself provides foundation of universal or something else. I think this sort of the metaphysical analysis of linguistic terms ensue a debate in Indian philosophy of language that is highly valued by the grammarians. The *Vyakti-śakti-vāda* delimits a word in terms of the particular term by following a realistic view (the conception of referential expressions makes sense here). *Jāti-śakti-vāda* contends that the import of the word is in no way similar to a particular; actually, it is “the universal in pursuance of laws of logical parsimony.”¹ Ganeri clarifies, “For clearly one might be a referentialist about definite description without being so about indefinite descriptions; likewise, one might be a referentialist about generic uses, but not about non-generic uses.”² The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Mīmāṃsākas, the realist schools of Indian philosophy, emphasize on a sentence that may be affirmative or negative but have a realistic stand (reference) to the object. The school gets rid of the thesis of an individual edifice of reality that gets closer to the conceptual schemata. Let us see the problem from a different level. My point is to understand the conceding approach of connecting words with ontological categories. Simply, the concern is how does the particular term “cow” categorically connote the universal “cowhood”?

WORD-MEANING INTERACTION

Kumārila underpins the debate in connection to the word-essence, which apprehends the meaning of a word that can be impeded only if different speakers failed to identify the particular word, since the identity of the word looks like a pointer that specifies the existence of a simple word-unit. In the case, like “the cow is standing up,” a hearer can understand that a speaker may talk about a particular cow instead of cow *genus*. Here, the popular use assumes the basic identity of the word and meaning as an unwanted premise. The principal understanding of *Mīmāṃsāsūtra*, I think, deciphers the universal as an exclusive connotation that can only concern about eternal words since the efficiencies are not only associated with the individual word like cow (determinatum) but similarly to self-same word *cowhood* as a universal that looks as determinant. The law of parsimony defines the comprehension of universal that can treat individual as a substratum and could be deduced from the indication (*lakṣaṇā*). Let us take an example. The sentence “the smoke is burning” remains nonsensical until the predicate term “burning” cannot be construed by the subject term “smoke” or similarly by “fire” since an inference takes a prominent place here to deduce the latter from the former. The naturalism that is preserved by Mīmāṃsā hinges a sort of non-convention-based language as a key tool that has a universalistic appeal. Besides, the logic that Mīmāṃsākas inculcate in defense of their thesis is an amalgam of universal with the nuance of language.

However, Navya Nyāya aims to criticize both the opinions (the meaning particularism and the meaning generalism). As we know, Gautama (*Nyaya-Sutra*, 2.2.66) articulates the meaning of a word in the sense of particular (*vākti*), form (*akṛti*), and universal (*jāti*). Gautama barely stresses on the concept of form while he hints at a particular as qualified by universal. Early Naiyāyikas believe in the connotation of a particular term that not only resides in the universal but also to the qualities, actions, and the substance as a configuration from a holistic scheme. This theory assigns integrity between the perceptual contents with the conceptual cognitions. If we only put the conceptual cognition as a prime configuration of the connotation of a particular term (like mango), then the taste of mango should not be cognized though the quality or the universal aspect of sweetness or sourness of the particular mango but by the perception of the content of mango that is cognized by *rasana* (palate) only.

Nyāya philosophy enhances the sense of public meaning as a sharable concept. The public meaning can precede the context of a speaker's belief since the word meaning is derived from the realm of sentence meaning that relies on the public sharability of meaning. Navya Nyāya resists this particular method to underline Kumarila's position on the meaning of a word that could be impeded in relation to the number of speakers who may fail to recognize the particular word, since the identity of the word as a pointer denotes the existence of a particular word instead of the genus. However, Navya Nyāya's stance (semantic holism) looks promising since they consider that the meaning of a sentence is a unified relational corpus, whereas the word cannot set as an individual component. The other schools treat the meaning of a word as a nonlinguistic entity, but the grammarians first emphasize the meaning of a word as a linguistic symbol.

COLLAPSE OF CONVENTIONALISM

In Vaiśeṣika philosophy, we notice that the relation between words and meanings is regarded as a matter of convention, and Nyāya accepts this hypothesis strongly. However, Patañjali looks at Kātyāyana's *Vārttika* that instigates an eternal relation of word-meaning by discarding the sense of conventionalism like Mīmāṃsā. Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣa* indicates that a universal seems one and it can be expressed by a word through the power of denotation (*Ekā ākṛtiḥ, sā cā bhidhīyate*). We can know this eternal nonderived linkage between the word and the meaning through people's invariable behaviors. Matilal clarifies, "People are seen to be using words to convey meaning, but they do not make an effort to manufacture words. . . . Jaimini in his *Mīmāṃsāsūtra*, 1.1.5 says that the relation between word and meaning is 'non-derived' or 'uncreated' (*autpattika*). Both Jaimini and Kātyāyana (see above) used two rather difficult words, *autpattika* and *siddha*, which do not have any transparent sense."³

Mīmāṃsākas might insinuate this problem in two different senses:

- a) Let us consider a word "X" (a pen). The supporters of eternal or non-derivative word-meaning relation can urge that "X" (a pen) is not an object that is

created by an individual since it is created by the omnipotent mind (God).

- b) We cannot expose the explicit origin of the majority of words. This procedure hints that words and their relation to meanings and referents are derived from the omnipotent mind that is beyond of any human endeavor.

Kumārila seems right as he challenges conventionalism to say that any convention should have to maintain the meaning relation within the edge of language, not prior to language. It looks promising to consider that words have a primacy over meanings while meanings are only denoted by words. The purport of words and its relation to meanings intermingles at the level of verbal judgment that confines the implication of public meaning as a conjecture of the causal referential directness to the reality.

The Indian grammarians (*Vaiyākaraṇa*) believe that the word evolves out of *śabda-brahman* (where words represent ultimate reality). The cognition of a word meets the criteria of the corresponding object of the world. Here, meaning connotes the word and the word-meaning relation relies on the process of the usages. Patañjali in his *Mahābhāṣya* refers to the contention of words (*śabdah*) that transmit to the substratum of the world. He considers that the appearance is congregated with the world through the metaphysical identification of words and meanings conjuncture. Patañjali stresses on the nature of cognition, but an eternal verbum (or supreme word) remains unaltered in grammarian as it lies beyond time and space. External verbum sounds as a transcendent principle that segregates all attribution qualities. Besides, eternal verbum as a unitary principle emerges the eternity of supreme reality, an ideal language form (*paśyantī*) that goes through the threefold cords of verbal, pre-verbal, and transcendental reality. In *Vākyapadīya*, external verbum is considered as the essence that is doubtlessly real and independent (*śabdattavaṃ yad akṣaram*). Sastri writes, "That the Eternal Verbum can be regarded as the Supreme Light that manifests different objects may be clearly understood with reference to our everyday experience. It is an undeniable fact that whatever passes current in our thought is determined by an articulate verbal form."⁴

Grammarians argue that the cognitive process of a newborn baby remains determinate, as the form of his/her knowledge is a sort of inarticulate or un-manifestative knowledge that links to the pre-natural knowledge. The reason is that the word according to grammarians is the material cause of the external world and any object beyond time and space dimension is comprehended by the subject's cognition. If there were no subjects or the concomitant objects, still words would have been in the universe as these are all pervading and eternal. For grammarians, eternal words are ahead of the *spatio-temporal* dimension. The eternal verbum emphasizes a comprehensible immutable reality that manifests in plurality and differentiation. In brief, analogically words are one and unique. Actually, the theory of evaluation of words for grammarians is a kind of unmanifested, immutable word essence (*śabda-vivarta-vāda*) that is independent of any kind of transformation

(*pariṇāma*). Like Vedāntin, grammarians' emphasis on the material cause (*upādāna kāraṇa*), an unchanging matrix that manifolds the phenomenal change (*aparīṇāmā prakṛtiḥ*). Bhartṛhari considers that one should not confuse between two different objects that are individually connoted to the different verbal expressions. This intimate relation between the object and the word manifolds a causation that goes towards the eternal verbum as the material cause of the world and the object. Now, one can argue whether the referent of a word differs from the word itself or the object that is determined by the word is identical with the word in nature. Bhartṛhari accepts the two alternatives and says,

Svamātrā paramātrā va śrutya prakramyate yathā

Tathai'va rūḍhatām eti tayā hy artho vidhīyate
(*Vākyapadīya*, 1.130)

Bhartṛhari emphasizes that the eternal verbum underlies a principle that accords objects and every being without adjoining any genuine amendment. This doctrine extends a kind of uniformism that discards any bifurcation between the word and the world. Eternal verbum as a *unitary principle* of words emerges from the eternity of supreme reality (*iha dvau śabdātmānau-kāryo nityaś ca* [Puṅyarāja's commentary, 50]).

ANALYSIS

Bhartṛhari's proposal tracks down a kind of *normativity* of grammar in order to strengthen the impact of grammar on epistemology. It sounds interesting when he says that all object-classes pivot on word-classes (*Vākyapadīya*, 1.15). Grammarians, especially Bhartṛhari are the leading adherent of monism who ensure that a word in its essence can be considered as an indivisible unit where the plurality of the linguistic forms and worldly phenomena has an interim pragmatic validity. One can ask whether we can deflect class characteristic (universal) from an individual. Bhartṛhari clarifies that the universal is the personification of the individual that looks unchanged through all its periods (*padārthasya prāṇa-pradaḥ*). It is intimately entwined with qualities and actions that have relation to the substratum, but the substance sounds nonrelative to the essence of the universal. Universal resides in each individual falling into the same class. However, it is not required to understand all the substitutes of the universal as infinite numbers bound it. Sastri clarifies Patañjali's stand on the universal and its relation to meaning that is closer to grammarians. Sastri writes, "In fact, a universal is neither a summation of individuals nor collectively inherent in the latter. It is a fact that a universal occurs in individuals and, when understood as a meaning, it includes an individual as a substratum of it."⁵

A particular phrase like "pot exists" denotes to the referent, i.e., a particular pot that exists, although the content of specific terms like "heaven," "hell," "intelligence," etc. has no reference fixation (existential reference) in the objective world. So here, the denotation of the empty terms cannot deduce from the existential referents. Despite the denotation of the word from the universal, particular, or quality, etc., the compelling relation (a syntactical relation) revolves around the word-meaning interaction by discarding the denotation method. Bhartṛhari advocates the

same attitude like Patañjali in his writing. Bhartṛhari thinks that the individual character of a word is a type of generous supplement linked to the general characteristic.

Another clue is that the import of a word relies on the context sensitivity of the persons by depending on different impressions (*vāsanā*). These kinds of different opinions exemplify the training of different philosophical schools and their way of understanding the problem, although to understand the ultimate reality, one has to be blessed with the vision of ultimate truth. Our inter-social and experimental knowledge cannot grasp the transcendental truth, so we should not put a great deal of reliance on perceptual knowledge and the denotation of the word from an individualistic sense. Bhartṛhari, I assume, holds a model of indeterminism about the import of word-meaning relation that hints towards an unfeasible attempt to get a universal approval on the meaning of a word and its consequences. As the meaning of a word depends on the society and an agent's preference, so the problem of incongruity or divergence in the case of denotation may recur. Besides, Bhartṛhari attunes an import of a word as fiction, although Bhartṛhari strongly believes in the reality of sentences and the conception of meaning in terms of an inseparable unit. Bhartṛhari questions about the objective validity of words and meanings. This thesis denies the appeal of *Abhihitānvayavādin* who considers that the meaning of a word does not stem from putting together the meaning of each constituent; neither the meaning of a word can be deduced from the corporate body of the sentence as propagated by *Anvitābhidāhnvādin*. Meaning for the grammarians—especially Bhartṛhari—is regarded as an indivisible unit that can be explained in the course of the meaning of an unreal word that comprises it. For Bhartṛhari the sentence seems real, but words are in *vaikaharī* level (ordinary speech that takes place in *spatio-temporal* forms) useful fiction that cannot relate to the empirical real objective. The point is that the semantic and syntactical part of words remains unreal. Bhartṛhari emphasizes, "The *śabda* that is designative of meaning is an individual unit, a sequenceless whole, but it is revealed through the divided items (noisy realities produced in proper sequences). The latter gets intermixed with the object/meaning for it constitutes the very nature of the object/meaning."⁶

Bhartṛhari's *sphoṭa-vāda* nourishes the threefold doctrine of letters, words, and sentences. The term *Sphoṭa* refers to the word-meaning liaison from a causal and effectual efficiency. The use of the word is considered as the instruction for engaging with certain *sphoṭa*. We know that *sphoṭa* (*śabda*) is in nature indivisible and distinct from any kind of internal sequence. Bhartṛhari thinks that there is *pada-sphoṭa*, which refers to the word as a meaning-bearing unit, whereas *vākya-sphoṭa* indicates to sentence, i.e., nonsequence and part less whole. It is controversial that sentences in Bhartṛhari's sense are regarded as a meaning bearing unit, but *sphoṭa* in its real sense interchange with the substratum, a kind of linguistic unit that is akin to meaning. Actually, *sphoṭa* is like the non-differentiated language principle. The metaphysical standpoint of Bhartṛhari instigates that the self is identical with language and this state is called *paśyantī* stage, while language and thought, which transmit an undifferentiated

state where the proper articulation of utterances closes to an intermediary stage (pre-verbal stage). In this pre-verbal stage, the speaker considers a differentiation between thought and language. This intermediate stage is familiar to the name of *madhyamā vāk*. The third stage is called the verbal stage (*vaikaharī*) that stands for speaker's word-meaning relation and the comprehension of the hearer. Here, the uttered sound can be perceived by our sense organs. So without comprehending the sound, an agent cannot understand what word (*śabda*) actually is. Now the interesting question is whether Bhartrhari's account tends toward monism or not. If we clearly go through Bhartrhari's analysis, then the pertinent point that we notice is his quest for the transcendental word essence that he called the first principle of the universe, and the *sphoṭa* theory is doubtlessly aligned with the ultimate reality (*sābda Brahma*). The manifestation that Bhartrhari preserved looks at a perfect knowledge of an individual where without being connected to any thought, no communicative language may ever exist. So the word precedes knowledge hypothesis sounds acceptable. In *paśyantī* level, language and meaning are one and inseparable, but at the verbal level, these may differ. *Sphoṭa* doctrine implies a reunion between the symbol and the signifier. Bhartrhari refutes Mīmāṃsākas' opinion that we get sentence meaning conjointly through the word meaning. There is a mutual linkage between the sentence meaning and the word meaning. The sentence meaning is nothing but the sequence of words' meaning. These theories preserve a kind of atomism. Bhartrhari's outlook defines the sentence meaning as an indivisible unit that cannot comprehend the atomistic approach of meaning. In *loka-vyavahara* (human practice), we undertake the holistic approach of language learning in the atomistic unit that correlates words and its meaning separately. The indivisible structure of the sentence is an internal part of language, but the manifestation that makes the whole into part is an external approach that is called speech (*nāda*). *Sphoṭa* and *nāda* are not two distinct issues while grasping the one means grasping the other at the same time. In fact, grammarian thinks *nāda* as an overlay and qualified facade of real language (*sphoṭa*). *Sphoṭa* reflects in the *nāda* as the color red is reflected on the crystal. Moreover, Bhartrhari urges that the comprehension of *sphoṭa* is conditionally (instrumentally) derived from the *nāda* just like through our visual system we can see a tree, etc.⁷ In this visual perception, an agent may be unaware of the visual faculty and its features. In Patañjali's words, *nāda* is an attribute of *sphoṭa*. Here the cognition of *nāda* is unable to precede the cognition of *sphoṭa*.

One can disagree with grammarians' hypothesis on the utility of language. In grammarian school, language plays three different roles at a time, communication (*pratipādana*), human practice (*loka-vyavahara*), and cognition (*jñāna*). If we would like to see language as a communication, then the process of comprehension (*pratipatti*) precedes communication (*pratipādana*). It is a sort of speech transaction where speakers accumulate speech reception in the context of speech meaning referred to by some speech acts. Language as a human practice endorses the concept of *speech power* that relates to the explicit language. How could the specific language come up? The answer is through language disintegration (*apabhraṃśa*),

but it is also true that the generalized language competence (*śabda-tattva*) can manifest a sort of specific language through *vāsanā* as an innate capability. This speech-bond procedure is causally dependent on the subject's will (it may be God's will or a person's will). Language as cognition brings a linguistic act that accompanies comprehension and generalized language competence with cognition (experience in mundane level). However, in particular, Bhartrhari hints at the ultimate form of language where the purity of the word generates the manifested essential characters. Without believing in the ideal language form (*paśyantī*), no grammatical form can elucidate how does the word and meaning manifest on the *sphoṭa* theory (real *śabda-bodha*). Language seems an intrinsic component of an individual's awareness. The learning process that is also nourished by this awareness can be gradually increased since the procedure of cognitive awareness is inseparably construed by words.

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NOTES

1. Sastri, *The Philosophy of Word and Meaning*, 139.
2. Ganeri, *Semantic Powers, Meaning and the Means of Knowing in Classical Indian Philosophy*, 85.
3. Matilal, *The Word and the World, India's Contribution to the Study of Language*, 27.
4. Sastri, *The Philosophy of Word and Meaning*, 5.
5. *Ibid.*, 147.
6. Bhartrhari *Vākyapadīya*, verse 1. 44.
7. *Ibid.*, verse 1, 45–49.

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