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Aristotle and Eudoxus on the Argument from Contraries

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Abstract: The debate over the value of pleasure among Eudoxus, Speusippus, and Aristotle is dramatically documented by the *Nicomachean Ethics*, particularly in the dialectical pros-and-cons concerning the so-called argument from contraries. Two similar versions of this argument are preserved at *EN* VII. 13, 1153b1–4 and X. 2, 1172b18–20. Many scholars believe that the argument at *EN* VII is either a report or an appropriation of the Eudoxean argument in *EN* X. This essay aims to revise this received view. It will explain why these two arguments differ in premises, contents and purposes, and why these distinctions matter for a proper assessment of Aristotle's understanding of pleasure and pain in general and his dialectical art in particular.

1 Introduction

The argument from contraries (hereafter AFC), roughly speaking, is an argument that attempts to infer the nature of something from the nature of its opposite. Although the charm of this argument seems to have worn thin in modern philosophical culture, it was nevertheless widely used in classical antiquity, both in philosophical and non-philosophical discourses. Within the Old Academy, few seemed to have entertained doubts about the value of AFC as an argumentative *topos*. Much of the debate over AFC tended to be about the manner of its application, in particular regarding the kind of conclusion one could draw from shared premises in terms of this *topos*. However, once questions about its use were raised, inquiry about the potentials and limits of AFC itself began to appear. It is thus not surprising that a debate between Aristotle, Eudoxus[1] and Speusip-

1 The exact relation between Eudoxus and the Academy is uncertain, but whether he was a member of the Academy or an outsider does not affect the main argument of the present study (cf. Lasserre 1966, 138). Although the anecdote that Eudoxus provisionally took charge of the Academy during Plato's second journey to Syracuse seems to be a misunderstanding caused

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pus took on a very personal, flesh-and-blood form concerning not only how to evaluate pleasure and pain, but also whether and to what extent AFC is relevant to revealing the value, or otherwise, of hedonic properties.[2] It is well known that Aristotle and Eudoxus formed an alliance, using this argument to establish the goodness of pleasure, while Speusippus disputed the cogency of their argument, turning AFC in his own favour.

Two versions of AFC are preserved in Aristotle's *EN* VII and *EN* X respectively:[3]

> AFC_{VII}: It is also agreed that pain is bad and is to be avoided; for one kind of pain is bad *simpliciter*, and another is bad in some respect, by virtue of being an impediment. But the contrary to what is to be avoided, insofar as it is something to be avoided and bad, is good; hence pleasure must be a good. (*EN* VII.13, 1153b1–4, modified)

> AFC_{X}: He (sc. Eudoxus) believed that the same conclusion followed no less evidently (φανερόν) from the contrary. For pain in itself, he said, is to be avoided for all, so that, similarly, its contrary is choiceworthy. (*EN* X.2, 1172b18–20, modified)[4]

The two arguments appear similar in tune and spirit. AFC_{X} is explicitly attributed to Eudoxus, whereas Aristotle seems to invoke AFC_{VII} in his own voice, without mentioning his "source". Their basic structures are indisputably identical, and can be outlined as follows:

> P1. Pain is bad.
> P2. Pleasure is opposed to pain.
> P3. Bad is opposed to good.
> Conclusion: Pleasure is good.

Beside the common structure, Aristotle also reports similar pros and cons around this argument in two accounts (cf. *EN* VII.13, 1153b4–7; X.2, 1173a5–13). The striking parallels tempt commentators to believe that Aristotle only quotes Eudoxus in *EN* VII, though in an anonymous way. Unsurprisingly, in his recent commentary,

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by the corruption of "*epi Euboulou*" in the list of the Athenian archons (Waschkies 1977, 34–58), there is little reason to doubt that Eudoxus stayed in Athens twice, where he attended Plato's lectures (DL 8.86.4–5) and participated in discussions at the Academy as a critical associate (cf. Krämer 2004², 57; Natali 2013, 157; *pace* Lasserre 1966, 141). Aristotle may have met Eudoxus during his second stay in Athens, and he knew some of Eudoxus' theories first-hand.

2 The imperfect tense used in Aristotle's account (ᾤετ', *EN* 1172b9 and b18, cf. *EN* 1101b29; ὡς γὰρ Σπεύσιππος ἔλυεν, *EN* 1153b4–5) suggests that the debate probably took place in oral form. For discussions of this aspect, see Philippson 1925, 449–450; Karpp 1933, 8; Jaeger 1955², 367 f. n2; Lasserre 1966, 151; also cf. *Metaph.* 992a20–21, 1036b25 and 1073b17–18.

3 Translations of Aristotle are mainly from Barnes 1997, except the *Nicomachean Ethics* (Irwin 1999). It will be noted if the translations are mine or adjusted.

4 I shall discuss these two texts and their translations in detail in Section 3.

Rapp labels AFC_{VII} as the "Eudoxean Argument".[5] Gosling and Taylor also claim that "in both Book VII and Book X Aristotle is trying to defend a Eudoxean position against Eudoxus' main antagonist".[6] Conceived along these lines, Aristotle provides two accounts of one and the same event – the battle between the friends of pleasure (Eudoxus and Aristotle) on the one side and its enemy (Speusippus) on the other over the argumentative relevance of AFC. In this common story, Speusippus dismisses the way Eudoxus invokes AFC as a non-sequitur, because the same logic equally renders the competitive conclusion that the neutral state – the absence of pleasure and pain – is good.[7] To fend off Speusippus' challenge, Aristotle insists that even if Speusippus' appeal to the principle of contrariety makes sense from a *general* point of view, the Eudoxean AFC still stands in the case of pleasure and pain (cf. *EN* 1173a8–9).

This standard picture appears to be without fault. Under a closer scrutiny, however, the back-and-forth moves of the arguments leave more than a few puzzles to modern readers. Since Aristotle is supposed to be a non-hedonist,[8] why does he take pains to defend the pro-hedonistic position of Eudoxus – pleasure is the best thing due to its function as the ultimate end of animal behaviors? Why does he not opt for a more effective strategy, highlighting his *via media* by dismissing Eudoxus and Speusippus – who seems to take pleasures as essentially bad – together as two extremes to be circumvented? Why is Aristotle so charmed by such a meagre or bad argument[9] that he feels obliged to retain it in his two most detailed accounts of pleasure, which, however, manifest considerable divergences or even seem incompatible with each other?[10] Would it be more prudent to follow the great commentator Alexander of Aphrodisias – who might have realized the dilemma – in expunging the Academic background of the debate over AFC, focusing instead on a purely theoretical exploration of the contrariety of pleasure and pain, judging the truth, plausibility, and limit of each possibility in a *systematic* way?[11]

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5 Rapp 2009, 209; cf. Warren 2009, 265: "This same argument is also mentioned in *NE* 7.13".

6 Gosling/Taylor 1982, 226.

7 For a recent reconstruction see Warren 2009; also cf. Philippson 1925; Gauthier/Jolif 1958 f., 800–802; Gosling/Taylor 1982, 228–231; Irwin 1999, 270.

8 Vogt, forthcoming.

9 The AFC is dismissed as a "bad argument" in Gosling/Taylor 1982, 162.

10 For reasons of space, this study cannot explore the intractable problem of the relation between Aristotle's two accounts of pleasure: *EN* VII.11–14 and X.1–5. Despite the efforts to reconcile one with the other since the time of Aspasius and Alexander of Aphrodisias, many scholars insist that the two accounts are incompatible (Merlan 1960, 24–27; Webb 1977; Bostock 2000, 154 f.; Broadie/Rowe 2002, 435; Wolfsdorf 2013, 131 f.).

11 For this aspect see Natali 2015; also cf. Cheng 2018.

I think they are real problems that the traditional reading cannot easily overcome. Yet, I do not consequently think that we should follow Alexander in being sensitive to the polysemy of the contrariety itself at the expense of erasing Aristotle's dialectical concern in unfolding and defending his standpoint. This paper, by contrast, will take Aristotle's argumentative strategy and its Academic background seriously. Instead of viewing AFC as a patent of Eudoxus, I shall argue that, as a popular *topos* for dialectical disputation, it can be employed in different ways for different purposes (Section 2). On the basis of explicating the sophisticated way Aristotle uses this argument as well as his account of the battle between Eudoxus and Speusippus, I attempt to elucidate the complexity of the Academic debate over AFC itself, and to assign to Aristotle a philosophically more promising view, which will also do more justice to the texts and their contexts exegetically. To be specific, I argue that the two AFC in *EN* VII and X are different with respect to their contents and purposes and that they also play a different role in two distinct contexts.[12] Only the former is an argument that Aristotle endorses, whereas the latter serves as a dialectical weapon against the Academic anti-hedonists in a particular dialectical situation (Section 3). Although in *EN* X Aristotle defends Eudoxus in confrontation with Speusippus' polemic, this does not mean that he thus commits himself to the Eudoxean AFC, let alone all of its implications. In comparison, AFC_{VII}, the Aristotelian version (I venture to claim), is dialectically subtler and philosophically more ambitious (Section 4).[13] Aristotle's affiliation with Eudoxus can be understood from ethical as well as theoretical points of view (Section 5).

12 Despite plentiful researches on the differences between *EN* VII and X, the substantial difference between the two versions of AFC, to my knowledge, has not been realized or adequately addressed. Even Weiss 1979, who seeks to dissociate Aristotle from Eudoxus to a radical degree, fails to notice this aspect. According to her, the only difference between the two AFC lies in that the former "does not make the strong claim that pleasure is most desirable and therefore that it is the chief good" (216). I shall address her interpretation in Section 3.

13 My study will not enter into the debate of how the central doctrines of *EN* VII and X – their understandings of the nature of pleasure – should be interpreted and evaluated. The conclusion of this study, however, at least can modify a bias that *EN* X enjoys an *overall* superiority over *EN* VII, which seems to be an unjustified generalization of the mainstream view that the determination of pleasure as the perfection of *energeia* in *EN* X represents a more developed stage of Aristotle's thought and is theoretically better than the definition of pleasure as unimpeded *energeia* in *EN* VII. Yet, note that this does not mean that I commit myself to the reasons Webb 1977 gives for his preference of *EN* VII to X.

2 AFC, Aristotle and the Academy

The argument from contraries (ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίων) is a subspecies of the argument from opposites (ἐκ τοῦ ἀντικείμενων) according to Aristotle.[14] The basic model of the inference, apart from its numerous subtypes, can be sketched as follows:

> If A is a contrary of B, then the property/evaluation of A can be inferred, directly or indirectly, from a conversed determination of the property/evaluation of B.

According to Aristotle, in this argument, we "examine whether the contrary of the one follows upon the contrary of the other" (σκοπεῖν εἰ τῷ ἐναντίῳ τὸ ἐναντίον ἕπεται, *Top*. 113b27–28), "both when we want to demolish and when we want to establish a claim" (καὶ ἀναιροῦντι καὶ κατασκευάζοντι, 113b28–29). An argument of this type has its merits, in particular if the statement about A is not easily determined, or appears to be controversial, while the corresponding statement about B is relatively clear, or at least can be shared (for whatever reason) by the participants of a debate as a premise for further discussion. If someone, for instance, aims to establish the goodness of knowledge in a dialectical dispute, she can appeal to its opposite, ignorance, for help, if all the participants agree that ignorance is bad.

Like the argument from analogy,[15] AFC was a part of the arsenal of conventional arguments commonly put to use in the fifth and fourth century BC[16] and was prevalent in Plato's dialogues.[17] It played an important role in rhetorical speeches and dialectical disputes, particularly in those concerning the judgments of value. In Plato's *Philebus*, Socrates already applies AFC to the assessment of pleasure and pain, reminding the hedonist Philebus that pain would not be all bad if pleasure is not all good (27e7–28a1). In view of the popularity of AFC, it is not surprising that Aristotle, who treats it as one of the most useful and current argumentative strategies (μάλιστα δ' ἐπίκαιροι καὶ κοινοί),[18] employs

14 Cf. *Cat*. 11b15–24; *Metaph*. 1055a38–b1, 1018a20–21.

15 Cf. Lloyd 1966, esp. 384–420.

16 Thuc. 6.92; Ar. *Ran*. 1443–1450; Lys. 16.11, 18.24; Andoc. 1.24; Dem. 19.214; Aeschin. 2.6; Isoc. 8.19; Isae. 8.32; Antiph. 1.11–12. These examples are indebted to Radermacher, Spengel and Grimaldi, see Grimaldi 1988, 294 (vol. 2).

17 In the *Gorgias*, for example, Socrates claims that righteous and good men are blessed, just as unjust and bad men are miserable (*Grg*. 470e), because "righteous and good" are contraries of "unjust and bad" just as "blessed" is opposed to "miserable". Also see *Grg*. 507a; cf. also 475a, 498e, 499a, 507c; *Hp. Mi*. 375e, 376a; *Prt*. 531c; *Ly*. 213b, 214d, 217b, 218e-219a.

18 Cf. *Top*. 119a36 f, *Rhet*. 1397a7–18. Aristotle is well aware that this *topos*, in addition to dialectical debates within the Academy, was widely used in other fields, too. He also quotes some of them in his works: Alcidamas' *Messeniacus* (Baiter/Sauppe II 154, cf. also *Rhet*. 1373b18), an anonymous verse in iambic trimester (cf. *Adesopta* F80 in *TrGF*, vol.2, Snell/Kannicht) and Euripides' *Thyestes* (F396 in *TrGF*, vol. 5, Kannicht).

and reflects on its usage in different places.[19] As a model, the general structure of AFC is lucid, yet its application is often constrained and complicated by various factors, including the sense of the items involved and the theoretical background of the participants in discussions or disputations.[20] More than once, Aristotle warns his students that a reliable use of AFC requires a clarification of the items involved, because they can be "predicated in many ways" (λέγεται πολλαχῶς, cf. *Top*. 106a16–b1; *Metaph*. 1055a16–17) and this will decisively affect the aim, scope, and effect of an AFC. For this reason, to know whether "F is good" is true in terms of AFC, you do need to know more than whether "an opposite of F is bad" is true. Thus, naturally enough, Aristotle explicitly criticizes those who (mistakenly) think that in the arguments concerning contraries, all of the terms involved are used in the same way (οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἐπιτιμῶσιν οἱ νομίζοντες *ὁμοίως λέγεσθαι πάντα*, *Metaph*. 1056a30–31). It is noteworthy that in speaking of the polysemy of an item in the relation of contrariety, Aristotle refers not merely to strict homonymy[21] – e. g. sharp can be an opposite of flat or an opposite of dull, which is determined by whether the subject matter is sound or body (*Top*. 106a16–19) – but also to the question of whether and how the item is qualified. For instance, he tells us, health *simpliciter* (ἁπλῶς) is the contrary of disease, whereas disease in a particular sense (e. g. fever) has no contrary (*Top*. 123b35–36). In the latter scenario, the qualifiers *simpliciter* (ἁπλῶς) and *per accidens* (κατὰ συμβεβηκός)[22] are of particular interest for our reconstruction of the ways in which Aristotle employs

19 E. g.: moderation is good because indulgence is bad (τὸ σωφρονεῖν ἀγαθόν· τὸ γὰρ ἀκολασταίνειν βλαβερόν, *Rhet*. 1397a10); cf. *Cat*.13b36–14a6; *Top*.147a32–35, 104a22–28; *Rhet*.1362a27–29; 1372a2–3; 1391b4–6; 1397a10–18. This list makes no claim to completeness.

20 The debate between Eudoxus, Aristotle and Speusippus, for instance, implies that they are at least in agreement that an animal's hedonic state can be divided into, or described by, three main properties: pleasure, pain and the neutral, which, as a basis, enables them to use oppositions among *three* elements in different ways. Yet suppose that an Epicurean, who takes pleasure to be nothing but the freedom from pain, joins the debate, then the discussion cannot get off the ground or at least cannot develop in the way we have met in Aristotle, because the tripartite division of hedonic space is invalid for him. In *Top*. 106b4–5, Aristotle tells us that in order to determine whether the terms in a proposition are differently employed, one should "see in regard to their intermediates, if one use has an intermediate, while another has none" (cf. also *Top*. 123b13–27).

21 For various kinds of homonymy in Aristotle, see Shields 1999.

22 Notice that I am not claiming that a particular disease is a disease *per accidens*. For the terms ἁπλῶς has different meanings (see below) and thus is correlated with different contrasting concepts. The distinction between F ἁπλῶς and F *per accidens*, like the distinction between F ἁπλῶς and a concrete F, can also be used to distinguish how F is qualified or used in different ways. They belong to the same scenario where Aristotle's theory of multiple predication is invoked to specify the meaning of an item.

AFC in different places, which, roughly speaking, concerns a distinction between F exhausting what F is in its own right and F being said in terms of something that is not intrinsically attributed to what F is.[23] Before my elaboration of how the distinction can shed new light on the hedonistic debate over AFC, it is worthwhile to recall two factors that are also relevant for the following survey.

First, the *simpliciter* and *per accidens* distinction can be traced back to Plato's distinction between being F *per se* (καθ' αὐτό) and being F *per aliud*,[24] which then probably became a commonplace among the Academics,[25] though used by different people in different ways.[26] Like Aristotle, the Academics did not always employ the same terms when appealing to this distinction; yet, whether or not such a distinction is used and how it is used are not trivial things. Second, in the *Topics*, one of Aristotle's earliest writings, pleasure and pain are already Aristotle's favorite examples for illustrating how AFC works, either to establish (like its usage in Eudoxus)[27] or to demolish a value claim (like its usage in Speusippus).[28]

23 This distinction can be understood in different senses in Aristotle. I shall only concern myself with the distinction in *EN* VII. 11–14. Other evidences will be taken into account insofar as they can contribute to the distinction there. It is worth noting, however, that in *EN* VII, as in other places, Aristotle even does not refer to this distinction in a unified way (see *EN* 1152b8–9, 1152b27, 1152b29; 1153b2; 1152b8–9; 1153a29–30; 1154b16–18; *EE* 1228b18–22). Strictly speaking, being F *simpliciter* (F is said of something in an unqualified sense) is not entirely identical with being F *per se* (καθ' αὐτό, F is said of something by its own property), just as being F *per accidens* (F is said of something by some non-essential factors attributed or related to it) seems to be a particular kind of being F *per aliud* (F is said of something in relation to something else). With respects to hedonic properties, this distinction, as we shall see, does not affect Aristotle's central concern in differentiating between (two main kinds of) pleasures and their evaluation. The present survey prefers the qualifiers *simpliciter* and *per accidens* not only for the sake of simplicity, but also because they seem more Aristotelian than the qualifiers *per se* and *per aliud*, which are more platonically colored (see also notes 24 and 25).

24 In addition to πρός τι (e. g. *Tht*. 160b9; *Soph*. 257e3), Plato also uses πρὸς ἄλληλα (*Soph*. 258b1), πρὸς ἄλλα (*Soph*. 255c13) and πρὸς ἕτερον (*Phlb*. 51d7; *Soph*. 255d1). How Plato understands or uses this distinction is highly controversial, cf. Owen 1971; Heinaman 1983; Frede 1992; Fine 1993, 171–174.

25 Cf. DL 3.108–9; Simplicius *in Cat*. 63.21–54.12; 63. 21–3; *in Phys*. 247. 30–248.15; Sextus *Adv. Math*. 10.263–5. For discussions, see Krämer 1959, 258–279; Annas 1971, 266; Thiel 2008, 346 f., 365–372. For a more skeptical view about the so-called Academic theories of categories, see Fine 1993, 176–182.

26 This does not mean that Aristotle uses this distinction in the same way as Plato uses it, nor does his understanding closely follow the so-called Academic tradition (for Aristotle's sophisticated discussions thereof, see *APo*.73a34–b15; *Metaph*. 1022a25–35; cf. Barnes 1993, 112–117).

27 Cf. *Top*. 119a39–b1: if every pleasure is good, then every pain is bad; if a certain pleasure is good, then a certain pain is bad.

28 Cf. *Top*.114b6–8: if the bad is not necessarily painful, then the good is not necessarily pleasant.

In particular, it is in terms of AFC that Aristotle tries to prove the polysemy of pleasure, a thought which seems to be picked up and echoed by his approach in *EN* VII. 11–14:

> See if one use of a term has a contrary, while another has absolutely none (τῷ δ' ἁπλῶς μηδέν); e. g. the pleasure of drinking has a contrary in the pain of thirst, whereas the pleasure of seeing that the diagonal is incommensurate with the side has none, so that pleasure is used in many ways (πλεοναχῶς ἡ ἡδονὴ λέγεται) (*Top*. 106a36–b1, modified).

According to this passage, we can discern at least two kinds of pleasure by considering whether it has a contrary or not. The distinction of the pleasure of drinking and the pleasure of geometry are representative for and reminiscent of Plato's distinction between impure and pure (καθαρόν) pleasure (*Phlb.* 32c, 52e, 63e) or Aristotle's distinction between pleasure *simpliciter* (pleasure that is the unimpeded *energeia*, cf. *EN* 1153a14–15) and that *per accidens* (pleasure that depends on a curative process and thus presupposes and is mixed with its opposite pain, cf. *EN* 1153a1–7; 1154a28–30; 1154b17–19). No matter what kind of distinction Aristotle has in mind here,[29] it is certain for him that AFC can be useful in discovering the polysemy of an item by considering its opposite. Conversely, if anyone wants to construct or assess AFC about F, she is obliged to clarify the kind of F that is at stake and the kind of opposition about which she is talking. According to Aristotle, therefore, an argument about a particular kind of pleasure cannot immediately apply to an argument about all pleasures or pleasure in general. Likewise, one cannot draw a conclusion about pleasure *simpliciter* from an argument about pleasure *per accidens*.

29 In the *Topics* and many other works, Aristotle unambiguously regards pleasure and pain as opposites (e. g., *Top*.114b6–8; 119a39–b1; *DA* 431a9–11; *EN* 1180a13; *Rhet*. 1369b35–70a3, 1381a6). The claim in *Top*. 106a36–b1 points, rather, to a belief common to him and Plato that in contrast to (a part of) sensory pleasures, which either depend on or are blended with correlated pains, the generation of intellectual pleasures (pleasure in studying geometry) is not accompanied by such a counterpart. In other words, intellectual pleasure (an instance of pleasure *simpliciter*) does not have an opposite in the sense that sensory pleasure has (a type of pleasure *per accidens*), so that the proposition that pleasure is a contrary of pain can be understood in more ways than one.

3 Eudoxean AFC vs. Aristotelian AFC

It has long been held, as noted above, that Aristotle records Eudoxus' AFC in *EN* VII and X, albeit in slightly different manners: AFC_X is explicitly attributed to Eudoxus, while AFC_{VII} is not. Before examining whether they are simply two versions of the Eudoxean argument, it is worthwhile to recapitulate the contexts in which these two arguments are embedded. Following Aristotle's routine, both *EN* VII and X begin with a stage-setting part highlighting the significance of pleasure and pain for living a good life (1152b1–8;1172a19–27); both are then followed by a doxographical part, where he documents different views on the evaluation of pleasure (1152b8–24; 1172a27–1174a12). Scholars, however, rarely notice that *only* in the opening lines of *EN* X does Aristotle emphasize that pleasure and pain are a subject that is *particularly controversial* (ἄλλως τε καὶ πολλὴν ἐχόντων ἀμφισβήτησιν, 1172a27). This seems to be an allusion to the hedonistic debates in the Academy, which also explains why the doxographical part of *EN* X is much longer and more dominated by Academic discourses than the corresponding part in *EN* VII (1152b8–24 vs. 1172a27–1174a12).[30] In light of this Academic backdrop, it is understandable that Eudoxus' views, as part of the doxography, are addressed in *EN* X, including his particular use of AFC, a *topos* which Aristotle himself recognizes as most useful and popular for dialectical disputation (*Top.* 119a36–37; cf. Section 2).[31] For the same reason, documenting Eudoxus' argument provides more than an opportunity to spell out a position to which Aristotle feels sympathetic; it also enables him to express his own stance concerning the relevance of AFC to the intra-school controversy over hedonism. In contrast to AFC_X, which unambiguously belongs to Aristotle's *report* about things that are said about pleasure (τὰ δ' εἰρημένα περὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐπέλθωμεν, 1172b7–8), it is noteworthy that the parallel argument, AFC_{VII}, does not occur *in*, but *after*, the doxographical part of *EN* VII. Put more precisely, this argument is found in Aristotle's elaboration of the nature of pleasure as *energeia* and his criticism of various anti-hedonistic arguments which

30 Whether the doxographical part of *EN* X begins with 1172a27 (ἄλλως τε καὶ πολλὴν ἐχόντων ἀμφισβήτησιν) or 1172b7–8 (τὰ δ' εἰρημένα περὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐπέλθωμεν) does not affect my argument. The end of the doxographical part of *EN* VII is clearly marked by the conclusion τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα σχεδὸν ταῦτ' ἐστίν (1152b23–24); the corresponding part of *EN* X is ended by the statement τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα περὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης ἱκανῶς εἰρήσθω (1174a11–12).

31 Gosling/Taylor provide a detailed comparison of the two accounts of pleasure in the *EN*, but according to them, "the difference in the introductions does not seem significant" (1982, 202). Although Webb notices the uniqueness of *EN* 1172a27, he only takes this as evidence indicating that the two accounts of pleasure are "quite separate pieces", which cannot originally belong to *one* work (1977, 236).

are built on the *energeia*-based understanding of pleasure (1152b26–1154a7). In view of its location, AFC_{VII} seems to be a part of his *doctrinal commitment*.

But what does this distinction mean? How does the initial observation of the contexts contribute to our understanding of the respective roles that Aristotle and Eudoxus play in the dispute? To answer these questions, we need to examine the *content* of the two arguments.[32] Let me begin with AFC_X, the Eudoxean AFC already quoted above (*EN* 1172b18–20):

> He (sc. Eudoxus) believed that the same conclusion followed no less (οὐχ ἧττον) evidently (φανερόν) from the contrary. For pain in itself (καθ' αὑτό), he said, is to be avoided for all (πᾶσι), so that, similarly, its contrary is choiceworthy (ὁμοίως δὴ τοὐναντίον αἱρετόν).

Although AFC_X can be taken to be an independent proof of the goodness of pleasure, Eudoxus, at least according to Aristotle's account, couples it with the argument from animal motion (hereafter AAM) as a subsidiary support (cf. 1172b18).[33] This link is important to understand the Eudoxean version of AFC. For both arguments are in fact two sides of the same coin, i. e., different expressions of the basic belief that all animals are motivated, first and foremost, by hedonic feelings. Aristotle's presentation of AAM is the following:

> Eudoxus thought that pleasure is *the* good (τἀγαθόν), because he saw (ὁρᾶν) that all [animals], both rational and non-rational (καὶ ἔλλογα καὶ ἄλογα), seek it, and in everything, he says, what is choiceworthy is fitting (ἐπιεικές), and what is most choiceworthy is the best (τὸ μάλιστα κράτιστον). The fact that all are drawn to the same thing [i. e., pleasure], indicates (μηνύειν), in his view, that it is best for all, since each [animal] finds its own good, just as it finds its own nourishment; and what is good for all (πᾶσιν), what all aim at, is the good (τἀγαθόν, *EN* 1172b9–15, modified).

In AAM, Eudoxus attempts to demonstrate that pleasure is the chief good by appealing to its function as the universal and most desired target of animal behaviors. This argument, as this passage shows, is correlated with AFC_X in two respects. First, instead of "the good" or "the bad", AFC_X notably prefers the terms

32 I shall return to the contextual differences in Section 4 below.

33 According to *EN* X, Eudoxus offers four hedonistic arguments. (1) AAM and (2) AFC_X aside, they are (3) Argument from Intrinsic Good/End: pleasure is pursued as the end in its own right rather than for the sake of something else (1172b20–23); and (4) Argument from Addition: pleasure makes F more valuable if it is added to F (1172b23–34). Weiss 1979, 217 f., assumes that the four arguments of Eudoxus in *EN* X could originally form *one* coherent proof, starting from arguing that pleasure is good through the intermediate theses that pleasure is good in itself and that pleasure is most choiceworthy, to the final point, that pleasure is the chief good. This order, she further assumes, is probably intentionally disjointed and distorted by Aristotle's interpretation. However interesting this hypothesis may sound, it remains speculative.

"to be chosen" (αἱρετόν) and "to be avoided" (φευκτόν). This terminological choice suggests that Eudoxus' AFC retains the teleological perspective of AAM (cf. ἐφιέμενα, 1172b10; τὸ αἱρετόν, b11; ἐπὶ ταὐτὸ φέρεσθαι, b12; ἐφίεται, b14), which considers pleasure and pain primarily as the universal and ultimate *ends* that *all* animals are naturally disposed to acquiring or avoiding (cf. πάντα, ἐν πᾶσι, 1172b10; πάντα, b12; πᾶσιν, b14; πᾶσι, b18).[34] The premise – pain is in itself avoided by all – is *not* directly equivalent to the unspecific thesis used in *EN* VII that pain is bad (*EN* 1153b1), because the badness of F, according to Aristotle, can be understood in different ways. As something in itself avoided by all animals is of course only *one* sense of F being bad. Second, the link between AAM and AFC_X is highlighted by Eudoxus' self-appraisal in the transition from the former to the latter: the *same* conclusion followed *no less evidently* (οὐχ ἧττον [...] φανερόν) from AFC_X than from AAM (*EN* 1172b18). This remark assures us, as mentioned, that the two arguments, according to Eudoxus, have one and the same effect and aim. In other words, his central thesis – pleasure is *the* good or the ultimate end – can be *equally* drawn from two opposite angles, either from the positive premise that all animals pursue pleasure (cf. πάντα, ἐν πᾶσι, 1172b10; πάντα, b12; πᾶσιν, b14) or from the negative one that all animals avoid pain.[35]

Aristotle seems to deliberately underline Eudoxus' self-confidence about the *equal* argumentative effect of AAM and AFC_X, which, however, follows and is dramatically contrasted with Aristotle's own comment on AAM: Eudoxus' thesis appears persuasive because more of his temperate character (σώφρων) than of the argument itself (1172b15–18).[36] This contrast is delicate and informative. It urges

34 Although the αἱρετόν and the φευκτόν are not directly equivalent to the good and the bad, no participant of this debate – either for dialectical purposes or as doctrinal commitment – disputes this point. See *Top.* 135b14–16: οἷον ἐπεὶ ἐναντίον ἐστὶν ἀγαθῷ μὲν κακόν, αἱρετῷ δὲ φευκτόν, ἔστι δὲ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἴδιον τὸ αἱρετόν, εἴη ἂν κακοῦ ἴδιον τὸ φευκτόν. Also cf. *Top.*119a39–b1; *MA* 701b36; *EN* 1113b1–2; 1119a22–3; *EE* 1225a16; 1227a40; *Rhet.*1385b13–14; 1386a7–9.

35 The conclusion – ὁμοίως δὴ τοὐναντίον αἱρετόν – does not show that AFC_X aims at something weaker than the conclusion of AAM (*pace* Krämer 2004², 64, and Weiss 1979, 216). This reading would render the opening comment on this argument – οὐχ ἧττον δ' ᾧετ' εἶναι φανερὸν ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου (1172b18) – incomprehensible. Contra Krämer, who translates "αἱρετόν" in 1172b20 as "ein Erwünschtes", I think that the "αἱρετόν" here must be a form of "τὸ αἱρετόν" that omits the definite article due to its predicative position (cf. Smyth § 1126, 1150). Note that Aristotle uses τὸ αἱρετόν in 1172b11 and continues to report that Eudoxus believes that AFC results in the *same* conclusion (1172b18). Also see *Top.* 135b15–16: ἔστι δὲ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἴδιον *τὸ αἱρετόν*, and contrasting *EN* 1153b4: ἀνάγκη οὖν τὴν ἡδονὴν *ἀγαθόν τι* εἶναι (for my discussion see below).

36 This comment should not be construed as Aristotle's indirect acknowledgement of AAM or his commitment to the Eudoxean hedonism at his early stage of development (*pace* Lasserre 1966, 15; Merlan 1960, 32f.).

us to ask to what extent the Stagiran endorses AFC_x and its conclusion. Admittedly, he holds that the pursuit of pleasure and avoidance of pain are somehow a universal phenomenon in the animal kingdom, but he never claims (in the manner of Eudoxus) that pleasure is *most* desired by *all* animals, which, however, is decisive for Eudoxus' inference from a descriptive evidence to the strong normative claim he aims to substantiate. It might be observationally true that by and large animals are *naturally* prone to pleasure, but that it is pursued by *all* animals *above all else* can hardly be verified from mere observation. The slender evidence Eudoxus provides, according to Aristotle's testimony, is that each animal, as the case of nutrition suggests, pursues its own pleasure as the proper, fitting good (cf. τὸ ἐπιεικές, 1172b9; τὸ αὐτῷ ἀγαθόν, 1172b13).[37] But this at best shows pleasure to be some kind of *natural* good rather than *the* good, let alone the chief good Eudoxus has in mind.[38] Interestingly, in subsequent passages, the phenomenon that each animal enjoys its own pleasure is invoked by Aristotle to reveal the *diversity* of pleasure, that pleasures differ in kind (1176a3–9), rather than their *unified* goodness. It is noteworthy that he even claims at the end of this book that humans who live a *natural* life (πεφύκασιν, 1179b11) by their feelings (πάθει γὰρ ζῶντες, 1179b13) – namely those who pursue their *proper* pleasure (τὰς οἰκείας ἡδονὰς διώκουσι, 1179b13) and avoid its opposed pains – do *not* really live a good life. All of these indicate that in Aristotle's eyes, the naturalness of biological impulses cannot license the normativity Eudoxus sets out to establish and that Aristotle' sympathy to AAM cannot be unqualified. This attitude has been well summarized by Warren:

> For Aristotle, certainly we can and should take Eudoxus and Eudoxus' philosophical views seriously, but there is no reason to overlook the fact that the argument has its weaknesses. Above all, there seem to be some evident and important shortcomings in Eudoxus' attempt to move from an – *already disputable* – *descriptive premiss* about animal behaviour to a claim about the universal and supreme value of something which all animals pursue. (Warren 2009, 260; my italics)

Just as Aristotle cannot whole-heartedly embrace Eudoxus' AAM,[39] he cannot espouse AFC_x *tout court*. If its starting point – that pain is to be avoided *in itself* by *everyone* – means that pain is avoided by all animals due to its own property,

37 Here I follow Warren 2009, 258 f.

38 Cf. the phrase "τι φυσικὸν ἀγαθόν" (1173a4) in Aristotle's remarks on AAM. On his view, ἡ φυσικὴ ἀρετή is a φυσικὸν ἀγαθόν, yet it differs from, and often is contrasted with, τὸ κυρίως ἀγαθόν and ἡ κυρία ἀρετή (*EN* 1144b3–7; cf. the contrast between κατὰ μὲν *τὰς φυσικὰς ἀρετὰς* ἐνδέχεται and καθ' ἃς δὲ *ἁπλῶς λέγεται ἀγαθός*, *EN* 1144b36–1145a1).

39 Cf. Weiss 1979, 215; Broadie 1991, 346–348; *pace* Merlan 1960, 32; Dirlmeier 1964, 572.

perhaps the quality of being unpleasant, Aristotle would have no trouble with this, but without further qualification this premise is insufficient for the conclusion that pleasure is the highest good. However, if we read AFC_x strictly in parallel with AAM, following *EN* 1172b18, it is not easy to judge how empirically solid it is to regard pain as being avoided *above all else*.[40] Aristotle himself does not provide such an account. Since for him human behaviors are not merely hedonically motivated, pain can hardly function as the *unique* or the *ultimate* object of avoidance among *all* animals.[41] More importantly, in contrast to Eudoxus, who seems to be more interested in the motivational role of pleasure and pain in animal behaviors, Aristotle cannot avoid exploring their essence or nature when inquiring about their value. Although it is not the right place to engage with this aspect in detail, his conception of pain, which seems to encompass all unpleasant experiences, is surely broader and richer than our ordinary understanding of pain as a simple sensation in which nothing is over and above the felt quality of being unpleasant.[42] Most notably, several negative emotions are even directly called pains by Aristotle,[43] which suggests that pain, on his view, can have complicated

40 As an anonymous reader reminds us, Eudoxus' addition of "in itself" might be "designed to account for cases in which animals obviously do something painful". In the face of such cases, Eudoxus can reply that "they still avoid pain in itself, but choose the action because the pleasure is greater". This strategy indeed enables Eudoxus to explain away the counterexamples mentioned above so as to "save the *phainomena*" on which he builds his pre-hedonistic thesis. But whether this addition can make his *conclusion* more plausible remains a question. In any case, we should not read the addition as a change of Eudoxus' argumentative aim. It is noteworthy that in *EN* 1172b20–23, in Eudoxus' third argument, he seems to use "καθ' αὑτὴν οὖσαν αἱρετήν" (1172b23) interchangeably with "μάλιστα [...] αἱρετόν" (1172b20).

41 Pain is found in Aristotle's list of basic bad things (e. g. αἰσχροῦ βλαβεροῦ λυπηροῦ, *EN* 1104b32), but it is not the *only* intrinsic bad, nor does he hold that all the other bad things can be reduced to pain. Aristotle often states, in a loose way, that pleasure is pursued whereas pain is avoided (e. g. *DA* 431a9–10, 431b9; *MA* 701b36; *EN* 1113b1–2; 1172a25; *EE* 1221b33–34). However, that pain is *the* bad or the ultimate bad cannot be attested in his works. In *Rhet*. 1382a10–11, on the contrary, he tells us explicitly that among bad things, injustice and ignorance (ἀδικία καὶ ἀφροσύνη) are worse than pain (λυπηρά).

42 For the variety and inclusiveness of Aristotle's concept of pain see Cheng 2019.

43 Cf. *Rhet*. 1382a21: ὁ φόβος λύπη τις; 1383b12: αἰσχύνη λύπη τις; 1385b13: ἔλεος λύπη τις; 1387b23: ὁ φθόνος λύπη τις; 1388a32: ζῆλος λύπη τις. As Dow argues, "Aristotle thinks that all emotions are states of pleasure, pain, or both. His treatment of the passions in the *Rhetoric* reflects this explicitly in many cases with emotions described as 'a pain' or 'desire-cum-pain'" (2011, 55). According to this construal, pleasure/pain are not simply *caused* by emotions (see Fortenbaugh 2002, 12 f., 110–112), but emotions *are* pleasures/pains (Dow 2011, 59). Even if Aristotle seems to (inconsistently) regard a few negative emotions such as hostility as being *painless*, this would not affect the current discussion, which is primarily concerned with normal cases. For discussions of this "inconsistency" see Leighton 1996, 232; Fortenbaugh 2002, 107; Dow 2011, 54 f.

content, even sometimes propositional one.[44] If we take this aspect seriously, we can hardly attribute to him the unqualified belief that all pains are *in themselves* to be avoided by *all* animals. It might be true for simple bodily pains, but it cannot apply to some emotional or psychological pains whose nature is not exhausted by the felt unpleasantness.[45] For this reason, I doubt that Aristotle can champion the foundation of AFC_X that all pains are to be avoided intrinsically *and* for all animals, let alone the stronger thesis that pain is the ultimate object of avoidance.

Now let us quote the parallel argument in *EN* VII again, considering whether Aristotle is only reporting the same argument in a different guise.

> Moreover, it is also agreed that pain is bad (ἡ λύπη κακόν) and is to be avoided; for one kind of pain is bad *simpliciter* (ἁπλῶς), and another is bad in some respect, by virtue of being an impediment (ἢ δὲ τῷ πῇ ἐμποδιστική). But the contrary (τὸ ἐναντίον) to what is to be avoided, insofar as it is something to be avoided and bad, is good; hence pleasure must be *a* good (ἀγαθόν τι, *EN* 1153b1–4, modified).

For convenience sake, I reformulate this argument, in parallel with my reconstruction of AFC_X as follows:

AFC_X (*EN* X)		**AFC_{VII} (*EN* VII)**	
(1)	Pain is to be avoided *in itself* by *everyone* (καθ' αὑτὸ πᾶσι) (1172b19).	(i1)	Pain is bad or avoidable (1153b1).
		(i2)	For pain is bad *simpliciter* or, as a hindrance, bad *in some respect* (1153b2–3).
(2)	The opposite of that which is to be avoided is to be chosen (1172b20).	(ii)	The opposite of that which is bad/to be avoided is good/to be chosen (from 1153b3–4).
(3)	Pleasure is opposed to pain (*endoxon*).	(iii)	Pleasure is opposed to pain (*endoxon*).
(4)	Pleasure is *in itself* to be chosen by *everyone* (from 1, 2, 3).	(iv)	Pleasure is good *simpliciter* or *in some respect* (from ii, iii, iv).
(5)	Pleasure is *the* good (from 4).	(v)	Pleasure is *a* good (from iv).

44 It is indisputable that according to Aristotle *some* emotions can have propositional content, although it is controversial whether judgement (*doxa*) or appearance (*phantasia*) is necessarily involved in *all* emotions for their representational content. For an excellent overview and diagnosis of this debate see Pearson 2014.

45 It is interesting to see that increasing research has recently suggested that negative emotion and physical pain share the same neural substrates, cf. Kross *et al.* 2011; Eisenberger 2012; 2015.

As mentioned above, if the premise (1) – that pain is to be avoided in itself by all animals –means that pain is avoided by all animals due to its intrinsic nature, it is too weak to establish what Eudoxus aims to achieve: that pleasure is the *chief* good. If, alternatively, it means that pain is what is *most* avoided by *all* animals, the thesis itself is not self-evident. At least in Aristotle's account, Eudoxus says little, one way or the other, about its justification, with the exception of the faint indication in the correlated argument AAM that he "sees" (cf. διὰ τὸ πάνθ' *ὁρᾶν*, 1172b9–10) each animal pursuing pleasure as its own good. It is, however, remarkable that AFC_{VII} neither corresponds to nor is linked with the Eudoxean AAM. As noted, the premise (i1) – that pain is bad (κακόν) – is vague, which leaves more flexible room for interpretation than the corresponding premise (1) in AFC_{X} – that pain is *in itself* avoided by *all* animals. In AFC_{VII}, as expected, Aristotle goes on to explain in what sense pain is said to be bad and should be avoided (see γάρ at 1153b2). Here, that pain is bad is also qualified by two parameters, although such a qualification differs considerably from the treatment of pain in AFC_{X}. It is not that all pains are bad in the same way; rather, some are bad *simpliciter* (τὸ ἁπλῶς), while others, like some kind of hindrance, are bad in relation to something else (1153b3–4). An unpleasant feeling from nerve injury, for instance, can be taken as bad of the former type, which should be avoided by any animal due to the nature of the very experience.[46] Some pains, by contrast, are only bad in a context-dependent way, particularly when it hinders a certain activity in a particular

46 To say that pain can be bad *simpliciter* does not mean that pain, in this sense, is *impersonally* bad, because pain, like pleasure, must be somehow experienced by humans or animals, or, with more primitive words, must be "in the soul". Since pain of this kind is in itself bad *for* and *in* all animals, it is bad *simpliciter*. What Aristotle has in mind, in accordance with Greek medical thought, especially with the Hippocratic tradition (cf. Scullin 2012), might be a forceful and perceived disintegration of the natural state, caused, for instance, by disease, harm, or injury (cf. *Top.*145b2–3; *Rhet.*1369b33–35). It is taken as bad *simpliciter*, even though, as a sign of the corresponding harm, it could be *instrumentally* good under certain circumstances (e. g. for diagnostic purposes). Alternatively, Salim 2012, 145 f., understands pain *simpliciter/per se* as the pain felt by a virtuous person in the natural state, for example, the virtuous person's feeling of sadness about evil. This cannot be correct. First, Aristotle takes pain *simpliciter* as simply bad, while sadness about evil felt by a virtuous person is obviously not so. Second, pain of whatever kind is closely associated with an *un*natural state, caused by disintegration of the natural state or hindrance of an animal's normal activities. It is thus inappropriate to characterize pain of this kind as remaining in the *natural* condition. Third, Aristotle's evaluation of pleasure and pain has some ethical implication, yet it is by no means confined to the ethical criterion, because he also addresses pleasures in gods and non-human animals, which are beyond or outside the ethical good and bad. The question of whether a person is virtuous or not is irrelevant to the issue of whether pain is predicated in a qualified way or not.

circumstance.[47] Fear, for instance, can improve or hinder actions, under different conditions (cf. *Rhet*. 1383a6–7). Pain of this kind, according to Aristotle, is only bad "in relation to" (πρός) someone insofar as a choiceworthy activity is impeded.[48] The emphasis on the *relative* badness of some pain as hindrance seems to imply a response to those who claim that pleasures are not good at all because they *hinder* thinking (ἐμπόδιον τῷ φρονεῖν αἱ ἡδοναί, 1152b16–17), an anti-hedonistic argument found in the doxographical part of *EN* VII that is, however, absent in *EN* X.[49] More importantly, the theory of double predication enables Aristotle to specify as well as to enrich the sense of the proposition that F is bad, which leads to the distinction between two kinds of pain and clears space for their evaluation. The result, then, substantially departs from the rigorous picture Eudoxus put forward, a meaningful implication I shall revisit in Section 4 below. Now it is worth pausing for a moment to confirm that the distinction Aristotle draws in AFC_{VII} is *not* an accidental or trivial move.

In Aristotle's theory of argumentation, as noted above, how an item is predicated is of crucial importance for the application of AFC, because it can affect its purpose, content and reliability. More than once he points out that fallacy or error occurs "whenever an expression used in a particular sense is taken as though it were used *simpliciter*" (ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰρημένον, *SE* 166b38, cf. 168b10–12, 169b10–12, 170a3–4), "because to be something and to be *simpliciter* are not the same" (οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὸ τὸ εἶναί τέ τι καὶ εἶναι ἁπλῶς 167a2, a4). He also alerts his students that such a confusion is in some cases easily seen (167a10–11), yet in some cases often passes undetected (λανθάνει πολλάκις, 167a14). In particular, one is inclined to "treat the limitation to the particular things or respect or manner or time as adding nothing to the meaning" of a statement, even if the question of whether a statement is qualified or not leads to a critical difference (169b10–12). If someone, for example, wants to engage with the problems of evaluating pleas-

47 In Aristotle's account, hindrance is usually a hindrance to φ (φ=a process or an activity). In ethical context, luck (*EN* 1100b29–30; 1153b16–19; 1153b23–24) and alien pleasures (ἀλλότριαι ἡδοναί, cf. *EN* 1153a20–22, 1175b1–3, 1175b6–8, cf. 1175b11–13) are also frequently taken as a hindrance for human praxis.

48 Among negative emotions, the evaluation of some is intrinsically bad, such as envy (cf. *EN* 1107a9–11). There is no *good* way of experiencing them. Others such as anger and fear, by contrast, can hardly be taken as intrinsically bad or good. Since they can be appropriate and inappropriate to the circumstances, their evaluation depends on the way they are experienced.

49 In view of the link between F as a hindrance and the relative badness of F, the implicit message is that even if (some) pleasures hinder thinking (under certain conditions), this can at best show a relative badness of them, not the radical conclusion the anti-hedonists aims to vindicate: no pleasure is good, either *per se* or *per accidens* (καθ' αὑτὸ οὔτε κατὰ συμβεβηκός, *EN* 1152b9, cf. 1152b12–13).

ure by appealing to AFC, the first step should be to clarify the kinds of pleasure and value properties that are at issue. For whether a particular version of this argument is valid, depends, *inter alia*, on the sense in which the items in question are understood. Hence, Aristotle's sympathy with the use of AFC in affirming the value of pleasure does not necessarily commit him to the *particular* version proposed by Eudoxus. If there is no substantial difference between AFC_X and AFC_{VII}, then we cannot make sense of the detour Aristotle makes in combining AFC with his theory of double predication in *EN* VII, nor can we explain why he concludes, more cautiously, that pleasure is *a* good (ἀγαθόν τι, 1153b4),[50] which is strikingly in contrast with Eudoxus' AFC_X regulated by the strict qualifiers in itself and for all (καθ' αὐτὸ πᾶσι).

But how should one understand the conclusion of $AFC_{VII,}$ that pleasure is *a* good? Does Aristotle want to show that (1) pleasure is one among all goods in a *particular* way, (2) that pleasure is good, yet only in a *qualified* sense, or (3) that pleasure is something like good (some sort of good) but actually not a good proper? If we take the move from (i1) to (i2) in AFC_{VII} seriously, the conclusion (v) must be a shorthand of the thesis that pleasure is good, although in an *unspecific* or *undefined* sense so long as it has not been determined what kind of pleasure is at issue. Only if this question is clarified, can we ascertain the sense in which it is good: *simpliciter* or *per accidens*.[51] In light of this, to claim that pleasure is *a* good – which implies that some pleasures are good *simplicter*, whereas the others are accidentally so – is more than to demarcate a moderate position from Eudoxus' strong one. Aristotle does not exclude that some pleasures can be bad, even bad due to their own nature,[52] but he also takes some pleasures, particularly those derived from divine contemplation, to be most representative of what pleasure *is* and allows them to be *the* good or the chief good.[53] If we keep this aspect in

50 Unfortunately, Weiss' interpretation of AFC_{VII} even fails to realize the existence of this τι, cf. her translation of *EN* 1153b3–4: "the contrary of that which is to be avoided, qua something to be avoided and bad, is good" (1979, 216).

51 Dow 2011, 69 f., provides four possible uses of the indefinite article τινα in *Rhet*. 1369b33–35. My interpretation of τι here is similar to the fourth option in his list, namely deliberately referring to "an indefinite phrase".

52 E. g. masochistic pleasure: pleasure from enjoying radical pain; indulgent pleasure: pleasure from violent and sudden replenishment; schadenfreude: pleasure from enjoying others' suffering.

53 Cf. Merlan 1960, 20–24. The prime mover, which is called ἡ οὐσία ἐνέργεια (*EN* 1171b20) or ἡ οὐσία πρώτη (*EN* 1172a31), constantly enjoys pleasure by contemplating itself perpetually (*Metaph.*1072b13–30, and cf. *EN* 1154b24–28, 1178b7–28). The simplicity of the prime mover requires that pleasure is numerically identical with its contemplation as ἐνέργεια, although they can be different with respect to essence. It is also telling to see that in *EN* VII Aristotle admits that "even contemplation itself is sometimes harmful to health" (*EN* 1153a20). This provocative claim, how-

mind, then the divergence between Aristotle and Eudoxus ought not to be simplified as the difference between a weak and a strong hedonism.[54]

4 Eudoxus, Aristotle and Anti-Hedonistic Strategies

We are now in a better position to revisit the context of AFC_{VII}. Although in both *EN* VII and X Aristotle wrestles with the anti-hedonists who deny the value of pleasure by taking it essentially as a restorative process (1152b12–15, b23, 1173a30–b15), the ways he meets this challenge differ considerably. In *EN* VII, as mentioned, his defense unfolds in terms of the distinction between being F *simpliciter* and F *per accidens*, which applies both to hedonic and to valuational properties.[55] Pleasure *simpliciter*, determined as the unimpeded *energeia* of the natural state, is taken to be good *simpliciter*, whereas pleasure *per accidens*, which cannot be realized without a process of relieving pain, is qualified as good only in a relative sense.[56] In Aristotle's eyes, it is simply out of ignorance of this distinction that different groups of anti-hedonists fail to understand and evaluate pleasure in a proper way.[57] This strategy, however, disappears in *EN* X, even though there Aristotle argues that pleasure is something like *energeia*[58] while equally acknowledging that pleasures differ in kind.[59]

Why does *EN* VII differ from *EN* X in this way? In *EN* X, as noted, the challenge from the anti-hedonist side is dominated by Speusippus and his followers, while in *EN* VII the anti-hedonist side appears more multi-faceted and systematically arranged. They cover a wide range of views from the extreme enemies of

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ever, makes sense against the background of the *simpliciter* and *per accidens* distinction, just as he points out that "there is nothing to prevent a thing, though good *simpliciter* (ἁπλῶς), being not good to a particular man, or being good to a particular man, yet not good now or here" (*SE* 180b13–14).

54 Cf. Joachim 1955, 235; van Riel 2000, 44.

55 *EN* 1152b26–27: πρῶτον μέν, ἐπεὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν διχῶς (τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἁπλῶς τὸ δὲ τινί).

56 *EN* 1154b1, b16–18. At the beginning of *EN* VII.12, the pair *simpliciter* and *per accidens* has been used to distinguish between two kinds of bad, see 1152b29–30: αἳ μὲν ἁπλῶς φαῦλαι τινὶ δ' οὔ ἀλλ' αἱρεταὶ τῷδε. This prepares for, and is echoed by, the double evaluation of pain made in AFC_{VII}.

57 For discussions thereof, see van Riel 2000; Rapp 2009; Frede 2009.

58 A crucial divergence here is of course whether pleasure is an *energeia* or something that supervenes upon *energeia*. This, however, falls outside the scope of the current study (cf. note 10).

59 For the concept of pleasure in *EN* X see Shields 2011; Strohl 2011; Aufderheide 2016.

pleasure (who think that no pleasure is good in any sense) to the moderate ones (who think pleasure is not the best).[60] Of all of these anti-hedonists, Aristotle is obviously most concerned with the radical group, namely those who argue that pleasure is neither good *per se* nor good *per accidens* (1152b8–9). They are worth noting not only because of the radicality of their attitude to pleasure, but, more importantly, because of the *per se* and *per accidens* distinction they employ to specify their evaluation. Since the double predication theory was a commonplace in the Academy, it is very likely that some Platonists already resort to this source in order to mark off their rigorous stance from other pleasure-hostile positions, such as the view held by the "pragmatic" anti-hedonists according to whom it is *practically* beneficial to take pleasure as bad, at least for ordinary people, even if pleasure is *essentially* not bad (*EN* 1172a27–33). Against this background, it makes sense that Aristotle picks out a common strategy while turning the Academic property to his own advantage. In doing so, he does not only offer his reply to the Platonists who are equipped with the similar dialectical technique, but also pinpoint his stance more precisely in the spectrum of the various views for and against pleasure in this debate.

If AFC_{VII} and AFC_{X} are different in the ways suggested above, we need to reflect further upon what kind of philosophy stands behind Aristotle's and Eudoxus' appeals to their AFC and to what kind of consequence each AFC would lead. As mentioned above, AAM and AFC_{X} are essentially one argument in two guises, the argument from animal motivation in which an animal's hedonic pursuit and aversion manifest the good or the badness of a state. While Eudoxus takes AAM as a

60 In *EN* 1152b12–24, Aristotle then reports at least nine anti-hedonistic arguments. Some of them seem to have the Academic background (e. g. pleasure is a perceptual process to a natural state, yet process and end differ in kind, 1152b13–14), while some of them are documented in general terms (e. g. some pleasures are unhealthy, 1152b22). Starting from the same premise (sc. Pleasure is a process, not an end), some draw a strong anti-hedonistic conclusion (pleasure is not good, either in itself, or incidentally, 1152b8–9), yet others draw a moderate one (pleasure is not the best, cf. 1152b10–11). Based on the phrase εἰ καί at 1152b11, Frede 2009, 192, points out, with good reason, that the *endoxa* that pleasure is not the best might be *invented* by Aristotle for *dialectical* purposes. He does not always need to keep a historical person or group in mind. Of course, some of Speusippus' arguments might be integrated into this doxographical account. It is, however, very hard to identify them insofar as the limited evidence allows (*pace* Festugière 1936). Aristotle's deliberate use of a systematic διαίρεσις suggests that here he is not much interested in the *historicity* of the debate. This de-contextualizing feature of *EN* VII differs considerably from *EN* X in which he deliberately makes use of the opposition of Eudoxus and Speusippus as a dramatic backdrop to develop and elaborate on his own account. Although Lieberg 1955, 45–47, correctly draws attention to the tendency of abstraction and systematization in presenting the *endoxa* in *EN* VII, I think he is mistaken in extending the same characteristic to *EN* X.

reversed version of AFC_X, there is no such counterpart of AFC_{VII}. Yet, it is telling to note that other arguments from the activities of pursuit and avoidance are present in *EN* VII, which, contrasting Eudoxus' AAM, serve *anti-hedonistic* purposes:

> (i) The temperate (ὁ σώφρων) avoids pleasures (1152b15).
> (ii) The wise person (ὁ φρόνιμος) pursues freedom from pain (τὸ ἄλυπον) rather than pleasure (1152b15–16).[61]
> (iii) Children and non-human animals pursue pleasures (1152b19–20).[62]

Like Eudoxus, some anti-hedonists try to infer value claims about pleasure from goal-directed behaviors of animals, rational or non-rational.[63] Yet, while Eudoxus' AAM and AFC_X can be understood as arguments from nature – pleasure is the good because it is *by nature* pursued; pain is the bad because it is *by nature* avoided – the anti-hedonistic arguments in *EN* VII are arguments in terms of *reason*. The activities of *rational* agents (the temperate or the wise person) count as a positive guide for the practical evaluation of a hedonic property, whereas the behaviors of *non-rational* animals function conversely. Aristotle himself seems to stand in the middle ground between both stances.[64] In explicating the nature of practical good, he attaches weight to the observation that animals are prone to pursuing pleasure and have an aversion to pain. This is of interest for evaluating hedonic experiences not simply because of its universality, there is also a teleological implication manifested by the innate tendencies that plays a more decisive role in Aristotle's consideration.[65] In the *Rhetoric*, he has pointed out that more than one tactic is available for indicating something to be good from a teleological point of view:

> We call 'good' (a) what is to be chosen for its own sake and not for the sake of something else; (b) that at which all things aim (οὗ πάντ' ἐφίεται); (c) what they would choose if they could acquire understanding (νοῦν) and practical wisdom (φρόνησιν); (d) and that which tends to produce or preserve such goods, (e) or is always accompanied by such things. (*Rhet*. I.7, 1363b13–1363b16, modified)

61 Arguments (i) and (ii) are not identical (Heliodorus *in EN* 158, 7), but different theses, cf. Anonymous *in EN* 451, 26, 28; Aspasius *in EN* 149,12; cf. Dirlmeier 1964, 497.
62 Cf. *EN* 1100a2; 1111a26; 1176b23; *EE* 1228b21–22; 1236a1–5.
63 The conclusion of (i) is stronger than the latter two. According to the former, pleasure is a bad thing, while according to the latter two, pleasure cannot be good.
64 *Pace* Gosling/Taylor 1982, 203, who argue that the account of pleasure of *EN* VII is guided by "the contrast between what is pleasant *by nature* and what incidentally" (my italics). As I have argued, the guiding principle of *EN* VII is the contrast between predications *simpliciter* and *per accidens*. Being F *simpliciter* is not entirely equivalent to being F by nature. Although in Aristotle's account, pleasure *simpliciter* must be by nature pleasant (cf. 1154b16–18), but not *vice versa*.
65 For the teleological implication here see Rapp 2009, 226–228.

Obviously, Eudoxus' AAM follows option (b), with which Aristotle, too, is in sympathy. Nevertheless, the universal inclination, Aristotle makes explicit, can at best function as a *sign* (σημεῖόν τι, 1153b26), rather than a *proof*, for the evaluation of pleasure as the best good *in a certain sense* (note the qualifier *πως* τὸ ἄριστον αὐτήν, 1153b26). The way in which Eudoxus infer his strong conclusion from animals' behaviors remains uncertain. Aristotle is doubtless well aware of the normativity problem in the Eudoxean AAM. In his defense for this argument, therefore, he shifts the emphasis from pleasure as the *universal* aim to that as a *rational* goal.[66]

> For (γάρ) if [only animals] without reason (τὰ ἀνόητα) desired these things, there would be something in the objection; but if rational [animals] (τὰ φρόνιμα) also desire them, how could there be anything in it? (1173a2–4)[67]

This shift brings Aristotle closer to the *rational* anti-hedonists, though for the sake of defending the value of pleasure. He even goes on to *re*interpret the implication of the behavior of non-rational animal in Eudoxus' argument. The normality, on Aristotle's view, does not derive directly from the observation that each animal pursues its own good; rather, it lies in the fact that the uniform inclination implies, or alludes to, some natural good that *transcends* what they are directly aiming at (1173a4–5).[68] Aristotle has reasons to defend AAM in this way, for he does not believe that the strivings for pleasure among non-rational animals can

66 Aristotle's defense for AAM begin with the claim: ἃ γὰρ πᾶσι δοκεῖ, ταῦτ' εἶναί φαμεν (1172b36–1173a1). This might tempt us to interpret it as his attempt to justify AAM based on what Rapp calls "the *consensus omnium* principle" (2009, 225), i. e. what seems the case to all, that we assert to be true. Although Aristotle doubtless attaches much weight to common experiences and opinions, he can hardly, here or in other places, endorse this philosophically very dubious principle as a methodological guide. It seems more reasonable to take this claim as a provocative prelude by means of which Aristotle expresses his sympathy with, and opens his defense for, Eudoxus' approach. In any case, as *EN* 1173a2–6 shows, Aristotle's account actually goes beyond this principle as well as the Eudoxean AAM by *reinterpreting* them. It is also noteworthy that a parallel account of *EN* 1173a2–6 can be found in *EN* VII.13. 1153b30–32, in which, however, the *consensus omnium* principle is not mentioned.

67 Here I follow the traditional interpretation of *EN* 1173a2–5. I am not convinced by the alternative interpretation recently proposed by Grönroos 2016, who limits Aristotle's scope exclusively to *human* goodness and rejects (in my eyes unnecessarily) the MS-reading.

68 In a similar vein, as *EN* 1153b31–2 shows, it is *not* the *naturalness* of an animal's striving for pleasure, but the *divine* implication of this natural inclination (φύσει ἔχει τι θεῖον) that indicates the goodness of pleasure. Both passages reveal that the normative force Aristotle defends in Eudoxus' AAM does not simply derive from the universality of the phenomenon, nor from the innocent nature of (non-rational) animal behaviors. For more detailed discussions about this, see Merlan 1960, 20–24; Rapp 2009, 228; Warren 2009, 263 f.

be *directly* used to justify a hedonistic or conversely an anti-hedonistic thesis as Eudoxus and the anti-hedonists did respectively. What non-rational animals enjoy, according to him, must be pleasures *per accidens*, which are accordingly good in a relative sense (1153a30–31). As a result, such evidence is insufficient to settle the evaluation of pleasure as such.

By contrast, I think it is not easy for Eudoxus to meet the challenge from the three pleasure-hostile arguments mentioned above. Since Eudoxus commits himself to the *universality* that pleasure is pursued by both rational and non-rational animals, he should somehow explain away the *phainomena* in (i) and (ii). On the other hand, (iii), the anti-hedonistic thesis that children and non-human animals seek pleasure, is an indispensable part of Eudoxus' claim that pleasure is *universally* pursued, and without this, his evaluation of pleasure as *the* best could not be established.[69]

Maybe Eudoxus can take himself as an example to show that it is incorrent or inaccurate to claim that the temperate or the wise person avoids pleasure or pursues only the freedom from pain.[70] Perhaps he can furthermore insist that they only decline pleasures that are excessive or unhealthy, but they can hardly avoid enjoying some basic forms of pleasure such as eating and drinking, albeit in a proper manner.[71] No doubt, the reply along this line is available for Eudoxus. At the same time, however, we ought to note that once he manages to distinguish the pleasure of the temperate and the wise person from the other pleasures, his pro-hedonistic belief is not only threatened by the classical "heterogeneity problem",[72] such a distinction asks for a more elaborate theorization and categorization of pleasure itself, which is not yet available in Eudoxus' arguments, at least according to Aristotle's testimony, the only evidence we have.[73] From a certain perspective, Eudoxus' silence about the ontology of pleasure might be a merit, because it allows him to focus on visible behaviors and actions without falling into the (for our modern ears weird) struggle with metaphysical categories (κίνησις or

69 Karpp 1933, 11, even argues that the pursuit of pleasure by *non-rational animals* is the core of Eudoxus' AAM.

70 Aristotle, as noted, points out that the temperateness (σώφρων, 1172b16) of Eudoxus, his self-control, paradoxically makes his pro-hedonistic attitude more persuasive.

71 I owe a more serious engagement with Eudoxus' AAM to an anonymous reader.

72 This is a classical objection to hedonism by disuniting the concept of pleasure itself, which is used by Sidgwick, Parfit, and many others (cf. Moore 2013). Aristotle seems to conceive of an anti-hedonistic argument along this line (see *EN* 1153b29–30). It is noteworthy that at 1172b10, Eudoxus stresses that all animals strive for the *same* thing (τὸ δὴ πάντ' *ἐπὶ ταὐτὸ* φέρεσθαι).

73 Frede 1997, 392 f., convincingly shows that Eudoxus does not have such a theory. For different speculative attempts to reconstruct Eudoxus' (metaphysical) theory of pleasure see Philippson 1925; Schadewaldt 1952; Gosling 1975.

ἐνεργεία) that preoccupy Aristotle and many Academics. Yet confronted with the challenge from the rational anti-hedonists, his "empirical" approach, as we can see, is either not cogent enough or has to go beyond its "behavioralist" outlook. In other words, if Eudoxus and the anti-hedonists join a debate face to face, they seem either to fall into a stalemate in their irreconcilable disparity about the reliability of experience – because the realities they "see" are principally incompatible – or else they are deadlocked by their contradictory readings of one and the same phenomenon. They should go beyond a hedonistic debate, to initiate a discussion at a different level, perhaps about the relation between reason and nature as well as about what pleasure essentially is. But on the observational level, Eudoxus and his enemies seem unable to surmount the *aporia*, as if they just speak different languages or live in different worlds.

How, then, does Aristotle reply to these anti-hedonists? He tells us:

> All these (sc. the three anti-hedonistic arguments) are solved by the same reply (τῷ αὐτῷ λύεται). For we have explained in what ways pleasures are good *simpliciter* (ἁπλῶς), and in what ways not all are good;[74] and it is these pleasures [that are not good without qualification] that beasts and children pursue, whereas the wise person (ὁ φρόνιμος) pursues painlessness (ἀλυπίαν) in relation to these. These are the pleasures that involve appetite and pain and the bodily pleasures (since these involve appetite and pain) and their excesses, whose pursuit makes the intemperate person (ὁ ἀκόλαστος) intemperate. That is why the temperate person (σώφρων) avoids these pleasures (but not all pleasures) since there are pleasures of the temperate person, too (*EN* 1153a29–35, modified).

In this presentation, Aristotle is self-confident that *one* reply is able to solve (λύεται, *EN* 1153a29) the three *aporiai* once and for all, which sharply contrasts his verdict several lines below that Speusippus' *lusis* of AFC_{VII} fails (*EN* 1153b5). In Aristotle's dialectics, a proper *lusis* is "an exposure of a false deduction, showing on what kind of question the falsity depends".[75] It is noteworthy, as he points out, that there are a number of ways to design a *lusis*: you can target either the premise or the conclusion; you can demolish an argument as a whole or, in a more subtle way, undermine it by drawing distinctions the argument ignores (διελόντα, *SE* 176b36).[76] In the hedonistic debate, Aristotle, unlike Eudoxus, seems little bothered by the *phainomena* the anti-hedonists describe. This is understandable because,

74 Here I follow the MS-reading rather than Irwin's conjecture (πῶς ἀγαθαὶ καὶ πῶς οὐκ ἀγαθαὶ ἁπλῶς πᾶσαι αἱ ἡδοναί) and the corresponding translation: "For we have explained in what ways pleasures are good, and in what ways not all are good without qualification".

75 *SE* 177a29–30: ἐστὶν ἡ μὲν ὀρθὴ λύσις ἐμφάνισις ψευδοῦς συλλογισμοῦ, παρ' ὁποίαν ἐρώτησιν συμβαίνει τὸ ψεῦδος.

76 My list is far from complete. For other strategies, see *Top.* 160b23–39; *SE* 176b29–177a8; *Rhet.* 1402a30–38.

as I have argued, Aristotle does not understand AAM in the exact same way that Eudoxus does. More importantly, an elaborate theory of pleasure is available to him if he needs to explain the sense in which pleasure is pursued and in which sense it is not. With respect to the anti-hedonistic arguments above, he rejects the *conclusion* that the anti-hedonists draw from the *phainomena* to which they resort. Yet, Aristotle does so not by demolishing their inferences entirely, but by referring back to a distinction he has already made: the distinction between *simpliciter* and *per accidens* in terms of which two kinds of pleasure are accordingly differentiated.[77] As mentioned above, this is a central strategy by which Aristotle frames the whole discussion of the nature and value of pleasure in *EN* VII 11–14. Again, he criticizes the anti-hedonists on the grounds that they have no idea of pleasure *simpliciter* and improperly generalize the nature of pleasure *per accidens* (pleasure that is avoided by the temperate and non-rational animals) to pleasure *in general*.[78]

It is noteworthy that being temperate (σώφρων), according to the *communis opinio* of classical Greece, means to possess a particular virtue whose core is self-control, in particular concerning desire and pleasure.[79] Yet, Aristotle not only further limits the scope of this virtue to sensory pleasures (ἀπεχόμενος τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν), or *mutandis mutatis*, pleasures of touch,[80] but also insists that people of this type have to be at the same time *enjoying* the very attitude or activity (αὐτῷ τούτῳ χαίρων σώφρων, 1104b5). As a result, two kinds of pleasure are experienced by the temperate: sensory pleasures in their proper form and a second-order pleasure taken in moderating the sensory pleasures (*EN* 1119a16–18). In comparison with the temperate, who is credited with a *particular* moral excellence, the *phronimos*, called the wise person here, embodies the virtue of *phronēsis*, which, as the practical wisdom, is broader than the virtue that the temperate represents. Despite respecting the phenomenon that freedom from pain is pursued by persons of this type, for Aristotle this cannot preclude that such people are open to the experience of pleasure as well; for being painless is also characteristic of pleasures *simpliciter*, but this does not exhaust the nature of such pleasures.[81]

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77 *EN* 1153a29–30: ἐπεὶ γὰρ *εἴρηται* πῶς ἀγαθαὶ ἁπλῶς καὶ πῶς οὐκ ἀγαθαὶ πᾶσαι αἱ ἡδοναί

78 Pleasure avoided by the temperate and pursued by non-human animals and children are the same in kind (*EN* 1118a24–26; 1119b4–7; *EE* 1230b34–31a8).

79 Rademaker 2005, 259.

80 See *EN* 1108a1–5, 23–26, 30–32, cf. *EN* 1107b4–5, 1147b25–28, 1148a5–9; *EE* 1230b23–25, 1230b34–1231a8.

81 Aristotle here does not provide evidence for the pleasures enjoyed by the φρόνιμος. According to him, people with practical wisdom are always able to deliberate well (καλῶς βουλεύσασθαι 1140a26), not only in part (κατὰ μέρος a27), but about "all kinds of things that promote the good

5 Asymmetrical Contrariety

If my argument is on the right track, it has been clear in which sense Aristotle is *ethically* motivated to propose AFC_{VII} and to defend AFC_{X}. Now I attempt to show further that his different attitudes toward Eudoxus and Speusippus are also based on his understanding of the nature of contrariety, which can be discerned in one of his earliest works, the *Categories*:

> What is contrary to a good thing is necessarily (ἐξ ἀνάγκης) bad; this is clear by induction from cases – health and sickness, justice and injustice, courage and cowardice, and so on with the rest. But what is contrary to a bad thing is sometimes (ὁτὲ μέν) good but sometimes (ὁτὲ δέ) bad. For excess is contrary to deficiency, which is bad, and is itself bad; yet moderation as well is contrary to both, and it is good. However, though this sort of thing may be seen in a few cases, in most cases (ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν πλείστων) what is contrary to the bad is always the good (τῷ κακῷ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐναντίον, *Cat*. 13b36–14a6, modified).

In this passage, Aristotle does not address pleasure or pain directly, but mentions an underlying principle that plays an important role in the hedonistic debate over AFC among him, Eudoxus and the Academics, i. e. "what is contrary to a bad thing is good".[82] Both Eudoxus and Aristotle agree that this principle can be reasonably invoked to establish the goodness of pleasure, but it is notable that the principle itself seems dubious. For although a bad can be opposed to a good (*Cat*. 13b26),[83] both the Academics and Aristotle acknowledge that the opposite of a bad can be another bad, so that AFC starting from bad can go in two opposite directions (*Cat*. 14a1–2). This does pose a serious problem for the aspiration of Eudoxus and Aristotle to affirm the value of pleasure in terms of AFC, since a central premise of their arguments is open to objection. Strikingly, *Cat*. 14a1–2 spells out nothing but

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life in general" (ποῖα πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν ὅλως 40a28). Since, for him, pleasures *simpliciter* are integral to a good life, they must be enjoyed by the φρόνιμος, who knows how to live well. A Platonist might complain that Aristotle reads his own concept of φρόνησις into, and thus distorts, the argument. In claiming that the φρόνιμος does not pursue pleasure, but freedom from pain, the anti-hedonist might keep in mind the person who is dedicated to a *rational* life, represented by reasoning and contemplation (Frede 2009, 190, refers this argument back to *Phlb*. 43c–d). That the φρόνιμος should be understood in a Platonic sense can be supported by the adjacent argument in the next line that pleasure impedes *φρονεῖν* (*EN* 1152b15), the activity of thinking, which does not seem to be limited to *practical reasoning*. Aristotle, however, would not be bothered by such criticism because the same point can be made in terms of the Platonic distinction between pure and impure pleasures.

82 This principle is used explicitly by AFC_{X} (cf. *EN* 1172b20) and implicitly in AFC_{VII}.

83 The debate in question merely concerns the goodness or badness of something, without getting the value neutral area involved.

the basic idea behind the refutation raised by Speusippus – pleasure as a bad can be opposed to pain as another bad – in undermining the cogency of Eudoxus' and Aristotle's AFC, even if pleasure and pain do not appear here.[84]

The parallel between this passage and the hedonistic debate over AFC in the *EN* continues. Just as we see Aristotle defending Eudoxus against Speusippus in *EN* X, in the *Categories* he seems to defend a similar use of AFC by justifying the inference from something bad to something good against the Speusippean objection, though for a different reason. In his reply, Aristotle insists that those who resort to the possibility of a bad-bad-opposition fail to understand the nature of value oppositions. It is of course *formally* correct to maintain that a bad can be opposed to a good as well as to another bad, but these two kinds of opposition are not symmetrical because, as the argument implies, the value opposition cannot be deemed to be a purely *formal* principle. Rather, with respect to value, he reminds his opponents that people should also take empirical facts into account.[85] This consideration leads Aristotle to the conclusion that can be called *the asymmetrical contrariety of value*: the good-bad-opposition is predominant in reality or in the practical world, whereas the bad-bad-opposition is relatively rare (14a5–6).[86]

This disparity seems to have intuitive appeal. Suppose that someone comes to mention "the opposite of indulgence (ἀκολασία)" in an ethical debate; we are more inclined to assume that what she has in mind is self-control/moderation (σωφροσύνη) rather than the state of being unable to enjoy pleasure, called *anaisthēsia* by Aristotle.[87] The asymmetrical contrariety, from another point of

84 See the signpost of generalization implied in the phrase "ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων" (*Cat.* 14a1).

85 The opening of this passages "τῇ καθ' ἕκαστον ἐπαγωγῇ" (13b37) suggests that the whole discussion is concerned with concrete cases. A similar requirement is found in the beginning of Aristotle's account of his doctrine of the mean: "[W]e should not only state this account (sc. the opposition among deficiency, intermediate and excess) in general terms but also [clarify] how it fits the particular cases" (Δεῖ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ μόνον καθόλου λέγεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα ἐφαρμόττειν, *EN* 1107a28–29, modified).

86 This is not the only asymmetry concerning the triple opposition of value. In his account of the doctrine of the mean, for instance, Aristotle also mentions, "in some cases, the deficient state, in others the excessive state, is *more opposed* to the intermediate condition" (*EN* 1108b35–1109a1, modified). In addition, with respect to two bad states, our nature is at times *more prone* to one than to the other (1109a13–19). They all indicate that the contrariety of value should not be taken as being purely formally constructed. For the link between *Cat.* 13b36–14a6 and Aristotle's doctrine of the mean, see Simpl. *In Cat.* 409.25–410.24.

87 I am using an Aristotelian example. The triple opposition in question concerns different attitudes to (bodily) pleasures: indulgence (excessive state) vs. moderation (intermediate state) vs. insensitivity (deficient state), cf. *EN* 1107b8; 1108b21–22; 1109a4; *EE* 1221a21–22; 1230b13–14; 1231a26–28.

view, helps us understand the reason why Aristotle in *EN* X concedes the rationality of the anti-hedonists' objection to AFC (cf. "what they say is [in general or formally] not bad", 1173a8–9) while insisting that this criticism cannot affect Eudoxus' case (cf. "what they say in the case mentioned is false", 1173a9). For he and Eudoxus, here, do not appeal to a *universal* principle, but an empirical guide that respects the priority of the inference from bad to good *in most cases*. The burden of proof is thus on the sceptics who, apart from insisting on existence of the bad-bad opposition, should also account for the *exceptional* status of pleasure and pain. When seen in this light, the passage from the *Categories* provides another reason for Aristotle's affiliation with Eudoxus, which concerns the connection of the principle of value contrariety to empirical reality. He could reply to Speusippus:

> "In addition to the absurd implication of your criticism,[88] the principle you invoke, the bad-bad opposition, is much less instantiated in reality than the good-bad opposition. You indeed say something that has *formal* plausibility, yet we should also take practical factors into consideration."

It is beyond the scope of this article to assess Aristotle' view of the asymmetrical contrariety of value in detail. Three remarks, however, seem sufficient for the current purposes. First, the "logic" behind the hedonistic debate over AFC in the *EN* was not alien to early Aristotle. *Cat*. 13b36–14a6 is in striking parallel with the argumentative back-and-forth in the debate between Aristotle, Eudoxus, and Speusippus. Yet, we need not assume that this account is inspired by, or abstracted from, this debate, because pleasure and pain are not even mentioned here. Second, Aristotle's sympathy with Eudoxus is not purely from an ethical concern, that is, he holds a more generous attitude to pleasure than the anti-hedonists, including Speusippus. As the *Categories* shows, his understanding of value contrariety also leads him naturally to side with Eudoxus concerning the application of AFC. Finally, there is more than one way to construct AFC in favor of the value of pleasure. AFC itself is only a general model, which can be realized in different ways, even for similar purposes. Everyone can use AFC to support the goodness of pleasure; this possibility, however, by no means

88 It falls outside the scope of this paper to explore Aristotle's counterarguments against the critics of AFC. Roughly speaking, in *EN* VII he points out that it is absurd to regard pleasure as essentially bad (1153b6–7), whereas in *EN* X he restates that pleasure and pain are opposed in the way that the former is pursued as good and the latter is avoided as bad (1173a8–13). Both replies seem to aim mainly at the counterintuitive implication of Speusippus' attack on AFC. Whether they are philosophically persuasive, however, is another issue. For recent discussion thereof see Rapp 2009, 213 f.; Warren 2009, 273–279.

implies that the same AFC must be always employed for *this* purpose. Aristotle's distinction between ordinary and exceptional oppositions do not appear in the *EN*; Eudoxus' introduction of the strong qualifier "in itself and for all" and Aristotle's *simpliciter* and *per accidens* distinction are also absent in the passage of the *Categories*. In short, Aristotle has theoretical and practical reasons to defend Eudoxus' AFC, but he also has theoretical and practical reasons to develop AFC in his own way.

6 Conclusion

Historically viewed, since AFC as a model was a common property of the Academy and widely attested in the whole Greek intellectual tradition, it is unlikely that Eudoxus was the first to apply AFC to the evaluation problem of pleasure and pain, or that it was *only* via him that Aristotle became aware of its relevance for the value claims concerning the hedonic properties. It is more reasonable to assume that they use their own AFC respectively, which – due to their different contents, effects, and purposes – should not be confused with each other. For dialectical purposes, Aristotle aligned himself with Eudoxus, taking advantage of AFC_x as an *ad hoc* weapon in humbling Speusippus,[89] just as, conversely, in *Metaphysics* MN, he used Speusippus' criticism of the doctrine of Forms to counter Plato and Xenocrates. Aristotle's efforts to defend Eudoxus do not require him to share all of the beliefs implied in Eudoxus' arguments, just as in the debate over first principles he does not become Speusippus' follower just because he adopts some of Speusippus' anti-Platonic arguments.

It is worthwhile to extend our scope from classical antiquity to the modern world. If we draw attention to Nietzsche's influential *Genealogy of Morality*, in particular to the first essay, the key strategy Nietzsche uses to initiate his adventure strikes us as nothing but an adoption of AFC, even an Aristotelian version. To prove that "good" is not a univocal term, but that it has two distinct senses: one is tied up with the nobility, whereas the other refers to moral evaluation such as selflessness and utility, Nietzsche resorts to two distinct contraries of good: bad (schlecht) and evil (böse). The non-moral goodness corresponds to the bad, a negative value in a non-moral sense, whereas the moral value corresponds to the evil, a negative value related to what he calls slave morality. This argument is fundamental to Nietzsche's project of re-evaluating all values through a genea-

89 For this aspect, see Warren 2009.

logical approach; yet, it is less noticed that what Nietzsche appeals to is a legacy from classical antiquity.[90] In fact, to establish the two senses of good in terms of two senses of bad is reminiscent of Aristotle' attempt to distinguish between two kinds of pleasure in terms of two kinds of pain in *EN* VII.[91] This not only tells us, again, that the polysemy of an item is crucial for the construction of AFC, but also that it is premature to claim, as I did at the beginning of this article, that AFC has been out of fashion in modern philosophical discourses.[92] Perhaps, no one has summarized what the present study aims to show better than Aristotle:

> In a dialectical debate, "it is useful to have examined the number of uses of a term both for clarity's (τὸ σαφές) sake (for a man is more likely to know what it is he asserts, if it has been made clear to him how many uses it may have), and also with a view to ensuring that our deductions shall be in accordance with the actual facts (τὸ πρᾶγμα) and not addressed merely to the word (τὸ ὄνομα) used. For as long as it is not clear in how many ways a term is used, it is possible that the answerer and the questioner are not directing their minds upon the same thing" (*Top*. 108a18–24, modified).[93]

EE	Aristotle, *Ethica Eudemia*
EN	Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea*
Metaph.	Aristotle, *Metaphysics*
MM	[Aristotle], *Magna Moralia*
Rhet.	Aristotle, *Rhetoric*
SE	Aristotle, *Sophistici Elenchi*
Top.	Aristotle, *Topics*
TrGF	Snell/Kannicht, *Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta*

90 Although Nietzsche manifests little interest in Aristotle's works (except the *Poetics* and *Rhetoric*), he has first-hand knowledge of Aristotle's accounts of pleasure. In the notebook written between autumn 1868 and the beginning of 1869, Nietzsche made a schematic comparison concerning different anti-hedonistic *endoxa* among three accounts of pleasure found in the *MM*, *EN* VII and X, respectively (Nietzsche 1994, 210 f.).

91 For another similar example, see *Top*. 106a20–22: "fine (τῷ καλῷ) as applied to an animal has ugly (τὸ αἰσχρόν) as its contrary, but, as applied to a house, mean (τὸ μοχθηρόν); so that fine is homonymous".

92 In contemporary philosophy, examples of more sophisticated discussions on the use of contrariety for evaluating and comparing hedonic properties can be found in Massin 2014 and Benatar 2006, 28–57.

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