

CHAPTER TWO

THE NOVEL AND THE *BÜRGER*: CITIZEN, BOURGEOIS, AND *BURGER'S DAUGHTER*¹

SINKWAN CHENG

Instead of discussing the novel and the middle class in socio-economic terms,² my essay will concentrate on the relationship of the novel to the visionary politics of the middle class during the Enlightenment—that is, the politics of human rights and citizen rights. This initial vision and its subsequent deformation will inform my analysis of the criticism launched by Gordimer and her character Rosa Burger against the bourgeois Afrikaners who have made citizenship and human rights into the white man's property. By reading Gordimer's novel alongside Bakhtin and Habermas, I will also connect *Burger's Daughter* to the Enlightenment bourgeois legacy of the public sphere. I will demonstrate how Gordimer's novel is performative of a democratic public sphere in which no voice is granted authority over others—a public sphere which forms a powerful counterpoint to the social and political hierarchies established by the racist South African regime. I will also highlight how, through her internationally acclaimed novels, Gordimer creates a worldwide public sphere whereby the violation of rights in South Africa becomes an object of international discussion and censorship.

Burger, the last name of the heroine of Gordimer's novel, carries a double meaning: citizen and bourgeois. The entwining of "citizen" with "bourgeois" recalls the revolutionary role of the middle class during the Enlightenment.³ Rosa Burger is not just the daughter of Lionel Burger the Marxist revolutionary in South Africa. Like her father, she is also the descendent of the revolutionary *Bürger* who wrote the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen. This heritage passes on to the Burgers the legacy of human and citizen

rights. That the Enlightenment legacy of rights is taken very seriously by the Burgers⁴ can be illustrated by Lionel's defense speech at the treason trial, when he repeatedly invokes the language of rights:

[. . .] the great mass movement of the African National Congress, and other movements, were outlawed . . . What legitimate *rights* had been recognized, according to the "standards of Western civilization" our white governments have declared themselves dedicated to preserve and perpetuate? . . . why is it no black man has ever had the *right* of answering, before a black prosecutor, a black judge, to laws in whose drafting and promulgation his own people, the blacks, have had a say?⁵

Note that Lionel's reference to the right of the people to participate in law-making is another idea inherited from the *Bürger* of the Enlightenment. Assuming the legacy of her father, Rosa confronts the white "bourgeois" government in South Africa with the critical origin of the legacy of the *Bürger*. Rosa's political commitment can thus be read as the faithful Burger/*Bürger's* daughter confronting the prodigal son—the white South African government which deviates from the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen—with the voice of the dead, including her dead father Lionel Burger and the dead *Bürger* from the Enlightenment.

THE UNIVERSAL AND THE INDIVIDUAL

The Enlightenment passes on two legacies: universalism on the one hand, and the dignity of the individual on the other. These two legacies are clearly stated in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen. Universalism prescribes that "Men are born and remain free and equal in rights" (Article 1), and that they are "equal in the eyes of the law" (Article 7).⁶ At the same time, the Enlightenment advocates the dignity and autonomy of the individual subject. Kant's notion that the individual gives himself/herself the law in his *Critique of Practical Reason* and *Groundworks to the Metaphysics of Morals* is given further explications in his legal and political philosophy.⁷ These ideas resonate with various articles in the Declaration which lay down the legal foundations for the autonomy of the individual with his/her inviolable rights. Article 2 establishes "liberty, property, security, and resistance to oppression" as part of "the natural and imprescriptible rights of man." This article is complemented by Articles 4, 7, 9, 10, and 11, which prescribe the protection against unlawful appro-

priation of individuals' rights and properties by the state, the freedom of religion, speech, and press, and protection against arbitrary arrest and punishment.⁸

The principles of equality and universal rights of man and of citizen on the one hand, and the dignity of individuals on the other, have been egregiously violated by the white South African government at the time Gordimer wrote this novel (first published 1979). It is my project to demonstrate how Gordimer in *Burger's Daughter* indicts the white government for their violations of the rights of the African people, and how she endeavors to revive for the daughters of *die Bürger* (including Rosa Burger, the Africans, and by extension, all human beings and all citizens) the legacy of rights in her novel. Gordimer refuses to compromise either the individual's freedom to participate in *public* affairs or the *private* individual's freedom from political and social coercions, and she brings together the entitlement of human being to both his/her radical singularity and his/her universal humanity by wedding existentialism to Marxism. This union at its best allows the "authentic" characters in Gordimer's novel the fortuitous actualization of the self-made possible by its participation in public affairs. However, Gordimer refuses to gloss over real contradictions in society by immediately⁹ presenting this vision of plenitude as the "perfect" solution. From time to time, this vision is disrupted by the incommensurability between universalism and particularism.

*Marxism and Universalism*¹⁰

Following Marx's emphasis on equality, itself an Enlightenment legacy of universalism, Gordimer charges the white capitalist South African government for making human and citizen rights into their private property by appropriating the rights of the blacks. Following Marx's "overcoming" of the bourgeois liberal tradition, Gordimer's protest against the apartheid government focuses on resisting racial separation made possible by private property, championing instead universal humanity and universal reason. It is on the grounds of universalism that Gordimer and her characters the Burgers can transcend racial barriers and side with the black Africans against the white government. The power of Lionel Burger's treason trial speech¹¹ stems precisely from his insistence on humanity and human rights as universal, and his conviction that the individual is intrinsically em-

bedded in this universality and hence his/her inescapable responsibility toward universal humanity. It is on the grounds of the principle that any human being, qua human being, participates in humanity that he indicts the white government for "deny[ing] the humanity of the black people they live among."¹² It is also because of his belief that he himself as a human being, qua human being, has a responsibility toward humanity that he finds it impossible to continue tolerating the government's "subjection and humiliation of *human beings*" on a daily basis — "a subjection and humiliation of live *people* in which, by my silence and political activity *I myself took part*."¹³ To stand by white injustice against the blacks would "mak[e] it impossible for me to see myself as *a man among men, with all that implies of consciousness and responsibility*."¹⁴ By invoking his human responsibility to resist injustice, Lionel Burger foregrounds both the responsibility of a South African citizen (*Bürger*) toward *humanity* and the political responsibility of a *human being*. Instead of separating the rights and responsibility of a citizen from those of a human being, he brings them together, and reconciles the particular to the universal. Also in line with Enlightenment universalism and democracy is Lionel's association of legitimacy with universal reason. He challenges the legitimacy of the apartheid regime for its refusal to grant "*reasonable recognition*" to the "*reasonable aspirations*" of the African people.¹⁵

Instead of acknowledging universal humanity and reason, the South African government enforces white separatism and appropriates black resources to expand their properties. Gordimer describes this in detail in *Writing and Being*:

The reaction of the white community to strikes and mass demonstrations was to raise the drawbridges over which blacks might commingle with whites. Sexual relations between black and white became a criminal offence, no mixed membership of political parties was allowed, even ambulances were segregated so that an accident victim might lie by the roadside until the vehicle mandated to the appropriate skin colour could be summoned.

A larger and larger army and police force were deployed to keep blacks out of white lives . . .¹⁶

The evil of racism, according to Gordimer, is an outgrowth of the white government's "economic greed."¹⁷ In opposition to the government's measures to "keep blacks out of white lives",¹⁸ Lionel opens his private house to the public, and adopts the son of a revolutionary

African into his family. To counter white separatism, Lionel espouses Marxism, bringing blacks and whites in a common struggle against injustice:

I saw that white Marxists worked side by side with blacks in an *equality* that meant taking on the meanest of tasks—tasks that incurred loss of income and social prestige and the risk of arrest and imprisonment—as well as sharing policy-making and leadership. I saw whites prepared to work under blacks.¹⁹

Lionel's efforts to overcome racial separatism earn him his deserved trust and loyal friendship from the blacks.

Existentialism and the Authentic Individual

Within the framework of universalism, Gordimer wants to preserve the dignity of the individual. Individual right is fundamental to the development of modern Western notions of justice—justice as intricately related to notions of liberty, privacy, personhood, security, agency, and power. It is important to note that the destruction of the individual rights of black Africans constitutes a significant part of the white government's crime against the natives. On the ontological and ethical levels, the protection of the private sphere allows the individual to "own" his/her self and his/her own thoughts. If we trace the word "own" back to the German word "*Eigen*," we can see how the maintenance of a private sphere makes possible the individual's *authentic* relationship to himself/herself. The fact that Gordimer weaves together in her story third-person and first-person narratives demonstrates her refusal to allow the individual's rights to self-expression and his/her first-person experiences to be dominated by public voices and public reports. To allow public discourse to take over individual expression would risk tyrannizing the individual with the discourse of "*das man*" and drowning him/her in the ocean of mass media, political propaganda, government surveillance reports, and the gossips and idle chatters of "the they."²⁰ Gordimer's repeated criticism of newspaper reports—a degenerated public sphere—can be seen in her literary writings as well. For example, when the judge sentences Lionel Burger to life imprisonment, "The newspapers reported a `gasp through the court' . . . [Rosa] did not hear any gasp."²¹ In response to her own question, "*When they saw me outside the prison,*

what did they see?", she surmises that "[i]t's all concocted. I saw — see — that profile in a hand-held mirror directed towards another mirror."²²

To emphasize the rights of the individual to pursue his/her own happiness, Gordimer juxtaposes to the political the private passions of her main character. Rosa's sexuality is portrayed to be as intense as her passion for public justice. In fact, within the immediate timeframe of the plot, we get to see only Rosa's relationship to Conrad and Katya — both of whom are dedicated to the pursuit of private pleasures. Rosa's parents who put public concerns before domestic affairs are, by contrast, invoked primarily through flashbacks. Conrad, Rosa's lover, espouses a bourgeois liberal idea of negative freedom — freedom from familial and political burdens. For him, only through private pleasure and desire can he register the meaning of his existence: "Fantasies. Obsessions. They're mine. They're the form in which the question of my own existence is being put to me."²³ Katya, Lionel's former wife, also prioritizes sexual and aesthetic pleasure above public responsibility. Katya is the antithesis of Cathy, Rosa's own mother and a political activist. Katya broke up with Lionel due to her reluctance to put politics before personal pleasure. Rosa goes to Katya to learn how to "break with Lionel" when she finds herself suffocating under the public citizen legacy she inherits from her parents.

The Sublation of the Private into the Public

At first sight, it seems that Gordimer is opposing private fulfillment to public good. The novel traces the wavering of the individual between the comfort of the one and the ethical imperative of the other. True to her father's heritage, Rosa eventually rejects both Conrad and Katya in the same way Lionel broke with Katya.

Rosa's recommitment to the public at the end of the novel signifies not so much a negation as a sublation of the private into a higher synthesis between private and public commitments. Public commitment becomes an authentic expression of the self when the individual experiences social injustice as a violation of one's own emotional and moral integrity. Such connection between the public and private seems unavoidable sooner or later because, as Gordimer repeatedly describes in her writings, private fulfillment is impossible within an unjust society. In her third novel, *Occasion for Living* (1963), for example, Gordimer demonstrates that even love relationship — supposedly

the most "private" and intimate of human relationship—is inevitably contaminated by apartheid:

A line in a statute book has more authority than the claims of one man's love or another's. All claims of natural feeling are overridden alike by a line in a statute book that takes no account of humanness, that recognizes neither love nor respect nor jealousy nor rivalry nor compassion nor hate—nor any human attitude whatsoever where there are black and white together.²⁴

In as much as private passion cannot be realized within an unjust society, public commitment also cannot be divorced from subjective feeling. In the dialectic between the universal and the particular, Rosa's journey of quest from the public legacy of the Burgers to her self-exile to private pleasures in Europe culminates in a synthesis whereby public action is rooted in, and arises from, personal conviction with its attendant emotional commitment. Implied in this trajectory is the author's conviction that abstract theory and imposed ideologies are incapable of arousing action unless given substance by the force of personal experience.²⁵ Kathrin Wagner points out how characters in Gordimer's novels are politicized not by ideologies but by heartfelt responses to injustice:

It is not so much that heart will overrule head, but that head will . . . indeed come into operation only when the heart's responses shock it into action. Throughout the novels Gordimer presents us with the phenomenon of individuals politicized not by the persuasive power of ideological rhetoric but by their love of others who act upon the conscious and liberate political commitments which they themselves as yet lack.

Oppression thus becomes emotionally meaningful to Gordimer's characters only when they are brought face to face with its effects on others or upon themselves when those effects impinge inescapably on their lives. It is in her depiction of such epiphanic moments that Gordimer locates the impact of apartheid upon individuals in the novels, and not in any larger or more impersonal representation.²⁶

Wagner, like some other critics, has pointed out three important events in Rosa's political life. The first turning point in Rosa's political career takes place after she witnessed the death of a tramp on a park bench, and the brutal whipping of a donkey by a black man who himself Rosa surmises must have been subjected to frequent abuses by his white masters. The next turning point takes place as a result of

the accusations launched against her by Lionel's black adopted child after he has changed his name back to Zwelinzima Vulindlela.²⁷ All three incidents have to do with Rosa's confrontation with injustice perpetuated by the whites against the blacks and her painful consciousness that her biology implicates her in the former even though her heart sides with the latter. Regretfully, no critic seems to have analyzed why the first two events trigger Rosa's flight to Europe, whereas the third brings her back to Lionel's country. This is a question I would like to take up here.

Basically, *witnessing the pain of others* under white injustice—that is, the death of the tramp and the black man's whipping of the donkey—overwhelms Rosa with their agony but above all with her sense of guilt by racial association. Rosa tries to *escape* from her Afrikaner identity and its attendant guilt by taking flight to Europe. But she *can no longer escape* when *she is confronted head-on* by Vulindlela with the stark reality of her implication in, and responsibility for, the sufferings of black South Africans. Hence her return to South Africa.

Rosa's initial desire to escape from her white guilt is evident in her explanations for her refusal to hand over to white justice the black man whipping the donkey:

I drove on because the horrible drunk was black, poor, and brutalized. If somebody's going to be brought to account, *I am accountable for him*, to him, as he is for the donkey. . . . The man was a black. So a kind of *vanity* counted for more than feeling; I couldn't bear to see myself—*her*—Rosa Burger—as one of those whites who can care more for animals than people.²⁸

Significant here is Rosa's confession that her flight from the scene (and subsequently from South Africa) is driven by "vanity" rather than "feeling"—that is, by her *image* of "Rosa Burger" as she surmises herself in the third rather than the first person. Rosa has special pride in her political difference from other Afrikaners. As such, she imagines that, once she cuts her "*external*" ties from the Afrikaners by leaving South Africa, all that will be left will be her "free and pure *internal* self."

This turns out to be no solution—a reality that Zwelinzima brutally confronts her with over the phone. While Rosa tries to *exculpate herself by leaving South Africa*, Zwelinzima *inculcates her even as she is far away in Europe*: "why do you think you should be different from all the other whites who've been shitting on us ever since they came?"

Zwelinzima tells her that her guilt cannot be absolved by performing occasional good deeds for the blacks, such as her attempt to deliver a fake pass to Zwelinzima's father to allow his return from Botswana:

He [Zwelinzima's father] was able to go back home and get caught because you took the pass there. You want me to know in case I blame you for nothing. You think because you're telling me it makes it all right—for you. It wasn't your fault—you want me to tell you, then it's all right. For you. Because I'm the only one who can say so. But he's dead, and what about all the others—who cares whose "fault"—they die because it's the whites killing them, black blood is the stuff to get rid of white shit.--²⁹

Rosa's attempt to help the senior Vulindlela escape only contributed to his captivity. The individual cannot seek exculpation by physically absencing himself/herself from a wrongful community of which s/he is a member. S/He must face reality and right the wrong of the community itself. Rosa's reflection on the black man whipping the donkey ends with "I don't know how to live in *Lionel's* country."³⁰ But the book ends with Rosa Burger taking up her father's position in prison.³¹ Rosa evolves from trying to escape the burden of Lionel's legacy to actively assuming her identity as Burger's daughter. Merely *refraining from action*—from turning over to "white justice" the black man beating the donkey—cannot release her from guilt. The book ends with Rosa turning away from the liberal bourgeois negative notion of "freedom *from*" to the positive notion of "freedom *to (act)*" of both Marxism and existentialism. Only right action can enable one to break through political and existential imprisonments by social injustice from the outside and by the sense of guilt on the inside.

Meaning as a Product of the External World Mediated through Subjective Consciousness

Kathrin Wagner describes Rosa's recommitment to social justice as a "subjectively swayed sense of morality—an embedded humanism."³² While Wagner stays with a materialist language, the phenomenon she is describing is given an existentialist sensibility in Gordimer's novel. Gordimer frequently registers conflicts between the individual and the political in existentialist-Marxist terms. *Writing and Being*, for example, is a book that explores the material practice of writing in relation to the existentialist question of being. In Chapter Two, "Hanging on a Sunrise: Testimony and the Imagination in

Revolutionary Writings," she uses existentialist language to describe the dilemma of Carl Niehaus, a devout Christian committed to fighting on behalf of the blacks against the Afrikaners:

[Carl Niehaus's] testimony is essentially of the moral agony of being at the same time *both* "Us" [the African National Congress] and "Them" [the Afrikaners], an *existential position* [my italics] which has been one of the phenomena of the divisions of successive racist regimes in a country that made us what we are.³³

This is also the language she uses to portray Rosa Burger—a language of *Angst*, of an individual being forced into conflict with herself and into questioning her own being because of her conflict with society. Following Yeats who understands the existentialist anguish of being caught between aesthetics and anti-colonial politics, Gordimer describes poetry as the result of political struggle turned inward into struggle within oneself:

"We make of the quarrel with others, rhetoric; but of our quarrel with ourselves, poetry," writes Yeats.

Beneath the rhetoric of the political struggle, which is inseparable from testimony, we have seen that there may be, also, the quarrel with oneself.

It is poets who can internalize the quarrel with others—the political struggle—within the quarrel with themselves: *the question of being*.³⁴

Let me now attempt to unravel the existentialist sensibility in *Burger's Daughter*. Gordimer's insistence that a positive activism can emerge only when a subject experiences injustice as a violation of her own emotional and moral integrity is an attitude deeply rooted in the existentialist tradition. Kierkegaard insists on the individual's appropriation of the external world for his/her subjective experience. The existentialist subject does not observe in a detached and "objective" manner the external world and allow himself/herself to be passively imposed upon by it. Rather, through care, the subject actively relates to the world as "that which is *at stake* for me." Translated into political terms, a subject is neither a mere spectator of politics, nor a passive instrument of abstract theories and imposed ideologies. Rather, s/he *actively* assumes the call of the Other [Justice] as duties emanating from his/her own existence in the world by asking the question: "How is this blatant injustice against humanity at stake for my exist-

ence, my moral and emotional being?" This is precisely how, for Lionel Burger, the witnessing of injustice committed by his fellow Afrikaners becomes his own existentialist responsibility. Thus he declares to the public at his trial:

. . . when as a medical student tormented not by the suffering I saw around me in hospitals, but by the subjection and humiliation of human beings in daily life I had seen around me all my life—a subjection and humiliation of live people in which, *by my silence and political inactivity I myself took part . . . I could not turn away from that tragedy. I cannot now. I took up then the pursuit of the end to racialism and injustice that I have continued and shall continue as long as I live. I say with Luther: Here I stand. Ich kann nicht anders.*³⁵

While many of Lionel Burger's fellow Afrikaners can look at white actions without seeing injustice, Lionel registers the sufferings of the black Africans subjectively, and it is this subjective opening to the outside world that allows him to see, and *be connected to*, the concreteness of the pain of the other, and to hold fast to it with a subjective certainty and passionate inwardness.³⁶ *This is precisely how existentialism and Marxism come together: it is the subjective passion of the existentialist subject that opens him/her to the world and makes that world concrete and meaningful for his/her existence. Far from cutting the subject off from the world, this existentialist passion is what renders the world as "that which is at stake for my existence."* The existentialist passion, in other words, makes the world available to the subject in its full concreteness. It rejoins the subject to a world charged with meaning. This is why for Gordimer, "the only route to a public and political commitment is via the intensity of a private epiphany."³⁷

Real meaning is possible, in other words, only when the subject relates to understanding in terms of the passion of his/her existence. Meaning is hence radically singular for each individual, as much as existence and experience is *in-each-case-mine*, to appropriate Heidegger's vocabulary.³⁸ This existentialist passion is *what lends radical singularity, concreteness, and dignity to Gordimer's characters. All suffer under apartheid, but all do not suffer it the same way, nor do suffering and apartheid carry the same meaning for everyone.* As Wagner puts it, "reality' in South Africa . . . is the private suffering of its oppressed peoples, and it can only be apprehended through a *personal* involvement at an emotional and *experiential* level which will make the abstractions of theory and ideology become *individually meaningful.*"³⁹ This is why,

despite the fact that Rosa was born into a family of revolutionaries, she needs to exile herself to Europe, and only after redefining what public justice means for her personally can she return to reclaim the Burgers' revolutionary heritage. In the words of Louise Yelin, "Rosa must stake her own claim to her inheritance, come to terms with the history that her parents incarnate, and find her place in a changing South Africa."⁴⁰ As it is, the novel ends with Rosa in prison, taking the place of her parents. But her assumption of the Burger legacy is the result of personal conviction, not imposed ideology: "I don't know the ideology," she says. The fact that the book ends with Rosa's identification with her father rather than her revolutionary mother is significant.⁴¹ Like Rosa, Lionel had gone through the detour of sensual pleasure with Katya before combining private with public passions. Rosa's (re-)turn to her father at the end of the book hence is no real proof of Gordimer's lack of appreciation for women.⁴² Rather, Rosa's final choice of Lionel's legacy signifies that her real comrade is neither a seeker of private pleasure nor a mere public personality, but Lionel who can combine the radical singularity of individual existence with universal justice.

THE NOVEL, THE HUMAN INDIVIDUAL, AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE

Rosa's recommitment to the political cause through the detour of private pleasures opens up the social-political to the lifeworld which includes the social-political but is not limited to it. The novel seems to be a felicitous medium for Gordimer to attend to issues of human fulfilment both in the private and the public spheres.

Fiction Compared To Historical Writing

To resist reducing the experience of people under apartheid into merely one more incident of that "general" phenomenon called "racism," to register how the white government violates the rights of Africans on very concrete individual levels, Gordimer decides on the novel rather than historical writing as her means for recording what happens in her country. While history records only what happens outwardly and describes events in terms of general attributes, the novel attends to the concrete lived experience of individuals and their radical singularities. As such, the novel would be better suited for

demonstrating concretely how the colonial South African government does irreparable damages to individuals both physically and emotionally, destroying outwardly their lives and properties and inwardly their sense of their own being and dignity. In an interview with Robert Boyers in 1984, Gordimer distinguishes herself from a historian: "I don't write about apartheid. I write about *people* who happen to live under that system."⁴³ In *Writing and Being*, Gordimer further explains the differences between historical writing and novel:

If you want to read the facts of the retreat from Moscow in 1815, you may read a history book; if you want to know what war is like and how people of a certain time and background dealt with it as their personal situation, you must read *War and Peace*.⁴⁴

In naming her book *Writing and Being*, she is drawing attention to the existentialist question of what it means *to be* for an individual, and how s/he is to fare with existence which, in Heideggerian terms, is "in-each-case-mine."

The novel is thus better than historical writing at preserving the radical *singularity* of the individual's *inner* experience. At the same time, the novel is also more *universal* than history in its concern and appeal. History records specific events, whereas fiction depicts the different possibilities of human (inter-)actions regardless of whether they have actually taken place. While history is limited to what has happened, the novel (and art in general) depicts things in their universal character. Aristotle famously observes that art [poetry] can be "more philosophical and more elevated than history: for poetry tends to express the *universal*, history the *particular*" (*Poetics*, Part IX). The freedom of the novel to explore what *can* and *should* happen instead of being restricted by what actually happened can be illustrated by Gordimer's rewriting of a historical figure Abram Fischer into a fictive character Lionel Burger. In choosing fiction as her medium, Gordimer is able to construct for the revolutionary hero a daughter who can carry on his legacy—a daughter who can inspire readers to take up the role of children to Fischer in the same way Rosa walks in the footsteps of her father.

Gordimer's use of art rather than history to mediate between the individual and the universal can find support in yet another idea of Aristotle—that is, *katharsis* and its role in training good citizens. By depicting passionate and critical situations, tragedy arouses emotions

that take the observer outside himself/herself and connects him/her with the general lot of his/her fellow citizens. Through sympathetic identification with the tragic character, the viewer's emotions extend *outward*, that is, away from self absorption. The soul is thus liberated from concerns of the *individual* to those of the *polis*.⁴⁵ Inasmuch as tragedy, rather than history, was chosen as the means for training good citizens in ancient Athens, Gordimer also chooses art rather than history for the training of Rosa Burger and other *Bürger* (citizens) in the modern world.

The novel, in short, allows Gordimer to universalize particular events, and enables her to take both Rosa Burger and her *Bürger*-readers outside their private realms into the realm of the public and the political. In order to illustrate this point, let me now turn to the "I" in Gordimer's novel. Unlike the "I" in historical writing, the "I" in *Burger's Daughter* is at once the voice of the individual and the universal.

Gordimer's "I," At Once Individual and Universal

In order to navigate between the private and the public, the inner and the outer worlds, Gordimer creates for her novel an "I" which is simultaneously singular and universal. Unlike the abstract universal Kantian "I" which is devoid of content and context, the "I" in *Burger's Daughter* exemplifies a unique "thisness"⁴⁶ which makes concrete the universal. In contrast to the disembodied "I" of Kant, Gordimer creates an "I" firmly implanted in his/her social-historical context. This is the "I" which appears in the epigraph to the novel: "I am the place in which something has occurred." This quotation from Claude Lévi-Strauss opens the novel with a declaration of the individual's fate as being inextricably bound up with his/her social-historical environment. It underscores the individual as the site of historical and political happenings and as both the receptor and creator of historical and political consciousness.

In Lukács' terms, Rosa Burger's life carries in it a typicality.⁴⁷ The type as outlined by Georg Lukács is "a peculiar synthesis which organically binds together the general and the particular both in characters and situations." A "typical character" is not a stereotype stock character. "Typicality" refers to the *interpenetration* of *uniquely individualized* and *historically representative* features. Lukács's ideal protagonist in the socialist realist novel—the "typical" character—is neither

average, eccentric, nor "crudely illustrative"; he should be one who reacts "with his entire personality to the life of his age," for in him "the determining factors of a particular historical phase are [to be] found . . . in concentrated form."⁴⁸ In such a character, "all the humanly and socially essential determinants are present on their highest level of development, in the ultimate unfolding of the possibilities latent in them, in extreme presentation of their extremes, rendering concrete the peaks and limits of men and epochs."⁴⁹ Note that "men" and "epochs" are given equal weight in typicality. As Stephen Clingman explains it, typical characters "are highly individualized characters who engage in their fullest potential with the social and historical circumstances of their situation. In this way, they come to represent the fullest exploration of that situation, while retaining their individuality as characters."⁵⁰

Inspired by Lukács,⁵¹ Gordimer creates her individual characters to be "social units" *actively* involved in, and not merely passively reflecting, the social-historical forces that shape their future. As Clingman points out, Lukács's premise that individual and social life are integral leads to the inevitable conclusion that "the most highly individualized characters will by definition engage most deeply with the social forces surrounding them." The impact of this belief on Gordimer is: "the more she delves into the personalities of her characters, the more they come to engage with history."⁵² Thus the life of the central character in *Burger's Daughter* runs parallel to the history of modern South Africa. As Dominic Head points out, Rosa's life is "deliberately presented in a symbolic parallel with the apartheid era: she is born in May 1948, the very month the first Nationalist government came to power; the period of her childhood and adolescence is punctuated by key political events—the Treason Trials, the Sharpeville massacre; Rosa's acceptance of her mission as the Burgers' daughter comes in the wake of the Soweto uprising, and Rosa is among those people detained, arrested, or banned in October 1977 (*Burger's Daughter*, 353)."⁵³ Gordimer creates characters who "both condense broader social and historical patterns and, in their individuality, engage with them in intense and extreme form. They are characters who fully become *subjects* of history, and in turn explore it as far as their capacities and situation will allow."⁵⁴

Rosa is not the only character in which the individual self and a macrocosmic human "Self" coincide, for whom private fulfilment and public responsibility have thoroughly penetrated each other. Even in

her "typicality," Rosa proves herself to be the real daughter of Lionel Burger (and the *Bürger* of the Enlightenment), in that Lionel also views his existence as simultaneously his own and an embodiment of humanity. It is his awareness of the intimate ties between his own being and the being of humanity, *his own* existence and *human* existence—with "all that implies of consciousness and responsibility"⁵⁵—that gives the impetus to his revolutionary actions and his impassioned speech against the South African government.⁵⁶ In the testimony he gives at his treason trial, he is defending as much the conscience of Humanity as his own conscience, as much the well-being of the African people as his own well-being. Inasmuch as Lionel speaks on behalf of not just an individual but also a universal "I," inasmuch as his speech is addressed to the "*national* liberation of the African people"⁵⁷ which potentially embraces everyone, his speech opens up the horizon for a national community that carries the promise of transcending racial difference.⁵⁸

The Novel as Performative of the Public Sphere

Lionel Burger/Abram Fischer uses his treason trial speech to call into being a national community. Likewise, Gordimer uses a novel to call into being a public sphere. That Gordimer chooses the novel as her genre is significant: the rise of the novel goes hand-in-hand with the rise of the bourgeois-citizen. In contradistinction to Ian Watt who focuses on the relationship between the novel and the bourgeois-economic-being, I have chosen to focus on the relationship between the novel and the bourgeois-political-being—that is, the connections between the "bourgeois genre" and the bourgeois public sphere which invites citizens to engage in democratic debates and exercise their rights to citizenship.⁵⁹ An ideal public sphere should allow for the voices of both the communal and the individual,⁶⁰ because either one version alone would not yield a meaningful picture. As Rosa Burger puts it, "My version and theirs. And if this were being written down, both would seem equally concocted when read over."⁶¹ Since the Enlightenment advocated both universalism and the dignity of the individual, the public sphere in its ideal form should allow for *both* self-expression and expression of the community.

The language of Gordimer's novel is itself performative of such an ideal public sphere. The text of *Burger's Daughter* consists largely of speeches by different characters. The narrative viewpoint of the

novel also switches constantly between the first person and the third person, privileging neither the former nor the latter, neither the private nor the public voice. It is worth noting that the third-person narrator is not omniscient—it is no more reliable than the voice of Rosa Burger narrating her story. At the beginning of the story, for example, Gordimer foregrounds the limitations of the third-person narrator by having it ask: "Who are all those people outside the prison?" In addition to having its share of ignorance, the third-person narrator also threatens to lapse from time to time into an inauthentic voice similar to that of the mass media, of gossips, etc.

Nor is the author granted any authority above her characters. Instead of giving the readers a complete story over which the author presides, Gordimer gives us an unfinished story full of fragments of different characters' consciousnesses over which the author imposes no final say. *Burger's Daughter* ends with a reference to a line in Rosa's letter deleted by the prison censor. "Madame Bagnelli was never able to make it out",⁶² nor can the readers, nor can the third-person narrator, nor can the author. The surrender of knowledge by the author places her on the same level as her characters—that is, she knows about them no more at any given moment than they themselves. This way, Gordimer's novel enacts the ideal public sphere where there is no hierarchy of discourse, where the individual characters' self-expression, the third-person narrator, as well as the author's more detached and sometimes more public observations are given equal standing.

The public sphere taking place in *Burger's Daughter* is not unlike the polyphonic novel as Bakhtin describes it. In *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics*, Bakhtin explains how Dostoevsky creates the polyphonic novel. Instead of having one authoritative consciousness preside over the novel, the author is repositioned alongside the characters as one of these consciousnesses and as their equal. Bakhtin claims that this new kind of novel is no longer a direct expression of the author's truth. Rather, truth emerges from a polyphony of consciousnesses: "It is quite possible to imagine and postulate a unified truth that requires a plurality of consciousnesses, one that cannot in principle be fitted into the bounds of a single consciousness, one that is, so to speak, by its very nature *full of event potential* and is born at a point of contact among various consciousnesses."⁶³ Likewise in Gordimer's work, "truth" arises out of democratic dialogues among different *subjectivi-*

ties rather than being a series of preset propositions imposed upon the characters.

Gordimer's novel is performative of an ideal public sphere in yet another sense. In choosing the novel as her genre, Gordimer foregrounds democracy by including not only the voices of different characters but also of different genres. She is able to incorporate into her novel non- or extra-literary forms. The interweaving of history and fiction, and the inclusion of the statement by the Soweto Students Representative Council in *Burger's Daughter*, are some examples. Like Bakhtin's polyphonic idea of the novel, Gordimer's work is tremendously open to the *other*, evident in its ability to accommodate everything and everyone—be it the literary or non-literary,⁶⁴ be it the characters, the readers, or the author, be it public discourse or private reflections and expressions.⁶⁵ Gordimer's novel, in other words, promotes a social form in contrast to the anti-democratic racist hierarchy established by the white government in South Africa.⁶⁶

Significant also is that Gordimer's all-embracing discourse without hierarchy allows for the invention of a new South Africa—a real South African nation where all are citizens and all equal before the law. This will make good Lionel Burger's vision of the "national liberation of the African people."⁶⁷ As Louise Yelin observes:

The figure of a set of reflections without an authoritative "original" [in *Burger's Daughter*] . . . suggests a strategy for imagining the nation itself. This figure undermines the hierarchy of signifying practices whereby certain representations are privileged, others are devalued, and still others are repressed or occluded altogether. And, reflecting all South Africans alike, it enables the circumventing of the prohibitions of apartheid. It gives us a nation as it is collectively imagined by subjects occupying different positions.⁶⁸

The Novel and the Construction of the Public Sphere

Gordimer's work does not just lay the groundwork for a public sphere in South Africa.⁶⁹ In taking up novel writing, Gordimer also cultivates a worldwide public sphere and draws international attention to the conditions of South Africa. Gordimer's international readership is evident from the many prestigious award she won: the James Tait Black Memorial Prize, the Booker Prize (joint winner, 1974), the French Grand Aigle d'Or Prize; the Italian Malaparte Prize and the Nelly Sachs Prize from West Germany. She won the Nobel

Prize for Literature in 1991. By admonishing her readers to listen to the voice of their conscience and encouraging them to exercise their rights to world citizenship and participate in discussions of world politics, by exhorting her readers to be responsible world citizens so that they could help the black South Africans to gain their rights to participation in political matters, Gordimer contributes to the eventual demise of apartheid and the dissolution of the unjust colonial regime in her country. While apartheid sets up artificial barriers and divisions among people, Gordimer's novels cultivate a common concern among people across the boundaries of nations, race, and gender: that is, the evil inflicted upon Africans and colored people in South Africa by the white government.

All these are possible only because Gordimer's "I" is the site where the particular and the universal have thoroughly penetrated each other--an "I" as a concrete, alive, and unique individual, who can also be identified with by others in its universal humanity.

NOTES

1. I wish to thank the following institutions for their generous fellowship support that made this project possible: Ustinov College and Hild Bede College at Durham University and the Center for the Humanities at Wesleyan University. I would also like to thank Eddie Soh for his input.

2. See, for example, *The Rise of the Novel: Studies in Defoe, Richardson and Fielding* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965); Bram Dijkstra, *Defoe and Economics: The Fortunes of 'Roxana' in the History of Interpretation* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1987); John Richetti, *Popular Fiction before Richardson: Narrative Patterns 1700-1739* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969); and John Bender, *Imagining the Penitentiary: Fiction and the Architecture of Mind in Eighteenth-Century England* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987).

3. *Die Burger* is also the name of the leading Afrikaans newspaper in Cape Town. The name "Burger" thus recalls the Enlightenment public sphere.

4. To the extent that Lionel Burger takes the South African government to task for ignoring the "legitimate rights" of the African National Congress and the rights of the blacks and the dissidents, he is speaking the language of a *Bürger* rather than a Marxist. In other words, his Marxism (and Rosa's) does not rule out the legacy of the revolutionary middle class in the Enlightenment period. Hence the word "Burger" in both their surnames and the title of the book.

Note that despite Marx's rejection of right for its association with bourgeois liberalism, the basic impetus of his theory can be understood as an attempt to fight for the rights of the oppressed. Hence communist countries in

the twentieth century can also deploy the language of rights in their promotion of social rights.

5. Nadine Gordimer, *Burger's Daughter* (New York: Penguin, 1979), 26-27; my italics.

6. The rights of "man" referred to in this document initially did include women but then excluded them shortly after the French Revolution. Due to space limitations, I have to reserve discussion of this issue in my book manuscript.

7. See especially Immanuel Kant, *Metaphysics of Morals*, trans. Mary Gregor (1991; reprint, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

8. Article 4 states that "the natural rights of each man have no limits except those which assure to the other members of the society the enjoyment of the same rights." Article 7 stipulates that "No person shall be accused, arrested, or imprisoned except in the cases and according to the forms prescribed by the law." Article 9 mandates that "all persons are held innocent until they shall have been declared guilty. Article 10 and 11 protect the individuals' freedom of speech and religious beliefs ("No one shall be disquieted on account of his opinions." These articles are complemented by Article 17, which prescribes that "no one shall be deprived [of property] except where public necessity, legally determined, shall clearly demand it . . ."

9. I hyphenate "im-mediate" in order to contrast it to the Hegelian-Marxist idea of mediation.

10. Marx does not forget the individual in the ideal he projects for the communist society: "From each according to his abilities; to each according to his needs" (*Critique of the Gotha Programme* [Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1954]). Nonetheless, existentialism places far stronger emphasis on the individual—especially the *interior* self of the individual—than Marx and his followers. For the Marxists, interior life is an ideology of bourgeois liberalism. See, for example, Theodor Adorno, *Kierkegaard: Construction of the Aesthetic*, trans. and ed. Robert Hullot-Kentor (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), and "Dialectic of Inwardness: Aporias of Expression," *Aesthetic Theory*, trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor, ed. Gretel Adorno and Rolf Tiedemann (London: Athlone Press, 1997).

The attempt to bring together Marxism and existentialism, in other words, requires special care and skill. We will soon see how Gordimer manages this feat.

11. Gordimer bases her character Lionel Burger on Bram Fischer, an Afrikaner lawyer who fought the white government on behalf of the blacks under apartheid. See Gordimer, "The Fischer Case," *London Magazine* 5 (March, 1966): 21-30, and "Why Did Bram Fischer Choose Jail?," *New York Times Magazine* 14 August 1966, 30 ff.

12. Gordimer, *Burger*, 25.

13. *Ibid.*, 24; my italics.

14. *Ibid.*, 25; my italics.
15. *Ibid.*, 26; my italics.
16. Nadine Gordimer, *Writing and Being* (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1995), 126-27.
17. *Ibid.*, 126.
18. *Ibid.*
19. Gordimer, *Burger*, 25; my italics.
20. The term is appropriated from Heidegger.
21. Gordimer, *Burger*, 27-28.
22. *Ibid.*, 14.
23. *Ibid.*, 47.
24. Nadine Gordimer, *Occasion for Loving: A Novel* (New York: Viking Press, 1963), 216.
25. Kathrin Wagner, *Rereading Nadine Gordimer* (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1994), 35.
26. Wagner, 37.
27. Gordimer, *Burger*, 318-323.
28. *Ibid.*, 210; my italics.
29. Gordimer, *Burger*, 322.
30. *Ibid.*, 210; my italics.
31. Rosa recalls Lionel Burger's legacy in the letter she wrote as a political prisoner to Madame Bagnelli: "In a passage dealing with the comforts of a cell as if describing the features of a tourist hotel that wasn't quite what the brochure might have suggested . . . there was a reference to a watermark of light that came into the cell at sundown every evening, reflected from some west-facing surface outside; something *Lionel Burger* once mentioned" (Gordimer, *Burger*, 361; my italics).
32. Wagner, 38.
33. Nadine Gordimer, *Writing and Being* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995), 31.
34. Gordimer, *Writing*, 35; my italics.
35. Gordimer, *Burger*, 24, 26; my italics.
36. See Kierkegaard's *Philosophical Fragments*.
37. Wagner, 36.
38. Heidegger is deeply influenced by Kierkegaard—an important predecessor to existentialism—even though there are significant differences between Sartre's existentialist subject and Heidegger's *Dasein*.
39. Wagner 36; my italics.
40. Louise Yelin, *From the Margins of Empire* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), 113.
41. Louise Yelin carefully notes the various details at the end of the novel that deliberately tie Rosa to her father:

[Rosa's] cell resembles the one that [Lionel] occupied, and the police captain who interrogates her reminds her "that he had known her father well" (353). . . . The novel ends with the omniscient narrator's report of a prison censor's deletion of part of a letter that Rosa writes to Katya. In this letter, Rosa puts herself—literally—in her father's place, describing 'something Lionel Burger once mentioned' (361). (Yelin, 130-31).

Above all, while her first two interlocutors—Conrad and Katya—are seekers of private pleasure, her final narratee—that is, the narratee of Part 3—is her father (See Yelin 130). Lionel Burger has the last word in Rosa's life. She was Conrad's lover and Katya's friend. But in the end, she discovers her true identity to be Burger's daughter.

42. After all, Rosa, the central character of the novel, is a woman.

43. Robert Boyers, "Public and Private: On Burger's Daughter," *Salmagundi* 62 (1984): 27; italics mine.

44. Gordimer, *Writing*, 20-21.

45. The performance of tragedy was explicitly a *political* activity in ancient Athens. It was an event attended by all citizens, and participation in such events was a ritualistic exercise of one's citizenship.

46. The term is borrowed from Dun Scotus's *haecceitas*, referring to a thing's unique "thisness" that refuses any abstractization but can only be pointed to in its here-and-now.

47. On characterological typicality, see György Lukács, *The Historical Novel*, trans. Hannah and Stanley Mitchell (London: Merlin Press, 1962), "Narrate or Describe?", in *Writer and Critic*, trans. and ed. Arthur Kahn (London: Merlin Press, 1970), 110-48, and *Studies in European Realism*, trans. Edith Bone (London: Merlin Press, 1972), 6. Lukács adopts the term from Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art*, trans. T.M. Knox (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975).

48. Gyorg [György] Lukács, *The Meaning of Contemporary Realism*, trans. John and Necke Mander (1955; reprint, London: Merlin Press, 1963), 122-23.

49. Lukács, *European Realism*, 6.

50. Stephen Clingman, *The Novels of Nadine Gordimer: History from the Inside* (1986; reprint, Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1992), 9.

51. For Lukács's influence on Gordimer, see Clingman, 10.

52. *Ibid.*, 227.

53. Dominic Head, *Nadine Gordimer. Cambridge Studies in African and Caribbean Literature* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 112.

54. Clingman, 9.

55. Gordimer, *Burger*, 25.

56. As much as Rosa's story culminates in a self-fulfilment that is simultaneously a fulfilment of her humanity as a human being among human beings, Lionel's life is also consecrated in his consecration of his responsibility as a human being toward other human beings. *The consummation of both his public*

and private lives takes place in his defense speech at the treason trial. In Lukács's language, Lionel's speech sums up how Lionel reacts "with his entire personality to the life of his age," for in him "the determining factors of a particular historical phase are [to be] found . . . in concentrated form" (*Contemporary Realism*, 122-23). His speech is an "Event" in the Heideggerian sense, during which "all the humanly and socially essential determinants are present on their highest level of development, in the ultimate unfolding of the possibilities latent in them, in extreme presentation of their extremes, rendering concrete the peaks and limits of men and epochs" (Lukács, *European Realism*, 6). The speech Lionel gives at the trial carries so much force precisely because his argument for *universal* justice is propelled by the miseries he has vividly registered in his *subjective* consciousness (the close connection between consciousness and conscience here can be better conveyed by the French word "*conscience*.") His speech is a heart-and-soul testimony of someone who suffers *internally* alongside the sufferings of his fellow human beings. In his speech, the "I" who witnesses the suffering of the blacks evolves into the "I" who cannot "turn away from that tragedy" (Gordimer, *Burger*, 26)—an I that finally consummates itself in "my covenant . . . with the victims of apartheid" (Gordimer, *Burger*, 27).

Note the conspicuousness of the "I" in his defense speech—not the egoistic, self-enclosed, proprietary "I" of the bourgeois Afrikaners, but an "I" that gives the public the testimony of precisely the *failure of proprietorship and of territorial boundaries*, the failure of how the "I" cannot help but be drawn out by, and drawn toward, the suffering of the Other: "I could not turn away from that tragedy. I cannot now. I took up then the pursuit of the end to racialism and injustice that I have continued and shall continue as long as I live. I say with Luther: Here I stand. *Ich kann nicht anders*" (Gordimer, *Burger*, 26; my italics).

Lionel ends his speech by declaring: "If I have ever been certain of anything in my life, it is that *I acted according to my conscience* on all counts. I would be guilty only if I were innocent of working to destroy racism in my country" (Gordimer, *Burger*, 27; my italics). What Lionel refers to as "acting according to my conscience" is precisely what Kierkegaard means by "subjective certainty held fast with a passionate inwardness."

Lionel's testimony is addressed not only to the white legal system or to the whites and the blacks inside and outside the courtroom. It is addressed to both the Subject and the Other—it is an Event through which the subject confronts both *his own being* and *the question of Being* through speech.

57. Gordimer, *Burger*, 26.

58. See Yelin, 115.

59. See Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry Into a Category of Bourgeois Society*, trans. Thomas Burger and Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1989). While Habermas gives me new tools to draw out the political implications of the form and

the content of *Burger's Daughter*, I do not adopt completely his idea of the public sphere. Habermas's public sphere refers to a "public realm of reasoning private persons":

The bourgeois public sphere may be conceived above all as the sphere of private people coming together as a public; they soon claimed the public sphere regulated from above against the public authorities themselves, to engage them in a debate over the general rules governing relations in the basically privatized but publicly relevant sphere of commodity exchange and social labor. The medium of this political confrontation was peculiar and without historical precedent: people's public use of their reason (*öffentliches Raisonement*). (27)

There are two important characteristics to Habermas's idea of the public sphere: 1. this sphere is distinct from the private sphere of the market and the family as well as from the political authority of the state; 2. it consists of private persons reasoning collectively about their common interests.

My idea of the public sphere differs from Habermas's in two ways. While Habermas derives his notion of the "private" from Hegel and Marx and ties it to the economic domain, the private sphere I am discussing in this essay refers to the inner sphere of the existentialist subject. What is discussed in Habermas's public sphere are issues of general concern, and discursive argumentation is employed to ascertain general interests and the public good. My ideal public sphere, on the other hand, allows for both discussion of public affairs and individual self-expression. The self-expression of artists, for example, is radically singular on the one hand and yet capable of engaging and being shared with the public. They are at one and the same time *private expression* and *public culture*. My argument here supplements Habermas's Kantian reason with Kant's idea of aesthetic judgment.

My second difference from Habermas arises in relation to the first. Inasmuch as Habermas's focus is on public affairs, the most important feature of his public sphere is the *public use of reason* in *rational-critical debate*. The public sphere as I envision it gives equal voice to discursive argumentation and poetic expression.

Ultimately, my divergences from Habermas hinge on what he and I regard as the *ideal* public sphere: it is the *political* public sphere for Habermas and the *literary* public sphere for me. The two kinds of public sphere, however, are continuous with each other. In Habermas's account, the literary public sphere anticipated the political public sphere. While Habermas sublates the former into the latter, I prefer, in the spirit of democracy, to give equal status to both.

60. Habermas hypothesizes a "literary public sphere" as the predecessor of the political public sphere. In particular, Habermas marks the significance of the rise of the epistolary novel and the psychological novel as reactions to a restructuring of the relationship between author, text, and reader. As Robert

C. Holub explains, "intimacy as a matter for public scrutiny in fictional works depends on and fosters the legitimation of the public utterance of private opinions" (364). Drawing inspiration from this idea, I would argue that Rosa Burger's expression of her intimate self, far from being incompatible with the public sphere, helps to widen and vitalize it.

61. Gordimer, *Burger*, 16.

62. *Ibid.*, 361.

63. Mikhail Bakhtin, *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics*, trans. and ed. Caryl Emerson (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 81.

64. Bakhtin believes that the polyphony which marks all discourse is especially conspicuous in the novel, for it is the novelist who "welcomes the heteroglossia and language diversity of the literary and extraliterary language into his own work . . ." (*Dostoevsky*, 298).

65. By wedding the public to the private, Gordimer prevents closing down the dialogism and democratic potentials of the novel with either vulgar Marxism or the total abandonment of libertarianism.

66. Gordimer, *Burger*, 25.

67. *Ibid.*, 26.

68. Yelin, 114-15.

69. *Burger's Daughter* was published in England and immediately banned in South Africa. There were appeals later from literary experts to unban the novel. But Gordimer's work was surely more available outside than inside South Africa. That is why I use the expression "*lay the groundwork* for a public sphere in South Africa" to describe the effect of Gordimer's work in her country. For Gordimer's comments on South African censorship, see her *What Happened to Burger's Daughter, or How South African Censorship Works*.