Denis Diderot is No Sexist!
Understanding his *Pensées* by way of *Le Rêve* ...

Denis Diderot’s thoroughly materialist metaphysics undergird prescient philosophical analyses; his forays into the field of ethics arguably tend toward what we today would class amongst the range of forward-looking alternative perspectives. It isn’t just that Diderot sketches or even defends the cutting-edge which motivates this paper, but also his use of female characters to reveal crucial insights. Anyone familiar with the prolific author’s body of work realizes that Diderot’s women are certainly not mere “pretty little things.” So it is that his *Pensées sur l’interprétation de la nature* might seem to smack dissonantly of sexism. My intent is to dispel such a misreading by demonstrating that the *Pensées* are addressed to the intellectual everyman. To wit, Diderot’s “jeune homme” is both gender and age neutral. Denis Diderot is proven, yet again, to be ahead of his time. Demonstration of the truth of this final analysis requires a series of considerations.

Our discussion opens with a defence of the legitimacy of the claim that Diderot’s *Pensées* might be read as sexist; we need to confirm the possibility of such an error in order to agree that the project at hand has merit. The plausibility (and fact!) of misconstrual established, we will turn to a survey of others of Diderot’s works which, on inspection, all prove consistent with clear pro-female positions. (To say Diderot is “pro-female” is simply to say he is not “anti-female”; it involves no claim that he is “anti-male”.1) This second stage of argument will necessitate a brief preliminary discussion of Diderot’s atheistic, materialist metaphysics. Diderot’s philosophical groundwork ultimately precludes any impermeable sex-based boundary standing on intellectual (which is to say rational and emotional) potential.2 Having recognized the clear and conscious presence of women in Diderot’s works, we will be ready to demonstrate that the “young man” of the *Pensées* is assuredly not necessarily male.3 At the heart of this final position stands an argument which pulls in particular from the *Rêve de d’Alembert* wherein Julie de Lespinasse proves key to a telling reading of the suggestively troubling words we meet in the *Pensées*. Our conclusion defended, a few remarks about reading Diderot and a few more about “modernity” will be in order.

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1 We will not take up the question of whether Diderot defends any kind of what we might now label “feminist” philosophy. The label is far too fraught with rich and interesting permutations. What we mean in saying that “Diderot is no sexist” is simply that Diderot does not carve out a position which favours or privileges males over females given the topic(s) at issue.

2 This fact results from the nature of the human beast. Had a difference in intelligence proved connected to sexual orientation or gender, Diderot’s account would identify and accommodate the resultant differences. A fascinating issue for development: Diderot describes reality; in reality, human intellectual ability does not assume a distinguishing role in matters of reproductive biology. Male and female minds may work differently but both permit the possibility of genius.

3 Our focus will be on the issue of gender-privilege. Age provides an interesting accompaniment to this discussion as it is one of the many “-isms” with which we today are concerned.
We humans tend to perceive our own times as more enlightened, more advanced, than previous eras. This widespread phenomenon gains legitimacy, where our focus is concerned, given well-known instances of sexist portrayals of females in 18th century French literature. From Voltaire we have Cunegonde and Mademoiselle de Saint-Yves, females whose beauty and charms are motor forces in their respective works, and whose roles might well be summarized as representations of an idealized romantic insipidity. Rousseau gives us the hyper-feminine Sophie. Even if, along with Denise Schaffer for example, we attempt a more sophisticated reading of Sophie’s nature, and hence her education, it requires effort to reject the oft-encountered assessment of Rousseau’s rather sexist account of women. In their *La Femme au dix-huitième siècle*, Edmond and Jules de Goncourt provide a detailed assessment of the unique position in which girls and women were held during the 18th century. Our 21st-century vantage point finds us poised to see and read Enlightenment France as fundamentally sexist; we are neither all, nor uniformly, aware nor quick to think of at least some of those women who marched on Versailles or those few who, for instance, translated Newton’s *Principia*, ruled Russia or engaged in prolonged philosophical exchanges with notable minds of their times. Even academics in the know must, for the benefit of their readership, defend the claim that women were not uniformly regarded in a decidedly sexist manner in the 18th-century. We struggle with sexism today; we understand that the problem is at least in heavy measure historically rooted. So it is that even from our modern perspective the *Pensées* might strike the reader as a sexist work. We can see, too, that during the 18th-century many a man (or woman) would not hesitate to understand, by “jeune homme,” “young male.” Then — as now — specificity of context aside, “homme” ambiguously referred exclusively to “man” or inclusively to “human.” And though Diderot would surely have been aware of such a possible misread, on inspection it is clear that he would not have defended the call of the *Pensées* as gender specific. In speaking of intellectual ability and inspiration, Diderot addresses human potential.

Diderot is a refreshing find. Those who have sampled his texts have certainly identified the radical nature of a number of his thoughts relative to his milieu. The fact is, Diderot’s metaphysics undergird a very different account of reality than do the majority, and the best-known, of those positions which comprise our current touchstones regarding Enlightenment...

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4 From Schaffer’s résumé of her work, we understand that Sophie’s divided soul, “calls into question Rousseau’s commitment to ‘wholeness’ as an ideal” and thus that “the real education provided by the pages of *Emile* — the education of its readers — resembles Sophie’s education more than Emile’s.”

5 The brothers Goncourt’s *La femme au Dix-Huitième siècle*, published in 1882, is a panoramic and fascinating window onto the place of women in that era which draws on art and records of all sorts.

6 Émilie du Châtelet, Catherine thé Gréât and Sophie Volland, respectively.

7 The University of Chicago’s ARTFL website, providing access to (among others) the 4th and 5th editions of the *Dictionnaire de l’Académie Française* confirms the exclusive and inclusive uses of “homme” during Diderot’s time.
thought. Our philosopher is unique not only for his materialism, but for his atheism and his embracing of a marvellous mix of both reason and emotion. As P. P. Gossiaux reminds us in his treatment of Diderot’s concept of nature, reading Diderot requires — in Diderot’s own words — that we constantly hold “présent à l’esprit que la nature n’est pas Dieu (AT II, 7).” Absent a divinely created difference between the weaker and stronger sexes, which we find echoed in an extension between the likes of emotion and reason, or the petty and the serious, Diderot’s materialism is set to discover that insofar as intellectual potential is concerned, it is the human animal regardless of gender which is at play. Genius may lie in the male or female of our species. This fact does not deny gender- or orientation-grounded differences in physical preference, predilection or propensity. That a woman may be adorable and sweet (by nature or nurture) cannot preclude the fact that she may be a genius — no more than a man’s sexual drive, physical appearance or comportment might preclude his own natural genius.

Diderot’s truly enlightened understanding of the role and place of a woman’s intellectual possibilities is borne out by the bulk of his works, as we shall see. The pieces we will survey are offered as representative of his thought, not only for their range in style but in subject matter; all include female characters who are far more than “eye-candy” or foils whose sole function is to support and privilege the glories of men. As always with Diderot, there is deep intertwining of theme and thought which reflects his materialistic metaphysics of interconnection. A brief survey of the pertinent aspects of this ontological stance will facilitate our survey of the rich brilliance of women in Diderot’s works.

Robert Morin’s *Diderot et l’imagination* explains the irreconcilability of Diderot’s materialism with the existence of a god: “Le vrai, c’est l’imperfection, qui n’est plus qu’une sorte de chute ou de décadence par rapport à un premier principe comme Dieu, mais une conformité à la réalité du ‘Grand Tout’, movement évolutif” (236). No divine creation, humankind is rather the result of material combination and recombination. Gossiaux confirms Diderot’s affirmation that the universe, “dans sa complexité, résulte du hasard” (340). Diderot’s thorough defence of the materialism he champions counters Berkeley’s irritating idealism by arguing that the sceptic’s refrain loses its oomph in face of the fact of interconnection which is the stuff of the universe, ourselves included. The on-going experiment, itself empirical discovery, ever more certainly demonstrates the materialist

8 From the closing line of his entertaining and revelatory “Sur les femmes”: “Quand elles ont du génie, je leur en crois l’empreinte plus originale qu’en nous.” Yes, a woman can be a genius and — as befits her gender — her intellectual brilliance may well be one of particularly eccentric originality, as understanding of the french “originale” in the context of Diderot’s opus makes clear.

9 The notion of genius Diderot employs is extremely rich and well-developed. It reflects and builds upon ideas current during his time. Many excellent discussions of “genius” exist. Here we need simply recognize that a genius has particularly heightened intellectual abilities where some aspect(s) of perceiving and learning, and hence discovery, invention and creation are concerned. Genius is not merely an affair of subject matter, but of varieties of vision, understanding and communication. Diderot himself is a genius of understanding and communication. He has been called “the great communicator” for this very reason. See: Pierre Zémor’s “Diderot, grand communicant.”
Diderot’s *Lettres sur les aveugles* really solidifies the proof. At the outset of this account, Diderot’s fictive author tells us that idealism is “la honte de l’esprit humain et de la philosophie ... le plus difficile à combattre, quoique le plus absurde [...]” (54). Toward the text’s end we hear Diderot in his authorial lines: “Je ne devine pas pourquoi le monde ne s’ennuie pas de lire et de ne rien apprendre, à moins que ce soit par la même raison qu’il y a deux heures que j’ai l’honneur de vous entretenir, sans m’ennuyer et sans vous rien dire” (97). Here Diderot pokes fun at the suggestion that exposure to knowledge which rides on the existence of an external world cannot teach because there is no truth in its empirically-gotten claims. He helps us to see that the connections woven through this solid reality cannot be chimera and thus must disabuse us of our idealist doubts. Between the lines we glimpse his and his fictive author’s smiles: author has connected with reader; the world is solidly material. Certitude, sensorially afforded, compounded over time, got by means of human interaction with and observation of the interplay of material comprising all of nature, refutes idealism. Everything in the world is and only is material, from dreams and ideas, through rays of light to human beings. The human mind is matter which grows in understanding — connections being forged — as it is impinged upon by any and every material encounter it undergoes. Male and female alike can happen to be an impressive amalgam of experiential material; man and woman alike can be genius.11

In his response to metaphysical idealism lies the heart of Diderot’s materialism: a constant, broiling, interaction of material bits which are all there is. Human interaction is just one wonderful aspect of this material bubbling. Thus we expect, and find, Diderot’s females to be characters who instantiate his metaphysics as well as other philosophical positions which the ever-fluxing bedrock of his account grounds. So, to ask whether the female is ignored in the *Pensées* is to wonder whether this particular text of Diderot’s is singular in its acceptance of sexist cultural norms or even whether it indicates a latent sexism on the part of its author.

Women do occur differently across the other many and sundry works which provide variations on what seems to be Diderot’s solidly pro-female stance. We encounter females who, by gender or social position, are illustrative of the human condition generally. For instance, qua human beings, the several mothers portrayed in *La Religieuse* are subjects of nature and her laws. Then again, as spouses or nuns, they are constrained by one or more men (husbands, priests or God), by religious or social regulations and by their beliefs. Diderot often uses female interlocutors, whether they figure in or as recipients of texts.

10 In Diderot’s “Conjecture [Grammaire]” of *l’Encyclopédie* we find a summary of the process of confirmation via repeated experience: “Il y a un certain point où nous cessons de conjecturer, & où nous assurons positivement”. Of course, Diderot sets out complexities (none of which deny, but support, the relevance of his position to claims relevant here).

11 An interesting comparison with theist and deist positions held by the likes of Rousseau and Voltaire might be undertaken. We remind ourselves that Diderot’s materialism is by force atheist as well, it eventuates, as it is by extension not sexist.
Consider Mirzoza of *Les bijoux indiscrets*, Mlle de Lespinasse of the *Pensées* and the older woman to whom the *Lettre sur les aveugles* is addressed, each of whom represents impressive philosophical ability. They are literary incarnations of positions which Diderot mulls over or defends. Female characters also occasion comedic interludes running from simple humorous commentary on social mores through straightforward philosophical perspicuity. In this vein, for example, what reads as sexual freedom and promiscuity of the Otaïciennes in the *Supplément du Voyage de Bougainville*, permits social and political commentary as well as laughter when a young priest repeatedly provides a desired stud service, all the while vociferously underscoring his religious faux pas. And so it continues. Susanne of the *Religieuse* is naïveté and goodness thrown into a world of evils, the product of a society gone wrong. We smile at Mirzoza, adorable in her philosopher’s get-up, and yet marvel at her powers of reason. In *Jacques le fataliste* there are few women, most are simple props, but we understand that the major focus — freewill, determinism and moral responsibility — is a human issue illustrated by a collection of characters whose gender is, in the final analysis, inconsequential to that primary topic. What we pull from this preliminary survey is that Diderot does in fact frequently give women significant roles.

We need now elaborate a bit further our samplings of Diderot’s female characters. Chronological order will enable us to see that his pro-female stance is neither a late arrival nor slow to appear in his thought. Finally, the *Rêve de d’Alembert* will be shown to be importantly linked to the *Pensées*.

Penne to earn money for a mistress and to demonstrate that he too could compose a bawdy item, *Les bijoux indiscrètes* (1748) is nevertheless more than merely a salacious tale. Diderot therein presents an assortment of women on whom the sultan Mangogul directs a magic ring which enables their vaginas to speak. What concerns us is the intelligence — strength of character and mind — of Mangogul’s favourite, Mirzoza, in whom we see a man’s intellectual equal, a thinking human being who passionately and rationally offers and considers hypotheses. As well, the *bijoux* reveals a man who begins to understand not only his own reticences but the power of his favourite woman. To read *Les bijoux indiscrètes* is to laugh, snicker, think and also to recognize that women — beautiful though they may be — are not essentially vapid and are certainly not a categorically lesser sex.

Two women feature in the scientific discourse of the *Lettre sur les aveugles à l’usage de ceux qui voient* (1749). The first, *Madame*, is a fictive intellectual to whom the work is addressed. Her presence is manifest throughout the piece whose tone is such that we understand the silent participant to be intelligent and interested in erudite discourse. The second was added about thirty years after the original publication date: Mademoiselle de Salignac, who commands the final and lengthiest addition to a list of “phénomènes” (which

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12 Although well before Eve Enster’s contemporary *Vagina Monologues*, Diderot’s is not the first work to feature vaginas. Yet, as he often does, Diderot borrows and remodels — to excellent effect. Unlike those of the *Monologues*, the *bijoux* in Diderot’s tale speak, having quite competent minds of their own. It is interesting to note that Diderot may have borrowed the few truly salacious items he includes in the *bijoux*. If true, we would have even more confirmation that Diderot’s writing is an expression of his passion for philosophy. The suggestion is offered by Antoine Adams in his preface to the *bijoux*. 
run a full fourteen pages) adjoined to the *Lettre*. This brilliant young blind woman with whom Diderot had developed a friendship confirmed for him, yet again, the enormous intellectual capacity of human beings which can instantiate in women. Mademoiselle de Salignac’s beauty and grace are at least matched by her true genius and Diderot bemoans her passing at the age of 22: “[Q]uel chemin n’aurait-elle pas fait dans les sciences, si des jours plus longs lui avaient été accordés !” (116). De Salignac’s story furnishes not only further empirical proof of the human mind’s ability to richly conceptualize even when denied ocular vision — that very sense which most of us regard as an absolute necessity — but also that the power of a human intellect can manifest in women.

In 1762, eight years after the publication of the *Pensées*, Diderot had published his *Éloge de Richardson*. The work was (and continues to be) received as the excessively emotive ranting of an obsessed admirer. J. Assézat and M. G. Tourneaux contend that the popularity of this piece contributed to Diderot’s being classed as a less than rigorous thinker: “Nous croyons que ce morceau coloré est trop coloré […] que c’est un de ceux qui à le plus nui, puisque c’est un de ceux qui à été le plus lu, à la mémoire de Diderot” (2). If so, Diderot has been wrongly undervalued for a misread of a little piece. Frankly, one needs exposure to more than a single item in order to fully appreciate what Diderot offers. His works stand in interconnection, by way of which they reflect and confirm his metaphysics. For example, those who have enjoyed his *Salons* and the *Éloge* will note similarities between the persuasive and argumentative strategies both works employ. To read the one helps us to grasp the full force of the other. Having experienced the *Salons*, one understands how the *Éloge* is not “too colourful” in any damning sense; genius is at work, and emotion in play with reason inspires.

“[T]u peins l’espèce humaine,” Diderot tells Richardson (8). This enthusiastic response to the author of *Clarisse* illustrates the fact that in Richardson our philosopher finds someone who has succeeded in producing a novel of unique moral value. Here Diderot presages the analysis of the contemporary philosopher Martha Nussbaum who describes “finely aware and richly responsible” novels as the missing piece of moral philosophic pedagogy. In Diderot’s words, certain novels, “élèvent l’esprit, qui touchent l’âme, qui respirent partout l’amour du bien” (1). As the *Lettres*, the *Éloge* is a straightforwardly scientific, which is to say first and foremost a philosophical, piece. In the *Éloge*, the importance of women as creatures who exemplify critical aspects of human being is made clear. Given their roles in the 18th century, women were regarded as inhabiting and thus befitting depiction of the territory of emotion. To study them — to read about them — is to be profoundly touched, it is to be helped to think deeply and to learn about humankind. For Diderot, increased understanding is the goal: human beings who literally reverberate with knowledge and the passion it inspires. Women are an integral part of the process, and not just for their beauty.

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13 See her, “‘Finely Award and Richly Responsible’: Literature and the Moral Imagination.”

14 Again, the brothers Goncourt provide fascinating summary of such matters.
La Religieuse appeared near the end of the century, in 1796, and was certainly influenced by Richardson’s style. As usual, though, it bears Diderot’s unique stamp — a stamp remarkable for the quest it embodies: original ways to discuss and present philosophically significant ideas. The series of nearly gothic, certainly noire, images which comprise the tale are designed to mark the heart and mind. Diderot’s metaphysics entail that to thus impress the feeling thinking human is to nurture reflection. In the Religieuse Diderot does not hide his convictions concerning the dangers of the artifice contrived by the social fabric of his century where women might find themselves cloistered away, restrained and abused by men. In contemplating the fate of these women, the reader might be brought to more deeply feel and understand their plight. The mythical idea of woman — young and innocent girls, protective and nurturing mothers, splendid and charming angels or beguiling and mysterious temptresses — is at play in this novel. In an important sense La Religieuse surpasses Clarisse as it is not only a commentary on women and society, not only an essential part of that moral pedagogical puzzle we aim to flesh out, but also part of a complex and complete philosophical framework. If we read La Religieuse in the context of Diderot’s other works, we feel its full force. In addition to ethics, metaphysics and epistemology are at issue. Such a project cannot but underscore the importance of thinking about women as well as the fact that despite what society may contrive for them, women are not ontologically lesser beings.

Jacques le fataliste proves to be a vehicle for a discussion of determinism and responsibility; morality is thus in play. Here there is no female philosopher. There really is no fully fledged male philosopher either as Jaques neither explains nor defends his opinions. Jaques just repeats con brio. Nevertheless, this tale illustrates the reality that, as human beings, women are fundamentally like men — we come in all sorts and are subject to the determinism of our materialist world. Gender is simply a predisposition to attract and to be attracted by certain others; men fit women and women fit men. Gender determines many aspects of human life but neither occasions nor precludes intellectual brilliance. For Diderot, the theme is important and recurrent.

Twelve years before his death, thus two dozen after having written Les bijoux indiscrètes, Diderot penned the philosophical triptych which concludes with the Supplément au voyage de Bougainville (1772). The Supplément affords a compendium of ideas which fascinated Diderot during his fertile career. Here, in a tale set in the South Seas, we once again find a work of fiction shot through with philosophical discussion and insight. The old Otaïcien, A and B, along with Orou, in turn voice social, political, metaphysical or moral philosophical analyses and arguments. Women play a role similar to that of the courtesans (though not of Mirzoza) in the Bijoux, or of those females with whom Jacques passingly frolics. They all illustrate natural truths of human nature: attraction and lust are part of our material being, life is in fact inextricably tied to philosophy and all is connected. A life “closer to nature”;

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15 This is precisely what Mademoiselle de Lespinasse is after in the Pensées when she offers that men and women are — reciprocally — monsters: “L’homme n’est peut-être qu le monstre de la femme, ou la femme [...] de l’homme” (121). Bordeu fleshes out the picture.
less caught up in the many and heavy chains the likes of which Europeans have forged in creating their societies, certainly does not negate human intellectual potential. That Mirzooza has no counterpart in Diderot’s tropical tale in no way argues that women outside of European latitudes are intellectually lacking. The Supplément does, however, feature two female characters noteworthy for the pro-female considerations they frame.

The parable of Miss Polly Baker and the appearance of an officer’s domestic who turns out to be a female in male disguise are telling (64-7 and 47-48). Polly’s is a tale of a woman’s skill in matters juridic as well as amorous. The sailor in disguise, who is only — and immediately— recognized as such by Otaïtian men, juxtaposes the obfuscating power of European stereotypes with a more natural man’s ability to register the pull of a woman. So too, the Supplément touches on injustices which European women are dealt as well as the effects of contrived rules and the fact that there just will be women capable and desirous of doing what men have traditionally done. Yet again, Diderot helps us to see that one must think of and about women in order to understand man — human beings — and our world. The lesson is metaphysical and moral.

Seven varied works thus confirm the complex and essential place of women (of woman) in Diderot’s understanding of the world, and so of his philosophy. No mere caprice leads him to include women in his writing. Thus, when we identify the absence of women in the Pensées, we do more than simply suggest that female characters ought to be there just because they are included in his other works or just because they are pretty diversions. Our concern runs deeper, for it identifies that Diderot really does assume an equal place for women such that when he directly speaks to his readership, he cannot do so from a stance which explicitly denies females a place in that group. So we ask whether, in the Pensées, written after he had penned many a work expressing clearly pro-female thought, Diderot perhaps waxed overtly sexist and took pains in 1754, to add the “court préambule” and a final “observation” in both of which he exclusively addresses “young men”.16

Such an answer would seem a bit glib. On this reading of the Pensées we are lead to conclude that Diderot at once speaks to young males who realistically comprise the group of future scientists and philosophers, and that he voices his own dangerously provocative (or pragmatic?) assessment of his era, and nothing more. This reading sees in the Pensées a manual whose goal it is to inspire new philosophers and thinkers (most certainly male). It also regards the work, in the words of Colas Duflo, as “a bit grandiloquent.”17 This interpretation fails to recognize that Diderot’s opening and closing remarks could only be regarded as such were the work grandiosely aimed at his established intellectual equals or at mature thinkers; it then might well carry a condescending and sexist tone. But it is neither so aimed nor of such a tone. The accusation might stick were the Pensées strictly

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16 We find women mentioned where “moles” are discussed, only because it is in the female uterus that these biological cell masses arise! This is no pro-female (nor pro-male) item. An interesting occurrence, it calls for further research.

17 Duflo’s introduction to the work is generally excellent, hugely informative.
pedagogical, but they are not. Diderot chose to wrap this work in inspirational words addressed to those who might be stimulated to become intellectual thinkers and doers. Just as he had already used emotional writing in the service of pedagogical communication, Diderot had already shown himself to be quite capable of sarcasm as well as the subtle presentation of scathing or sensitive ideas. The reader needs to consider Diderot’s tone and style across a variety of his works to see that, insofar as the identification of its readership is concerned, the Pensées are neither sarcastic nor subtle. The work describes yet another variation on Diderot’s forms of expression. It stands as a motivational appeal on a personal level designed to excite and inspire all manner of scientifically gifted intellects to take up the mantle and learn more — to forge ever more connections in the fields of understanding, and to share them with us all.

Diderot tutoie-s the reader whom he hopes to inspire. He is familiar in register and speaks to the youthful (as opposed merely to the young). His post-script demonstrates the desire to create an inspirational link between his own intellectual enthusiasm and that which he helps the gifted reader to realize within his (or, as we will confirm, her!) youthfully passionate intellectual self. If we note a bit of humour in the post-script, where Diderot reminds Newtonians that a hypothesis is not a fact, it is surely because the philosopher hopes that by the end of the Pensées, the student-reader who has persevered will understand a jibe along with the message. A mature genius might be insulted by Diderot’s address and concluding remarks — by his familiarity, teacherly energies or perhaps his little snide remark. A student will not; a student will laugh, be inspired and joyfully take up the challenge. It is this student, this “young man” whom we want to prove to be gender-free: our philosopher is no sexist. Julie de Lespinasse of Le Rêve de d’Alembert holds the key to this final step of our argument.

Diderot’s conscious decision to add introductory and concluding remarks to the Pensées distinguishes the work from pure argumentation or theoretical discussion. To repeat: the piece is designed to set fresh minds and hearts a-trembling, to inspire them to join the burgeoning frontiers of science and philosophy. Men and women alike will be touched. With Diderot it simply cannot be that the Pensées are written for an exclusively male audience. At this juncture the claim seems plausible; it remains to be solidly confirmed.

We began by noting that “homme” first appears with a capital H and thus can be read as referring to all humans (where the capital letter denotes species or kind rather than gendered subset thereof). The works just surveyed bear up this reading, providing a sort of

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18 Not every genius, nor every academic, would be thus insulted. What insults surely reflects the ego of the one offended. Here we focus on the fact that the reader to whom the Pensées are directed is not being purposefully insulted. What’s more, s/he is not likely of a sort or at a developmental stage which inclines her/him to take umbrage at the address Diderot offers.

19 Reference to the idea of interconnectivity of all things, to an increasing understanding of this metaphysical reality, and so to Diderot’s use — for instance — of the images of harpsichords and spider webs, is intended. These metaphors depict our constitution, our ways of knowing and being. Anne Beate Maruseth’s “Harmonique” in l’Encyclopédie du Rêve de Diderot is insightful in this vein.
preliminary defence of the claim that “Homme” refers to “human kind”. The argument needs to be clinched. An analysis of four of the characters in the dialogue of the *Rêve de d’Alembert* will furnish the key to our proof. The characters: the philosopher Diderot is an empiricist and materialist, d’Alembert is a mathematician specializing in geometry, doctor Bordeu is an experimental scientist and defender of the real Diderot’s philosophical positions, and Mademoiselle de Lespinasse is ... Mademoiselle de Lespinasse. The four are friends.

Julie de Lespinasse proves an intelligent match for intellectual discussion with her male counterparts despite her gender or her novice status where their more developed scientific, philosophical and mathematical experiences and knowledge are concerned. The objection that her ideas are at times underdeveloped or even misguided, such that she represents a sort of permanent feminine mental immaturity, fails when we quickly see that she is ready — in fact passionately motivated — to reconsider, to think and to reconstruct her thoughts. Julie is a philosopher from whom questions abound; probing thought toward sound conclusion truly motivates her. The tête-à-têtes she holds with Bordeau are proof of this claim. What distinguishes Julie de Lespinasse from her cohorts is that she is unconstrained, unashioned, not yet determined by years of study and grooming in a chosen field. It is not that the men cannot modify their ideas, in fact such work is a hallmark of each of their — real-world and fictively relevant — scientific-cum-intellectual personae. Their positions do not completely enchain them. Yet, as the character d’Alembert illustrates, an intellectual well-established in his field will be at least a bit constrained by his commitments, by the positions he champions and in which he is invested. The freedom of thought which distinguishes Mademoiselle de Lespinasse is that of the newcomer to whom the *Pensées* speak. Beneath her becoming exterior, she is in effect that “jeune homme.”

In a significant sense, Julie de Lespinasse is naked while the other characters are attired. The males are fairly well trussed up in their intellectual garb which reflects at once their academic thoughts and achievements. In this regard, their clothing also indicates positions which, in the 18th century, carried a form of respect often given to men and considered a man’s due. The importance of Julie’s figurative nudity must not be underrated. We would be remiss to fail to notice that it serves as an instance of that metaphoric imagery which Diderot so appreciates, and employs. Diderot describes the attire of the participants in the *Pensées*. It is thus a short step for the reader to the recognition that Julie’s everyday attire is simply that of “a woman.” Intellectually, academically, she is not yet dressed. This nudity englobes Julie’s beauty — both physical and intellectual — as it conjures up recognition of

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20 To say “developed” is not to say “correct”; the discussions presented indicate that Julie often sees more presciently and accurately than do her male counterparts.

21 It is commonplace: older scientists, for instance, are not all easily able to embrace paradigm shifts which require that they see the world differently or even that they relinquish positions they have long-defended.

22 That a riddle about an operating room doctor’s being the patient’s mother was successful well into the 20th century is a telling comment here.
her state of readiness to become a fully-fledged new mind. To speak of nudity is not to overstep the bounds of relevance to Diderot, even where issues of the mind are concerned.

The frontispiece of “Diderot’s” *Encyclopédie* features a reproduction of an engraving by Prévost. As Diderot informs us, in his explanation accompanying the image, the nearly nude female figure representing Truth (surrounded by the sciences, arts, and faculties of human spirit such as the imagination) illustrates the breadth and variety of knowledge of which humans are capable. The effect of Truth is emblematic; “nude and voluptuous, she is awesome.” The possibility of attaining Truth without the hindrance, the veil, of clothing exists. One needs, as Diderot often says — following the direction of Descartes’ rationalism — to see clearly and distinctly. Our philosopher, of course, additionally insists on the importance and power of feeling, of emotion. One also needs to connect perspectives, and so we understand the importance of the “ligue philosophique” of which Diderot speaks in the *Pensées* (60).

Intellectually, a “nude”, an unencumbered, start is a good start. It is the point from which the “jeune homme” begins the study of Nature. Unconstrained by the ready-made garb of any field of study (or even by a dressing gown — already less restrictive than waking-world intellectual attire! — as d’Alembert in his bedclothes illustrates in the *Rêve*), a fresh arrival’s mind stands a better chance of determining a unique approach to Truth. Mademoiselle de Lespinasse’s intellectual nudity is fortuitous; it is essential to Diderot’s plot.

The unhampered state of mind in which Julie participates in the *Rêve* does not impede, but motivates, her; her verve is unrestrained. She incarnates the philosophical spirit of the Enlightenment. She does not want discussions to end and she dares consider scandalous topics, hesitating only momentarily where social diktats might constrain a less spirited, less bright mind. With a healthy admixture of passion, Julie tries to find and follow solid reasoning — truth her goal. Everything fascinates her. She is a “jeune homme” setting off on a metaphorical journey of exploration. But she is female. How and why might this choice of Diderot’s matter?

It is my contention that Julie de Lespinasse is gendered at one level of text. At another, she is genderless. At this second level, Mademoiselle de Lespinasse is the intellectual everyman, every young human. At the first level, her character certainly sports female garb, she is lovely and Bordeu finds her attractive. (We should recognize that Julie’s beauty and attractiveness hold at the second level as well. Intellectual ardor and magnetism exist; the physical is not absolutely apart from the intellectual.) Thus Julie does keep us reading, she makes the story lively. When she senses — in French “elle ressent”, she senses/feels — the dreaming d’Alembert’s orgasm and climax (and allows him to kiss her), she registers an intellectual and physical climax (115). This young woman understands and shares physical

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23 Diderot, “Explication du frontispice de l’Encyclopédie.”

24 Joël Castonguay-Bélanger is responsible for this apt turn of phrase (pronounced during a lecture at the University of British Columbia in the Fall of 2016).
and intellectual energies, two fields of human experience which rock a sleeping mathematician. It is Julie who brings us to recognize, indeed to feel and to know, that her role must be filled by a woman.

In the Rêve, as in Jaques, Diderot has penned a page-turner. In the Rêve, it is the young female protagonist who makes us want to keep reading. Colas Duflo aptly remarks that, “Le Rêve de d’Almbert perdrait beaucoup de son charme sans le personnage de Mlle de Lespinasse,” and that he sees her, “surtout [... comme ...] la femme pour qui le discours philosophique se fait aussi discours séduisant et séducteur, l’esprit sans préjugés métaphysiques appris au collège” (34). Duflo’s conclusion is insufficient. His final analysis is that philosophy is only worthwhile for Julie — for the female character — if it entertains. At bottom this claim sees Diderot relegate Julie de Lespinasse, and perhaps so all women, to the categorically lesser position of children in need of amusement, or to that of lovely little human butterflies attracted to “sweets”. It is difficult not to read Duflo’s analysis as suffering from maladies of which modern-day feminists would most likely hope to disabuse him. Duflo certainly correctly identifies the ground level of Mademoiselle de Lespinasse, that her female presence is essential to the tale. However, he neglects the important philosophical role she plays. It is the latter which ultimately defends the conclusion that the Pensées reflect no sexism in their author.

Return to the intellectually unconstrained Julie: her sex, her gender, have absolutely no importance at the level of philosophy wherein Diderot conceives of the intellect, mentality, verve and promise of the “jeune homme” to whom the Pensées are addressed. The very same argument would hold were Julie male. Even if the lived biology of a man is not that of a woman, both can enjoy a philosophically rich life. Individual ability and drive determine the intellectual possibilities of each human. That said, in the Rêve, the men are clothed and we are privy to the effects of their attire; the character who, among other things, models the “young human” must be female.

In the 18th century, doctors, philosophers and mathematicians were overwhelmingly male. And, Diderot’s desire with the Pensées was to encourage the formation, even the birth, of thinkers fresh to philosophical thought. As Duflo points out in his introduction to the Rêve, Diderot had to include a character who was not yet indoctrinated. We have seen that in the Pensées, “homme” is an unrestricted variable to be variously replaced. But, the character in the role of foil in the Rêve had to be female. A young man titillated at d’Alembert’s bedside would have been too scandalous, likely to the point of overshadowing the philosophy presented. It seems Diderot rarely touched on male homosexuality in his

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25 With the exception of rarities, such as Émilie du Châtelet who translated Newton into the French, women appeared rather more as Rousseau described them, incapable of complex thought. That women were at best thought fit for botanical studies (a field not yet regarded as a complex science) is general knowledge, but it bears repeating.
Lesbianism appears to have struck him as less dangerous, more pressing an issue or perhaps more prevalent. Regardless, neither a young eroticized homosexual male nor lesbian would have worked in this story which presents caricatures of actual persons, men of intellect open to ideas as well as humour.

So we have it: Mademoiselle de Lespinasse stands as that very sort of “jeune homme” to whom Diderot speaks in his Pensées. Her gender is irrelevant. She is that human being gifted with fine intelligence and motivating energies such that she is driven to discover the very sorts of things which are described in the Pensées. She is as of yet unencumbered by a set philosophy. If she retains her verve, her freshness of spirit and desire to uncover truths, she will be well-poised to uncover new verities or, at least, to help promulgate those already uncovered. Thus, Julie is the “jeune homme,” which is to say, she is the human of youthful spirit whom Diderot hopes to inspire.

A few closing remarks are in order. First, it behooves us to note that “jeune homme” can be conceived of as referring to both genders at once or as ignoring gender altogether. In saying “Homme” (capital H), it is to every human in their philosophical, explorative, knowledge-seeking guise that Diderot speaks. Thus we refute the charge that our philosopher has revealed a sexist bent in the Pensées by explaining that he has shown himself either to address males and females, or that he simply ignores gender when the ability to take up philosophy and to learn is being discussed. Of course Diderot identifies a plenitude of differences between men and women (many of which are socially or politically described artifacts) — the other of his works surveyed here suffice to demonstrate that he does so. However, that he sees and writes about differences between men and women does not mean that Diderot fails to recognize the existence of a level at which men and women are simply human beings. As we have shown, Mademoiselle de Lespinasse helps us to see this complex fact. On one level she is a mademoiselle, at another she is a human being. And, it would be as incorrect to read her as an honorary male as it is to see her as a mere child entertained by men. For a lovely intellectual interval, Diderot’s vision of humanity permits us to forget the male/female distinction. This strikes me as an enormous and valuable gift, one we would do well to accept and take up with the jeunes hommes of our own era. It is a moral insight which issues from a materialist metaphysics, offered by a gifted philosopher who champions reason coupled with feeling.

Finally, if the Rêve serves as key to the Pensées, the opposite holds true as well. Without having read the latter it would be difficult to understand that we may, or really must,

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26 One finds what may be vague allusions to physical attraction between men, such as that in the bijoux indiscrètes when Cyclophide describes male “bijoux” which remain indolent (100) or yet again, the possibility of a young man who was “usé, mal né, ou maléficié.” Elsewhere we read of the deep love and jealousy as well as the physical attraction Grimm occasions in Diderot (see the article “Amitié” in the Dictionnaire de Diderot, 22).

27 The topic looms in La Religieuse, for instance.

28 The work is not an inquiry into sexual preference. How or whether sexual preference might have been relevant in a modernized version of the tale is another issue. I suspect it would be irrelevant.
appreciate Mademoiselle de Lespinasse at two levels. Diderot’s works reflect the depth of interconnection which his metaphysics describe. Interconnection cannot but infuse his ideas, his texts and, of course, even his humour. To read just one of Diderot’s works in isolation is to deny oneself full experience of his skills as an author and of his rich thought. If we trace the connections between two of his creations (which are themselves entwined in the entirety of his philosophy), we confirm that Denis Diderot is no sexist. What he is is a genius whose prescient works inspire us all to further reading and bolder reflection.

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