Abstract: In this paper, I examine the possibility of constructing an ontological phenomenology of love by tracing Nietzsche’s questioning about science. I examine how the evolution of Nietzsche’s thinking about science and his increasing suspicion towards it coincide with his interest for the question of love. Although the texts from the early and middle period praise science as an antidote to asceticism, the later texts associate the scientific spirit with asceticism. I argue that this shift is motivated by Nietzsche’s realization that asceticism and science share the same fetish of facts. It is now for Nietzsche no longer a matter of proving the so-called facts of the backworlds to be wrong (something science is very capable of doing), but a matter of rejecting the very structure of thought that reduces a shapeless reality into a series of facts, subjects and objects. It is this second attitude that Nietzsche regards as the common core of science and asceticism. From this critique of science and its correlative critique of facts, Nietzsche begins searching for a counter-attitude able to perform the reduction of the factual attitude. This is the attitude he calls love. Although Nietzsche’s concept of love has often been elucidated in terms of its object or its subject, I argue that such interpretations precisely defeat Nietzsche’s point, which is to recover a ground that precedes the division of the world into subjects and objects. Love becomes the name of this intra-relationship of being, opening up to new perspectives on Nietzsche’s ontology of the will to power.

Keywords: Love, Science, Fate, Ontology, Ambiguity, amor fati, Judgment, Phenomenology.


**Schlagwörter:** Liebe, Wissenschaft, Schicksal, Ontologie, Vieldeutigkeit, *amor fati*, Urteil, Phänomenologie.

**Introduction¹**

In this essay, I propose some ways to make sense of the tensions between Nietzsche’s praise of science and his distrust of it. My main suggestion is that in his later texts, Nietzsche sought a new practice of science that would maintain the integrity of science whilst doing away with its prejudices. Such prejudices, Nietzsche contends, lie in the scientists’ choice of the object of their inquiry: facts and discrete objects. Nietzsche’s new science rejects such local objects of knowledge, and seeks a new object: fate as a holistic, ontological principle.

My proposals will be guided by an examination of the shifts occurring between the first instalment of 1882’s *Gay Science* and book V of 1887. This is an arbitrary separation, which ignores the several texts from MA, M and the first instalment of FW (in which Nietzsche already shows some mistrust towards science) as well as the texts of Za and BGE. Dealing with all of those would simply be far too tall an order. Yet, focusing on the transition between the first and the second instalment of FW is justified by the following two points:

Firstly, if the early texts do demonstrate some intuitive mistrust of science, they hardly give any systematic reason for it. Indeed, they present an intuition that becomes fully articulated only on the basis of the ontological view developed in the later works.

Secondly, Nietzsche’s appending of book V to FW cannot be taken to be arbitrary: on the contrary, it indicates that he regarded book V as entering into a dialogue with the earlier instalment, one which was after all explicitly focused on the question of science.²

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¹ An early version of this paper was presented at Radboud University, Nijmegen, in October 2013. For this version I am indebted to comments from Prof. Paul van Tongeren and the anonymous reviewers of the *Nietzsche-Studien*.

² On the history of the appending of book V to the 1882 book, see Werner Stegmaier, *Nietzsches Befreiung der Philosophie. Kontextuelle Interpretation des V. Buchs der Fröhlichen Wissenschaft*, Ber-
Bearing these disclaimers in mind, I provide a textual and inter-textual argument to suggest that the first instalment of FW displays a generally positive appreciation of science, insofar as it represents an antidote to all forms of theological-moral prejudices. In the second phase, the texts of 1886 and 1887 show that Nietzsche’s relationship with science becomes hostile. Science is now counted among the ascetic practices, and as a last bastion for morals, it is a domain inhabited by the “shadows of god.” The reason for this mistrust, I argue, is that Nietzsche’s critique of moral values has developed in the years 1882–1886 into a metaethical critique of what grounds both morality and science: judgment, both moral and conceptual.³ For judgment focuses on objects taken to be independent from each other and independent of the observer, therefore ignoring the phenomenal nature of the world. This, in turn, leads Nietzsche to establish a new ground where reality may be grasped outside of the traditional categories. According to him, this new ground must become the object of a new science whose key concept is love.

Recent years have seen the Nietzsche scholarship demonstrate interest in Nietzsche’s concept of love. Works by Chiara Piazzesi,⁴ Patrick Attali,⁵ Babette Babich⁶ and Beatrice Han-Pile⁷ among others, have stressed the importance of the concept of love for other famous Nietzschean notions such as *amor fati*, but also in its own right. They have established Nietzsche’s debt to both Stendhal’s *De L’Amour* and Mantegazza’s *Physiologie der Liebe*, and have emphasised his criticisms of the...
Christian concept of love in particular, thereby bringing out in greater detail the psychological and physical implications of the concept of love in Nietzsche’s thought. Such works regard love from the point of view of the loving subject. From another perspective, the rich literature on Nietzsche’s views on women sometimes consider “woman” as an object of love, whether it be in Nietzsche’s life or in his thought. Alternately, Leslie Paul Thiele examines the possibility that the object of love be perfection, and therefore implicitly suggests that love should not be regarded only as interpersonal. As every Nietzsche reader knows, Nietzsche regarded his psychological insights as among his proudest achievements, and the elucidation of love as an interpersonal, passionate and psychological emotion is an invaluable contribution to the understanding of his thought. Although fully compatible with these readings, this essay will develop the different hypothesis that Nietzsche also thinks of love as an ontological principle. I suggest that love is not only a psychological phenomenon for living things, but also a fundamental structure of being. The notion of love at stake here is a pre-psychological and pre-affective notion: it is a love that precedes both its subject and its object, and constitutes them.

As a result, my argument is as follows: Nietzsche finds science to be insufficient because of its objectivism which has two flaws: It arbitrarily separates the world into discrete objects. It is unreflective, dealing only with the outside world. Nietzsche wishes to replace it with a holistic science of “our relation to things” (FW 246), that is to say, a phenomenological ontology (sections 1 and 2). He seeks to establish this new science through a new method based upon the concept of love: love overcomes judgment and judgment sub-tends the arbitrary separation of objects and the arbitrary separation of subject and object (section 3). Once his basic method for inquiry is thus established, Nietzsche applies his new science towards ontological discoveries: our “relations to things” are characterized by ambiguity: they are made of a unified element, called fate, whose essence is to only ever disclose itself as a duality of subject and object (section 4).

1 Science and Love in the Texts of 1882

Throughout the first instalment of FW, Nietzsche represents science as an antidote to morality. In his first mention of science in FW 33, he introduces what he means by “gay science”: “Why should man be more mistrustful and evil [böser] now? ‘Because he now has – and needs – a science.’”

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9 Unless otherwise noted, all Nachlass translations are my own, based upon the Colli and Montinari edition of KGW. For the published works, I use the following English translations: Untimely Medita-
Science opposes the morals of good and evil [böse] and that is why we “need” it. This is a point he reiterates in FW 37, where he calls “errors” all the morally-driven appeals to science one finds in Newton, Voltaire and Spinoza. Against them, Nietzsche argues that science and morals are incompatible. The “honesty” of science is based on its ability to ignore prejudices, largely thanks to its reliance on experience. As a result, science provides near-pure “facts”, and this factualism short-circuits all the false interpretations and “prejudices” which support religious discourse and morals (see FW 46, 59, 97, 123 and 178). This means that the role of science in Nietzsche’s war against morality resides in its ability to combine factualism and integrity: it overcomes prejudices by keeping to facts. Indeed, Nietzsche approves of science’s factualism without reservation in FW 99, where he draws a sharp contrast between the noble and the “barbaric” reasons one has to follow Schopenhauer. Only the nobles, he says, retain Schopenhauer’s “factualism” whilst the rabble is attracted to the shiny holistic superstitions displayed by Schopenhauer in his worst moments.

However, this praise of scientific factualism is not Nietzsche’s last word on the matter, and he engages a shift in his views on science in book III. There, science is still praised for its ability to unmask moralistic prejudices but Nietzsche suggests that it also needs reformation. In books III and IV, he indicates that such a reformation is required for three reasons:

Firstly, the experimental sciences must overcome their mechanistic tendencies (FW 112).

Secondly, the poison-antidote relation between morals and science must be revised. It is now only a difference of degrees.¹⁰

Thirdly, in FW 246 and after, the object of science must shift from the things to our relation to them (this could be called a scientific phenomenology):

Mathematics. – Let us introduce the refinement and rigor of mathematics into all sciences as far as this is at all possible, not in the faith that this will lead us to know things but in order to determine our human relation to things. Mathematics is merely a means for general and ultimate knowledge of man. (FW 246)

¹⁰ In FW 114, a short aphorism entitled “The Scope of the Moral”, Nietzsche remarks that morality extends into domains that one would normally regard as purely assertoric. For example, the way we “construct” a “picture” depends on a balance between our “past experiences” and “the degree of our honesty and justice”. He concludes that “there are no experiences other than moral ones, not even in the realm of sense-perception”. Given the fact that science relies on objectification and objectivity, I take Nietzsche’s remark here to initiate a new view of science, where it is continuous with value judgment insofar as value judgment participates in the so-called “synthesis of recognition”.

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So, based on Nietzsche’s long-held psychologism which regards mathematics and logic as revealing not the structure of the world but the structures of our minds, the focus of science should shift away from the object to both “our relations to things” and our relation to “ourselves.” This idea is reiterated in FW 300, entitled “Preludes of Science”, where religion is credited for offering the roots of the scientific attitude, namely man’s “hunger and thirst for himself, and [the urge to] find satisfaction and fullness in himself.” As a result, the famous aphorism FW 319 announces that science must become a reflective exercise:

We others, who thirst after reason, are determined to scrutinize our experiences as severely as a scientific experiment – hour after hour, day after day! We ourselves wish to be our experiments and Guinea pigs. (FW 319)

This understanding of science as a reflective exercise echoes aphorism 48 of M:

‘Know yourself’ is the whole of science. – Only when he has attained a final knowledge of all things will man have come to know himself. For things are only the boundaries of man.

Nietzsche seems to reverse the declared purposes of science: no longer the discovery of the outside world but the discovery of the scientist herself. His appeal to science is therefore made on the basis that this science is reflective and phenomenological. This will turn out to be a first step towards approaching the relationships of science and love in a useful manner. Let me now turn to the question of love before examining how it connects with science thus construed.

Nietzsche’s concept of love cannot be treated independently from his concept of fate, as most of his love talk is contained in his discussions of fatalism. FW famously introduces most of the key concepts of Nietzsche’s later philosophy, among them, *amor fati*:

I want to learn more and more to see as beautiful what is necessary in things [das Nothwendige an den Dingen] – then I shall be one of those who make things beautiful. *Amor fati*: let that be my love henceforth! I do not want to accuse those who accuse. Looking away shall be my only negation. And all in all and on the whole: someday I wish to be only a yes-sayer. (FW 276)

In this, his first formulation of *amor fati*, Nietzsche insists on two things that will later vanish from his thought: the necessary is presented as “what is necessary in the things”, that is to say, it is a certain portion of what Nietzsche calls “the things”, i.e.: reality. Secondly, Nietzsche still reserves the right to “look away”, that is to say, he maintains some room for preference and discrimination within “what is necessary.” This presents only a weak version of *amor fati*, as the wistfulness of the final line testifies: “someday”, Nietzsche says, he will achieve a stronger form of *amor fati*. In this first characterisation, *amor fati* appears as a local form of affirmation, it is attached to some things in particular, not to any “fate” in general. In this sense, it is parallel to
Nietzsche’s appraisal of science as I outlined it above: traditional science tells us the truth about specific “things”, “facts”, and most of all “values.”

This probably explains why in FW, all the references to love and all the references to science are made from a factual perspective. Science is promoted because it offers facts that oppose the claims of morals, even though it is not structurally – even less essentially – opposed to it; and love is not yet a general acceptance of all things just because they are. On the contrary, at this stage, Nietzsche’s praise of love is a case of what Daniel Dennett calls “local fatalism”,¹¹ a case-by-case acceptance of facts not because they are, but because they are necessary (a distinction Nietzsche will come to criticize severely in his later texts).

Interestingly, Nietzsche himself brings together his defence of science and the local fatalism expressed in his first formulation of amor fati. In the famous aphorism entitled “Long live physics”, he writes:

> We, however, want to become those we are – human beings who are new, incomparable, who give themselves laws, who create themselves. To that end we must become the best learners and discoverers of everything that is lawful and necessary in the world: we must become physicists in order to be creators in this sense. (FW 335, my underlinings)

Here, Nietzsche takes over the terms he used in his announcement of amor fati in FW 276: physics will tell us what to love, because it will tell us what is necessary, and value is derived from necessity, not from existence.

For authors like Solomon¹² and Clark,¹³ local fatalism is all there is to amor fati and one is not supposed to love fate so much as the fateful things contained in it.

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¹³ Maudemarie Clark, Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy, Cambridge / New York 1990, emphasises the importance of the details in the description of the eternal return as found in Zarathustra’s “the vision and the enigma” in order to construe the eternal return as dependent on the “what” of this that is to return, and uses this as a basis for her “local” view of Nietzsche’s fatalism. However, there are many other ways of understanding Nietzsche’s relative luxury of details. I believe it more consistent with the larger Nietzschean picture to interpret this foremost as an insistence on the fatality of eternal return itself, and thus on the fatality of this that one is supposed to accept. It is also obvious that Nietzsche goes to significant lengths in order to construe eternal return as realistically as possible, so that one can never feel that one’s approval is abstract and inconsequential. All to the contrary, for Nietzsche, eternal return has to be the most dreadful of thoughts and this is because whatever returns. It thus seems to me that eternal return is actually a device that permits Nietzsche to extract and distill the fatality of fate from necessity insofar as it demands acceptance of whatever, including the most painful of experiences. It is this importance of the experiential aspect that leads Nietzsche to insist on concrete details, not some interest for fate understood “locally” according to its contents.
Clark argues for an even more restricted form of “local fatalism”: according to her, not everything is necessary, so not everything is Fate, so not everything must be loved. Thus, she says, it remains possible to prefer “a” fate from another. In her discussion of the relations between amor fati and the eternal recurrence, she writes: “I see no evidence that Nietzsche’s ideal person would have to choose this exact life over a similar one in which Hitler was aborted.”¹⁴

Here, we cannot help but be reminded of Zarathustra’s anticipation of this argument, and of his gruff response:

They meet an invalid, or an old man, or a corpse – and immediately they say: ‘Life is refuted!’ But they only are refuted, and their eye, which seeth only one aspect of existence. (Za I, Von den Predigern des Todes)¹⁵

Indeed, not only life cannot be refuted (something Clark would accept), but as we shall see, Nietzsche (at least after FW) insists that judging any aspect of life leads to denial in general. So Zarathustra shows that after a phase of local fatalism, which was temporarily congruent with his praise of science, Nietzsche moved towards global fatalism. It is in this context that Nietzsche’s opposition to science must be understood.¹⁶ How has Nietzsche come from the local fatalism of FW to an affirmation that fatalism can only be a general attitude? I think that the solution is to be found in the development of the remarks made on science in FW II and III, where it was revealed that there was a ground of compatibility for science and morals and that science should direct its efforts no longer towards the things, but towards our “relations” with them.

## 2 Overcoming Judgment in the Later Texts

The entirety of book V of FW is a hunt after the “shadows of god” and all the invisible remains of the religious spirit in which the dead god lives on. These sediments are invisible because they are found in places that we usually consider to be free of

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¹⁴ Clark, Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy, p. 182.
¹⁵ Fate extends far beyond the bounds of our own narrow outlook, for us to judge it and “pick and choose” as the “local” view contends would be like shooting in the dark. See also among many others: NW, Epilog 1, and EH, Warum ich ein Schicksal bin 5.
¹⁶ In addition to Nietzsche’s own objections to local fatalism, let me emphasise the importance of the local/global fatalism distinction for my present argument. I argue that Nietzsche’s overcoming of the scientific view corresponds to a move on his part towards ontology, and that this move is supported by the realization that judgment should be rejected. As I shall argue below with reference to Kant, one of Nietzsche’s objections to judgment is that judgment is always partial, and therefore commits us to a local view, which is necessarily arbitrary.
superstition. One of those domains is science. After establishing the aim of book V as the clearing of the shadows of god in FW 343, Nietzsche confesses that, even if we are “godless” (now that god is dead), we are “still pious” (fromm). The aphorism continues by putting forward new ideas about science: “science”, Nietzsche laments, “rejects subjectivity”, that is to say, it transferred moral altruism into the epistemic realm of knowledge: its presuppositions are not scientific but moral. With reference to the reflective science he advocates as seen above it becomes clear that science as it is practised fails to be reflective exactly because it fails to overcome morality. Secondly, science is based on the fantasy that there are two worlds, the “real world” and the “world of appearance” (FW 344), again transferring into the epistemic realm the moral devaluation of “this world” inherited from Christianity.¹⁷

Here, Nietzsche begins to suggest that the common ground between science and morals uncovered in FW IV is too important to be ignored any further. The problem, Nietzsche says, is that science relies on “metaphysics”, an affirmation of the “real world” (that is, a “backworld”) against the “only world”, which is the world of life. Unlike his previous position which emphasised the differing conclusions of morals and religion, Nietzsche’s later intention is to insist that science and morals have a common structure, and therefore, that we must be suspicious of science too.

So, it seems that Nietzsche’s later critique of scientific reason takes place within a general critique of objectivity, focused on two sorts of problems:

Firstly, as we saw, objectivity eludes the “relations between us and the things.” As such, it artificially removes the observing subject from its field of investigation (a process Nietzsche calls “Selbstlosigkeit”) and thereby limits itself to local knowledge (FW 345).¹⁸

Secondly, as we shall see, Nietzsche’s later critique of scientific reason divides reality into entities, which are called “facts” (GM III 24, see also Nachlass 1884, 25[12], where he criticizes the emphasis on “petits faits”) or “things” (FW 246, where he criticizes the emphasis on “things” rather than on our relation to things).

¹⁷ This is a question that intensely occupied Nietzsche in the second half of 1887. See in particular Notebooks 8, 9 and 11 of 1887. On the “real world” being an imitation of the world of experience, see also GD, Wie die ‘wahre Welt’ endlich zur Fabel wurde.
¹⁸ One may discuss whether Nietzsche’s critique of “Selbstlosigkeit” in the scientific spirit is primarily or solely dependent on his critique of morality. Stegmaier, Nietzsches Befreiung der Philosophie, pp. 161–175, has shown that it is around FW 345 that Nietzsche’s critique of morality and his critique of some aspects of the scientific spirit became harmonized. The question is whether Nietzsche’s critique of science is part of his critique of morality, or whether they are both part of a larger project, which, I suggest, is ontological. My argument, which is not contradictory with Stegmaier’s as far as I can see, is that Nietzsche criticizes the scientist’s “Selbstlosigkeit” not only for perpetuating and expressing moral prejudices but also for relying on an epistemic fallacy: the fallacy that knowledge may be impersonal. On this basis, I see Nietzsche lamenting the loss of self involved in science in two senses: it seeks to do away with the moral ego (in its moral dimension) as well as the observing subject (in its epistemic one).
For Nietzsche, these problems are serious enough to make us turn away from science in general since it is of no help against the new object of his attacks: no longer morals in particular but the very structure of judgment in general. This, of course, is a controversial claim. Dionysus himself, Nietzsche declares, is “a judge.” This is in fact a problem that runs through the whole of Nietzsche’s philosophy, and an ambiguity in his work that Nietzsche recognized explicitly when he asked himself the question of the “point of view of desirability” (“Standpunkt der Wünschbarkeit”, Nachlass 1886/87, 7[62]). This is a problem, he declares, for his philosophy promotes both judgment and non-judgment, and as a result, he asks himself: “where do we get this right to judge from?” (Nachlass 1886/87, 7[62]). Even though the problem of desirability in Nietzsche is crucial, we cannot offer any systematic account of it just yet, but perhaps reminding ourselves of the fact that this is a problem in Nietzsche’s own view can allow us to affirm that Nietzsche aims, at least in parts of his philosophy, to overcome judgment.

At this point, it may be worth recalling the Kantian context in which Nietzsche is operating. In Kantian terms, what Nietzsche is complaining about are the distortions brought about by our acts of judgment. Judgment, for Kant, is responsible for the “syntheses of recognition”,¹⁹ that is to say (among other things):

a) Judgment “isolates” areas within the flux of sensations.²⁰

b) Judgment “subsumes” these syntheses under concepts in order to offer objects to perception.²¹

This provides the context for Nietzsche’s famous and repeated critique of Kant’s thing-in-itself (a critique engaged – not insignificantly – at the end of FW’s book IV, in the aphorism FW 335 entitled “Long Live Physics!” quoted above). For Nietzsche, the problem with the “thing-in-itself” is the implication that there is a real distinction between the world of the observer and the world of the object of observation (this distinction precludes Nietzsche’s reflective view of science). Like in FW V and GM, the problem of the two-worldliness of science is always connected to science’s inability to consider the appropriate object of enquiry: not “what things (including faculties) are?”, but again “what is our relation to things?” Here, we encounter the critique of science as part of a critique of Kant: both are interested in objects, not (in Nietzsche’s opinion) in how we relate to objects. I think that this strict parallelism between Nietzsche’s treatments of science and of Kantian metaphysics is a clear indication


²¹ Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A 115.
that Nietzsche’s critiques of scientific objectivism, of morals and of metaphysics all take place within a general critique of judgment.²²

So we can say that the evolution of Nietzsche’s thinking about scientific reason leads him to seek a cure for judgment. Judgment must be overcome, if not “bracketed” in a pre-Husserlian fashion. Nietzsche is now seeking his *epoché*. It is this idea of love as *epoché* which I shall develop in the remainder of this paper.

GM III 24 strikingly shows that a result of Nietzsche’s new claim that scientific and moral reasons rely on judgment is that fatalism becomes general just as the focus of science becomes re-directed towards the subject-object relation. This connection parallels the connection of local fatalism and scientific objectivism. This parallelism between the treatment of science and the treatment of fate invites us to investigate in more detail Nietzsche’s later thought about fate. First of all, let’s look at Nietzsche’s rejections of “local fatalism.” After FW 276, all the – rare – further mentions of *amor fati* make it clear that the object of *amor* cannot be local. Nietzsche writes:

> Seen from above and in the light of a superior economy, everything is necessary, and also useful in itself – not only should one bear it, one should love it ... *amor fati*: this is the very core of my being. (NW, Epilog 1)²³

This passage from 1888 is a direct result of Nietzsche’s recognition in the same year that the great type of man invented by Goethe

stands in the middle of the world with a cheerful and trusting fatalism in the belief that only the *particular* is loathsome, that everything is redeemed and affirmed in the whole – he does not negate anymore. (GD, Streifzüge eines Unzeitgemässe 49, my underlinings)

Only the “particular” is not necessary, therefore not subject to affirmation, but we know from the previous passage that nothing is truly “particular” “in the light of a superior economy.” On the contrary, all separations are arbitrary. This means that overcoming moral judgment must involve overcoming the local view, and this local view, as we have seen, is provided by conceptual judgment. Here, Nietzsche treats value judgments (“loathsome”) and the isolating conceptual activity (“particular”) together, showing how conceptual judgment is a condition for moral judgment. This connection between the two forms of judgments, Nietzsche suggests, was already

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₂² Interestingly, Nietzsche hints at a common ground between moral judgment and “understanding” in FW 333, where he opposes Spinoza’s belief in the opposition between “judging” and “understanding”, and argues that they share a common source.

affirmed – to opposite effect – by Kant. Indeed, Nietzsche goes on to declare that Goethe’s affirmation of reality has an “antipode”, Kant:

What he [Goethe] wanted was totality; he fought against the separation of reason, sensibility, feeling, will (– preached in the most forbiddingly scholastic way by Kant, Goethe’s antipode), he disciplined himself to wholeness, he created himself ... In the middle of an age inclined to unreality, Goethe was a convinced realist: he said yes to everything related to him. (GD, Streifzüge eines Unzeitgemässen 49)

We must pay attention to this final colon which establishes an equivalence between reality and “everything related to [oneself]”, for this equivalence furthers Nietzsche’s anti-Kantian (and pre-phenomenological) project to create a reflective science of “our relation to the things.”

In these texts, Nietzsche uses fatalism and amor fati interchangeably. Remarkably, in some other texts from the same period, he uses even the concept of love in a similar sense. Love, he suggests, is a cure against objectivity, and against all sorts of judgments. In fact, I will argue that the ground which Nietzsche seeks beyond judgment (in FW 380 for example) can only be attained by way of love. With love, it seems Nietzsche has found his epoché. Let’s follow this hypothesis further.

In 1886’s Beyond Good and Evil, for example, Nietzsche famously – and beautifully – suggests that love overcomes moral judgment: “What is done out of love always takes place beyond good and evil” (JGB 153) and in book V of FW, from the following year, he wrote: “Love, thought in its entirety as great and full, is nature, and being nature it is in all eternity something immoral” (FW 363). Even if it remains to be clarified in which sense love is meant here, it is a clear indication that Nietzsche regards it as a possibility of circumventing moral judgment.

In the same years, Nietzsche also thinks of love in opposition to conceptual judgment to the point that objectivity is defined as the antipode of love: “Objectivity = lack of personality, lack of will, incapacity for love.” (Nachlass 1887, 9[165])²⁴ As we shall develop shortly, this fragment could in several ways be regarded as an early exposition of Nietzsche’s understanding of the love of life in Bizet’s Carmen as developed later in WA. Life is an instance of choice and preference: objectivity is the very denial of this choosing, and therefore, it directly opposes life. Therefore in order to achieve the “great” fatalism that Nietzsche promotes, we must overcome both forms of judgment. For Nietzsche, a privileged way to overcome them is love.

First, let me make some preliminary remarks on Nietzsche’s treatment of love. It has been argued by several authors²⁵ that Nietzsche re-motivated the traditional

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²⁴ See also Nachlass 1887, 9[156].
categories of love as philia, agapé and éros inherited from the Greeks and re-worked by Christianity. Such authors correctly emphasise that Nietzsche differs from the Christian and Platonic traditions in his regard for éros.²⁶ However, they also overlook the fact that Nietzsche writes about love in two different senses. The first one, which is the one most often emphasised, roughly accommodates the traditional categories. It is love (whether éros, agapé or philia), which has an object, be it God,²⁷ a friend (FW 14), a lover (FW 59), family (Nachlass 1886, 4[6]), the Motherland (Nachlass 1887, 9[156]), the Truth (FW, Vorrede 4) or even an enemy (JGB 216). Here, love is meant in the sense of the feeling that determines a relationship with an object assumed to be real and independent.

The second sense of love is more specific to Nietzsche, and I think, more interesting. It takes center stage after the introduction of amor fati, suggesting that it was that concept that induced a transformation of the concept of love in Nietzsche. This love is love without object. In this perspective, loving is defined by a pathos, the state of the lover, no longer by a loved object or person. Nietzsche initially expresses this by insisting that even in object-directed love, the object is inessential, and even inconsequential. In 1886’s JGB, he writes: “From time to time, we embrace some arbitrary person (because we cannot embrace everybody) for reasons of brotherly love” (JGB 172).

Here, love is truly for “everybody”, that is to say, its object is indeterminate and more importantly, it precedes the encounter with its object (no one knows “everybody”), which opens up the possibility that love could exist irrespective of its object. Consider this other remark from Za: “It is true: we love life [wir lieben das Leben], not because we are used to living [Leben], but because we are used to loving [Lieben].” (Za I, Vom Lesen und Schreiben)²⁸

Love is spontaneous. It is not aroused or determined by its object. In JGB, Nietzsche takes stock of this fact and simply leaves the object of love out of the structure of love: “Ultimately, it is the desire (Begierde), not the desired (Begehrte), that we love” (JGB 175). The context suggests that Nietzsche means “desire” and “love” inter-

²⁶ See especially Babich, Nietzsche and Eros, and JGB 168.
²⁷ Yirmiyahu Yovel, Nietzsche and Spinoza: amor fati and amor dei, in: Yirmiyahu Yovel (ed.), Nietzsche as affirmative Thinker, Dordrecht 1986, pp. 183–204. See also “The love for one individual is barbarous, for it is practiced at the expense of everyone else, even a love for God” (JGB 67). On the way in which intersubjective love is based on exclusion, see also FW 14.
²⁸ It is remarkable that the previous section of Za I, Vom bleichen Verbrecher, approaches the same issue, not in terms of love but in terms of aggressivity: our aggressivity is not essentially directed against any specific object, the object is just a point of discharge, a pretext for our instincts which are spontaneously expressed. Nietzsche writes: “Thus speaks the scarlet judge: ‘But why did this criminal murder? He wanted to rob.’ But I say to you all: his soul wanted blood, not loot; he was thirsting for the joy of the knife! But his meagre reason was unable to grasp this madness and it won him over. ‘What is the point of blood!’ it said; ‘Do you not at least want to steal something too?’” (Za I, Vom bleichen Verbrecher)
changeably here.²⁹ Indeed, the aphorism is structured on the idea that one would expect that the object of love is the desired (Begehrte). This would be a fair assumption for Nietzsche to make only if it was understood here that the object of love was the object of desire. Therefore, I interpret it as Nietzsche’s affirmation that love is directed at itself: love is love of love.

If love is self-directed, it involves the lover but not the loved one (Nietzsche fondly quotes Goethe – again – as early as FW 141: “If I love you, is it your concern?”). This helps understand why Nietzsche conceives the “great” and “noble” love as an act of self-affirmation on the lover’s part, sometimes even as selfishness (EH, Warum ich so gute Bücher schreibe 5, and WA 2). Consider this remark from 1887:

Love has been falsified as surrender (and altruism), while it is an appropriation or a bestowal following from a superabundance of personality. Only the most complete persons can love; the depersonalized, the “objective”, are the worst lovers (– one has only to ask the girls!) This applies also to love of God or of “fatherland”; one must be firmly rooted in oneself. (Egoism as ego-morphism [Ver-Ichlichung], altruism as alter-ation [Ver-Änderung]). (Nachlass 1887, 9[156], my underlining)

It is now clear that in Nietzsche’s later concept of love, the object of love is always only accidental: it does not arouse love, but simply provides a pre-existing objectless, blind love with an object. As a consequence, “great love” (GM II 24)³⁰ is opposed to altruism because it is an affirmation of the self and it exists irrespective of the circumstances. In short, Great Love is love a priori.

Therefore, we can say that love satisfies the two requisites posited by the critique of objectivity: (a) love overcomes both moral and conceptual judgment and (b) it affirms the subject over the object, thereby offering a cure to asceticism. Moreover, it satisfies both requisites in one stroke, because insofar as it is non-objectively directed, it is both non-representational and self-affirming for the lover.

²⁹ There is an abundance of evidence to the effect that Nietzsche considers love in some sort of connection to desire. See for example FW 363, where “love” is presented as a “desire” for submission in the woman, and a “desire” and a “thirst” for “possession” in a man. This does not mean that the two words are entirely equivalent all the time, as desire seems to often be presented as determined by an object whereas, as we are arguing, love is considered independently from its object. This is why it seems that in Nietzsche’s texts desire often presents itself as an initiation to love. For an example of the way Nietzsche regards germane concepts as representing different levels of maturity of a continuous notion (one initiating to the other), see Werner Stegmaier’s discussion of Heiterkeit and Fröhlichkeit in Stegmaier, Nietsches Befreiung der Philosophie, pp. 95–101.

³⁰ This describes a superior form of love, as ascertained by this entry from the same period: “Reaction of the little people: / Love gives the greatest feeling of power / To grasp to what extent not man in general but a certain species of man speaks here. This is to be exhumed more precisely” (Nachlass 1888, 14[130]).
Here, it becomes clear that the generality of Nietzsche’s later concept of fate (fate as the entire fabric of reality) corresponds to the non-objectivity of his later concept of love (love as independent from its object). This requires of us that we investigate the articulation of love and fate. Let us return to fate first.

A preliminary remark we must make about fate pertains to its grammatical structure. Nietzsche uses “Fatum”, “Schicksal”, “Verhängnis”, “Los” or derivations of these to describe fate. Of all these, only Los, which is rarely used in the sense of fate, has a purely local sense. It refers to one individual’s *lot* in life.³¹ All the other terms are commonly used in German to describe both one’s fate (JGB 231) or destiny, and fate as a general element or as “grosse Ökonomie.”

An advantage of this grammatical ambivalence is that it places the concept of Fate in the vicinity of other key Nietzschean concepts which apply both to the individual and to the fabric of the world in general: “Nature”, “Existence”, and most of all, “Life.” This is to say that fate, like these concepts, refers to existence only insofar as it is the *encounter* of an individual with the general. One uses the word “fate” neither when it has no one to be the fate of nor to refer to an entity seen as entirely independent from any object. On the contrary, for Nietzsche, fate presents itself as an alternative to the object-directedness of objectivity, and thus it may possess the potential to achieve the new project assigned to science in FW: to move our focus from the things to our relationship with them. The hypothesis I wish to put forward here is that Nietzsche’s preference for the term “fate” instead of “reality” or – even worse – “being”, is informed by the necessity to escape the division inherited from objectivism between the local and the global, the individual and the general, the inside and the outside and eventually, the subject and the object. I think therefore that the ambivalence in the concept of “fate” is the reason why Nietzsche favours “fate” over “Realität” and even the more common and Schopenhauerian “Wirklichkeit.”

### 3 A Science of Ambiguity

As a result, I wish to propose that the *ambiguity* of the term Fate is the very *object* Nietzsche is trying to grasp in his texts on fate: “fate” formulates the ambiguous articulation of the local and the global and it is this articulation which is the ground of life. Let us remember the striking aphorism FW 373, entitled “Science as Prejudice”, where Nietzsche repudiates science’s “mechanism” (the word recurs three times, with emphasis, in the aphorism) for its inability to grasp the “ambiguity” of “existence.” In his recent in-depth study of book V of FW, Werner Stegmaier locates in this very

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³¹ See for example EH, Warum ich ein Schicksal bin 1: “I know my fate [Loos]. One day there will be associated with my name the recollection of something frightful”.

aphorism the announcement of a new science, which he calls “philosophy.”³² My reading of this aphorism only furthers Stegmaier’s line of argument: it is Nietzsche’s critique of science that leads him to replace it with philosophy, and even, in my reading, with ontology. The object of this new “philosophy” is the “ambiguity of existence.” As I mentioned above, “existence” is, along with “life” and “fate”, one of these ambiguous concepts where the local and the general meet. Consider: “Above all, one should not wish to divest existence of its ambiguous character [vieldeutigen Charakters].” Nietzsche continues by describing the fallacies that would result in such expurgating of ambiguity (all fallacies related to making the world calculable and computable as the mechanistic sciences threaten to do). In contrast, Nietzsche’s counter-proposal clearly constitutes an elaboration of what he means by “ambiguity”:

Would it not be rather probable that, conversely, precisely the most superficial and external aspect of existence – what is most apparent, its skin [Haut] and making-sensible [Versinnlichung] – would be grasped first – and might even be the only thing that allowed itself to be grasped? (FW 373)

The context indicates that Nietzsche regards “ambiguity” as related to “superficiality”, to “externality” and therefore to “skin.” However, this connection is cryptic and it needs elucidating. Let us begin with skin: in touch, skin counts as the interface between the subject and the object, it is both my surface and the surface of the world (see M 48 cited above). As Nietzsche declares, it is the place where the world becomes “graspable.” We can see how skin may be regarded as ambiguous: it is this that separates the subject and isolates it from the world by enclosing it within itself, and yet, it is also what gives the subject access to the world. It is superficiality insofar as it is a surface, but it is externality insofar as it insulates the inside from the outside. Ambiguity qualifies this that has several meanings (vieldeutig). Nietzsche suggests here that it is the place where the world transforms into my world through perception. In Nietzsche’s barbaristic terms, ambiguity is Versinnlichung (note the intentionality contained in the prefix Ver-, expressing the en-counter of self and world), that is to say, the process-by-which-the-things-become-sensible which, against Kaufmann’s “sensualization”, I translate – barbaristically – as “making-sensible.” This Versinnlichung, with its ambiguity, is I think precisely the object of Nietzsche’s new science.

We have now come to a set of three preliminary conclusions which need to be reconciled. Firstly, love is directed at itself.³³ Secondly, Fate is the name of the ambig-

³³ This statement may lead to the following objection: if the purpose of building love into an ontological principle is precisely its ability to avoid objective thinking, why maintain the structure of object-directedness? In regard to the discussion provided above, I think the answer may be framed in terms of Nietzsche’s wish to take responsibility not only for unmasking illusions (here, the illusion of the subject-object structure), but also to take responsibility for accounting for the very existence of
uous encounter of the individual with the fabric of the world. Finally what matters is neither love nor fate, but “the love of fate”, _amor fati._

If love is always love of love and _amor fati_ is love of fate, then it seems to follow that love and fate are equivalent. In the context of Nietzsche’s later works, where an increasingly unified doctrine remains expressed in different terms depending on the context, this would hardly be surprising. In his discussion of Bizet’s _Carmen_ in 1888’s _The Case of Wagner_ Nietzsche himself affirms that great love is _fatum_:

– And finally love, love translated back into _Nature! Not_ the love of a ‘cultured girl!’ – no Senta-sentimentality. But love as _fatum_, as a _fatality_, cynical, innocent, cruel (WA 2).

FW 373 quoted above may help us understand this equivalence between love and _fatum_. According to that text, one form of the ambiguity of existence is the interlacing of the inside and the outside across the surface of our body, represented by “skin.” The skin is ambiguous because it represents altogether the separation and the possibility of the encounter between the individual and the world. For Nietzsche, this separation-union is what is “grasped first.” That is to say: it is this surface that _constitutes_ the inside and the outside, and _only thereafter_, the subject and the object, not – as traditional metaphysics have it – the other way around. The reasons for this are developed in Nietzsche’s elaboration of the concept of incorporation.

In FW 110 Nietzsche had inaugurated the all-important concept of “incorporation” [Einverleibung], which he initially applied to the concept of truth. Keith Ansell-Pearson³⁴ has persuasively demonstrated the central role of the “incorporation of truth” in the economy of Nietzsche’s doctrine. It is significant also that the concept of incorporation, thanks to which Nietzsche applies the spiritual to the physical, became developed into a key concept for Nietzsche’s physiology too. As a cornerstone of Nietzsche’s physics, incorporation is presented in connection with the will to power. In 1883’s _Z_, Nietzsche announces that “all life is will to power”: “Where I found the living, there I found will to power” (Za II, Von der Selbst-Ueberwindung). Later, he describes the basic _modus operandi_ of the will to power as incorporation:

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Life is not the adaptation of inner circumstances to outer ones, but will to power, which, working from within, subdues and incorporates [einverleibt] more and more of that which is ‘outside.’
(Nachlass 1886/87, 7[9])

The basic relationship between the inside and the outside is incorporation, that is to say, conquest.\(^{35}\) I have argued above that this relation is also called “fate.” So, Nietzsche says, fate is incorporation. In The Case of Wagner, after saying that love is fatum as “cynical, innocent, cruel” he writes:

– Such a conception of love (the only one worthy of a philosopher) is rare: [...] They imagine that they are selfless in it because they appear to be seeking the advantage of another creature often to their own disadvantage. But in return they want to possess the other creature ... (WA 2)

Here, Nietzsche paints Great Love in the colors of incorporation. It is fundamentally a desire to “possess the other creature.” So the equivalence of fatum and incorporation expands to include love as well. If this is true, we must now examine in what sense incorporation is related to ambiguity.

Incorporation is ambiguous in two ways. Firstly, incorporation makes the relationship between the inside and the outside ambiguous insofar as it makes it relative and reversible. Secondly, incorporation places ambiguity at the core of the subject-object relation because, if we understand incorporation correctly, we can never talk of a “subject” or an “object” of incorporation. As a result, subject and object are inherently ambiguous entities. Allow me to elaborate.

Nietzsche presents the first ambiguity contained in his idea of incorporation by repeatedly asserting that the distinction between the inside and the outside of an individual is relative. Consider:

Sense perceptions projected “outside”: “inside” and “outside” – does the body command here –?

The same equalizing and ordering force that rules in the idioplasma, rules also when it incorporates (Einverleiben) the outer world: our sense perceptions are already the result of this assimilation and equalization in regard to all the past in us; they do not follow directly upon the “impression.” (Nachlass 1885/86, 2[92])

\(^{35}\) One of the most interesting interpretations of Einverleibung in recent years comes from Keith Ansell-Pearson, Incorporation and Purification: On Nietzsche’s Use of Phenomenology for Life, in: Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 38.1 (2007), pp. 61–89. Ansell-Pearson does not regard Einverleibung as conquest but as a “naturalistic purification [which] is an attempt to see the world and ourselves free of the prejudices and fears of ‘morality’”. (p. 74, fn. 4) That is to say, Ansell-Pearson’s argument addresses the strategic value contained in Nietzsche’s characterization of life as Einverleibung: it allows us to de-moralise life. On this basis, I regard my reading of Einverleibung as conquest to be consistent with Ansell-Pearson’s purification. The strategic stakes of the concept of Einverleibung are, indeed, aimed at “naturalistic purification”, and the metaphysical implications involve that life is in its essence, the bringing of the different into the same, which I characterise by using Nietzsche’s term of Eroberung. For more on Einverleibung as Eroberung and as purification, see Frank Chouraqui, Ambiguity and the Absolute, New York 2013, pp. 39–42 and 69–70.
This passage requires some clarification. When he writes that sense-perceptions are “projected” outside, Nietzsche means that we take them to be a testimony of the outside world. This, he says, is a judgment we make for internal reasons, not because the boundary between the inside and the outside is real. This separation, which we interpret as a boundary which informs our being, is in fact only the line along which two drives resist each other. This resistance is always only a changeable phenomenon, which precedes the victory of one drive, and the submission of the other:

The will to power can manifest itself only against resistances; therefore it seeks that which resists it – this is the primeval tendency of the protoplasm when it extends pseudopodia and feels about. Appropriation and assimilation are above all a desire to overwhelm, a forming, shaping and reshaping, until at length which that which has been overwhelmed has entirely gone over into the power domain of the aggressor and has increased the same. – If this incorporation (Einverleibung) is not successful, then the form probably falls to pieces. (Nachlass 1887, 9[151])

The individual is therefore determined only by the lines of conflict that surround it, lines that are not only always contingent, but further, whose unending motion (there is no latent power, so incorporation is always occurring) signify that it (or some of it) incorporates or becomes incorporated. Consequently, bearing in mind that nothing defines the individual but these lines, a change in lines means a change in the identity of the individual. Enter the second ambiguity: Nietzsche expresses this by showing that incorporation is not a straightforward affirmation on the part of the incorporator, or a total surrender on the part of the incorporated. On the contrary, incorporator and incorporated merge and transform by way of each other.

Life would be then be defined as an enduring form of a process of the establishment of force, in which the different contenders grow unequally. To what extent resistance is present even in obedience; individual power is by no means surrendered. In the same way, there is in commanding an admission that the absolute power of the opponent has not been vanquished, incorporated, disintegrated. (Nachlass 1885, 36[22])

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36 See also Nachlass 1885, 43[2], KSA 11.701f.: “Kampf der Atome, wie der Individuen, aber, bei gewisser Stärkeverschiedenheit wird aus zwei Atomen Eins, und aus zwei Individuen Eins. Ebenso umgekehrt aus Eins werden zwei, wenn der innere Zustand eine Disgregation des Macht-Centrums bewerkstelligt. – Also gegen den absoluten Begriff „Atom“ und „Individuum“! / Das Atom kämpft um seinen Zustand, aber andere Atome greifen es an, um ihre Kraft zu vermehren. / Beide Prozesse: den der Auflösung und der Verdichtung als Wirkungen des Willens zur Macht zu begreifen. Bis in seine kleinsten Fragmente hinein hat er den Willen, sich zu verdichten. Aber er wird gezwungen, um sich irgendwohin zu verdichten, an anderer Stelle sich zu verdünnen usw. / Weltkörper und Atome nur größenverschieden, aber gleiche Gesetze.”
Here, Nietzsche describes four important features of incorporation:

a) The inside/outside divide is relative and changeable.

b) Incorporation, which was thus far conceived as the transfer of a drive from the outside to the inside, also takes place within an organism.

c) Incorporation is not destruction but preservation of the incorporated.

d) Incorporation transforms both the incorporator and the incorporated.

This makes the relations between the subject and the object of incorporation ambiguous in a second, stronger sense. By virtue of b), organisms must now be thought of as ensembles of organisms relatively external to each other. This implies two things:

i) No organism is fully unified.

ii) All organisms can be seen as either whole or parts of a whole, simultaneously.

4 Love and Will to Power

The incorporation which takes place between organisms as well as within them, Nietzsche calls, strikingly, “Love.” As early as FW 14, entitled “The things people call love”, he insisted that love was the desire for possessions. As a form of will to power, love is – again – described as insatiable, because it seeks seeking itself (and therefore perpetuates the seeking). According to Nietzsche, this explains why once we possess something we once longed for, we grow tired of it: the striving is gone. Here, Nietzsche comes to a problem which is fascinating in many ways: how can we avoid growing tired of ourselves if we ourselves do not change? Nietzsche answers that we must find a new self. This means that instead of incorporating the outside drives, we must undertake incorporation inside ourselves:

Our pleasure in ourselves tries to maintain itself by again and again changing something new into ourselves; that is what possession means. To become tired of some possession means tiring of ourselves. (FW 14)

If tiring of our possessions means tiring of ourselves, this means that our possessions somehow define us. This is because incorporation transforms both the incorporator and the incorporated (see d) above). So, what Nietzsche is saying here is that neither the incorporator nor the incorporated maintain their self-identity in incorporation (even though c) tells us that none of them is annihilated either). Considering that the mode of being of any organism is incorporation, and that incorporation means loss of identity, we can now assert that paradoxically, being a given organism is defined by ceasing to be this specific organism. Here, the ambiguity informed by life’s incorporative mode of being gains depth: this ambiguity renders any idea of self-identity absurd (incorporation is continual, so identity is impossible), and brings out the ambiguity contained in the self-affirmation which Nietzsche sees at work in love. As I mentioned
before, and as Nietzsche points out constantly, self-affirmation is defined by over-powering, that is to say, by incorporation. Yet, incorporation necessarily entails the vanishing of the incorporator’s identity. As a consequence, self-affirmation means a certain form of self-negation. As early as UB III, Nietzsche wrote of love that it deprives us of our identity because it connects the inside and the outside and overcomes the separation which defines us:

There are moments and as it were bright sparks of the fire of love in whose light we cease to understand the word ‘I’, there lies something beyond our being which at these moments moves across into it, and we are thus possessed of a heartfelt longing for bridges between here and there. (UB III 5, my underlinings)

Nietzsche is quick to point out that this self-effacement in love is the exact opposite of self-denial. In the preparatory notes to this very text, Nietzsche wrote about Schopenhauer’s “disintegrative” desire for knowledge:

That is a disintegrative, destructive aspiration, yet, it makes the individual great and free. Perhaps he will perish outwardly from it, not inwardly. (Nachlass 1874, 34[36])

This “disintegrative aspiration” is the aspiration for a form of knowledge that eludes the subject-object separation and that the later Nietzsche seeks to achieve with his new science. It is “disintegrative” because it leads to the vanishing of the separation between oneself and the world, and because with this separation it is one’s identity too which disappears. Yet Nietzsche differentiates between the ascetic and the healthy disappearance of identity: the former, he says, is a “perishing inwardly” (this will be developed as the “internalization of man” in GM II 16), whilst the latter is “perishing outwardly”, that is to say, a perishing in favor of a higher, external organism.³⁷

³⁷ It is impossible, in the space provided, to offer a detailed explanation of the difference between the healthy and the sickly modes of self-destruction. It may suffice here to point out that for Nietzsche, the healthy form of self-denial is dynamic and opens up to new incorporative events, whilst the sickly form entails sterility and uneventfulness. A good example of this contrast is to be found in Nietzsche’s critique of those he calls – significantly – the “objective men” and the “last humans”: they are, Zarathustra says, a “standstill”. He further expresses this by saying that the last human has eradicated all “chaos” from his being: “‘I say to you: one must still have chaos within, in order to give birth to a dancing star. I say to you: you still have chaos within you. ‘Alas! The time will come when the human will give birth to no more stars. […] ‘Behold! I show to you the last human’. The last human is incapable of any event, that is to say, any incorporative event (chaos is another word for the incorporative opposition). The healthy kind of self-denial distinguishes itself from the ascetic kind insofar as, far from bringing eventfulness to a standstill, it guarantees a future of incorporative events because the disappearance of its identity results in an increase in power, which guarantees new conquest (power always expresses itself through incorporation).
This characterisation of love as a pathos which leads to “perishing outwardly” and to letting ourselves be incorporated into a greater whole\textsuperscript{38} seems contradictory with the later characterisation of love as a desire to possess. However, the contradiction vanishes if we remember that for Nietzsche incorporation is a reciprocal process. If it is true that the ascetic “perishing inwardly” is too contradictory with incorporation to be related to love, “perishing outwardly” on the contrary refers to our loosing our identity in order to gain power, or to be more precise, in order to become part of a more powerful whole. As I argued earlier, the latent consubstantiality of the self and its outside, which makes our “perishing outwardly” possible, was reformulated by Nietzsche in terms of the consubstantiality of the general and the local fate. This allows us to envisage this perishing outwardly as altogether our being incorporated into a greater whole \textit{and} an internal incorporation on the part of the whole. In this hypothesis, it is assumed that the selves are already part of the general fate, whose surfaces emerge from a conflict between the local and the general drives. It is an internal conflict from the general point of view, and an external one from the local point of view.

If we should therefore not postulate a contradiction between the texts from 1874 and the later ones, this means that we must accept that Nietzsche describes love in 1874 in the same terms as he describes fate later: they are intended to grasp the ambiguity captured by Nietzsche’s concept of incorporation. Therefore, we must ask a final question: in what sense can we say that \textit{amor fati}, which combines fate and love, is also connected to incorporation?

The concept of \textit{amor fati} is formulated from a perspective that regards ambiguity as a ceaseless \textit{reciprocity}: of my fate with fate in general. As mentioned above, the ambiguity of incorporation results from its reciprocity: the incorporated \textit{and} the incorporator both transform each other as they move across their former boundaries. In this sense, both benefit from the incorporative act in an agonistic way: the creation of a greater, higher and stronger organism allows for further incorporation which is in the interest of both.\textsuperscript{39}

It is this agonal relation that determines the very mechanics of incorporation that \textit{amor fati} is intended to formulate. I have argued that “Great love” should be conceived as the love of love. I have also argued that fate was determined by the reciprocity contained in its concept (it is the encounter of the general and the local). If it is true that fate is the encounter of the inside and the outside (my “fate” and “fate” in general), and that the basic mode of relation between the inside and the outside is

\begin{footnotesize}
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  \item \textsuperscript{38} See FW 118.
  \item \textsuperscript{39} At this point, we must remind ourselves that for Nietzsche the will to power does not seek satisfaction, but incorporation itself. The fact that the incorporator is transformed by the incorporation (which entails that it is always another – a new – organism which “benefits” from the increase in power offered by the incorporative event) is therefore not an objection to this description of the mechanics of incorporation.
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incorporation, which is also the only expression of the will to power (there is no latent power), this means that fate and will to power are equivalent. In his controversial Nietzsche lectures, Martin Heidegger convincingly argues that the will to power must be reduced to the “will to will.” This is because Nietzsche consistently characterises life as the will to incorporate \textit{and} will as incorporation – there is no undischarged will (see Nachlass 1888, 14[79]) and incorporation is the only mode of discharge. As a result:

in [Nietzsche’s] view there is nothing else than will to power, and power is nothing else than the essence of will. Hence will to power is will to will, which is to say, willing is self-willing.⁴⁰

This is, I think, ascertained by the equivalence we have drawn between desire and will to power and by the remark from JGB quoted above: “Ultimately, it is the desire, not the desired, that we love.” (JGB 175) Yet identifying desire and love with fate (as incorporation) should not lead us to conclude that their combination in \textit{amor fati} is an unnecessary redundancy (something Heidegger comes close to saying with regard to the will to power, from which he simply amputates the element of power). It is true that the ambiguity at the core of the concept of fate does account for the ambiguous relations of the local and the general: there is “my” fate and there is “Fate” as the general fabric of reality, and they are unified in Nietzsche’s idiosyncratic and indeterminate concept of fatum. On the other hand, the circularity of self-seeking love accounts for the characterization of life as the will to incorporate and of will as incorporation. So it may be argued that love and fate are in fact redundant concepts, and therefore, that \textit{amor fati} is as it were doubly redundant. This would be true if Nietzsche’s purpose was only to propose a critique of the concepts of inside and outside (and of the correlated dualities of self and other and subject and object).

I believe however that beyond a mere critique of these concepts, Nietzsche seeks to accommodate a place for such errors in his doctrine (see Nachlass 1886/87, 7[62]). These errors, he thinks, indicate an essential possibility of the will to power: it creates errors, and most of all, it creates the basic error: the subject-object distinction. Therefore, I think that if Nietzsche insists on \textit{amor fati}, it is precisely because the ambiguity he wants to formulate with this concept is even more ambiguous than the one I have described hitherto. Indeed, Nietzsche holds that this ambiguity is itself ambiguous. It is an ambiguity which is ambiguous about its own ambiguity. This ambiguity to the second power lies in the fact that it presents itself as unambiguous. In Nietzsche’s view, only \textit{amor fati} is fit to grasp this “ambiguous ambiguity.” Indeed, the second dimension of ambiguity is not accounted for in any simple affirmation of love or fate. As Nietzsche says: “one must not only accept [Fate], one

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must love it” (NW, Epilog 1), in other words, it is more important to love fate than to affirm it.

Amor fati is a good fit for expressing this double ambiguity because it contains both the tendency towards the affirmation of subject and object (we remember that love affirms the lover, and presents – even if it does not actually aim at – the object of love) and the affirmation that this distinction is erroneous (since fatalism affirms the consubstantiality and strict interdependence of all life). This mixture of the subjective and the objective, of an affirmation of the subject through love and of the object through fate, allows us to complete Nietzsche’s project to account for incorporation as the mechanism that both constitutes and constantly denies the structure of objectivity.

Contrary to the first, one-dimensional ambiguity of incorporation, the “ambiguous ambiguity” which Nietzsche discovers gradually after 1882 is not a stable substance. On the contrary, it is subject to constant turbulence and chaos, caused by its essential propensity for presenting itself as non-ambiguous, and therefore constantly – and indefinitely – shaping itself into semblances of objects and subjects. In it, the subjective and the objective pole constantly alternate, leading endlessly into one another by way of incorporation, and it is this ambiguous leading into which is the focus of Nietzsche’s new science.

If Nietzsche wants a new science of life after 1882, it is because he has glimpsed a new life: it is not only the erroneous character of objectivity which is overcome in amor fati, it is the error of thinking that a life where this error is corrected is possible. For Nietzsche, the object of the new science is our “relation with things”, that is to say the mechanics that account for the encounter of the general and the local (Versinnlichung). This object can only be attained by way of one’s locality (one’s fate) because as the locality imperfectly merges within the general (the general Fate), it perfectly merges within the true object of its experiment: the merging itself. This knowledge can only be achieved by way of our own being. At this point, the new scientist truly becomes, as Nietzsche wished, her “own Guinea pig” (FW 319), and the knowledge she acquires is the knowledge of the ambiguity which defines “fate”, “existence” and “life.” Here is what the new science of life teaches: life is the non-objective which presents itself as objective or, better said, it is nothing but the movement by which the non-objective presents itself as objective, and the discovery of this fact is achieved through the very act of living.