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CONTENTS

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CONTENTS

Editorial Note

PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY - POLITEIA

Philosophical Inquiry, after 41 years continues its philosophical publication activities under a new Editorship and a new Editorial Board. Its Editorial Team continuing their scholarly contribution to all philosophical subjects, with an emphasis on Ancient Greek Philosophy, proceeded to the edition of Politeia, International, Interdisciplinary Philosophical Review.

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POETRY AND SKIAGRAPHIA IN *REPUBLIC* X: A NEW ANALYSIS OF TRAGIC MIMESIS

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INTRODUCTION

In Republic X Socrates accuses poetic "imitators" [μιμητικοί] of corrupting the soul (the psychological charge) and producing appearances that are far removed from truth (the metaphysical charge). The success of the psychological charge against mimetic poetry crucially depends on the success of the metaphysical charge; tragic poetry corrupts the soul *by making images that are far removed from truth* (that is, appearances of virtue and value). The dominant interpretive strategy cashes out the relationship between these two charges as follows: images corrupt the soul, because images are metaphysically inferior; all images are "far removed from truth" and hence potentially corruptive. Unfortunately, this strategy pits Book III against Book X; mimetic poetry forms the foundation of the guardians' early education (in Book III), but mimetic poetry is corruptive (in Book X).

In this paper I defend an alternative strategy. I contend that the metaphysical charge should be interpreted narrowly, to encompass false and illusory appearances of virtue and value produced via skiagraphic techniques. I argue that Socrates' critique of tragedy and Homeric poetry does not rest on dubious metaphysical claims about images per se, but rather on the plausible and interesting claim that tragedians and their leader, Homer, employ skiagraphic techniques – that is, the manipulation of temporal distances and the contrasting of fortune with misfortune and virtue with vice - in order to produce powerful illusions of virtue and value. Even the denier of the Forms must take this claim seriously. I conclude with some thoughts about good mimesis and the importance of poetry to the larger project of the *Republic*.

One of the greatest interpretive difficulties facing *Republic* X commentators is specifying what Socrates bans in *Republic* X. What is Socrates' target? At the outset of Book X Socrates remarks that they were right to ban "imitative" [μιμητική] poetry in light of the tripartite theory of the soul; such poetry corrupts the soul (595a-b). Socrates next proposes to define "mimesis as a whole"[1] [μίμησιν ὅλως], with a view

to characterizing the imitative poet (595c). This proposal would be otiose, if Socrates had already defined 'mimesis as a whole' in Book III. While in Book III Socrates states that "to make oneself like someone else in voice or appearance is to imitate [μιμεῖσθαί] the person one makes oneself like" (393c4-5), this statement is not intended as a definition of 'mimesis as a whole.'[2] Rather, impersonation is one type of mimesis, as evidenced by the fact that musical mode and meter also emerge in Book III as distinct forms of mimesis (399a-400a).[3] Nor is impersonation the defining feature of imitative [μιμητική] poetry specifically. Whereas Socrates proposes to ban all imitative poetry, he does not ban all impersonation. In Book III and Book X Socrates permits impersonations of good men (397d, 607a).[4] Thus, given that some mimesis and some impersonation escape the ban, whom does Socrates banish in Book X?[5] My goal in this paper is to answer these questions through a new analysis of *Republic* X, which underscores Book X's relation to the rest of the *Republic*, particularly Books III and IX. Drawing on Book IX, I argue that Socrates bans *skiagraphic* poets, particularly tragedians and their teacher, Homer. Tragedy and Homeric poetry utilize contrast and distancing techniques to produce false, corruptive appearances of virtue and value. Thus, Book X is consistent with Book III; some, not all, poetry is banned.

1 THE PROBLEM: WHY ARE MIMETIC APPEARANCES CORRUPTIVE?

Socrates defines the imitator [μιμητής] as one who produces appearances [φαινόμενα] of sensible particulars; the painter produces appearances of artifacts and craftsmen (597e-598c),[6] and the poet produces appearances of agents and actions (599b).[7] The imitator is like a man carrying a mirror, who makes things appear (596d-e). In contrast, craftsmen produce an artifact "of like character as" [τοιοῦτον] its Form [τὸ ὄν], albeit not "completely" [τελέως] its Form (597a).[8] Similarly, agents produce actions and deeds, rather than imitations thereof (599b).

It is not immediately obvious how this characterization of painting – as producing the appearances of sensible particulars – carries over to poetry. What is the poet's correlate of the painter's bed? According to some, the analogy with painting is deeply flawed; nothing corresponds to the painter's bed.[9] The poet does not, in the manner of the painter, produce appearances of sensible particulars. Rather, the poet produces the general "look" or "feel" of agents in action, as well as appearances of goodness and badness (of said agents and actions).[10]

This criticism is too quick. In Socrates' view, both poet and painter convey generalities through producing appearances of particulars. In books II-III Socrates claims Greek poetry produces "appearances" of particular historical events and persons – that is, historical events and persons as imagined by the poet. This is not to deny that poems about the ancient past are poems about virtue and value. As Socrates himself emphasizes, it is through portraying highly esteemed personages (that is, heroes or gods) that poems about the ancient past represent and recommend general ways of life (388d). Certainly, Homer's image of Achilles does not relate to an actually existing person in the same way that the painting of Socrates' bed relates to Socrates'

bed. However, a painting of an imagined bed is parallel to the poetic representation of Achilles; each represents an imagined particular.[11] A further parallel is this: like poems, paintings produce general images of goodness. According to Socrates, the painting of a carpenter or a cobbler is an appearance of good carpentry or cobblery.[12] In Socrates' view, both poetry and painting communicate axiological ideas about what is worthwhile and agathological ideas what is good or virtuous. In other words, both poetry and painting express axiological and agathological generalities through producing appearances of particulars.[13]

While in Books II-III Socrates suggests that Greek poets radically misrepresent the ancient past (and hence have no, or at least flawed, cognitive access to the past), he does not linger on this point.[14] According to Socrates, even if Greek poets are correct about the ancient past (for example, Cronos really did castrate his father), their poems must be banned, lest they produce a corruptive appearance of how one ought to live (377e-378c).[15] Given Socrates' focus on the psychological and behavioral effects of poetry, it is no surprise that Socrates sets aside the difficult epistemological question (addressed in the *Ion*) of whether and how the poet has cognitive access to the ancient past. Since the primary task of Book X is to demonstrate how tragedy and Homeric poetry corrupt the soul, Socrates focuses on tragedy's appearances of virtue and value, rather than tragedy's appearances of past particulars. The former – and not the latter – are immediately relevant to demonstrating how tragedy corrupts the soul.[16]

However, well before Socrates accuses tragic poetry of corrupting the soul, Socrates denigrates the μιμητικός for producing appearances that are "far removed from truth" (598b4). Thus, the metaphysical charge that such appearances are far removed from truth is distinct from the psychological charge that tragic poetry corrupts the soul. Nevertheless, the success of the psychological charge against tragic poetry depends on the success of the metaphysical charge. This is because tragic poetry corrupts the soul "by making images that are far removed from truth" [εἴδωλα εἰδωλοποιοῦντα τοῦ … ἀληθοῦς πόρρω πάνυ ἀφεστῶτα] (605b). Tragic poetry corrupts the soul by producing appearances of virtue and value.[17] Thus, the success of the psychological charge depends on the success of the metaphysical charge.

How are tragedy's appearances "far removed" from truth? After all, given that the imitator, including the tragedian, produces appearances of likenesses of Forms, aren't mimetic appearances relevantly related to truth? If, in producing appearances, the imitator simply mirrors sensible reality (as the mirror analogy suggests), then the imitator's work is "trivial," but certainly not corruptive.[18] In addressing this problem, the dominant interpretive strategy has been to suggest that images corrupt the soul, because images are metaphysically inferior. In other words, the metaphysical charge is ordinarily interpreted very broadly, to encompass all images; all images are "far removed from truth" and hence potentially corruptive. Unfortunately, this strategy fails to account for the fact that in Book X Socrates targets tragedy and Homeric poetry specifically, permitting painting and even some poetry. Even worse, this strategy pits Book III against Book X; mimesis and poetry form the foundation of the guardians'

education in Book III, only to come under attack in Book X.

In what follows I shall outline an alternative strategy, concluding with what is wrong (and what is right) with the dominant interpretive strategy. I contend that the metaphysical charge should be interpreted narrowly, to encompass the false and illusory appearances produced by skiagraphia. While I do not deny that all images are, in some sense, "removed from truth," I maintain that only skiagraphic images of virtue and value are removed from truth *in the relevant way* – that is, in a potentially corruptive way. For this reason, only skiagraphic images of virtue and value are banned, and Books III and X are consistent.

2   FALSE APPEARANCES AND SKIAGRAPHIA: CORRUPTING THE SOUL

Although Socrates sets out to define "mimesis as a whole," he does not ban all mimesis. For this reason, we should expect Socrates to differentiate banned mimesis from mimesis in general. And indeed, after characterizing all imitators and all mimesis in terms of the mirror analogy (so as to show that all imitators produce images), Socrates "distinguishes" [διορίζει] imitating sensibles "as they appear" [οἷα φαίνεται] and "as they are" [οἷα ἔστιν] (598a2). According to Socrates, Greek painters and poets imitate sensibles as they appear, not as they are. Socrates explains:
- Now, tell me this about the painter. Do you think he tries in each case to imitate the thing itself in nature or the works of craftsmen?
> - The works of craftsmen.
> - As they are or as they appear [οἷα ἔστιν ἢ οἷα φαίνεται]? For you must yet distinguish this [τοῦτο γὰρ ἔτι διόρισον].[19]
> - How do you mean?
> - Like this. If you look at a bed from the side or the front or from anywhere else is it a different bed each time? Or does it only appear different, without being at all different? And is that also the case with other things?
> - That's the way it is – it appears different without being so.
> - Then consider this very point: What does painting do in each case? Does it imitate that which is as it is [τὸ ὄν, ὡς ἔχει], or does it imitate that which appears as it appears [τὸ φαινόμενον, ὡς φαίνεται]? Is it an imitation of appearances [φαντάσματος] or of truth   [ἀληθείας]?
> - Of appearances [φαντάσματος].
> - Then imitation [μιμητική] is far removed from truth [τοῦ ἀληθοῦς], for it touches only a small part of each thing and a part that is itself only an image [εἴδωλον]. And that, it seems, is why it can produce everything (597e8-598b6).

How should we interpret this "further distinction?" Commentators emphasize that Socrates distinguishes μιμητική (from mimesis more generally) as the practice of "copying" appearances, as opposed to merely *producing* appearances.[20] The practitioner

of μιμητική, the μιμητικός, is unique in that she *imitates appearances*.[21] On this reading, Socrates targets mimesis that imitates appearances. The μιμητικός is "two removes from truth," in virtue of reproducing appearances of likenesses of Forms.

Of course, this cannot be the entire story. While I agree that the μιμητικός reproduces appearances, I deny that the μιμητικός is in the business of reproducing any and all appearances.[22] I will argue that Socrates' attention to skiagraphia suggests that the μιμητικός is a skiagraphic artist, who utilizes popular skiagraphic techniques to reproduce false or illusory appearances. One prima facie advantage of this interpretation is that it connects Book IX to Book X. In Book IX Socrates compares mixed pleasures to skiagraphia, only to extend this analogy to tragedy and Homeric poetry in Book X.[23] By juxtaposing pleasure with pain, mixed pleasures produce the false appearance of great intensity (583b, 584a, 586a-c). In Book X Socrates further develops this analogy with skiagraphia: by imitating varied [ποικίλα] characters (and their varied fortunes and misfortunes), tragedy produces false appearances of the magnitudes of goodness and badness.

Not only does my interpretation have the benefit of preserving continuity between Books IX and X, it has the added benefit of harmonizing Books III and X; both books attack false poetic images, not images per se. In Book III Socrates refers to Homer, Hesiod and other censored poets as "making an image" [εἰκάζειν] of what heroes and gods are like (377d9), with an important caveat: such poets construct their images "badly" [κακῶς], in that their images are not at all *like* [ὅμοια] what they purport to be images *of*. In other words, μιμητικοί like Homer reproduce false images. Book X goes beyond Book III in articulating how such images corrupt the soul. Moreover, although Book X critiques tragedy, Socrates explicitly targets Homer, qua "leader" of the tragedians (595b-c). This is because tragedians draw on Homer to produce mimetic appearances, and Book X is concerned with the production and reception of mimetic appearances, rather than the mimetic impersonation of particular characters.[24]

My analysis will proceed as follows: first, I will say a word about the content of banned poetry, characterizing the kinds of illusions such poetry produces. Next, I will turn to the techniques of the μιμητικοί, where my focus will be on the methods μιμητικοί employ to produce poetic illusions. Attention to the latter will reveal that Socrates does not attack poetic images per se, but rather false, skiagraphic poetic images. Finally, I will return to versions of the dominant view, pointing out what is right and what is wrong with these analyses. I will conclude with some thoughts about good mimesis, the place of Book X in the larger project of the *Republic* and an important consequence of my interpretation: even the denier of the Forms must take Socrates' critique of tragic poetry seriously.

2.1 *Poetry and Axiological Illusion*

According to Socrates, tragic and epic poetry produce agathological and axiological "illusions" [φαντάσματα, εἴδωλα].[25] Poetic images of revered heroes lamenting the loss of external goods (fame, fortune, family, etc.) create the illusion that a "noble man"

[κάλος] suffers horribly and that lamentation is a "worthy" [ἄξιον] response to such "terrible" [δεινόν] loss (387d-e, 388d). In truth, however, only the loss of internal goods (virtue or soul health) is terrible for a human being. What is more, a truly noble man is not excitable, irritable and "variable" [ποικίλος]. Rather, he is "most self-sufficient in living well" (387d11) - which is to say, for the noble man, "living well" is an outward expression of his internal excellence (rather than the outward possession of external goods). In contrast to Achilles, a man of true virtue quietly endures disenfranchisement, dishonor and even death, lest violent lamentation corrupt his soul. Because his tame emotions and desires follow reason's stable and unified vision of the good, the man of virtue is not variable but "remains pretty well the same" (604e1).[26]

Also, μιμητικοί[27] produce the appearance that their poems are fine or beautiful [καλά], which creates the illusion that the poet is knowledgeable about that which he imitates (that is, virtue and value). In effect, the poem's appearance of fineness intensifies the axiological and agathological illusions therein. Socrates remarks at 601e4-b5:

> Then shall we conclude that all poetic imitators [ποιητικοὺς μιμητάς], beginning with Homer, imitate images of virtue [εἰδώλων ἀρετῆς] and all the other things they write about and have no grasp of truth? As we were saying just now, a painter, though he knows nothing about cobblery, can make was seems to be [δοκοῦντα] a cobbler to those who know as little about it as he does and who judge things by their colors and shapes. … And in the same way, I suppose we'll say that a poetic imitator [ποιητικόν] uses words and phrases to paint colored pictures of each of the crafts. He himself knows nothing about them, but he imitates [μιμεῖσθαι] them in such a way that others, as ignorant as he, who judge by words, will think he speaks extremely well [πάνυ εὖ] about cobblery or generalship or anything else whatever, provided – so great is the natural charm of these things – that he speaks with meter, rhythm, and harmony, for if you strip a poet's works of their musical colorings and take them by themselves, I think you know what they look like. You've surely seen them. … Don't they resemble the faces of young boys who are neither fine nor beautiful [καλῶν] after the bloom of youth has left them?

Just as the painter makes what *seems to be a cobbler*, the imitative poet makes what *seems to be a virtuous man*. Furthermore, the apparent fineness or beauty of the artwork supports and sustains the artwork's illusions. Crucially, medium informs content.[28] Μιμητικοί use music and meter to dress up their work, such that it falsely appears to reflect real ethical expertise. Similarly, the "bloom of youth" [ἄνθος] dresses up the inherent ugliness of a boy, such that he falsely appears beautiful (601b).

2.2 *Skiagraphia: Painting*
What is skiagraphic painting [σκιαγραφία]? In the absence of extant examples of

skiagraphia, art historians and archaeologists have wrangled over the exact nature of the practice. Drawing on a dearth of textual evidence, most scholars have postulated that skiagraphia essentially involved juxtaposing colors and shades to produce the optical illusion of three-dimensional reality.[29] However, others have hypothesized that skiagraphia is a form of divisionism or a means of intensifying colors through the juxtaposition thereof.[30] In the absence of any extant Greek skiagraphia, it has been difficult to settle the debate.

However, the relatively recent discovery of Macedonian tomb paintings provides support for the view that skiagraphia essentially involved the modulation of shade and light so as to create the illusion of depth. Breaking conventional outlines and, in some cases, violating traditional tetrachromy, these wall paintings use tone mixtures and shadowing to produce the illusion of a three-dimensional reality, when viewed at a suitable distance (Plantzos, 172-9).[31] Plato associates the practice with juxtaposition (584a, 586a-c; *Philebus* 42b-c), distancing (523b; *Parmenides* 165b-d; *Theaetetus* 208e; *Philebus* 42b-c), and deceptive illusion (365c, 583b, 586a-c; *Laws* 663b; *Phaedo* 69b; *Theaetetus* 208e; *Philebus* 42b-c).[32] The dialogues presuppose a shared knowledge of popular skiagraphia, frequently appealing to the practice in order to explain ethical illusion.[33]

Why suppose Book X targets *skiagraphic* painting, as opposed to painting entire? The best clues come at 602c-d, where Socrates claims that the μιμητικοί appeal to a part of the soul that forms beliefs on the basis of the following sorts of optical illusions:

Something looked at from close at hand doesn't seem to be the same size as it does when it is looked at from a distance. … And something looks crooked when seen in water and straight when seen out of it, while something else looks both concave and convex because our eyes are deceived by its colors [χρώματα], and every other similar sort of confusion is clearly present in our soul. And it is because they exploit this weakness in our nature that skiagraphic painting [σκιαγραφία], conjuring, and other forms of trickery have powers that are little short of magical.

Remarkably, the μιμητικοί appeal to a part of the soul that forms beliefs on the basis of skiagraphic painting and optical illusions of size and shape, which manipulate colors and distances to deceive our eyes. Here, Socrates invokes the very techniques Plato and others associate with popular skiagraphic painters – that is, distancing and manipulation of color or light to produce illusions of size and shape. If Socrates had intended to target traditional, two-dimensional painting, why would he claim that the mimetic painter appeals to a part of the soul that is susceptible to optical illusions produced via coloring and distancing techniques? Why would he actually employ the term "skiagraphia" (above)? Another indication that Socrates confines his critique to popular skiagraphia occurs earlier in the argument, at 598b-c:

… we say that a painter can pain a cobbler, a carpenter, or any other craftsman, even though he knows nothing about these crafts. Nevertheless, if he is a good painter and displays his painting at a distance, he can

> deceive children and foolish people into thinking that it is truly [ἀληθῶς εἶναι] a carpenter.[34]

Again, realistic, skiagraphic mural paintings fit Socrates' description, in that they would have produced the illusion of three-dimensional reality when viewed at a distance.[35]

What does skiagraphic painting have to do with poetry? Poetry does not produce the illusion of three-dimensional reality. Here it is important to take a cue from *Republic* IX, which offers a schema for how to interpret Socrates' skiagraphia analogies. Tragedy and Homeric poetry are analogous to skiagraphic painting not so much in the kind of illusion it produces (though there are some parallels[36]), but more in how it produces its illusion; namely, through distancing and contrast techniques. In the next section, I examine how Socrates develops the skiagraphia analogy with respect to pleasure (in Book IX) and poetry (in Book X). I argue that Socrates' critique of tragedy does not rest on dubious metaphysical claims about images, but rather on the plausible claim that tragedians manipulate temporal distances and contrast fortune with misfortune and virtue with vice in order to produce agathological and axiological illusions. Even the denier of the Forms must take this claim seriously.

2.3 *Skiagraphia: Pleasure, Poetry and Poikilia*

I now turn to Socrates' skiagraphia analogies. First, I examine skiagraphic pleasure in Book IX. Next, I turn to Book X, with a view to articulating the sense in which tragic poetry is skiagraphic. Book X's comparison of tragedy to skiagraphic painting and emphasis on deceptive contrasting and distancing techniques (familiar to us from Book IX's skiagraphic analysis of pleasure) strongly suggest that tragedy and its predecessor, Homeric poetry, are problematically skiagraphic.

In Book IX Socrates explicitly invokes skiagraphia at 586b7-c1, summarizing his analysis of 'mixed pleasures' (that is, pleasures arising from the cessation of pains[37]) as follows:

> Then isn't it necessary for these people to live with pleasures that are mixed with pains, mere images and skiagraphia [ἐσκιαγραφημέναις] of true pleasures? And doesn't the juxtaposition [ἀποχραινομέναις [38]] of these pleasures and pains make them appear intense, so that they give rise to mad erotic passions in the foolish … ?

Mixed pleasures are like skiagraphia's color mixtures; both produce illusions through juxtaposition or contrast. However, in Book IX Socrates is less interested in skiagraphia's illusions of three-dimensional reality and more interested in skiagraphia's illusions of color intensity.[39] Consider another color parallel at 584e6-585a5:

> Is it any surprise, then, if those who are inexperienced in the truth have unsound opinions about lots of other things as well, or that they are so

disposed to pleasure, pain, and the intermediate state that, when they
descend to the painful, they believe truly and are really in pain, but
that, when they ascend from the painful to the intermediate state, they
firmly believe that they have reached fulfillment and pleasure? They are
inexperienced in pleasure and so are deceived when they compare pain to
painlessness, just as they would be if they compared black to grey without
having experienced white.

In effect, Socrates tightens the analogy with skiagraphia, for the purposes of
explicating hedonic illusion. Both skiagraphia and mixed pleasures achieve their
illusions through juxtaposition. The neutral hedonic state (cessation of pain and
pleasure) appears pleasurable to those in pain and painful to those in pleasure
(583d-584a). It is important to note that the illusion in question is not an ontological
illusion; there *really is* a color or a hedonic state. The illusion is an illusion of
magnitude, produced in virtue of a contrast. The analysis of mixed pleasures in the
Philebus illuminates this point:

Well then, in the case of sight, seeing things from too near at hand or
from too great a distance obscures their real sizes and causes us to have
false opinions; and does not this same thing happen in the case of pains
and pleasures? … Because they [mixed pleasures] are seen at various and
changing distances and are compared with one another, the pleasures
themselves appear greater and more intense by comparison with the
pains, and the pains in turn, through comparison with the pleasures, vary
inversely as they. … They both, then, appear greater and less than the reality.
Now if you abstract from both of them this apparent, but unreal, excess or
inferiority, you cannot say that its appearance is true, nor again can you
have the face to affirm that the part of pleasure or pain which corresponds
to this is true or real (41e10-42c3).[40]

Both contrast and distance condition our perception of the felt magnitudes
of pleasure and pain; distancing and contrasting produce hedonic illusion. The
experiencer's pleasures and pains are genuine hedonic states, but when contrasted
and brought close, they appear and feel greater than they really are. Ultimately, such
illusions are effective because their subject is positioned far from truth in the following
sense:

Therefore, those who have no experience of reason or virtue, but are always
occupied with feasts and the like, are brought down and then back up to the
middle, as it seems, and wander in this way throughout their lives, never
reaching beyond this to what is truly higher up, never looking up at it or
being brought up to it, and so they aren't filled with that which really is
and never taste any stable or pure pleasure. Instead, they always look down
at the ground like cattle, and, with their heads bent over the dinner table,

they feed, fatten, and fornicate. To outdo others in these things, they kick and butt them with iron horns and hooves, killing each other, because their desires are insatiable. For the part that they're trying to fill is like a vessel full of holes, and neither it nor the things they are trying to fill it with are among the things that are (585e5-586b4).

Because the subject is far from Forms (and the pure and stable pleasure of knowing Forms), she cannot dispel hedonic illusions. Just as skiagraphia's ontological illusions are effective so long as the viewer beholds the work in a place that is distant from the painting, so too mixed pleasures' illusions are effective so long as the experiencer regards such pleasures in a place that is distant from Truth.

In the hedonic case, only the unique epistemic and hedonic situation of the subject determines the particular contrasts and distances that condition her experience of pleasure and pain. The painting and poetry cases are importantly different, in that the skiagraphic painter or poet determines the contrasts and distances that condition a spectator's experience of the work.[41]

In addition to Socrates' comparison of tragic poetry to skiagraphic painting, his focus on "poikilia" (in connection with tragic poetry) suggests that skiagraphic contrasts are essential to his conception of popular tragedy and Homeric poetry. Greek metallurgy (toreutics and jewelry), weaving and painting produced poikilia-type artifacts, including skiagraphia.[42] Commonly characterized by color contrasts, such poikilia involved the inlaying or meshing of varied substances, shapes and/ or color threads, so as to create a contrastive, brilliant and striking effect. Greek literature frequently associates the seductive power of poikilia with their complexity and extends the concept to wily, enchanting and variable Gods and heroes (Grand-Clemént, 407 & 411-16).[43] Despite the popularity of poikilia, Plato harbored a deep suspicion of poikilia – a suspicion borne out in his characterization of popular poetic mimesis as "ποικίλη" (Grand-Clemént, 415-16).

According to Socrates, the popular poet imitates the "excitable and multicolored character" [τὸ ἀγανακτητικόν τε καὶ ποικίλον ἦθος]. The ποικίλον character is easy to imitate and readily recognizable by "a crowd consisting of all sorts of people" (604e-605a).[44] The ποικίλος man is the democrat, whom Socrates describes in Book VIII:

> And so he lives on, yielding day by day to the desire at hand. Sometimes he drinks heavily while listening to the flute; at other times, he drinks only water and is on a diet; sometimes he goes in for physical training; at other times, he's idle and neglects everything; and sometimes he even occupies himself with what he takes to be philosophy. He often engages in politics, leaping up from his seat and saying and doing whatever comes into his mind. If he happens to admire soldiers, he's carried in that direction, if moneymakers, in that one. There's neither order nor necessity in his life, but he calls it pleasant, free, and blessedly happy, and he follows it for as

> long as he lives. … I also suppose that he's a complex man, full of all sorts of characters, fine and multicolored [ποικίλον], just like the democratic city, and that many men and women might envy his life, since it contains the most models of constitutions and ways of living (561c5-e6).

Socrates likens the democratic city to poikilia; in particular, to a garish "coat embroidered with every kind of ornament" (557c4). Most people erroneously judge the coat to be most beautiful, because they are bewitched by its color contrasts (557c5-7). As we saw in Socrates' analysis of mixed pleasures, color and pleasure contrasts intensify the contrasted members. Similarly, variability in the democrat's actions and character create contrasts that amplify aspects of her action and character, such that she and her actions appear finer than they really are. What is more, ποικίλα characters and actions appear most fine to the majority. Thus, in imitating the democratic character and mode of life, the poetic imitator is "imitating sensibles as they appear" (to the democratic majority), rather than as they are. These imitated appearances are skiagraphic illusions, insofar as they arise from contrasts.

Notably, tragic mimesis takes on the character of what is imitated; the mimesis is itself multicolored [ποικίλη] (604e1). Poetic images of good and bad and virtue and vice comingle to create agathological and axiological illusions. Consider the tragic, Homeric hero Achilles, the poetic representations of whom Socrates most severely censors.[45] The character and life of Achilles contain dazzling contrasts and, as a result, great skiagraphic illusion. The mercy Achilles shows Priam in returning Hector's corpse only appears intensely noble when juxtaposed with Achilles' prior, violent treatment of Hector's corpse. Similarly, Achilles' bravery in battle only appears spectacularly noble when juxtaposed with Achilles' former, petulant refusal to join the war efforts. What is more, Achilles' misfortunes – in particular, the death of his beloved Patroclus and his own eventual death in battle – appear all the more terrible in contrast to Achilles' previous glory and good fortune. Thus, it is no wonder that skiagraphic poets like Homer imitate Achilles and other poikila characters; such characters and lives contain the *very sorts* of skiagraphic contrasts that amplify illusory appearances of virtue and misfortune and, by extension, the audience's problematic emotional engagement with tragedy, which nourishes the "pitying part" of the human soul (606b). In short, tragedy deals in skiagraphic contrasts. It buys its great illusions and great emotional power with the currency of poikilia. This, I take it, is a main pillar of Socrates' critique of tragedy. The other pillar of Socrates' critique is beyond the scope of this paper; namely, an analysis of how, exactly, tragedy's ethical illusions enlarge and corrupt the appetitive and spirited parts of the soul.[46] Nevertheless, unlike mere 'images of sensible particulars', ethical, skiagraphic illusions are a much better candidate for being the kind of thing that can plausibly corrupt the soul.

Finally, tragedians also manipulate temporal distances in order to magnify human good and bad. To see this, consider how "rational calculation" dispels the illusion of tragic misfortune:

First, it isn't clear whether such things will turn out to be good or bad in the end; second, it doesn't make the future any better to take them hard; third, human affairs aren't worth taking very seriously; and, finally, grief prevents the very thing we most need in such circumstances from coming into play as quickly as possible … . Deliberation. We must accept what has happened as we would the fall of the dice, and then arrange our affairs in whatever way reason determines to be best. We mustn't hug the hurt part and spend our time weeping and wailing like children when they trip. Instead, we should always accustom our souls to turn as quickly as possible to healing the disease and putting the disaster right, replacing lamentation with cure (604b8-d1).

Whereas the skiagraphic painter positions his painting far from the viewer, the skiagraphic poet positions human good and bad close to the audience. This closeness is a temporal closeness, in that it conveniently deletes the future, failing to capture a complete human life, within which the true sizes of goods and bads may be calculated. But there is another sort of closeness at issue here – one that should recall Socrates' caustic remarks about the blind pursuer of mixed pleasures (585e5-586b4). Unable to occupy the timeless vantage point of intelligible Truth, which properly captures the cosmic insignificance of human beings, the hedonist embroils herself in "human affairs" - feeding, fattening, fornicating and killing others in her blind pursuit of false pleasures. Hence, by positioning his audience so temporally close to human calamities, the tragedian effectively distances his audience from the vantage point of intelligible Truth, not unlike how the intense experience of mixed pleasures distances one from true, pure pleasures.[47]

In sum, tragedians are analogous to the skiagraphic painter in that they employ contrast techniques and manipulate distances in order to create and sustain skiagraphic illusions. Tragedy's illusions are agathological and axiological in nature; through contrasting good and bad and manipulating temporal distances, Greek tragic drama (which draws heavily on Homer) constructs a false reality concerning value (for example, that the noble Achilles undergoes a terrible misfortune). In like manner, the skiagraphic painter contrasts colors and manipulates spatial distances in order to create and sustain illusions of color intensity and a false reality concerning ontology (for example, that the painting of a bed is truly a bed). This interpretation of Socrates' analysis of tragedy receives support from Socrates' focus on skiagraphia and poikilia in the latter books of the *Republic*. In addition, it has the added benefit of making Plato's views on tragedy more intelligible. The idea that tragic drama relies for its power on contrasts is an interesting one, as is the suggestion that such contrasts create ethical illusions – illusions that have the potential to corrupt the human soul. Moreover, we are now in a position to appreciate why imitative poetry corrupts the soul by producing images. Such poetry utilizes skiagraphic techniques to produce ethical illusions; and, unlike images of sensible particulars, ethical illusions can plausibly corrupt the soul.[48]

I will end by examining other interpretive strategies and situating Socrates' critique of poetry within the larger context of the *Republic*.

3   THE DOMINANT INTERPRETATION

The dominant interpretive strategy locates poetry's allegedly corrupting nature in the intrinsic deceptiveness of images; by their very nature, images mislead or distort. Poetry corrupts audiences by producing images of virtue and value, which, due to their metaphysical status qua images, necessarily deceive viewers about virtue and value.

3.1   *The Incompleteness Interpretation*

I shall dub the first version of this interpretive strategy the "Incompleteness Interpretation" (II). According to II, images are inherently deceptive insofar as they are "incomplete" and hence "deficient."[49] Consider again the following passage:

> - Now, tell me this about the painter. Do you think he tries in each case to imitate the thing itself in nature or the works of craftsmen?
> - The works of craftsmen.
> - As they are or as they appear [οἷα ἔστιν ἢ οἷα φαίνεται]? For you must yet distinguish this [τοῦτο γὰρ ἔτι διόρισον].
> - How do you mean?
> - Like this. If you look at a couch from the side or the front or from anywhere else is it a different couch each time? Or does it only appear different, without being at all different? And is that also the case with other things?
> - That's the way it is – it appears different without being so.
> - Then consider this very point: What does painting do in each case? Does it imitate that which is as it is [τὸ ὄν, ὡς ἔχει], or does it imitate that which appears as it appears [τὸ φαινόμενον, ὡς φαίνεται]? Is it an imitation of appearances [φαντάσματος] or of truth	[ἀληθείας]?
> - Of appearances [φαντάσματος].
> - Then imitation [μιμητική] is far removed from truth [τοῦ ἀληθοῦς], for it touches only a small part of each thing and a part that is itself only an image [εἴδωλον]. And that, it seems, is why it can produce everything (597e8-598b6).

On the basis of this passage, one might reasonably infer that mimetic images are "two removes from truth," because they are incomplete and hence deficient. Indeed, in the *Cratylus* Socrates insists that images are incomplete of their very nature; if an image of Cratylus presented *every* detail of Cratylus, it would be a Cratylus duplicate, not an image of Cratylus (432b-d). Thus, necessarily, mimetic appearances do not present truth in its entirety. A mimetic appearance only provides a single perspective (that is, an "incomplete view") of that which it imitates. The painting only presents one angle of the couch; similarly, the poem only presents one angle on virtue. Insofar as foolish

audiences suppose that poems supply them with a complete picture of virtue, they are deceived. II not only specifies the sense in which mimetic images are "less true" than that which they imitate; it also explains why imitative poetry corrupts the soul. To the extent that "foolish people" suppose that incomplete appearances of virtue and value represent the entire truth about virtue and value, they develop a superficial and ultimately damaging conception of how to live. Hence, II nicely ties the ontological inferiority of appearances (that is, their being "incomplete") to their capacity to mislead audiences about virtue and value.

However, II does not capture the structure of Socrates' argument. Socrates seeks to establish that Homer is a μιμητικός by demonstrating that he lacks both knowledge and correct opinion about that which he purports to imitate; namely, "what ways of life that make people better in public or private" (599d3-4). If II were correct, then the structure of Socrates' argument would likely be very different; having defined μιμητικοί as producers of something incomplete, Socrates would have next pointed out that poetic μιμητικοί produce incomplete representations of virtue and value (epistemological arguments aside). Instead, Socrates argues that poetic μιμητικοί are *completely ignorant* about virtue and value, for which reason they employ skiagraphic techniques to produce illusory images of virtue and value. Moreover, such images are not incorrect *in virtue of* their incompleteness, but in virtue of their skiagraphic nature. And indeed, the *Cratylus* sharply distinguishes between the incompleteness of an image and its correctness or incorrectness; whereas all images are incomplete, only some lack correctness [ὀρθότης] (432b-c).

3.2 *The Multiplicity Interpretation*

How can the painting of the couch misrepresent the couch, in the way that Homer's poetry misrepresents virtue and value? The "Multiplicity Interpretation" (MI) addresses this question. According to MI, images necessarily misrepresent or distort sensible particulars in the same way that sensible particulars misrepresent or distort Forms. Just as the many perspectival appearances of the couch are "varied, changing and contradictory" with respect to the single sensible couch (of which they are appearances), the many sensible couches are "varied, changing and contradictory" with respect to the Form of the couch. Similarly, just as a sensible couch is "stable, uniform and consistent" with respect to the many perspectival appearances of it, the Form of the couch is "stable, uniform and consistent" with respect to the many sensible couches.[50] The Divided Line seems to support this interpretation; sensible particulars are to Forms as sensible particulars are to images, with regard to truth (510a-b). In short, an image is removed from truth in the same way that a sensible particular is removed from truth; presumably, by being varied, changing and contradictory with regard to the relatively stable, uniform and consistent object to which it is related. Further support for this interpretation may be found in the fact that the poets portray the "multicolored" [ποικίλον] and "excitable" [ἀγανακτητικόν] character, whose various representations are changing and contradictory (604d-605a). Thus, poetic

imitations of virtue are varied and changing with respect to their relatively uniform, stable and consistent object; namely, the good and rational character, who remains the same. As such, poetic imitations of virtue necessarily mislead (and hence corrupt) ignorant audiences, who are led to mistake multiple mimetic images of a good character for the real thing. Additionally, in Book III Socrates criticizes the poets for being "multiply imitative" – that is, for imitating in voice and body many different things (395a), as opposed to singly imitating the good person (397d). Quite possibly, Socrates also faults the poets for producing competing and contradictory images of virtue and value.[51]

Despite MI's initial attractiveness, the central assumption – namely, that sensible particulars are "removed from" Forms in the same way that skiagraphic illusions are removed from sensible particulars - is, I think, mistaken. This assumption stems from supposing that there is no relevant difference between the mimetic artist's skiagraphic illusions [εἴδωλα] and the images [εἰκόνας] that occupy the bottom section of the Divided Line. However, for Socrates, a sensible instance of justice, courage, or temperance is *like* the Form of Justice, Courage, or Temperance (respectively). [52] However, as I have argued, an incorrect skiagraphic appearance of justice, courage, or temperance radically misrepresents and is fundamentally unlike that which it purports to be an image of (even if it bears certain similarities to the original). Censored poets are censored precisely because they construct their images such that they are not at all *like* [ὅμοια] their originals (that is, gods and heroes) (377d9). In other words, MI makes no room for the crucial distinction that sits at the heart of Socrates' argument; namely, the distinction between correct and incorrect images. Skiagraphic appearances of virtue and value corrupt the soul, because skiagraphic appearances of virtue and value are incorrect. In contrast, correct images of virtue and value actually improve the soul, as evidenced by their prominent role in the education of the young (and, for that matter, in Plato's dialogues more generally).

A secondary problem with MI is this: If the relationship between Forms and sensibles and sensibles and images were one of radical distortion (as MI suggests), we should expect the kallipolis to be constructed very differently. First, the guardians would be banned from consuming any images of virtue, in poetry or otherwise, lest they come to accept misrepresentations of virtue. Second, a philosopher-king's knowledge of the Forms would not qualify him or her to rule in the sensible realm, since knowledge of F would not necessarily enable one to identify a sensible instance of F (the latter being a radical distortion or gross misrepresentation of the Form of F). However, the kallipolis is not structured in this way. Consumption of correct images of good characters (in the form of poetry) is an integral part of the guardians' early education. Also, the philosopher-king's knowledge of the Forms uniquely qualifies him or her to rule in the sensible realm. A final passage nicely illustrates the point that sensible particulars and images [εἰκόνες] are likenesses of truth[53]:

> … am I not right in saying that neither we, nor the guardians we are
> raising, will be educated in music and poetry until we know the different

> Forms of moderation, courage, frankness, high-mindedness, and all their
> kindred, and their opposites too, which are moving around everywhere,
> and see them in the things in which they are, both themselves and their
> images [εἰκόνας] … (402c1-6).

In sum, in addition to failing to make room for Socrates' distinction between correct and incorrect images, MI also commits its adherents to an independently implausible interpretation of the *Republic*.

That said, II and MI do get something right, which explains their initial plausibility. Images *are* incomplete and multiple, and these very features distance them from truth or the Forms. However, the same can be said of sensible particulars. Just as the incompleteness and multiplicity of images presents a danger (insofar as images are mistaken for truth), the incompleteness and multiplicity of sensible particulars presents a danger (insofar as sensibles are mistaken for truth). The Lover of Sights and Sounds exemplifies this danger, insofar as she mistakes a sensible instance of F for the Form of F (476e). For example, Polemarchus mistakes a single just action (that is, giving someone what is owed to him) for justice entire (331e-332a). However, this just action is incomplete and multiple. Being incomplete (that is, representing only *one aspect* of justice), it provides no guidance in some cases; and being "multiple" or "variable," it is unjust in one application (for example, giving weapons back to a madman) and just in another (for example, returning money to a sane person). Immersed in the world of likenesses, the lovers of sights and sounds (Polemarchus included) love poetry. Poetic likenesses present an equal danger to the lover, insofar as she sets up a likeness as the criterion for truth. Like sensible particulars, poetic likenesses are incomplete and multiple, in virtue of the fact that images, qua images, do not reproduce all and only the features of the original. Hence, a likeness is a likeness in some respects and not in others, just as a sensible particular is a likeness of a Form in some respects and not in others.

However, the educational system of the kallipolis protects against the danger of conflating likenesses and originals, insofar as it is specifically designed to teach students to distinguish between images, sensibles and Forms. For example, a guardian's education in mathematics and dialectic is intended to prompt her to exit the "cave" of likenesses and to enter the world of Forms, where she will recognize sensibles and their images for what they really are; namely, mere likenesses. Hence, in the kallipolis poetic likenesses (that is, *correct* images) do not pose a danger and so are not banned. Thus, while II and MI correctly capture some potentially deceptive features of likenesses, these features do nothing to explain Plato's banishment of the μιμητικοί.

CONCLUSION

This paper has centered on *Republic* X and a notion of μιμητική developed therein. But *Republic* VI introduces another kind of mimesis; namely, that of the philosopher rulers:

> No one whose thoughts are truly directed towards the things that are, Adeimantus, has the leisure to look down at human affairs or to be filled with envy and hatred by competing with people. Instead, as he looks at and studies things that are organized and always the same, that neither do injustice to one another nor suffer it, being all in a rational order, he imitates [μιμεῖσθαί] them and tries to become as like them as he can [μάλιστα ἀφομοιοῦσθαι]. … And if he should be compelled to put what he sees there into people's characters, whether into a single person or into a populace, instead of shaping only his own, do you think that he will be a poor craftsman [δημιουργόν] of moderation, justice, and the whole of popular virtue? – He least of all. And when the majority realize that what we are saying about the philosopher is true, will they be harsh with him or mistrust us when we say that the city will never find happiness until its outline is sketched by painters who use the divine model [οἱ τῷ θείῳ παραδείγματι χρώμενοι ζωγράφοι]? … And I suppose that, as they work, they'd look [ἀποβλέποιεν] often in each direction towards the natures of justice, beauty, moderation, and the like, on the one hand, and towards those they're trying to put into human beings, on the other. And in this way they'd mix and blend the various ways of life in the city until they produced a human image based on what Homer too called "the divine form and image" when it occurred among human beings (500b7-501b6).

The philosopher king or queen is not unlike the demiurge of the *Timaeus*, who, in crafting the cosmos, imitates the "divine model" (that is, the Forms). I do not deny that mimesis of the Forms (with a view to producing sensible particulars) is a kind of "good mimesis," analogical to (albeit distinct from) the concept of 'mimesis' developed in *Republic* III and X.[54] What I deny is that such mimesis is the *only* form of good mimesis. The poetic mimesis of sensible particulars "as they are" - with a view to producing *correct* images of goods and bads - also constitutes good mimesis. Such "philosophic" mimesis would be careful to avoid deceptive contrasts that amplify goods and bads and would position human goods and bads in their rightful cosmic context. However, philosophers are not in the business of composing poetry, despite their special cognitive access to the Forms. Possessing genuine knowledge of virtue and value, they devote their time to fine deeds rather than poetic images thereof (599a-b). Nevertheless, they supervise the poets, communicating to them correct opinions about virtue and value. So, Socrates declares at 379a:

> You and I, Adeimantus, aren't poets, but we *are* founding a city. And it's important for the founders to know the patterns on which the poets must base their stories and from which they mustn't deviate. But we aren't actually going to compose their poems for them (379a).

Thus, unsurprisingly, in *Republic* X Socrates anticipates the possibility of imitative

painters consulting the makers of artifacts, so as to gain correct opinion regarding fine artifacts (601e-602a). Similarly, it seems, the kallipolis poets would consult the "craftsmen of the city's freedom," the philosopher kings and queens, who would communicate correct opinions about virtue and value. Thus, knowledge of the Forms is not required of the good poet. To be sure, in an important sense, good poetic mimesis is grounded in the philosopher's knowledge of the Forms, to the extent that philosophers supervise poets. Nevertheless, even if we depart with Plato on this point and insist that the good poet's correct opinion need not be acquired through consultation with genuine "knowers of Forms," Plato's distinction between good and bad poetic mimesis still stands. It is not anchored to the theory of the Forms; it requires only that there be an objective sense in which an image can be said to be correct or incorrect. In other words, whether or not you believe in Forms, you can believe that skiagraphic techniques produces false appearances. Likewise, whether or not you believe in the Forms, you can believe that mixed pleasures produce hedonic illusions, in virtue of juxtaposing pleasure and pain.[55] To be sure, you will only find these argument compelling so long as you think there is an *objective answer* to questions about goodness and badness, virtue and vice or pleasantness and painfulness; however, such a commitment to objectivity does not commit one to the theory of Forms. This focus on Forms has unfortunately obscured Plato's compelling critique of tragedy as skiagraphic.[56]

Why should we care about Socrates' critique of poetry in *Republic* X, especially given that *Republic* X is commonly treated as a mere "excrescence" of the *Republic* proper.[57] The critique of Greek poetry in *Republic* Book X is absolutely integral to the entire project of the *Republic*, which is not only to define justice and injustice but also to show how justice and injustice come about in cities and souls. The *Republic*'s constant preoccupation with the latter (and the role of poetry therein) is evidenced by both the drama and dialectic of the *Republic* itself: Socrates' mildly menacing assailants on their way to a festival featuring poetic performances; Adeimantus' complaint that Greek poets persuade the youth that justice is only instrumentally good; the guardians' revisionist education in music and poetry; the place of poetic images in the Cave analogy; the critique of Greek poetry in Book X; and finally the Myth of Er, which arguably operates as a kind of psychically beneficial "rewriting" of Homeric poetry.[58]

Republic X, as I have interpreted it, clarifies the nature of Plato's preoccupation with poetry in the *Republic*. Images do not pose a threat to justice; rather, false, skiagraphic appearances of virtue and value do, so long as they are permitted to freely circulate in the culture. Although we are bound to disagree with Plato's authoritarian solution to this problem, we can surely appreciate the problem itself – even if we, like the Lovers of Sights and Sounds, deny the existence of the Forms.

Endnotes

[1] Unless otherwise noted, I use the following translation of Plato's *Republic* throughout: G.M.A. Grube (trans.) and C.D.C. Reeve (rev.), *Republic* (Hackett, 1992). I depart with Grube and Reeve in translating "σκιαγραφία" as "skiagraphia," rather than "trompe l'oeil."

[2] S. Halliwell, *Plato:* Republic *X with Translation and Commentary* (Aris & Phillips, 1988), 108. In contrast, Janaway assumes that Socrates defines mimesis in Book III and that the definition of mimesis changes between Book III and Book X. See C. Janaway, *Images of Excellence: Plato's Critique of the Arts* (Oxford, 1995), 126.

[3] See P. Woodruff, 'Mimesis', in P. Destrée and P. Murray (edd.), *A Companion to Ancient Aesthetics* (Wiley, 2015), 345-6 for a catalogue of Plato's various, non-conflicting senses of 'mimesis.' According to Woodruff, *Republic* X targets ignorant, pleasure-seeking mimesis.

[4] In Book X Socrates declares that only "hymns to the Gods" and "eulogies to good people" are permitted in the kallipolis (607a2-4). As Burnyeat points out, Greek hymns include long "engaging narratives" with "lots of mimesis," and encomia would likely include adventure stories. See M. Burnyeat, 'Art and Mimesis in Plato's *Republic*', in A. Denham (ed.), *Plato on Art and Beauty* (Palgrave, 2012), 54-71.

[5] The *Republic* itself is further proof that Plato approves of some forms of literary mimesis. C. Meinwald, 'Reason v. Literature in Plato's *Republic*: Does the Dialogue Rule Itself Out?', *AP* 31.1 (2011), 25-45 argues that the *Republic* meets its own criteria for good mimesis.

[6] Socrates does not explicitly limit the subject matter of painting to artifacts and craftsmen. However, he describes the painter as painting artifacts and crafstmen in order to preserve the analogy with poetry; painters represent craftsmen producing artifacts, and poets represent agents "producing" actions. See especially 599b.

[7] Cf. *Rep.* 603c and 604d-e. The poet also produces appearances of characters through representing agents in action.

[8] According to Socrates, the carpenter's bed is a "dark affair" [ἀμυδρόν τι] compared to the "truth" –i.e., the Form of the bed.

[9] See J. Annas, 'Plato on the Triviality of Literature', in J. Moravcsik and P. Temko (edd.), *Plato on Beauty, Wisdom and the Arts* (Rowman & Littlefield, 1982), 4-6. Cf. G. Else, *Plato and Aristotle on Poetry* (UNC Press, 1986), 44-6 and G. Ferrari, 'Plato and Poetry', CHLC 1 (1989), 92-148 for the ways in which poetry and painting are supposedly disanalogous.

[10] E. Belfiore, 'Plato's Greatest Accusation against Poetry', CJP IX (1983), 40-62 and J. Moss, 'What is Imitative Poetry and Why is it Bad?' in G. Ferrari (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Plato's* Republic (Hackett, 2007), 415-44.

[11] S. Halliwell, 'Beyond the Mirror of Nature: Plato's Ethics of Visual Form', in A. Denham (ed.), *Plato on Art and Beauty* (Palgrave, 2012), 173-204.

[12] Moss, *What is Imitative Poetry and Why is it Bad* compellingly argues this point.

[13] I emphasize this point, because a common caricature of Plato goes something like this: Plato defends the view that poetry and painting imitate sensible particulars, not intelligible reality (e.g., J. Perry, J. and K. Taylor, 'Poetry as a Way of Knowing: Interview with Jane Hirshfield', *Philosophy Talk* [Iamplify Podcast audio, 4/6/2012]), and Aristotle rightly rejects this view, claiming that poetry represents universals. Importantly, Aristotle never ascribes this simplistic view to Plato.

[14] Determining the nature of the imitative poet's cognitive access to ancient events is not immediately relevant to Socrates' project, which is to show how imitative poetry corrupts the soul. However, even if the Muses give imitative poets cognitive access to the past, the imitative poets, lacking knowledge of human value and virtue, may nevertheless misinterpret ancient events. See C. Collobert, 'Poetry As Flawed Reproduction: Possession and Mimesis', in P. Destrée and F. Herrmann (edd.), *Plato and the Poets* (Brill, 2011), 41-62 and, more recently, P. Murray, 'Poetic Inspiration', in P. Destrée and P. Murray (edd.), *A Companion to Ancient Aesthetics* (Wiley, 2015), 158-74. Murray argues that, for Plato, the passive nature of inspiration makes it incompatible with knowledge possession.

[15] See Halliwell, 'Fiction', in P. Destrée and P. Murray (edd.), *A Companion to Ancient Aesthetics* (Wiley, 2015), 345-7 for the argument that Plato conceived of such stories as fiction but did not ban them on this ground.

[16] While Socrates targets epic and comic poetry as well, he does so by drawing quick analogies between them and tragedy. See especially *Rep.* 598d and 606c.

[17] For a fuller defense of this point, see Moss, *What is Imitative Poetry and Why is it Bad?* and Belfiore, *Plato's Greatest Accusation Against Poetry*.

[18] Annas, *Plato on the Triviality of Literature* argues that imitative poetry cannot corrupt the soul (despite Socrates' statements to the contrary), because imitative poetry copies the look of sensible particulars and is therefore "trivial."

[19] Here I diverge from Grube and Reeve 1992, which translates "τοῦτο γὰρ ἔτι διόρισον" as "you must be clear about that." What is the nature of the distinction between imitating the bed "as it is" and "as it appears?" The temptation is to suppose that imitating the bed "as it is" is to imitate the Form of the bed. But Socrates clearly asks *of the works of craftsmen* whether or not *they* are imitated "as they are" or "as they appear."

[20] The mirror analogy brings out this general feature of *all* mimesis – i.e., that it *produces* appearances, rather than artifacts. In other words, the mirror analogy is not really an essential part of Socrates' critique of the tragedians, and with good reason. For if tragedians are like men with mirrors, then their work is trivial, not corruptive.

[21] A. Nehamas, 'Plato and the Mass Media', in A. Nehamas (ed.), *Virtues of Authenticity: Essays on Plato and Socrates* (PUP, 1999 reprint of 1988 original print), 279-302 and S. Halliwell, *Plato:* Republic *10 with Translation and Commentary*. See Belifore, 'A Theory of Imitation in Plato's *Republic*', *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 114 (1984), 121-46 for a defense of the view that Socrates targets μιμητική (the "art of imitation"), not μίμησις more generally.

[22] Contra E. Asmis, 'Art and Morality', in P. Destrée and P. Murray (edd.), *A Companion to Ancient Aesthetics* (Wiley, 2015), 488, who follows Belfiore, *A Theory of Imitation in Plato's* Republic. Belfiore follows V. Menza, 'Poetry and the Techne Theory' (Diss., Johns Hopkins University, 1972).

[23] C. Shaw, 'Poetry and Hedonic Error in Plato's *Republic*', *Phronesis* 61 (2016), 373-96 argues for a strong continuity between the two books. According to Shaw, *Republic* X completes Book IX's analysis of pleasure by examining a mixed pleasure of the soul; namely, "tragic pleasure." In Shaw's view, tragic pleasure involves the juxtaposition of painful grief with the dual pleasures of admiring the hero and appreciating the formal elements of the poem. While I agree with Shaw's claim that juxtaposition is key to the experience of tragedy (as Socrates understands it), I deny that the experience of tragedy is that of tragic pleasure (as Shaw understands it). I also deny that Book X, like the *Philebus*, is in the business of classifying a mixed pleasure of the soul. In my view, the central experience of tragedy is that of pleasurable lamentation, and the relevant juxtapositions are those of the hero's virtue and vice and fortune and misfortune. In effect, I am arguing for a weaker continuity between Books IX and X: Socrates imports the skiagraphia analogy from Book IX (where it is applied to pleasure) and applies it to tragedy in Book X.

[24] Book III is concerned with mimetic impersonation, whereas Book X is concerned with the production of mimetic appearances. This should come as no surprise, given that Book III addresses the guardians' education, which would have involved reciting and performing poetry (as was common educational practice in ancient Greece).

[25] The terms "εἴδωλα," "φαντάσματα" and "φαινόμενα" often denote deceptive or spurious images (Janaway, *Images of Excellence: Plato's Critique of the Arts*, 110-11 and Halliwell, Republic X *with Translation and Commentary*, 118-19).

[26] These points about variability will become important later, in developing the skiagraphia analogy.

[27] I use the Greek term "μιμητικοί" throughout (rather than "imitators"), in order to keep clear my earlier point that Socrates does not target any and all imtation. Μιμητικοί are practitioners of a deceptive "τέχνη of imitation," as distinct from mimesis in general. Kelsey, *Truth and τέχνη in Plato's* Philebus *and* Statesman (unpublished) argues that in the *Philebus* and the *Statesman* τέχνη is indifferent to truth – a mere "imitation" of true wisdom.

[28] Also, the audience is not passive. For more on the audience's "cognitive contribution" to the experience of tragedy, see V. Harte, 'Republic X and the Role of the Audience in Art', *OSAP* 38 (2010), 69-96. S. Jansen, 'Audience Psychology and Censorship in Plato's *Republic*: The Problem of the Irrational Part', *Epoché* 19.2 (2015) argues that the spirited part of the soul contributes much to the experience of tragedy. Cf. R. Sinpurwalla, 'Soul Division and Mimesis in *Republic* X', in Destrée and F. Herrmann (edd.), *Plato and the Poets* (Brill, 2011), 283-98.

[29] See especially J.J. Pollitt, *The Ancient View of Greek Art* (YUP, 1974), 247-54 and Plantzos, 'Wall- and Panel-Painting', in T. Smith and D. Plantzos (edd.), *A Companion*

to Greek Art, Vol. 1 (Blackwell, 2012), 172-9. The textual evidence comes primarily from scattered references in Plato and Aristotle, as well as book 35, chapter 36 of Pliny the Elder's *Natural History*, in which Pliny credits 5th century BCE Athenian Apollodorus with being the first to paint objects "as they appeared" – a practice Plutarch identifies with the mixture and toning down of shade [φθορὰν καὶ ἀπόχρωσιν] (*De glor. Ath.* 2, *Mor.* 346a). Pliny credits Apollodorus with inspiring the Greek realist painter, Zeuxis.

[30] See respectively E. Keuls, *Plato and Greek Painting* (Brill, 1978) and E.G. Pemberton, 'A Note on Skiagraphia', *AJA* 80.1 (1976), 82-4.

[31] The expansion of the traditional color palate was also important in this transition to representing reality as it appears. See H. Brecoulaki, 'Greek Painting and the Challenge of Mimesis', in P. Destrée and P. Murray (edd.), *A Companion to Ancient Aesthetics* (Wiley, 2015), 223-31.

[32] The *Philebus* passages never use the term "skiagraphia;" however, the technique described at *Phil.* 42b-c matches perfectly with skiagraphia as it is described at *Rep.* 584-586. What is more, both texts apply skiagraphia to an analysis of mixed pleasure. For Plato's suspicion of skiagraphia, see M.M Sassi, 'Perceiving Colors', in P. Destrée and P. Murray (edd.), *A Companion to Ancient Aesthetics* (Wiley, 2015), 262-73 and Brecoulaki, *Greek Painting and the Challenge of Mimesis*.

[33] Plantzos, *Wall- and Panel-Painting* claims skiagraphia was popular and blames the lack of extant skiagraphia on the fact that it commonly adorned walls and panels, which, unlike Greek sculpture and vase-paintings, disintegrated with the buildings it once decorated.

[34] There is a long history of debate over what Socrates means by "is truly" [ἀληθῶς εἶναι] a carpenter. The Greek is consistent with either an ontological or veridical interpretation of "ἀληθῶς εἶναι." So, Socrates could be referring to skiagraphic painting so as to make the point that foolish people mistake the painting of a carpenter for a real life carpenter. See Halliwell, *Plato:* Republic *10 with Translation and Commentary*, 119-20 and Janaway, *Images of Excellence: Plato's Critique of the Arts*, 134 for this "ontological" interpretation. Alternatively, Socrates could be making the point that foolish people mistake the painting of a carpenter for a *correct representation* of a carpenter.
See Belfiore, *Plato's Greatest Accusation Against Poetry*, 40-50 and Moss, *What is Imitative Poetry and Why is it Bad?*, 422-23 for this "veridical" interpretation. My own suspicion is that Socrates intentionally trades on this ambiguity, in order to develop the analogy with poetry. Poetry involves veridical deception, because the audience is deceived into believing that Homer *correctly represents* virtue.

[35] In the literature the temptation has been to invoke the *Sophist*'s distinction between φανταστική and εἰκαστική. Whereas the latter produces an actual likeness of the object, the former "abandons truth" and produces an apparent likeness of the object (235c-236c). See especially N. Notomi, 'Image-Making in *Republic* X and the *Sophist*', in P.

Destrée & F. Herrmann (edd.), *Plato and the Poets* (Brill, 2011), 299-326. However, not only does the *Sophist* never mention skiagraphia, the technique of the phantastic artist is different – i.e., distorting the proportions of the original in order to accommodate the perspective of the viewer, who is situated far below the artwork.

[36] Even here there are parallels. As I have said, skiagraphic painting and imitative poetry both produce illusions of fineness; for example, the painter produces the illusion of fine artifacts (601b-602a). Moreover, as we will see, both skiagraphia and tragedy produce illusions of intensity or magnitude.

[37] The analysis of mixed pleasure is interesting, in that Socrates initially categorizes such "so-called pleasures" as mere "relief from pain" (584c). However, the remainder of the analysis tacitly acknowledges that such pleasures *are* pleasures, albeit "less true" than unmixed pleasures. The *Philebus* echoes and even sharpens this point, especially at 42b-c (which I will consider shortly).

[38] Notice, Plutarch also uses "ἀποχραίνω" to describe skiagraphia. See footnote 28.

[39] See Keuls, *Plato and Greek Painting*, who argues that skiagraphia produced illusions of color intensity.

[40] H.N. Fowler (transl.), *Plato:* Statesman, Philebus, Ion (*Loeb Classical Library*) (HUP, 1925).

[41] This is not to deny that the audience has an active role in constructing such illusions, but rather to point out that, in the tragedy case, the artist also has an active role in constructing illusions. See Harte, Republic X *and the Role of the Audience in Art*.

[42] Grand-Clemént, 'Poikilia', in P. Destrée and P. Murray (edd.), *A Companion to Ancient Aesthetics* (Wiley, 2015), 408-11.

[43] Grand-Clemént writes of poikilia: "… the fine play of colors and patterns intrigues and makes one wish to uncover the secret of its making. That is what lies behind the expression *thauma idesthai*. Wonder springs from the knowledge that beyond the apparent confusion there is order and rules, thought up by a skillful demiurge whose heroic or divine prototype could be Daedalus, Hephaestus, or Prometheus. The effect of *poikilia* induces an entrapment of the eye caused by the interplay of chromatic contrasts animating the patterns" ('Poikilia', 413).

44 The tragedian also appeals to a part of the soul whose character is ποικίλον. Again, this points to the spectator's role in constructing agathological and axiological illusions. See footnote 40.

[45] From *Republic* 379d to 391e there are sixteen references to Achilles or his speeches, fourteen of which are critical. A. Hobbs, *Plato and the Hero* (CUP, 2000) emphasizes this point. However, she sees Achilles as the exemplar of the timocratic character.

[46] See S. Jansen, 'Audience Psychology and Censorship in Plato's *Republic*: The Problem of the Irrational Part', *Epoché* 19.2 (2015) for an in-depth analysis of how poetry's ethical illusions corrupt the souls of audience members.

[47] The tragedian produces a mixed pleasure in his audience; namely, the mixed pleasure of lamentation.

[48] See S. Jansen, 'Audience Psychology and Censorship in Plato's *Republic*: The Problem of the Irrational Part', *Epoché* 19.2 (2015) for an in-depth analysis of how poetry's ethical illusions corrupt the souls of audience members.

[49] For II, see J. Marusic, 'Poets and Mimesis in the *Republic*', in P. Destrée & F. Herrmann (edd.), *Plato and the*
Poets (Brill, 2011), 217-40.

[50] The primary defender of MI, Jessica Moss, is not explicit about the sense in which sensibles or appearances are "changing, varied and contradictory" (*What is Imitative Poetry and Why is it Bad?*). Are sensibles and appearances "changing, varied and contradictory" with respect to *other* sensibles and appearances (respectively) or with respect to *themselves* (or both)?

[51] J. Gould, 'Plato and Performance', *Philosophy and Literature* 20.1 (1996), 13-25.

[52] See V. Harte, 'Plato's Metaphysics', in G Fine (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Plato* (OUP, 2008), 191-216 for an argument against the view that sensibles distort or misrepresent the Forms. If Harte is right about this (and I think she is), then MI loses even more traction: mimetic appearances are not false in virtue of distorting their originals in the same way that sensibles distort Forms.

[53] Asmis, *Art and Morality* suggests that Plato promotes reformed poetry comprised of "likenesses" [εἰκόνες] of virtue. "Poet-technicians" (who follow the prescriptions of others regarding virtue) and "poet-creators" (who discover true virtue themselves) produce reformed poetry. However, her analysis is a broad analysis of Plato's works, rather than a focused analysis of *Republic* X.

[54] Why isn't mimesis of Forms (which involves producing sensibles, not images) included in *Republic* X's discussion of mimesis, given that the stated aim of the discussion is to define 'mimesis in general?' Strangely, Book X's categorization of "makers" would classify both the philosopher king and the demiurge as "craftsmen" in contrast to "imitators." Both look to the Forms with a view to producing sensibles. (In a similar vein, the carpenter looks to the Form of the couch with a view to producing the sensible couch.) Possibly, in setting out to define "μίμησις ὅλως" Socrates means to define what is "wholly" and "completely" mimesis. Certainly, the
demiurge and philosopher king are mimetic in some respects, but (unlike the poet) they are genuinely "craftsmanlike" in other respects (i.e., in virtue of producing sensible artifacts reflective of Forms). So, they are not *completely* mimetic and hence fall outside of the *Republic* X discussion.

[55] To be sure, a philosopher's pleasures are superior because they involve being filled with Forms. However, importantly, the tyrant's pleasures are not grossly inferior because they involve being filled with images, but rather because they are thoroughly *skiagraphic* and, as a result, hedonically *false*. This criticism of the tyrant's pleasures survives, whether or not we accept Forms.

[56] One might object that my interpretation fails to reconcile the differing accounts of "μιμητική" or "imitativeness" in *Republic* X and III. In other words, how does the practice of copying appearances (as articulated in *Republic* X) connect with μιμητική as

it is defined in *Republic* III; namely, seriously impersonating (in voice and body) many different characters, both good and bad? (As I have noted on p. 2, impersonation is nonequivalent to μιμητική, because impersonation of good characters is permitted and even encouraged, whereas poetic μιμητική is banned. See Belfiore, *A Theory of Imitation in Plato's* Republic for the view that μιμητική essentially involves being "multiply imitative" – i.e., imitating everything and anything. Ferrari, *Plato and Poetry*, 118-119 helpfully develops Belfiore's view, adding that μιμητική involves "seriously" [σπουδῇ] impersonating multiple characters – i.e., impersonating them in a non-satirical way. While more needs to be said about what constitutes serious impersonation, this interpretation has the benefit of explaining why Socrates permits unserious, "playful" impersonation of bad characters [396d4-e1, 397a3].) First, it must be noted that Book III is concerned with mimetic impersonation, whereas Book X is concerned with the production of mimetic appearances. This should come as no surprise, given that Book III addresses the guardians' education, which would have involved reciting and performing poetry (as was common educational practice in ancient Greece). (See E. Havelock, *Preface to Plato* (HUP, 1963) for the nature of this common Greek educational practice, which involved impersonating poetry characters.) Thus, in Book III Socrates explores the effects of μιμητική on the μιμητικός – i.e., on the individual who, in reciting an performing poetry, impersonates various characters. The worry is that the μιμητικός becomes the multifarious, vicious characters she imitates. This difference in emphasis (between the two books) does not itself entail a splintering in in the concept of 'μιμητική.' Rather, impersonation and the production of appearances are two aspects of the very same practice. In "seriously impersonating" a tragic hero the actor (or poet) produces the appearance of a virtuous man undergoing terrible misfortune (603c). (In calling the *poet* an impersonator, Socrates is thinking about actors as extensions of the poet. *Burnyeat* remarks that Plato intends "this picture of the poet sprouting extensions of himself and his voice all over the theater" as grotesque [*Art and Mimesis in Plato's* Republic, 61].) Put simply, impersonation is the medium through which performed or recited poetry produces its appearances. (This is not to say that imitative poetry communicates its appearances through impersonation exclusively, since Socrates recognizes musical mode and meter as distinct forms of mimesis [*Rep.* 399a-400a].) To be sure, more needs to be said about how "serious" impersonation departs from "playful" impersonation, such that the former (and not the latter) produces false appearances of virtue and value. However, there is no prima facie reason to suppose that such an explanation cannot be provided. In any case, the dominant interpretive strategy (i.e., PI and MI) shares the problem of unifying the discussions of μιμητική in Books III and X.

[57] J. Annas, *Introduction to Plato's* Republic (Oxford, 1981), 335. Cf. Else, *Plato and Aristotle on Poetry*, which also denies that *Republic* Book X is an integral part of the *Republic*.

[58] See Destrée, 'Plato on Tragic and Comic Pleasures', in A. Denham (ed.), *Plato on Art and Beauty* (Palgrave, 2012), 125-41. One exciting consquence of my interpretation

is that it also removes an obstacle to understanding Plato's dialogues as "good" or "revised" dramatic poetry. See S. Jansen, 'Plato's *Phaedo* as a Pedagogical Drama', *AP* 33.2 (2013), 333-52 for the view that Plato intends the *Phaedo* as revised poetry. Interestingly, the *Phaedo* does exactly what my interpretation of reformed poetry predicts: it represents Socrates' character as uniform

PHILOSOPHY AS MEMORY THEATRE: PLATO'S ODYSSEY

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Abstract:

Contrary to its self-proclamation, philosophy started not with wonder, but with time thrown out of joint. It started when the past has become a problem. Such was the historical situation facing Athens when Plato composed his Socratic dialogues. For the philosopher of fifth century BCE, both the immediate past and the past as the Homeric tradition handed down to the citizens had been turned into problematicity itself. In this essay, I will examine the use of philosophy as memory theatre in Plato's *Republic*. I shall do so by interpreting Book X of the *Republic* as Plato's "odyssey" and suggest that such Platonic odyssey amounts to an attempt to re-inherit the collapsed spatial and temporal order of the fallen Athenian maritime empire. In my reading, the Odysseus in the Myth of Er comes forth for Plato as the exemplary Soldier-Citizen-Philosopher who must steer between the Scylla of ossified political principles and the whirling nihilism of devalued historical values, personified by Charybdis. I shall further suggest that Plato's memory theatre also constitutes a device of amnesia and forgetting. The post-Iliadic Odysseus must drink of forgetfulness from the river Lethe, so that the revenant soldier, Er, and those who inherited the broken historical present during and after the Peloponnesian War, would be enabled to remember in a particular way. Such remembrance, I shall conclude, may be what Plato means by philosophy, a memory theatre of psychic regulation and moral economy that sets itself decidedly apart from earlier tragic and comic catharsis.

Key Words: Plato, Philosophy as Memory Theatre, Remembrance, Forgetting

> Ah, cousin, could we but survive this war
> to live forever deathless, without age,
> I would not ever go again to battle,
> Nor would I send you there for honor's sake!
> The Trojan Sarpedon to Glaucus, *The Iliad*, XII 320-4[1]

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[1] Homer, *The Iliad*. trans. Robert Fitzgerald. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.

> … resembles that of the sea-god Glaucus whose first nature can hardly be made out by those who catch glimpses of him, because the original members of his body are broken off and mutilated and crushed and in every way marred by the waves, and other parts have attached themselves to him, accretions of shells and sea-weed and rocks, so that he is more like any wild creature than what he was by nature—even such, I say, is our vision of the soul marred by countless evils. But we must look elsewhere, Glaucon." "Where?" said he. "To its love of wisdom."

<div align="right">

Socrates to Glaucon, *The Republic*, X 611d-e

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Opening Remarks:
Athens, a place without place

Fifth-century Athens is a time where identity and place do not coincide. No one is at home there. The city, at war with its brothers of Hellas garrisoned against it at the Peloponnese, is no longer an *oikos*, a house, an estate, in the archaic agrarian sense as Ithaca was to Odysseus or Sparta to Helen in the epic recitation of a Homer. It is a place you find yourself being turned away from; it is a place you cannot hope to return to. It is a place without placeness, more so for the generation that was born and came of age during the last twenty years of capricious fighting, volatile politics and unnatural deaths at the close of a golden or gilded age opened by the hereditary house of Pericles. Among the blushing youths of the city's withering aristocracy: Alcibiades, Xenophon, Plato. Denounced by the reared many-headed hydra of an unruly demos and in time coming to denounce it, the younger generation found itself false heir to a polis with all the sound and fury it was unable to inherit as its own. The city is no home. By a protean democracy pressurized into seeking their fortunes outside the walls of the polis, Athens' brilliant young men carried within them no anchorage of home, only a transcendental void, specter of a homeland that for the elders of the city perhaps still had been and yet for them and their generation never really is.

I. Collapse of a Spatial Order

During these last years with the escalation of its inter-imperial struggle against a militarized Sparta for maritime control, Athens' imperial desire for colonial expansion and land- and sea-appropriation in the Aegean was thwarted and came to general grief. The spatial order whilom established by the maritime empire of Athens at her Periclean acme upon Greece' victory over the barbarian Orient fell apart and into desperate disrepair. Before the Athenian empire had annexed the afar; now it only alienates the near. Marred as it were by the waves of the raving raging multitude, the motley body politic of a now democratic Athens assumes the aspect of that of the sea-god Glaucus whose original members and limbs are thus broken-off and mutilated. Upon the lacerated body politic grow accretions of sundry desires masquerading

in the boisterous metaphors and metonyms of a rhetorical discursivity swaggering through and hailed in the obstreperous citizen assemblies. Founder of the nomos in the classical age of the ancient Mediterranean, imperial Athens has by now lost its maritime supremacy to Sparta its terrestrial, hoplite-ethos infused brother, and was no longer in a position to maintain the hegemonic order previously imposed upon foreign soil and waters by the might of its organized naval violence and its ideological persuasion of free words and free commerce. Neither had such an Athens found the just measure (δίκη) to hold the equilibrium of neighboring imperial forces on ascension nor to have them precariously balanced on the newly drawn grid of a novel spatial order.

It is in this state of geopolitical ignominy and self-alienation that fifth-century Athens becomes a place when the continuity of time, or if we weigh history with a human scale, the durability of all things human, indeed the unity of generationality itself is broken whereupon both youth and age end up being equally unbearable. Afflicted by and reflecting on the cares of his time and his native city, a Plato well past the bloom of his youth had come to shun the enthusing charm of the recited word and consigned to the written form of dialectic and dialogue that enigmatic piece of work, the *Republic* (Πολιτεία). Signaling the genre transformation of tragic poetry into the tragicomedy that is philosophy, the *Republic* amounts to no less than an attempt at critically inheriting and transforming the Homeric tradition whose epics and heroics had degenerated into mere rhetoric and sophistry in his own time wedged between the two wars. It is an attempt to re-appropriate if not to re-invent the common past of the Greek world corrupted in the historical present of the pan-Hellenic stasis of the Peloponnesian War. The *Republic* can thus be understood as Plato's work of mourning and re-founding, of his re-weighing and transvaluation of all the former values formative of the Heroic age of the Greeks which yet had been transmitted in fossilized form and adopted in his own time with such use and abuse as contributing to the downfall of imperial Athens, once paragon of all Greece and lord over the wine dark Mediterranean.

II. Artemis against Dionysus:
Transforming the Night

At the head of this tragicomic philosophical drama recalled and recounted by our anti-Homeric reciter Socrates (lent voice by the playwright Plato), we encounter the conversation between the affluent elderly Cephalus and Socrates in the harbor estate of the former's male offspring and heir, Polemarchus. It was yesternight, the topos of dramatic action being outside the city walls, by the war-mongering Athenian port of Piraeus (Πειραιάς, meaning roughly "the place over passage") in the rich house of the metic and arms manufacturer Cephalus. We may well imagine the whole scene bathed in an exotic festive ambience, as it was happening between the sacrificial rite in honor of a foreign goddess (Bendis, a Thracian Artemis) and the torch race on horseback and the carnival vigil. Relying heavily on agricultural imports due to the poor, stingy

(στενοχωρία) soil status of Attica, imperial Athens was susceptible to the foreign inflows of immigrant customs in her cultural life too. Besieged as well as fascinated by images of herself in otherness as such, in Plato's time (circa 429-413 BCE) the city had naturalized as among the official ceremonies of the polis the Thracian rite alluded to here, the Bendideia.

This initial situating of the dramatic action amidst the foreign festivities calls to mind at the outset an interesting parallel to and a perhaps not implausible contrast with the institution of the tragic theatre at the festivals of Dionysus, whose attributed Asiatic origin also makes him a foreign arriving-outsider god. While Dionysus is hailed as the god of excess, drunkenness and ecstasy, Bendis, despite her being a foreign goddess, is worshiped as the Thracian Artemis, the stainless maiden, goddess of purity and a huntress, lunar sister to the prophetic god at Delphi, to Phoebus Apollo, god of foresight, limit-setting and sobriety whose oracle had always prompted the seeking of a temperate Socrates. Unlike the tragedies and comedies performed and contested at the City Dionysia with their unrestrained revelry and a god torn to pieces, the tragicomedy of The *Republic* took place under the patronage, as it were, of an entirely different divinity. Artemis is the goddess of virginity, chastity and childbirth, known for her divine attributes of being unharmed and uninjured (ἀρτεμής), a huntress too alongside her archer-brother, both of whom wield bows and arrows emblematic of clarity, intentionality and teleological movement. The covert intimation of Artemis in the opening lines by the dramatist Plato implicitly set to work a contrastive connection of the night (Artemis the goddess of the moon) and the day (her twin brother Phoebus Apollo the sun god) from the one ruled by Dionysus. For it transforms the night from one of wanton intoxication and regenerative violence to one of an inward-building, moon-chaste quest for the birth of the sun.

The subtle installation of this cultic device by the dramatist Plato imperceptibly saps the meaning of the nocturnal long governed by the ek-static logic of the Dionysian. During the course of the ten books of the *Republic*, the tragicomic play of philosophy shall gradually work to alter the psycho-somatic economy of the democratic Greek soul hitherto driven by the dialectic of the Dionysian and Delphic enlightenment that as a whole constitutes the rhyme and reason of the tragic. With the Thracian Artemis, goddess of the moon, virginity, chastity and childbirth, our playwright Plato is able to suspend the signification of the night as one leading into the orgiastic pleasure of drunken excess and in this bracketed period of tragicomic philosophizing to inaugurate a taming of the nocturnal. To transform and civilize the primordial night with wine-inspired, definition-seeking discourse means the transformation of the master genre of the city, tragic poetry, into tragicomic philosophy. In the dramatic universe conducted by this meta-theatrical apparatus of Artemis versus Dionysus, on this particular night of the official celebration of the adopted Thracian goddess, our teacher, lover, arch-seducer Socrates was on his way back to the city accompanied by Plato's brother Glaucon.

III. *Memento Mori*:
Socrates' Memory Theatre

The keen host Polemarchus, son of Cephalus, intercepted the duo with his train of beautiful aristocratic youths. Socrates dallied, feigning to persuade him and his youthful company out of the pressing invitation while Polemarchus made joking threats of outnumbering the pair and mocked the futility of persuasion to those who out of defiance or mischief simply "would not listen" (327a-328b). Already we have here a complete political allegory set up for the tragicomic stage of Plato's memory theatre of philosophy. As spectator, reader and rival lovers of wisdom we hear the question without it being posed: what use are words for persuasion if the demos has not the ear to hear?

Framed by this allegorical scheme of the haunting presence of the polis' political predicament we then see with the eyes of the reluctant guest, our remembrancer and narrator Socrates the entry and movement of a seemingly accidental theme: advanced age; last things in life. Socrates recollected Cephalus then and there appearing to him "a very old man," for it had been long since each had seen the other with Cephalus too old to go to the city and Socrates not visiting him in his state of retirement at the harbor estate (meanwhile what had Socrates been busying himself with, we may want to ask, politics, war, young lovers from other houses?). Apparently the result of a chance observation recalled in time or perhaps the hap of a wayward reminiscing mind, this first impression of Advanced Age garlanded in easy chair after a courtyard sacrifice (328c) also tells us something about the person who does the remembering. Needless to say but in the current case important to bear in mind that not everyone would have noticed or recalled the same thing from the same occasion. One hypothesis for Socrates' attention being thus drawn and kept is suggested by himself in his answer to Cephalus' apology for the latter's lessened mobility caused by his old age. Socrates replied:

> "As a matter of fact, Cephalus … I enjoy talking to very old men, for they have gone before us, as it were, on a road that we too may have to tread, and it seems to me that we should find out from them what it is like and whether it is rough and difficult or broad and easy. You are now at an age when you are, as the poets say, about to cross the threshold, and I would like to find out how it strikes you and what you have to tell us. Is it a difficult time of life, or not?" (328e)

Let us try to visualize: this question of the last things was pronounced in the parlor of an opulent arms merchant's house on a festive evening, in the company of the fair youths of the city whose adolescent physique and avid, impressionable minds figure both as paeans of erotic love, provocations to life, and as elegies of past innocence, remembrances of *memento mori*. Crowned by the wreath of blushing youth both literal and figural, the garlanded elderly head of the family Cephalus (the Greek word Κέφαλος meaning "head") discoursed on the vicissitudes of aging and with a Socrates

who himself was well past his prime at the time. The mind of a Socrates at this station of his life, we may gather, was not without no reason inclined in the direction that had prompted the asking, remembering and recounting of the opening question of the last things in life and preparations for death.

Father still and always, about yet to cede if not already having bequeathed his life's title of pater familia to his all-grown sons, Cephalus seemed to discourse well and to the apparent delight of his younger and aging interlocutor. Character it was that made the whining elders, he maintained, not old age *per se*: "For if men are sensible and good tempered, old age is easy enough to bear: if not, youth as well as age is a burden" (329d). Cephalus quoted the incidence of the city's illustrious tragedian, an elderly Sophocles, who, upon being challenged about his remaining virility, remarked that he was only all too glad to have left behind that tyrannical master that is sex. We shall register at this point that pleasure—spent, savored, coveted, diminished, unforgotten, reflected upon—here enters the stage as the more fundamental motif lying under and cutting diagonally through the original topic of age and aging.

IV. Imperial Wealth, Compulsory Legacy

Steeped in the ambiguous air of bittersweet ephemerality and virility recollected and taunted, self-taunted, the talk between the two elderly men came to be intensified by a stroke of irony revealing the existence of something darker, deeper which cannot be sugar-coated over even by deference to or consideration of seniority. Thus teased a seemingly satisfied Socrates his all-too-sagely, easily virtuous companion: "I'm afraid that most people don't agree with what you say, Cephalus, but think that you carry your years lightly not because of your character but because of your wealth. For they say that the rich have many consolations." (329e) This rather ad hoc reference to Cephalus' wealth by the ironist Socrates signals a moment when history and political reality irrupts in the dramatic dialogue. For in fact Cephalus had garnered his life's wealth from profiteering from military provisioning[2] for Athen's imperial projects in which a younger Socrates himself had been a valiantly fighting hoplite. The foregrounding of wealth and exposing its complicity with old age instantly turn what had till then sounded to an unwary, guileless ear like casual greeting into a highly politicized, charged matter. Polemos, giving voice not only to the orality of the epic and the performed literacy of the tragic, becomes manifested here as the motivating force of the tragicomic philosophical discursivity as well.

The little rejoinder by Socrates ruthlessly stripped the subject matter of the conversation down to its unhumoured, unhumourable austerity: no longer age and aging whose rugged edges can be blunted by the many comfortable trappings of the worldly, but threadbare life, examined through the at once retrospective and future-fearing lens of its last years. It turns out to be a life governed by the restricted economy

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[2] See Mark Gifford, "Dramatic Dialectic in *Republic* Book I," in *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy.* vol. xx. 2001. Oxford University Press.

of utility with its meaning lived and interpreted in terms of material transaction, of debt and repayment. It is a life saturated and obsessed with the demands of justice (δικαιοσύνη). Thus by discoursing over life's withering in the midst of its budding and blossoming is set the tone of the *Republic*, bittersweet drama of the life of the city and of man. The severities of the old age is ameliorated or buffered in the case of Cephalus only by the wealth accumulated through what strikes us modern reader and definitely our dramatist Plato too unconscientious war-abetting and its blood-stained comforts comfortably interpreted as trophies and glory. Therefore Cephalus' sagely repose is by no means merely the attitude of conventional content or the socialite ease of the amply, more-than-amply provided. It is the pinnacle, the last and fleeting trace of glory of the imperial war machine of Athens that by now had come to run amok and was beginning to tear itself apart by the many-headed hydra of its own democratic assemblies.

Anyone at the time who had suffered his fate with that of his city would have known the true weight of the ironist's light-sounding retort. Hence this sudden intrusion of money into a conversation otherwise about the natural course of life's mellowing and wilting is far from being the meaner of the platitudes of society talk common to all cultures and times. It puts its finger sharply upon one city, imperial Athens, and one historical present, the wake of her defeat in the Peloponnesian War, the ruin of the former spatial order of the Mediterranean imposed by the erstwhile glory of her maritime hegemony. It pins down the situation of an historical emergency whereby on this side there was the hemorrhage of the leviathan, and on the other side, the rise of the behemoth, a monolithic, terrestrial Sparta as the new master of the Greek world—in short, the endpoint of an era that once bore the proud name of Athens. Cephalus belonged to this past era, his wealth too, which by now had instead become the compulsory and ambiguous legacy being handed down to the younger generation of the polis and as such had to be reckoned and accounted for.

V. Genealogy of Justice as Economy

Therefore, rather than material possessions *per se*, wealth as harped upon by the ironist Socrates in the dramatic dialogue has an irreducible historical and genealogical dimension. It must first and foremost and in the end be understood as the historical wealth obtained through the land- and sea-appropriations of an imperial Athens now in disintegration. The wealth in question documents the rise and fall of an empire. In the tragicomedy of the philosophical dialogue, it is pursued as an ambiguous imperial symbol as well as the material heritage it necessarily is which yet can never divest itself of its own dubious spiritual aspect to become the abstract coinage of "money" pure and simple. It is Socrates' mission as an ironist to loosen up the sedimented sense covering up the historical origin and genealogical meaning of this wealth as exemplified in the case of the arms manufacturer Cephalus. We watch the ironist proceed to lay open the ethical under-layers of this historical wealth as he questioned Cephalus about the chief advantage his wealth brought him, whereupon the elderly spear- and shield-maker confessed:

"… when a man faces the thought of death there come into his mind anxieties that did not trouble him before. The stories about another world, and about punishment in a future life for wrongs done in this, at which he once used to laugh, begin to torment his mind with the fear that they may be true … he is filled with doubts and fears and begins to reckon up and see if there is anyone he has wronged. The man who finds that in the course of his life he has done a lot of wrong often wakes up at night in terror, like a child with a nightmare … *wealth contributes very greatly to one's ability to avoid both unintentional cheating or lying and the fear that one has left some sacrifice to God unmade or some debt to man unpaid before one dies.*" (330e-331b, italics added)

The usage of money for the appeasement of "conscience" (to anachronistically draw the word from the lexicon of Christianity to gesture toward a germane, unborn sentiment) is in the case of the war profiteer Cephalus a very different matter from someone exclusively out of the realm of the ethical and the private, say, an ordinary civil merchant. This is the case even if or perhaps all the more when the injuries perpetrated by the imperial war machine of Athens fueled by his own military provisioning were the last things entering Cephalus' mind when as an elderly man he was contemplating death and the afterlife. Christian legacy and modern human rights' discourse aside, at this moment of the unfolding of the tragicomic philosophical drama the analogy and aligning of life and money lead the reader-spectator to catch a glimpse of a deeper unity of the political economies governing and driving the workings of both. It turns the natural course of organic life into one that is human, whose weaving and undoing in time and among other lives cannot but fall into a pattern of meaning enforced and finished by death.

The anxious, scorching vision of life, of human life at its last moments as bookkeeping and account balancing steals a glance at the economic roots of the moral and legal concept of justice (δικαιοσύνη). This shopkeeper's justice and the colonial, imperial wars it sponsored owe their emergence to a shared origin. Both sprang out of the barren soil of Attica, which could afford but a privative materiality, holding its inhabitants permanently at the mercy of the caprice of the elements.[3] It is not man and his hands, but the raging sea and the treacherous wind that dictate the outcome of profits for the sea-borne cargoes and determine the prospect of local harvests.

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[3] The scarcity of arable lands should be held partly responsible for Greek colonization of the Mediterranean and even of the regions to the east that lie beyond it, e.g. of the sea beyond the Mediterranean, another sea in the middle of lands, the Black Sea: "When the Mycenaean kingdoms passed away and were replaced by small, hungry city-states perched on Greek and Ionian headlands, the ships returned to the Black Sea on the same errand, which became steadily more desperate as the city-states grew more populous and their small arable hinterlands grew less fertile through over-cultivation." Neal Ascherson, *Black Sea*. 1995. New York: Hill and Wang, p.7.

The latter in any case were far from enough to feed the native population. Obtaining provisioning from elsewhere, from the lands belonging to another, had been the more likely way of survival.

Hence trade, not agriculture, the virtues and vices, indeed the values and scales of valuation of the former, and not those of the latter, became ingrained and cultivated as the moral and physical being of a race. The need for barter and exchange elevated justice in the numerical sense from being a necessity to the status of being a virtue for a race of traders. The sword of such a primitive justice hanging over the head of the living comprehends life primarily in the economy of owe and due, of credit and debit. The notion of death and the afterlife as a final having to pay-up is embedded in the lived experience and interpretation of life as a restricted economy of the day, or more specifically, of the business day, with its imperative of utility and daily bargaining.

VI. Inheritance of a Non-existing Conscience

With Cephalus the consciousness of having to return what is due to another remains purely economic. It may have been inner-worldly ethical, but as yet not moral-transcendental. For such an ethical consciousness had been construed in monetary terms, and there it stays, un-sublimated, even as numerically it may grow and has with the years, when individual life approaches its end. A lot of one's dealings with one's fellow beings, Cephalus seemed to suggest, are capable of being paid and repaid by money—even those with the divine, through ample and timely offerings of sacrifice. It has indeed been an ingenuous device on the part of our philosophical playwright Plato to make the conversation between Cephalus and Socrates a lengthy parenthesis inserted between the ritual sacrifice the elder man had been attending to since the party entered the house from the very beginning. Was he then trying to ease his mind, to allay his anxieties concerning judgment and the afterlife whose wisdom he was soon to expound as he did to Socrates and his company?

For Cephalus, his generation and those of his occupation, repayment is at most and at its most inexorable a finite practice, not an infinitizing compulsion. For them who had had their share of the material as well as cultural tributes paid by the rest of the Greek world to a still imperial, hegemonic Athens, there could not have existed that unappeasable, implacable, infinite need to repay. Whatever ethical unease there may have been for them actually can and was being assuaged by the amassed wealth from the highly gainful activity of wartime profiteering. Cephalus' eschatological anxieties have not been sublimated or made transcendental into something like a permanently damaged, "bad," conscience. Polemos and the violence it has unleashed has not made a dent upon the young man or turn him into a moral being when he was old. His mind dwells in the ease of ethical certainty, relic from an imperial moral order that held no more— for those younger than him, those who were made to bear fuller the weight of the war as it was making itself felt since the defeat and collapse of the spatial as well as moral order hitherto in place. The son and our host Polemarchus was the heir, to take over from his father not only the ancestral house, its history and its destiny, but also

the argument developed thus far, the historical challenge posed by the ironist Socrates, as it were. As son and host Polemarchus was the next in line for the succession of the conversation, fated to incorporate and to unravel the moral implications of the political and psychic economy bequeathed to him by his father (331d). Be it the fortune of the family house or the misfortune of the city, to the younger generation who found themselves inheriting a dubious past, a certain present defeat and an uncertain future, such patrimony was thrust into their hands and cannot be refused.

VII. Eclipse of the Tragic,
or the Tragicomic Theatre of Philosophy

The mandatory bequeathal and patrimonial heritage of an unfinished philosophical conversation furnish us with some notion as to how the dialectic practice of philosophy in the Platonic-Socratic sense was conceived to be carried on as historical responsibility. In questioning and questing, in answering and answering-for philosophy is responsibility not in a sedimented, moralistic sense, but in an originary, dramatic sense. Confronted with the same post-war political and moral aporia, the city's tragedians sought expression for and relief from the grief and passions (πάθημα) of the war. They represented and reenacted foredoomed kinship lines from the mythic and epic past of the Greek mind, unearthing the themes of patricide, matricide, fratricide and infanticide and made them mirrors for the problem of genealogy interrupted, of inter- and intra-generationality broken by the event of imperial expeditions and colonial warfare.[4]

Having to inherit the same historical present, philosophy likewise was faced with the genealogical and the inter- and intra-generational as the quintessentially questionable and the problematic. Differing from the tragedians and mistrusting their expressive work of mourning, philosophy diagnosed the problem differently. Tragedies' repetition and reiteration of past pain would sooner produce a doomsday indulgence than purge the city of its traumatic memory. The tragic is a genre that eternalizes the past and monumentalizes the present as unredeemed; it admits no future. It is precisely a future that philosophy sought invent. It tried to fashion an Ariadne's thread of definition and linearity that would lead the present of the polis out of the historical labyrinth it seemed so trapped in and along whose circular walls it seemed doomed, like a blinded Oedipus, to be forever wandering. Neither Homeric epic nor tragedies was able to deliver a future out of the enigma of the present when past itself has become the very source of nihilism.

Philosophy heralds the representation and presentation of a new mode of action (δρᾶμα) through the working and metamorphosing of human action from being

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[4] To name just one among the countless, usually equally illustrious examples, think of the curse of Poseidon called down upon his own son Hippolytus by the jealous father Theseus, legendary founder of Athens in Euripides' *Hippolytus*. See Anne Carson, *Grief Lessons: Four Plays by Euripides*. New York: New York Review of Books, 2006.

chained to its past and tragic to an interpretation of and commendation for human action as being future-oriented and tragicomic. Inheriting the genre of the tragic and transforming it, philosophy invents this new genre of the tragicomic dialectic and makes the asked, the enigma, the riddle of man itself into the un-present present-ing protagonist. We see that the tragic approaches the absurd, the abject, the pitiable in Euripides' dramas where philosophy is very clever, but capable of doing nothing except being clever against a landscape of divine indifference and infinite desolation.

While this is also a depiction of human life becoming a riddle, it is a riddle that closes off, while with Plato and Socratic irony, life, while being beyond laughing and weeping, exceeding the limit of expression, is a mystery that invites its own pursuing, an arcanum that seeks to rule. It is an enigma that opens up, so to speak. It is this open and opening questionability and problematicity that are being handled and delivered by a midwife Socrates and are the hero of the new drama. Philosophy has made it into its task that historical life is to change its genre: the historical present can only be redeemed by the good life, and this good life is neither a tragic nor a comic one. Through the education of desire into eros that is philosophy, the life of man and of his city has to become a bittersweet tragicomedy in order to give birth to an historical future grounded in eternity.

VIII. The Generationality of Desire

The problem of genealogy and generationality is a problem of the erotic conceived broadly, of pleasure and of desiring. The eroticization of desire into eros conducted inter-generationally was to play a crucial role in the reparation of broken generational bonds. Constituted inter-generationally, the love of wisdom, Socratic love, philosophical eros provides for Plato nothing less than the seed for the birth and growth of this new tense of a form of human life, the future tense. The genealogy pursued and reconstructed in the cycle of regimes and characters punctuates the throbbing and erratic course of unschooled desire. In the third generation of desire, i.e. the democratic one, brought up by oligarchic fathers the democratic character is afflicted with a problem that can be diagnosed, like the ailment befalling the polis and its young men, as a problem of time. The democratic character is condemned to his own freedom, to the nihilism of an equality of pleasures, to the momentary, the meaningless present:

> "For the rest of his life he spends as much money, time and trouble on the unnecessary desires as on the necessary. If he's lucky and doesn't get carried to extremes, the tumult will subside as he gets older, some of the exiles will be received back, and the invaders won't have it all their own way. He'll establish a kind of equality of pleasures, and will give the pleasure of the moment its turn of complete control till it is satisfied, and then move on to another, so that none is underprivileged and all have their fair share of encouragement." (561b)
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> "In fact,' I said, 'he lives from day to day, indulging the pleasure of the

moment. One day it's wine, women and song, the next water to drink and a strict diet; one day it's hard physical training, the next indolence and careless ease, *and then a period of philosophic study*. Often he takes to politics and keeps jumping to his feet and saying or doing whatever comes into his head. Sometimes all his ambitions and efforts are military, sometimes they are all directed to success in business. There's no order or restraint in his life, and he reckons his way of living is pleasant, free and happy, and sticks to it through thick and thin." (561d, italics added)

The excessive desire of a regime leads to the downfall of this regime (562b). The final equalization of all pleasures under democracy means the de-sublimation of hitherto verticalized and self-discriminated desire into the undifferentiated and the horizontal. It is not a horizontality of the firm ground that provides one with order and orientation. Rather, it is a miscellany of fragmented horizons thrown together in the placelessness of the democratic city. This horizontality of the placeless plunges the one who desires not only into lawlessness and anarchy, but into a *taste* for lawlessness and anarchy, in which he exalts (that is, if such a one is still capable of exalting anything), calling it his liberty. In a democracy, even the domesticated calves and fowls are given to wander about unrestrained. All established hierarchies and distinctions, between the old and the young, men and women, even the human and the animal have evaporated. The de-domestication of the domestic animal signifies at last the de-domestication of the human animal under democracy's infatuation with all forms of formlessness.

The democratic character's nihilistic hankering after what he likes to think of as his "liberty" makes him all the readier to succumb to the intoxicating spell of anyone who would pander to their distaste for law and authority of any kind (562c-563d). This surrender leads to the inevitable, almost ritualistic shedding of filial blood by the one thus elected into power, a rite that stages mimetic violence to minimize it and prevent it from coming from the community at large. The rite of fratricide broadly construed completes the transition of the democratic leader into the tyrant and announces the beginning of the reign of tyranny. It also signifies the start of the last phase in the cycle of regimes and characters from timarchy to oligarchy, down to democracy and now at last to tyranny, end of history. The cycle has traced the metamorphosis of warlike thumos into dissolute appetite in desperate need of being re-sublimated into the eros of philosophy. This psychic as well as historical process of the life of desire is punctuated by and coincides with the economic change from a society organized around warfare valorizing (aristocratic) valor to one by trade and commerce emphasizing (plebeian) utility, then to a society of spectacles insatiable with anarchy and lawlessness, and in the end, to tyranny and the tyrant's self-tyrannizing, to the self-imprisonment in worldlessness and fear.

IX. The Danger of Unmanliness:
Fear and Tear of Odysseus

For the Greeks of the heroic age, haughty and immediate, fiery in all their likes and dislikes, there was no need for Homer as an educator. The opposite would be truer: it was the heroes that gave rise to the poet. But for the Greeks of the democratic age, having reached the endgame of desiring, Homer would prove a toxic teacher to this very different political and individual organism of empire shattered and imperial desire bankrupt. That only a Socrates and only philosophy can save the ailing body politic of Athens seems to be what is implied here in Plato's pharmakon of written performativity. Plato's verdict of Homer as being unfit for the re-education of the battered contemporaries of a post-war Athens could be the result of an intimation, perhaps even a self-intimation, that the nerves of the Athenians youths of the present, democratic generation have become much too raw and overwrought by the incitements of the tragic and its use and abuse of the Homeric.

Seen as part of the charge of direct mimesis, instilling a future of fear, instilling future as fear, is what Plato made his Socrates explicitly fault Homer with. The horrid vision of the afterlife has a potential detrimental influence on the character of the good citizen that his manhood be undermined. For the democratic Athenian youth is far less of a "man" in the sense of and than his Iliadic forefathers and thereby has to be made, manned into one through the Apollinian fabrication of philosophy. We may wonder, what is so horrid about the vision of the afterlife in Homer? In Book XII of the *Odyssey*, Odysseus, master mariner and soldier, of land ways and seaways, was instructed by the goddess Circe that were he to leave her hall he would have to embark on a journey to the Isle of the Dead. There he should seek from the shades the one of the prophet Tiresias, from whom he should learn the prophecy of his homecoming and its particular difficulties foreboded.

The action that follows is one of extreme poignancy where pathos was shown to flow unconstrained, or indeed un-constrainable, incontinent, from the forbearing great tactician Odysseus. On the Isle of the Dead he greeted in turn the famed ladies of the past, the prophet Tiresias, his own mother, and encountered the series of Trojan heroes with whom he fought in the *Iliad*: Agamemnon, Achilles, Aias. Then came the divine court of justice and the shades of those whose offense was punished in eternal torment, among whom we find Tantalus and Sisyphus. Last to come was the shade of mighty Heracles, civilizing hero of the Greek world. Basically, the whole of the heroic past marched forth before Odysseus, not as glory, but as horror and vain suffering. From this pandemonium of ghostly visions Odysseus fled in horror with his crew. This pathos-laden book from out of the *Odyssey* could well serve as the object of much unease for Plato, as the very hero who alone inherited not only the armor of Achilles but were made to bear the legacy of the *Iliad* wept three times and finally took flight, courageous as he was and ranked high in valor and even more so in stratagem.

What Plato sets out to do is not so much to revise into a rosy picture the horrid vision of the afterlife in Book XII of the *Odyssey*, but to undo the unmanning impact

it had on an Odysseus, to redo the whole action so that it may act in the right manner upon the far more delicate sensibility of the democratic youths of post-war Athens. So in place of Homer's vision of the afterlife Plato makes Socrates supply philosophy's own representation of the greatest mystery and last thing in the myth of Er. The narrative mode of the myth of Er is the telling of a telling of a recollection of a vision, told by Socrates to Glaucon in the presence of his brother and other guests, a memory theatre within a memory theatre, as it were.

X. Mimesis, Enantiomorphosis, Metempsychosis:
Philosophy's Trinity

Like Odysseus, Er was a soldier, perhaps a lesser one, but no less brave, who was killed in battle and came around when the bodies of his comrades were already decomposing. His provisional state of bodily immortality, of being un-rot and non-decaying makes him the suitable listener, watcher, messenger of the mysteries that are to follow. Thus in the limbo between life and death, Er is assigned the role of a Hermes, a hermeneutic role, as it were. He is allowed to circumspect the border separating the living and that undiscovered country from whose bourn no traveller returns. Er, in Plato's meta-theatre of philosophical muthos, returned to tell the tale.

The tale is an eyewitness' account of the post-mortem rites of passing and passage. It is a seeing, recalling, and narrating of the great transition, that of the metamorphosis of life into the afterlife, of the human into non-human and the animal. Only within the chasm opened by polemos between the living and the dead is allowed to take place this piece of muthos that probes and interrogates the limits of being human. A master of meta-theatrical apparatuses, Plato sets the geographical locus of the entire dramatic action in the *Republic* in the port of Piraeus, as we recall, "the place over passage." Now we watch him set out to close the action with Er's narrative of the great passage, of the soul's transmigration (metempsychosis) as trans-personalization. Plato's memory theatre (Er's) within memory theatre (Socrates') of life and the afterlife is a hermeneutic voyage of meaning and translation, and despite philosophy's injunction of mimesis ("enantiomorphosis"), comprehends and embodies mimesis in its essence as becoming.[5]

Hence mimesis, enantiomorphosis and metempsychosis would constitute the tragicomic trinity of philosophy. What Plato wants to discipline by the propriety of meaning through the Socratic definition of the relentless "what is" includes above all the boundless desire of language itself to metamorphose, to change shapes, to transfer and transform meanings through the medium of metaphor. By the muthos of Er told by Socrates to Glaucon, our accomplished dramatist Plato gives a masterly performance of the power of the mimetic desire inherent in language, a power prone to be abused and which often is, but which through the education of philosophical eros

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[5] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. trans. Brian Massumi. 1987. Minneapolis, London: University of Minnesota Press, pp.107-9.

is infinitely capable of self-shaping and self-forming. This schooling and self-schooling of language would in turn be the new genre articulating the inner life of the city and of man. Bound by the pillars of philosophy's definitions, the infinitizing mimetic desire of language would always be in the of forming its own limit of a transcendental horizon (ὅρος, boundary, landmark). It is toward this transcendental horizon always in the forming that the fragmented horizontality of democratic lawlessness would be united.

XI. Choose, and Drink!

The transcendental horizon constantly being shaped by the philosophy-eroticized mimetic desire of language provides an adequate figure for the teleologization of the knowledge of the good life. The pursuit of the good brings with it a temporalization of the present and of the present as desire, and it is teleological in the sense of being both futuristic and a returning. One knows what a good life is so that he may be better able to choose the right kind of afterlife when he departs this life to return to another cycle of organic living. Among the choices of the afterlife made by the Iliadic heroes, Aias, Agamemnon and Odysseus, only the last chose another round of human life, and one that is ordinary and uneventful (620b-c). What is it about Odysseus, we may wonder, that sets him apart from the other Trojan heroes? Perhaps Plato does not differ so much from Homer as he sometimes seems to give his readers to think, for both have seen something in Odysseus and singled him out as the inheritor of a hitherto shared fate.

Having made their choice, the souls went up to the three Fates, maiden daughters of Necessity (Ἀνάγκη) who span the spindle of Necessity and sang to the Sirens' music. They are co-weavers of temporality, of past, present and future: Lachesis, the weaver, of the past, Clotho, the measurer, of the present and Atropos, the cutter, of the future (617c). And it is in this order, of the past, present and future that the souls went from one goddess to the other, preparing to cross the river Lethe and drink of forgetfulness before embarking upon the new round of living (620e-621b). Let us pause and ask, why would weaving be favored by Plato as the paradigm for the workings of the fates, of necessity and of time? What is it about weaving that might teach us something about man's relation to his shared finitude with his fellow beings that other activities such as making war cannot teach us? Apart from Plato's divine weavers, called to mind is another famous weaver out of Homer, a mortal one, wife to the journeying Odysseus, Penelope.

During all the years of her husband's absence, Penelope had been weaving a mourning shroud for Odysseus' father and undid part of it every night to put off marrying one of the suitors. In the meantime she had kept his estate at Ithaca and raised their child to manhood. From the returning veterans of Trojan War she heard words of victory and of deaths. Alone in this vast uncertainty and possible disaster, she patterned and un-patterned time with her at first blooming, then no longer blooming womanhood. Some see Penelope as a monument of patience, a statue in the shrine of

wifely virtues; others see her as a coy, shrewd heiress. With the woof and warf of her work of mourning, she seems to me a patroness of the poets, the human and tenth of the Muses, a mortal Mnemosyne. Toward the end of the muthos of Er, we learn that before the souls embarked upon their new cycle of life, they must drink and forget. Only the dead soldier Er himself was forbidden to drink from the river, and so the remembrancer returned to tell the tale to the living, as Socrates told Glaucon, or Plato us.

If we take the *Republic* as Plato's work of mourning for all that was dead and no no longer with Athens' defeat in the Peloponnesian War, we may in a way be situated to appreciate the allegory of the dual imperative at the closing of the whole book, of the souls to forget and of Er to remember. The dialectic of remembering and forgetting weaves the work of mourning where remembrance is the woof and forgetting the warf. Plato in that last moment allowed a simple piece of insight to shine through from the memory theatre within the memory theatre of the tragicomedy that is philosophy, that there would be no memory without forgetfulness, and no future life without remembering.

Closing Remarks:
Between Scylla and Charybdis, philosophy

The *Republic* has started with a search for the definition of justice and ends with a rigorous separation of the unjust from the just. The need for weighing and measure, for balancing and proportioning continues to work on the tension between and transition from the older gift economy to the more recent one increasingly dominated by commerce and trade.[6] The search undertaken in the course of the dialogues is not just for a necessary, deliberate equation and equalization of the unequal and the ontologically disparate. More than anything, it is a search for a place in language where meaning can form a line and march forth, impervious to the topsy-turvy word-imageries going in all directions with neither order nor orientation. It is the search, in other words, for a plane, a marching ground of truth. As such it necessarily pursues a logic of exclusion, demarcating the boundary of the "what is" from the "what is not." There we witness the historical birth of the binary opposition from the ruins of the former spatial and temporal order. It means the readiness to oppose and to decide, the imperative to steer and to choose between.

Like the ancient mariner off the ruins of a flaming Troy, those who are to lead Athens out of her post-war nihilism have to steer her between and through the narrow strait guarded by the imposing mountain and the eddying maelstrom. One has to choose to sail by the Scylla of ossified and imperious *arche*, or the Charybdis of the bottomless decadence of de-territorialization and the whirling dissolution into the abyss of meaningless chaos. The young who are made to inherit this historical moment, like the son of Odysseus, the young Telemachus, have to raise themselves

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[6] See the essay on Simonides, "Alienation," in Anne Carson, *Economy of the Unlost*. 1999. Princeton University Press, pp.12-27.

from the apprenticeship of the *ephebe* to that of an hoplite fighting in his own way alongside one's ancestors, turning the ghost of the dead into the remembrance of the living. This turning and this remembering, I suggest, may be what Plato understands philosophy to be.

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ARISTOTLE ON POLITICAL NORMS AND MONARCHY

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Abstract: Constitutions differ in kind, according to Aristotle (*Politics*, III), and the perverted ones are posterior to the nondeviant ones. This paper interprets Aristotle's treatment of monarchy in light of his distinction in *Posterior Analytics* (I) between the order of being (constitutional types) and the order of experience (existing constitutions). The paper moves from an analysis of political definitions (*Politics*, III) and their psychological implications to Aristotle's analysis of kingship as a species of constitutional correctness. It becomes apparent that, when discussing the relation between a political community and the rule befitting it, Aristotle is consistently using cognates of potency (*dunamis*) whereby a form already present in a thing becomes the principle of formal actualization of another. Such a mutual relation between rulers and ruled and between their psychological powers sheds light on Aristotle's inclusion of kingship among proper constitutions, even in the absence of shared governance, and to his willingness to suggest policies that preserve even tyrannies.

Keywords: Aristotle, Kingship, Tyranny, Deliberation, Action

Citizenship and the Paradox of Monarchy

The fact that Aristotle, in the *Politics*, makes active citizenship the condition for human fulfillment, which is achieved by the exercise of wisdom it enables, challenges his inclusion of kingship among the correct constitutions because everyone but the king is deprived of ruling, and consequently of practicing excellence.[1] The proper political character of kingship is thus questionable, and Aristotle's claim that kingship at its best is the rule of one with absolute authority—namely, without official limitations

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[1] Aristotle even warns that political authorities, who conceal the fact that the citizen proper shares in the honors of office, are intentionally deceiving community members into submission. *Pol.*, 1278a34–b5.

by law—seems to contradict the actual political nature of political communities.[2] The same political premises also make Aristotle's recommendations on preserving tyrannies perplexing, if not disturbing.[3] The present study reexamines kingship and tyranny in light of the ontological priority of correct constitutions and their common standard: attaining the common interest.[4]

In agreement with recent scholarship, I assume that Aristotle's natural and metaphysical principles are consistent with his analysis of the political community. Scholars have fleshed out the bearing of Aristotle's philosophy of nature on his *Politics* to address objections that the *polis* cannot be both a product of human reason and natural. In the process, the distinguishing character of the *polis* as a deliberating collective, which is not merely an artifact but constitutes a dynamic system whereby rational animals flourish, has been contrasted with modern instrumental conceptions of politics that view the political community as serving minimal common goods and mostly negative in content rights. The consensus is that the *polis* uniquely completes rational human nature.

Exactly how Aristotle formulates the deliberative completion of human rationality by the *polis*, however, is more controversial. The debate has focused on the meaning of 'natural' when applied to the *polis* and its emergence, but the heart of the disagreement is the relationship between human psychological powers and the *polis*. Organic accounts emphasize the intimacy between the *polis* and the human soul.[5] An embed-

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[2] The problem is well noted in the literature and, according to R. Mayhew, "Rulers and Ruled, The Kingship Problem," in G. Anagnostopoulos (ed.), *A Companion to Aristotle* (Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 526–39, it has resisted solutions by scholars (537). D. R. Riesbeck, *Aristotle on Political Community* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016) is a recent attempt. His introduction includes a critical account of the scholarly debate and of the standard solution that attributes to Aristotle a "strong" and a "weak" concept of citizenship, which does not ultimately resolve the problem of exclusion in light of Aristotle's participatory politics (6–9). Riesbeck for the most part defends legal kingship (*kata nomon*), qualities of which he transfers to "total kingship" (*pambasileia*). However, such defense does not account for Aristotle's claim that *kata nomon* monarchies are not strictly monarchical. *Pol.*, 1285b33–1286a9.

[3] See R. Boesche, *Theories of Tyranny from Plato to Arendt* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996), who, assuming that politics is like medicine, doubts that prolonging the life of the tyrannical patient can have any beneficial results (81). He also challenges Aristotle on a number of points including the definition of tyranny as the rule of one, which contradicts historical facts known to Aristotle such as the Thirty Tyrants in Athens.

[4] *Pol.*, 1275a38–1275b2 and 1279a17–21.

[5] The most robust and sustained argument comes from A. M. Trott, *Aristotle on the Nature of Community* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014). The *polis* is natural because constitutional deliberation is an inherent to the *polis* structural or developmental principle. See also R. Kraut, "Nature in Aristotle's Ethics and Politics," in D. Keyt, F.D. Miller (eds.), *Freedom, Reason, and the Polis: Essays in Ancient Greek Political Philosophy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 199–219 and J. Frank, *A Democracy of Distinction: Aristotle and the*

ded human reason relies on the matrix of the *polis* to attain its deliberating potential. Consequently, participation in an ongoing and public deliberative process of determining, from a plurality of goods, what is good for each is how one achieves one's good: self-determination regarding the ends of human life. Inclusive participation is warranted by the natural sharing of human beings in reasoning and deliberating capacities. Nonorganic accounts, on the other hand, posit that the *polis* is the forum of reason.[6] It provides the institutional means necessary for deliberation to take place; namely, for individuals to state their stakes to goods against those of others they rely on for cooperation. Political participation is gradual or hierarchical without compromising the human good because the *polis* is only a stabilizing medium that enables its members to seek further intrinsically worthwhile, nonpolitical goods.[7]

My analysis emphasizes the formal aspects of Aristotle's account of deliberation and action, which are at the heart of politics and include the coordination of psychological powers active in the rulers and the ruled but also in the institutions of the *polis* with a view to noetic actualization. This treatment of political deliberation and action explains: (a) how kingship can, in principle, be an instance of political correctness even in complete absence of shared governance institutions (*pambasileia*), and (b) the psychological implications of tyranny that forbid abrupt constitutional transition. This interpretation also highlights (c) the interdependence of psychological activities and political life in ways not explored in current discussions of the *Politics*.[8]

Work of Politics (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2005).

[6] Although the *polis* is the result of human art, it is also natural because an extended meaning of the word "natural" includes the means employed by organisms in the process of fulfilling their inherent ends, whereby art imitates and completes nature. For detailed discussion of the debate, see Riesbeck, *Aristotle*, 109–14, who defends the nonorganic interpretation. I borrow the term "organic" to describe literal naturalistic accounts from Riesbeck (110). For other nonorganic models, see M. Leunissen, "Biology and Teleology in Aristotle's Account of the City," in J. Rocca (ed.), *Teleology in the Ancient Word: The Dispensation of Nature* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 107–24 and F.D. Miller, "Naturalism," in C. Rowe and M. Schofield (eds.), *The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 321–43.

[7] Not all accounts of hierarchical political participation understand the *polis* as inclusive. For example, W. R. Newell, "Superlative Virtue: The Problem of Monarchy in Aristotle's Politics," in C. Lord and D. K. O'Connor (eds.), *Essays on the Foundations of Aristotelian Political Science* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 191–211 argues that the inclusiveness of constitutional politics contradicts the exclusive politics of virtue (204). See also Leunissen, "Biology," 124.

[8] For example, C. Atack, "Aristotle's *Pambasileia* and the Metaphysics of Monarchy," *Polis: The Journal for Ancient Greek Political Thought* 32 (2015), 297–320 argues that Aristotle's treatment of *pambasileia* is a critical response to models of cosmic and virtue monarchies that underscores for his contemporary audience the requirement of such models on the part of the citizenry to surrender decision-making powers (319–20).

The Polis as Natural and the Human Soul

Aristotle's political vocabulary is, to a great extent, also psychological vocabulary.[9] This linguistic overlap is not merely coincidence but captures the continuity between political and psychological facts.[10] The *polis* accommodates the human soul, whose complexity is the model for the distinction between ruler and ruled. A foundational tenet in book I of the *Politics* is that the *polis* is the naturally appropriate environment for human beings. The theoretical third book formally qualifies the terse statements of the foundational first book. The condition sufficient for citizenship is not sharing with others habitation, cultural, religious, and national ties, or even participating in legal rights (III.1–3) but the ability to participate in the management of common affairs.

Managing common affairs requires institutions. Indeed, Aristotle defines a citizen strictly speaking as a person invested with authority to share in the deliberative (*bouleutikēs*) and judicial (*kritikēs*) element of the *polis*.[11] Aristotle has in mind the deliberative and judicial institutions of the various city-states; for example, assemblies, various councils, and courts. These offices are the means by which all city-states assign deliberation (*bouleuesthai*) and judication (*dikazein*) to all or some members of the community about all or some issues. The Greek terms used here also capture a close connection between these offices and primary powers of the human soul; namely, the deliberative (*bouleutikon*) and discriminating or judging (*tō kritikō*) faculties.[12] In-

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[9] Politics is explicitly identified as psychological capacity (*dunamis*) in the *Politics* at 1282b17 and 1284a8–11. The variety of ruling kinds corresponds to the relationships among psychological capacities at 1254b2–9. The educational suggestions for legislators in Book VII are based on the human soul, the capacities of which are outlined at 1334b5–28.

[10] Both *Nicomachean Ethics* and *De Anima* are relevant for tracking this continuity. The connection between ethical and political studies that the *Nicomachean Ethics* and the *Politics* explicitly claim (e.g., *NE*, 1180a6–7 and *Pol.*, 1280a18; 1296a36) has not convinced all scholars of substantial connection between the two treatises. The realist tone of the *Politics* is considered an indication of Aristotle's reservation that political life and action can eventually satisfy ethical ends. See E.C. de Lara and R. Brouwer (eds.), *Aristotle's Practical Philosophy: On the Relationship between His Ethics and Politics* (Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2017), 1–6. However, assuming Aristotle's psychology as the common denominator of both *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Politics* makes a consistent account of monarchy plausible. On the soul in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, see esp. Book I.13, where, according to J. Burnet, *The Ethics of Aristotle* (London: Methuen, 1900), Aristotle adjusts his psychological vocabulary to match the more established vocabulary of Plato's Academy (58).

[11] *Pol.*, 1275b17–21.

[12] In *De Anima*, thought (*dianoia*) and sensation (*aesthēsis*) are declared together as judging capacities (*kritikai*), tentatively at 427a18–20 and definitively at 432a16–17, where the soul of animals is said to be characterized overall by both *kritikon*, which is the function or outcome (*ergon*) of sensation and thought when thought is present, and locomotion. Deliberation (*bouleusis*) figures prominently in *Nicomachean Ethics*. Book III.3 considers deliberation, along with appetite (*orexis*), as an aspect of deliberate choice (*proairesis*) and, hence, a condition

stitutions of the *polis*, then, are synonymous with the psychological apparatus of its constitutive members. Synonymy, unlike homonymy, is not chance name sharing but indicates generic partaking of characteristics.[13] Shared management of common affairs, then, implies the collective exercise of primary psychological powers that are specific to human beings.

Aristotle's remarks about constitutions in the *Politics* add one more element to the correlation between psychological faculties and political institutions. A *polis* is distinct from any other kind of community because it is a partnership or society of citizens who have in common deliberation and judgment in virtue of a constitution (*politeias*), which is the form (*eidos*) of the *polis*.[14] Aristotle captures two operations that the constitution performs concurrently: (a) As comprehensive legislation distinct from particular laws, a constitution orders the distribution of sovereignty and the function of offices; that is, "the constitution is in fact the government".[15] (b) As the form of the *polis*, the constitution is immanent principle of political life and of its variations, "the life (*bios*) of the city".[16] Even without explicit reference to the powers of the soul, Aristotle's use of the term 'constitution' evokes both a distinct kind of life and the product of such life.

The use of political terms with reference to psychological makeup—power (*dunamis*), correlative activity (*energeia*), and function or outcome (*ergon*) of such activity—is further attested in the eighth chapter of book VI of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. The various political functions are here classified as manifestations of a single state of the human soul, of practical wisdom (*phronēsis*). *Phronēsis* is the excellence of calculative or practical thought (*logistikon*) (VI.5), by which means human beings deliberate (*bouleuesthai* or *logizesthai*) about variable things; namely, about materializing ends.[17] In the same context (*NE*, VI.8), Aristotle subsumes politics under practical wisdom and, by extension, under practical thought for two reasons: (a) Because a decree signifies an act (*prakton*), politics is concerned with action (*praktikē*). (b) Because a decree signifies an act performed because out of calculation that the act will contribute to a

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for human action (1139a23). Book VI.1 (1139a12–15) more widely equates deliberation with calculation (*logizesthai*); namely, with the activity of practical and productive thought (1139b1).

[13] See *NE*, 1130a32–34; *Topics*, 123a; and *Categories*, 1a6–11.

[14] *Pol.*, 1276b1–12. R. McKeon (ed., tr.), *The Basic Works of Aristotle* (New York: Random House, 1941).

[15] *Pol.*, 1278b9. See also 1289a15–20 and 1290a7–13.

[16] *Pol.*, 1295a40. *Bios*, more than life, is "mode or manner of life"; see H.G. Liddell and R. Scott, *Greek-English Lexicon* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1996). See also, 1274b38; 1275b18–21; 1276b29; and 1328b1–2.

[17] *NE*, 1140b25–26. *NE* VI investigates intellectual excellence. *Phronēsis* is the excellence of calculation involved in action only, even though both action and production are functions of calculative thought (1139a36–37sqq; 1140a30; and 1140b3–4).

given end, politics involves deliberation (*bouleutikē*).[18] Aristotle's analysis of intellectual excellence makes both action (*praxis*) and art (*poiēsis*) actualizations of calculative thought, yet action remains distinct from art,[19] and Aristotle classifies the instances of political life with action rather than art.

The *Politics* and the *Nicomachean Ethics* together establish that shared management of common affairs entails distinct but simultaneous ways in which the *polis* is a constitutional community of citizens. By sharing in constitutional legislation, government, and subordinate governing decrees that result from such legislation, citizens share in the various acts that are part of governing the political community. Thereby, citizens have in common deliberation and judgment that the selected government and the policies decreed by the government are pursued as the indicated course of action in order to achieve desired ends. This constitutes the mark of calculative and practical thought, a dianoetic operation.

While Aristotle acknowledges aspects of politics that suggest instances of production and art, his *polis* ultimately instantiates communal life, the focal point of which is the activity of reasoning about ends. The political community is unique in kind: the human community organized on the same principle that organizes the distinctively human way of life.[20] A constitution is more than just governing arrangements; it is shared reasoning about and articulation of life goals and appraisals of what makes human life worthwhile according to the community. The constitution is therefore essentially an occasion for action.

Aristotle's concept of action is both narrower and wider than modern concepts, as scholars have noted. It is narrower in that goal-oriented, selective, voluntary, or even rationally explained motion is not necessarily action.[21] The condition for Aristotelian action is deliberation in a reciprocally complementary relationship with appetite (*orexis*), which presides over pursuit and avoidance in the way intellect presides over affirmation and negation.[22] Aristotle calls the deliberative and appetitive convergence

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[18] In this context, Aristotle in fact complains that public opinion considers those involved in issuing decrees as the only ones to participate in politics (*politeuesthai*). This narrow notion ignores deliberation—in other words, the psychological activity (*energeia*)—and thus, reduces action to "doing" in the manner of manual labor (*NE*, 1141b28–29). Given the above, one could be engaged in active politics without acting, although Aristotle does not make the point explicitly.

[19] *NE*, 1140a1–20.

[20] This implication is not present in the human-collective terms "society" and "culture" often used interchangeably with political terms in political discourse. Against conflating "political" and "social" see Kraut, "Nature," 202–3.

[21] *NE*, 1139a20 and *Pol.*, 1280a32–34. See D. Charles, *Aristotle's Theory of Action* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), 151–53.

[22] *NE*, 1139a21–22.

"deliberate choice" (*proairesis*) and identifies it as the beginning of action.[23] Although the beginning of action, *proairesis* is not its end, which is good action (*eupraxia* or *eupragia*)[24] and the object of wish (*boulēsis*).[25] Additionally, *proairesis* is necessarily linked to the understanding (*nous*, *dianoia*) and character (*ēthikē hexis*) of the agent,[26] while *phronēsis* is the excellence of the whole practical domain.[27] Moreover, action, as intellectual actualization, is human end and completion, an aspirational psychological given.[28]

Aristotelian action agrees with important factors of contemporary action theory such as the reasoned or conscious pursuit of objectives, the refinement or control of unconscious psychological elements, and the autonomy of choosing intrinsically worthy activities. But in a wider sense, according to Aristotle, action includes how agents engage their psychological powers when they aim at goals and how agents appreciate the contribution of various instances of psychological engagement to living a good life over the course of human life; in other words, action constitutes psychological synergy.[29] Consequently, action entails deliberation about and disposition toward one's own psychological potential. Human action culminates in what one makes of one's soul by means of the ends one pursues. The possibilities are many, but one condition determines whether any of them amounts to human fulfilment: support of the circumstances that ensure the rule of *logos*.

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[23] *NE*, 1139a31–32. According to the general psychological outline of *De Anima* (432a16–17), judgment (*krisis*) and locomotion are the main functions of animal life, which is characterized by sensation and thought, when thought is present. Closer examination of locomotion brings to the fore two additional capacities, appetite (*orexis*) and wish (*boulēsis*); that is, hedonic appraisal at the sensible and dianoetic level respectively (*DA*, III, 10). Even if *proairesis* combines *bouleusis* and *orexis*, the fact that locomotion is determined orectically in *De Anima* speaks about hedonic operational primacy in the domain of purposeful movement, whether locomotion generally or deliberative locomotion specifically; namely, action.

[24] In the *Politics*, *eupragia* and *eudaimonia* are said to be the same thing (1325a32–33). See also *NE*, 1139b3–4.

[25] *NE*, 1113a23. Both *boulēsis* (wish) and *bouleusis* (deliberation) are etymologically related to *boulomai* (to will) and *boulē* (will, counsel, deliberation, Council or Senate), Liddell and Scott, *Greek-English Lexicon*, s.v. *Boulēsis* is especially important for monarchy because the power is one of two factors that define monarchical rule.

[26] *NE*, 1139a33–34.

[27] *Phronēsis* calculates not only means toward particular goods such as health or strength, but also what is conducive to the good life comprehensively (*eu zēn olōs*) (*NE*, 1140a26–28). See also *Rhetoric*, 1366b20.

[28] *NE*, 1098a 3–4.

[29] See K. Steiger, "The Aristotelian Notion of *Proairesis*," *Rhizomata* 2, no. 1 (2014), 33–51 whose interpretation of Aristotelian action joins action and production, ends and means, desire and deliberation as perpetual state of the human soul.

Aristotle addresses the matter of psychological synergy into which action culminates in book VII of the *Politics* in terms of identifying the life most worthy of choice (*airetōtatos bios*). However, which is the life most worthy of choice ends up being a question of identifying how human action best coordinates the operation of psychological abilities.[30] Aristotle concludes the discussion in the following way:

> Activity [*kai touto* in the text—Aristotle has been discussing action], as well as other things, may take place (*endechetai sumbainei*) by sections (*kata merē*); there are many ways in which the sections of a state act upon one another (*pollai gar koinōniai pros allēla tois meresi tēs poleōs eisin*). The same thing is equally true of every individual (*kai kath'enos hotououn tōn anthropōn*). If this were otherwise, God and the universe, who have no external actions (*exōterikai praxeis*) over and above their own (*para tas oikeias tas autōn*) ['energies' in the translation but not specified in the text; the most immediate noun, to which *tas autōn* would refer, is *praxeis*], would be far enough from perfection (*scholē gar an ho theos echoi kalōs*). Hence it is evident that the same life is best for each individual (*hekastō te tōn anthropōn*), and for states (*kai koinē tais polesi*) and for mankind collectively (*kai tois anthropois*).[31]

According to this text, the life most worthy of choice (a) is the same for each human being and common to political communities and all human beings alike, and

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[30] The relationship between practical and theoretical intellect and their place in political life is notoriously contested. Recent research has stressed that a theoretical or contemplative life is an active life. Still, scholars who find Aristotle in favor of theoretical intellect over practical tend to downplay the importance of the *polis* for human completion, while scholars who stress the importance of the *polis* for human completion tend to downplay the significance of *nous* actualization for human life. Aristotle's intellectual vocabulary is varied. Distinctions such as that between "discursive reason" (*logos*) and "intuitive reason" (*nous*) aside, *nous* operates with comprehensiveness that "mind" or "reason" and their strict epistemological connotations often miss. For the purposes of this paper, I translate *nous* as "understanding," and I use *logos* generically with reference to the whole gamut of human reasoning abilities. For a position that favors theoretical life, see P.A. Vander-Waerdt, "Kingship and Philosophy in Aristotle's Best Regime," *Phronesis* 30, no. 3 (1985), 249–73, who attributes to Aristotle its severing from political activity, which is full of *ascholia* (257). Absolute kingship is the best regime because the king frees his citizens to pursue the theoretical life. For a position that favors political life, see Frank, *Democracy*, according to whose interpretation of Aristotle the work (*ergon*) of human beings, which is "unity in difference in the soul" and "open to any human soul" is not accomplished by "theoretical or scientific study but choosing good mentors, specifically mentors with practical wisdom" (51). For a discussion of the relationship between *nous* and *logos* in Aristotle's thought, see R.A. Lee and C.P. Long, "*Nous* and *Logos* in Aristotle," *Freiburger Zeitschrift fur Philosophie und Theologie* 54, no. 3 (2007), 348–67.

[31] *Pol.*, 1325b26–32.

(b) is a matter of sectional, reciprocal action that can be external but also internal. An excellent constitution brings this life into being. Citizens share management of common affairs in order to exercise their practical intelligence and attain excellence. The text, though, displays the extent of requirements for practical thought to operate and action to emerge.

Each psychological power that forms the human soul has its own proper activity and end that agents act to achieve. In this sense, action is sectional.[32] Yet action also involves relations of parts to the whole, so action is also reciprocal. The practical sphere can be excellent only when the psychological synergy that constitutes action makes understanding—the activity of theoretical intellect—its ultimate aim. Understanding, then, enables action when enabled by action. Ultimately, understanding transforms experience and particularity, the immediate given of action, from chance occurrences to apprehensions organized and articulated by their causal kinds.

This synergetic character of Aristotelian action clarifies the rule of *logos* over the soul. To say that *logos* rules (*archei*) is to say that its activation leads human action by being the aim and end of human life. To lead in this way, *logos* needs the support of all other psychological powers, particularly the desiring ones. *Logos* does not merely issue directions and commands but supplies their end, or what they strive to attain, when properly habituated, in addition to their own specific ends.[33] Consequently, action is external; it involves motions in space and time, or what one does in pursuit of the human good. Action is also internal to the degree that what one does prompts psychological activity formed by the aim of theory and with the agent being aware of the activity's exact contribution to the realization of the human good within oneself.[34] Internal action consists in deliberately choosing (*proairesis*) to deploy one's psychological powers, individually and together, so as ultimately to serve theoretic completion of the human form and soul, a completion on which excellence of parts and whole depends.

The distinction between ruler(s) and ruled, ubiquitous in the *Politics*, mimics the

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[32] *NE*, 1094a3–6.

[33] Scholarship on Aristotelian action for the most part emphasizes the role of reasoning on nonreasoning processes, while the influence of nonreasoning powers on human functioning is usually understood as impediment. See B. Garsten, "Deliberating and Acting Together," in M. Deslauriers and P. Destree (eds.), *The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle's Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 324–49, who highlights the importance of nonruling, deliberating citizens for the city, which is an acting whole, but describes deliberation as "the process in which desires listen to reason and are partly constituted by reasoning" (342). S. Salkever, "Teaching the Questions: Aristotle's Philosophical Pedagogy in the *Nicomachean Ethics* and the *Politics*," *Review of Politics* 69 (2007), 192–214 also explains that "the practical work of logos is to reflect on our desires, to transform them from biologically inherited impulses to parts of a mature personality" (197).

[34] *NE*, 1144a3–5.

rule of *logos* over the soul.[35] Accordingly, the ruling element of the political community refers primarily to the preferred collective pursuits and institutions of the political community—namely, external actions—which correlate with various preferred psychological activities—namely, internal actions. Political arrangement of institutions engages the complex psychological potential of the participants and forms shared appraisals of the nature and value of the psychological powers that underpin institutions. Economic institutions and policies, for example, are actualizations of practical thought that establish practices regarding material resources. At the same time, such institutions and policies shape evaluations not just of material resources, but of the nutritive functions primarily accommodated by economic activity, and of their import for human life. These evaluations also habituate affective attitudes toward the capacities involved in sustenance. Proper political rule makes the institutional and collective pursuit of understanding the political end with understanding also being the ultimate end and limit of all other institutional activities and pursuits. The question of what is the ruling element of the political community is answered not by identifying the classes or people in leadership positions, but by identifying the hierarchy of institutions of the political community and its underlying psychological hierarchy initiated by the leadership.

The action of the *polis*, then, is also sectional and reciprocal: each institution (*koinōnia*) within the political one has its own proper end. The *oikos*, as the realization of nutritive abilities in the service of sustenance needs is fundamental, but the *polis* contains many other institutionally coordinated pursuits that are functions and activations of various psychological powers; for example, religious or artistic institutions are fulfillments of the sensitive and desiring soul.[36] The *polis*, as an essentially deliberative community, is the architectonic unit that directs the operation of all institutions towards the goal of actualizing a collective life of understanding. The *polis* as such a directing agent is the condition necessary for both excellent political deliberation and excellent functioning of each institution included within the *polis*. A *logos* that leads as a beacon assures that the political community is not only reasoning but also reasoned.[37] Alternative rankings of institutional pursuits, even if deliberative and collective, turn the *polis* into an appetitive alliance, which carries the name *polis* only *homonymously*.[38]

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[35] *Pol.*, 1260a5–15.

[36] See also, *NE*, 1160a9–29.

[37] The description of compromised deliberation and action that characterizes both the tyrant and the tyrannized people in the fourth section of the paper illustrates the consequences of instrumentalizing *nous* and understanding. Without assigning primacy to understanding, practical reasoning will take its cues from unilluminated and haphazard appetite. See also n. 21.

[38] *Pol.*, 1280b5–13. The implication is that a common good always emerges in political communities, implicitly even if not explicitly. For example, the fact that oligarchies are ruled

As institutional pursuit of understanding, the shared life of the proper political community is common interest (*koinē sumpheron*) and justice (*dikaion*) for citizens and noncitizens alike.[39] The *polis* actualizes the human form and soul in more than one respect. Political institutions—namely, all the institutions included by the *polis* and not just governmental or deliberating ones—provide the *polis* members with the developmental and operational means to activate and exercise their psychological potential and, provided they accomplish this, to become citizens. More importantly, all community members share in the life of the *polis* by participating in its institutional nexus and thus partake to the best of their ability of the psychological activities that form the human good. Political action completes the limitations of the individual *qua* individual and makes up for the various psychological shortcomings. The *polis* is inclusive by making available to all its inhabitants the life proper to the human soul by the institutional action it assumes and its corresponding psychological activity.

Kingship, uniquely among political systems, gives opportunity to study the complex psychological activity that animates political life precisely because of the constitution's extremely restrictive citizenship. Conversely, tyranny, which is kingship's constitutional reversal, permits students of politics to sketch the psychological corruption created by perverted regimes, an abuse that extends far beyond oppression. Among constitutions, monarchical ones best display the operation and reciprocity of psychological activities at the core of politics.

Kingship: Possible Political Best

Kingship or royalty (*basileia*) is one of the proper constitutions and, Aristotle seems to agree with Plato that, under certain circumstances, kingship would be the best constitution.[40] Royalty (*Politics*, III, 14–17) completes the series of theoretical topics treated in book III of the *Politics* and immediately follows the discussion about just distribution of political authority (chs. 10–13). Aristotle begins his examination by

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by few and democracies by many is an accident of the fact that few are wealthy and many poor (1279b34–1280a5). Both constitutions therefore operate on the same corrupt concept of justice, which makes wealth and appetition the good of communal engagement, and which compromises the *polis* and the soul of its members, who are formed into appetitive-with-reasoning-skills animals. The cure, Aristotle suggests, requires more than moderating and equalizing property, which the skilled legislator will nonetheless engineer. The legislator will strive to equalize desire (1266b26–31), one assumes foremost by means of the institutions that tend to desire.

[39] *Pol.*, 1282b14–1283a22 and 1284a2–3. *Nicomachean Ethics* (V.1) discusses universal justice, the sort of justice equivalent to the whole of virtue: complete virtue (*aretē teleia*) in relation to others (*pros heteron*) (1129b25–27). This qualitative justice is the principle of quantitative, whether distributive or compensatory.

[40] *NE*, 1160a31–b12. See also *Pol.*, 1289a30–33.

classifying five types of monarchy (ch. 14)[41] and proceeds to identify the common elements of the types he enumerates.[42] To the degree that the rule is despotic, monarchies are tyrannical. To the degree that they are in accordance with law (*kata nomon*) and chosen by subjects ruled voluntarily, monarchies are kingly.

Pambasileia is unique in Artistotle's classification because it is not *kata nomon* and follows the household ruling principle, which promotes primarily the interest of the ruled and only coincidentally the interest of the ruler.[43] Specification of the meaning of *pambasileia* is deferred until chapter 16, where it is defined as the kind of rule in which the king rules everything (*kath' hēn archei panta ho basileus*) according to his wish (*kata tēn heautou boulēsin*).[44]

The above qualification of *pambasileia* explains the direction the discussion took in chapter 15. According to Aristotle, identifying the range of monarchical rule brings to the fore two fundamental and interconnected issues involved in monarchy: (a) perpetual leadership and (b) the rule of law versus personal rule.[45] Aristotle casts aside the former issue as not pertaining to the study of constitutional types as long as perpetual leadership is according to law.[46] In fact, kingship under law does not properly qualify as monarchical rule, something obvious with democracies or aristocracies that allow offices to be held for life or for one person to preside over the whole administration.[47] Rule according to law (*kata nomon archē*), even when it is presided over by a single person, is rule that involves the deliberation of more than one precisely because it is *kata nomon*—namely, in accordance with custom or law. Monarchical rule as a distinct political species, or as a unique constitutional type (*politeia*), requires not only a quantitative criterion, the rule of one, but also a qualitative criterion, the rule of one with authority over everything[48] or according to his wish.[49]

On the matter of the rule of law versus personal rule, the examination of *endoxa* leaves Aristotle in favor of the rule of law, which is the impassive principle, except in one situation that admits kingly rule (ch. 17). The condition is a kind of people (*plēthos*) by nature capable of bringing forth (*ho pephuke pherein*) a kin superior in the virtue relevant to political authority. Such *plēthos* is *basileuton*—namely, suited for

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[41] *Pol.*, 1285b20–33 summarizes the types listed.

[42] *Pol.*, 1285b2–3.

[43] *Pol.*, 1278b38-79a8.

[44] *Pol.*, 1287a8–10. See also 1287a1–3.

[45] *Pol.*, 1285b37–86a9.

[46] *Pol.*, 1286a2–4.

[47] *Pol.*, 1287a3–6.

[48] *Pol.*, 1286a1.

[49] *Pol.*, 1287a1 and 10.

kingly government—while the superior kin is royal, *genos basilikon*.[50] Aristotle uses a consistent formula to discuss the relationship between the people and the rule befitting them. A people can be, by nature, *despotikon* (disposed to mastery rule), *basileutikon* (disposed to kingly rule), or *politikon* (disposed to political rule) in accordance with justice and for the common interest.[51] Ruling and being ruled is the coming together of two reciprocal *dunameis*: the *dunamis* of the ruler(s) to rule in a certain way and the *dunamis* of the ruled to be ruled in a correlative way.[52]

The meaning of *dunaton* (potent) and, by extension, of *basileutikon*, *basileuton*, *basilikon*, etc. derives from the meaning of power or capacity (*dunamis*).[53] Strictly speaking, *dunamis* is the principle of movement or change in something else or in the same thing *qua* other, whereby a form already present in a thing becomes the principle of formal actualization of another.[54] Discussing rulers and ruled, the first meaning is the pertinent one: a *basileuton plēthos* is the principle of *basilikon genos* as much as the *basilikon genos* is the principle of a *basileuton plēthos*. Hence, *pambasileia*, when practiced, constitutes the simultaneous actualization of the distinct but mutual capacities of its elements. *Pambasileia* actualizes the power of the qualified and appointed king to rule according to his wish and in the manner of household management. *Pambasileia* also actualizes the power of the people to carry the rule of a human being of superior excellence with regard to political authority.[55] Analysis of the content of the powers involved shows *pambasileia* to be *politeia*.

Wish (*boulēsis*), like deliberate choice (*proairesis*), is appetition that engages practical thought and, consequently, is also an efficient cause of action. *Boulēsis*, however, is of the human end and includes the action of others.[56] Consequently, the king acts according to

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[50] *Pol.*, 1288a8 and18.

[51] *Pol.*, 1287b38–40. The text is not without difficulties, as the terminology is not consistent, but 1288a34–37 delivers the main point clearly. See also 1288a8–15 and 1288a34–37.

[52] The same linguistic formula figures prominently in Aristotle's psychology with reference to the objects that energize the various psychological powers, such as *aisthēton, noēton, orekton, prakton, mnēmoneuton, phantaston*. Aristotle explains the formula in *De Sensu*, 445b 8–9. Additionally, the activity of psychological powers (*energeia*) signifies the simultaneous actualization of two capacities (*dunameis*): the capacity of the object to be part of the power's operational range and the capacity of the psychological power to engage with the object (*DA*, 425b27–426a2).

[53] *Metaphysics*, 1019a32–34sqq.

[54] *Met.*, 1020a4–6. See also 1019a16–18.

[55] Some scholars assume that people suited for kingly rule would lack virtue. See R. Robinson, *Aristotle: Politics, Books III and IV* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995), 65. Riesbeck, *Aristotle*, 274–87 assigns to the people sufficient virtue to recognize the political excellence of the king, whose political wisdom exceeds the collective political wisdom of the people without presupposing theoretical wisdom or extraordinary excellence. My interpretation in this section, based on the mutuality of the potency to rule and the potency to be ruled, differs from both these positions.

[56] *Boulēsis* is proximate to *proairesis*, yet distinct according to *Nicomachean Ethics*. Unlike

his wish not because his rule is arbitrary, but because he acts so that his subjects do well. The preeminent excellence of the king uniquely qualifies him to grasp the human good and act effectively to achieve it. His rule is his best chance to attain the most excellent life possible for him. Equal sharing with men of lesser excellence would be an injury for such a man.[57] However, the king's rule is also the people's best chance to attain the most excellent life possible for them given the circumstances; namely, the presence of the king and his prodigious excellence among them. Hence, the preeminently excellent human being who rules according to the household ruling principle[58] and its concomitant friendship,[59] rules wishing the advantage of the ruled essentially and his advantage incidentally.

Pambasileia allows ruler and ruled to best actuate in each other the human soul and form. Even in the absence of institutionally shared management of common affairs, *pambasileia* is shared deliberation that the king's ruling best attains the best end of both ruler and ruled, therefore, essentially a community that reasons about ends and action, in other words a *politeia*. In addition, genuine reasoning about ends and the resulting action require coordinating the operation of all psychological powers with a view to theoretical completion. *Pambasileia* then is a proper *politeia* because it makes it possible for all its members, by its political action, which is the whole of its institutional action, to partake in the activation of psychological powers that constitutes the most choice-worthy life.

The *pambasileus* is the one who initiates and directs communal action. His rule has all the advantages of personal rule compared to the rule of law and none of the disadvantages. The prominently virtuous human being embodies law[60] both because law articulates what is right and fitting for the community, which is the human good, and because the human form is actualized in him to such a degree that he is the measure of

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proairesis, boulēsis (a) can be of the impossible (e.g. of immortality), (b) can be of what is the result of another's agency (e.g., for an athlete to win), and, more importantly, (c) is of the end rather than of the means towards the end (1111b19–29). *De Anima* identifies *boulēsis* as a species of appetite (*orexis*), one that involves calculation (*logismos*) (432b5 and 433a22–26), which explains its proximity to *proairesis*. As calculative appetite of the end, the *boulēsis* of the excellent man is of the true good (*NE*, 1113a29–31).

[57] *Pol.*, 1284a8–17.

[58] *Pol.*, 1285b29–31 and 1278b37–79a8. According to Newell, "Superlative Virtue," 195 monarchy's rule by "mastery of household management" makes monarchical rule nonpolitical, because political rule rests on sharing. If *poltieia* essentially is sharing reasoning psychological activities via the action all institutions establish, then the lack of shared rule is not sufficient to disqualify a community from being political. Household management itself is complex and includes other ruling kinds, notably political rule toward wives (*Pol.*, 1259a35). See also n. 18.

[59] The classification of constitutions in the *NE* (VIII, 10) is part of Aristotle's treatment of friendship (1161a10).

[60] *Pol.*, 1284a13–14.

human excellence.[61] The person of complete virtue or universal justice is the standard of justice; his action constitutes the discretionary norm rather than being subject to the norm. In lieu of law, the rule of such a human being would be as close to the rule of God and Mind (*archein ton theon kai ton noun*) as humanly possible.[62]

Equipped with self-sufficiency that guarantees dedication to procuring benefits for the ruled,[63] the *pambasileus* also enjoys the pleasure of exercising friendship.[64] According to Aristotle, justice (*dikaion*) and friendship (*philia*) are commensurate, because they occur regarding the same objects and in the same persons; in other words, both justice and friendship extend as far as the mutual interest of the parties who have things in common.[65] Friendship, then, is the affective aspect of the mutual sharing that establishes community, while justice is the factual. It would seem that no friendship can exist between the *pambasileus* and the people he rules, because equality between the mutual contributions of the two parts that make up the political community is impossible.[66] After all, the *pambasileus* is the disproportionally excellent human being. Yet it is the activity of loving (*philein*), not being the recipient of love (*phileisthai*), that is proper to friendship.[67]

The king is a benefactor, and Aristotle sees no paradox in the fact that the benefactor loves the benefitted more than the benefitted reciprocates the love of the benefactor.[68] The benefactor perceives in the benefitted a manifestation (*ergon*) of his activity (*energeia*). By extension, the benefactor in a way perceives his own being in the benefitted.[69] The action of *pambasileus* actualizes the human form in the ruled. Even if the contribution of the king is beyond what the ruled can actively reciprocate in a quanti-

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[61] See, *NE*, IX, 4, 1166a12–29. The *spoudaios* is in possession of complete virtue or universal justice. The theme of the chapter is self-love on account of which the *spoudaios* is also a best friend of another, especially of another like him.

[62] *Pol.*, 1287a29–30.

[63] *NE*, 1060a35.

[64] *NE*, 1161a10–22.

[65] *NE*, 1159b25–28.

[66] See C.A. Bates, Jr., *Aristotle's "Best Regime": Kingship, Democracy, and the Rule of Law* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2003). According to Bates, because the reader understands that *pambasileia* is inimical to friendship, the reader is led to conclude that the constitution is not the most choiceworthy one (192–93). J. Cooper, "Political Animals and Civic Friendship," in R. Kraut and S. Skultety (eds.), *Aristotle's Politics: Critical Essays* (Lanham. MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), 65–90 also emphasizes that the *polis* promotes friendship and a life of common activity but points out that Aristotle does not spell out how life in well-constituted communities encourages moral improvement of the citizens (87, n 21).

[67] *NE*, 1159a33–35.

[68] *NE*, 1167b17–19.

[69] *NE*, 1168a5–9. Because the recipient of benefits perceives in the benefactor the useful, which is less pleasurable and lovable, he loves less.

tative manner, mutuality and equity is preserved because the king's *ergon*—namely, the human form realized in the ruled—mirrors the king's own being.[70] In other words, one aspect of the king's action is amplified contemplation of his own psychological activities and of the range of their power for good, whereby the king's good is coincidentally magnified to the good of the ruled.

The preeminently virtuous human being relates to the *polis* as a whole relates to a part: he possesses the whole of virtue, of which the other citizens, individually and collectively, possess part(s).[71] Being superbly virtuous, he is equal only to himself in his capacity to contribute to the common interest.[72] He should then rule only and not be ruled, if one is to abide by distributive justice, the political standard all call upon,[73] The people therefore does not share in rule and its honors. However, they are not without political action. A people capable of bearing such a superb human being and, more importantly, capable of acknowledging the extreme virtue manifest in a fellow citizen and its significance for political life would itself be accomplished in virtue. Their ready assent (*peithesthai asmenōs*)[74] to him and to his policies implies that they have calculated the best course of action to the best end regarding the common interest. Endorsement and their consequent participation in the institutions of the *polis* is the action of the ruled in accordance with strict principles of justice and an exercise of architectonic *phronēsis*.

Authorizing and embracing the rule of such a king is also an exercise of friendship. Unable to reciprocate the benefits received by the king in virtue, the ruled do requite disproportionate honor, as he alone rules, proportionally to his disproportionate excellence.[75] Community between such disproportionate elements is maintained by means of *homonoia*, or political friendship.[76] *Homonoia* is the state of the political community that psychologically and institutionally concurs about things that are done, that are mutual and of magnitude, and that are to be entrusted to the same person. The satisfaction of the above conditions allows all members of the community

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[70] The same condition explains why the superior virtue of the *pambasileus* does not compromise his well-being, because he lacks *spoudaious* like himself, who would be his proper friends. A friend as another self magnifies awareness (*sunaisthēsis*) of one's being (*NE*, 1170a29–b7). In the absence of friends like him, the superbly virtuous human being enhances his awareness of his being by contemplating the human form realized by his action in the ruled.

[71] *Pol.*, 1288a26.

[72] *Pol.*, 1288a29.

[73] *Pol.*, 1288a20–21.

[74] *Pol.*, 1284b32–34. See also 1288a28–29. One can infer that *peithōs* is more than obedience by its importance in political discourse. See *Rhetoric*, 1365b21–25.

[75] *NE*, 1163b2–15. Besides friendship of equality (*NE*, 1158b1), Aristotle allows for friendship of inequality (1158b11), like the one between a king and the people the king commands.

[76] *NE*, 1167a26–28.

to attain their aims.[77] Ostensibly, the virtuous one who consents to be king and the people who authorize him to be king are mutually deciding on a form of government, on a *politeia*. Essentially, the king and the people are mutually engaging the *bios* of the king's action and excellence, an exceptional chance for human standards to approximate God and Mind.

Aristotle's commitment to a description of perfected possibilities does not blur his awareness of the fact that the disproportionately virtuous human being would be an anomaly in political life.[78] Only the virtuous action of the people in endorsing the king turns the anomaly into a best constitution and averts injustice and crime, whether ostracizing or murder.[79] While it is highly uncommon for somebody to exceed disproportionately all the other community members in excellence, it is no less uncommon than the possibility that all community members would meet the high demands of complete virtue and it is within the realm of human possibility, which politics as science studies.[80] In actuality, though, monarchy is a constitution of the past, as Aristotle's historical overview of the development of constitutions reveals.[81] It belongs to an earlier stage in the development of the *polis* that, in his judgment, has been rendered impracticable by his contemporary conditions. Yet he acknowledges that kingship could be suitable for a perfected psychological and political future.[82]

Tyranny: The Reverse of Kingship

Deviant (*parekvatikai*) or errant (*hēmartēmenai*) constitutions share the name "constitution" with the proper ones but not the definition or the essence, because they fall short of their function.[83] They are also posterior to the ones that do not miss their

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[77] *NE*, 1167b2.

[78] *Pol.*, 1284b27–34. See also 1288a24–29.

[79] *Pol.*, 1313a15.

[80] *Pol.*, 1288b10–15.

[81] *Pol.*, 1286b9–22. See also 1297b16–28 and 1313a3 for similar evaluation of Greek political reality. The difference between conceived perfected possibilities and practicable actualities is also the reason Aristotle can say that kingship is the best constitution, as he does, for example, in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (1160a35), but also make a case for the rule of law in the *Politics*.

[82] *Pambasileia* is a conceived perfected, future possibility not because of its eschatological status, but because the constitution presupposes a highly virtuous people. Such people would be the result of generations reared in correct political settings without factoring the complexity of each human being and the accidents of each human life. The political prodigy can only arise among such people in the same way that any prodigy emerges in an environment characterized by sophistication in the area of one's prodigious abilities.

[83] *Pol.*, 1279a17–21.

mark.[84] According to Aristotle, no perverted regime deserves the name constitution.[85] Yet tyranny is the farthest removed from a well-constituted form,[86] actually in principle "the very reverse of a constitution."[87]

Aristotle dedicates a brief chapter of the *Politics* (IV.10) to the formal study of tyranny, where he notes that it must be examined for the completion of the subject matter. Tyrannical varieties chosen by subjects who are ruled voluntarily overlap with kingship and are under law (*kata nomon*); that is, not strictly monarchical.[88] As long as the rule of tyrannical varieties is despotic—namely, undertaken with a view to the interest of the monarch primarily and of the subjects only incidentally[89]—these regimes are strictly tyrannical.[90] Tyranny proper is specified with reference to *pambasileia*, its corresponding constitutional norm, as monarchy that aims at the interest of the monarch or monarchical and despotic rule (*monarchia despotikē*) of the political society,[91] which is unaccountable (*anupeuthunos*),[92] and which puts equals to the ruler and better than the ruler in the ruler's service.[93] The principle of this type of rule is intolerable by free human beings and, consequently, its subjects are coerced.

The more empirical account in *Politics* V.10 explains the conditions that generate tyrannies and the course that tyrannies take once they are in place. Tyranny supersedes law and compounds elements of both extreme democracy[94] and unmixed oligarchy.[95] In the manner of extreme democracy, the tyrant acts as demagogue and rises as the savior of the many and poor from the injustice and excesses of the few and wealthy.[96] In this case, the oligarchy suffers the most obvious and immediate injury. Aristotle observes that, historically, this is the most common way tyrants have come to

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[84] *Pol.*, 1275a38–1275b2.

[85] *Pol.*, 1253a20–25.

[86] *Pol.*, 1289b1–4.

[87] *Pol.*, 1293b29.

[88] *Pol.*, 1295a9–16.

[89] *Pol.*, III.6, 1279a34–37.

[90] *Pol.*, 1295a16–18.

[91] *Pol.*, 1979b10 and 1279b15.

[92] The *pambasileus* rules *kata boulēsin*; namely, by wishing the good of his subjects according to household management and personifying law. His ruling is principled and therefore accountable to scrutiny, even in the absence of accountability institutions. Tyrannical rule is *anupeuthunos archē*. Aristotle does not assign *boulēsis* to the tyrant and his rule. See *NE*, 1113a24–25 and *Pol.*, 1295a16.

[93] *Pol.*, 1295a19–23.

[94] See *Pol.*, 1292a4–32.

[95] See *Pol.*, 1292b5–11.

[96] *Pol.*, 1310b12–14.

power.[97] But it is not uncommon for a king or higher official to overstep, in the manner of extreme oligarchy, legitimate authority either hereditary or constitutional and to use the power already in his hands to accumulate wealth in order to satisfy his personal ambitions and goals.[98] In this case, tyrants injure the people by taking measures against them.

Tyranny thus alienates the largest possible part of the political community—theoretically, everyone except the tyrant—from even the minimum of communal advantage: safety and property protection.[99] No existing tyranny could achieve such complete abuse of the people. The cohesion of any constitution rests on its capacity to realize shared, deliberative pursuits. Constitutions persist as shared life, which forms the psyche of its members, initiated and sustained by institutions. Tyrannies exist to the degree that they accomplish such cohesion, which reflects the tyrant's manifold psychological perversion.

More than distributive justice, tyranny violates universal justice. By making wealth and appetitive pursuits his primary objective, the tyrant misidentifies the human good and shatters the mutual and common advantage. Theoretical understanding is the human good that measures the goodness of all other goods. Measuring other goods literally entails delimiting their pursuit. The goal of attaining a life organized by and toward understanding determines what is sought too much or too little, when, where, and how, and completes the excellence of all human tasks and of all action. Realization of understanding is also the end that secures the common and mutual interest and advantage because, by seeking one's own good, one actively effects the good of the other and vice versa.

Absence of the human good as measure throws the appetitive and passionate psychological powers into disarray.[100] They become limitless. Equipped with the formidable means of deliberation, satiety of need poses no limit. Additionally, the use of deliberation as passionate tool ensures its subordination to goals that remain inscrutable and prevents understanding from posing an alternative limit.[101] Hence, a lawless human being is the worst animal.[102]

Aristotle recognizes naturally despotic rule: the rule of the soul over the body and of the master over the slave.[103] Despotic rule is in accordance with nature when it

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[97] *Pol.*, 1305a8-9 and 1310b15.

[98] *Pol.*, 1310b23–26.

[99] *Pol.*, 1310b3–7.

[100] Appetition for sentient beings is always passionate because *orexis* cannot be activated without the cooperation of either calculative (*logistikē*) or sensitive (*aisthētikē*) perception (*phantasia*) (*DA*, 433b30).

[101] *Pol.*, 1257b40–58a14.

[102] *Pol.*, 1253a33–35.

[103] *Pol.*, 1254b3–9 and 16–20.

extends the advantage of deliberation and action to what or who has the capacity to deliver deliberative outcomes but no autonomous deliberative power. However, the reduction of deliberation to appetitive subservience, characteristic of tyrannical *bios*, compromises and ultimately annihilates action. Practical thought is of variable things, of possible ends that could be achieved. Subordinating practical thought to appetite twists the ability to envision the range of possible ends into cunning compulsion.

While despotic rule is natural under some conditions, no people is *turannikon*; in other words, no people has a natural disposition for tyrannical rule.[104] Privations are potentialities only *homonymously*.[105] People end up under tyrannical rule as result of their being abused by prior constitutions, which have failed to realize the human good. Similarly, the formal actualization of the human soul of the tyrant is such that what he brings about is further formal privation in the ruled; namely, their psychological deterioration. The vices of tyranny form the action and the character of the people. Wealth, pleasure, honor, and the psychological powers underpinning these goods become of ultimate value in a tyrannical regime. The tyrant manipulates his subjects by distributing and depriving people of such advantages in order to estrange them from each other, from authority, and from themselves, and in order to ensure their habitual enslavement to his rule.[106]

The *bios* cultivated by tyranny also determines the possibilities for change. Tyrannies may be extreme, allowing minimal access to their institutions. As such, tyrannies are hated and despised and give rise to revolutions as the subjects, estranged from office and honor, become angry, fearful, ambitious, or contemptuous of the tyrant.[107] The worse the tyranny in terms of how much of the community it alienates, the more short-lived it is.[108] Aristotle's account of the "traditional way" in which most tyrants govern in their effort to preserve tyranny could be considered a forewarning to the tyrant.[109] Left to its own devices, the regime will change to either an oligarchy or a democracy, or one tyrant will replace another. The net psychological result remains the same: even as the people hate tyranny and the tyrant, they end up seeking appetitive and affective satisfaction, because their hatred and revolt cause them to assume the tyrant's distorted psychological configuration. Given its psychological antecedents, the oligarchy or democracy replacing tyranny would likely be extreme. Additionally,

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[104] *Pol.*, 1287b38–40.

[105] *Met.*, 1019b6–13.

[106] *Pol.*, 1314a25–29.

[107] *Pol.*, 1312b34–37. Tyranny can also be overthrown by an external force, by another regime (whether democratic or aristocratic), or by strife within the cycle of the tyrant himself (1312b1–10).

[108] *Pol.*, 1315b11–14. It is worth noting that Aristotle considers a regime lasting for a century short-lived.

[109] *Pol.*, 1313a34–14a29.

both oligarchy and democracy harbor tyrannical elements and can relapse to tyranny.

Usually, however, a number of the ruled are collaborators and sympathizers who share the power and the riches of the tyrant.[110] Even in tyrannies, there is a shared notion of justice, albeit perverted, as well as at least a modicum of friendship.[111] An even larger number of the population come to envy what the tyrant has. Tyranny is generically a monarchy, and monarchies are preserved as moderate kingships.[112] While *pambasileia* is the logical opposite of absolute tyranny, it does not follow that *pambasileia* is a feasible alternative to existing tyrannies. Ruling and being ruled are correlative powers. It is unlikely that a people who have suffered the psychological distortion of tyranny would accept the ruling and the noetically oriented, shared *bios* instituted by the preeminently virtuous king even if he were to manifest among them. For the same reason, it is unlikely that the regime could become an aristocracy or a polity.

Aristotle's concept of the reciprocity between the powers to rule and to be ruled could account for his aversion toward revolutions.[113] Overthrowing the tyrant would violate his supporters' sense of justice and would generate resistance. More importantly, the people would lack the character and the appreciation of psychological capacities necessary for immediate transition to one of the proper constitutional forms.[114] Securing the stability of the existing constitution is a crucial first step toward genuine reform to a healthier constitutional type. Aristotle focuses on the formative power of political institutions as the most effective means of correcting constitutions, and he gives advice about policies that will preserve not only democracies and oligarchies but also tyrannies.[115]

Accordingly, Aristotle's suggestions in the *Politics* aim at shifting existing tyrannies to their feasible better type. Tyranny cannot become kingship but—this is an important qualification—it can at least appear to be like kingship.[116] The virtues are habits

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[110] Aristotle therefore emphasizes the importance of the monarch's guard in, e.g., *Pol.*, 1285a24–29 and 1286b35–40.

[111] *EN* 1161a10–14 and 1161a30–35.

[112] *Pol.*, 1313a18–20.

[113] *Pol.*, 1301a38. The virtuous do not proceed to violently overthrow any regime, even if they are the most justified to do so.

[114] For an attempt to explain Aristotle's preservation of tyrannies, see R. Bodeus, "L'attitude paradoxal d' Aristote envers la tyrannie," *Tijdschrift voor filosofie* 61, no. 3 (1999), 547–62, who sees in Aristotle's suggestions regarding tyranny an emphasis on popular consent and, consequently, an anticipation of social contract theories and of modern participatory democracies. A. Rosler, *Political Authority and Obligation in Aristotle* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005) also attributes Aristotle's reluctance to advocate resistance to the political extremism of Aristotle's times (255).

[115] *Pol.*, 1310a13–36.

[116] *Pol.*, 1315b5–12.

acquired by practice.[117] By acting as if he were virtuous, the tyrant might come to see more than the apparent good. Even though Aristotle does not make the case explicitly, he could be guided by his trust in the inherent pleasure of natural fruition, which the proper actualization of psychological powers brings about, rather than his Machiavellianism. More than anything else, the tyrant would experience the pleasure of more genuine friendship.

The people, however, would unquestionably profit from the tyrant's half-wickedness or half-virtue. Their resulting virtue would be actual and not merely apparent. Provided that a stable enough constitution is in place, one that orders institutional pursuits and psychological activities more appropriately to the human soul, the conditions will be present for further incremental transformations to other better forms. Aristotle's suggestions create the conditions for change not as the result of passionate reaction, but as an affair of and for the sake of deliberation and action by focusing on psychological remedy, which requires institutional means. Even if constitutional stability is present, one should be ready for a very long haul.[118] The goal of correction, which is the psychological reorientation of the members of the political community, requires generations to take hold.

Conclusion

Pambasileia is a constitution to the degree that ruler and ruled acknowledge that the opportunity for the best life is the *pambasileus*'s rule. The mutual acknowledgement makes them a community reasoning about ends. *Pambasileia* is a proper constitution to the degree that, by participating in the institutional arrangement of the king's rule, community members engage in psychological functioning driven by noetic actualization, which is the common interest and advantage. However, the conditions necessary to institute and maintain the constitution are extraordinarily rare. Tyranny proper is even rarer. The regime is constitutional negation: the absence of community and of the capacity for deliberation and action in both ruler and ruled.

In the *Politics*, Aristotle accounts for deviant constitutions by deriving their definition and analysis from an understanding of constitutional norms, which are prior and better known. The order of being and understanding, however, reverses the order of experience and is further from it.[119] Experience does not yield pure constitutional forms.[120] Nevertheless, constitutional forms are principles of understanding and action. They enhance understanding by illuminating the trajectory of human potential and guide political action by directing the course of political change. In effect, as schol-

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[117] *NE.*, 1103a32.

[118] *Pol.*, 1289a1–5.

[119] *APo.*, 71b33–72a6.

[120] The most empirically oriented classification of constitutions appears in the *Rhetoric* (I.8) and lists four constitutional forms (1365b29–30).

ars have noted, Aristotle's analysis of *pambasileia* challenges most claims to absolute authority. On the other side of the spectrum, Aristotle's analysis of tyranny challenges most political liberators, who usually promote their own appetitive and passionate agendas.

Aristotle's insights regarding monarchy illuminate aspects of political life at large in a unique way. The ruling element of political communities is ultimately the set of psychological capacities their institutions advance. Accordingly, the indispensable political questions for every political community are: Which psychological powers are given reign collectively? and By which institutional means? Because the institutions included by the *polis* activate the diverse human psychological powers, the political organization of institutions determines the psychological functioning of its members and their attainment of the human good. The capacity for deliberation requires more than participation in deliberating institutions, even if such institutions are pluralistic. *Logos*, in its various manifestations, functions properly on condition that it is not treated as an instrument—namely, when it is valued and desired as the good (*prakton*). A life of communal deliberation therefore requires political action that constructs all its institutions so that they cultivate the desiring and choosing of *logos* along with, yet prior to, everything else.

Under these terms, Aristotle would be a qualified pluralist, advocating a plurality of goods, ends, and pursuits, the goodness of which is determined not only independently but also by their contribution to the actualization of *logos*.[121] Aristotle's politics can exclude community members from rule, but the exclusion is bound by inclusion in the nurturing and cultivating nexus of institutional activities. More importantly, exclusion from rule due to lack of excellence can be justified only if access to cultivating excellence, a task that involves all the institutions of the *polis*, is made available to all.[122] Politics is famously the art of the possible. For Aristotle, human possibility, more than restriction, is the teleological horizon of the potential of the human soul beyond accommodation of contingencies.

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[121] C.D.C. Reeve, "The Naturalness of the *Polis* in Aristotle," in G. Anagnostopoulos (ed.), *A Companion to Aristotle* (Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 512–25 makes a case for a multiplicity of goods toward which human life can legitimately aim. He also finds that Aristotle's identification of the human good with practical activity or theorizing clashes with the facts (519–20).

[122] Aristotle's treatment of slaves, women, and laborers is often a matter of concern in scholarship. As discussed earlier, Aristotle is never in favor of abrupt political transitions because of the time and effort required to achieve the psychological reorientation of the members of political communities.

ARISTOTLE'S WONDERING CHILDREN

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Abstract

Wonder is undoubtedly a term that floats around in today's academic discussion both on ancient philosophy and on philosophy of education. Back in the 4th century B.C., Aristotle underlined the fact that philosophy begins in *wonder* (θαυμάζειν), without being very specific about the conditions and the effects of its emergence. He focused a great deal on children's education, emphasizing its fundamental role in human beings' moral fulfillment, though he never provided a systematic account of children's moral status. The aim of this paper is to examine, on the one hand, if, to what extent, and under what conditions, Aristotle allows for philosophical wonder to emerge in children's souls, and, on the other hand, how his approach to education may shed light to the link between wonder and the ultimate moral end, i.e. human flourishing. We will, thus, 1) try to offer a unified outlook of the philosopher's views on children's special cognitive and moral state, and 2) illustrate how wonder contributes in overcoming their imperfect state of being.

Introduction[1]

It is beyond controversy that wonder is given much attention in today's academic discussion on ancient philosophy and on philosophy of education. Plato is the first great philosopher who points out that philosophy begins in wondering.[2] Aristotle follows his teacher in taking wonder to be the very beginning of philosophy. Wonder is inseparably connected to *aporiai*, meaning the philosophical puzzles that one confronts while contemplating a subject.[3] The person who wonders considers attentively the

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[2] *Theaet*. 155d.

[3] *Met*. I 982b12-28.

perplexities and the contradictions of his subject, and his contemplation comes with astonishment and awe. For Aristotle, wonder has a specific cognitive character. It entails one's awareness of his own ignorance and his simultaneous direction to knowledge. He who wonders is able to use his rational capacities and move from ignorance to knowledge.

Aristotle never provided a systematic account of children's moral status and neither did he explicitly illustrate if and how children are able to experience wonder. However, he dwelled on their education and emphasized its role to human beings' fulfillment. In this paper we examine, on the one hand, if, to what extent, and under what conditions, Aristotle implies that education has the power to invoke philosophical wonder in children's minds, and, on the other hand, how his approach to education may shed light to the link between wonder and the ultimate moral end, i.e. human flourishing.

Aristotle shares with his teacher, Plato, the understanding of education's crucial role in the attainment of human flourishing (εὐδαιμονία). He illustrates that moral education, which co-occurs with cognitive development, consists in transforming children's natural dispositions into stable virtues of character through habituation. Given the fact that children's rational capacity has not yet been activated, children cannot experience wonder properly. Until they enter the process of education, they remain *pre-wondering* beings or, in other words, they are *potentially* wondering children. What we suggest is that *wondering* children are those who enter the educational program, and 1) carefully observe and reflect on the various particulars they perceive with their senses at the beginning of the inductive method, and 2) thoughtfully examine the particular moral actions they are encouraged to perform during their habituation. In the course of the educational program, children develop an imperfect kind of character friendship with their educators, whom they may even come to appreciate as moral models. They are continuously engaged in discussions with them concerning at first the application of the set moral standards and then the contribution of the latter in their own fulfillment as human beings. Wondering children are, thus, those who, not only find themselves in the transition from mere living (ζῆν) to—as Aristotle would hope—living well (εὖ ζῆν), but also those who are on their way to understand the difference between these two kinds of living.

Following the above sketchy description, our paper will examine Aristotle's perspective on children's wondering nature, the latter being indissolubly related to the long process of their cognitive and moral development. At the same time, we will designate wonder as the crucial experience that motivates human flourishing in the direction of the excellence of reason.

I.   Children's Cognitive and Moral Conditions for Wondering

Let us first query whether the practice of wondering is applicable to children. As we mentioned before, a certain development of intellectual skills allows for wonder to appear in an individual. Therefore, the inquiry regarding wonder in children presupposes an examination primarily of children's cognitive state, and, in turn, of

their moral condition, which is essentially determined by the presence or the lack of knowledge. The Aristotelian account of human soul is presented both in the *Nicomachean Ethics* and the *De Anima.* Desire (ὄρεξις), which is the source of soul's motivation, functions either rationally or irrationally. A soul in which the rational part prevails stays still and calm. Aristotle points out that knowledge consists in a restful state of the soul and it is wrong to associate it with any kind of movement.[4] At this point, the inference about children's cognitive deficiency is noteworthy: it is obvious that children lack knowledge, because we see them being in endless motion and unrest.[5] In *Politics* I 1260a10-14, we encounter a similar remark about their cognitive state. There, Aristotle compares children to slaves and women, and claims that all parts of the soul (both the rational and the irrational ones) are present to all of them.

Aristotle asserts that children's cognitive condition specifies their moral status. Since children are deprived of the rational capacity (λόγος), their behavior is dictated by senses. As a result, they are motivated by the irrational part of their soul; they constantly pursue pleasures and seek to satisfy their insatiable desires.[6] In the *EN*, Aristotle identifies the rational character of deliberation (βούλευσις) and choice (προαίρεσις). Deliberation is the attentive examination of the given facts, which prepares human soul to make a decision and choose an action. Choice follows deliberation in selecting the final action among various alternatives.[7] Given that reason is absent from children's soul, the capacities of deliberation and choice are also absent. Therefore, children cannot engage in any deliberations or choices, and they are not able to reason about final ends. What is more, their lack of the capacity to choose implies lack of moral virtues. A moral virtue, as Aristotle defines it, is a disposition that is chosen for its own sake. Additionally, if a human being is not able to make a choice, then she cannot be morally virtuous either. Moral and intellectual virtues consist of an indissoluble unity, which means that the lack of one implies the lack of the other.[8]

Meanwhile, children possess natural dispositions. Natural virtues are the admirable dispositions (ἕξεις) that all animals, humans included, bear right from their birth.[9] These natural features, like courage, justice and intelligence, do not have a specific ethical quality. They fluctuate between good and evil, but often are able to function as inclinations towards the good. Given that they are not supervised by reason, these dispositions operate as raw, mechanical impulses, and can sometimes be harmful. A child who behaves courageously does so due to his natural attraction to actions of this sort; an attraction that motivates the child to act courageously at random. However,

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[4] See *Phys.* VII 247b14-25.

[5] See ibid. 247b25-248a3.

[6] See *EN* III 1119b5-8; VII 1152b19-20; VII 1153a32-37.

[7] See ibid. III 1113a10-11; VI 1139b4-5.

[8] See ibid. VI 1144a36-b1; VI 1144b30-1145a2; X 1178a16-19.

[9] See ibid. VI 1144b3-17.

she does not evaluate, deliberate or choose her action as a properly virtuous person would do. Proper virtues are settled dispositions that determine people's choices and actions by necessity. The fact that children possess natural dispositions is indicative of their resemblance to beasts and slaves. In the *EN*, Aristotle draws a parallel between children and beasts.[10] Children's moral state is similar to that of beasts, given that they both bear inherent, natural dispositions which define their behavior. They both pursue pleasures, and specifically the harmful ones.[11] They also perform voluntary actions (ἑκούσιον), but are not capable of choosing them, because they lack προαίρεσις. Furthermore, children are morally analogous to slaves. Children, just like beasts, share with slaves the feature of behaving out of irrational desire and not out of deliberation and choice.[12] Both children and slaves are considered to be parts of their masters and not free moral agents.[13]

And here lies the problem: for Aristotle, wonder has a very specific cognitive character. He who wonders looks thoughtfully at a subject, feels confused and astonished, and is eager to get to know it. Given that children are deprived of cognitive skills and moral virtues, how are they capable at all of experiencing wonder and moving from ignorance to knowledge?

II.   Children as Pre-Wondering Beings

Although children lack rational capacities, they carry a fundamental tool of knowledge: senses. Aristotle's thesis on the significant role of the senses in reaching knowledge, specifically in grasping the universal principles through the method of induction, is clear. In the first book of the *Metaphysics*, the philosopher argues that all people desire knowledge by nature. This is the reason why they take delight in their senses, and especially in the sense of sight.[14] Within the process of acquiring knowledge, senses are explicitly described as the initiation phase.[15] The philosopher illustrates the importance of senses with an impressive statement in the *Posterior Analytics*: "Sense perception is the innate faculty of discrimination in humans".[16] Children cognitively stand exactly where senses lie: on the very starting point of knowledge. Now a crucial

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[10] See ibid. III 1111a24-27; VI 1144b3-17. Also, *HA* VII (VIII) 588a17-b4 and *Phys*. II 197b7-8.

[11] See *EN* III 1119b6.

[12] See ibid. 1111b8-11. See, also, *EE* II 1224a24-30.

[13] See *EN* V 1134b10-11; *Pol*. I 1254a8-11.

[14] See *Met*. I 980a21-24. See Mary Michael Spangler, *Aristotle on Teaching* (Lanham/New York/ Oxford: University Press of America, 1998), 105. Spangler, following Thomas Aquinas, explains people's natural desire of knowledge in terms of their natural desire to reach perfection, and specifically, of the inclination of the potential intellect to become actual.

[15] See *Met*. I 980a28-981a7. And *An. Post*. II 99b35-39.

[16] *An. Post*. II 99b35-36, trans. Hugh Tredennick & Edward Seymour Forster (Loeb Classical Library, 1960).

question can be articulated. How are children going to be detached from the irrational world of appetites and psychic disturbances? Under what conditions will they get provoked by the complications they encounter to make a move forward, wonder, and direct themselves to knowledge?

In *Politics,* Aristotle acknowledges that the deliberative faculty (βουλευτικόν) appears incomplete or undeveloped (ἀτελές) in children's souls.[17] The inadequate presence of the deliberative faculty implies here that reason is not completely absent from children's souls; in our reading, it exists in children's souls *potentially* (δυνάμει).[18] The potential existence of reason in children indicates that reason exists in a subordinate and undeveloped way, in contrast to the complete, mature way in which something fully functional exists. At the same time, reason's existence in a state of *potentiality* "promises" that it will eventually enter its complete existence, i.e. it will be *actualized.*

The assumption that children participate in reason *in a potential way,* that is by having the incomplete capacity of deliberation, allows us to query whether children are eligible at least for some kind of virtue.[19] The philosopher argues that children cannot be virtuous in the same way perfect adults are. Proper virtue occurs in excellent souls, but children's souls have limited capacities. The poor participation of children's souls to reason can only justify their limited approximation to virtue, which can be comprehended again in terms of *potentiality*. Children's possession of natural dispositions cannot justify an eternal similarity between them, beasts and slaves. To the extent that children possess natural dispositions *at present* (κατὰ τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον), they resemble beasts and slaves. But as potential bearers of the full virtue that they will acquire *in the future* (τῶν ὕστερον ἕξεων ἐσομένων), they bear a similarity to full-fledged human beings.[20] Children's natural dispositions place them only temporarily in the inferior position of being morally similar to beasts and slaves. Their *natural virtues* can at the right time be transformed into *full, perfect virtues*. As excellent traits of human character, they are expected to be developed after natural virtues are cultivated and rationalized. In children, virtue merely exists in its imperfect version as *potentiality*, while in educated full-fledged moral agents, full virtue exists in its perfect version as *actuality*.

Aristotle states that when a living being is born "it starts at something and grows towards something else";[21] specifically, it moves towards its future end, which is dictated by its nature. Both intellect and virtues, when in the state of *potentiality,* are children's *powers* which are going to be activated at the right time. Children are

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[17] See *Pol.* I 1260a10-14 and, also, VII 1334b23-25.

[18] See Charlotte Witt, *Ways of Being: Potentiality and Actuality in Aristotle's "Metaphysics"* (Ithaka/London: Cornell University Press, 2003), 7-11, 38-39 and 45.

[19] See *Pol.* I 1259b30-35.

[20] See *HA* VII (VIII) 588a30-b1.

[21] *Phys.* II 193b16-18, trans. Philip Henry Wicksteed & Francis Mcdonald Cornford (Loeb Classical Library, 1957).

thus gifted with all the powers needed,[22] so that they can become what their human nature determines. What is implied here is that children are not going to live forever in the immature cognitive and moral state of the senses. They are naturally inclined to achieve the fulfillment of their human essence. Children are not identical to beasts and slaves, but not to mature free men either. They are transitional beings, driving towards their physical, intellectual and moral completion. For as long as they are children, they live their proper lives *potentially*, and they possess *powers* awaiting to be *actualized.*

However, there might be a more precise depiction of children's lives. Children are full of motions. Every actualization process is a motion. According to Aristotle's definition in *Physics* III, motion is an *incomplete entelechy*, because all through its duration the potentialities have not been actualized yet.[23] It stands to reason that children can be described as living in this *incomplete entelechy*. Having some of their powers active and others inactive, they move continually towards the perfection of their natural properties. The *incomplete entelechy* signifies that children are in continuous motion, on the way to their achievements. If wonder presupposes cognitive skills and intellectual virtues, and if children are potentially knowledgeable and virtuous, then it goes without saying that they are *potentially wondering beings.* Children's potential wonder is not sufficient in order to render them *wondering beings.* However, we do not err in saying that children are *pre-wondering beings.* If certain conditions are met, potential wonder will be actualized. Hence, it is time to pose the question: how and when does this actualization occur?

The key to identify how children's wonder is able to flourish is their *reason-responsive soul.*[24] In humans the *generally desiderative* (ὅλως ὀρεκτικόν) part of the soul, although irrational by its nature, is capable of obeying to reason and it can be trained to harmonize with it.[25] What exists potentially must be brought to actuality by something already actual.[26] Thus, the student who possesses potential knowledge will move to actual knowledge under the conduction of someone who actively knows.[27] Children's obedient response to parental guidance and to tutors' instructions verifies that the irrational part of a human soul can be persuaded and ruled by reason.[28] The

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[22] See Rebekah Johnston, "Aristotle's *De Anima*: On Why the Soul is Not a Set of Capacities," *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 19/2 (April 2011): 185-200. Johnston argues that, while human soul possesses inherent powers, defining soul as a coherent whole of powers would be contrary to the Aristotelian statement that soul is *entelechy.*

[23] See *Phys.* III 201b30ff. See, also, *Met.* IX 1048b28-35.

[24] We are borrowing the term *reason-responsive soul* from: Kristen Anne Inglis, "Aristotle on the Virtues of Slaves, Women and Children" (PhD diss., Cornell University, 2011), 14-15.

[25] See *EN* I 1102b13-1103a3; X 1180b3-7. Also, *EE* II 1220a10-11; *Pol.* VII 1333a16-18.

[26] See *Met.* IX 1049b24-26.

[27] See Spangler, *Aristotle on Teaching*, 5.

[28] See Sarah Broadie, *Ethics with Aristotle* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 63.

voice of the reason in charge of illuminating the irrational desire can be either external in the case of children who conform to the rational instructions of their parents and teachers, or internal in the case of adults who follow their reason instead of the tempting directions of their desire.

The reason-responsive soul of children, together with all the intellectual and moral powers it includes, explains why children are capable of following an educational program. The educators possess knowledge *actually*, and they are able to assist young pupils activate their powers and drive them to advanced knowledge. It is within the educational process that children experience wonder for the first time, when they are called to contemplate a problem and deal with its difficulties.

It is now obvious that children's ability to wonder is inextricably connected to their inherent inclination to respond to reason and be conducted from *natural* living to *rational* living, i.e. from living under the strong influence of emotion (κατὰ πάθος) to living under the command of their reason (κατὰ προαίρεσιν).[29] Their potential of advancing in knowledge and reaching the moral completion that befits free full-fledged humans is what makes them stand out as the very special beings who can achieve the transition from an irrational life to a life which is regulated by reason.

The expectation of children's cognitive and moral development inevitably stimulates our next inquiry on the methods and the purposes of children's education. We will now elaborate on the process of the education that Aristotle visualizes for children and attempt to trace the instances of wonder that children may experience throughout their evolution and in their relation to their tutors.

III. Becoming Wondering Pupils

As we mentioned above, children, qua human beings, have the disposition to overcome their natural state of character (φυσικὴ ἀρετή) and acquire virtue in the proper sense (κυρία ἀρετή). In order that one be properly virtuous, one must develop the fluctuating natural character traits towards the right direction, and at the same time acquire the intellectual virtue of practical wisdom. In the integration of character virtues and practical wisdom (φρόνησις) lies the essence of human virtue, which is manifested in the deliberative choice of the right goal and the right means to pursue that goal.[30] Human life is defined by the *rational activity of the soul*, and, more specifically, the rational activity of the soul that is in accordance with *perfect virtue* (τελεία ἀρετή).[31] The complete human being is the virtuous human being, and the virtuous human being is the one that aims primarily not at mere living (ζῆν) but at

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[29] See Gavin Lawrence, "Acquiring Character: Becoming Grown-up," in *Moral Psychology and Human Action in Aristotle,* eds. Michael Pakaluk & Giles Pearson (UK: Oxford University Press, 2011), 233-83, esp. 236-7.

[30] See *EN* VI 1144a6-8.

[31] See ibid. I 1097b23-1098a16; 1102a5.

living well (εὖ ζῆν).

But, is moral development a natural process? In other words, do all children reach, in virtue of their nature, a human being's full actuality? Aristotle, in *EN* II, is absolutely clear about that: "moral virtue comes about as a result of habit […] none of the moral virtues arises in us by nature; for nothing that exists by nature can form a habit contrary to its nature". Accordingly, regarding intellectual virtue, he states: "intellectual virtue owes mainly both its birth and its growth to teaching (for which reason it requires experience and time)".[32] Human beings must, along with the natural process of their biological development, undergo an educational process of character and intellectual cultivation as well, in order that they become fulfilled human beings and not human beings only by name. Moral development consists, in fact, in the unification of virtues of character and intellectual virtues—especially that of practical wisdom. What we assert here is that wondering is introduced in the above integrative process of education as a crucial factor for its progress. As soon as they are introduced in this process, which is for the most part a long process of habituation, children are *ready to experience wonder*.

Habituation starts already in early childhood within the household and involves the gradual transformation of the unstable natural dispositions into stable dispositions of character; the latter become eventually a human being's "second nature." By repeatedly performing particular good actions, under the constant guidance first of their parents and then of their teachers, who transmit morally good standards, children are trained to act like virtuous people do. For example, they acquire some familiarity with justice by performing a series of just actions under various conditions. Such a concept of moral habituation coincides with the description of the *inductive* process of cognitive development in *An. Post.* II 100a3-8. According to that passage, it is through the experience of particulars that people are led to the perception of the universal, i.e. of what is common to many individual cases, and, furthermore, to the grasp of its essence. Wonder emerges during the cognitive phase of induction.[33] When children perceive external objects through their senses, educators prepare them to go beyond their sensory perceptions, use their memory to retain their representations, create a unified experience of them and finally arrive at the universal principles.[34] In the very beginning of induction, wonder is plausibly stimulated by the educators. The pupils are called to deal with a problem presented by their tutors, linger on its difficulties and contemplate its complications. As they confront their *aporiai* with astonishment, they actualize their progression to knowledge.

At the same time, during the phase of habituation, pupils become acquainted with virtue as a fact that they do not question. They learn to perform like actions one

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[32] Ibid. II 1103a14-19. Trans. (modified) David Ross and rev. James Opie Urmson (*The Complete Works of Aristotle*, 1984; sixth printing with corrections, 1995).

[33] Spangler, *Aristotle on Teaching,* 121-2 and 157.

[34] Concerning induction, see *An. Post.* II 99b35ff.

after the other, reflecting only on what connects and differentiates those particular actions. It is only later that they acquire a unified perception of the instances they have experienced so far, moving thereby into a deeper comprehension of what they have been doing all this time. By performing just actions, for example, children progressively understand why their actions have been just and why they have been acting like just people essentially do.[35] In other words, children gradually move from knowing *that* (τὸ ὅτι) towards knowing *why* (τὸ διότι) something is virtuous, or towards grasping the essence of their good actions. The end of the moral educational process is, thus, identified with the condition of human beings that a) have knowledge of what they do, b) choose their actions for those actions' own sake, and c) act out of a firm state of virtuous character.[36]

Children's engagement in the process of habituation requires that their cognitive capacities be activated in addition to the capacities of the sensitive (αἰσθητικόν) and desiderative (ὀρεκτικόν) faculties of their soul. In *EN*,[37] the desiderative faculty is characterized as the irrational part of the soul that participates πως (in a way) in reason, on the grounds that it has the tendency to be "persuaded" by the power of reason, which is progressively activated later in people's life.[38] Although children, as bearers of the desiderative faculty, are motivated only by what is pleasant (ἡδύ), by cultivating the potential of their rational faculty in the direction of virtue, they will eventually manage to bring the choice of pleasant into line with the choice of good.[39]

The establishment of the above harmony between pleasant and good is first pursued through imitation, which is at the same time a source of pleasure and a medium of learning.[40] *Imitation* of good actions is significantly involved both in children's play

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[35] James G. Lennox, "Aristotle on the Biological Roots of Virtue: The Natural History of Natural Virtue," in *Bridging the Gap between Aristotle's Science and Ethics*, eds. Devin Henry & Karen Margrethe Nielsen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 212. Lennox describes, quite comprehensively, the above process as follows: "This process of education and training is a matter of being encouraged to perform the actions that their caretakers know to be the just, temperate, or benevolent actions on each specific occasion. Gradually, children learn to use their own developing practical intelligence to determine (now for themselves) the appropriate actions and reactions to the concrete situations in which their lives consist and thus learn to integrate, as their caretakers have, practical intelligence and virtue of character. They now have a state expressed in deliberative choices to act and react in the manner defined by the person of practical intelligence; that is, they now have complete virtue".

[36] See *EN* II 1105a30-33.

[37] See ibid 1102b28-1103a19.

[38] See *Pol*. VII 1334b24-25.

[39] On the rearrangement of the three motives of choice in the soul of the virtuous human being, see Myles F. Burnyeat, "Aristotle on Learning to Be Good," in *Essays on Aristotle's Ethics*, ed. Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 69-92.

[40] See *Poet*. I 4 1448b5-9.

activities (παιδιαί) and in their musical education. At a very early age, children are encouraged to perform good actions through playing games based on imaginary situations and stories; these actions are *imitations* (μιμήσεις) of the good actions that they are expected to perform when they become adults.[41] In like manner, when, at a later age, they are exposed to musical compositions, they are also exposed to *likenesses* (ὁμοιώματα) of all kinds of character traits and their corresponding actions. By listening to and performing the right kinds of musical representations, they become habituated to delight in the virtuous character qualities and noble actions. Thereby, they will come, in the end, to get pleasure from the actual virtuous qualities and actions.[42]

Moral practice through habituation, even within the context of imitation we described above, does not occur on the basis of a blind repetition of like actions, and, thus, can scarcely be mechanical. Instead, as Sherman insightfully points out, the repetition is "critical."[43] More specifically, the particular actions can by no means be identical, since on most occasions different conditions are encountered, which in turn call for different responses. In a sense, most particular cases are deviations—no matter how slight they may be—from the exemplary type, while other cases may be outstanding exceptions. Children are constantly invited to practice their judgment. They perceive, compare and classify the various cases of the particular virtuous actions, and explore the limits of the acknowledged moral standards. The gradual development of their cognitive capacities in parallel with the continuing moral practice enable children to act by having their eyes fixed on virtuous goals, and, on account of the instructions they are being given, to decide how to apply their increasing experience and knowledge to concrete cases.

However, the pattern very often changes, leaving children in a state of wonder (ἀπορία). In such instances, children are puzzled at how they should act and whether this or that course of action is the right application of the model they have in mind. The most natural and reasonable way to overcome such recurrent moments of bewilderment is to address their *aporiai* to their educators.

IV.   Children as Wondering Friends

The medium of communication between children and the adults most proximate to them, i.e. parents and teachers, is λόγος/speech. The "sharing in speech and thought" (κοινωνεῖν λόγων καὶ διανοίας) is what makes the fundamental difference between

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[41] See *Pol.* VII 1336a29-34.

[42] See ibid. VIII 1339b11-1340b29. These two habituational practices are thoroughly discussed by Leunissen in Mariska Leunissen, *From Natural Character to Moral Virtue in Aristotle* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 116-23.

[43] Nancy Sherman, *The Fabric of Character: Aristotle's Theory of Virtue* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 179.

human beings' and other living beings' socializing activities.[44] The most worthy kind of sharing speech, which is peculiar to a full human being's nature, is not a kind of casual conversation, but a certain kind of fruitful conversation that improves human beings both intellectually and morally.

Engagement in such purposeful discussion is a significant element in Aristotle's conception of character friendship—the type of friendship founded on the recognition of the other person's moral goodness. In cases of perfect (τελεία) character friendship (ἡ τῶν ἠθῶν φιλία), conversation takes place between equal parties. Children and their parents are, nevertheless, bound with a particular type of character friendship, which is developed between unequal individuals.[45] And, although it is nowhere discussed in detail, a similar type of friendship, i.e. between unequal parties, is developed between educators and children. More concretely, children are indeed imperfect character friends, because they are not yet virtuous; they are still learners and, thus, morally and intellectually dependent on their superior friends. However, they can still participate in character friendship, as far as they are - or, at least, learn to be - associated with other people primarily in virtue of the good qualities of character that they recognize and admire (θαυμάζειν) in them, and not in virtue of mere pleasure and/or benefit.

In light of the process of habituation, the above kind of relationship with their educators forms a context in which children seem to unfold their wondering nature. Apart from setting the guidelines for the course of actions, educators (and parents) set moral examples by the way they themselves live and act. Children detect in their moral actions patterns and aspects of moral character, which they may come to admire. But it is mainly through conversation, which in the course of time becomes more and more challenging, that children move closer to the essence of virtuous actions, until they accomplish full virtue.[46] At this point, they will have already acquired the disposition to establish perfect friendships as equal, virtuous partners, who shape each other to such an extent that the one becomes the other's "other self."[47]

Discourses and presentation of arguments (and counterarguments), as well as lecturing by superior friends, are critical for the full comprehension of virtuous actions, but what is surely presupposed is the fact that the junior friends have been previously involved in a personal inquiry of the virtuous actions' characteristics.[48] Wonder-full education in Aristotle starts with a growing devotion to actions that express virtue and proceeds towards the firm understanding of what virtue is. Through habituation,

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[44] See *EN* IX 1170b10-14. A similar view is expressed in *EE* VII 1245a12-18. See, also, Anthony Kenny, *Aristotle on the Perfect Life* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 50-1.

[45] See, e.g., *EN* VIII 1158b10ff.

[46] On the method of dialogue between friends in Aristotle character education, see Kristjan Kristjansson, *Aristotelian Character Education* (London/ New York: Routledge, 2017), 123-7.

[47] *EE* VII 1245a30.

[48] Such human beings already have a kinship to virtue: "δεῖ δὴ τὸ ἦθος προϋπάρχειν πως οἰκεῖον τῆς ἀρετῆς" (*EN* X 1179b29-30). See, also, *EN* I 1095b3-8.

children form an intimate attachment to virtue, while, through discourses, they become motivated to reflect on the nature of virtue and on virtue's contribution to εὐδαιμονία. Wondering has a share in both the above methods adopted in education and is defined by the relation in which they stand to each other. Namely, the context of the discourses is, as we previously described, determined to a great extent by the course of habituation. One cannot simply persuade, via lecturing and argumentation, either a person with no previous attachment to good actions to be good or a person habituated to good actions to shift to bad habits.

Human beings brought up in good habits do not start from scratch; they do not actually wonder why a life in accordance with virtue is the life they should live. Such human beings are almost already convinced about the value of a virtuous life, i.e. the kind of life that pertains to their species, so that they do not need to explicitly ask why they should pursue such a life. The transition from the "that" to the "because" does not occur abruptly, but it happens continuously as the process of moral education takes place. Wondering, under these circumstances, does not really concern "why" questions but rather more refined "how" questions.[49] Namely, the person who attempts to understand why virtue is the most preferable way to the attainment of εὐδαιμονία, is actually the one who poses more advanced questions about how and under what conditions any human being should generally proceed in life in order to flourish; this is, most probably, the kind of young person Aristotle addresses in his ethical treatises.

Conclusion

All the above considered, we can infer that Aristotle assigns to wonder an active role. More concretely, when tracing the occasions of wonder in the educational process, we basically look at a state of mind that is expressed as an *aporia* or a series of *aporiai*. This kind of wonder signifies, not only a state of astonishment over the incomprehensible (θαυμάζειν), but also—and for the most part—a state of puzzlement (ἀπορεῖν) one tries to overcome by calling for clarifications and raising more and more specific *aporiai*. Wondering, in such a context, is experiencing a kind of productive embarrassment or uneasiness, which stimulates children's intellectual and moral inclinations to move towards a firm grasp both of the ultimate goal of human life, i.e. εὐδαιμονία, and of the means to achieve this goal in the most appropriate way to a human being's nature.

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[49] On that matter, see Sherman, *The Fabric of Character,* 193-7.

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CREATIVITY THROUGH LATERAL THINKING TECHNIQUES

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Abstract: Creativity is a developing topic in philosophy in recent years, and it raises a series of challenging questions both in theory and practice for us. In this paper, I will explore creativity with the lateral thinking techniques which aim to solve problems in a creative and lateral way. I will examine the meaning of lateral thinking and its three kinds, the conceptual lateral thinking, the emotive lateral thinking, and the diagrammatic lateral thinking, trying to find out how the space of possible solutions is affected by lateral thinking, which separates the creative from the problem-solver.

Key Words: creativity, lateral thinking, emotive

Creativity now is developing into an influential topic in philosophy research, however, it has long been overlooked for many years or was limited to the fields of art or aesthetics.

There were different conceptions of creativity in different times. The pre-Christian understanding on creativity is the concept of genius, which was originally related with mystical powers of protection and good fortune. The Greeks put emphasis on an individual's Daimon (guardian spirit); by the time of Plato and Aristotle, creativity had a connection with madness and inspiration.[1] Plato's view on inspiration has had a profound influence for centuries, he thinks inspiration is from the divine being. In his dialogue, *Ion,* the poets and rhapsodes get inspiration from Muse and are taken as conduits for divine inspiration. As a result, this view on inspiration pushed creativity to the very edges of rational enquiry.

In Rome, the meaning of the concept of creativity began to become broader, because it was not only limited to poetry any more, but art was thought to share the divine inspiration and imagination as well, just like poetry. In the Christian period and Middle ages, the concept of creativity means God's creation, and art was not a domain of creativity, not even poetry.

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[1] Robert S.AIbert and Mark A.Runco. *A History of Research on Creativity.Handbook of Creativity,* Ed. Robert J.Stemberg. New York: Cambridge UP, 2009.16-32

The development of modern concept of creativity begins in the Renaissance, when people had a sense of their own independence, freedom and creativity, and they sought to give voice to this sense of independence and creativity. So creation began to be taken as one kind of ability of individuals, but not the from divine being.

By the 18th century, the concept of creativity was appearing more often in art theory, and it was linked with the concept of imagination. Hobbes was the first major figure to recognize the importance of imagination in human thought and how constructive it could be. His idea on imagination reappeared and was discussed during the Enlightenment. In the 19th century, art began to be recognised as creativity and it, alone, was so regarded. At the turn of the 20th century, discussions on creativity appeared in relation to the sciences and in even about nature.[2] Interest in creativity has been increasing since 1950s, when people began to do systematic research on creativity; since then, many different definitions for creativity have been proposed, focusing on creativity's two characteristics: novelty and usefulness.

From the history of creativity, we can see that people's view on the source of creativity has undergone a process of demystification, from depending on divine source to creative initiative. From ancient Greece, when people thought human creativity was dependent on divine source, such as the Muse, to the Enlightenment and the 18th century when people began to resist divine authority and nonscientific sources, and realized that it is their own right to explore the world without divine permission, people were inspired to think more independently and motivated to create. The meaning of creativity also is becoming broader; it is not limited to poems or art any more, rather it can be applied into many other different fields, like education, science and industry, etc.

Many philosophers in history also made comments on creativity, including Kant, who speculated that "since there can also be original nonsense, its [the genius'] products must at the same time be models, i.e. exemplary"[3] Two points can be seen in his comment on creativity: creative person should be able to produce original and valuable things. Besides the originality and value, the recent research highlighted that "surprising" should be included in the definition in order to exclude as creative something only slightly new.[4]

What is central to creativity is the subjects and their actions, who can be agents of creativity and consumer or evaluator of a product's creativeness.[5] This is what the

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[2] Tatarkiewicz Wladyslaw. *A history of six ideas: An essay in aesthetics*, The Hague: Nijhoff, 1980.

[3] Kant, I. *Critique of the Power of Judgment*. Trans. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2000

[4] Boden, M. *The Creative Mind: Myths and Mechanisms*. 2nd ed. London: Routledge, 2004 and Novitz, David. *Creativity and Constraint*. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77.1 (1999): 67-82

[5] Gaut, B. *'Creativity and imagination'. The Creation of Art: New Essays in Philosophical Aesthetics*. Eds. Berys Gaut and Paisley Livingston. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2003. 148- 73

project of C2Learn[6] exactly addresses, which aims to create a highly innovative digital gaming and social networking environment.

They look into the education from a holistic perspective, and try to help children become creators and evaluators of creativity, make them prepare well in an increasingly competitive society, and more importantly, trying to pass on some values to them, such as creativity. Also, they adopt practical ways to understand creativity, and learn the meaning of creativity from the creativity enhancing techniques. In C2Learn project, the development of lateral thinking techniques is one of the major methodological innovations, by making use of the subject to continuously participate in the practice of various communication modes and by allowing children's full cognitive ability to play a role in the creative process.

What is lateral thinking?

This term was promulgated in 1967 by Edward de Bono. Lateral thinking aims to solve problems with an indirect and creative approach.[7] It is different from the traditional step-by-step logical way of thinking; rather it uses reasoning that is not directly obvious and involves ideas that may not be accessible by traditional way of thinking. Lateral thinking is very different from the standard perception of creativity as "vertical" logic. Unlike critical thinking, which is primarily concerned with judging the truth value of statements and seeking errors, people use lateral thinking to move from one known idea to create new ideas. The basic rule of creativity through nonlinear thinking is to proceed by analogy. There are three basic tools in lateral thinking: abstraction, comparison and reconceptualization. Lateral thinking is different from linear thinking, because it fully engages the imagination, and trains us to realize and overcome our invisible thinking habits or bias, which are usually ignored by us. What is most often connected with lateral thinking is the phrase of "thinking out of the box", which, suggests that we always confine our thinking within unidentified and hidden boundaries produced by our thinking habits or bias in our usual reasoning patterns. Lateral thinking can help us recognize and overcome those thinking boundaries, though they have never really existed.

There are some techniques helpful to understand the mechanisms of lateral thinking, for example, the conceptual lateral thinking techniques. However, we will not just work on the conceptual lateral thinking techniques in this paper, we will also try to extend these techniques, by introducing the players' emotional abilities and developing two new types of lateral thinking: the emotive thinking and diagrammatic thinking. Furthermore, we will explore the fundamental principles directing lateral thinking to expand in these two new directions.

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[6] European Union, http://www.c2learn.eu/

[7] De Bono, E. *Lateral Thinking: A Textbook of Creativity.* Penguin, 2009

Conceptual lateral thinking

Conceptual lateral thinking is based on the properties of the problems and possible solutions, with using concepts and linguistic formations. There are four basic techniques in the conceptual lateral thinking.

We call the first type of technique "random stimulus", and its main principle is to introduce an external conceptual element to disrupt those prejudged notions and habitual thinking patterns and the participants are forced to use the external element when creating solutions.

After learning the problem, the player is given a random stimulus and asked to use it creatively when reasoning or imagining. We usually think an intermediate step including a bridging idea is involved in this process. Although the idea is not the solution that we are looking for, there is an analogical link between the stimulus and the problem, which will be used to create an idea solution.

The external conceptual element should be introduced randomly, which can also stimulate creativity. It is important to use a random stimulation generator here, by combining different domain. This technique disrupts, adapts and exploits the formed ideas, which is the spirit of the technique. Many different things can be candidates of random stimulus, a picture, word, rule, text, analogy, etc.

The second type of technique, re-contextualization, is related with the Random Stimulus, but also contrary to it in many ways, because the established ideas and solutions are used in this technique and it tries to develop the potential of familiarity in new environment and produce new ideas.

Therefore, after the problem is introduced, the player has to search for a proper candidate as an established idea, and then tries to re- contextualize the familiar solution to the problem in the new environment. The familiar established solution will be applied to the new and unfamiliar environment, therefore, the familiar but new application will promote innovation.

The third type is escapism, and the main principle of it is that the temporary escape from the established will not only contribute to the creation of new ideas, but also make the environment of the problem more localized and focused. In this stage, the player needs to imagine some elements of the world, which can range from simple facts, to basic natural principles or ethical and social norms. Those elements is where the problem is situated in. And then the player will build a temporary solution, which will work as a model or basis of inspiration for the real solution to follow.

The last type is role-playing, which is based on daily experience or intuition. The change of perspective can lead us to new paths for a problem, and also can let us know our limitation in our way of seeing that we have already got used to.[8] The player in this stage is asked to play a different role and try to solve the problem from the new

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[8] Carruthers, P. *The Architecture of the Mind: Massive Modularity and the Flexibility of Thought* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006

perspective with new solutions. What is important for the player is that the player realizes the new opportunities or limitation that this new role may have. Here, we do not need to specify what the role is, because there is no limit to what the role should be, and it is just a tool to make a change of perspective.

Emotive lateral thinking

Emotive lateral thinking tries to increase the possibilities of solution by identifying and assessing emotional influence of changes in ethical or social norms, which will produce the possible solution in the relevant audience.

The recent discoveries in neuroscience provide us the basis of this approach, which claim that the influence of the world on our emotion is the basis of our understanding of the world.[9]

Compared with concepts, emotions are more primitive, so we usually think that our actions are always affected by emotions pre- conceptually, and emotions can also operate potential similarities, comparisons and analogies. In turn, the concepts can classify and manage our emotional responses.[10] We take the community and its social practice and norms as the foundation of the meaningful solution space, according to Wittgenstein's approach to meaning.[11] In addition, the study of artificial intelligence shows that emotion plays an important role in a language's semantics.[12] Therefore, emotions and norms are what we will work on for our research on creativity. Generally speaking, emotive thinking is usually a kind of thinking that occurs when a person thinks about how to act or make a decision.

How these findings can help shape creativity enhancing techniques requires introducing the distinction between first and second order emotive thinking can help to understand this question. The first order emotive thinking refers to the agent's own recognition of emotional stimulation or the agent's own emotional states, which means the objects and situations in the world have emotive value, and it is essential for agents to establish emotional equivalence and analogy between different objects and situations. Compared with the first order emotive thinking, the second order emotive thinking is that the agents recognize others' emotional stimulation or emotional states. The second order emotive judgment can be made by the creative agent to see whether target audience can accept the change in norms. The agent can also assess the potential

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[9] Damasio, A. *The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness*. New York: New York: Harcourt., 1999

[10] Damasio, A. *The Somatic marker hypothesis and the possible functions of the prefrontal cortex*. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Science, 351 (1346), 1413-1420, 1996

[11] Wittgenstein, L. *Philosophical Investigations*. Wiley-Blackwell, 2009

[12] Stenning, K. *Seeing Reason: Image and Language in Learning to Think*. Oxford Cognitive Science Series, 2002

of a given solution more accurately and move through analogical solutions by the practice of identifying emotional equivalences.

By radically changing the meaning of what a solution is, through a better understanding of the original semantic directors, this transformative creativity tries to create a new solution. A very well- known example of such emotive lateral thinking is the Judgment of Solomon. The King Solomon resolves a dispute successfully over the parentage of a child by calling for the child to be cut in half, and rightly making his second order emotive judgment by recognizing the emotional reactions from both sides of the dispute.

Diagrammatic Lateral Thinking

Diagrammatic lateral thinking is lateral thinking by means of visual representations of related topics, and the possibility of creating analogical solutions.

Our society is not of a single model any more, but rather, it is becoming more and more multimodal. Text is not the single way to convey information, and the image is playing a more and more dominant role now. We are surrounded by images, from all kinds of signs to digital icons and they have already become an essential part in our daily life.

The first step to look for a solution with the diagrammatic lateral thought is to be familiar with the grammar in the image, and we also need to interact with the image and extract its structure. Three levels of interaction can be built in this whole process.

We should firstly take an image as a simple operator and make a rule in the text, for example, converting a symbol to another, and the text is related with an image-operator. Selecting the right image-operator is the exercise for the task, however, we cannot take this level as lateral thought, yet, though it lays the foundation for deeper connection with the image's structure.

In the second level, we try to train the lateral thinkers to start to see the analogy between situations based on the image structure, by giving the player a situation or relation, and the player will be asked to choose or create an image best showing the situation or relation. The player has to explain why he or she chooses or creates that for this image, which is very important for this task. Then the player will be asked to think of a different situation or relation, which can also match the same image well.

The last and the most comprehensive level is to give the player a problem and then ask him or her to find a solution with the structure of the image as an analogical guide. The skills acquired in the first two levels must be used in this process. These three levels are very different from simple inspiration, because there is close and detailed connection with the image's inherent structure, which is achieved by questioning which helps the player have a deeper understanding of the picture's grammar.

LEIBNIZ ON ORDER

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a. The Basic Leibniz's Premises

There are three distinct levels constitutive of the Leibnizian philosophical system. These levels are the ideal, the real and the phenomenal. In the first one can find all the ideal entities, such as space, time, number etc., in the second belong the Leibnizian monads together with their representational states and the third is the realm of what appears to us as belonging to the spatio-temporal reality. The objective of this paper is to discuss certain aspects of the phenomenal level as they are related to corresponding aspects of the level of the real. More specifically, to discuss the notion (or notions) of "order" as well as the corresponding Leibnizian "principle of order" or, equivalently, "the law of order". We will also consider some of the contents of the first level, that is, of the level of the ideal which play the role of the abstract fabric our theoretical framework for describing the general features the world is made of. In this framework, it is important to notice that such Leibnizian ideal entities as space and time lack unitary and substantial referent in the sense that what Leibniz calls "space" and "time" at the phenomenal level are correspondingly the sets or the collections of spatial relations (that is of coexistence) and the sets or the collections of temporal relations (that is of succession). As a matter of fact, Leibniz thinks that such collections are manifestations of the ordered way this phenomenal world of ours is made of. In a short passage from a letter to Des Bosses, dated July 16, 1712, he states that:

> …space is the order of coexisting phenomena, as time is the order of successive phenomena[1].

And again in a letter to Nicolas Remond, dated March 14, 1714, talking about the "composition" of the continuum, he states that:

> The source of our difficulties with the composition of the continuum comes from the fact that we think of matter and space as substances, whereas in themselves material things are well-regulated phenomena and space is exactly

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[1] See L. E. Loemker (ed. and trans.) *Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: Philosophical Papers and Letters*. D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1969, p. 604 and C. I. Gerhardt, *Die philosophischen Schriften von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz*. In 7 volumes. Weidman, Berlin, 1875-1890. Vol. III, p. 450. In the sequel, we will be using the abbreviations L for L. E. Loemker and G for C. I. Gerhardt.

the same as the order of coexistence, as time is the order of existence which is not simultaneous[2].

The next question we are faced with is what are the contents of the Leibnizian levels of the real and of the phenomenal in his tripartite metaphysics. The level of the real is filled only with monads which are not empty shells, but simple substances containing once and for all their total point of viewish history of the world. What the monads really do is to represent all the other monads as representing so that, at the phenomenal level, to see one and the same world perspectively. The following quotation from Leibniz's work *The principles of Nature and of Grace Based on Reason* is quite revealing:

> *Simple substance* is that which has no parts. *Compound substance* is a collection of simple substances or monads…2. *Monads* having no parts, can neither being formed or unmade. They can neither begin or end naturally and, therefore, last as long as the universe, which will change but will not be destroyed. They cannot have shapes, for then they would have parts. It follows that one monad by itself and at a single moment cannot be distinguished from another except by its internal qualities and actions and these can only be its *perceptions* – that is to say, their representations of the compounds, or of that which is without; in the simple – and its *appetitions* – that is to say, its tendencies from one perception to another – which are the principles of change. For the simplicity of a substance does not prevent the plurality of modifications which must necessarily be found together in the same simple substance; and these modifications must consist of the variety of relations of correspondence which the substance has with things outside[3].

That the representational structure of the monads is point of viewish (i.e. perspective) and that such perspective viewing is of one and the same single universe is very clearly expressed in the following quotation from *The Monadology*:

> 57. Just as the same city viewed from different sides appears to be different and to be, as it were, multiplied in perspective, so the infinite multitude of simple substances, which seem to be so many different universes, are nevertheless only the perspectives of a single universe according to the different points of view of each monad[4].

An important question to be addressed at this point is what is the source of the mutual agreement of the representational structures of monads. In other words, since the contention of the perspective viewing of the same single world amounts to the perspective viewing of the same world of phenomena, what is the source of such unification and such a mutual agreement between the perspective viewings of the monads? The answer for Leibniz is that:

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[2] See L, p. 656; G, Vol. III, p. 612.

[3] See L, p. 636; G, vol. VI, p. 598.

[4] See L, p. 648; G, vol. VI, p. 616.

… such a harmonious agreement had to be pre-established by God, the benevolent creator who had freely chosen to bring into existence this best of all possible worlds[5].

As we have already said, at the level of the real we have only monads at particular representational states which are perspective viewings of the same single world. "Monads have no windows through which anything could enter or depart"[6]. They do not interact and they live in a world where the only activity is internal to them and concerns the automatic movement from one representational state, for each one of them, to a next one. According to Rescher:

… each individual substance is subject to a perpetual continuous change of state the only activity of which it is capable. Leibniz chooses to call it appetition, but connotations of this term toward some sort of active, conscious seeking or striving must be avoided[7].

To return back to the only source, namely God, of the mutual agreement of the representational structures of the non-interacting perpetual automata, that is to say, of the monads, we would like to point out that the real and the phenomenal levels of the Leibnizian system are in complete agreement, because they are in fact perspective replicas of relative ideas already existing in the mind of the Creator. In a passage from *The Leibniz-Clark Correspondence*, Leibniz's "Fifth Paper", he states that:

… God himself cannot perceive things by the same means whereby he makes other beings perceive them. He perceives them, because he is able to produce that means. And other beings would not be caused to perceive them, if he himself did not produce them all harmoniously and had not therefore in himself a representation of them; not as if that representation came from the things, but because the things proceed from him and because he is efficient and exemplary cause of them. He perceives them, because they proceed from him; if one may be allowed to say, that he perceives them, which ought not to be said unless we divest that word of its imperfection; for else it seems to signify that things act upon him. They exist and are known to him because he understands and wills them; and because what he wills is the same as what exists. Which appears so much the more, because he makes them to be perceived by one another and makes them perceive one another in consequence of the natures which has given them once for all, and which he keeps up only, according to the laws of every one of them severally; which though different from one another

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[5] See D. A. Anapolitanos, *Leibniz: Representation, Continuity and the Spatiotemporal*, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 1999, p. 9. In the sequel we will be using the abbreviation AN for D. A. Anapolitanos…

[6] See *The Monadology* L, p. 643; G, vol. VI, p. 607.

[7] See N. Rescher, *Leibniz: An Introduction into his philosophy*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1979, p. 7.

yet terminate in an exact correspondence of the results of the whole[8].

So God is the absolute benevolent creator and architect who can guarantee the existence of an external world of monads representing. He could not be a deceiver creating only us and making us represent in a vacuum of the other substances. That is to say:

> What we represent within has a solid basis, a solid ground without … Additionally, since what we represent is not responsible for our representation of it because every monad is windowless, self-sufficient and does not interact with others; God made a two-fold provision concerning the truthfulness of representations. First, we do correctly represent within things existing outside of us because both the thing represented and the thing as represented are the two faces of the same representable [pre-existing in God's mind] and second, the representations of all the representors, in normal circumstances, are coherently tied together by pre-established harmony[9].

b. The Leibnizian notion of order and his principle of order or of general order

As it has already been said, the Leibnizian world is tripartite. Its three levels are those of the real, of the phenomenal and of the ideal. The levels of the real and of the phenomenal are in agreement and such an agreement constitutes the basis of Leibniz's representational metaphysics of truth. At the level of the phenomenal, one can observe that a notion of "order" plays a quite central role. Everything appearing at that level belongs to a well-founded phenomenal reality, in the sense that nothing exists or takes place at the real level. The order of things or substances or events in the phenomenal world cannot be violated by facts or incidents of a disorderly nature. With the exception of miracles, which are, pre-established by God, breaks of a predominant given order, things at the phenomenal level exist and change regularly and consistently obeying to unchangeable laws.

Such a general notion of "order" takes a very specific form when it is referring to space and time. Leibniz usually defines time together with space. He insists that both are innate abstract representations or orders having to do with coexistence and succession, where by "succession" he means existence which is not simultaneous. Space and time belong to the ideal level of the Leibnizian tripartite metaphysics and constitute the basic ideal fabrique either of the world of coexisting phenomena or the world of successive phenomena.

We should, nevertheless, stress that, as it has already been mentioned, the usage

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[8] See H. G. Alexander (ed.), *The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence*, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1970, p. 84, and G, vol. VII, p. 411. In the sequel, we will be using the abbreviation A for H. G. Alexander …

[9] See AN, p. 11.

of the terms "space" and "time" by Leibniz when he is referring to the phenomenality of succession and coexistence is a little bit misleading, in the sense that these terms in that case signify correspondingly the sets or the collections of spatial relation (that is, of coexistence) and the sets or collections of temporal relations (that is, of succession). In a passage from Leibniz's "Third Paper" contained in *The Leibniz-Clark Correspondence*, he insists saying:

> 4. As for my opinion, I have said more than once that I hold space to be something merely relative as time is; that is, I hold it to be an order of coexistence as time is an order of succession[10].

A small remark should be made at this point. The best interpretation of the use of the term "relative" is that of relational in the sense that both phenomenal space and time as we have already seen can be considered as the sets or the collections of all possible relations of simultaneous coexistence or of, correspondingly, all possible relations of successions.

Between the two orders, that of simultaneous coexistence and that of succession, there are specific dissimilarities, three of which have as follows: (a) Phenomenal change has as its basic characteristic that of directionality. One can distinguish what has passed from what is going on now and from what is going to happen later. Formally, such a directed sequence can be expressed by the linearly ordered triad *before-now-after*. Such a characteristic of directionality does not exist in the case of phenomenal simultaneous coexistence. Our possibility to move from a spatial point A to a special point B in a straight line does not constitute directionality. (b) A second dissimilarity between the order of the spatially extended and the order of phenomenal change has to do with obvious differences concerning dimensionality. Phenomenal change can be expressed as a linear (i.e. one dimensional) actual continuum. On the other hand, the spatially extended, at any particular moment can be represented as a three-dimensional actual continuum. (c) The third important dissimilarity between the order of the spatially extended and the order of phenomenal change is that, although Leibniz's metaphysics does not allow the existence of vacua at the level of the phenomena, the verification and even the measuring of vacua (if vacua existed) in the three-dimensional phenomenal reality is possible with the same thing to be impossible at the level of phenomenal change. It is quite interesting that we find in the *New Essays of Human Understanding* the following passage:

> I will add a comparison of my own to those that you have given between time and space. If there were a vacuum in space (for instance if a sphere were empty inside), one could establish its size. But if there were a vacuum in time, i.e. a duration without change, it would be impossible to establish its length. It follows from this that we can refute someone who says that if there is a vacuum between two bodies then they touch, since two opposite poles within an empty

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[10] See A, p. 25; G, vol. VII, p. 363.

sphere cannot touch – geometry forbids it. But we could not refute anyone who said that two successive worlds are continuous in time so that one necessarily begins as soon as the other ceases, with no possible interval between them. We could not refute him, I say, because that interval is indeterminable. If space were only a line and if bodies were immobile, it would also be impossible to establish the length of a vacuum between two bodies[11].

Following the above quoted passage, we could additionally say that:

On the other hand, if vacua in space existed, they would be verifiable by experience, because a vacuum in one dimension could be empirically accessible, at least in principle, by an inspection via the other dimensions, i.e. by moving as it were, all around such a vacuum. What is interesting is that Leibniz holds that the non-existence of an epistemological access to temporal vacua is characteristic of phenomenal change's linearity only and has nothing to do with its other properties. In the case of one-dimensional spatial world, if vacua existed, they would not be empirically traceable or recognizable either. That is, linearity of such a world would necessarily imply the epistemological inaccessibility of spatial vacua[12].

In order to have a better view of the role the notion of "order" plays in the Leibnizian metaphysics, one has to consider his *principle of order* or rather his *principle of general order*. According to such a principle, this world of ours is an ordered world, a world, that is, hierarchical with no disorders which in the case of space and time would mainly mean the existence of vacua. The basic Leibnizian principles are (a) the principle of continuity (b) the principle of contradiction (c) the principle of the best (d) the principle of order or of general order (e) the principle of plenitude (f) the principle of sufficient reason and (g) the principle of the identity of indiscernibles. The principle of order or of general order is connected mainly with the principles of the best and the principle of continuity. According to the principle of continuity, which is the most important architectonic principle of the Leibnizian system, the world as it is represented by us and as it really is, is continuous. The following passages, the first from the *New Essays on Human Understanding* and the second from a letter of Leibniz to De Volder, dated March 24/April 3, 1699, are quite revealing:

Nothing takes place suddenly, and it is one of my great and best confirmed maxims that nature never makes leaps; which I called the Law of Continuity[13].

No transition is made through a leap … this holds, I think, not only of transitions from place to place, but also of those from form to form or from state to state.

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[11] See P. Remnant and I. Bennett (trans. and eds.) G. W. Leibniz: *New Essays on Human Understanding*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981, p. 155 and G, vol. V, p. 142. In the sequel, we will be using the abbreviation NE for P. Remnant …

[12] See AN, p. 139.

[13] See NE, p. 56; G, vol. V, p. 49.

For not only does experience confute all sudden changes, but also I do not think any a priori reason can be given against a leap from place to place, which would not militate also against a leap from state to state[14].

There is a third passage from the same letter to De Volder in which Leibniz tries to explain why his principle of continuity is metaphysically and aesthetically important:

This is an axiom that I use – no transition is made through a leap. I hold that this follows from the law of order and rests upon the same reason by which everyone knows that motion does not occur in a leap; that is, that a body can move from one place to another through intervening positions. I admit that once we have assumed that the Author of things has willed continuity of motion, this itself will exclude the possibility of leaps. But how can we prove that he has willed this, except through experience or by reason of order … why could God not have transcreated a body, so to speak, from one place to another distant place leaving behind a gap either in time or in space producing a body at A, for example, and then forwith at B etc.? Experience teaches us this does not happen, but the principle of order proves it too according to which, *the more we analyze things the more we satisfy our intellect*. This is not true of leaps, for here analysis leads us to mysteries[15].

According now to the principle of the best, the created world we live in is the best possible. Let us now see how Leibniz proves that this world of ours has to be governed by the principle of continuity. The principle of continuity is for Leibniz "a principle of general order"[16]. It is a consequence of the principle of the best that this world of ours is the best possible. Such a world has to be ordered in the best possible way. The best possible way of being ordered is the continuous one. So this world of ours has to be governed by the principle of continuity, since discontinuities are signs of disorder and imperfection. At this point, we should stress that the principle of sufficient reason is supportive for the principle of the best as we can assert through the following passage from *The Leibniz-Clark Correspondence*, Leibniz's "Fifth Paper":

… a contingent which exists, owes its existence to the principle of what is best, which is a sufficient reason for the existence of things[17].

c. Linear ordering and Cauchy completeness

As we have already seen, according to Leibniz, there exist at least two dissimilar kinds of order which, although continuous, are structurally different. The first one is exemplified by space as the order of coexisting simultaneous phenomena and the

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[14] See L, pp. 515-516; G, vol. II, p. 168.

[15] See L, pp. 515-516; G, vol. II, p. 168.

[16] See G, vol. III, p. 52.

[17] See A, p. 53; G, vol. VIII, p. 390.

second by time as the order of successive phenomena. The second is characterized by linearity and directionality, characteristics which cannot be found in the first kind. Both do share the property of being continuous which for Leibniz and the philosophers and mathematicians of his time was equivalent to density. That is to say, the property according to which, between any two points A and B of such orders there exists a third one C.

Before getting any further, let's look again at the Leibnizian principle of continuity as a principle of general order. Such a principle is absolutely characteristic of the Leibnizian metaphysics of an organizational and architectonic nature. It can be found to apply not only at the levels of the real and the phenomenal, but also at the level of the ideal. The following two passages, from a letter of *Mr. Leibniz … to the responses of the Rev. Father Malebranche*, are quite revealing:

> … a given ellipse approaches a parabola as much as is wished, so that the difference between ellipse and parabola becomes less than any given difference … and as a result all the geometric theorems which are proved for the ellipse in general can be applied to the parabola by considering it as an ellipse, one of whose foci is infinitely removed from the other or (to avoid the term "infinite") as a figure which differs from some ellipse by less than any given difference[18].

> … equality can be considered as an infinitely small inequality and inequality can be made to approach equality as closely as we wish[19].

That the principle of continuity is applicable even at the level of ideal is strong evidence to the fact that *order* is a universal characteristic of the Leibnizian metaphysics, since, as we have already seen, continuity is for Leibniz the best possible way to order a world.

To return back to our initial division of the two kinds of continuous order, we will focus our attention to the second kind, namely, the one exemplified by time as the order of successive phenomena. Such an order is linear and we can represent it as a real line if we wish to see what the basic characteristics of continuity are from an anachronistic modern point of view. It is a matter of fact to say that Leibniz favors linear continua in his treatment of the continuous. For instance, when he insists that «no transition is made through a leap» he supports it by the phrase «this holds, I think, not only of transitions from place to place, but also from form to form or from state to state»[20].

To repeat what was said before, the Leibnizian linear continuous ordering can be represented by a real line. What are the basic characteristics of the real line?

(a) *Linearity*: There is a binary relation called «less than» and an axiom

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[18] See L, p. 352; G, vol. III, p. 52.

[19] See L, p. 352; G, vol. III, p. 53.

[20] See again L, pp. 515-516; G, vol. II, p. 168.

characterizing linearity, according to which, given any real numbers A and B of the real line, one exactly of the three following sentences holds, «A is less than B», «A is equal to B», «B is less than A».

(b) Directionality: Given any three real numbers A, B and C of the real line, if «B is less than A» and «C is less than B», then «C is less than A».

(c) Density: Given any two real numbers A and B, there exists a third real number C such that A is less than C and C is less than B.

(d) Completeness (or Cauchy completeness): Every Cauchy sequence is convergent.

The first three characteristics are quite clear. Concerning the fourth one, we need some technical details, which, once given, we hope they will clear the ground. First, we need the notion of a sequence of numbers (real numbers, rational numbers or whatever). A sequence of numbers starts with a first one, a_1, and it continues so that, for each natural number n, to have the number a_n, which belongs to the sequence. A sequence a_1, a_2, …, a_n, … is convergent[21] to a number a if and only if for every interval which has as its center the number a finitely many members of the sequence remain outside the interval. A sequence a_1, a_2, …, a_n, … is Cauchy if and only if the difference of a_n-a_m, as the n and m tend to the infinite, is a sequence converging to the number 0. A set of numbers is Cauchy complete if every Cauchy sequence is convergent. Concerning the relation between density and Cauchy completeness, we should say that it can be easily seen that convergent sequences are Cauchy. It is a fact that:

> Both density and … Cauchy completeness are properties of … the real line… That the property of Cauchy completeness is not a consequence of density can be seen quite easily. It is enough to show that there is a mathematical structure, wherein density holds and .. Cauchy completeness fails. The real line contains proper subsets which, considered by themselves, constitute such structures. The most familiar example is that of the set of rational numbers. A *rational* is any real number which can be expressed as m/n, where n≠0 and m,n are integers with no common divisors except 1. The set of rational numbers is dense … without being complete. For instance, we can construct a Cauchy sequence of rational numbers having as its limit the irrational … real number $\sqrt{2}$[22].

We should add one more technical detail before returning to Leibniz. *In the real line the Cauchy sequences are convergent.* Leibniz was not fully aware of Cauchy completeness as a characteristic of continuity. For him, continuity was a basic property of this world of ours, which is ordered in the best possible way, meaning density. Nevertheless, there is a passage from a letter to Pierre Varignon written in 1702, where

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[21] In a much stricter way, a sequence of numbers a_1, a_2, …, a_n, … is called convergent, if there is a number a such that the following holds: $\forall\varepsilon\exists n\forall m(m>n \rightarrow |a_n\text{-}a| < \varepsilon)$. A sequence of numbers a_1, a_2, …, a_n, … is called Cauchy, if the following holds: $\forall\varepsilon\exists n\forall m\forall k(m>n \wedge k>n \rightarrow |a_m\text{-}a_k| < \varepsilon)$.

[22] See AN, p. 71.

definite traces of the property of Cauchy completeness can be found:

> … I think I have good reasons for believing that all the different classes of beings whose assemblage forms the universe are, in the ideas of God, who knows distinctly their essential gradations, only like so many ordinates of the same curve whose unity does not allow us to place some other ordinates between two of them, because that would be a mark of disorder and imperfection. Men are therefore linked with the animals, these with plants, and the latter directly with the fossils, which in their turn are linked with those bodies which the senses and the imagination represent to us as perfectly dead and formless. Now the Law of Continuity demands that when the *essential determinations of one being approximate those of another as a consequence all the properties of the former should also gradually approximate those of the latter*. Hence it is necessary that all the orders of natural beings form but a single chain in which different kinds like so many links clasp one another so firmly that it is impressible for the senses and the imagination to fix the exact point where one begins or ends; all the species which border on or dwell, so to speak, in regions of reflection or singularity are bound to be ambiguous and endowed with characters related equally to neighboring species. Thus, for example, the existence of Zoophytes, or as Buddaeus calls them, Plant-Animals, is nothing freakish, but is even befitting the order of nature that there should be such. So great is the force of the Principle of Continuity in my philosophy, that I should not be surprised to learn that creatures might be discovered which, in respect to several properties, for example, nutrition or reproduction, could pass for either vegetables or animals, and that would upset the commonly accepted rules based on the assumption of a perfect and absolute separation of the different orders of simultaneous creatures that fill the universe. I say I should not be greatly surprised, but I am even persuaded that there ought to be such beings which Natural History will someday come to know when it will have studied further that infinity of living beings whose small size hides them from ordinary observation and which are buried in the entrails of the earth and in the abyss of the waters[23].

Looking carefully at the above passage, it is almost obvious that it is not density at the forum as the basic characteristic of the actual linear continuum of beings. It is not Cauchy completeness either in its full generality. Nevertheless, there exist obvious particular traces of Cauchy completeness. What Leibniz states is that there are two sequences of beings converging from opposite directions towards a common point which is unknown whether it exists or not. At exactly this juncture says Leibniz there is not an empty space. We do not have to do with a hole in the linearly ordered chain

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[23] See P. P. Wiener (ed.) *Leibniz: Selections*, Charles Scribner and Sons, New York, 1951, pp. 186-188, A. Buchenau (trans.) – E. Cassirer (ed.) *G. W. Leibniz: Philosophische Werke*, in 2 volumes, Meiner, F., Leipzig, 1924, Vol. II, pp. 558-559.

of beings. We do not even need to rely on empirical grounds in order to say that such a hole does not exist. Following Leibniz, we can be assured the force of the Principle of Continuity is so great that in the linear ordering of beings the Cauchy sequences of the plants and the animals are convergent with their point of convergence being a Zoophyte.

SETS AND NECESSITY

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Abstract

This paper addresses the issue of the metaphysical status of sets and their interconnections. It discusses a foundational approach of the iterative set theoretic hierarchy comparatively to a regressive approach. Then it takes under consideration some naturalistic accounts of set theory and presents certain difficulties naturalism faces. It claims that the ontological status of sets should be dealt with in non-naturalistic terms and suggests that the issue in question could rather be placed in the context of a metaphysical discussion concerning abstract objects. So it investigates the operation '*set of …*' as governed by necessary ontological dependence. After comparing some of the platonistic views S. Cowling (2017) has discussed, it proposes one of them as an appropriate account of sets as abstract objects with a modal status.

1. Introduction

Although, the concept of set has rigorously been defined in the context of Zermelo-Fraenkel set-theory, it initially originated from unrefined intuitions about *collections*. A natural collection is taken to gather together objects that already exist and may belong to different kinds. For example, we can form a collection of two oranges, one chair and three books. A relative, yet different, notion is that of a *class* which is regularly defined on the basis of the unrestricted "principle of comprehension". For example, the predicate 'a student in my classroom' defines the *class* of all students in my classroom. We say that the objects that constitute the class in question satisfy the same property or *fall under* the same concept (: "student in my classroom"). However, the unrestricted use of the principle of comprehension was eventually regarded as responsible for certain results that caused the well-known uneasiness in mathematics in the beginning of 20th century. For example, if a class emerges as the class of all objects satisfying a certain property then Russell's paradox can be derived. Take the case we state the class a of all classes x that satisfy the property '$x \notin x$'. If a∈a then a∉a because a is a member of a hence it should satisfy the supposed property. If a∉a then a satisfies the property in question so it should be a member of the set a, i.e. a∈a. The illness of the paradox was definitely cured by the axiomatization of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory since the axioms enclosed safe ways of defining sets. Nonetheless, scientific notions in general become rigorous only in the contexts of certain theories because the meanings

of scientific terms are determined by means of the strict role those terms are purported to play inside the intellectual environment of theories. Similarly, the set theoretical notions have acquired their rigorous meanings in the context of mathematical theories e.g. ZF set theory. This paper deals with the issue of the metaphysical status of sets and their interconnections.

2. Justification of set theoretical axioms

Iterativeness is a notion that concerns the hierarchy of set theoretical levels. It starts from the level V_0 that includes all objects ("atoms") that are not sets and proceeds with V_1 which includes all atoms and sets of atoms. That is, V_1 is $V_0 \cup P(V_0)$[1]. We go on stating sets of all objects which are available on previous stages. So V_2 is the union $V_1 \cup P(V_1)$ etc. In general, $V_{\alpha+1}$ is the union $V_\alpha \cup P(V_\alpha)$ (*a*: ordinal). According to J. Ferreirós (2016, 286), the procedure in question safeguards the existence of the sets used in mathematical practice as well as the endorsement of higher cardinals.

The determination of set theoretical relations and interconnections is possible on the basis of iterativeness however, there are various philosophical accounts of the relations in question. According to mathematical platonism, the interconnections of sets follow certain ontological characteristics of them. Hence, the existence of every set in the hierarchy is justified by certain metaphysical conditions that define its interconnections with those sets that precede it. The iterative hierarchy is taken to describe the set theoretical mathematical reality. M. Potter (2004, 39) notes that according to mathematical platonism, the restrictions that rule the set theoretical hierarchy have a metaphysical status since they stem from the very nature of sets and the necessities ruling their relations. In similar lines, ∅. Linnebo (2017, 149) remarks that the iterative hierarchy leads us to "deep metaphysical paths" by building up a theory with explanatory strength. It appears that there is a kind of metaphysical necessity which requires that sets in one stage could not exist without their members occurring in previous stages. So the operation '*set of …*' is governed by necessary ontological dependence.

In addition, Gödel's platonistic inclinations are well-known. He regarded sets as abstract entities and thought that the elementary axioms of set theory are "forced upon human mind" (Benacerraf & Putnam, 1983, 484). Axioms regularly are supposed to have a special epistemological status and formulate basic mathematical beliefs which are self-evident and not reducible to other primitive beliefs. This is due to a kind of intrinsic persuasiveness they hold themselves. Further, certain inferential correlations (deductive relations) connect axioms with theorems. Foundationalists insist in the supposed evidence of axioms and maintain that there is no need to prove that mathematical axioms *are* true. On the contrary, if one doubts their truth then she should provide a proof of their falsity. Besides, Gödel as well as Descartes regarded intuition as an intellectual ability by which humans acquire mathematical elementary

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[1] $P(V_0)$ is the power set of V_0

beliefs. Intuition is usually taken to be an analogue to sensual perception. Yet the role of mathematical intuition has been undermined by some philosophers of 20th century (e.g. C. Chihara (1982) and P. Benacerraf (1973)) who characterized it as a flabby explanation or a rather obscure faculty. On the other hand, J. Brown (1990) and J. Katz (1995) defended intuition on the grounds of the alleged analogy between it and perception as two distinct cognitive skills the one concerning perceptual experience, the other concerning elementary mathematical knowledge. Furthermore, J. Bengson (2015) made an attempt to clarify the function of intuition as a representational skill about which never an adequate epistemic account was given. He argued that intuition works appropriately in certain cases, e.g. the case we grasp transitivity of identity, the case we grasp necessary falsity of the contradiction «p & ﹁p» or the case we form the belief that every natural number has a successor. Bengson (2015, 715) held that intuition is not dependent on senses and it differs from sensory perception, since it does not concern only singular states of affairs as, for example "this apple is identical with itself", but also general laws like "everything is identical with itself". Besides, he has stated that intuition operates by creating mental states which are not just *representational* but they are *presentational* too. A presentational mental state not only represents world as it should be so that the content of the state in question is true but moreover, it brings and makes the objects and states of the world present to human mind. Furthermore, he holds that mental states that originate from mathematical intuition, e.g. the intuitive grasp of the case that every natural number has a successor, *make* this fact *present* to our mind. So intuition is a process of epistemic access to basic mathematical beliefs. Axiomatization of set theory makes those beliefs clear and strict, whereas it corrects various ill formed principles like the unrestricted principle of comprehension mentioned above. With concern to the *intuitive* approach to axioms, M. Potter (2004) asserts that it invites us to clarify our conceptions of sets to such an extent as to determine the axioms those conceptions satisfy. If sufficient clarity is achieved then we trust the axioms in question and we acquire confidence in their truth and the truth of theorems that are derived so. The notion of intuition supports certain foundational accounts of set theoretical justification.

However, Gödel himself argued that set theoretical axioms of higher levels are quite remote and not accessible by means of our intellectual capacity of intuition. In this case, other criteria are needed to choose axioms. In mathematical practice, decisions concerning the choice of axioms which lack direct evidence are usually based on certain pragmatistic criteria according to a set of research targets and theoretical perspectives. So Potter discusses an alternative strategy of justification which he calls "regressive" that is not foundational. The *regressive strategy* regards the axiomatic base as successful in case it can produce theorems whose results are accepted on other mathematical grounds. It focuses its attention on the interconnections of our beliefs and the possibility they can form a coherent context. The justification of axioms is not based on any intrinsic evidence or intuitive force but it comes from their participation in a consistent theoretical context as well as their fruitfulness and usefulness. The

account in question reminds of the notion of *reflective equilibrium* which seeks to achieve coherence of a system of beliefs through a procedure of mutual adjustments and revisions (Williams, 2001). So Potter's "regressive" approach is pragmatic in principle and connected to a kind of justificatory coherentism. However, philosophers with realistic inclinations do not agree with this kind of approach to set theory. M. Tiles (1989) rejects justification which is based on fruitfulness of the concequencies of the selected axioms. In particular, she maintains that justification of set-theoretical axioms should be independent from their contextual interconnections and from the fruitfulness of their results.

3. Sets in the context of naturalism

This section concerns approaches to sets that have been developed in the context of naturalism. W. V. Quine placed mathematical beliefs inside the web of beliefs in a par with beliefs of other scientific areas. In Quine (1951), he rejected the distinction between the 'analytic' and 'synthetic' and condemned the conception of a priori knowledge. According to him, mathematical beliefs are a posteriori and revisable as all other scientific beliefs in the web. Yet, mathematical beliefs and logic are placed in the central area of the web so that any revision of them might cause considerable cost. So, revisions of scientific theories laying at the outskirts of the web, e.g. physical theories and theories of empirical sciences in general, are preferable than revisions of the central area. Further, Quine and Putnam defended mathematical realism on the basis of the "indispensability arguments". Mathematical entities like sets and numbers should be accepted as real in a similar way that non-observable entities of physical sciences are accepted. Both kinds of entities are indispensable to our best theories of the world. Hence, Quine is a realist concerning mathematical entities however, not of the traditional kind. He accepts exactly those mathematical entities that take part in certain applications of mathematics. An objection to Quine's naturalism concerns his claim that only those mathematical objects that are indispensable to scientific theories should be accepted in our ontology. This is an extreme position that could be omitted since, there are mathematical objects that do not take part in applications in general or they have not taken part in applications up to now. Some other naturalists, like J. Burgess, hold that mathematics possesses its own methods of confirmation and its own intrinsic criteria of evaluation of mathematical results and mathematical ontologies (Burgess and Rosen, 1997). The latter claim appears to be more appealing to mathematicians themselves who are not willing to be waiting for physicists to tell them which mathematical objects and mathematical truths should be accepted.

P. Maddy (1990, 1997) has defended the methodological and ontological independence of mathematics too. In her (1990), she defends set theoretical realism by taking sets to be real entities, causally active, laying in the space-time context. She holds that sets are responsible for certain mathematical beliefs we form, in a similar way that empirical objects are responsible for empirical beliefs. Her account presupposes that sets have physical objects as their members. For example, a set of one

apple, two oranges and three lemons is taken to be located in the very space where the fruits in question are located and it causes certain stimulations to our senses. Maddy endorses a kind of "impurely a priori" by regarding certain set theoretical beliefs coming from intuition and being mixed with perceptual elements. She takes sets to be spatio-temporal entities and argues that sets of medium-sized physical objects can be perceived in the same way as physical objects. On this account, children become able to classify physical objects in groups and re-arrange them by means of operations like union, conjunction and the operation of power set. Sets are stable and possess duration in time like physical objects (chairs, trees or tables). Maddy maintains that physiological accounts of perception concerning physical objects could allow for perception of sets of physical objects too. While a child acquires neurologically the ability to recognize a space-occupying "something", similarly she can form beliefs concerning sets of physical objects falling under operations like union and pairing. Nevertheless, mathematical intuition is taken to justify some basic axioms, however other axioms of higher levels of set theory are selected to the extent that they are able to systematize and explain lower level beliefs. Nonetheless, Maddy (1990, 1997) endorses two-tiered Gödel's epistemology according to which, some set theoretical axioms are justified intuitively, others hypothetically or theoretically by means of criteria concerning fruitfulness.

To sum up, Maddy (1990, 1997) endorses a posteriori mathematical knowledge in similar lines with Quine and believes that the existence of sets as real entities can be justified on the grounds of "indispensability" type arguments. Sets are indispensable to scientific theories so we accept them as real, analogously to non-observable physical entities. Furthermore, Maddy endorses a kind of monism in the context of which she is entitled to identify any empirical object with its singleton. So every individual object has both a physical and a mathematical aspect and further, the whole world has simultaneously a physical and a mathematical aspect. Suppose that x is an egg, then Maddy takes it to be identical to the singleton {x}. Nonetheless, such an identification is opposed to the axiom of foundation that excludes the case that a set *a* may belong to itself (i.e. for every *a*, $a \notin a$). However, Maddy maintains that the rest of the axioms (Subset, Pair Set, Union, Infinity, Replacement, Choice) stand fine and she concludes that the identification of individuals with their singletons is no serious obstacle to set theory. Besides, she rejects the real nature of the empty set and replaces the pure Von Neumann hierarchy by an *impure* hierarchy. The Von Neumann hierarchy begins with the empty set:

∅,   {∅},   {∅, {∅}},   {∅, {∅}, {∅, {∅}}}, …

Maddy proposes an hierarchy which begins with two distinct physical objects
p, q   (in this sense, it is characterized as *impure*):
{p, q},   {p, q, {p, q}},   { p, q, {p, q}, {p, q, {p, q}}}, …

One may notice that in both cases, every set has as members all the sets that precede it. However, the first case is based on the empty set whereas the second case is based on

a doubleton of discrete physical entities. The second hierarchy is naturalistic since it begins with a pair of physical objects (*impure hierarchy*). Nevertheless, Maddy (1990) admits the fact that the empty set is included in set theory just to make things easier, for example, if the empty set is accepted then the intersection of two sets is always defined even when they are disjoint. On Maddy's view, the empty set has no physical status but we may retain it just for simplicity in the status of a fictional element or as a mere notational convention.

To summarize, Maddy's sets are sets of physical objects, sets of sets of physical objects, sets of sets of sets of physical objects etc. Her account of monism makes set theoretical realism compatible with naturalism since world is regarded both as mathematical and physical. Everything physical is mathematical too and everything mathematical is grounded on physical staff. However, the alleged identification of a physical object with its singleton has been strongly criticized by some philosophers. C. Chihara (1982) questioned it on the grounds that the distinction between a physical object and its singleton may not be perceptual at all. According to Maddy, if x is an orange then it is identical to {x}, however the higher set {x, {{x}}} is not identified to any physical object. Yet she maintains that all sets in the alleged hierarchy have a broad naturalistic status. If x were distinguished from {x} then the latter should be regarded as fictitious so naturalistic set theoretical realism might fail. In addition, M. Friend (2007) criticizes Maddy's set theoretical naturalism by arguing that in the alleged relation between a physical object and its singleton, a very concept, the concept of set is interposed. To give an account of a singleton one should have independently, already, realized or formatted the conception of *set*. In similar lines, one might claim that singletons could be characterized as merely mental[2] or abstract[3]. The first set in the "impure hierarchy" might not have a naturalistic nature, moreover, the higher sets in the hierarchy in question may not be naturalistic too. In any case, naturalistic set theoretical realism faces certain problems concerning the controversial metaphysical status of the relation among a physical object and its singleton. Besides, its assertion that sets appearing in the "impure hierarchy" have a naturalistic status due to the physical members of the first set appears to be very defeasible.

4. *Sets as abstract objects*

Set-theoretical realism regards sets as abstract objects causally inert, without spatio-temporal location, independent of human mind. Realism is often associated to the reception of a kind of metaphysical necessity obtaining among abstract objects. According to Potter (2004, 39), realism holds that the restrictions that rule the set theoretical hierarchy origin from the very nature of sets as abstract objects and the necessities concerning their interconnections. Take the standard hierarchy $V_{\alpha+1} = V_{\alpha}$

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[2] Mental object: conceptual, something that exists just in thought

[3] Abstract object: an object that is regarded as spatio-temporally isolated and causally inert, however real (according to realism)

∪ P(V$_a$) (*a*: ordinal). Then the existence of every set in the hierarchy is determined by certain ontological conditions based on interconnections with those sets that precede. The operations of power-set and union rule the alleged necessary interconnections among the sets that precede and the sets that follow. So necessity is an important factor in our considerations about the metaphysical status of sets appearing in the hierarchy. The question that arises for the realist is whether each of the sets in the hierarchy has a necessary existence on its own.

Some philosophers, for example Humeans, reject all necessary connections. Against this opposition to necessity, a Platonist may set an argument that R. Cameron (2006) has described as following: we suppose that there could be nothing. If it is true that there is nothing then the proposition that *there is nothing* exists. Hence, something exists: a proposition. Yet, Humeans insist rejecting necessary existence as well as necessary connections. The so called "Hume's razor" imposes the task of avoiding multiplying necessities (Forrest, 1982). S. Cowling (2017, 202) makes an important remark. He notes that we can distinguish two kinds of necessities: the first is about necessary existence of abstract objects, the second concerns necessary relations among them. An example of the first kind is the supposed necessary existence of natural numbers. An example of the second kind is the following: if the number seven exists then it has a successor. This distinction is quite promising so far as we investigate the metaphysical status of sets taking part in our hierarchy. What kind of necessity if any, characterizes their existence? To deal with this issue, we will take in account some views about abstract objects and their metaphysical status Cowling (op. cit.) presents.

Cowling considers four Platonist[4] views about the modal status of abstract objects as following.

a. "*Immutabilism*" takes abstract entities to be *necessary existents* and the whole abstract reality is taken to be invariant. On this account, we might take the existence of sets to be necessary and their relations settled by the set-theoretical hierarchy stable and unchanged.

b. "*Systematic mutabilism*" regards the existence of abstract objects as dependent on certain concrete entities. In this case, the set {Socrates} depends upon Socrates. Nonetheless, concrete entities are contingent so the abstracta which depend on concrete entities should be regarded as contingent too. If applied to set theoretical realm, Systematic mutabilism reminds us of Maddy's account of sets according to which sets are dependent on members which are physical objects.

c. "*Serious mutabilism*" takes abstract entities to exist at only some worlds, however at any worlds where certain abstract objects exist, all connections among them and their properties hold necessarily. If this account is applied to sets then it is legitimate to maintain that sets are not necessary existents themselves but their correlations and interconnections are necessary in any world those sets exist.

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[4] They are characterized as "Platonist" in the contemporary sense of Mathematical Platonism according to which there exist abstract objects independent of human mind

d. "*Extreme mutabilism*" rejects all kinds of metaphysical necessities concerning abstract objects, their existence and their interconnections. That is, the existence of abstract objects is contingent and their correlations are contingent too.

As already noted, option b) reminds us of Maddy's approach whereas option d) favors contingency in all cases. So in what follows, we will take under consideration the options a) and c). The option a) might serve as an account of mathematical sets as necessary existents whose properties and relations are entirely fixed. Since abstract reality is regarded as non-contingent in nature, accordingly set theoretical reality should be taken to be invariant. Further, propositions concerning sets, for example, axioms and theorems, should be necessarily true since they describe necessary existents (sets) and their fixed properties. Hence, set theoretical realism regards the relations of sets in the standard hierarchy as necessary on the grounds of certain metaphysical properties of them. According to this strong version of set theoretical realism, the axioms describe set theoretical entities inside an abstract realm as well as their properties and relations. For example, the axiom of infinite makes a powerful assertion concerning set theoretical existence, the separation axiomatic schema makes another assertion etc. However, one may object that the application of *immutabilism* to the case of set theoretical realm faces some obstacles:

It appears that there are certain reasons to doubt that the mathematical realm is a fixed realm with necessarily existing inhabitants. To state this objection, let us consider the cases of a controversial axiom of set theory like the axiom of choice. Zermelo believed that such a fruitful axiom should be accepted and included. The axiom of choice states that if a is a set of non-empty and mutually disjoint sets then there is a set s that contains just one element from every set x that belongs to a. However, this existential assertion has provoked objections because the existence of the set in question is not obvious at all. Zermelo (1908, 187) defended the axiom in favor of its fruitfulness regarding set theory itself as well as other mathematical areas. Various mathematical propositions are related with the axiom of choice, e.g. Cantor's theorem on well-ordered cardinals and the comparatibility of them. There is a transfinite sequence of cardinal numbers:

$$0, 1, 2, 3, \ldots, n, \ldots; \aleph_0, \aleph_1, \aleph_2, \ldots, \aleph_\alpha, \ldots.$$

If the axiom of choice is accepted then this transfinite sequence includes every cardinal number. Nevertheless, some propositions of other mathematical areas either are deduced by the axiom of choice or are equivalent to it. For example: "Every vector space has a base", "The product of compact topological spaces is compact", "If every finite subset of a set of first order propositions has a model then the set in question has a model" etc. On the other side, those who rejected the axiom of choice maintained that since there is no way to define a function of choice in order to form the contentious collection of sets then the axiom of choice cannot be justified. For example, Lebesgue,

Baire and Borel believed that the existence of a set (like the above contentious *s*) depends on whether or not we possess a rule in order to define the elements of that set (cf. Maddy, 1990, 124). Nonetheless, it appears that the debate concerning the acceptance or not of the axiom of choice is based on a disagreement about whether the existence of the set *s* in question is either independent of human mind or a mental construction. For example, constructivists are suspicious of the assertion made by the axiom of choice since there is no constructivist way to define the choice function. However, at the end, fruitfulness of the axiom of choice established it as one of the axioms of ZFC theory.

In fact, in cases of controversial axioms like the axiom of Choice, a theorist has two paths to follow: either a) she accepts the axiom of choice and makes an extension of ZF theory by adding this axiom (: ZFC theory) to the other axioms or b) she rejects the axiom of choice and makes an extension of ZF theory adding the denial of the axiom (: ZF + ¬AC). Both theories are consistent if ZF is consistent. The decision in favor of the one of the two options might be made on pragmatistic grounds. However, a difficulty arises particularly for the proponents of set theoretical realism since they should be able to offer an account of about *which* of the two universes is *the real* one. Yet they have no such option since both "universes" are acceptable.

A similar case is that of CH (*Continuum Hypothesis*), the hypothesis that $2^{\aleph_0} = \aleph_1$ (the first infinite cardinal which follows $\aleph_0$ is the cardinal number of the continuum). In this case, we can extend ZFC towards two alternative directions: either a) we add CH to ZFC and form ZFC + CH or b) we add the denial of CH to ZFC and form ZFC + ¬ CH. Both extensions are consistent if ZFC is consistent. Then we can make up our minds on the basis of fruitfulness criteria and make use of that theory which is more fruitful than the other. Yet, again, realists are not able to meet the dilemma of about *which* of the two universes described by the two alternative theories is *the* real one. Gödel believed that an independent mathematical reality exists and the question about the truth or falsity of the Continuum Hypothesis should have a definite answer. Further, he thought that the axiomatic system of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory does not provide an adequate picture of the set theoretical realm: "…*It comes that set theoretical notions and theorems describe a well-defined realm in which Cantor's conjecture should be either true or false. Perhaps its un-decidability in our times might mean that those axioms do not provide a full picture of that realm*" (1947, 182-183 / 1964, 476). Nonetheless, CH remains an undecidable proposition in the context of ZFC theory.

On the basis of the above situation, the case for the realist cannot be successfully addressed except one endorses a *multiple* set theoretical realm in terms of M. Balaguer's (1998) *full-blooded platonism* or Ø. Linnebo's (2017) *"pluriverse view"*. In order to deal with undecidable propositions, the realist might accept the metaphysical claim that the set theoretical realm is constituted by many alternative universes so the theories ZFC + CH and ZFC + ¬CH describe different universes of the supposed realm. The case of the axiom of choice is similar since the theories ZFC and ZF + ¬AC should be taken to describe alternative universes of the set theoretical realm. Questions like

"which proposition is true? AC or ¬AC ?" and "which proposition is true? CH or ¬CH ?" should be addressed as stated in the context of the relative model, in connection with the appropriate domain. For example, AC is a true proposition with regard to certain interpretations/models of ZFC whereas ¬AC is true with regard to certain interpretations/models of ZF + ¬AC. Hence, the extensions of ZF towards either ZFC or ZF + ¬AC offer true descriptions of alternative set theoretical universes.

Granted that the difficulties against realism just described may be dealt with in the context of a *pluriverse* view, we may now decide whether the option a) or the option c) is the most appropriate for the modal status of sets. As we saw, the option a) about abstract objects as necessary existents of a realm with necessary relations would offer an account of set theoretical realm as stable and invariant. This description would be in tension with the situations just investigated concerning multiple universes. So I suggest that the metaphysical option which is most appropriate to the case of sets is c) i.e. "*Serious mutabilism*" (Cowling, 2017). As we saw, this option takes abstract entities to exist at only some worlds, however at any worlds where certain abstract objects exist, all connections among them and all their properties hold necessarily. If applied to sets then "*Serious mutabilism*" offers an account according to which sets are not on their own, necessary existents of a stable abstract realm but they still have some contingent status. However, at any universe where they exist, their properties and their interconnections hold necessarily. More explicitly, necessity of sets holds inside certain abstract universes. Hence, in cases which are controversial as the above exposed, we can regard sets as existing in certain alternative universes. In every such universe, properties and relations of those sets have a necessary status.

In conclusion we can favor the option c) about "*Serious mutabilism*" (from the four options that appeared above) in order to deal with the metaphysical status of sets as abstract objects.

5. Conclusion

This paper has discussed the metaphysical status of sets and their interconnections inside the iterative hierarchy. Set theoretical realism is a view that faces certain problems however, there are options to sustain a viable position for it. Naturalistic accounts are quite weak so a more strong metaphysical view is needed to support the existence of sets as abstract entities. However, as we saw, the set theoretical realm appears not to be a uniquely fixed one because of alternative situations concerning the choice of axioms. So an approach to multiple set theoretical universes should rather be endorsed. Set theoretical realism can rather be based on an account that allows alternative universes so that at any universe certain sets exist, their properties and relations hold necessarily. That is, necessity concerns rather properties and interconnections of sets inside a universe at which they exist, than the very *existence* of sets as entities themselves.

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THE PROSPECT OF 'HOPE' IN KANT'S PHILOSOPHY

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Abstract

This paper discusses Kant's prospect of 'hope' that entangles with interrelated epistemic terms like belief, faith, knowledge, etc. The first part of the paper illustrates the boundary of knowing in the light of a Platonic analysis to highlight the distinction between empiricism and rationalism. Kant's notion of 'transcendent metaphysical knowledge', a path-breaking way to look at the metaphysical thought, can fit with the regulative principle that seems favourable to the experience-centric knowledge. The second part of the paper defines 'hope' as an interwoven part of belief, besides 'hope' as a component of 'happiness' can persuade the future behaviours of the individuals. Revisiting Kant's three categorizations of hopes (eschatological hope, political hope, and hope for the kingdom of ends), the paper traces out Kant's *good will* as a 'hope' and his conception of humanity.

Key words: Kant; Hope; Good Will; Humanity; Summum Bonum; Kingdom of Ends

The question that initiates a debate in philosophy is: Why 'hope' becomes pertinent in Kant's philosophical milieu? Immanuel Kant, a revolutionary philosopher with his 'brilliantly dry style' (in Schopenhauer's sense) constructs philosophy in the fourfold cords upholding the following long debating queries:

a) What is a human being?

b) What can a human know?

c) What a human should act?

d) What may a person hope instead of believe?

All these questions are interrelated. This paper emphasises 'hope' and analyses its import in Kantian philosophy.

The Boundary of Knowing

The boundary line that Kant intends to draw, even in the case of knowledge, raises the following questions:
a) What can an agent know about the perceptual world or nature?

b) What can an agent know about the non-perceptual God, the ultimate substance?

In Platonic sense, the perceptual world cannot provide us with true knowledge and the awareness of the world is a kind of animal-like proclivity. But knowledge, as a particular insight of humans, makes a difference with the rest of the animals. Opinion, according to Plato, may present our world relating to the faxable beliefs[1], while knowledge makes us conscious of a super sensible external world that hints at the sublime truth. The object of perception seems a particular thing, but the object of intellect (obviously based on reason) concerns an immutable and real universal concept that reflects the idea of good as an ultimate source of all truths and goodness. Russell says, 'Philosophy, for Plato, is a kind of vision, the 'vision of truth'. It is not purely intellectual; it is not merely wisdom, but love of wisdom'
(Russell 1995, 138).

Before Kant, two dominating opinions that govern our European philosophical paradigm are familiar with rationalism and empiricism. The rationalists (Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz) believe in the reality that has an intrinsic logical structure tested by reasons. Rationalists who believe in Plato's *theory of knowledge* present that human mind have innate capabilities with certain indubitable ideas. The opponent empiricists (Locke, Berkley, and Hume) put forward a radical opinion that treats experience as the sole source of knowledge and concepts too as opposed to the intuitive knowledge or the superiority of reason-based knowledge that rationalists endorsed.

Kant, who was first motivated by Newton's scientific laws (1766), later realized that metaphysics cannot be suitable for the limited boundary of physics. In *Inaugural Dissertation*, Selection 2 (1770), Kant follows Christian Wolff's line of thought in defence of the metaphysical crew of thought is authenticated by the indisputable law of contradiction. However, this Wolffian stance later appeared to him as a dogmatic slumber that is broken by the thought of David Hume. Kant himself confesses:

> I openly confess that a reminder by David Hume was the very thing which many years ago first interrupted my dogmatic slumber and gave my investigations in the field of speculative philosophy quite a new direction. (Kant, *Prolegomena*, 159)

Kant tries to put Hume's quest for empiricism (it means without external reference, reason is unable to provide any insightful knowledge) on the foundation of the concept in association of the causal relation — a necessary connection linking the observed facts to the other- observed and unobserved facts, not filtered through logical reasons and intuitive ideas. As a matter of fact, Kant was dissatisfied with Humean empiricism as he was unwilling to confine himself in the domain of rationalism or empiricism. Kant prefers to consider empirical knowledge with an objective validity (depending on the pure concept of understanding) as *judgments of experience*, whereas empirical knowledge relates to the subjective validity (depending on logical tie to perception) is called *judgments of perception*. Kant's critical approach leads him to the transcendental idealism, a sort of Copernican revolution in philosophy. Lewis Beck clarifies:

> The content of knowledge, he (Kant) said, comes from experience (*a posteriori*); the formal structures and rules lie in the mind *a priori*, and the content conforms to the structures and rules, not the reverse. (Beck 1988, 10)

One can ask: Why does the 'transcendent' become indispensable here? We know that metaphysics present the conception of reason without basing on experience. If we intend to apply pure reason in the case of experience, metaphysics would be closer to science; besides, if we apply pure reason outside the physical objects, then it goes beyond the scientific assertions. The *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781) maintains that knowledge seldom transcends experience; yet in part there is an *a priori* knowledge that is non-conferred from an inductive experience[11].

The initial inquiry of Kant's philosophy outlines the question – what can we know? This seems an epistemic survey within the periphery of metaphysical sphere. Kant emphasizes two faculties of knowledge that he calls sensibility and understanding. Peter Strawson argues:

> He distinguishes between the *receptive* faculty of *sensibility*, through which we have intuitions, and the *active* faculty of *understanding*, which is the source of concepts. (Strawson 1966, 88)

Sensibility is a receiving faculty that copes with the space and time as pure intuitions, while understanding as a thinking faculty captures concepts. So, human reason is based on two interrelated elements of knowledge, namely contents (intuition) and concepts (thought). The possibility of experience remains unfeasible without intuition. The idea that Kant draws here in favour of the transcendent metaphysical knowledge relies on a particular belief that the metaphysical thought could be suitable for the regulative principle beneficial in the pursuit of experience basing on knowledge.

Beyond the Boundary

The outline of *Critique of Pure Reason* is in the nutshell 'thoughts without contents are empty; and intuitions without concepts are blind' (B 75). So, thought needs to be impregnated by the content of thought and there is no alternative way through which concepts can be instantiated in experience without being related to the space and time or in other words our sensibility. However it looks startling when Kant delimits 'belief' by regimenting it from knowledge. The concern 'what can I know?' that we prefer to know subsequently raises the other interesting questions like 'what may I hope?' (*Critique of Pure Reason*, A 805/ B 833).

Kant appreciates the rational belief, a belief that seems to be the foundational structure of our theoretical and practical knowledge. Beliefs may entertain all manners of things, but 'hope' becomes pertinent since an agent is unable to 'hope' for something only if s/he does not believe in that particular thing. Besides, we can believe in a particular thing without hoping to achieve it. It is true that hope and belief are interwoven in most of the cases, but for Kant, 'hope' always remains attached to happiness or the components of happiness. 'Hope' is a conditional aspiration that cares for something that is ought to happen.

'Hope' is not only a mere belief but a kind of belief that has the power to influence or motivate an individual's behaviour and thought. Kant says that hope is an 'unexpected offering of the prospect of immeasurable good fortune'[111]

We can highlight 'hope' in three different levels, maintaining Kant's thought. These are: Eschatological hope, Political hope, and hopes for the Kingdom of ends.

Eschatological Hope:

In *Critique of Practical Reason*, Kant hints at this kind of 'eschatological hope'. The 'eschatological hope' primarily brings about the conception of eternal life, and secondly, it deals with the *summum bonum*. Actually an eternal life is a kind of justificatory belief where hope takes a privileged stance. Kant concerns about this particular 'hope' since he was worried about the mere cherishment of the natural and moral laws that are only governed by the rational organized world. Kant argues that it may be true that God is not the moral governor of the universe, but the existence of God becomes a necessary condition to establish the model of *the summum bonum*. Therein lays the challenge when one argues that virtue may not be the cause or the effect of an individual's happiness. So the concept of the *summum bonum* seems to collapse. Kant's answer would be that we are not bound to do it for the sake of mere 'belief', whereas we must do it for the sake of 'hope'. One can 'hope' for a noumenal world where this necessary condition of the 'hope' turns out as a belief that may be feasible. The belief that aims to support an agent's 'hope' in favour of the *summum bonum* may induce an agent to assume that God must exist to dispense happiness for the virtuous acts. Critics may argue that the *summum bonum* thesis, in defence

of the 'hope' of happiness, dispels the autonomy of virtue by making it an incentive to virtue. It may be better to 'hope' for happiness on the earth instead of the moral happiness in the heaven. Kant's writes,

> Happiness, taken by itself, is, for our reason, far from being the complete good. Reason does not approve happiness (however inclination may desire it) except in so far as it is united with worthiness to be happy, that is, with moral conduct. Morality, taken by itself, and with it, the mere *worthiness* to be happy, is also far from being the complete good. To make the good complete, he who behaves in such a manner as not to be unworthy of happiness must be able to hope that he will participate in happiness. (Kant, 1929, 640)

It needs to be clarified here that Kant aims to discard any kind of superstition, fanaticism or non-moral arguments in defence of the existence of God; according to him morality is a moral law that is nothing but a divine command, an implementation of consecrated duty which His law obligates on us for guiding our morals. So, our eschatological 'hope' looks for a spontaneous moral improvement to achieve an eternal life following the divine command.

Definitely this quest depends on the transcendent world, which seems closer to religion. Still, Kant believes, in the worth of happiness as an issue pertaining to moral conduct since the concept of moral itself cannot be worthy of happiness. Happiness intends to fall within the domain of empiricism (psychological aptitude), while moral thinking relates to human reasoning. Morality is not a mean to getting happiness, but it looks for a rational condition of happiness without entangling the prudence of self-interest. What is a moral wish? Kant thinks that moral wish coupled with the moral laws stimulate the highest good (*Kingdom of end*) by discarding self-interest to perform duty for the sake of performing the same.

Political hope:

Kant likes to engage 'hope' not only in the pursuit of knowledge, but also in the sphere of politics. Metaphysics of politics is a consequence of all that the metaphysics of laws come to. Kant explicitly pursues political concerns in his different periods of writing like *What is Enlightenment, Ideal for a Universal History* (1774), *Perpetual Peace* (1795), *Metaphysical Elements of Right* (1797) etc. His political thoughts are tied up with his moral theories. Kant believes in the concurrence of metaphysics set off that is a sort of *a priori* principle of reason, which rudimentarily judges the worthy happiness or lawfulness of any political activity.

In *An Answer to the Question: 'What is Enlightenment?'* (Kant 2009), a well-known work, Kant talks about human's 'self-incurred tutelage', a kind of tutelage where reason is undirected by the resolution and courage. Kant says, 'Have courage to use

your own reason! – that is the motto of enlightenment' (Kant 1988, VIII. 35). Political progress takes place where the individual has the ability to think about herself where her thought is not directed by any external evil agency. Man needs to be free from the bondage of tutelage (a sort of incapability to utilize a man's own understanding) that nearly becomes her habit. Freedom can help people to attain enlightenment even in the case of politics. Kant puts freedom as an *a priori* of all rational wills of human beings under which an individual can act. The implementation of the 'good will' of the rational agent is not an individual's self-interested will, rather the overall happiness of the 'good will' entails the overall happiness of the interest of humanity or in other words, performing good for others by 'treating people as ends' in preference to mean. Prejudices from the guardians passed on to their younger generation led towards the reprisal policies that could do harm to our society. Kant defines freedom as follows:

> The public use of one's reason must always be free, and it alone can bring about enlightenment among men. The private use of reason, on the other hand, may often be very narrowly restricted without particularly hindering the progress of enlightenment. (Kant 1988, VIII, 36)

Reason as we know for Kant is a social quest that cannot develop in a solitary living individual, but can thrive in the social trail, interface, instructions, etc. people work hard to make the life of next generation much more easy, in a way, they construct future of the next kin. It seems true that human beings have two diverse characteristics that Kant called 'antagonism'. Kant enunciates this in 'Idea for a Universal History':

> By 'antagonism' I mean the unsocial sociability of men i.e., there propensity to enter into society, bound with a mutual opposition which constantly threaten to break up the society. Man has an inclination to associate with others, because in society he feels himself to be more than man (i.e., as more than the developed form of his natural capacities). But he also has a strong propensity to isolate himself from others, because he finds in himself at the same time the unsocial characteristic of wishing to have everything go according to his own wish. Thus he expects opposition on all sides because, in knowing himself, he knows that he, on his own part, is inclined to oppose others. (Kant 1988, 417-18)

'Hope', according to Kant is a reasonable rational demand concerning certain contexts. The indispensable connection between the moral laws and 'hope' for happiness is maintained because of 'pure reason'. In our empirical world, there is no assurance of the entanglement of moral laws and 'hope' for happiness; but we can find out this hypothesis only in the case of non-empirical assumptions like highest reason or God. Kant believes in the peaceful future of humanity, especially with political

progress. He introduces 'hope' in the sense of attaining happiness in near future instead of moral laws. Kant describes 'hope' as being escorted towards happiness; in the same way he argues that the practical necessity to think of moral principles should be interconnected with the theoretical necessity that entails 'hope' where one can get happiness by performing morally-good actions.

What sort of an act should an agent perform in our society? Kant's answer would be recasting a universal framework of natural law that is entangled by a person's good will. One can formulate any maxim for herself and society, but Kant's check point shows that the maxim needs to be followed basing on different outlines:

a) One's maxim must be guided by reason.
b) One should delineate her maxim to shape universal law and its applicability so that other rational agents can universally pursue her maxim in the similar situations.
c) One needs to put her maxim in our conceivable world where natural laws are governed by the society.
d) One should ask himself/herself, whether she would prefer to act according to maxims in this world and if others would follow her maxim in similar situations.

Kant in *Groundwork of Metaphysics of Morals* claims:

> But if I conceive a *categorical imperative*, then I know at once what it contains. For since besides the law this imperative, I know at once what it necessity that our maxim should conform to this law, while the law, as we have seen, contains no condition to limit it, there remains nothing over to which the maxim has to conform except the universality of a law as such;... There is therefore only a single categorical imperative and it is this: 'Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law'. (Kant 1972, 84)

In accepting the moral laws, self-understanding plays a relatable part. It looks inevitable that the *summum bonum* must be the postulate of moral laws; equally, the existence of God is the foundational claim to attain the *summum bonum*. Now the query is, 'will it be achieved, at all?' Kant's preference for understanding the power of (reflective) judgment shows self- understanding as a pining requirement of an agent and it signifies nature as it seems classifying along with the lines of intelligent cause (God) that cannot be questioned intelligibly. We have a propensity to prioritize our self-interest and act accordingly. But our actions should be guided by the 'revolution of the will' that can only be explained by two non-fragmented issues:

a) To attain the inscrutable maxim of the moral laws of an agent's behaviour and action depending on 'hope' that intends the person to become a good man through constant efforts.[iv]

b) Without the 'hope' of moral improvement of the human race, no society can reach at its attainment of 'hope' for the better times' as Kant has urged. Actually it is a sort of reasonable 'hope' proliferated through the indispensable presumption of moral duties cum responsibilities for the future generations.

Kant intends to 'hope' for 'better times' that relies on the human motivation and aspiration to act for a common good of society. The social union of mankind calls for a civilized society, but here the problem is we are far from having attained the conception of morality. Hans Reiss writes:

> The principles of morality would, in one way, go beyond purely legal questions; for they affect private inner decisions by men which can neither be regulated nor enforced publicly. Law deals only with what remains once such inner decisions have been subtracted. It is the outer shell, so to speak, of the moral realm. And a theory of law is that which can be necessary and universal in the realm of politics. (Reiss 1971, 20)

The affirmative outlook of Kant signifies the principle of public right that synchronies maxims with rights and politics together. The aim of publicizing the motto of public right needs to be accomplished and there should be satisfactory universal public interests emanated from an unconditional imperative sense ensuring happiness.

Kingdom of Ends:

Kant prefers to look for 'hope' within the realm of religion in his work *Religion Within the Boundaries of Reason Alone* (1793). As we know, Kant's 'unsocial sociability' hinges at an advance civil state where men can uplift themselves from natural habitats. Human beings become united through the motivation of obeying moral laws to make these a kind of judicial laws of the society. This kind of judicial unity and the community of human beings are called an 'ethical commonwealth' which is not similar to constructing a state, but an individual moral power that relates to the character of the each individual of the society. Beck claries Kant's opinion:

> For the establishment of an ethical commonwealth for which man hope's, he feels the need of divine assistance and thinks that, in the foundation of Christianity, he has had it. Consequently belief in God supports the 'hope' of the triumph of good over moral indifferentism and evil in the course of history. The instrument of that triumph will be 'the people of God' united in the 'truth of church'. (Beck 1988, 19)

Kant's optimistic stance focuses on the human's ultimate zeal or endeavour that

is doubtlessly the idea of 'Highest Good', a complete moral virtue enshrined by the complete happiness. In the preface of the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant proclaims that nothing can outshine what he calls 'the supreme principle of morality'. The autonomy of 'Good will' is the supreme principle of morality that not only sounds good for Kant in a tautological sense, but especially a will that one can wish and act for the sake of duty. Moral conviction is overtly coupled with the rational will (practical reason) that bring us close to the 'kingdom of ends'. Kant writes:

> The concept of every rational being as one who must regard himself as making universal law by all the maxims of his will, and must seek to judge himself and his actions from this point of view, leads to a closely connected and very fruitful concept – namely, that of a *kingdom of ends*. I understand by a *'kingdom'* a systematic union of different rational being under common laws. (Kant 1972, 95)

A rational being can play two different roles in the 'kingdom':

> First, as a member of the giving laws, he/she is the subject of the 'kingdom'.
>
> Second, a rational being can belong to it as a supreme head. Actually, in the preference of legislating, he/she is not anyway the subject to the will of others.

It's sound puzzling whether a rational being can occupy the place of supreme head i.e. 'God'? Kant believes in two interconnecting policies that can take a man to the sphere of 'supreme head'. The first policy maintains the freedom of the will of the subject (man) even in the case of holding the status of a member or head in the place of 'kingdom'. And the second policy indicates clearly about a complete independent being who have no personal need, but have an inexhaustible power conferred with her will—a kind of will which perform an action depending on maxims that can construct a universal law.[v]

Kant indeed trusts in the individual freedom and aims to segregate it from the domain of theology. We could not make other people moral beings, but it is their own *choice*[vi] not to be guided by coercion to become moral. Morality is generally self-imposed, so there is no question to logically consist of any arbitrary divine command. Even if there is any divine command, then the divine command obviously inspires us to follow 'categorical imperative' that taught us to perform duty for duty's sake. A *kingdom of ends* creates an ideal condition where people would act following 'categorical imperatives' consistent with rational free will and autonomy of being a subject and supreme head of the laws that she will make and obey in the same manner. Every one in the society will follow the same will. However, this is an ideal picture of a rational and pure reasoned-based society that hardly exists in reality. 'Hope' nourished by Kant in favour of another ground belief is the existence of God as a

more instantaneous conviction of moral duties. Kant believes in the 'hope' for divine assistance here in performing a moral action, but it is, I think, not in the sense of moral ground as the thesis would be against his dictum; men are free to choose his moral action and they are entirely liable for their good will. In fact, Kant 'hope' for a divine assistance, but the assumption comes from the metaphysical level, never from the domain of the moral laws.

Some words

My point is that Kant's idea of 'good will' seems infused with 'hope' especially in the result of the particular will. We may be acquainted with the famous Kantian dictum 'It is impossible to conceive anything at all in the world, or even out of it, which can be taken as good without qualification, except a *good will*' (Kant 1972, 58). Kant was concerned about the fact of rendering 'misfortune' that we may call 'moral luck'. Sometimes, something which is good is incapable to produce its good outcome because of some inevitable misfortunes, but Kant believes that in such a case 'good will' remains still intrinsically good because of its unconditional goodness as a unique feature of any individual 'good'. This 'unconditional goodness' that will always allied with each of good sounds to me close to 'hope' that have some background enabling conditions. 'Hope', as we know, fall under two different schemes. For Kant, a 'hope' is nothing but the primacy of practical reasoning that is the prospect of attaining happiness following the moral acts (categorical imperatives). Besides, the margin of 'hope' is limited in the theoretical level where the consequences are not always fully specified. 'Hope' always draws a weaker contemplation pertaining to the possible notion of knowledge. The epistemic status of 'hope' retains a probability hypothesis, while faith deciphers towards objects of the world in the present sense. But 'hope' transmits to future related matters, or something is relied on one's expectations to desire that might happen.

Adopting this hypothesis, it seems to me that Kant preludes 'humanity as an end' that is a sort of rational choice conferring goodness and rationality. In *Metaphysical Principles of Virtue*, Kant writes in defence of humanity:

> The capacity to propose an end to oneself is the characteristic of humanity (as distinguished from animality). The rational will is therefore bound up with the end of the humanity in our own person, as is also, consequently the duty to deserve well of humanity by means of culture in general, and to acquire or promote the capacity of carrying out all sorts of ends, as far as this capacity is to be found in man. (Kant 1996, 392)

It would not be too ambiguous, if we describe 'humanity as an end' itself a 'hope' that is based on a normative condition to synchronize the rational reason. Irrational 'hope' could escort impossibility, only if the referred object of the particular

'hope' seems unproven. This is how I understand Kant's constructive part of 'hope' as a subjective reason-centric action that expresses knowledge triggering with a future, which Kant later says in German as *Leitfäden* or 'come to know'. This epistemic conception of 'hope' cannot be derived from the metaphysical qualm. The ideas for which we should 'hope' like '*summum bonum*', 'good will', etc. efficiently stand for the transcendent ideals. There are a lot of places where the conception of one's 'good will' turns out as 'self-prediction'[vii], a kind of description rather than a moral decision. 'Good will' is certainly good, but to say that 'good will' would be necessarily 'good' is the root of mutual entailment with others like freedom, happiness, and a panorama of good future (as a pragmatic outcome). This method tends to see 'good will' in an optimistic way that we can call 'hope' in Kantian tune[viii].

Notes and References

[i] Plato thinks that knowledge form may contrast with the enigmatic physical world as objects have change properties and it can differ according to the sphere of appearance. Reasoning can be the suitable source of knowledge instead of perception that might be the ordinary sources of knowledge. Morton elucidates Plato's theory of knowledge to say, 'Plato suggests tentatively that to know is to believe with a reason for believing. Not any reason will do; it has to be the kind of reason that supports knowledge.' (Papineau 2004, 79)

[ii] This analysis is impregnated with Russell's thought on Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. Russell also says, 'The part of our knowledge which is *a priori* embraces, according to him (Kant), not only logic, but much that cannot be included in logic or deduced from it.' (Russell 1995, 679)

[iii] Please see the work of Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, 1974, 122.

[iv] See, Kant, *Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone* (1793, AE 6:46).

[v] See Kant's Groundwork of Metaphysics of Morals, 434 or Kant 1972, 95-96.

[vi] A very interesting definition of *choice* is depicted by Isaiah Berlin, when he writes, 'Action is choice; choice is free commitment to this or that way of behaving, living, and so on; the possibilities are never fewer than two: to do or not to do; be or not be.' (Berlin 1980, 178)

[vii] Isaiah Berlin rightly says, 'It seems to me that I can, at times, though perhaps not always, place myself, as it were, at an outside vintage point, and contemplate myself as if I were another human being, and calculate the chances of my sticking to my present resolution with almost the same degree of detachment and reliability as I should have if I were judging the case of someone else with all the impartibility that I could muster. If this is so, then 'I know how I shall act' is not necessarily a statement of decision: it can

be purely descriptive. Self-prediction of this kind, provided that it does claim to be too exact or infallible, meets Popper's objection, cited above, by remaining tentative, allowing for possible alterations of conduct as a result of the self-prediction itself – seems possible and compatible with determinism.' (Berlin 1980, 187)

viii Kant considers, 'I entitle the world a *moral world*, in so far as it may be in accordance with all moral laws; and this is what by means of the freedom of the rational being it *can be*, and what according to the necessary laws of morality it *ought to be*.' (Kant 1929, 637)

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AESTHETIC CRITERION: A CONCEPTUAL GEOGRAPHY

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In memory of P. Michelis*

Since Aristotle's time aestheticians have painstakingly tried to provide a sound definition of the aesthetic criterion. In particular, Stagirites's reference to the catharsis as a necessary condition of the definition of tragedy opened a new field for investigation for those concerned about art, for both its factual and formal elements. The attention was focused upon (a) the audience's reaction towards the art object and the resulting psychic experience which aestheticians have endeavored to describe and use as a ground for the establishment of the aesthetic criterion. The other chief direction was related with (b) the art object itself, i.e. the stimuli source, whose the sort of structural physiognomy or properties could, it was thought, secure an objective criterion. A third

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* Fifty years since the author of the classic work An Aesthetic Approach to Byzantine Art (B. T. Batsford, London 1955) was passed away (1969), his theoritical framework is basic for the interpretation and philosophical assesment of Byzantine art, even today indispensable. For his contribution see:

> "Is Michelis a Platonist", The British Journal of Aesthetics (British society of Aesthetics), 1972, Vol. 12, p.p. 935-402.
>
> "The Problem of Method in Greek Aesthetics", The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism (American Society of Aesthetics), 1973, Vol XXXI, p.p. 201-213.
>
> Festschrift for P.A. Michelis, Reviewed in The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol XXXV, 1, p.p. 565-568.
>
> "The Problem of Aesthetic Categories in Greek Aesthetics", Neo-Hellenika (Amsterdam), 1970, Vol. I, p.p. 141-179.
>
> History of Neo-hellenic Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art
>
> Greek Aesthetic Theories, Newspaper National Herald (N.Y.)

This essay was written in memory of P. Michelis for the In Memoriam volume of the La Société Hellénique d'Esthétique where I was a member (Associate Professer) at the University of Missouri-Kansas City (1968-1975) and the Doctoral Faculty of the University of Missouri: Saint Louis, Columbia, Kansas City and Rolla.

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major field of investigation is mainly concerned about (c) the creator whose nature and intentions could, entirely or partly, have decisive bearings upon the construction of the criterion. Of these three main orientations the first two seem to have most attracted theoreticians in the past as well as nowadays. The literature pertinent to *a* and *b* is plentiful, but for the purpose of this paper I have made a selection of certain studies that, I thought, have remarkably elucidated the conceptual geography involved in the criterion issue. However, I conclude that, despite the clarificatory merits of these studies, the problem is still open. This in no way means that a justifiable definition cannot be offered. Aesthetics, like several sciences, has to work with justifiable definitions which can function directively, and at the same time remain open and subject to future modifications. In this discussion I have made certain distinctions, (i.e. between perception and experience), and described concepts and operational mechanisms involved in «aesthetic» perception. My commentary, I hope, will prove useful to those who endeavor hard to elucidate the conceptual map of this complex issue.

<div align="center">I</div>

I begin the discussion with the object-oriented studies by J. Urmson[1] and Frank Sibley[2]. J. Urmson's position is that although psychic reactions and their significance cannot be disregarded by the aestheticians in the study of the overall area of aesthetics, their analysis and description cannot help in distinguishing the aesthetic from the non-aesthetic. The right thing to do is to direct our efforts towards the sensible qualities of objects. Plus, in such studies we should not begin «with great and complex works of art», but with simple ones. As he puts it: If we examine some very simple cases of aesthetic evaluation, the grounds given are frequently the way the object appraised looks *(shape* and *colour),* the way it *sounds*, *smells, tastes* or feels. For Urmson, these qualities of things can constitute the ground for establishing the criteria for aesthetic evaluation.

Urmson has influenced several aestheticians who have tried to elaborate these general suggestions. Of these the most worthy for his views is Frank Sibley[3] who attempts to provide an objectivistic basis of the art criterion. Stating first that objects have qualities and appearances he proceeds to differentiate these qualities and «looks» into three classes : (a) those which «we can admire in themselves», (b) those which «cannot stand alone as basic grounds») but need an explanation by a linkage with qualities that can stand alone aesthetically (of the *a* category), and (c) those which «we cannot admire aesthetically at all [because] our interest is less for themselves than for their instrumental value», and because no linkage can be provided (I take it to mean linkage with qualities of the *a* category). In *a* Sibley classifies such qualities as

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[1] «What Makes a Situation Aesthetic», *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,* suppl., vol. 31 (1957).

[2] «Aesthetics and the Looks of Things», *The Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 56 (1959).

[3] *Ibid.*

smoothness, high gloss, simplicity, translucence, regular, intricate, richness; in class *b* he includes angularity, colours, equitevality, ellipticity, squareness and so forth; and, in class c he refers to serrated, hygienic, and sanitary which are more specialized or peripheral.

A further distinction made by Sibley is that qualities of class *a* are core experiences in human existence because they are related with his survival. Man has an «awareness and concern» for them. For Sibley they are so indispensable a part of man's existence as are man's basic passions like anger, fear, hope, pity, longing, ecstasy, and despair. More specifically, he attaches warmth, peace, and energy to the survival concept, whereas purity, clarity, and simplicity to what he calls concern.

On the other hand, Sibley distinguishes qualities that he calls specialized or peripheral or instrumental which he classifies into categories *b* and *c.* They are without any vital interest. Eventually, through reduction the ultimate criterion of valuing some qualities as aesthetic and others as non-aesthetic is biological *survival.* Sibley, of course, realizes that this talk is vague and speculative and that it is not an explanation but a comment. He considers his talk as hints which can be «replaced by something more precise and adequate». Although it might be considered as an advancement of Urmson's views, as a theory cannot stand a philosophical elenchus. By way of critique, the following points can be made: (1) By offering his tripartite classification of qualities Sibley merely makes another epistemological division of qualities which cannot offer much to the solution of the problem. What guarantees that qualities and appearances of category *a* under all conditions will always be aesthetically admired? There is no way to verify such a proposition (which is implicit in his discussion). Statements like «that there is such a division I am sure», and «I believe this is not so» without the required support are not convincing at all. Suppose that we take one of the qualities of category *a,* say «smoothness», make the statement «smoothness is a quality admired aesthetically», and further attempt to verify it. Suppose we record the answers (private statements whose reliability can easily be questioned) of a considerable number of people. What does it mean? For the formulation of the «aesthetic criterion» it can hardly mean anything. It suffers from what synthetic statements suffer. Premises drawn from statistical findings cannot establish an invulnerable conclusion. The same applies to statements referring to the quality of simplicity («simplicity is a quality admired aesthetically»). Besides, what is precisely meant by siplicity? Gould there be given a standard of simplicity? Has it to do with unanalyzable substances, figures, elements, what? Simplicity of what?

(2)   Sibley assures us that we admire these qualities aesthetically. He means that after perceiving the qualities either for themselves (category *a)* or as fitted into a context (category *b)* we come to a certain psychic state, admiration. One alternative is that Sibley *identifies* admiration with aesthetic; a second one is that admiration (wider of the aesthetic itself) is a necessary *condition* of the aesthetic. In both cases Sibley's thesis is inadequate. In the first alternative, the identification would result in a broad definition which would allow any other sort of admiration to be called aesthetic. In

the second where aesthetic is a species of admiration or requires admiration as its necessary condition the result will be a definition too narrow, since other kinds of emotions will be excluded.

(3)   There seems to be a circularity in Sibley's argumentation. Specifically, he says that some qualities (category *a)* are always permanent sources of the aesthetic; this we know because when they are experienced they always are «admired aesthetically»; and we are sure that we aesthetically admire them because we experience such qualities that we take as permanent sources of the aesthetic.

(4)   Sibley's ultimate reduction of the aesthetic to man's «vital interest» is also inadequate to establish the desired criterion. It seems to me that Sibley implicitly intends to reinforce the universality of the criterion by referring to man's universal tendency to survive, and, because of it, to man's uniform biological mechanisms to cope with his environment. Upon these primary mechanisms other secondary mechanisms (perhaps of a Pavlovian kind) are built up. In the survival struggle of the organism qualities such as warmth, peace, and energy are vitally connected with these mechanisms whose purpose is to preserve and enhance these qualities. There is no room here for relativism based on non-uniform qualities, that is, qualities which are not panhuman. People at all times will be interested and will have aesthetic admiration for these qualities. I interpret that Sibley both implies this assumption and on its ground rejects the proposition «what is aesthetically admired is wholly relative to a particular cultures

Sibley confuses the aesthetic with the useful. Even if such a biological aesthetics is sound in the sense that it might help in tracing genetically aesthetic concepts and states, it does not offer any consideration and analysis of all ascending levels of sophistication that aesthetic concepts passed and were rendered thus refined. Furthermore, Sibley disregards the fact that very many things can be reduced to man's biological interests: behavioral acts, attitudes, states, etc. The problem is not really to show the derivation of the aesthetic, but to define what itself is.

<div align="center">II</div>

In this section I discuss the two effect-oriented studies by M. Beardsley and R. F. Racy. Beardsley makes a valiant attempt[4] to re-estate the concept of aesthetic experience (AE). He thinks (and rightly so) that once AE is defined the problem of the aesthetic criterion (AC) is solved. Let us see what Beardsley's elaboration is. First, he makes the following statement:

> «A person is having an aesthetic experience during a particular stretch of time if and only if the greater part of his mental activity during that time is united and made pleasurable by being tied to the forms and qualities

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[4] «Aesthetic Experience Regained»), *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* vol. 1, xxviii (1969), pp. 3-11.

of a sensuously presented or imaginatively intended object on which his primary attention is concentrated[5]».

Second, Beardsley proceeds in his description by making the distinction between what he names phenomenally objective field (POF) and phenomenally subjective events (PSE). The POF refers to sounds, pictures, etc.; the PSE refers to such events as the arousal and fulfillment of expectations, and also to «sympathy-Iike or anger-like emotions»). The properties of the work of art which Beardsley calls «phenomenally objective qualities and forms» as well as the «phenomenally subjective feelings and emotions») can be described. He holds that the affects (PSE) «can be said to be caused by the objective features») (POF). Then, he concludes that :

   «the experience as such, consists of both objective and affective elements»[6].

Third, Beardsley comes to the most crucial point of his thesis : to offer the characteristic required for the differentiation of the aesthetic experience (E^1 = AE) from any other experience (E^3.. .$E°$). E^1 becomes the experience which is more or less unified (U), i. e., «more or less coherent (C), and more or less complete (Co). The term coherent is referred to as continuity which in turn takes its import by the intensity of a feeling that might start as a usual feeling among others, and gradually «spreads over the whole field of awareness»). He sees the continuity in the development of a feeling in the sense that it is intensified in a gradual manner as if it has an orderly kinetic (energy) pattern until it culminates up to a high degree of intensity. The description is definitely Deweyan. Beardsley also invokes A. Maslow's «peak-experiences»[7], a species of which is the aesthetic experience. The special traits that Maslow attaches to the «peak-experiences» are : (a) *integration* (unification, wholeness, all-of-a-piece), and (b) in the negative side, *freedom* (from blocks, inhibitions, cautions, fears, doubts, controls, reservations, self-criticisms, breaks...). As for the term complete, he offers the following interpretation: a complete work of art «can help to provide an experience that is completes; the experience in turn can take two patterns: the one which is formed when impulses or tendencies come to a state of equilibrium or balance (when an opposition of emotional reactions emerges from the same work of art); the second when an expectation is fulfilled. A paradigm case of the first kind of pattern can be a musical experience. For Beardsley, the feeling of expectation for subsequent, not yet experienced parts of the developing experience will be «caused» by the counterparts of the real musical sound sub- patterns. The finishing of the symphony correspondingly coincides with the completion of the experience which during the process of its build-ing up was somehow anticipated and expected. The fulfilled expectation turns to

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[5] *Ibid.,* p. 5.

[6] *Ibid.,* p. 6.

[7] *Toward a Psychology of Being,* Princeton (1962), pp. 93 and 101.

become a completed gestalt. It becomes completed, i.e. its character is crystallized by the finishing of the last musical sub- pattern. In the final experiencing we are mentally activated in such a manner as to recollect the initial expectation experience which, added to the now fulfillment experience, results to a high intensification or «peak-experience». Again, in order to reinforce his description, Beardsley refers to Maslow's concept of «peak-experiences» which is characterized by (a) completion-of-the-act, (b) complete orgasm, (c) total discharge, (d) catharsis, (e) culmination, climax, (f) consummation, (g) emptying, or finishing.

Fourth, Beardsley considers[8] pleasure as a *presupposition* of the aesthetic experience. For him the artistic goodness of an object is a function of its «capacity to provide a certain desirable kind of experience». Pleasure, which covers positive affective states such as sense of liberation, the joy of play, elation, fullness of power[9], is not only a necessary condition of the aesthetic experience, but the means to solve the problem of artistic betterness, i.e. a means for deciding how good a work of art is. Following is a schematic representation of Beardsley's views :

$$\text{Experience in general (E)}$$
$$E = POF + PSE$$

```
                    A                              A¹
                    |                              |
           Aesthetic experience          Non-aesthetic experience

          B            C                    B¹            C¹
          |            |                    |             |
       Unified   Pleasurable           Ununified  Non-pleasurable

     D              E                   D¹                E¹
     |              |                   |                 |
Complete :     Coherent :          Non-complete      Non-coherent
d¹ : equilibrium  e¹ : continuous  (non-balanced,    (non continuous,
d⁹ : expectation  e² : intensified  expectation       non-intensified )
   fulfilled                        not fulfilled)
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$$A = (D + E) + C$$

For Beardsley *D, E,* and *C* taken as necessary conditions and combined with the object of art as an additional necessary condition, the so much needed sufficient conditions of the aesthetic can be secured. Now, let us see how much Beardsley's views can pass a philosophical elenchus[10].

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[8] *Ibid.,* p. 9.

[9] The reference is again to Maslow's concept of «peak-experience.»

[10] Although I read Dickies' critique («Beardsley's Phantom Aesthetic Experience», *Journal of Philosophy,* LXII, 1965, pp. 129 - 136), I will not discuss it in this paper. His disagreement

(1)   I argue that it cannot be claimed that the experience consists of both objective and affective elements. Since by objective elements Beardsley means properties of the work of art (POF — sounds, pictures, qualities and forms) he really is obliged to face the old problem of the primary and secondary qualities, i.e. to justify whether sound and colour can in fact be predicated as objective. Of course, Beardsley talks about phenomenalism («phenomenally objective field»), but even so phenomenalism can hardly provide the kind of objectivity that is so much required for the aesthetic. The affective elements are part of the experience, but not the properties of an art work even if the first are «caused» by the latter. The sources of the stimuli which result in experience after a perceptual elaboration cannot be identified as being parts of the experience per se.

(2)   Beardsley claims that POF and PSE can be described. This can hardly be accepted. How can one describe the inner affective elements. The difficulty is known to any psychologist who tries to describe inner processes and results of these processes. The accounts given by psychologists are of a tentative and operational kind, and thus unwarranted for their semantic firmness. Accounts of the PSE are, and should be taken as, semantically precarious.

(3)   If $A = (D + E)$ -f- G, then D, E, and C, as consisting the sufficient conditions of A should be examined. D gets its import by what Beardsley calls equilibrium (d^1) and fulfillment of expectations (d^2). Equilibrium of impulses or tendencies which I assume Beardsley means are PSE, implies that the POF causes opposing PSE. Are those opposing PSE elements caused by POF at the same time, tautochronous, or consecutively at different times, heterochronous? If tautochronous this would raise serious problems concerning the objectivity of POF. How could it be that the same object «causes» two diñerent PSE elements at once, i.e. how the perceiver can be aware at the same moment of two opposing PSE. PSE elements in fact cannot be considered as emotional elements. They rather fall in the cognitive field whereas impulses and tendencies are non-cognitive. It seems to me that Beardsley makes an illegitimate leap from PSE (which can be considered as the experiencial counterparts of POF) to the emotional field.

On the other hand, if the opposing impulses are heterochronous (in the sense that A follows B) followed by a kind of reconciliation and integration, then Beardsley's talk concerns processes and not the end products of processes. *Heterochronicity* in this sense implies a kinetic character in the opposition of impulses. If so, this pattern is unreliable for obtaining objectivity. But, is it necessary to assume that what always occurs between POF and PSE is the product of opposing impulses? Does Beardsley mean that there are opposing elements in POF, and «because» of this, opposing

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with Beardsley's theory is radical and is based on different grounds than the grounds of my observations. I believe that Beardsley follows the right direction. However, a more adequate phenomenological description is needed for experience and kinds of experience, so that a sound account of the aesthetic experience would be feasible.

impulses or tendencies are aroused? If so, this would imply that opposing elements in the POF must be in the final analysis taken as a necessary condition of the aesthetic experience. It cannot really be counted as such because there are objects without opposing elements which are said to be art objects. On the other hand, there might be objects whose POF has opposing elements, but still are not said to be art objects. Thus, the concept of the opposing elements cannot be used as a requirement for it shows to be both too narrow and too broad.

D^2 (fulfillment of expectation) is also a complex process which requires two factors: (a) past experience and recollection of approximately the same (musical) pattern[11], and (b) anticipation of the pattern which (is going to be realized by the new sound reproduction)[12], will start after the recognition of the initial sub-patterns that by way of stimuli will activate the latent past experience pattern. In this sense, the listening person can anticipate. The expectation *per se* and even its fulfillment cannot account for aesthetic experience. One chemist, for example, might make an anticipation (based on his past experiences which are now just a formalized procedural pattern), and eventually what he expects if fulfilled. He has a *sui generis* feeling, but is it necessarily a feeling which can be taken as aesthetic experience? Unless there is a too much widening of the denotative aspects of the definition of the aesthetic experience, the fulfillment of expectation cannot be considered to be a necessary condition of *A*.

It might be supported that during the fulfilling process, and after the fulfilling of the pattern, a particular kind of emotion arises, which precisely can be considered as aesthetic (or a part of the aesthetic) experience. This being so, again the question arises as to how it can be distinguished from the emotion which accompanies, for example, the solution procedures and the final solution of a geometric problem? Such a claim seems also to render the definition as too broad.

E (coherence) is reduced to e^1 (continuity) and e^2 (intensification). Both e^1 and e^3 might be taken as the main characteristics of coherence when the latter applies to things which are of a kinetic nature. It seems that order and coherence of what is kinetic in nature cannot be understood otherwise except by reference to kinetic patterns which show a certain regularity in their appearance. Thus, Beardsley rightly points to these two characteristics. Here he faces, undoubtedly, the same old problem[13] of being and becoming that has originated in Heraclitus' philosophy and much discussed by Plato

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[11] I refer to the same paradigm case of the musical pattern used by Beardsley.

[12] What would happen if one experiences a musical pattern if listening for the first time to a new symphony? Could it be claimed that there will be anticipation and expectation which might or might not be fulfilled? I think there will be anticipation and expectation, but the chances for fulfillment would be considerably less than in the case of reproduction. Usually, the underlying mechanism securing anticipation and expectation in «virginal» cases of experiencing is what in psychology is called *positive transfer* where general patterns or abilities (visual, acoustic, tactile, etc.) are transferred, consciously or unconsciously, into new situations.

[13] Beardsley himself states that the problem is «how to cope conceptually with change».

in his *Theatetus*. My only comment about E ($e^1 + e^2$) is that Beardsley's account needs more elaboration. There could be made a better phenomenological description.

Finally, what remains to be considered is condition C. Is pleasure a simple necessary condition of *A* or pleasure itself is *A* (or part of A)? If the first, then we would expect a further result, the needed *A*. Because the explanation should be that given the unification (completeness, coherence) and pleasurability of any experience, *A* is «caused» or resulted. If so, what is this *A* ? To state the conditions of *A* does not mean that the nature of *A per se* has been described. (Does he mean that C during the experiencial process and in combination with D and E acquires a certain quality, that is it is differentiated from any other kind of pleasure?) Beardsley is not quite clear at this point. He wants *C* as a presupposition of *A*. He does not identify *C* with *A,* but we are left without any account of *A per se.* In my interpretation, he does not seem to subscribe to the second alternative, i.e. given *D* and *E*, then *C* is produced, which precisely is A.

R. F. Racy discusses[14] the definability of art also in terms of the aesthetic experience. In fact, he attempts to use more decisively D. W. Gotshalk's theory of art[15] whose starting point is the audience reaction rather than the art work or the creator.

Racy wants to convince us that one should look to this direction because «aesthetic» means «perceptual». He argues that because «aesthetic» derives from the Greek word *aesthesis*, and aesthesis is perception, therefore «aesthetic» should be identified with «perceptual». But because not all «perceptual» is «aesthetic», it is required a something, x, to differentiate and signify the aesthetic perception from other sorts of perceptions. Thus, Racy substantiates his x by the *how*, i.e. the way we perceive a given object. There could be several ways of perceiving which in turn are determined by *what* we are looking for. He makes the distinction between utilitarian (instrumental) and intrinsic qualities - a distinction obviously of a Kantian derivation. If we look for intrinsic qualities and respond *directly*, Racy claims we respond aesthetically. Furthermore, Racy distinguishes perceptual experience from sensual experience. The first is «concerned with the *in* the object» whereas the latter «with *our own* sensations».

Thus, Racy in agreement with Gotshalk states the definition of art «as the creation of objects for intrinsic perception», a definition which covers three elements: (a) the artist, (b) the art work, and (c) the audience. Intention is also counted in the definition as an indispensable element. For Racy, the term art should be used descriptively and not evaluatively. The three conditions, a, &, c, should be used when we have to decide whether or not an object is an art; but during this particular classificatory act we should not be concerned whether the art is good or bad. An illustration could be the machine analogy: an object is classified as a machine if it meets certain requirements, and this machine might be good or bad.

Conditions a, b_y and c should be considered as primary ones. They admit

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[14] «The Aesthetic Experience», *The British Journal of Aesthetics,* vol. 9, No. 4 (1969).

[15] *Art and the Social Order,* Dover Publications, 1962.

specifications by virtue of other elements which can enrich and signify the art work to the highest degree. For Racy, they *(a, b, c)* constitute the definitional core of art. However, these views have been criticized[16]. The first criticism is that Racy identifies perception with experience. This indeed, is implied by the overall discussion of the topic. He seems to take perception as the crystallized result of processes (as what is considered to be the *percept*), and not as a process. Surely, this originates difficulties in his discussion. I think Racy also perpetrates the etymology fallacy by arguing that aesthetics should be grounded primarily upon *aesthesis* since the first happened to derive from the latter (and since Baumgarten coined the term for this particular field). Perhaps this might help as a directive in terms of the emphasis to be given in the aesthetic inquiries, but certainly cannot be used as an argument. In accepting Racy's etymology argument aesthetics as a discipline will be denotatively dilimited. There must be eliminated a variety of approaches.

Furthermore, Racy arbitrarily equates aesthetics with perception (for the purpose of deriving the needed conclusion: *aesthetic is «perceptual). Aesthesis* as a process is only a part of the perceptual process, but a conversion of this proposition would consist of a logical violation. It is as if one argues that because «all cats are animals» it follows that «all animals are cats». Perhaps Racy could resort to the ascribed denotation of the term «aesthesis» by the Greeks[17] which referred to the entire perceptual activity. Still, it would disregard the semantic modifications of the term through history whereby aesthesis (or sensing) is only a phase of the entire perceptual process.

III

A different approach to the problem has been advocated by V. Aldrich[18]. The emphasis is put upon the *way* of perceiving. The starting points of this highly sophisticated theory are Wittgenstein's and Gombrich's observations upon the phenomenon of the change of «aspects». Aldrich distinguishes aspection from aspects. The first denotes «the phenomenon of the change», the second refers to the number of interpretations which an observer or observers make of a given object[19]. But let us see the main propositions of the aspection theory:

(1)   Material object (X) is capable of being perceived (P).
(2)   Perception (P) of X is observation (O).
(3)   P of X is «simply seen», prehension (PR).

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[16] John Clammer, «On Defining the Aesthetic Experience», *The British Journal of Aesthetics*, vol. 10 (1970), pp. 147 - 51.

[17] D. W. Hamlyn, *Sensation and Perception*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London 1961; D. A. Andriopoulos, «An Examination of Aristotle's Theory of Perception» *Platon,* vol. 10' (1967), pp. 45- 76.

[18] Virgil Aldrich, *Philosophy of Art,* Prentice-Hall (1963), pp. 19-24.

[19] He cites the known geometric figure which can be interpreted as a tunnel, a truncated pyramid, lampshade, etc.

(4)   Thus, X admits categorial aspection (CA)[20].

(5)   Physical space (PS) is a condition of O.

(6)   Aesthetic space (AS) is a condition of PR.

(7)   PS is O if there is awareness of X's «space properties as fixed by metrical standards and measuring operations». In this CA, that is O, the X's «characteristics are realized as qualities that qualify (Q) it».

(8)   AS is a condition of PR, if there is awareness of X's «intensities or values of colour and sounds». In this GA, that is PR, the X's «characteristics are realized as 'aspects' (objective impressions) that animate (AN) it».

(9)   PR and O are *exclusive* achievements (RA), i.e. PR cannot occur simultaneously with O.

(10) In between the two extremes, PR and O, there is a basic, simple, non-categorial, non-achievement sort of perception called halophrastic perception (HP). Negatively, if one is not perceiving X in a PR or O manner, one's perceptual mode is termed as HP. It seems that Aldrich by HP denotes any kind of effortless (since PR and O are achievement like mental actions) ordinary perception.

(11) Mind is «potential for this or that sort of experience of material things»[21]. Also, add to it the same assertion: «a condition of what you see is what you have in mind»[22].

What this theorist aims to achieve is to elucidate, through this phenomenological elaboration, the concept of the aesthetic perception as a *sui generis* mode among other modes of perception[23]. Thus, he thought that PR, which is a mode of CA, can, as distinct from other modes, be taken as the needed aesthetic perception. But note in 8 that AS is a condition of PR, and the simple structuration of X by colour and sound is a condition of AS. The reduction PR -> AS -> colour and sound -> realized as «aspects» (objective impressions) -> AN, imply that PR is conditioned by several factors which are not related to PR proximately. Crucial to these reductions are the X's qualities of colour and sound which can be challenged as really offering secure ground for PR. I think that an implicit assumption is involved in the distinction between PR and O, namely that primary qualities (size, number, etc.) are in some sense used as the criterion of O, which is non-aesthetic (see proposition 7), and secondary qualities (sound, colour, etc.) for PR, which is aesthetic. If so, again we have to ask how much those qualities are objective qualities. But even if the objectivity of these qualities is accepted, what is the answer to the question: do we not follow the same path in order to know the X which is signified as an X, not only by primary qualities, but also by secondary qualities?

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[20] *Ibid.,* p. 21 : The *same material thing* may be perceptually realized either as a *physical* or as an *aesthetic object.* This refers to *two modes of perception different in category* (underlining mine).

[21] *Ibid.,* p. 23.

[22] *Ibid.,* p. 20.

[23] *Ibid.,* p. 20: This kind of perception is what I am trying to *isolate* and characterize for what it is worth (italics mine).

What would differentiate a cognitive procedure from an aesthetic one (PR), given that in both of them the qualities primary and secondary are involved? Of course, there is proposition 11 which might be used as a resort in the sense that while the qualities (colour, sound etc.) are necessary conditions for PR, but not sufficient, the addition of the mind's potential as another necessary condition secures the set of sufficient conditions for PR.

This proposition is obviously of paramount importance and deserves much more explanation. Contrary to the detailed descriptions of the X's qualities, there has not been given a satisfactory description explaining why «what you have in mind is a condition of what you see», how is this supported, what mechanisms are functioning, and, above all, how the mind's content («what you have in mind») can provide a firm base for the sought criterion.

I will try to explain proposition 11, but I will eventually use it to arrive at a different conclusion. My emphasis is transferred from the object qualities to the «content» of mind. The mechanism behind aspection is projection through what the transactionalists call *assumption*. Let me first give a brief account of the concept of assumption. An assumption is a kind of stabilizer[24] of experience. It is what persists throughout from the initial stimuli which is refined and crystalized as past experience[25]. Any new perceptual experience is referred to, and signified by, the assumption pattern. The assumptions themselves are *modified* and *modifying;* they are always *organized* and *organizing.* Kilpatrick is explicit:

> «If we follow the theory outlined in this book this integration is based on assumptions built up through part experience; that is, through acting with respect to the same or similar stimulus patterns. It follows that the perception is an interpretation, a 'bet' as to what is occurred out there»[26].

Kilpatrick is characteristically emphatic as to how the new experiences are signified. For him the assumptions almost determine both the way we perceive and the meaning of our perceptual experiences[27]. Note at this point Aldrich's proposition 11 that the ways we look at, and see, things are conditioned by the content of mind. Transactionalists assure us that the stimulus pattern does not exist objectively; the outside world is not mirrored passively in the perceiver's consciousness. Indeed, experiments carried out by the transactionalists Ames, Kilpatrick, and Ittelson, such as the (distorted room»,

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[24] The term was suggested to me by Professor Lambros Houssiadas of the University of Salonica. Although the suggestion referred to Piaget's psychology, I found it adequate to characterize as such the concept of assumption.

[25] P. F. KILPATRICK, *Explorations in Transactional Psychology,* New York University Press (1961), pp. 46, 49, 53, and 257.

[26] *Ibid.,* p. 265.

[27] *Ibid.,* p. 257 : Under one complex of assumptions stimuli will be perceived in another way.

«the rotated trapezoid», and «the cards» strongly support their claim.

Proposition 11 can also be related with Piaget's theory of schemata as well as Husserl's concept of horizon. Both schema and horizon are crystallized past experience; they play an operational role[28] in the sense that both the perceptual mode at any moment and the percept of each object are conditioned by them. The following diagram might be helpful in seeing better the operational mechanisms involved in Aldrich's aspection.

Aldrich rightly says that we might see his geometric figure (a) now as a tunnel, now as a lampshade, now as an aerial view of a pyramid and so forth (b). The explanation according to the perception theory which I use is that for each aspect (pyramid, lampshade, tunnel) there is a corresponding schema or assumption (past experience) (c) which is activated precisely at the input moment of the stimuli derived from the now perceived object (a). The new, yet uncrystallized, stimuli pattern is accommodated into the relevant assumptions pattern; it is referred, and interpreted semantically. Bruner would call it *categorization* and categorical identity[29]. If it is referred to the schema of pyramid, then the object (a) is interpreted as a pyramid. The new stimuli might, however, be referred to the schema of the lampshade; then the object will be interpreted and recognized as a lampshade. Some perception theorists call this operation projection: the schema (c) is projected upon the object (a).

If this perception theory is sound — I believe it is — one might wonder how much or at all Aldrich's concept of aspection can provide a safe base for the aesthetic. In the first place, because aspection is conditioned by the content of mind (prop. 11), and since assumptions or schemata are subject to continuous modification, there can be no way to single out a *sui generis* way of looking, an X, that could be called aesthetic. Perhaps, one might go back to the object qualities (a) to resort to a *certain kind* of qualities. This, no doubt, will not help because the object qualities are there, and if they are signified in a variety of ways this is due according to Aldrich to the variety of ways we look at them (aspection). The same object with its qualities might be «simply seem (aesthetic) or «observed» (the way scientists observe) or holophrastically seen

[28] See my study «Husserl's Concept of 'Horizon' and the Psychological Concepts of 'Schema' and 'Assumption⁵»), *Platon,* vol. K' (1968), pp. 307 - 317.

[29] J. BRUNER, J. GOODNOW, and G. AUSTIN, *A Study of Thinking,* Science Edition, New York (1965), p. 9.

(HP). Secondly, provided that a passivity, camera-like perception theory is rejected[30], it might be argued that here is involved a puzzling circularity. Suppose — see the diagram — that the aesthetic is a certain kind of perceiving (bx); bx is conditioned by *c* and *a*. But you might, in turn, claim that *c* is conditioned by a, and *b* as well as that *a* is conditioned by *b* and c. Note carefully how the three factors *a, b, c* are related in terms of what Aldrich calls aesthetic perception (propositions 3, 6, 9).

These two main criticisms, I think, render the aspection theory inadequate to offer a firm account of the aesthetic. However, Aldrich brought to the hitherto endless discussions another dimension. It is an important emphasis upon a factor (in between object and experience) which was rather considered in a secondary manner when discussions mainly were focused either upon the object or the experience. It waits, and deserves, to be further investigated by both perception psychologists and aestheticians.

IV

If the points made in the preceding commentaries are correct, then one might draw the following general conclusions:

(1)   Despite the numerous studies[31] in Aesthetics the aesthetic criterion cannot be said it has been adequately established.

(2)   Nevertheless, investigations focused upon both the ways of perceiving and the resulting experiences (content of mind) have considerably cleared up the conceptual geography of the issue.

(3)   Help from object-oriented theories cannot be expected to be of much importance. Although the object is a main factor in any aesthetic study, itself seems to be a poor base for the needed *sui generis* mark, the aesthetic.

(4)   Both the circularity problem (object — way of perceiving — experience), and the change-staticity (Heraclitus - Parmenides) problem seem to be most formidable to any endeavor towards the establishment of the aesthetic.

(5)   However, it might be said Aesthetics has to, and can, work with tentative definitions. Tentativeness in definitions is not an unusual practice among sciences.

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[30] The activity theory of perception has been advocated by many philosophers and psychologists: ARISTOTLE, *Posterior Analytics*, Book II, Chapter 19; W. JAMES, *The Principles of Psychology*, H. Holt, New York 1890, pp. 1 - 2 , 78, 107; J. Drever's epitomizing statement is : It seems that we must think of perception as something the organism *does,* not something which happens to the organism, and our ways of talking do not always take this into account. See his article «Perceptual Learning», *Annual Review of Psychology*, 1959, p. 131.

[31] I have examined only some of these studies which I believe fairly represent the recent literature concerning this topic.

THE FACE BEHIND THE FOUNTAIN: WHAT HEIDEGGER DID NOT SEE IN *ORIGIN*

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ABSTRACT

Heidegger claimed that world beings, existing or extant, including artworks, become intelligible in the preservation of perceptual determinations instigated by some extraordinary art that stands apart in being world-disclosive. In the lack of adequate premising scholarship has found this claim so incoherent, that it dismissed its seriousness and has treated all art Heidegger pointed to as equal. Besides being an issue in itself, this relinquishing leaves unanswered the biggest liability in Heidegger's philosophy, the so-called "Münchhausen circularity" between Being and Dasein in the creation of world. But there is evidence to actually validate the exorbitant claim, evidence Heidegger himself did not see emerging as a potential from within his own conjectures. A phenomenological reduction that allows the implementation of suprasegmental theory of prosody suggests that *Blonde Youth*, an early fifth century Greek statue is the missing art through which all art, and with it all world constituency, has become intelligible.

KEYWORDS: Heidegger, Blonde Youth, Face, Roman Fountain, Greek statuary

1. The Anomaly that Explains the Normal

Heidegger has been caught to display a certain "legendary hermeneutic arrogance" whenever he found himself understanding more than the artist about what was at work in the artist's work.[1] Perhaps it is about time to have the compliment returned to him, from a state of affairs in which he otherwise gave us insight in great abundance. There is, indeed, something most important this time Heidegger himself failed to see in his own work, in the case he made regarding the origin of world in *The Origin of the*

Work of Art.

We recall the two most brazen claims in *Origin*, that world *begins* at the footstep of the Greek temple and that the Greek statue is not a representation but *is* the god himself.[2] So brazen indeed, that if *Origin* could remain somewhat comprehensible, these claims had to be watered down. Hence Julian Young's conceding that Heidegger could not possibly have been serious about this, that he was just being "poetic."[3] Paradigmatic of Thomas Kuhn's dictum that in rational syllogisms what is overlooked resurfaces as an anomaly from which the entire edifice must be reinterpreted, what is skimmed out of *Origin* is precisely that from which Heidegger's radical hypothesis of art as the provenance of world may begin to make sense. Not to mention, that hinged in this demonstration initially pertaining only to *Origin*, lies the viability of Heidegger's case against Western metaphysics in its entirety.

Suppose we push the anomalous work under the carpet and instead try to comprehend and appropriate the more user-friendly interpretations of art in *Origin*. What ensues is a cacophony between scholars who exclude or underplay one normal artwork in order to argue the higher importance of another. Yet no normal artwork can be appropriated and understood in *Origin* or elsewhere in Heidegger's discussions of art if the anomaly is not first appeased, since for Heidegger there is some art through which all world objects, including other artworks, become intelligible, and no other art is intelligible until that world-disclosive art is discerned from all that which it determines. If all art is equal, then art is not the extraordinary conception Heidegger meant it to be beyond aesthetics.

That primordial art through which all other art is intelligible *ought* to appear as an anomaly, to the degree that its appropriation necessitates a certain violation of the usual order of things. In *Being and Time* we already read that the access to such a determining primordiality requires that the authentic interpretation must transcend its own presumptions, "*that it be in charge of the being of this being in spite of this being's own tendency to cover things over*"; and that the existential analytic towards such an extraordinary task "… constantly has the character of *doing violence* …"[4] And yet the call for the confrontation with the origin of world through the anomaly which Heidegger impregnates *Origin*, has gone unanswered.

Heideggerians typically pay attention to just three works interpreted in *Origin*: Van Gogh's peasant shoes painting, the Greek Doric temple, and C. F. Meyer's poem *Roman Fountain*. The fourth work, the statue, always goes unnoticed, evidently due to its highly anomalous proclamation as "god himself." Just like the German Romantics who are said to have suffered under the "tyranny of Greece over Germany,"[5] (Heine, Hölderlin and Nietzsche lost their mind in the end) modern scholars don't know what to do with the hot potato that is the Greek statue. Soon after its introduction as god, the statue is ignored even by Heidegger himself. His undue prioritization of the temple over the statue in claiming that the statue's presence is determined and possible only by means of the temple,[6] has Young and Hubert Dreyfus focus on the temple instead. Before they are done with the temple, however, they further exclude Van Gogh's work

for being inconsistent and irrelevant to art's essential capacity to disclose world.[7] But then neither can the temple serve this purpose. In Young's concession, "whether or not *some* artwork may have created the Greek world, it is extremely difficult to see how it could have been *the temple*."[8] The indispensable role that the world-disclosive work can play in our overcoming the epiphenomenal aesthetic understanding of art that we inherited from Romanticism, has Iain Thomson discern that "[t]here are, in my view, only two viable candidates to fill this crucial role … Meyer's poem and Van Gogh's painting."[9] Others have seen in the *Roman Fountain* alone the significance of certain motifs, patterns and metaphors which better explain Heidegger's alternative ontology, justifying in this way Heidegger's attention to the poem. William Tate argues that Heidegger refers to the *Fountain* because it describes his understanding of the relation between earth and world,[10] while Robert D. Cumming notices the *Fountain*'s recirculation of water serving as a metaphor of the circular logic between Being and Dasein.[11] In *The Overlooked Work of Art in "The Origin of the Work of Art,"* Karen Gover argues that Heidegger uses the fountain poem to illustrate a central problem concerning the status of art as mimesis.[12]

Yet the one work *really* overlooked in *Origin* by scholarship and from some point on even by Heidegger himself, is the statue. This bears consequence. It may be a long shot, but we must start somewhere: none of the works discussed either in *Origin* or elsewhere by Heidegger or anyone else concerned with art can be understood, if the Greek statue is not first understood. While Heideggerian scholarship busies itself with ontological concerns over the other works, there is evidence that the Greek statue alone is that which immanently pertains to Heidegger's *fundamental* ontology, the only launch pad from where the breach with aestheticism and the break with Western metaphysics can be raised. Evidence that the reprioritization I suggest does not belong to the dissonance of antagonistic prioritizations set off by *Origin* is that arguably no other work, not even the Greek temple, is intelligible if not from the determinations of the understanding covertly disclosed as the Greek statue to its preservers.

We recall that for Heidegger the *world-disclosive* attunement is just one particular *mood*, and we observe that moods can manifest and appear themselves *originally* in the world only as human face. The face as the *original* appearance of mood is the very reason why while all animals have heads, only humans have face; a conjectural indication that Heidegger was right to believe that animals have no world. As regards to extant beings, a Doric or Gothic temple, tragic or epic poetry, a fountain expressed in the Rococo or Bauhaus style, and the painting of a pair of work shoes either worn at the stage of the opera or in the deep soil furrows of the field can all encompass and convey certain moods. They can indeed exude and be made through and through of mood alone. But such works are mere ontological aftermaths of world inception, since they can only *mediate* mood within a world already established. The fundamental ontological manifestation of the many world-*maintaining* moods in general, as well as the one world-*disclosive* mood of primordial Angst in particular, can originally manifest and appear amongst extant and existing beings only as face. And since not existing but

only extant beings can be regarded as artworks, then amongst extant beings no temple, fountain, or shoe, only the statue can afford a face. Were we to accept, of course, that the statue is an extant being, which as we will see in what follows, *it is not*.

The face of the statue, or rather the world-disclosive mood, that is face, that is statue, being the primordial disclosure of intelligibility, arguably lies behind and makes intelligible the other three artworks discussed in *Origin*. Amongst them, the easiest to showcase this furtive metaphysical dependence, is the *Roman Fountain*. And despite what Tate, Cumming, and Grove argue from their ontological perspectives, Heidegger's preoccupation with fundamental ontology suggests that this forsaken dependence of the *Roman Fountain* to the statue must be the reason alone which, even subliminally, obliges Heidegger to take notice of Meyer's poem.

To demonstrate the dependence of the particular normal artwork that is the *Roman Fountain* to the anomaly that is the statue, we must correspondingly identify a particular statue that determines and shows the dependence. *Origin* speaks of the Greek statue in general, but not all Greek statues are equal in fundamental ontological terms. The elusive dependence would be demonstrable provided that there is a Greek statue that is nothing but "face," where this face would manifest as no other than the world-disclosive mood that precedes and instigates Dasein's temporal horizon of the disclosure of beings. In other words, *if there is some art through the preservation of which this art's preservers understand any other art for what it is, then that determining art must somehow show to relate to and determine perception "prior" to what it determines in perception*. This primordiality is at least categorically possible because for Heidegger "[t]he nothing is the origin of negation, not vice versa,"[13] and because "[i]n anxiety Da-sein finds itself face to face with the nothing of the possible impossibility of its own existence."[14] From such premises we know that Angst is a more primordial structure than the structure of horizontal temporality and its equiprimordial four existential structures of care through which beings are reified in perception. Hence the statue that we are looking for, should manifest into the world it determines as primordial Angst *itself*.

A statue that satisfies such a high demand of ultimate primordiality has only recently been identified. In "*Blonde Youth*, Lieutenant of the Nothing: Greek Art Responds to Heidegger" (2019),[15] I call for attention to *Blonde Youth*, a largely neglected work oddly wedged in between Archaic and Classical Greece. Art historians have dealt with it hastily, as an anomaly that does not belong to either of the two successive main styles or eras of Greek statuary. The finest specimen amongst just three surviving works of the same "style,"[16] *Blonde Youth* is regarded as defining the threshold between two incommensurable worlds, the Homeric world of mythos and the Socratic world of logos. In his book Arvanitopoulos argues extensively that this must be the kind of *accountable* world-disclosive art Heidegger talked about without knowing about its actual existence, and thus without being able to convince people like Young, who want to know exactly how can some artwork defy alternative explanations of the world's origin to instigate world as it were out of thin air. The only evidence we

have that Heidegger may have met with *Blonde Youth*, somehow sensing this work's exceptionality yet still rather unaware that he was standing before the tangible proof of his own metaphysics, comes from what he wrote in *Sojourns* about his entering the chambers where they kept such works at the Acropolis Museum in Athens, in his visit in 1967. There he had: "… a view that halted the will to understand as it constituted something purely strange. However, this kind of strangeness was not frightening. It led to a world, which had been determined as the inception of a great destiny."[17]

Arvanitopoulos pursues what Heidegger attempted only with Hölderlin's and Sophocles' poetry, but did not commence with the art he regarded as the manifestation into world of the Holy itself.[18] Arvanitopoulos ventures into a full-fledged phenomenological reduction of *Blonde Youth*, where it is shown that the reduction, instead of the expected distillation of the object's experience as an experience that is exclusively human – this is the standard methodological outcome of any phenomenological reduction since its inception by Husserl – it instead leaves as a residue no less than *the conditions of the possibility of human perception and experience themselves*. The anomalous result of the reduction is thus from the outset indicative of this statue's Kuhnian potentiality to explain the other works discussed in *Origin*, along of course with the derivation of the origin of all world beings in that perceptive contingency that is human.

2. Head, Face, and Faciality

The most weighty idea in *Being and Time* must be the world-productive capacity of primordial Angst. It takes the systematic networking of fecund ideas perhaps of the entire *Gesamtausgabe* to premise this singular conclusion, while the value of all that Heidegger wrote depends on whether this conclusion is true. No mythological cosmogony, not the Gods of monotheism, neither the end product of the scientist's thermodynamic regression, nor the feminist's said metaphysical womb; only a mood is that from which *all* has ensued. But what is the relationship between Angst as that world-disclosive mood, and the Nothing as the origin of the negation of the will to live from where the horizontal temporality for the disclosure of beings obtains? Are Angst and the Nothing one and the same? This question can be addressed only at the whereupon of their appearance. But where would that be?

Heidegger often speaks of the Nothing as if it had a face of its own.[19] We find this in expressions such as: "[t]he nothingness of the world in the face of which *Angst* is anxious …,"[20] in "… brings it face to face with …,"[21] and "[i]n *Angst*, Da-sein finds itself faced with the nothingness of the possible impossibility of its existence."[22] If Angst, the mood that it is, must originally appear amongst phenomena as a human face, and if the Nothing as the origin of negation in the face of which one is anxious is the ultimate world-productive exigency, then primordial Angst and the Nothing must converge indistinguishably into one phenomenon. This is actually what Heidegger means when he writes that "… these two phenomena coincide."[23] We note that only

charitably is here the Nothing called a phenomenon, since for Heidegger the Nothing, or the "nullity of Being," may appear amongst beings as if it was the beings themselves and thus only in concealment. Be that as it may, because in the said "face to face" *two* "faces" are involved as Angst and the Nothing converge to define the essence of Dasein, the result of this encounter should appear as *something akin* to the phenomenon we understand as face. But not quite.

Heidegger clarifies that whereas all other, innerworldly moods like fear may show up amongst phenomena (where we may add that they must originally appear as face), the one world-disclosive mood cannot appear as the living human face precisely because of its essential affinity with the Nothing, itself always doubly concealed in *alētheia* as deception and as refusal.[24] In several contexts throughout *Being and Time* we are told that primordial Angst never occurs isolated in the stream of experience, that it is covered up or distorted as fear by the they, that it is never objectively present in the world.[25]

But then how is it possible that we have any glimpse or understanding of primordial Angst, if this world determinant does not appear in experience albeit only in concealment, at best only as something other than what it is? Heidegger looks at Sophocles' poetry and the Greek temple and points to art. Yet poetry and architecture are only aftermaths of the original event of appropriation of primordial Angst as art. Arguably the price Heidegger had to pay for this miscue is registered as the biggest delinquency in his philosophy, no less than the ultimate failure to connect Dasein with Being and *Being and Time* with *Origin*. A failure he admitted only by 1956: "the relation of Being and human being, a relation that is unsuitably conceived even in this version has posed a distressing difficulty, which has been clear to me since *Being and Time* and has since been expressed in a variety of versions."[26] Heidegger may have considered the temple and the poem for the housing of Being, but that evanescent objectivity in need to be housed must first be objectified as the *object* that frees. Dasein's resisting what negates its will to live in a world, first of all requires a body; and more so, a body that is essentially tragic. Poetry and architecture can only name and house that body, thus they cannot be the art in question. What art is then that which, being the *ens transcendens*, the mediator between Being and Dasein, can afford to bear the *original* precipitation of the originary attunement *as a phenomenon* in its essential convergence with the concealed nullity of Being? It is from such considerations that we are lead to the Greek statue.

And there are further exclusions to be made. If what we understand as face is constituted only by innerworldly moods, and if originary Angst is not one of them, then originary Angst cannot appear as face. This qualifier would exclude all the statues that have a mere face. In fact Arvanitopoulos excludes all Greek statuary art, except the three aforementioned surviving specimens from the lingering threshold between mythos and logos. If originary Angst is embodied to objectify the object that frees as a transcendental determination, originary Angst must appear as something that lies "behind" face and determines face in the very same way that face lies "behind" and

determines head.

In the case of humans, and at the first level of this threefold relation between head, face, and what lies behind face, the relationship between head and face is not causal, as if facial expressions configured the head stretching the hypodermal maxillary structures in a mechanical linkage. This only happens with the non-human animal, at best with the cranial structure of primates, which despite possessing muscular-maxillary structures somewhat comparable to human, still do not have face. The face of a human being does not *cause* the configuration of the human head, like the movement of one part of the human body, say the movement of a finger, causes the configuration of the hand. Because of its dependent relation to face, neither is the human head part of an unbreakable continuance of the human body through the same certain biological processes which compile cellular layers genetically driven by the certain utilitarian purpose that the head serves in the animal's body. In this elucidation the human face is detached from the rest of the human body no less than how much the human face is detached from the animal kingdom. Deleuze and Guattari observe this phenomenon when they write in *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* that: "The head, even the human head, is not necessarily a face. The face is produced only when the head ceases to be a part of the body, when it ceases to be coded by the body, when it ceases to have a multidimensional, polyvocal corporeal code – when the body, head included, has been decoded and has to be overcoded by something we shall call the Face."[27]

All in all, the causal relations that delimit natural science cannot explain the human face. In *What is a Face?* Daniel Black examines various scientific accounts to conclude that the face is still "the most mercurial, unstable, and elusive feature of human anatomy, endlessly exceeding efforts to capture it and draw a stable, generalized view of it from its endlessly shifting living reality."[28] If, unlike what transpires in the animal kingdom, the human face does not *cause* the configuration of the human head, how then are the two necessarily related?

The better exegesis of the elusive relation between head and face in spite of *causality* is available by the alternative phenomenological concept of *grounding*. Heidegger's phenomenology replaced the empiricist concept of causality with that of grounding as part of his sweeping movement to undo the epiphenomenal, naïve story-telling of Western metaphysics shared by philosophy, science, and religion regarding the origin of "the" world. It is partially from this replacement that a brand new, critical understanding of "world" became possible, where world is shown to be not a universal container of an unaccountable origin, but a dynamic, itinerant horizon of disclosure hauled along by Dasein's existential intentionality.

Grounding is not a new concept at all. It is deep-rooted both in archaic German and in ancient Greek. Before its recognition by phenomenology, the concept laid dormant in the verb *grund*, which originally meant "grind," then "sandy soil" and "earth" as noun. As a verb, *gründen* translates "to ground," "to base." *Begründen* means "to establish" or "justify." Two other cognate nouns relevant in our developing context, are *Urgrund*

and *Ungrund*, the first translating as "primal ground," the second as "unground" or "groundless."[29] The concept of the original noun *grund* was instrumental in the formulation of the "principle of sufficient reason" (Leibniz, Schopenhauer); in *Der Satz vom zureichenden Grund*, "nothing ever happens unless it has a cause of at least a determining reason," where every cause is a type of ground.[30] We may observe how it is logically tenable to replace causality by the grounding, in the deductive argument "All men are mortal/Socrates is a man => Socrates is mortal." The first premise "All men are mortal" reveals the logical possibility of a relation between predicate and subject that is not causal, but a relation between the ground and the grounded in grounding. Here the universal proposition contains the ground of the understanding that Socrates is mortal, without the predicate itself being the cause of Socrates' death. In *The Essence of Reasons* Heidegger associates *Grund* with the Greek noun *archē*, which means both "beginning" and "principle" or "measure," together as "beginning by a measure," or "measured beginning."[31] The definition thus qualifies *Blonde Youth* as *archē-technē* just in case this work is found to be the art that discloses world as a measured beginning for its preservers. This is precisely the reason art historians nonchalantly speak of works in terms of a certain "rhythm," the other name for "measure." Supportive to our argument that only statuary art can disclose world because only through a body, not a poem or a temple, can Dasein free itself by resisting what negates its will to live, is Heidegger's other observation, this time in *The Essence of Grounds*, that: "Freedom is the origin (*Ursprung*) of the principle of ground."[32] Last in our cursory reference over the most important phenomenological concept of grounding, is this: because Dasein as a finite temporal being exists only for as long as it steps beyond itself to negate the negation to have a world, the grounding as sufficient reason *for existence* is not to be understood by *Grund* or *Urgrund*, ("ground" or "primal ground"), but only by *Ungrund* ("groundless").

As we saw, the raw groundlessness of Being, a *primordial* attunement that it is, cannot appear objectively, uncovered and isolated in human experience; thus the primordial attunement would never appear *as face* when the face configures, that is, *grounds* the living head into a head that is *human*. Since the world-disclosive attunement surfeits the loss of world, the closest it may appear as Dasein's face to ground the configuration of head is either as sheer boredom or as fear. On the other hand, we also saw Heidegger insisting that the statue is god *himself*. If what makes the statue "god" can be no other than this work's disclosure of the blueprint of *human* experience to the work's preservers, then here we have clear indication that Heidegger had actually intuited – and vastly elaborated on – the primordial *structures* which instigate this disclosure, albeit without being able to see these structures manifest not merely in art but *as* art. In the art that he paid attention to these structures were already a concealed aftermath and thus not available to cognition prior to the phenomenological reduction which Heidegger never attempted with the statue. This explains why Heidegger was unable to respond from the poem or the temple to people like Young, who retorted that "whether or not *some* artwork may have created the Greek world [sic], it is extremely difficult to

see how it could have been *the temple*."³³

But in the statue the primordiality of Being cannot hide as easily as in *Antigone* or the Doric column. Arvanitopoulos applies in his phenomenological reduction of *Blonde Youth* suprasegmental theory, typically used to help explain some aspects of the mystical phenomenon of prosody in linguistic renditions. He is thus able to discern and analyze by cross-reference between *Blonde Youth* and Heidegger's discussions of how Dasein relates to Being, one by one seven concomitant and overlapping suprasegmentals converging to render the otherwise elusive primordial attunement into a *phenomenon*, that is, *a being*, albeit an anomalous one amongst the world's other, normal extant and existing beings. These suprasegmentals are recognized, more or less analyzed always in different contexts, and are scattered throughout Heidegger's works. They are: Implosion (*Gegenwendigkeit*), Deficiency (*Unzulänglichkeit*), Reticence (*Verschwiegenheit*), Detachment (*Wirklichen*), Awe (*Scheu*), Offence (*Verletzung*), and Uncanniness (*Unheimlichkeit*), in this order from the more primordial ones to the more worldly. It is also considered but remains indecisive whether the manifold of the suprasegmentals should also include Guilt (*Schuld*).

The manifold of the seven suprasegmentals is found through the reduction to constitute *Blonde Youth* in a mode no other world object or being, either extant or existent, is assembled. Here the manifestation of what we understand as "art" into an object of perception *thoroughly consumes the material it uses to make itself manifest by rendering the material absolutely dependent to what has manifested in it*. The dependence of the material to what manifests in it and gives it form precipitates to such an overwhelming degree, that the material disappears in this dependence. Were we to remove "the art" out of this exocosmic object otherwise so casually displayed at the museum, where the "art" is *no other* than the manifold of the concomitant suprasegmentals converging into what Heidegger explicated as the elusive primordial attunement, then *the object itself would vanish from perception, since the determination through which the object is understood for what it is and for whom it is, would be what has departed*. No other object in Dasein's world, including other objects we consider as art, bears such a burden as a payback for its own constitution. In the clearing of beings that is Dasein, phenomena never carry along *as their own* ontological constituency the fundamental ontological exigency that instigates the possibility that they appear, *together with the determination of the existence of whomever they appear for*.

Blonde Youth blatantly violates the nuclear proclamation of the Heideggerian transcendentalism, namely that: "The being of beings 'is' itself not a being."³⁴ For here it is, Being perfectly visible if the possibility for intelligibility in itself was ever possible to see and touch. It is a being amongst all others, its praesence ultimately vilifying Heidegger in *Origin* but contesting him in *Being and Time*, and vice versa for different reasons. Heidegger may have foreseen that somewhere in the history of Being expressed in Dasein's *volatile* datability Being would force itself into the clearing that itself instigates, legislates, assembles, and occludes, albeit disclosing itself therein in praesence (present in absence) as a false equal amongst other beings. This explains why

Blonde Youth has always been inauthentically understood along the lines of statuary art, as a representation, an idealization, a historical or climatological accident, etc., all except what this object really is. Only the Homeric Greeks[35] and now Heidegger, experienced and understood, respectively, the statue as the god himself. The temple and the poem would not fulfil this expectation, to the degree that Young's objection is a sound and universally accepted argument in our objectivism. But in preobjective experience, in the praesence of *Blonde Youth* Dasein dissolves into the dark light where *das Nichts Nichtet*, comes face to face with Νύξ Ἔρεβός τε μέλαν πρῶτον καί Τάρταρος εὐρύς,[36] Dasein attunes to the Doric rhythm which measures its existence from the bowels. Notwithstanding their own deception, art historians have not failed to feel the unbearable mood, as *Blonde Youth's* surviving counterpart *Euthydikos Kore's* nickname is "the moody one." Post-Homerically speaking, Heidegger may have not anticipated such a great degree of an authentic encounter between *Sein* and *Lichtung* when he saw that: "Thought of in reference to beings, this clearing is more in being that are beings."[37]

It may be a counterintuitive, indeed a seemingly ludicrous idea coming from the preobjective encounter with equipmentality only the phenomenological reduction may unleash, but *Blonde Youth does* precede and determine its own discovery in a way that even the laws of physics do not precede and determine their own discovery, where: "Before Newton's laws were discovered, they were not 'true.'"[38] The *unearthing* of this marble god in 1923 could not have been chronicled "prior" to the disclosure *by this object* to its preservers of the possibility of discovery as an existential structure of Dasein and the possibility of earth as Dasein's ground. The unearthed primordial mood as art is the very condition for the understanding of earth, since Heidegger elaborated on how "understanding … is also always attuned, that is, mooded."[39] We may unshakably believe that the earth and the Earth and all that comes with it in the historical having-been of humanity are all initially there prior to what determines and discloses their possibility, but Heidegger demonstrated that the constitution of the object of perception is *itinerant* in the temporal horizon of disclosure, and that: "what is initially 'there' is nothing else than the self-evident, undisputed prejudice of the interpreter, which is necessarily there in each point of departure of the interpretation as what is already 'posited' with interpretation as such, that is, pre-given with fore-having, fore-sight, fore-conception."[40] The fact that this art appears as yet another historical happenstance within the world as a spatial container which otherwise this art alone has allowed to obtain, owes only to our *aesthetic* misunderstanding of art and world. *Thrown* Dasein experiences this god not as the mediator of the Holy between Being and beings that it is, but only in how this mediator lets itself appear as the limestone thing under concealment. The Cartesian subject/object dichotomy masks the primordial world-production in the art's preservation of the instigated perceptual contingency. Our factical familiarity with the limestone, our incredulous assuredness that the limestone is what this object is made of, hides our originary fundamental ontological dependence which has legislated the clearing of the thing in the first

place. This is what Heidegger means in: "What seems natural to us is presumably just the familiarity of a long-established custom which has forgotten the unfamiliarity from which it arose."[41] Since "*archae*-ology" is not at all the science of unearthing, understanding, and appropriating things bygone, it is rather logos probing on its own *measured beginning*, archaeological discovery and unearthing cannot precede the interpretation that is perception; it is inextricable part of it and it is instigated with every single event of enowning appropriation (*Ereignis*). Thus world is reenacted and with it the marble god is discovered and unearthed if ever, ever anew. It is only from this preobjective understanding of the possibility of perception in general, and of the possibility to perceive the archaeological object in particular, that Heidegger makes sense in saying that: "… temporality temporalizes itself in every ecstasy. Temporalizing does not mean a 'succession' of ecstasies. The future is *not later* than the having-been, and the having-been is *not earlier* than the present. Temporality temporalizes itself as a future that makes present, in the process of having-been."[42] In our grounding throwness we are held hostage to the prejudice that the earth precedes what the earth hides in it, so that the soil of the northeast cliffs of the Acropolis where *Blonde Youth* was excavated appears, together with what is dug out of it, under the three pre-Heideggerian conceptions of the thing: as formed matter (Aristotle), a bearer of traits (Hume), and as the unity of the sensory manifold (Kant). But Heidegger has demonstrated – at least he tried, looking at the wrong art – that it is only from art that we can arrive to the thing, not the other way around. *Blonde Youth* precedes the soil out of which it was dug out, and with this it precedes and determines the Earth and the ever expansive plenum that surrounds it. The Greek ontotheology which returns with Heidegger to haunt both Ptolemy and Copernicus by relapsing us to this, forgotten *existential* geocentrism, is a precedence nevertheless inconspicuously reenacted by Dasein at each and every event of hermeneutical appropriation.

The exposure of the prosodic suprasegmentals to intelligibility in the reduction releases the rarest of sights: *Blonde Youth* summoning for the understanding *the originary* clash of earth and world both as grounds. This is the world-disclosing *Grundriss*, prior to the disclosure of beings, where earth as ground is *recalcitrance*, and where world as ground is *groundlessness*. Where recalcitrance meets with groundlessness, there *der Klang*, there ἡ κλαγγή των ὅπλων, there the primordial sound, of war, there the first god is born. How is it possible that the two originary grounds meet? "The world grounds itself on the earth and the earth juts through the world. … The world, in resisting upon the earth, strives to raise the earth completely. As self-opening, the world cannot endure anything closed. The earth, however, as sheltering and concealing, tends always to draw the world into itself and keep it there."[43]

Where earth and world clash, the gods are born without face. It is not even by default that we are duped to see face in *Blonde Youth* where there is none. Rather the enforcement of Dasein's aboriginal mandate that we shall never see Being for what it is while it sneaks in so close to us. The Husserlian resurgence of Being in the command to get back to the thing itself, shows that *Blonde Youth* does not represent anything,

it does not even present a thing, but it is the condition for every presence. This is the reason why unlike any other object, that which this object is *really* made of we can never touch. The primordial attunement is a suprasegmental prosody, something like a dark, tragic song. To experience it is, as Thomson promptly anticipates: "… to become attuned to something that is not a thing (hence 'nothing') but which conditions all our experiences of things, something that fundamentally informs our intelligible worlds but that we experience initially as what escapes and so defies our 'subjectivist' impulse to extend our conceptual mastery over everything."[44]

We already saw that the primordial attunement never *appears* in the world which it itself instigates as a human dwelling, never as a *facially*-expressed mood grounding and configuring the living human head. With this exclusion, the conditions for the possibility that the primordial attunement may after all appear in the world are thus: that it appears as the possibility of world *prior* to what this world may contain, that it appears where all moods *first* appear, that it appears *in concealment*, and that it appears *as* art. *Blonde Youth* (with its two surviving peers) emerges as the only world object that satisfies all four conditions.

The second and the third conditions are met with what we have already premised, that moods must first appear in the world as the human face, and that the primordial mood never discloses itself for what it really is in the world it instigates. The first and the fourth conditions are satisfied by this object's consumptive remittance to be the primordial battleground of the originary clash between the dark assuredness of earth and the ethereal groundlessness of world. Only world-disclosive art can lay out the *primordial* battleground for what Heidegger understands as the essential strife, where: "The work-being of the work consists in the fighting of the battle [*der Bestreitung des Streites*] between world and earth."[45] That these two primordialities have actually met *as* this particular work, is observable in that the limestone yields and thoroughly dissolves into the attuned groundlessness which calls out the earth's stubbornness, while in return world is forced down to earth by the earth to reify as tangible matter. The said work-being of the work is that and that alone which objectifies and reifies it, for unlike every other world object here the object's meaning does not stand apart from us as the perceived property of an external object, and neither does its objectification owe to our projection onto it of our own subjectivity. Unlike what is the case with this anomalous object, as we saw earlier innerworldly beings, either extant or existent, never carry along in their objectification what justifies their appearance. The *primordial* interdependence between earth and world in this object is easier to see once we try to figure out what would be left if we subtracted from the object the work-being of the work. Strangely, our answer cannot be "the limestone out of which the work was chiseled," since not only the segmental configuration of the limestone into the constituency of the human head, but also the possibility of "limestone," that is, its eidetic suchness, is absolutely determined by the suprasegmental prosody which the material lets manifest.

In the primordial strife world appears as suprasegmental prosody that *arrests* the

earth's segmental inchoateness, where otherwise the breaking down of a stone always reveals no more than smaller stones, *ad infinitum*. This primordial arresting of the earth's stubbornness by the groundlessness of world appears in meaningful intelligibility as a withholding, a measurement of a certain rhythm. Arvanitopoulos sees here the absolute primordiality of the Doric amongst all the innerworldly historical rhythms, making *Blonde Youth* the only fitting resident of the Doric temple.

In this primordial withholding the head of the statue is not configured by face, but by something lying behind face into which the human face is grounded in the very same way that we saw the human head not being caused by face but being grounded in it. Levinas' extensive discussions of the primitivity of the human face failed to see what lies behind it to ground both face and the human head as human,[46] but Deleuze and Guattari nevertheless did detect an indefinite "someone 'behind' the face," an elusive effect they vaguely coined as "Faciality" (*Facialité*).[47] Faciality is the simplest of structures, the most elementary void, the *Abscondus* in itself, an empty circle drawn on a surface where reportedly people of different ages and cultures inexplicably tend to see an inherent possibility of face.[48] Arvanitopoulos explains the intercultural phenomenon by using Heidegger's fundamental ontology contra Levinas, showing that the head of *Blonde Youth* is directly grounded onto the primordiality of Faciality without the intermediacy of face, as if this head is rendered by a direct implosion into the dark center of a void. While Levinas' metaphysics of alterity is built around two main structures, face and world precipitating *infinitely* in between the said face of the same and the face of the Other, acknowledging the primitivity of the human face as the ultimate transcending grounds, Heidegger insists that the *finiteness* of the horizon of disclosure of beings suggests that there must be some *primordial* determination hiding behind *primitive* Dasein. And whereas Levinas trivialized art in general as a "façade," dismissing the statue as something like a dud,[49]*Blonde Youth* comes back to suggest independently that Heidegger was right and Levinas wrong.

In transposing Heidegger's fundamental ontology to *Blonde Youth*, Arvanitopoulos advances the hitherto vague concept of Faciality into demonstrating its essential equiprimordiality with the nullity of Being. The transposition is possible both in terms of structure (*Fügung*) and as ground (*Ungrund*). In *Origin* and in *The Anaximander Fragment* structure as *Fügung* is the concept that explains how things are delimited to appear as what and for whom they. The concept provides the intelligibility missing in naïve realism's dependence on paratactic causality. *Fügung* is more than a rigid structure, as it *contains*, that is, both includes and withholds movement into a certain rhythm. The containment of the *Fügung* rendering the living head into human head is concentric and concomitant with the encirclement of the Heideggerian concept of the clearing (*Lichtung*) where beings are disclosed. In this concentricity and concomitance, and since mankind is the *Lichtung* itself, the human head may be cleared into a being that is neither extant or existent, just in case it is *Nichtung*, the unadulterated nullity of Being, which renders the head through the manifold of the suprasegmental prosody we understand as Doric. Such a world-disclosing event would be art as prosopo-*poesis*.

It is only through this poesis that we get a glimpse of the "making of a face," of how for the head to be appropriated so that it may appear and function as *human* head, a whole a priori and unseen process is at work behind it: the structure of the Nothing has already aligned with the structure of Faciality, the structure of clearing has already aligned with the structure of face, and both the later structures of the clearing and the face have already been grounded in the former structures of the Nothing and of Faciality. The transcending loci of the clearing and of the face are concomitant because the clearing and the face are both disclosing world constituency as expediencies of more foundational grounding structures disclosing the possibility of world. Accordingly, vulgar, infinite temporality is coincidental only with the movements of the head as a bestowal, while the face of the finite being is moved by worldly moods as a founding, themselves ultimately withheld into the imploding void of Faciality and the primordial rhythm as a grounding (*Ungrund*).

Faciality does not cause the face, it grounds it. For the reasons we already accounted for, this grounding is invisible in the living human face, but slips into the world in concealment as *Blonde Youth*. Faciality is a ground in itself and prior to what it grounds because it is groundless in its essential groundlessness. Face must be grounded in Faciality because only such a groundless grounding can make face out of head. Causes can be understood only as *efficient* causes, whereas Faciality is the origin of every *deficiency*. A deficient mechanical part that fails can be the cause for an unsuccessful airplane take off, but deficiency itself cannot be a cause inasmuch as every appropriation that ensues from it has *succeeded* to fail. In this success, the primordial deficiency is world-productive. In *Art and Space*, Heidegger sees the bounded void which Arvanitopoulos develops into the concept of Faciality initially coined by Deleuze-Guattari, as a grounding and productive deficiency: "And what would become of the emptiness of space? Often enough it appears to be a deficiency. Emptiness is held then to be a failure to fill up a cavity or gap. Yet presumably the emptiness is closely allied to the special character of place, and therefore no failure, but a bringing-forth."[50] In German the Nothing and the ground are both contained in the same world, where the Nothing as ground is the "abyss" (*Abgrund*). Heidegger underlines the ground of all grounds as the Nothing that *is*, in itself: "Being the ground, it itself *is* a nullity of itself. Nullity by no means signifies not being objectively present or not subsisting, but means a not that constitutes this *being* of Da-sein, its thrownness."[51] We already saw that for Heidegger the Nothing, being the ground as unground *is* in itself, as subject and predicate, the nullity of Being that nullifies. We may also assume that Faciality *is* in itself, as the void that voids and thus opens the only possibility of face *as human face*. This is because of all living heads only the human can make manifest the *groundlessness* of Dasein as face behind the head, and since this groundlessness is the very condition of experiencing and expressing truth as un-truth, to which belongs "… the reservoir of the not-yet-revealed, the un-covered, in the sense of concealment."[52]

In *The Essence of Reasons*, written in 1929, Heidegger discerns the primitive threefold function of *gründen*: founding (*Stiften*), gaining ground (*Bodennehmen*), and

giving reasons (*Begründen*). The essence of grounding in the basic threefold function is already implemented with small variations throughout *Being and Time* (1927) and especially in sections III and IV of Division Two, where in the determinations of Being the Nothing thereby grounds, founds, and bestows primitive Dasein. The threefold function appears matured in *Origin* (1935), where now it is the artwork that founds, grounds, and bestows world. By now the three functions of the origin of truth as un-truth are best explicated from art.[53]

From this developed threefold of the grounding, founding, and bestowing of primitive Dasein to which Faciality, face, and head are found to exactly correspond, we may now proceed to conclude our hypothesis that in all its normalcy the *Roman Fountain* is not a self-sustained art that discloses world where world-disclosive art is discussed in *Origin*. That the poem is only a metaphor of something even more originary appearing and dismissed as the anomaly that is the statue.

3. Where What Is Behind Lies Within

Heidegger says that the poem does not present or reproduce the essence of the actual object, which the poem nevertheless vividly describes, but is disclosing something about the origin and the structure of truth:[54] Heidegger has missed something most important about his own work, if the poem is found to be a mere metaphor of another art where the said structure of truth is *originally* disclosed. We juxtapose here C. F. Meyer's 1882 poem in the last of seven original German renditions, the one which Rolf-Peter Wille says not only describes the fountain, but actually builds it.[55]

Roman Fountain	*Der Römische Brunnen*
The jet ascends and falling fills	*Aufsleight der Strahl und fallend gießt*
The marble basin circling round;	*Er voll der Marmorschale Rund*
This, veiling itself over, spills	*Die, sich verchleiernd, überfießt*
Into a second basin's ground.	*In einer zweiten Schale Grund;*
The second in such plenty lives,	*Die zweite gibt, sie wird zureich,*
Its bubbling flood a third invests,	*Der dritten wallend ihre Flut,*
And each at once receives and gives	*Und jede nimmt und gibt zugleich*
And streams and rests.	*Und strömt und runt.*

Heidegger introduces the poem with some inciting yet generic commentary about the relationship between the poet, truth and the work. But even a first look from our context immediately reveals that the fountain's vertical structural staging by basins that *are grounds*, and its concentric threefold componentry, its leveled basins hiding under one another, as well as its source and recycling direction of movement through its core column, corresponds accurately to the *horizontal* structural staging, the threefold componentry overlapping and thus concealing one another, and the source and direction of movement in the face of the *Blonde Youth*.

In the extrapolation and conjointment of fountain and statue the poem bespeaks of the human face as it has never been seen before, either by the commonsensical empiricist understanding of the human face (Hume), or even in the phenomenologically advanced metaphysics of alterity (Levinas). In the empiricist view the face is just *one* manifold world object, resembling something like an absorbing fence between world and brain where both the object of perception and the face itself obtain in causality as *adaequatia rei et intellectus*. In Levinas the face is the deeper layer of now a *two*-structure arrangement, where while the face lies behind the head it is the face that signifies what lies in front of it, the head along with the world that transpires between this face of the same and that face of the Other, because of the other as infinite Other. But this is not the case with the face of *this* marble statue.

Just like with the marble fountain, in the face of the *Blonde Youth* we can distinguish *three*, concentric and superimposed cyclical structures. Here not vertically but horizontally layered in a receding *horizontal* regression, where with "horizontal" we understand both the ontic topography *and* this hermeneutic discernment itself obtaining in the temporal horizon of the discernment's disclosure. In the fountain, the largest of the three basins lies closest to the ground, founding the second basin through the core column and through it bestowing to the third basin and to the fountain as a whole the water as a source of life that rises to feed it through and through. The fountain, and by extrapolation to Heidegger's metaphysics, much more visibly so the statue, answers the woman's question of the whence of world in *New Testament*, John 4:11:

Sir, thou hast nothing to draw with,   λέγει αὐτῷ Κύριε, οὔτε ἄντλημα ἔχεις
And the well is deep;   καὶ τὸ φρέαρ ἐστὶν βαθύ·
From whence then has thou that living water?   πόθεν οὖν ἔχεις τὸ ὕδωρ τὸ ζῶν;

Roman fountain as metaphor
structuring the grounding,
founding, and bestowing of Being

Originary Angst as art
grounding, founding, and bestowing
the mediation of Being to Dasein

The ground that grounds in the statue, and the *Grund* of the fountain's first *Schale,* is *Faciality merged with the Nothing*. While in the fountain this grounding is a metaphor, in the statue as the disclosure of what is particularly human it is a world disclosure. In the statue it grounds and founds the core of Being which rises and runs through all three structures under the pressure (the "jet") of time as a temporality that is pressurized because it is *finite*. In Heidegger's words anticipating such a rising and such a statue: "Da-sein is not itself the ground of its being, because the ground

first arises from its own project, but as a self, it is the *being* of its ground."[56] The fountain's second basin, the one which "invests" and in "plenty lives," corresponds to the statue's *face merged with the clearing*, where the plenitude of beings springs out as investment, or as Heidegger puts it, where beings are disclosed in the clearing of their "service*ability*, us*ability*, detriment*ality*."[57] The fountain's third, smallest and closest to the sky basin is "vailing itself over" and "spills." This basin corresponds to the statue's *head merged with world*, for as we premised earlier the head devoid of face is already part of the assemblage of innerworldly beings. When seen from the right distance from above, the top basin which corresponds to the statue's head completely covers and hides the other two levels which underlie it. Heidegger anticipates this concealing correspondence between the statue and the fountain, in writing that: "Truth essentially occurs as such in the opposition of clearing and *double* concealing."[58] (My italics). The third, highest basin "spills" world back and over to its source, to recycle what itself has been bestowed with from the lowest basin, its grounding. Nowhere else amongst worldly beings, extant or existing, does the grounding basin of the fountain metaphor shows itself in itself, but in this unique statue's head's expression, the *Blonde Youth's* "spill' into world of pure originary Angst, as the mediation of the holiness of Being to Dasein.

   The fountain's cryptic metaphor lets us begin seeing the absence of causality in the structuring and grounding of the three *fully phenomenal* levels which constitute the mediation of the holiness of Being to Dasein. The statue's three levels is a prosodic phenomenon available to the Husserlian essential intuition in a full-fledged phenomenological reduction of the statue; in it Being and Dasein are observable in subjecting themselves into their own business as usual, *merging as one and the same essence concealed in its unconcealment and unconcealed as a concealment*. The segmental manifold of constituency of the statue's head lies on top and thus covers the two suprasegmental structures that bestow this head with its Doric rhythm, because as the face of the nullity that nullifies, this art as head gathers the structural and grounding assemblage of the unadulterated embodiment of primordial Angst.

   In its apposition with the statue, and only herein, the fountain helps us not merely understand, but virtually see how the three levels of Being, primordial *Nichtung*, primitive *Lichtung*, and worldly *Dasein*, are structured and founded *simultaneously behind-while-within* one another towards the production of world, where "each at once receives and gives/and streams and rests." This is the grounding and structural relation between Dasein, the clearing and the Nothing that has had scholarship stranded in scrambling in vain through causal relations and paratactic arrangements. Heidegger had it laying there innocuously in plain sight amidst the incomprehensibility of *Origin*. The apposition of the fountain to the statue is the imagery from which to answer Heidegger's critics like Quentin Lauer, Christopher Fynsk, and Michael Haar, who evidently bind in causal and linear relations cannot accept the so-called "Münchhausen circularity" between Being and Dasein in the creation of world.[59] Outside of our apposing the *behind-while-within* of the fountain as object and art to the statue as

object and art, the *Fountain* remains trivial or at least cryptic in Heidegger's limited interpretation. On the other hand, whereas *in the apposition* the statue's threefold *behind-while-within* layering is immediately observable, yet it is very difficult to talk about, this being the reason these eerie Greek things were always discussed in terms of a mystery and the ineffable.

In the fountain as innerworldly extant being, the mystical vertical structure of the *behind- while-within* startles us only when our phenomenological reduction of the object through the poem has us realize that what we had hitherto viewed so casual and self-evident was in fact so extraordinary. But in the statue as the mediator of Being to the being that exists, the horizontal structure of the *behind-while-within* remains apocryphal because horizontal temporality as the horizon of the disclosure of every interpretation runs through and through the constituency of the three-level structure, merging and fusing it into a unity that is absolute in its own determination, thorough and complete. Thus whereas in the fountain we can actually observe the possibility of a structure as *behind-while-within* by viewing its three basins either from its side or from above it, such a view is *almost* impossible with the head of the statue. In the statue as in the fountain occurs what Heidegger described: "[o]ne being places itself in front of another being, the one helps to hide the other, the former obscures the latter, a few obstruct many, one denies all. Here concealment is not simple refusal. Rather, a being appears, but presents itself as other than it is."[60] In the statue, no matter the angle we view it in trying to discern the two suprasegmental levels, the ever widening "basins" of *Lichtung* and *Nichtung* lying *behind-while-within* one another and both hiding *behind-while-within* the segmental level of head, the head of the statue resists. It remains head. Only the phenomenological reduction of the right art, which is the statue, and then of the right statue, which is *Blonde Youth*, could reveal what Heidegger missed to see in his own work.

Endnotes

1. Iain D. Thomson, *Heidegger, Art, and Postmodernity*, 2001, Cambridge University Press, N.Y., p. 69.

2. Martin Heidegger, *The Origin of the Work of Art*, in *Basic Writings*, edited by David Farrell Krell, 1993, HarperCollins, New York, p. 168.

3. Julian Young, *Heidegger's Philosophy of Art*, 2001, Cambridge University Press, UK, p. 97.

4. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, translated by Joan Stambaugh, 1996, State University of New York Press, New York, p. 289.

5. See E. M. Butler's *The Tyranny of Greece over Germany*, 1935, Cambridge University Press.

6. Martin Heidegger, *The Origin of the Work of Art*, in *Basic Writings*, edited by David Farrell Krell, 1993, HarperCollins, New York, p. 167.

7. See Julian Young, *Heidegger's Philosophy of Art*, 22; cf. Hubert Dreyfus, *Heidegger's Ontology of Art*, 409; Iain Thomson, *Heidegger, Art, and Postmodernity*, 66.

8. Julian Young, *Heidegger's Philosophy of Art*, 2001, Cambridge University Press, UK, p. 30.

9. Iain D. Thomson, *Heidegger, Art, and Postmodernity*, 2001, Cambridge University Press, N.Y., p. 67.

10. William Tate, *"Where Eyes Become the Sunlight": Roman Fountains in Martin Heidegger and Richard Wilbur*, in Janus Head, 2016, Vol 15, issue 2, pp. 133-155.

11. Robert Denoon Cumming, *The Odd Couple: Heidegger and Derrida*, in *The Review of Metaphysics*, Vol. 34, No. 3, March 1981, p. 506.

12. Karen Gover, *The Overlooked Work of Art in "The Origin of the Work of Art,"* *International Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 48, June 2008.

13. Martin Heidegger, *What is Metaphysics*, in *Basic Writings*, edited by David Farrell Krell, 1992, Harper San Francisco, p. 105.

14. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, translated by Joan Stambaugh, 1996, State University of New York Press, New York, p. 245.

15. Michael Arvanitopoulos, *"Blonde Youth:* Lieutenant of the Nothing: Greek Art Responds to Heidegger," 2019, on review, University of Crete Press, Athens, Greece.

16. The *Euthydikos Kore* and the *Kritios Boy* are the other two.

17. Martin Heidegger, *Sojourns – The Journey to Greece*, translated by Panteleimon Manoussakis, foreword by John Sallis, 2005, State University of New York Press, p. 45.

18. See in George Kovacs' *The Question of God in Heidegger's Phenomenology*, 1990, Northwestern University Press, the case of Heidegger's replacement of "god" to "holy."

19. Actually this occurs literally only in Joan Stambaugh's English translation. Heidegger uses either the relative adverb *Wovor* or *davor*, which literally translate accordingly as "be-fore-what" or "be-fore." Stambaugh's translation, however, is at least conceptually justified since it follows the first reference of "face" to connect the human with the holy in Greek, serving to Heidegger's intention. Ioannis Chrystostomus was using the phrase ἐνώπιος ἐνωπίω ("face to face") in the *New Testament* by 4-5 AD.

20. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, translated by Joan Stambaugh, 1996, State University of New York Press, New York, p. 315.

21. *Ibid.*, New York, p. 245.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 245.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 315.

24. Martin Heidegger, *The Origin of the Work of Art*, in *Basic Writings*, edited by David

Farrell Krell, 1993, HarperCollins, New York, pp. 178-179.

25. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, translated by Joan Stambaugh, 1996, State University of New York Press, New York, pp. 179, 316, 175, 315.

26. In the 1956 addendum to *Origin*, commented by Sharin Elkholy in *Heidegger and a Metaphysics of Feeling*, 2008, Continuum, New York, pp. 9-10.

27. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, 1987, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, p. 170.

28. Daniel Black, *What is a Face?*, in *Body and Society* journal, vol. 17, 4: pp. 1-27, 2011, pp. 4, 8, 27.

29. Michael Inwood, *A Heidegger Dictionary*, Blackwell Publishers, 1999, Oxford, UK, p. 82-85.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 83.

31. Martin Heidegger, *The Essence of Reasons*, GA 9: 4f; S, 220ff./181ff.; XLIX, 77.

32. Martin Heidegger, *The Essence of Grounds*, GA 82: WG 51; WG 43-49.

33. We note here Young's uncalled diminishing Dasein's world only as "Greek world," in order to distinguish it from our world. Yet, although Heidegger has talked about a certain "second beginning" of authentic life after the Greeks, the analytics of Dasein do not distinguish between the Greek world as a world bygone and the world you and I live; quite the contrary.

34. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, translated by Joan Stambaugh, 1996, State University of New York Press, New York, p. 5.

35. See Deborah Tern Steiner, in *Images in Mind – Statues in Archaic and Classical Greek Literature and Thought*, observing in *Iliad* a scene where the statue of Athena stands in the temple as the Trojan suppliant women arrive to   ask for help, and where 'Pallas Athena turns her head away' from them. "At no point in the episode does the poet distinguish between the deity and the statue standing in the temple." (2001, Princeton University Press, p. 135.

36. Aristophanes, Comic. *Aves* [0019.006] line 693.

37. Martin Heidegger, *The Origin of the Work of Art*, in *Basic Writings*, edited by David Farrell Krell, 1993, HarperCollins, New York, pp. 178.

38. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, translated by Joan Stambaugh, 1996, State University of New York Press, New York, p. 208.

39. *Ibid.*, p. 234.

40. *Ibid.*, p. 140.

41. Martin Heidegger, *Poetry, Language, Thought*, A. Hofstadter, trans. New York: Harper & Row, 1971: 24; *Gesamtausgabe*, Vol. 5: Holzwege, F.-W. von Herrmann, ed. Frankfurt: V. Klosterman, 2002: 9.

42. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, translated by Joan Stambaugh, 1996, State

University of New York Press, New York, p. 321.

43. Martin Heidegger, *Poetry, Language, Thought*, A. Hofstadter, trans. New York: Harper & Row, 1971: 49; *Gesamtausgabe*, Vol. 5: Holzwege, F.-W. von Herrmann, ed. Frankfurt: V. Klosterman, 2002: 35.

44. Iain D. Thomson, *Heidegger, Art, and Postmodernity*, 2001, Cambridge University Press, N.Y., p. 85.

45. Martin Heidegger, *Poetry, Language, Thought*, A. Hofstadter, trans. New York: Harper & Row, 1971: 49; *Gesamtausgabe*, Vol. 5: Holzwege, F.-W. von Herrmann, ed. Frankfurt: V. Klosterman, 2002: 35-6.

46. I argue that here is the crux of the differences between Heidegger and Levinas.

47. Daniel Black, *What is a Face?*, in Body and Society journal, vol. 17, 4: pp. 1-27, 2011, p. 8.

48. *Ibid.*, pp. 1-27, 2011, pp. 3, 4, 8, 27.

49. In *Totality and Infinity* we read that "[i]t is art that endows things with something like a façade," and that "the gods immobilized in the between-time of art, left for all eternity on the edge of the interval, at the threshold of a future that is never produced, statues looking at one another with empty eyes, idols which, contrary to Gyges, are exposed and do not see." Emmanuel Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, translated by Alphonso Lingis, 1961, Duquesne University Press, Pittsburg, Pennsylvania, pp. 193, 222.

50. Martin Heidegger, *Art and Space*, translated by Charles H. Seibert, Loras College, p. 8.

51. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, translated by Joan Stambaugh, 1996, State University of New York Press, New York, p. 238.

52. Martin Heidegger, *The Origin of the Work of Art*, in *Basic Writings*, edited by David Farrell Krell, 1993, HarperCollins, New York, p. 185.

53. *Ibid.*, p. 199.

54. *Ibid.*, p. 163.

55. Rolf-Peter Wille, blog at meyerbrunnen.blogspot.com.

56. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, translated by Joan Stambaugh, 1996, State University of New York Press, New York, pp. 362-363.

57. *Ibid.*, pp. 135-136.

58. Martin Heidegger, *The Origin of the Work of Art*, in *Basic Writings*, edited by David Farrell Krell, 1993, HarperCollins, New York, p. 185.

59. In *The Triumph of Subjectivity – An Introduction to Transcendental Phenomenology*, 1978, Fordham University Press, New York, pp. 146-147, Quentin Lauer, S.J. notes that the problem is a fundamental dilemma of all rationalism, bitterly adding that, "Beginnings can never be strictly rationalized, yet all subsequent rationalization

is   rendered suspect by the initial failure." Also, in his *Heidegger Thought and Historicity* Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1993, p. 48-49, Christopher Fynsk observes this: "[W]e have approached the question of the origin of this movement of authentic existence, and though we have seen Heidegger assign something like a spontaneous, autochthonous birth to it, we have also seen that it is caught up in the circular structure whereby it is made possible by what it reveals …" And in his *Heidegger and the Essence of Man*, trans. William McNeill, Albany, State University of New York Press, 1993, p. 14, Michael Haar wonders: "Does Dasein have the potential to make itself possible? The idea that it itself makes itself possible is incredible, no less remarkable than that of the *causa sui*. Would Dasein be like the Baron von Münchhausen, who took hold of his hair to lift himself into the air? Whence does the possibility – as it is not simply logical, but ontological – draw its power to make possible?"

60. Martin Heidegger, *The Origin of the Work of Art*, in *Basic Writings*, edited by David Farrell Krell, 1993, HarperCollins, New York, p. 179.

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• BOOK REVIEW •

N. AVGELIS
INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY
(THESSALONIKI: STAMOULIS 2012)
PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE
(THESSALONIKI: STAMOULIS 2014)

by Emmanuel Perakis
University of Crete

In this article two important Greek academic philosophical books by Emeritus Professor of Philosophy of the Aristotelian University of Thessaloniki Nikos Avgelis, will be presented: Introduction to philosophy (Thessaloniki: Stamoulis 2012) and Philosophy of language (Thessaloniki: Stamoulis 2014).

Writing an introductory book is not something as easy as one might firstly think. In contrast to the usual, purely research books, in the case of an introductory book emphasis should be given on its educational character, without losing its scientific and academic features. An introductory book to philosophy might have a thematic, historical or even mixed character. Professor Nikos Avgelis' Introduction to philosophy has somehow attained the status of a classic for the Greek academic standards, as it has been published seven times, and it has a mixed, thematic and historical character. It is not a concise, simple or popular style introduction. It is a large book of high academic standards, mainly for the undergraduate students.

The book focuses on theoretical philosophy, i.e., ontology, metaphysics and epistemology, leaving aside practical philosophy, i.e., ethics and aesthetics. Obviously the author is quite ambitious aiming not just at popularizing philosophy. His demanding approach on theoretical philosophy is probably due to the view that this kind of philosophy is the core of philosophy.

The main body of the book consists of two parts. In the first part there is an attempt to answer the question 'What is philosophy?' In the second part, through the history of philosophy from Greek antiquity to our times, the main branches of the theoretical

philosophy, namely the metaphysics/ontology, epistemology and philosophy of language are being analyzed. According to the author's view, metaphysics and ontology are at the heart of ancient Greek philosophy, modern philosophy until the nineteenth century focuses on epistemology, whereas there is a linguistic turn in philosophy in the twentieth century.

In the first part, the author makes a general introduction to philosophy by examining the origin of the term, with references to Greek antiquity, especially the pre-Socratic philosophers, Plato and Aristotle, and the reasons that led to philosophy. Then the author presents us the thoughts of many thinkers on philosophy. One of the most important contributions of the book is the chapter on the history of philosophy, which is characteristic of the historical nature of the approach of this Introduction. There are also references to the relation of philosophy and science (without being identical, they share common roots and similarities), as well as the views expressed by various philosophers about the relation of philosophy and religion. Finally, we see the ways in which philosophy has at been divided into various disciplines.

The second and most extensive part of the book is divided into three chapters.

The first chapter (pp. 121-263) is a historical tour to the metaphysical and ontological issues that ancient Greek intellectuals were concerned with. Through the presentation and analysis of several passages, the author presents us the ontological thought of the Presocratics, who attempted to explain the first principles of the world. Then reference is made to the ontological views of the Sophists and Socrates, with whom an anthropological turn in philosophy is observed. Particular emphasis is given on the metaphysical views of Plato and Aristotle. Concerning Plato, the author concentrates on the theory of Ideas, metaphysical issues and related allegories. Concerning Aristotle, the author focuses on his metaphysics, as the science of the first principles and substance and as theology too. The chapter is completed with a short sub-chapter referring to the transition from Neoplatonism to medieval philosophy.

The second chapter (pp. 265-554) covers almost half of the book and introduces us to the epistemological problems that formed the main axis around which the modern thought until the 19th century turned. The author presents the major modern philosophical figures, including useful biographical notes, texts and bibliography.

Through the thought of the three most important rationalists -Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz- we see the epistemological problems of that time. Descartes seeking a new foundation for knowledge through the methodological doubt arrives at the first certainty, 'Cogito ergo sum'. Then he overcomes our doubts about the existence of the external world resting on the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient and benevolent God. According to pantheist Spinoza, God is not the personal God of the religions, but is identified with the world. Leibniz considers the immaterial monads as the essence of the world and distinguishes between logically necessary truths existing in all possible worlds and empirical truths, which are not necessary, but contingent.

A key point in the history of philosophy was the Copernican revolution of the critical philosophy of Kant (pp. 416-81), which constituted the middle ground

between rationalism and empiricism. The author presents in detail key points of Kantian philosophy, including, among other things, Kant's attempt to determine the pre-empirical terms of our experience, as well as the distinctions between a priori and a posteriori knowledge, analytical and synthetic propositions, phenomena and noumena.

The 3 main figures of German idealism, Fichte, Selling and Hegel (pp. 482-542) are also being presented. Fichte's philosophy is a development of Kantian philosophy and sought to understand Kant better than Kant himself. Schelling in his early philosophy identifies the self with everything there is, while in his later philosophy he identifies nature and spirit. Hegel considers the Idea as the true essence of things and overcomes the distinction between subject and object. He transforms Kant's transcendental logic into dialectics and identifies what is real with reason.

Finally, the author refers to Comte's positivism and Nietzsche, who criticized traditional metaphysics and Christian ethics. Nietzsche did not consider knowledge as a kind of perceiving reality per se, but as an interpretation of reality based on the needs of our life.

In the last chapter (pp. 555-66) the author refers to the linguistic turn of philosophy in the 20th century. Wittgenstein considers philosophical problems as products of linguistic confusions. The members of the Wiener Kreis, as well as analytical philosophers adopt a similar view of philosophy.

It might seem strange to the reader that the two parts and the chapters of the book differ too much in size. For example, the second chapter of the second part covers almost half the extent of the book, while the third chapter on the language philosophy covers only a few pages. Apparently the author has followed this way due to the nature of his subject, as well as his interpretational model according to which, in the level of theoretical philosophy, in ancient Greek philosophy the metaphysical and ontological reflection prevailed, in modern philosophy the epistemological reflection, while in the last century there was a linguistic turn in philosophy. Some readers might prefer the book to include references to areas of practical philosophy such as morality and aesthetics as well as more recent developments in modern philosophy. I suppose that the author has historically focused on theoretical philosophy on the grounds that it is the core of philosophical thought and has avoided referring to the most recent modern philosophy, probably considering that engaging with it is a stage following after a first introduction to philosophy.

This book is already quite well known to a number of Greek university students from numerous previous editions. It is not a very simple, very popularizing and very short book. It is quite an extensive and very rich in information book from which the reader can learn a lot about both the history of philosophy and the specific philosophical subjects. The author balances between the necessary simplicity an introductory book must have and the high level of an academic book. The book is mainly addressed to University students, but not exclusively to them: It can also be very useful to the wider, scholarly readership that seeks a valid and reliable guide to

acquaintance with the history of key disciplines of theoretical philosophy, but also to academic scholars, as an invaluable reference book. We could evaluate this book as one of the most convenient and useful textbooks of its kind in Greece, and for this reason it is already widely accepted and appreciated.

The second book of Professor Avgelis, we are going to examine, Philosophy of language, is somehow complementary to the first, despite being more complicated and specialized in its subject. In the Introduction to philosophy, only a few pages focus on the linguistic turn in philosophy in the 20th century. This linguistic turn is central in the Philosophy of language.

In this book the author analyzes the subject both historically (from ancient Greek to contemporary philosophy) and systematically and succeeds in maintaining the balance between academic depth and educational focus. The author explores the genesis and the change of examples or models of language in the history of philosophy. The book is a product of long-term research and teaching by the author.

Philosophy of language lies in the heart of contemporary analytical philosophy that tries to solve the problems that arise from the misunderstandings of language. The first chapter of the book is the one that gives it its special historical character. Here we are given a clear and concise look at the evolution of the philosophy of language from Greek antiquity until the 18th century (pp. 25-88). It is important that in this chapter we can read about the philosophical reflections on language of the ancient Greek philosophers, Plato, Aristotle and Stoics, as well as those of the early modern philosophers, like Locke and Berkeley. As far as I know this is something unique in the Greek philosophical literature and therefore it is an invaluable offer to the Greek readership.

The author begins with Plato's Cratylus for which he mentions that it is the very first text of Western philosophy that deals philosophically with language. The key question in the dialogue is whether there is a natural or conventional relation between the names and the things the names depict. Plato also wrote about language in his dialogues Theaetetus, Sophist and Phaedrus, as well as in his Seventh letter. Aristotle deals with language in his work On Interpretation.

The following four chapters deal with philosophy of language in the 20[th] century and cover the largest part of the book. This is quite natural, since in our times philosophy of language gained greater weight. The second chapter (pp. 89-143) starts with Gottlob Frege, who marked important developments in the subject from the late 19th century. His aim was to unravel the misinterpretations and the vagueness of natural language through an idealized, symbolic language. He distinguished between analytical and synthetic propositions, replaced the grammatical categories with mathematical ones, that is function and argument, in order to distinguish the logical structure of the proposition. Being an anti-psychologist, he considered that the meaning of a proposition is its truth value and it has an objective, inter-subjective character. Each name has a sense (the way the object is presented to us) and a reference (the object to which the name refers).

At the beginning of the 20th century, in order to solve some logical paradoxes, Bertrand Russell, one of the founders of analytical philosophy, formulated the 'type theory' and the 'theory of descriptions'. This complex theory was criticized by later philosophers, such as P.F. Strawson, Keith Donnellan. The ideal, artificial, symbolic languages of Frege and Russell do not cover the wealth of human experience, like natural language does. According to descriptive theories of names in a natural language a name is associated by some speakers with a group of descriptions (John Searl), while according to Saul Kripke, a proper name does not have a sense, but only a reference, it is rigid designator and always refers to the same object in all possible worlds.

The third chapter (pp. 145-178) refers to the early philosophy of Wittgenstein in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Influenced by Frege and Russell, early Wittgenstein in his picture theory of meaning reflects on the relation between language and reality. Language depicts the world of experience and any attempt to express something beyond its bounds inevitably leads to nonsense. Wittgenstein distinguishes between meaningful propositions of the natural sciences, meaningless logical and mathematical propositions and nonsense propositions, such as those of metaphysics, ethics, aesthetics and philosophy. His early work influenced the logical positivism of the Wiener Kreis and sparked interpretative conflicts over the last 30 years concerning the character of the 'nonsense' of his philosophical propositions.

In the fourth chapter (pp. 179-238), the author focuses on linguistics and Ferdinand de Saussure. In the main question in Plato's dialogue Cratylus whether there is a natural or conventional relation between the names and the things the names refer to, Saussure's thought there is a conventional relation. Seeing language as a conventional communication system, he considered that the linguistic signs take their meaning from their relations with other signs of the linguistic system. The relation between the signifier and the signified is arbitrary, that is, not natural, and necessary within the linguistic community for all the language users. Saussure distinguished between language as a social fact and speech as an individual verbal act, which are studied by two different branches of linguistics, phonology and phonetics, respectively. He also distinguished between the diachronic and synchronic analysis of language.

Then the author returns to philosophy of language and the theory of the indeterminacy of translation by W.V. Quine: the meaning of a sentence is what it has in common with its translation into another language. Quine did not accept that there are absolute platonic synonymy criteria for translation and he concludes that such a translation can only be indeterminate. According to Donald Davidson, in a language we understand the expressions of other speakers by interpreting their communicative intentions.

In the fifth and final chapter of the book (pp. 239-319), the author returns to Wittgenstein, who in the late period of his philosophy abandons his ideals of artificial, symbolic language and the absolute precision of his early period and turns to the common, everyday, natural language. He considers language as a game of rules and the meaning of a word as its use in a language. Grammar has the same relation with

the language as the description of the rules of a game with this game. Wittgenstein rejects the theory of Saint Augustine that teaching a language is a matter of matching words and things that is achieved through demonstration. Demonstration can help us learn a foreign language, if we already know another language. The language game of demonstration remains indeterminate, if we have not already been taught it. Wittgenstein rejects the idea that there can be a private language, given that the meanings of a language must be public, inter-subjective, in order to achieve the goal of communication. Finally, the author refers to ordinary language philosophy that was cultivated after World War II in Oxford (J.L. Austin, P.F. Strawson) and outside Oxford (John Searle). In Austin's speech acts theory, language is a form of action.

It is more than clear that the author has a deep knowledge of the subject. The structure of some chapters might seem strange to the reader at a first sight. For example we might have expected early and late Wittgenstein to be examined in the same chapter and in comparison. It also seems strange that Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure is examined in the same chapter with more recent American analytical philosophers, W.V. Quine and Donald Davidson. Here it seems that the criterion of thematic continuity has been prevailed to that of historical continuity. This is also the case in the second chapter, where Russell is been contrasted with more recent analytical philosophers.

This book follows the course of the philosophical reflection on language, which, although it has its roots deep in the history of philosophy, it became prevalent in it in the 20th century. The distinctiveness and originality of this book is that apart from the systematic and thematic discussion of its subject, it also emphasizes on its historical dimension, which is largely ignored in the relevant Greek and international bibliography. Despite the fact that it is mainly a high level academic book, it might also be of interest to a wider well educated readership. It provides us with an enormous amount of stuff and it can also serve as a reference book on this subject.

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
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
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Edited in co-operation with the
CENTER FOR HELLENIC STUDIES (GREECE)
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
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CONTENTS

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