Against Three Requirements for Market Objectors

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Abstract
Moral objections have been levied against the market system for as long as it has existed, but there has been relatively little systematic theorizing about what the requirements of a *successful* objection are. There are at least two strategies for constructing such a requirement. One strategy is to endorse one of the many moral or political theories on offer. But given persistent contestation over the right moral theory, any requirement produced by this strategy will likely be controversial. A second strategy circumvents this problem, and has been pursued in recent work by Jaeggi (2016), Brennan & Jaworski (2022), and Robson (2023a; 2023b). These authors propose requirements which do not depend on any particular moral or political theory. In this paper, I evaluate these proposed requirements, rejecting most on the grounds that they are either too restrictive or unsystematic.

1. Introduction

The market system, as a first approximation, is a political economic system of private property, production for sale, and social coordination through fluctuating prices. Objections have been levied against the market system for as long as it has existed, but there has been surprisingly little systematic thinking about what the requirements of a *successful* objection are (Robson 2023a, 205).

In this paper, I survey and object to three requirements on objections to the market system. I consider Gregory Robson's (2023a; 2023b) 'Normative Representativeness Requirement', Rahel Jaeggi's (2016) 'Uniqueness Requirement', and Jason Brennan & Peter Jaworski's (2022) 'Strong Necessity Requirement'. The argument will run as follows. In Section 2, I present Robson's Normative Representativeness Requirement and reject it because it is too restrictive. In Section 3, I present Rahel Jaeggi's Uniqueness Requirement and reject it because it is unsystematic. In Section 4, I develop the Necessity Requirement implicit in Brennan & Jaworski (2022) and reject it because it is too restrictive.

1.1 Thick and Thin Moralism

Given the vast number of objections to the market system on offer, one might wonder how we should mark certain objections as ultimately successful or unsuccessful; that is, which of the many objections one might raise against the market system actually gives us an all-things-considered reason to reject it? One strategy, which we might call 'thick moralism', is to endorse one of the many moral theories on offer. For instance, it seems clear that endorsing rule utilitarianism generates just one requirement on successful objections to the market system: that it must show that another social arrangement maximizes utility.[1]

[1] It seems that one major example of this is MacIntyre's (1981, 254) argument in that "the tradition of the virtues is at variance with central features of the modern economic order" and thus "has to be rejected from a standpoint that

Another strategy, which we might call 'thin moralism', has recently been explored by Robson (2023a; 2023b) and Jaeggi (2016). Thin moralists try to generate requirements on successful objections to the market system without controversially endorsing any particular systematic moral theory. Robson, for example, endorses the Normative Representativeness Requirement, which states that an objection to the market system is successful only if it addresses a representative sample of firms and it shows that this sample is overall unethical. Jaeggi endorses what I call the Uniqueness Requirement, which states that an objection to the market system is successful only if it addresses a feature of the market system that only occurs within the market system.

With this distinction in mind, I'll argue that many of these thin moralist requirements do not succeed. To this end, my main argumentative strategy will be to survey the various thin moralist requirements that have been endorsed in the literature and show that they do not adequately account for all of the possibly successful objections to the market system.

1.2 The Market System

The market system is a social arrangement which consists of three definitional features:

(1) private ownership;

(2) production for sale and mediated consumption; and

(3) a system of dynamically adjusting prices.

First, a market system must define the power of actors within the system to assume a normative *ownership* relation to an object, which accords the actor with a set of rights with respect to that object. These rights and powers might include the following:[2]

- the right to possess the object

owes genuine allegiance to the tradition of the virtues". For MacIntyre, the necessary (and sufficient) requirement is whether the objection shows that the market system is compatible with virtue theory.

[2] Here, I'm drawing from Waheed Hussain (2023, 209-210).

- the right to exclude others from using the object
- the rights to use, transform, waste, and destroy the object
- the right to transfer one's rights or ownership status over the object

In a market system, these rights of private ownership also extend to ownership over one's labour power, i.e. the ability to perform labour.

These rights can be more or less extensively defined and still satisfy condition (1). However, they should not be too restrictive, for it seems hard to fathom how a social arrangement could be a market system if it doesn't feature, say, the right of transfer. At the same time, it seems like these rights need not be maximally extensive in order to satisfy the private ownership condition. This is because the modern social arrangements that we routinely call market systems (such as the United States' system) feature property rights which have certain limits. The United States' market system is still a market system even though it does not feature a right to transfer ownership over kidneys. Thus, there seems to be a range of private property rights that a social arrangement can define and still be a market system. I'll simply leave open how this should be precisely defined, as it won't be entirely necessary for my argument.

Second, a market system includes production for sale and mediated consumption (Hussain, 215-217). We might think of society as divided into households, each of which possess a set of skills and a set of needs. In a market system, instead of the household producing things to directly satisfy the needs of the household, its members apply their skills in ways that satisfy the needs of other households. In doing so, households receive a monetary income with which they can spend on their consumption. For example, rather than personally growing all of the food required for my household's consumption, I might perform other tasks — producing research, grading papers, teaching classes — for which I receive an income to consume the things my household needs.

Third, a market system functions through a system of dynamically adjusting prices. Various economic conditions affect the behavior of economic actors (buying, selling, contracting), which affects price levels, which finally affects changes in the division of labour. Say there is a shortage of chairs. Consumers bid against one another to secure access to the limited supply, moving the price up. This sends the signal to the carpentry industry to increase the production of chairs.

Private ownership, production for sale, and a system of dynamically adjusting prices are what define a market system. There may be a wide variety of possible social arrangements which meet this definition. One possible market system is the United States' economy, which consists of many small and large private firms owned and governed by shareholders and overseen by a regulatory bureaucracy. Another possible market system is one composed of a network of worker-owned co-operatives, each transacting and competing with each other on a market while regulated by various councils of trade unions.

2. Against the Normative Representativeness Requirement

2.1 The Normative Representativeness Requirement

A recent contribution by Gregory Robson has created a beachhead for systematic theorizing about objections to the market system.[3] Robson proposes what he calls the 'Normative Representativeness Requirement' (NRR) on successful objections to the market system, which states that an objection to the market system is successful only if two conditions are fulfilled:

(1) **Representativeness Condition:** The objection addresses a representative sample of firms.

[3] Robson uses the term 'profit system'. I mean to refer to the same thing with my use of 'market system'.

(2) **Wrongness Condition:** The objection shows that this sample is overall unethical.

(Robson 2023a, 207)

Behind condition 1 is the idea that successful objections to the profit system must not be hasty generalizations (Robson 2023a, 207). On this point, Robson draws an analogy:

> [S]uppose that you see a couple dozen sports cars on the road and 20 are driving far too fast, endangering others. You thereby gain some inductive evidence that sports car drivers tend to put others at risk. But notice: as the target of your generalization widens, your observation becomes less evidentially valuable (Robson 2023a, 207).

As you aim to generalize from this observation to the set of sports car drivers in your community, state, country, or the world, your inductive evidence becomes progressively less valuable. Robson claims that there is an analogously similar requirement for objections to the market system.

If Robson is right that the NRR is a requirement on successful objections to the market system, then objectors to the market system have their work cut out for them. For if the NRR is true, then it is only if "the many examples of unethical firms cited by scholars and the public generalize to the set of over 30 million firms" that we are rationally permitted to have a successful "indictment of the [market] *system* itself" (Robson 2023a, 207). It is just not enough that we only have a particularly morally egregious sample of, say, 100 firms.

2.2 The NRR Against the Moderate and Radical Critiques

Robson uses the Normative Representativeness Requirement to argue that two influential critiques of the market system — the 'moderate critique' from Elizabeth Anderson and the 'radical critique' from G. A. Cohen — are unsuccessful (Robson 2023a; Robson 2023b). I'll briefly recapitulate these two critiques (as interpreted by Robson) as well as Robson's replies using the NRR.

First, let's consider Anderson's 'moderate critique'. According to Anderson, modern capitalist workplaces are "like communist dictatorships" (Anderson 2017, 39). Robson reconstructs Anderson's argument as follows. There are three ways that firms might be structured in a market system. First, perhaps workers or consumers make up a part of the governing boards of firms, in addition to shareholders. Call these 'type-1 firms'. Second, perhaps workers or consumers get to vote for who gets to be part of governing boards. Call these 'type-2 firms'. Third, perhaps shareholders have all the power, and workers and consumers do not have any governing power or authority; rather, shareholders appoint managers who exercise authority over lower managers and workers. 'Call these type-3 firms'.

Type-3 firms are governed not democratically, but rather like 'communist dictatorships'. Anderson claims that employers of type-3 firms treat their employees unethically in violation of a republican conception of freedom, according to which a person is free when they are not subjected to arbitrary power (Pettit 1997). In support of this claim, Anderson cites various surveys in which employees indicate dissatisfaction with their employers and a lack of freedom (Robson 2023a, 209-210). For instance, Anderson cites surveys which state that 25 percent of employees see their bosses as dictators, "93 percent of garment factories in southern California violated labor laws", and so on (Robson 2023a, 209).

Against Anderson, Robson argues that the moderate critique is not a successful moral objection to the market system because it does not meet the Representativeness Condition of his NRR. This is because Anderson's sample of firms is not representative of all firms, as there are over 30 million firms in the United States alone, with widely varying management practices, sizes, cultures, and so on. So, while Anderson may cite many examples of unethical firm behaviour, the sheer number of firms in the market system and the dynamic and changing nature of the market system renders Anderson's empirical claim practically unverifiable (Robson 2023a, 214-15). Thus, Anderson's moderate objection fails.

Now, let's consider G. A. Cohen's 'radical critique'. Cohen (2009, 44-45) claims the following about the market system:

> Motivation in market exchange consists largely of greed and fear … a person typically does not care fundamentally, within market interaction, about how well or badly anyone other than herself fares.

The pervasiveness of these kinds of motivations, on Cohen's view, indicts the market system itself. Robson's reply, using the NRR, points out that Cohen's claim that market exchange is not empirically substantiated, for "we need a representative sample of exchanges" (2023b). Again, Robson (2023b) appeals to the "over 30 million firms in the United States … and scores of millions of others globally" along with the dynamic and changing nature of the market system to foreclose the possibility that this critique fulfills the Representativeness Condition of the NRR. Further, Robson argues, there is empirical research which suggests that virtuous qualities like "honesty, trust, reliability, fairness, and altruistic norm enforcement are ubiquitous … in well-functioning markets" (2023b).

Thus, if the NRR is true, the market objector has a very high bar to reach: address a representative sample of all firms or the objection fails. And as Robson has suggested, the sheer vastness of the number of firms and the dynamic nature of the market make it difficult for any sample of firms to be truly representative.

2.3 Representativeness is Not Necessary

Now, I'll argue that the NRR is too restrictive and improperly motivated. The upshot is that the NRR is, at best, a requirement on inductive arguments against the market system.

First, the NRR is too restrictive. There are some objections that are possibly successful even though they do not address a representative sample of firms (thus failing the Representativeness Condition). You could, for example, take a small but persistent set of unethical firms as the basis of your objection. Consider the following case:

> **Ecological Critique**: Imagine there exists a small subset of firms which emit egregious amounts of carbon into the Earth's atmosphere, say, just 100 firms.[4] Say these firms are responsible for the vast majority of carbon emissions, such that anthropogenic climate change can be almost entirely attributed to the activities of these firms. Say there is also no way to feasibly ameliorate this in the market system, due to factors such as corporate lobbying against climate change policies.

This objection seems possibly successful, and importantly, it does not address a representative sample of firms. It only addresses 100 firms, out of a set of tens of millions. But the first condition of the NRR, the Representativeness Condition, entails that the ecological objection is not possibly successful because it fails to address a representative sample of firms. A proponent of the Ecological Critique might be well justified in maintaining that addressing a representative sample of firms is not what grounds their objection. Instead, it is a small but persistent set of firms which provides the basis for critique. One might reply by questioning the empirical assumptions of this objection, but this is besides the point. If the NRR is true, it has to hold in all possible cases.

[4] This refers to a disputed claim from 2017 that 100 companies are responsible for 71% of all global carbon emissions.

Second, some objections are possibly successful even though they do not address firms at all. You could, for example, take any of the definitional features of the market system as the basis of your objection. Consider the following:

> **Authority Critique:** According to this, political authority is never justified. The market system, with private ownership as one of its defining features, requires political authority to enforce the rights associated with the status of private ownership.

So, the market system is thereby unjustified according to the Authority Critique. This objection does not address a set of firms, let alone a representative sample of them; yet, it is possibly successful. But the NRR entails that it is not possibly successful because it fails to address a representative sample of firms. Again, one might worry that political authority is sometimes justified. But we should set aside whether we think it's plausible that political authority is never justified. Instead, we need only accept that it's possibly so.

Behind the failure of the NRR to account for the possibility that the Ecological Critique and the Authority Critique are successful is that the Representativeness Condition is improperly motivated. Recall that the motivation for the NRR was the idea that an objection must not be a hasty generalization. This 'No-Hasty-Generalization Requirement' is a general requirement on reasoning, which states something like this:

> **No-Hasty-Generalization Requirement:** If you generalize from the claim that 'some *F*s are *G*s' to the claim that 'all *F*s are *G*s', then your sample of *F*s must be a representative sample of all *F*s.

Crucially, the force of this requirement is conditional upon making a generalization in the first place. Your sample of *F*s must be a representative sample, *if* you're trying to generalize. But recall the Representativeness Condition of the NRR:

Representativeness Condition: The objection addresses a representative sample of firms.

The Representativeness Condition implausibly strengthens the general No-Hasty-Generalization Requirement on reasoning by removing its conditional in the case of firms. While the No-Hasty-Generalization Requirement only asks us to address a representative sample *if* we're making a generalization, the Representativeness Condition asks us to address a representative sample *simpliciter*. Therefore, absent any independent reason to make this leap, the No-Hasty-Generalization Requirement does not adequately motivate Robson's Representativeness Condition in the NRR. But Robson intends for the NRR to show that "*no* objection can succeed without meeting these conditions" (Robson 2023a, 206; emphasis own). As I've tried to show, the NRR can do no such work.

In light of this, it seems like the No-Hasty-Generalization Requirement can only justifiably motivate a weakened conditional version of the Representativeness Condition:

Conditional Representativeness Condition: If the objection attempts to generalize to the set of all firms, then the objection addresses a representative sample of firms.

If this is right, then the NRR would not apply to all objections to the market system, but rather only 'inductive objections' to the market system which try to generalize from some subset of firms to the set of all firms (or exchanges, transactions, etc.). But as we have seen, there are possibly successful objections to the market system that are not inductive objections, so the NRR is not a requirement on successful objections to the market system.

What does this mean for the aforementioned moderate and radical critiques? It depends on how we're reading the objections. If, as Robson claims, Anderson and Cohen indeed intend to generalize from a set of undemocratic firms and a set of greedy transactions to the larger respective set of all firms and all transactions, then these critiques are still subject to objection based on the weaker Conditional Representativeness Condition. Thus, in light of my rejection of the NRR, it may be the case that the moderate and radical critiques still fail.[5]

3. Against the Uniqueness Requirement

In this section, I'll draw out an implied requirement, which I'll term the 'Uniqueness Requirement' from Rahel Jaeggi. Then, I'll argue that it is unsystematic and should not be a requirement on successful objections to the market system.

3.1 The Uniqueness Requirement

Jaeggi (2016, 45) writes the following: "[i]s there something, then, that is not just a side-effect of some chance peculiarity of capitalism, but which occurs *systematically* in conjunction with it (and *only* with it)--something that is, moreover, fundamentally problematic?" While several requirements are implied here, I'll focus on the one which states that an objection must target something that occurs "only with" the market system. Call this the 'Uniqueness Requirement':

> **Uniqueness Requirement:** An objection to the market system is successful only if it addresses an element of the market system that occurs only within the market system.

Jaeggi uses this requirement to reject Marxian objections to capitalist exploitation as ultimately unsuccessful:

> [I]t is to some extent clear in what sense capitalism could be a (moral) evil--namely, to the degree that it purportedly involves exploitation [...] To be sure, it is not clear whether this applies to an evil *that is specific to capitalism*. After all, there had been child labor, a slave trade, and additional, grave forms of exploitative oppression in precapitalist

[5] That's not to say that these two critiques can't be reinterpreted in ways that skirt this objection. One way of doing this may be to reject the way that Robson has reconstructed the two critiques as inductive arguments. A radical critic might, for instance, agree that neither all nor most market transactions are unethical. However, the radical critic might still insist that what grounds their objection to the market system is the unrepresentative yet persistent subset of unethical transactions.

> societies as well [...] Therefore, we must not only claim that capitalism *also* exploits human beings [...] but that it does so systematically and in a *specific and distinct way*. (45)

The Marxian objection to capitalist exploitation is unsuccessful, according to Jaeggi, in part because it fails the Uniqueness Requirement. Many non-market societies have had exploitation, so an objection which relies on exploitation is not a successful one.

3.2 Uniqueness is Not Necessary

In this section, I'll object to the Uniqueness Requirement on the grounds that it is unsystematic. Consider the following case: child labor might be (presumably) wrong because children cannot consent to the labor contract, and any contract is therefore nonconsensual and wrong. This critique, while it might explain why the act of child labor contracting is wrong, does not target a feature that *only* child labor contracting exhibits. For instance, it might also be wrong to steal from others because it is nonconsensual. It therefore seems unsystematic to apply such a high bar to successful objections to the market system absent any special justification, given that we do not set such a condition on successful objections to other wrongful acts and social arrangements.

One might reply that identifying a unique harm or wrong of the market system might make an objection to it stronger. After all, if there are many other systems that we could switch to, then this would surely be a stronger critique of the market system. I grant that uniqueness may factor into these ampliative concerns, but this does not imply that Uniqueness Requirement is a necessary requirement on successful objections to the market system.

4. The Necessity Requirement

In this section, I'll develop what I call the 'Strong Necessity Requirement', motivated by some recent work in the ethics of commodification from Jason Brennan and Peter Jaworski (2022). I object to this on the grounds that it is also too restrictive. I then consider and reject a more permissive version of this requirement, which I call the ‘Weak Necessity Requirement’.

4.1 The Strong Necessity Requirement

In the literature on the ethics of commodification, many objections have been levied against markets for various goods (e.g. organs, sex, and so on). In their seminal *Markets Without Limits*, Brennan and Jaworski (2022) argue that the current objections on offer in this literature fail. In the following, they lay out the main argumentative strategy they levy against their anti-commodification opponents:

> It won’t be enough for them [anti-commodification theorists] to show us that some markets are bad--morally impermissible--on some or even many “settings”. They need to show us that markets in certain commodities are bad on all the possible settings. (Brennan and Jaworski 2022, 50)

This requirement has led Brennan and Jaworski to reject, for instance, Sandel’s (2012) worry that commodification of certain goods might corrupt the meaning embodied by the good:

> We also have to argue about the meaning of social practices and the goods they embody. And we have to ask, in each case, whether commercializing the practice would degrade it. (147)

Brennan and Jaworski (70) respond by claiming that the meanings we attach to goods are contingent, because there are possible social arrangements in which different meanings are attached to goods such that buying and selling would not degrade its meaning. There is a possible social arrangement, for example, in which we do not attach any special meaning onto the kidneys such that buying and selling kidneys would not degrade anything. Brennan and Jaworski thus object to anti-commodification theorists by (1) endorsing the claim that a successful objection to a market for some good must address a *strictly necessary* element of that market, and (2) by showing that the current objections on offer only address contingent elements of markets.

From this, one might try to construct a parallel requirement for successful objections to the market system as a whole. To motivate this move, I'll try to argue that a market system is essentially an aggregation of markets for specific goods. This will show us that we might be able to import Brennan & Jaworski's requirement on objections to specific markets to develop a requirement on objections to the market system as a whole. Recall the three definitional features of the market system: (1) private property, (2) production for sale and mediated consumption, and (3) a system of dynamically adjusting prices.

A market system, so defined, is just the aggregate of many markets of specific goods. Consider what it means for there to be a market for a specific good, say a market for kidneys. You currently have certain private property rights over your kidney. You can possess it and you can exclude others from using it, for example. If you live in a jurisdiction which prohibits kidney markets, those are (roughly) all the private property rights you have over your kidney. For example, you don't have the right to transfer your kidney to others. Consequently, there is also no (legal) sale and mediated consumption of kidneys. What would it mean, then, to set up a market for kidneys? It seems like it means, at least, according to persons a right to transfer kidneys, thereby creating an environment in which there is sale and mediated consumption of kidneys through a system of dynamically adjusting prices. Now, consider the following case:

> **Stateland:** Stateland is a social arrangement in which no markets exist at all. Instead, government bureaucrats centrally plan the economy, providing all its citizens with the goods and services they need. There is also full compliance with the law, such that no

> black markets exist. One day, bureaucrats in Stateland decide that they've had enough with centrally planning the economy. Instead of risking quick social change which may lead to unrest, they devise a plan to slowly turn Stateland's economy into a market system over several months. Each day, Stateland gives its citizens new private property rights (such as transfer rights) over a different good. On the first day, Stateland sets up a market in such a way for pencils. On the second day, Stateland sets up a market for erasers, and so on.

After several years, Stateland would have markets for as many goods as one might be able to permissibly buy and sell in a modern market system such as the United States'. It seems clear that Stateland, at some point after several years, becomes a market system. But is there anything about Stateland's market system that isn't just an aggregation of many markets for specific goods? It seems not. If that's true, then a market system is just an aggregation of many specific markets. And if the market system is just an aggregation of many specific markets, then requirements on critiques of the market system are just requirements on critiques of an aggregation of many specific markets. This might help us motivate the move from Brennan & Jaworski's requirement on objections to specific markets to a requirement on objections to the market system:

> **Strong Necessity Requirement:** An objection to the market system is successful only if it addresses a strictly necessary element of the market system.

Thus, according to the Strong Necessity Requirement, an objector to the market system needs to address an element of the market system that is strictly necessary or else their objection fails.

4.2 Strong Necessity is Not Necessary

The Strong Necessity Requirement is too restrictive. Recall our previous Ecological Critique. It clearly does not address a strictly necessary element of the market system, because there are possible market systems which are not subject to the same conditions which make it possibly successful. Perhaps there is a possible market system where there is good compliance with environmental laws and little rent-seeking from corporations. But since the Ecological Critique seems possibly successful, and since the Strong Necessity Requirement, if true, would rule out the Ecological Critique, the Strong Necessity Requirement is false.

The Ecological Critique does not target a strictly necessary feature, but it does target a feature that cannot be *feasibly* removed in that case.[6] The subset of polluting firms is a persistent one, resistant to regulation. Perhaps, then, one might respond to cases like the Ecological Critique by weakening the Strong Necessity Requirement to a 'Weak Necessity Requirement':

> **Weak Necessity Requirement:** An objection to the market system is successful only if it addresses an element of the market system that is not feasibly removable from it.

But the Weak Necessity Requirement is also too restrictive. Consider the following case: imagine that there are two social arrangements, one market system *A* and one non-market system *B*, which are feasible for some set of inhabitants. *A* and *B* have the same moral defect, and in both systems the moral defect is feasibly removable. But imagine that its removal from system *B* is *more* feasible than its removal from system *A*. This seems like a successful objection to the market system *A*, even though it addresses an element of it which *is* feasibly removable.

The reason why both the Strong Necessity Requirement and the Weak Necessity Requirements are untenable is that we could have sufficient reason to reject a given social

[6] Here, I simply understand feasibility as the following: "a state of affairs is feasible if it is one we could actually bring about" (Pablo Gilabert & Holly Lawford-Smith 2012, 809). There are many ways to cash this out (see Daniel Guillery 2021), but the only thing necessary for my objection is that feasibility is a more restricted form of possibility in the broadest sense.

arrangement for highly contingent reasons. This is because we may have moral duties to not do things for highly contingent reasons. It might be wrong to push a button if it, contingently, happens to release a toxic gas into a room of people, even if it does not have such a function in other possible worlds. Thus, the Strong Necessity Requirement and Weak Necessity Requirement cannot be requirements for objections to the market system.

Conclusion

In this paper, I have argued that three thin moralist requirements that have been proposed for successful objections to the market system — the Normative Representativeness Requirement, the Uniqueness Requirement, and the Necessity Requirement — all fail. The NRR and the Necessity Requirements fail because they are too restrictive, and the Uniqueness Requirement fails because it is unsystematic.

Interestingly, however, these proposed requirements might factor into ampliative considerations in that they might make a given objection *stronger*, all else being equal. First, while the NRR may not be a requirement, it seems like if a critique addresses a representative sample of firms then it is stronger than a critique which addresses an unrepresentative sample of firms, all else being equal. For if the market system features unethical behaviour that is widespread rather than limited, this seems to be a stronger reason to abandon it. Second, a critique which addresses an element which is entirely specific to capitalism might also be stronger than a critique which addresses an element which holds in many more social arrangements, all else being equal. For if there are many alternative social arrangements which do not consist of the purported problematic features of the market system, then this also seems to be a stronger reason to abandon it. Third, a critique which addresses a necessary (or not feasibly removable) element of the market system is surely stronger than a critique which does not, all else being equal. For if there is no possible (or feasible) market system which meets the demands of a given moral objection, then there is no (feasible) possibility of reforming the market system to meet such demands.

The upshot of this paper's argument is that it suggests that there are no thin moralist requirements on objections to the market system. If that's the case, then deciding which moral objections to the market system are (un)successful may just depend on what moral theory one endorses.

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