AJPS AMERICAN JOURNAL of POLITICAL SCIENCE

The Distinctive Value of Elections and the Case for Compulsory Voting

Emilee Booth Chapman Stanford University

Abstract: *In this article, I defend compulsory voting on the grounds that it reinforces the distinctive and valuable role that elections play in contemporary democracy. Some scholars have suggested that mandatory voting laws can improve government responsiveness to members of poor and marginalized groups who are less likely to vote. Critics of compulsory voting object that citizens can participate in a wide variety of ways; voting is not important enough to justify forcing people to do it. These critics neglect the importance of voting's particular role in contemporary democratic practice, though. The case for compulsory voting rests on an implicit, but widely shared, understanding of elections as special moments of mass participation that manifest the equal political authority of all citizens. The most prominent objections to mandatory voting fail to appreciate this distinctive role for voting and the way it is embedded within a broader democratic framework.*

Concern about the gap between public opinion and policy outcomes and about the disproportionate influence of wealthy citizens has recently reinvigorated the debate over compulsory voting. Proponents of compulsory voting suggest that declining and unequal voter turnout rates have exacerbated the responsiveness gap in contemporary democracies. There is ample evidence that enforced compulsory voting is among the most effective ways of increasing voter turnout. Supporters and opponents of mandatory voting disagree, however, about whether higher voter turnout is actually a valuable goal, and whether compulsion is an appropriate way of achieving it.

In this article, I argue that the case for compulsory voting rests on an implicit recognition of the unique and valuable role that elections play in contemporary democratic practice as periodic moments in which there is an ambition toward universal participation. Understanding the distinctive value of elections strengthens the case for compulsory voting in many established democracies. Addressing prominent objections to mandatory voting,[1] I argue that critics who deny the value of high turnout achieved though compulsion fail to give sufficient attention to voting's unique role in contemporary democracies.

My argument rests on the critical assumption that greater political equality, understood as government that is more equally responsive to all citizens, and greater democratic legitimacy are worthwhile goals to pursue. Thus, my argument is not directed at those criticisms of compulsory voting denying the value of a more equally responsive government.[2] Though I do try to address some of the specific objections raised in these criticisms of compulsory voting, my argument is primarily addressed at the important line of criticism that high voter turnout, especially when achieved through compulsion, does not

Emilee Booth Chapman is Assistant Professor, 616 Serra Street, Encina Hall West, Room 100, Stanford, CA 94305-6044 (emileebc@stanford.edu).

The author would like to thank participants at the University of California, San Diego, Political Theory Workshop; the Stanford Center for Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law colloquium; and the Princeton Graduate Political Theory Workshop; as well as Philip Pettit, Steve Macedo, Annie Stilz, Chris Achen, Kevin Elliott, Shmulik Nili, and three anonymous reviewers for insightful comments on earlier drafts of this article. The author would also like to thank Alec Walen and Trevor Latimer for many helpful conversations.

[1]The terms *mandatory voting* and *compulsory voting* refer to the same type of policies, and both are common in the academic and popular literature on the topic. I use the two terms interchangeably throughout this article.

[2]This specification of the ultimate aim of mandatory voting as a more equally responsive government is intentionally ambivalent about both what equal responsiveness entails, and to what aspect of citizens governments should be responsive (e.g., actual preferences, deliberative preferences, or interests), because the debate over the democratic value of mandatory voting turns on precisely these questions. The argument in this article aims to demonstrate why responsiveness to citizens' preferences expressed in elections is, in fact, a democratically important form of responsiveness, in part by arguing that equal responsiveness to citizens' votes helps to promote other valuable forms of equal responsiveness.

American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 63, No. 1, January 2019, Pp. 101–112

 DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12393

significantly contribute to political equality or meaningful democratic legitimacy.

The argument proceeds in the following steps: First, I argue that the ambition toward universal participation establishes a distinctive and important role for voting in modern democratic systems, and, to the extent that they approximate this aim of universal turnout, elections contribute in unique ways to the promotion of democratic values, especially equal responsiveness. Second, I argue that compulsory voting is a particularly good method for increasing turnout because it is more effective than other similarly feasible methods, and it can complement more substantial electoral reforms. Moreover, the method of compulsory voting is well suited to reinforce the distinctive virtues of elections. Finally, I address some major objections to mandatory voting to show that the expected benefits of mandatory voting are likely to outweigh the expected costs and that its effects will not undermine the value of high voter turnout.

Before proceeding, it is worth making a few remarks about the scope of this argument. First, technically, this argument applies only to compulsory *turnout*; enforcing a legal requirement to cast a valid vote would require eliminating the secret ballot, which I do not advocate. In keeping with the norm in the existing literature, though, I use the more common terms *mandatory voting* or *compulsory voting* to refer to compulsory turnout.

Second, this argument applies only to voting in elections (or potentially referenda) in large-scale democratic societies (i.e., nation-states, or large provinces in a federal system). The distinctive virtues of elections that I lay out in the first section of this article may be less important in smaller communities that can ensure consistent and equally effective access to other modes of participation.

Finally, the argument I advance in this article only supports an all-things-concerned judgment in favor of implementing mandatory voting when the system has been designed to achieve its goals and limit negative side effects in the particular context, which, in most cases, will require appropriate complementary reforms. A desirable system of mandatory voting will, for example, require accessible polling places and an enforcement structure with reasonable penalties to ensure that the law is not overly burdensome, especially for already vulnerable populations. Nonetheless, this aricle contributes to the case that proponents of democracy should regard mandatory voting as a potentially powerful tool for democratic reform, and that it is worth figuring out how to implement it effectively and justly.

The Role of Elections in Contemporary Democracy

Proponents of compulsory voting typically justify compelling people to vote by appealing to two benefits from near-universal electoral turnout: First, higher turnout will produce a political system that is more equally responsive to all citizens; second, higher turnout will increase the perceived legitimacy of the political system (Engelen 2007, 24–25; L. Hill in Brennan and Hill 2014; Lijphart 1996, 1997).

Critics of compulsory voting, on the other hand, object that these arguments place too much emphasis on the act of voting while neglecting the diversity of participation that characterizes healthy democracies. Annabelle Lever (2010, 908) argues, "Voting is, at best, only one form of democratic political participation and, from some perspectives, not an especially important or attractive one." Other critics likewise claim that compulsory voting arbitrarily singles out one kind of participation as essential to democracy (Brennan in Brennan and Hill 2014, 31). High voter turnout, opponents contend, is not necessarily important for democracy. Moreover, compelling higher turnout is not harmless. Critics argue that compulsory voting could compromise the quality of democratic participation and that it needlessly interferes with individual liberty.

Opponents of compulsory voting rightly observe that voting is only one aspect of democracy, but they wrongly conclude that approximately universal voting is not valuable to contemporary democracy. Voting is not interchangeable with other forms of political influence. Elections play a distinctive and important role within a broader framework of democracy, a role characterized by *mass* participation, in fact, by an ambition toward *universal* participation.

Established democracies devote tremendous resources to making voting accessible. India's 2014 Lok Sabha election, for example, required nearly a million polling places to ensure that all eligible voters, even those in the most remote parts of the country, would have a meaningful opportunity to vote (Vyawahare 2014). Public discourse and the widespread belief in a duty to vote suggest a further publicly shared belief that it is important not only for citizens to have ample opportunity to vote, but also that citizens actually take advantage of that opportunity (see, e.g., Blais 2000, 95). This public attitude toward voting is distinct from attitudes toward other forms of participation; in the popular

imagination, voting is singled out as the object of a duty.[3]

Of course, critics of compulsory voting who doubt the value of high voter turnout are also likely to be critical of this prominence of voting in public discourse and in the popular imagination. Voting is not the only way citizens participate in decision making in today's democracies. Citizens might also contribute to public deliberation, petition their representatives, donate money to a campaign, or even stand for office themselves. Popular voting alone need not (and surely cannot) bear all of the normative weight of democracy, and fostering a more equally responsive government certainly requires attention to the significant inequities in these other domains of participation (Lever 2010). Seen in this light, the special emphasis on electoral participation may seem arbitrary and thus an insufficient basis for compelling citizens to vote.

The special emphasis on voting in popular political culture is not arbitrary or misguided, though. Rather, it is grounded in the distinctive and valuable role that periodic moments of approximately universal participation play in contemporary democratic practices. When characterized by approximately universal turnout, elections interrupt the ordinary, delegated business of government with extraordinary spectacles of democracy that command the attention of the general public and manifest the equal political authority of all citizens. Though they cannot fully instantiate democracy on their own, these moments effectively contribute to contemporary democratic practices in a number of ways.

First, the ambition toward universal participation in periodic elections helps to guard against political disengagement and alienation by defining concrete expectations for participation. Skeptics of the value of high voter turnout often argue that active participation is not essential to democracy because individuals can passively exercise political authority by deferring to their fellow citizens or to political elites. But political inaction can only be interpreted as passive participation if citizens believe it is appropriate and possible for them to intervene when they are dissatisfied with the direction of their public life. In modern societies, though, many people do not see themselves as political agents in their own right, able to exert influence over their political circumstances (Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 2012, 168).

A pluralist model of democracy might simply call for citizens to take advantage of opportunities to participate whenever and however they wish, but many citizens will never participate because they never feel competent to do so, or because it simply never occurs to them. The ambition toward universal participation in elections mitigates this problem of habitual disengagement by establishing an expectation that citizens *will* perform their political agency on specific and predictable occasions.[4] Knowing that they will be called upon to actively participate on a recurring basis provides citizens with a reason to develop an enduring political identity.[5] Moreover, by directing citizens' attention to particular political questions that they will be expected to answer, elections make the often frustrating and potentially discouraging task of figuring out what to pay attention to easier for ordinary citizens.[6] This benefit is magnified by the relative information saturation that occurs around elections.

Critics of compulsory voting might argue that, rather than trying to enforce universal electoral participation, we can more effectively combat political disengagement and alienation by promoting participation in other arenas.[7] But, even if nonelectoral participation can be more effective than voting at increasing political engagement and efficacy in individual cases, approximating universal participation in other forms of activism or participation would require much more radical reforms of political culture and institutions. Efforts to increase voter turnout, on the other hand, build on an extensive infrastructure of electoral administration and the existing, widespread norm that there is a duty to vote.

Moreover, periodic moments of approximately universal participation would likely still play a valuable role in a political system already characterized by widespread citizen engagement, for several reasons. First, these moments facilitate collective action. Individuals can influence public life more effectively when they are

[3] In a cross-national survey of political attitudes, the 2004 International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) citizenship module, respondents were asked to rate on a 7-point scale how important it is for a good citizen to "always vote in elections." In 37 of 40 countries included in the survey, over 50% of respondents rated this a 6 or 7. By contrast, the percentage of respondents who rated "keeping watch over the government" in the top two categories of importance exceeded 50% in only 22 of the 40 countries studied. And only in one country did more than half of respondents rate "being active in social and political organizations" in the top two categories of importance (ISSP Research Group 2012, 31–44). On the distinctiveness of motivations to vote versus to participate in other activities, see also Campbell (2006), Dalton (2008), and Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995, 23–24).

[4] Unlike other forms of political participation, voting is habit forming (Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 2012, 173).

[5] See Dinas (2014) on the effect of voting on partisan attachment.

[6] Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995, 358–59) note that, compared to other forms of participation, voting has less demanding "prerequisites" in terms of resources, civic skills, and education.

[7] Participation in school or workplace democracy, for example, might increase feelings of political efficacy (Almond and Verba 1989, 300).

able to combine their efforts with other like-minded citizens. Insofar as elections represent occasions in which all citizens can count on each other to participate, they can help to overcome some of the coordination problems that make it difficult for large, diverse, unorganized, or underresourced groups to effectively utilize other channels of influence.

Second, when citizens internalize an expectation of universal participation in elections, electoral campaigns also create a relatively attentive audience to whom political leaders and activists can address political claims,[8] facilitating the introduction of new issues and the contestation of existing political divisions.

Finally, periodic moments of approximately universal participation make the political involvement and formal political equality of all citizens *manifest*. This spectacle reinforces parties' and elected officials' incentives to take the interests and concerns of all citizens into account. Elections are not the only way for citizens to hold political leaders to account, but elections are still distinctively valuable mechanisms of democratic control when they predictably involve the entire citizenry in the sanctioning process. When characterized by nearly universal participation, elections provide an unambiguous reminder to public officials that they are accountable to *all* citizens, not just the most vocal and active.

Because elections make manifest the responsiveness of the political system to the equal agency of all citizens in at least a few concrete instances, the optics of periodic moments of approximately universal participation can also contribute to the empirical legitimacy of a democratic regime. Those who find themselves on the losing side of a political decision may have a harder time maintaining the belief that they speak for a silent majority when citizens routinely reveal how they align themselves on significant dimensions of political conflict (see also Przeworski 1999).

The optics of approximately universal participation also imbue elections with powerful expressive effects that can reinforce citizens' commitment to democracy. In *Just Elections*, Dennis Thompson (2002) observes that elections have two kinds of expressive effects: First, "they enable citizens to express attitudes about the political process"; second, they "express the polity's attitude toward its citizens" (22). When they credibly call for the participation of *all* citizens, elections convey the community's belief in the value of all citizens' contributions. And by voting, citizens participate in this public expression: "When citizens go to the polls on the same day, visibly and publicly participating in the same way in a common experience of civic engagement, they demonstrate their willingness to contribute on equal terms to the democratic process" (Thompson 2002, 34). By regularly participating in elections, citizens habitually enact their roles as participants in the political community as well as their commitment to decision-making procedures that instantiate the equal political authority of all citizens.[9]

The Case for Compulsory Voting

The democratic value of increased voter turnout thus derives from the contributions of elections—*as periodic moments of (approximately) universal participation*—to an equally responsive government and other democratic values. But the extent to which elections satisfactorily perform this important function depends on voting rates. Consistently low turnout rates diminish many of the distinctive democratic virtues of elections. This is especially true when a substantial number of citizens in contemporary democracies never vote and when these habitual nonvoters tend to be concentrated in poor and otherwise disadvantaged groups. Many citizens do not vote in part because they do not perceive the political system as responsive to them. Public officials in turn reinforce this perception; officials have an incentive to prioritize the concerns of likely voters over those of habitual nonvoters (Griffin and Newman 2005; K. Q. Hill, Leighley, and Hinton-Andersson 1995; Martin 2003). Periodic moments of universal participation ideally prevent this kind of informal disenfranchisement, but communities with voluntary voting rely on social norms to enforce the expectation that everyone votes. In marginalized groups within large societies, such norms may not be available.

Many scholars have pointed to compulsory voting as an important step in counteracting this cycle of disengagement in marginalized communities (Birch 2009, 53–54; L. Hill 2010, 919–21; Lijphart 1997). Numerous studies have shown that compulsory voting effectively and often dramatically increases turnout rates—by 15 percentage points or more (e.g., Birch 2009, 79–97;

[8]The pattern in Google searches for "politics" illustrates the relative attentiveness around elections. The ngram for "politics" searches in the United States since 2004 shows dramatic peaks in October of presidential election years, with smaller spikes around midterm elections and competitive primaries (Google Trends Ngram 2018).

[9]Lipset (1981, 30–31) similarly argues that elections act as valuable "integrative institutions," reinforcing citizens' commitment to legitimate decision-making processes, and Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995, 24) point out that "the vote is the single mode of participation for which the maximum input is equalized across actors," enabling it to strengthen democratic norms of political equality.

Hirczy 1994)[10]—and electoral participation is distributed more evenly across society (Fowler 2013, 72; Hooghe and Pelleriaux 1998, 421–22). By promoting reliable compliance with the expectation of universal electoral participation, effectively enforced compulsory voting remedies the collective action problem that plagues vulnerable communities with chronically low turnout rates. Members of politically alienated groups have more reason to regard their vote as an instrument of political influence if they know that others like them will also vote.

The claims that increasing voter turnout through compulsory voting will improve government responsiveness to and representation of the poor and marginalized are especially plausible in light of the functions of moments of approximately universal participation, and there is at least some evidence to support these arguments for mandatory voting. Some studies, for example, have found that compulsory voting is associated with lower levels of income inequality and corruption—outcomes that benefit the poor who are less likely to vote in voluntary systems (Birch 2009, 130–31; Chong and Olivera 2008).

Compulsory voting is not the only instrument for increasing voter turnout, but, even when penalties for not voting are relatively low and excuses are permissive, compulsory voting tends to be more effective than most other measures, especially those that are comparably feasible. Relatively uncontroversial reforms focused on making voting more convenient and accessible at best increase turnout by only a few percentage points, and they do not typically draw many new voters from underrepresented groups (James 2010, 373–74). In fact, sometimes these "convenience voting" reforms can result in decreased turnout (Berinsky 2005). More dramatic convenience reforms—like Sunday voting and automatic voter registration—tend to produce more significant increases in turnout, but they still fall short of compulsory voting's effectiveness (James 2010, 378–82). The only measure that appears comparably effective—switching from majoritarian to proportional representation—requires radical systemic change, and it may not be effective or desirable in all political or institutional contexts.[11]

[10]The point estimates for compulsory voting's effect vary both because the effect of mandatory voting depends on the counterfactual baseline turnout rate, and because different measures of turnout are used. For example, the 90–95% figures often reported for Australia's turnout include only registered voters. Though Australia has compulsory registration, critics point out that many eligible voters still remain unregistered. The turnout rate among eligible voters is therefore lower (Ballinger 2006). On balance, though, the literature is clear that mandatory voting significantly increases turnout (Birch 2009, 96–97; James 2010, 375–76).

[11]In presidential systems, for example, the strategic environment may mute the turnout effects of proportional representation (Cox 2015). And, of course, this measure is unavailable to polities that already have proportional electoral systems, but still fall short of desired levels of turnout.

And, of course, compulsory voting can be regarded as a complement, not simply an alternative, to other turnout-boosting reforms.

Compulsory voting is not a unique or universal solution to the problem of low voter turnout, but its combination of effectiveness and flexibility relative to other measures for increasing turnout make it a particularly valuable tool in the toolkit for democratic reform. The case for compulsory voting rests not only on its effectiveness, though, but also on its compatibility with the virtues of moments of universal participation. Compulsory voting can magnify elections' effect on democratic norms by adding the expressive power of law to the norm of universal voting. Compulsory voting clearly sends the message that all citizens—not just the college educated or wealthy—are expected to contribute to electoral decision making. This expressive effect, reinforced by the experience of actually participating in the vote, encourages citizens to see themselves as political agents. Because of its expressive effect, compulsory voting is also valuable as an object of political support. When citizens support mandatory voting laws, they clearly express a public belief in and commitment to the value of all citizens' participation in democracy (Engelen 2007, 29).

Because compulsory voting strengthens the public commitment to democratic norms while also increasing the government's adherence to those norms, proponents have argued that mandatory voting also increases at least the descriptive legitimacy of a political system, and anecdotal evidence supports this claim (see, e.g., Lijphart 1997, 10). Compulsory voting has also been associated with a higher reported satisfaction with democracy (Birch 2009, 114).

Thus far, I have demonstrated that increasing voter turnout is an important goal for contemporary democratic societies, and that compulsory voting is, at least initially, an appealing means of increasing turnout. Completing the case for mandatory voting, though, requires showing that the likely costs of implementing it do not outweigh the likely benefits. In the next section, I complete this step by responding to four significant objections to mandatory voting.

Four Objections

I have argued that critics who deny the value of high voter turnout fail to recognize the distinctive role of elections

in contemporary democracies. While it is true that voting is only one of many ways for citizens to influence government, voting is not interchangeable with other forms of participation. Elections play a valuable role in modern democracy as special occasions for universal participation. Compulsory voting enables elections to fulfill this role more reliably.

Even if they grant the value of widespread voting, though, many critics object that compulsory voting is not an appropriate means of achieving higher turnout. One potential concern is that mandatory voting might crowd out intrinsic motivations to vote and thus undermine the expressive benefits of elections. And although proponents of mandatory voting tout its potential to promote a more equally responsive government and increase the descriptive legitimacy of a democratic regime, many critics worry that mandatory voting will have perverse effects in these domains. These critics have argued that compulsory voting can lend a veneer of *false* legitimacy to deeply flawed, or even authoritarian regimes, even while mandatory voting might actually make government *less* responsive to its citizens, because nonvoters typically do not have the kind of political knowledge they need to use the ballot to advance their interests. Perhaps most seriously, Jason Brennan (in Brennan and Hill 2014) has argued that, because it involves coercion, compulsory voting faces a very high burden of justification—one it cannot meet. According to Brennan, the benefits of higher turnout are neither sufficiently weighty nor sufficiently likely to justify punishing citizens who do not vote.

In this section, I argue that these objections are insufficiently attentive to the distinctive role of voting in contemporary democracies, and to the ways that electoral practices and institutions are embedded within a broader democratic framework. None of these objections is sufficient to universally defeat the case for implementing (or maintaining) a well-designed compulsory voting scheme.

The Crowding Out Objection

Many of the benefits of moments of mass participation that I have outlined in this article—in particular, their ability to reinforce citizens' perception of themselves as political agents and their commitment to democratic principles—rely on people's voting for the right reasons. Habitual voting more effectively reinforces democratic norms if citizens vote in part *because* they endorse those norms (see Atiq 2014, 1094). Critics of compulsory voting might worry, then, that *forcing* people to vote will not reinforce the commitment to democracy. Instead, they might worry that compulsory voting will have the opposite effect: Adding an extrinsic motivation to vote—fear of punishment—may crowd out intrinsic motivations, even among those who would have voted voluntarily.

Social scientists have shown that offering extrinsic (typically monetary) incentives for good behaviors can sometimes change the way people view those good behaviors, crowding out intrinsic motivations for doing them (see, e.g., Gneezy and Rustichini 2000). Skeptics of compulsory voting might worry that if voting were required, citizens would no longer vote out of a sense of duty and commitment to democracy, but rather would go to the polls grumbling at the legal burden, or perhaps would choose to pay the fine and spare themselves the trouble.

Extrinsic motivations do not always crowd out intrinsic motivations, though. Compulsory voting might avoid the perverse effects sometimes generated by incentives for good behavior because it involves the expressive effect of the law. Laws do not just provide external incentives for citizens to behave in certain ways; often, they also express a community's approbation of certain forms of behavior (Hasen 1996, 2172). Many compulsory voting laws seem to exist mainly for this expressive purpose. Some are not enforced at all, whereas others are not enforced very strictly (Birch 2009, 36). Australia has one of the most effectively enforced compulsory voting systems in the world, but even there, excuses for nonvoting are readily granted, and many cases of unexcused abstention are not pursued. Only about one in four Australian nonvoters actually pays a fine (Birch 2009, 6). Given this low enforcement rate, it seems likely that Australia has achieved its high participation rates through a combination of the expressive and punitive functions of its laws.

The case of Australia demonstrates that appropriately designed mandatory voting laws can avoid crowding out intrinsic motivations to vote. Australia has had compulsory voting for federal elections since 1924, yet still enjoys one of the highest rates of belief in the duty to vote in the world (ISSP Research Group 2012, 10). A majority of Australian citizens support compulsory voting, whereas very few strongly oppose it (Mackerras and McAllister 1999, 221). In a 1996 survey, 87% of Australian respondents said they would "probably" or "definitely" still vote even if it were not compulsory (Mackerras and McAllister 1999, 227). Compulsory voting laws act in concert with existing public norms about the value of democracy and the importance of voting, increasing the motivational efficacy of these norms by backing them up with the expressive and coercive power of law. Compulsory

voting does not corrupt, but rather reinforces intrinsic motivations to vote (see Elliott 2017).[12]

The False Legitimacy Objection

Earlier, I cited increased descriptive legitimacy as a likely benefit of mandatory voting, but some critics deny that increased descriptive legitimacy is actually a valuable outcome to pursue. Pointing to the historical use of compulsory voting in authoritarian regimes, they argue that mandatory voting can be used to create a false veneer of legitimacy in regimes that are not, in fact, legitimate (see, e.g., Jakee and Sun 2006, 64). Some critics also worry that even in democratic regimes, compulsory voting may generate political complacency and discourage citizens from confronting and correcting serious flaws in their political systems (Brennan in Brennan and Hill 2014, 49–50). This criticism suggests that voluntary voting systems may provide an important collective benefit insofar as turnout levels can convey information about the existence of dissatisfaction among citizens, providing a spur to social activism.

That mandatory voting can be used by authoritarian regimes to generate false claims to democratic legitimacy does not present a strong objection to its use in democratic regimes; authoritarians employ mandatory voting for the same reason that they pretend to hold elections in the first place: Because under the right conditions, these institutions do, in fact, strengthen democratic legitimacy. Moreover, there is good reason to doubt that compulsory voting does increase complacency within democratic regimes. In a comprehensive cross-national study of the effects of compulsory voting, Sarah Birch (2009) finds that citizens in countries with compulsory voting report higher levels of satisfaction with democracy (113), but they also display less faith in the efficacy of voting (67) and a greater inclination to engage in protest (70–71). Birch attributes the lower sense of electoral efficacy in countries with compulsory voting to the fact that in these countries with very high turnout, citizens cannot cling to "the illusion of an unfulfilled potential efficacy" that is available to citizens in voluntary voting systems (69). Because it more closely conforms to the ideal of voting as a form of universal participation, compulsory voting might actually encourage citizens to develop a more realistic understanding of what voting can and cannot accomplish.

Compulsory voting strengthens contemporary democracy by better ensuring that elections fulfill their distinctively valuable role as moments of mass participation, but it also strengthens democracy by more clearly delineating the limitations of that role. The perceived informative benefits of voluntary voting systems are largely fictive; low turnout is often attributed to apathy or laziness, whereas high turnout can be driven by anger or fear. Since compulsory voting eliminates the option of staying home on Election Day, it decreases the temptation to interpret high turnout as an expression of political satisfaction. And, since compulsory voting prevents citizens from conveying their political disaffection by avoiding the polls, they have more reason to seek out other arenas for dissent.

The Uninformed Voters Objection

Many critics object that although compulsory voting may lead to more widespread political participation and more equal government responsiveness, the kind of participation and responsiveness achieved by compulsory voting is not actually more democratic or desirable. Critics claim that compulsory voting increases turnout only by introducing more indifferent and ignorant individuals into the electorate. Ample survey research has shown that voters demonstrate more political interest, more political knowledge, and more definite political preferences than their nonvoting compatriots. Critics argue that there is no reason to value government responsiveness to the uninformed or arbitrary votes of those who are not politically engaged enough to vote in a voluntary system. In fact, critics argue, adding more uninformed voters into the electorate might lead to electoral results that are even less representative of public opinion than results from low-turnout elections (Brennan in Brennan and Hill 2014, 43–45; Jakee and Sun 2006, 67–69; Saunders 2010, 72).

Proponents of compulsory voting have responded to these objections by arguing that levels of political engagement and knowledge under a voluntary voting system are not necessarily indicative of what they would be in a system with compulsory voting. They argue that compulsory voting can affect the costs and benefits of acquiring political knowledge and forming political judgments in a variety of ways and indirectly "serve as an incentive to become informed" (Lijphart 1997, 10). First, compulsory voting decreases the cost of informed voting relative to individuals' other options (Shineman 2013, 35–36). Second, because it solves a collective action problem and enables

[12]The expressive effect of the law depends on how it is framed. Legal incentives can be administered in different ways that affect whether people perceive legal penalties as "punishments" or as "costs." When penalties resemble punishments, they induce more compliance with the preferred behavior (Feldman and Teichman 2008).

citizens to rely on others with similar values and interests to vote, compulsory voting might increase the expected benefit of casting an informed vote (L. Hill 2014, 149–52; Lijphart 1997, 9). Third, compulsory voting might shape the political culture in a way that increases citizens' perception of the social value of political knowledge and creates a more information-rich environment (Birch 2009, 61; Hasen 1996, 2168).

It is difficult to assess the evidence for these claims about compulsory voting's benefits because it is difficult to construct reliable measures of the quality of the information environment or of a culture of engagement, and although scholars do have a variety of tools for measuring political engagement and political knowledge, the relevance of these measures may vary across political contexts, making it difficult to compare levels of knowledge in different political systems (see Shineman 2013, 75). Moreover, compulsory voting is only one of many factors affecting levels of engagement, so it may be difficult to detect an effect of compulsory voting when comparing communities that vary along many dimensions. Unsurprisingly, studies of the effects of compulsory voting on political engagement and political knowledge have yielded mixed results.

What are the normative implications of this ambiguous evidence? In *Compulsory Voting: For and Against*, Jason Brennan (in Brennan and Hill 2014, 46) argues that the existence of empirical studies finding no evidence that compulsory voting increases political engagement provides grounds for "strong doubt" about the justifiability of mandatory voting laws. In the next section, I will address the burden of justification that proponents of mandatory voting bear. Here, I want to focus on how much doubt mixed results of existing studies raise about the educative benefits of compulsory voting.

How much doubt null findings raise about the existence of an effect depends in part on how likely it is that the study will find an existing effect. Most of the null findings that Brennan cites examine aggregate cross-national data that have not found that countries with compulsory voting typically experience higher rates of political knowledge or engagement (Brennan in Brennan and Hill 2014, 46; see also Birch 2009, 66). But given the difficulties of isolating the effects of compulsory voting when comparing different political systems, these cross-national studies may not be able to detect improvements in political knowledge resulting from compulsory voting. More importantly, some types of compulsory voting regimes may have more educative effects than others. If poorly designed or implemented mandatory voting laws do not have beneficial effects, this should not affect the normative case for a well-designed system of compulsory voting.

There are two additional reasons that mixed evidence about compulsory voting should not raise as much doubt as Brennan claims. First, some experimental and quasi-experimental research designs, which are better able to control for confounding variables, have suggested compulsory voting may have educative benefits. In one field experiment in California, Victoria Shineman found that individuals who were offered a financial incentive to vote performed significantly better than members of a control group on a follow-up political information test, even though the payment for voting was not in any way conditional on the individual's performance (Shineman 2013, 172). In another study exploiting a high degree of historical variation in compulsory voting laws across Austrian states, Shineman finds that long-term exposure to compulsory voting has marked effects on self-reported levels of attention to the news (and political news in particular), political interest, and some measures of objective knowledge (Shineman 2013, 102).

At the same time, both cross-national and intranational studies on the political outcomes associated with compulsory voting *have* yielded evidence that should alleviate critics' worry that compulsory voting will necessarily make government *less* responsive to its citizens. A few studies have found, for example that compulsory voting tends to produce outcomes more favorable to poor citizens who are less likely to vote under a voluntary voting scheme (Birch 2009, 132–33). Evidence also suggests that, in Australia, compulsory voting has disproportionately benefited the Labor party and resulted in a leftward shift of party platforms and public policy (Fowler 2013, 172–77; see also Mackerras and McAllister 1999). Since poor voters are more likely to favor labor parties and progressive policies, the introduction of compulsory voting in Australia shifted Australian politics in the direction we would most expect if the citizens just introduced into the electorate were making choices as informed as those of voluntary voters.[13]

Objections to compulsory voting based on the apparent competence gap between voters and nonvoters fail to account for the distinctive role of elections in contemporary democracy. These objections assume that nonvoters informally delegate electoral decision making to their more informed and engaged compatriots. But elections are not meant to harness the benefits of delegation to

[13] A pair of recent studies using cross-national data have also found evidence for gains in political knowledge and cognitive engagement concentrated among poor and less educated citizens in mandatory voting regimes (Carreras 2016; Sheppard 2015).

more informed, passionate, and engaged citizens. As periodic moments for mass participation, elections help to *cultivate* such citizens. Requiring citizens to periodically perform their political agency plays an important role in democracy: Without a sense of the value of their own political agency, citizens have little reason to become politically informed and engaged. Critics of compulsory voting overstate the risk that compulsory voting will produce *less* responsive government, in part because they underestimate how periodic moments of approximately universal participation shape patterns of political engagement.

Coercion and the Burden of Justification

In the preceding sections, I have argued that higher voter turnout is a worthwhile end to pursue, and that mandatory voting effectively increases turnout in a way that is likely to produce the purported benefits of widespread electoral participation. But justifying compulsory voting requires demonstrating that compulsory voting produces outcomes that are *sufficiently valuable and sufficiently likely* to outweigh the countervailing reasons to avoid forcing citizens to vote. In this section, I respond to claims that compulsory voting faces a high standard of justification, and that arguments in favor of compulsory voting fail to meet this standard.

Proponents of compulsory voting have effectively argued that a properly administered compulsory voting system need not violate any fundamental liberties, and therefore it does not face the high burden of justification associated with violating a fundamental right (L. Hill in Brennan and Hill 2014, 154–73, 2014). Brennan (in Brennan and Hill 2014) has argued, though, that "skeptics do not have to establish that all citizens possess a specific right not to vote" because "all restrictions on liberty are presumed wrong and unjust until shown otherwise" (10). According to Brennan, the presumption against coercion places a heavy burden of proof on proponents of compulsory voting. Proponents of compulsory voting need to provide a compelling argument that compulsory voting will produce a significant benefit. They also need to show that there is no alternative way of achieving these benefits without coercion. Opponents of compulsory voting, by contrast, need only "cast strong doubt" on proponents' arguments (11).

Brennan claims that arguments in favor of compulsory voting have not satisfied the heavy burden of proof required to justify coercion. He argues that the lower levels of political knowledge among nonvoters and the mixed results of empirical studies on the educative effects of compulsory voting are sufficient to establish strong doubt about whether compulsory voting could actually produce better or more representative government (2014, 83). Finally, Brennan claims that there is an equally effective noncoercive way to achieve the purported benefits of compulsory voting: randomly sampled voter lotteries.

Brennan's argument against compulsory voting ultimately fails, though. As I have argued, Brennan overstates the grounds for skepticism of compulsory voting's benefits, and he fails to address a key component of the case for compulsory voting: the distinctive role of elections in contemporary democratic practice. Moreover, Brennan mischaracterizes the burden of justification borne by supporters of mandatory voting, and he consequently proposes an alternative to compulsory voting, which, while apparently less coercive, actually faces a much higher burden of justification.

Brennan's characterization of the burden of justification facing proponents of compulsory voting depends on a controversial libertarian understanding of the presumption against coercion and the kind of justification it demands. Brennan claims that the presumption against coercion is a feature of commonsense morality, and the "defining feature of liberalism" (in Brennan and Hill 2014, 10). While mainstream contemporary liberalism does share with libertarianism a belief in the presumptive value of liberty and wrongness of coercion, many mainstream liberals reject Brennan's understanding of what this presumption entails for the justification of political institutions and policies.

In their *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* article "Liberalism," Gerald Gaus and Shane Courtland (2011) define liberalism not as a presumption against coercion, but rather as "a presumption *in favor of liberty.*" This characterization more accurately conveys the range of political views under the label of "liberalism." Because they disagree about the conditions for liberty, liberal philosophers disagree about how the presumption in favor of liberty should guide government action. One of the most prominent strands of contemporary liberalism, political liberalism, emphasizes the need to justify coercive power in general, not just particular instances of coercion. In *Political Liberalism*, John Rawls (2005) argues that the liberal project of justifying coercion applies to "a society's main political, social, and economic institutions, and how they fit together into one unified system of social cooperation," what he calls "the basic structure of society" (11). The basic structure demands justification because it has "deep and long-term social effects and in fundamental ways shapes citizens' character and aims" (68).

Because the basic structure of society has such a pervasive impact on individuals' options and inevitably conditions their liberty, the liberal imperative to justify

constraints on liberty is not a matter of justifying some instance of coercion. Rather, it requires justifying one set of coercive political and social arrangements against another. A basic structure with compulsory voting needs to be justified, but so does a basic structure without compulsory voting. Since both of these sets of arrangements condition liberty in such fundamental ways, it does not make sense to say that one of these structures is presumptively justified because it involves less interference. A basic structure that seems to involve more government coercion may actually be more consistent with individual liberty, because it creates a society in which individuals enjoy a more robust opportunity to choose from a wider range of valuable options.

The belief that instances of coercion may be justified as part of a broader set of social and political arrangements is not unique to political liberalism. Nearly everyone agrees that taxing citizens to pay for frequent, accessible elections is justified so that all citizens can enjoy a share of political power. The particular instances of coercion necessary to sustain a democratic political system make the existence of coercive power and the pervasive influence of social and political conditions in general more justifiable, since they enable all citizens to exert influence over the exercise of political power and to contest laws and policies they consider inappropriate. The argument for compulsory voting is similar to the argument for publicly administering elections. These instances of coercion actually promote liberty: The existence of coercive power and the pervasive influence of social arrangements are more consistent with individual freedom when all citizens participate in shaping the character of public life and governing the exercise of public power.[14]

There is a strong argument that compulsory voting can make the pervasive influence of political arrangements more justifiable by more equally distributing de facto political power and better enabling elections to fulfill their valuable role as moments of approximately universal participation. Although critics have raised concerns about potential negative effects of mandatory voting, there is little evidence that mandatory voting does have these perverse effects, and proponents have offered plausible arguments for how a well-designed compulsory voting scheme can avoid them. So long as the penalties for nonvoting are mild, the burdens of voting are minor, and appropriate exemptions are allowed, opponents of compulsory voting do not enjoy a strong argumentative advantage. Given its potential to strengthen a crucial democratic practice, defeating the case for compulsory voting requires serious grounds for doubt. In the previous section, I argued that the main source of Brennan's skepticism about the argument for compulsory voting—that nonvoters' ignorance will prevent greater government responsiveness to their wishes—does not actually provide grounds for serious doubt.

Brennan does not succeed in casting sufficient doubt to defeat the case for compulsory voting. However, he offers another objection. Brennan contends that the benefits of compulsory voting can be achieved just as well through a noncompulsory alternative: Instead of open elections, we might have a system that selects a random sample of citizens to vote in each election (in Brennan and Hill 2014, 36). With correctly implemented sampling, these voter lotteries would be even more representative than elections with nearly universal turnout. According to Brennan, voter lotteries thus achieve the most significant purported benefit of compulsory voting—a more representative electorate—without resorting to coercion.[15] Since coercion bears the burden of proof, according to Brennan, the existence of this equally good noncoercive alternative is enough to defeat the case for compulsory voting.

It is far from clear that voter lotteries do offer an equally good noncoercive alternative to mandatory voting, though. Brennan suggests that the right to vote exists to ensure that all citizens' preferences receive equal consideration in political decision making, and he argues that a voting lottery could protect this interest as well as popular elections (in Brennan and Hill 2014, 36–37). However, as I argued in the first section, the special status of voting in contemporary democratic practice (of which the right to vote is a central feature) undergirds the valuable role of periodic moments of mass participation, which provide a number of benefits beyond the equal representation of citizens' preferences. Whatever particular virtues voter lotteries might have, it is not clear how they could replace the distinctive role of mass popular voting.

There are a number of reasons to be skeptical of the voter lottery proposal, as it would require a radical revision of existing political arrangements. The most serious is that a voting lottery would undermine the role of voting as a minimum level of participation that encourages

[14]The belief that coercively maintaining democratic structures is necessary to promote liberty is not unique to contemporary political liberalism. Neo-republicans, for example, hold that unless government is subject to "a form of popular control in which we all equally share," citizens cannot effectively protect themselves against domination by their fellow citizens or by the state. Maintaining democratic arrangements is a priority for republican freedom (Pettit 2012, 2–25).

[15]See López-Guerra (2010) for a more thorough discussion of a similar proposal.

citizens to see themselves as political agents. Popular elections remind citizens that the public business is *their* business. Some scholars have raised doubts about whether voting can really accomplish this—elections are too infrequent, and voting too undemanding to really require a high level of political engagement (see Lomasky and Brennan 2000, 82–83)—but these doubts apply to a much greater extent to voting lotteries. In the United States, I am called upon to vote for the president once every 4 years. Under Jason Brennan's proposed lottery scheme, there is only about a 1 in 500 chance that I would be selected to vote for the president in my lifetime.[16] Even if elections still received the same hype that they currently do, it would not seem as though they had much to do with me.

Conclusion

Compulsory voting can be a powerful tool for increasing participation in elections, strengthening the unique and valuable role of elections as special occasions for universal participation. Compulsory voting elicits at least minimal participation from many citizens who would otherwise be politically marginalized. There is, moreover, some evidence to suggest that compulsory voting fosters more widespread political engagement and results in policies that are more favorable to the poor. By involving more citizens in official decision-making processes, compulsory voting also contributes to democratic legitimacy, but at the same time, it promotes a more realistic understanding of the limitations of voting as a method of democratic rule. Though critics of compulsory voting have questioned whether the goal of increasing turnout can really justify punishing nonvoters, I have shown that their objections fail to account for the way compulsory voting reinforces the distinctive role that voting plays within a larger democratic framework. None of the major objections can defeat the argument for a well-implemented system of compulsory voting.

Recognizing the particular value of elections in contemporary democracy makes the case for mandatory electoral participation much clearer, but it should also caution us against treating compulsory voting as the cure for all democratic ills and fit for all patients. The effects of compulsory voting laws (and the desirability of those effects) depend on the broader political context in which they exist. Critics' concerns about the limitations and potential perverse effects of compulsory voting should inform our assessment of the circumstances in which compulsory voting is likely to be beneficial. Critics' concerns should also encourage us to think about complementary reforms that might interact with compulsory voting to reinforce the democratic value of elections. Some such reforms, like moving to a more proportional electoral system or reducing the cost of political information, aim to make widespread voting more meaningful. Others might promote greater nonelectoral participation. By strengthening other aspects of the democratic framework, such reforms free elections to fulfill their own distinct and valuable role as special occasions on which all citizens exercise their equal political authority.

[16]Brennan (2014) suggests selecting 20,000 electors for each electorate. Suppose an eligible population of 200,000,000 people, and suppose I am eligible for 20 presidential election lotteries in my lifetime. The probability of being selected into any one lottery is .0001. The probability of being selected into a lottery in my lifetime is .002 (1 in 500).

References

Almond, Gabriel A., and Sidney Verba. 1989. *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations.* Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Atiq, Emad. 2014. "Why Motives Matter: Reframing the Crowding Out Effect of Legal Incentives." *Yale Law Journal* 123(4): 1070–1117.

Ballinger, Chris. 2006. "Compulsory Turnout: A Solution to Disengagement?" In *Democracy and Voting*, ed. Alex Brazier and Phil Parvin. Democracy Series. London: The Hansard Society, 5–22.

Berinsky, Adam. 2005. "The Perverse Consequences of Electoral Reform in the United States." *American Politics Research* 33(4): 471–91.

Birch, Sarah. 2009. *Full Participation: A Comparative Study of Compulsory Voting.* New York: United Nations University Press.

Blais, Andre. 2000. *To Vote or Not to Vote? The Merits and Limits of Rational Choice Theory.* Pittsburgh, PA: Pittsburgh University Press.

Brennan, Jason and Lisa Hill. 2014. *Compulsory Voting: For and Against.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Campbell, David. 2006. *Why We Vote: How Schools and Communities Shape Our Civic Life.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Carreras, Miguel. 2016. "Compulsory Voting and Political Engagement (beyond the Ballot Box): A Multilevel Analysis." *Electoral Studies* 158–68.

Chong, Alberto, and Mauricio Olivera. 2008. "Does Compulsory Voting Help Equalize Incomes?" *Economics and Politics* 20(3): 391–415.

Cox, Gary W. 2015. "Electoral Rules, Mobilization, and Turnout." *Annual Review of Political Science* 49–68.

Dalton, Russel J. 2008. "Citizenship Norms and the Expansion of Political Participation." *Political Studies* 56(1): 76–98.

Dinas, Elias. 2014. "Does Choice Bring Loyalty? Electoral Participation and the Development of Party Identification." *American Journal of Political Science* 58(2): 449–65.

Elliott, Kevin. 2017. "Aid for Our Purposes: Mandatory Voting as Precommitment and Nudge." *Journal of Politics* 79(2): 656–69.

Engelen, Bart. 2007. "Why Compulsory Voting Can Enhance Democracy." *Acta Politica* 42(1): 23–39.

Feldman, Yuval, and Doron Teichman. 2008. "Are All 'Legal Dollars' Created Equal?" *Northwestern University Law Review* 102(1): 223–62.

Fowler, Anthony. 2013. "Electoral and Policy Consequences of Voter Turnout: Evidence from Compulsory Voting in Australia." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 8(2): 159–82.

Gaus, Gerald, and Shane D. Courtland. 2011. "Liberalism." In *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/liberalism/.

Gneezy, Uri, and Aldo Rustichini. 2000. "A Fine Is a Price." *Journal of Legal Studies* 29(1): 1–17.

Google Trends Ngram. 2018. "'Politics' (Searches in the United States, 2004–Present)." https://trends.google.com/trends/explore?date=all&geo=US&q=politics.

Griffin, John D., and Brian Newman. 2005. "Are Voters Better Represented?" *Journal of Politics* 67(4): 1206–27.

Hasen, Richard. 1996. "Voting without Law?" *University of Pennsylvania Law Review* 144(5): 2135–80.

Hill, Kim Quaile, Jan E. Leighley, and Angela Hinton-Andersson. 1995. "Lower-Class Mobilization and Policy Linkage in the U.S. States." *American Journal of Political Science* 39(1): 75–86.

Hill, Lisa. 2010. "On the Justifiability of Compulsory Voting: Reply to Lever." *British Journal of Political Science* 40(4): 917–23.

Hirczy, Wolfgang. 1994. "The Impact of Mandatory Voting Laws on Turnout: A Quasi-Experimental Approach." *Electoral Studies* 13(1): 64–76.

Hooghe, Marc, and Koen Pelleriaux. 1998. "Compulsory Voting in Belgium: An Application of the Lijphart Thesis." *Electoral Studies* 17(4): 419–24.

ISSP Research Group. 2012. "International Social Survey Program: ISSP 2004—Citizenship I Variable Report." Gesis Data Archive for the Social Sciences. https://www.gesis.org/issp/modules/issp-modules-by-topic/citizenship/2004/.

Jakee, Keith, and Guang-Zhen Sun. 2006. "Is Compulsory Voting More Democratic?" *Public Choice* 129(1): 61–75.

James, Toby. 2010. "Electoral Administration and Voter Turnout: Towards an International Public Policy Continuum." *Representation* 46(4): 369–89.

Lever, Annabelle. 2010. "Compulsory Voting: A Critical Perspective." *British Journal of Political Science* 40(4): 897–915.

Lijphart, Arend. 1996. "Compulsory Voting Is the Best Way to Keep Democracy Strong." *Chronicle of Higher Education*, October 18. http://chronicle.com/article/Compulsory-Voting-Is-the-Best/76577/.

Lijphart, Arend. 1997. "Unequal Participation: Democracy's Unresolved Dilemma." *American Political Science Review* 91(1): 1–14.

Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1981. *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Lomasky, Loren, and Geoffrey Brennan. 2000. "Is There a Duty to Vote?" *Social Philosophy and Policy* 17(1): 62–86.

López-Guerra, Claudio. 2010. "The Enfranchisement Lottery." *Politics, Philosophy & Economics* 10(2): 211–33.

Mackerras, Malcolm, and Ian McAllister. 1999. "Compulsory Voting, Party Stability and Electoral Advantage in Australia." *Electoral Studies* 18(2): 217–33.

Martin, Paul S. 2003. "Voting's Rewards: Voter Turnout, Attentive Publics, and Congressional Allocation of Federal Money." *American Journal of Political Science* 47(1): 110–27.

Pettit, Philip. 2012. *On the People's Terms: A Republican Model of Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Przeworski, Adam. 1999. "Minimalist Conception of Democracy: A Defense." In *Democracy's Value*, ed Ian Shapiro and Casiano Hacker-Cordon. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 23–55.

Rawls, John. 2005. *Political Liberalism*. Expanded ed. Columbia Classics in Philosophy. New York: Columbia University Press.

Saunders, Ben. 2010. "Increasing Turnout: A Compelling Case?" *Politics* 30(1): 70–77.

Schlozman, Kay Lehman, Sidney Verba, and Henry E. Brady. 2012. *The Unheavenly Chorus: Unequal Political Voice and the Broken Promise of American Democracy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Sheppard, Jill. 2015. "Compulsory Voting and Political Knowledge: Testing a 'Compelled Engagement' Hypothesis." *Electoral Studies* 300–7.

Shineman, Victoria Anne. 2013. "Isolating the Effects of Costly and Incentivized Participation on Incentives to Invest in Costly Information and Informed Participation." Ph.D. dissertation, New York University. Ann Arbor: ProQuest/UMI (Publication No. 3591349).

Thompson, Dennis. 2002. *Just Elections: Creating a Fair Electoral Process in the United States*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady. 1995. *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Vyawahare, Malavika. 2014. "A Primer on India's Parliamentary Elections." *New York Times India Ink*. http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/04/08/a-primer-on-indias-parliamentary-elections/.