Actions, Products, Demonstrations

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Abstract. As it is broadly accepted, typical uses of demonstratives are accompanied by demonstrations. The concept of demonstration, however, manifests the action–product ambiguity analogous to that visible in the opposition between jumping and the resulting jump, talking and the resulting talk or crying and the resulting cry. It is also a heterogeneous concept that enables demonstrations to vary significantly. The present paper discusses action–product ambiguity as applied to demonstrations as well as the heterogeneity of the latter. An account that acknowledges ambiguity and heterogeneity of demonstrations is sketched in the paper. It is argued that it has a rich explanatory and descriptive potential.

Keywords: Demonstratives; demonstrations; demonstrate; action–product distinction; referential intentions.

To Magdalena and two wonderful cat-beings: Boris and Lalunia.
1. Two profiles of demonstrations

Jack’s utterance of

[1]  This green is well balanced between blue and yellow

might be accompanied by several types of pointing actions: he might point at this particular patch of green with a finger; he might use a paintbrush to paint a particular patch of green; he might grasp a particular greenish object and show it to the audience; or he might refrain from any overt action if he believes that the particular shade of green is salient in the context. It might even be claimed (although I won’t be defending this view here) that the use of “green” in “this green” is nothing more than a constituent of each of the aforementioned pointing actions. In all these cases, the actions in question play a role of a demonstration, and it seems that the following is true of exophoric uses of demonstratives:

(Heterogeneity Thesis) Demonstrations accompanying uses of demonstratives vary with respect to their form\(^1\).

If heterogeneity is true (and it is hardly controversial that it is), then one might ask what unifies varieties of possible actions making them exemplifications of demonstrations. One possible answer to this question is provided by the dual-intention model of demonstrations (Ciecierski & Makowski (2022)) according to which all demonstrations – as occurring in acts of communication\(^2\) – are complex actions that have both an ostensive and an intentional profile.

An ostensive profile of demonstrations comprises any basic behavior that constitutes a demonstration: motor activity of a particular kind (grasping something, pointing with a finger, eye gaze, etc.) or refraining from an overt action. In order to distinguish such basic behaviors from complex acts of demonstration (the former are constituents of the latter), we might refer to

\(^1\) Or, if one prefers not to use the concept of a form: different actions might accompany uses of demonstratives and play a role of a demonstration.

\(^2\) This restriction is important as demonstratives might be employed also in speech acts that are audienceless (cf. Davis (2002)). The model described above does not apply to such cases.
them as “indications” or “demonstrations sensu stricto” (“demonstrations_s” for short), reserving the terms such as “demonstrations in the broad sense” and “demonstrations_L” for complex acts of demonstration. Heterogeneity assumes, among other things, that the form of a demonstration_L is inherited from the form of an indication that is its constituent, i.e., that if two indications have different forms, the forms differentiate also between demonstrations_L that contain them as constituents. An intentional profile of demonstrations comprises speaker’s intentions that accompany particular indications.

In the case of particular demonstrations, of course, the two profiles co-occur, and it is not always easy to tell them apart. However, it should always be in principle possible to single out the ostensive profile by considering, firstly, alternative ostensive interpretations the demonstration_s might receive and, secondly, the non-ostensive interpretations it might get. As noted by Wittgenstein (1953: 75), it is possible that a person “naturally reacted to the gesture of pointing with the hand by looking in the direction of the line from finger-tip to wrist, not from wrist to finger-tip”; it is also possible to treat the gesture in the manner characteristic of some animals, as not involving ostension at all.

The aim of this paper is to develop a theory of the ostensive profile of demonstrations in the broad sense and supplement it with a pragmasemantical theory of demonstrative utterances. The theory I shall propose makes use of the action-product distinction. I start with a description of the distinction in question and relate it to intentional profile of demonstrations in the broad sense. Next I describe various truth-conditional ways in which the theory might be developed. Each such way presupposes the idea of pragmatic filter: a manner of determining the class of potential demonstrata. This concept is described in the next section of the paper. The resulting theory has rich descriptive and explanatory potential for dealing with various scenarios of demonstrative communication. It also provides a conceptual framework that enables representing various rival theories of demonstrative utterances.
2. The intentional profile of demonstrations

There are at least two dimensions within which one might consider the specific occurrence of an utterance containing a demonstrative and an accompanying demonstration. The first is the communicative dimension: leaving aside the unusual cases of self-directed speech, both the demonstrative utterance and the accompanying gesture must be interpretable. The second is the pragmasemantic dimension: the interpretation that the recipient arrives at should provide an identification of the object of the indication (demonstratum) and the related reference of the demonstrative expression (potentially identical to the demonstratum).

The intentional profile of demonstrations, therefore, comprises at least two aspects: an intention to get the interpreter to form a particular hypothesis regarding the reasons why a particular demonstration is performed by the speaker (we might call it “abductive intention”) and the intention to get the interpreter to form, on the basis of this hypothesis, another one regarding the demonstrated object (we might call it “deictic intention”). Both intentions are, just like indications, constituents of every demonstration in the broad sense.

To illustrate the idea: if an utterance of [1] is accompanied by an act of painting a particular patch of green, the act of using the paintbrush in a certain manner is a case of an indication, while the two accompanying intentions are, respectively, the intention to get the interpreter to form a hypothesis that the speaker used the paintbrush in this particular manner in order to single out a particular shade of green and the intention to get the interpreter to form the hypothesis that this particular shade of green is the demonstratum.

The abductive intention aims at a hypothesis explaining the ostensive action or, more precisely, aims at making the interpreter to form the hypothesis explaining the ostensive action. The deictic intention aims at attributing demonstratum to demonstration (and related reference to a demonstrative). In order to be a possible subject of both roles we need a concept of demonstration that is capable of playing both roles, i.e. one that makes demonstrations a subject-matter of explanation (as actions) and one that makes them subjects of properties such as reference (or their analogues in the case of demonstrations).
3. The ostensive profile of demonstrations:
the action–product distinction

Uttering [1] is an action that contains other actions (like the action of uttering particular words that occur in [1]) as constituents. However, some words that are used in the utterance are not purely linguistic devices – they are rather hybrid expressions, i.e. expressions that contain (to use Frege’s well-known formulation) means of expressing the content as parts, constituents or aspects (for various interpretations of this idea see: Künne (1992), (2010), Textor (2007), (2015), Kripke (2008), Penco (2013), Ciecierski (2019)). In case of demonstrative words the respective means are demonstrations. It follows that the action of uttering a demonstrative sentence contains as a constituent the action of using a hybrid expression which contains as a constituent a linguistic expression (i.e. a demonstrative word) and a demonstration.

The concept of demonstrations, however, exhibits action–product ambiguity, analogous to that visible in the opposition between jumping and the resulting jump, talking and the resulting talk or crying and the resulting cry. As I shall suggest below, the ambiguity might be linked to two types of intentions that constitute the intentional profile of demonstrations, i.e. corresponds to two aforementioned roles demonstrations has to play.

The action–product distinction was introduced by Kasimir Twardowski in 1911 in his seminal paper Actions and products: Comments on the broader area of psychology, grammar, and logic. One of Twardowski’s main motivations for introducing the distinction was the rejection of psychologism; however, the distinction is philosophically interesting independently of that motivation. In recent years, for instance, it gained some importance in discussions regarding propositions and propositional attitudes (cf. Moltmann, 2013). It has also been extensively exploited in praxiology (cf. Kotarbiński, 1965; Makowski, 2017). As we shall see below, another area where it might find an application are the debates about demonstratives and demonstrations.

Twardowski introduces the action–product distinction by appealing to the difference in the verb–nouns pairs such as:
to jump – the jump

to shout – the shout

to lie – the lie

to judge – the judgment

to think – the thought

to speak – the speech

to cry – the cry.

As he observes:

(...) the relation of the verb to its corresponding noun (...) expresses the relation of some action to what emerges as a result of it, owing to, by means of, that action. When we fight, a fight results; when we think, thoughts arise; when we [issue a] command, a command occurs; when we sing, a song results.

(Twardowski, 1911: 14-15)

He dubs “that which arises (...) by means of that action” – “the product” of that action (ibidem). Hence, the jump is the product of jumping, the shout is the product of shouting, the lie is the product of lying, the judgment is the product of judging, the thought is the product of thinking, etc. By the same token, we might say that the indication (demonstrations) is the product of indicating (demonstrations).

The action–product distinction, however, is not a simple by-product of the verb–noun distinction. As Twardowski notes, immediately in some cases the nouns themselves suffer from action–product ambiguity:

(...) there is no question that we also frequently make use of a noun for designating an action, which renders these nouns ambiguous, capable as they are of designating now actions, now their products. In the phrase “to take someone’s advice,” the term “advice” denotes the product of the activity of advising, but when we say: “It’s no use giving you advice,” we wish to express the sentiment that the activity of offering advice has met with difficulties. (Twardowski, 1911: 15-16)
Twardowski’s main argument for the distinction must be, therefore, independent of the linguistic motivations that are behind it. And this is indeed the case: the ground for the distinction is that actions and products have different properties, although in some cases, as Twardowski stresses, it might be difficult to clearly separate a particular action from its product.\(^3\) For instance, the plan but not the action of planning might be implemented, actions, in contrast to some (but not all) products, do not have fulfillment or success conditions (Gerner, 2017: 325). Moreover, all “enduring” (in Twardowski’s terminology) products differ with respect to their temporal extension from the corresponding actions (compare: painting qua action and the particular painting that results from it). Some authors claim also the sameness relation might connect products but not actions (Gerner, 2017: 326), as it makes no sense to talk about Jill’s jumping being identical to Kate’s, while we might truly say that Jill’s jump was identical to Kate’s. However, this last observation is very problematic as it seems to be based on the confusion of types with tokens: my thought as a product might be identical with yours if we talk about the type while my action of thinking is different from yours if we pay attention to two actions-tokens. If we, however, compare tokens to tokens and types to types the sameness relation seems to be equally applicable or inapplicable to the respective action-product pairs.

It is important not to confuse products of actions and arbitrary effects of actions. Although every product is an effect of some action, not every effect of an action counts as its product. Producing a particular vowel is an effect of talking but only the entire talk counts as the product of talking. The criterion that enables distinguishing arbitrary effects from products is intentional: the product is the intended effect of a whole action that is, at the very same time, constituted and necessary determined by the action as

\(^3\) As Brandl (1998) notes: there are at least two possible interpretations of Twardowski’s considerations. The first requires a categorial ontological difference between actions and products according to which actions and products constitute inseparable wholes but might be nevertheless distinguished conceptually as distinct entities. The second requires a difference in meaning without a difference in reference and ontology. Here I am assuming (contrary to Brandl’s suggestions) the correctness of the first interpretation.
a whole. I might, for instance, talk in order to achieve a certain persuasive
goal but it will not count as the product of my action of talking because –
even if it is intended as the effect of the entire action – it is not constituted
or necessarily determined by it: nothing in the talk itself secures the effect in
question. This contrasts clearly with the case of the talk as a whole which
is constituted by the action in question⁴.

Following (and slightly modifying) the suggestion of Brandl (1998), we
might represent the ambiguity in terms of Davidsonian event-semantics. The sentence:


might be interpreted as (action-directed reading)⁵

[2A] \( \exists e \exists t \ [\text{Shouting}(e) \land \text{Agent}(\text{Magdalena, } e) \land \text{Patient}(\text{Boris, } e) \land \text{Time}(t, e) \land t < t_0] \)

while the sentence ‘Magdalena’s shout at Boris was loud’ (product-directed
reading) either as:

[2Pn] \( \exists e \exists x \exists t \ [\text{Shouting}(e) \land \text{Agent}(\text{Magdalena, } e) \land \text{Patient}(\text{Boris, } e) \land \text{Time}(t, e) \land t < t_0 \land \text{Product}(x, e) \land \text{Shout}(x) \land \text{Loud}(x)] \)

or as:

[2Pe] \( \exists e \exists e' \exists x \exists t \ [\text{Shouting}(e) \land \text{Agent}(\text{Magdalena, } e) \land \text{Patient}(\text{Boris, } e) \land \text{Time}(t, e) \land t < t_0 \land \text{Product}(e', e) \land \text{Shout}(e') \land \text{Loud}(e')] \)

depending on how we would like to treat products in our ontology: as events
(2Pe) or entities of (potentially) some other category (2Pn).

Similar differences can be found in the case of indications qua actions
and indications qua products. The former might be a subject matter of

⁴ Let us note, however, that the idea of nonending products (e.g. jump as a prod-
uct of jumping or demonstration as a product of demonstrating) has been recently
criticized by some authors (cf. Bronzo (2020)). I am not offering here a reply to this
criticism as the issue deserves an independent study.

⁵ \( t_0 \) represent here the time of utterance.

⁶ I leave open the question of whether \( e \) and \( x \) range over a single category of
entities (events).
psychological explanation (“Why she behaved like this, i.e., why she performed this particular act of indication?”), while nothing similar applies to the latter (the question “Why did the particular indication qua product occurred?” is not the question about the psychological factors responsible for the occurrence of a particular event).

Additional support for the applicability of the distinction to cases of indications comes from modal considerations. Consider, for instance, the following scenario (de Gaynesford, 2008: 169):

Scenario 1] The speaker points with a finger towards a horse (A) but another horse (B) replaces A during the utterance of “that’s my horse” when the speaker closes her eyes for a second.

And contrast it with the following one:

Scenario 2] The speaker points with a finger towards a horse (A) during the utterance of “that’s my horse”. She closes her eyes for a second but no other horse replaces A during pointing.

In the first case, a certain demonstration qua product (DP1) and a certain demonstrationS qua action (DA1) co-occur, while in the second scenario the very same demonstration qua action (DA1) is accompanied by a different demonstration qua product (DP2). At least in some cases, therefore, a demonstration qua action might co-occur with a distinct demonstration qua product.

If we agree that the distinction is well-founded, we are entitled to claim that7:

[3] Jill’s demonstrationS accompanying the utterance of ‘this’<l,t> is vague.

might receive the following two readings:

[3A] ∃e[Indicating(e) ∧ Agent(Jill, e) ∧ Time(t, e) ∧ Utters(Jill, “this”<l,t>, t) ∧ Vague(e)]

7 Following the idea of Reichenbach and others (cf. Ciecierski (2020)) we are using token quotes “x”<l,t> that refer to a particular token of an expression x having a particular spatiotemporal characteristics marked as <l, t>.
corresponding, respectively, to action-directed reading of [3] and product-directed reading of [3].

As we have observed above products – in contrast to actions – might have success or fulfilment conditions. However, this does not mean that every product has them. Compare, for instance, expectation and jump. The former can be fulfilled as it makes sense to say of a certain expectation that it concerns a certain state of affairs and that the state of affairs in question occurred or not. At the very same time nothing similar can be said of jump. Is demonstration the product of the first or of the second type? Consider again the two horse racing scenarios described above. In both cases it is clear that we might attribute to the speaker several intentions including the one regarding the correct hypothesis to be guessed by the interpreter. Now, in the first scenario the interpreter or rather the rational interpreter (the actual but deluded or inattentive cannot be proxy for the success of demonstration) will be unable to guess the reasons for performing the demonstration. Hence the demonstration will be unsuccessful. In the second scenario, on the other hand, she will be able to form the correct hypothesis explaining the behavior of the speaker. Hence the demonstration will be successful. This illustrates the sense in which demonstrations qua products have success or fulfilment conditions.

4. Demonstrata: potential, intended and actual

In both scenarios the situation was relatively simple. However, it might happen that the interpreter will end up not with one candidate for the explanatory hypothesis but with several ones that are consistent with what is known about the context and the demonstrative behavior and there are

\[3\text{Pe}] \exists e \exists x [\text{Indicating}(e) \land \text{Agent}(Jill, e) \land \text{Time}(t, e) \land \text{Utters}(Jill, "this"<\!,t>, t) \land \text{Indication}(x) \land \text{Product}(x, e) \land \text{Vague}(x)]\]

8 Or: \[3\text{Pe}] \exists e \exists x \exists e' [\text{Indicating}(e) \land \text{Agent}(Jill, e) \land \text{Time}(t, e) \land \text{Utters}(Jill, "this"<\!,t>, t) \land \text{Indication}(e') \land \text{Product}(e', e) \land \text{Vague}(e')], if one wants to treat products as events.

9 Action-product ambiguity applies here also to the notion of utterance – I am ignoring it for the sake of presentation.
several ways of unpacking the idea of success conditions for demonstrations in such cases. One requires that the demonstration is successful in contributing an object to truth-conditions only if it either has a singular interpretation (the multiplicity of hypotheses is not the case) or if (assuming that the multiplicity of hypotheses holds) among its interpretations there is one which captures the intended demonstratum. Another pays no special attention to cases of singular interpretation and treats cases of mismatch between intended demonstratum and potential demonstrata as resulting in truth-value gaps. I do not have any knockdown argument for or against one of the options (nor against other possible extensions of the framework) – both might be included in the truth-conditional extensions of the theory sketched in this paper (compare: Truth Conditions 1 and 2 given below).

Within the ostensive profile of demonstrations, indications qua products — as having success or fulfillment conditions — contribute candidates for the object demonstrated (potential demonstrata), while the intentional profile of demonstration contributes the intended demonstratum. Now what is the actual demonstratum depends on the relation between the two or rather on theoretical constraints that a semantic theory imposes on the relation in question. Here are some (but definitely: not all possible) ways of developing the idea.

The first looks as follows. If the intended demonstratum is on the list of potential demonstrata, then it is the actual demonstratum. If it is not, then, depending on how big the class of potential demonstrata is, there is no actual demonstratum or the demonstrator is the only object that is the potential demonstratum (in cases where demonstrations contributes a single object). More formally: let \( c \) be a context that contains \( s \) as the speaker, \( i \) as the indication qua product, \( D_i \) as the class of potential demonstrata that correspond to \( i \), and \( D_s \) as the (singleton) class whose only element is the individual the speaker has in mind. For the utterance \( u \) of “This is F,” the corresponding truth conditional clause takes the following form:

\[
\text{(TRUTH CONDITIONS 1)}
\]

\( u \) is true in \( c \) that contains \( s, i, D_i \) and \( D_s \) iff (i) every \( x \) in \( D_i \cap D_s \) is F and \( D_i \cap D_s \neq \emptyset \) or (ii) every \( x \) in \( D_i \) is F and \( D_i \cap D_s = \emptyset \) and \( |D_i| = 1 \).
u is false in \( c \) that contains \( s, i, D_i \) and \( D_s \) iff (i) every \( x \) in \( D_i \cap D_s \) is not \( F \) and \( D_i \cap D_s \neq \emptyset \) or (ii) every \( x \) in \( D_i \) is not \( F \) and \( D_i \cap D_s = \emptyset \) and \( |D_i| = 1 \).

\[ u \text{ lacks truth value in } c \text{ that contains } s, i, D_i \text{ and } D_s \text{ iff } D_i \cap D_s = \emptyset \text{ and } |D_i| > 1. \]

This analysis follows the intuition of those who believe that demonstration and intention are jointly decisive for demonstrative reference but who also claim that in some cases (when there is only one potential demonstratum) demonstration might take over and become a decisive factor. This interpretation might be treated as a version of Kaplan’s account from \textit{Dthat} (Kaplan (1978)) which stresses the importance of demonstrations and contextual cues while attributing purely disambiguating role to referential intentions.

Here is another way in which we might develop the idea: if the intended demonstratum is on the list of potential demonstrata, then it is the actual demonstratum. If it is not, then there is no actual demonstratum. Here, the corresponding truth conditional clause takes the following form:

(\textbf{TRUTH CONDITIONS 2})

\[ u \text{ is true in } c \text{ that contains } s, i, D_i \text{ and } D_s \text{ iff every } x \text{ in } D_i \cap D_s \text{ is } F \text{ and } D_i \cap D_s \neq \emptyset. \]

\[ u \text{ is false in } c \text{ that contains } s, i, D_i \text{ and } D_s \text{ iff every } x \text{ in } D_i \cap D_s \text{ is not } F \text{ and } D_i \cap D_s \neq \emptyset. \]

\[ u \text{ lacks truth value in } c \text{ that contains } s, i, D_i \text{ and } D_s \text{ iff } D_i \cap D_s = \emptyset. \]

This analysis follows the idea that a speaker’s intentions determine the reference of a demonstrative, but only if he or she selects one of the potential demonstrata. It also assumes the thesis (cf. Roberts (1997): 191) that demonstrations do not override the referential intentions.

The two options are not the only available. We might, for instance, spell out a view (also considered as an option in \textit{Dthat} but not supported by Kaplan himself) one might call \textit{strong demonstrativism} according to which the only thing that truth-conditionally matters is the class of potential demonstrata:
(Strong demonstrativism)

- \( u \) is true in \( c \) that contains \( s \) and \( D_i \) iff every \( x \) in \( D_i \) is F and \( |D_i| = 1 \).
- \( u \) is false in \( c \) that contains \( D_i \) iff every \( x \) in \( D_i \) is not F and \( |D_i| = 1 \).
- \( u \) lacks truth value in \( c \) that contains \( s \) and \( D_i \) iff \( D_i = \emptyset \) or \( |D_i| > 1 \).

Which stands in a direct opposition to strong intentionalism (the view of Kaplan from *Afterthoughts* and other intentionalists like Radulescu (2019)) which claims that the referential intentions are the only thing that matters:

(Strong intentionalism)

- \( u \) is true in \( c \) that contains \( s, i, D_s \) iff every \( x \) in \( D_s \) is F.
- \( u \) is false in \( c \) that contains \( s, i, D_s \) iff every \( x \) in \( D_s \) is not F.

From the viewpoint of strong intentionalism and strong demonstrativism theories that embrace (TRUTH CONDITIONS 1) or (TRUTH CONDITIONS 2) are hybrid views that combine intentionalism and demonstrativism\(^{10}\).

An orthogonal with respect to the previous extensions is the one that assumes a dependence of the intended demonstratum on the fact that a particular object counts an the unique potential demonstratum. It is orthogonal as it provides an answer to the question how the intended demonstratum is determined. The truth-conditional clause it makes would be analogous to that of strong intentionalism but it could not be treated as a version of strong intentionalism due to the fact that the determination of the intended demonstratum is not purely subjective.

Last but not least, the truth conditional analyses presented above are deliberatively simplified as the actual demonstratum (if there is one) does not have to be the referent of the corresponding demonstrative. In regular cases it has this status, but in the cases of deferred reference such as:

\(^{10}\) For a discussion regarding the role of intentions and demonstrations in truth conditional interpretation of demonstrative utterances, see Reimer (1991), Bach (1992), Roberts (1997), Perry (2009), King (2014), Radulescu (2019), and Leth (2020).
This [the speaker shows a copy of Promise me, dad] is the current president of the USA\textsuperscript{11}

the relation between the actual demonstratum (the copy of the book) and the referent of demonstrative (Joe Biden) is indirect (cf. Nunberg, 1993). So the truth conditional clauses should also include the relation of representation that holds between the demonstratum and the demonstrated object.

The choice of a particular version of truth conditional theory depends on additional philosophical arguments and motivations that I shall not offer in this paper.

With the exception of strong intentionalism, all the analyses presented above make some use of the concept of potential demonstratum. The rough intuition is that:

Demonstrations\textsubscript{qua} products along with some presuppositions regarding the relevance of particular factors determine potential demonstrata.

Consider, for instance, the following scenario (a modified version of the example discussed by Reimer, 1991):

Suppose that Peter grabs a bunch of keys from his desk while saying “These are mine”. The bunch actually contains some keys that are Peter’s and some that are not.

Here the list of potential demonstrata comprises all the sub-collections of keys from the bunch grasped by Peter. The relevant factors concern the presuppositions regarding the rationale behind Peter’s behavior.

Or consider the following scenario:

I am sitting on Venice beach on a crowded holiday looking south, with swarms of people in sight. I fix my attention on a woman in the distance, and, intending to talk about her and gesturing vaguely to the south, say “She is athletic”. (King, 2014: 224)

Here the list of potential demonstrata comprises all the females visible within the scope of the vague gesture. The relevant factors, again, concern

\textsuperscript{11} Following Kaplan (1989), the description within the brackets is a description of a demonstration, i.e., it is not a part of what is said.
the presuppositions regarding the rationale behind the speaker’s behavior. Such a presupposition determines that we are talking about persons visible within the scope of the gesture who have a certain gender.

Consider, finally, a scenario inspired by one of John Perry’s (1997) examples:

Someone utters the sentence of the language EL*: “That fish was yea big,” which differs from English only in that EL* contains the expression “yea,” which conventionally always refers to the distance between the hands of the speaker. While uttering the expression, the speaker is making a suitable gesture.

Here the list of potential demonstrata contains a single element being a particular length. The relevant factor here is that we are employing a certain (strict) linguistic convention that precisely determines the relation between the gesture and the object demonstrated.

5. Pragmatic filter

Let us call the mechanism of employing certain factors in the process of the determination of potential demonstrata a pragmatic filter. There are, I think, at least two ways in which one may attempt to explicate this concept.

The first one appeals to the already introduced idea of the rational interpreter of a demonstration. According to that approach, potential demonstrata are the objects a rational interpreter might consider as demonstrata when forming the hypothesis explaining the act of indicating. Sometimes there are many hypotheses at stake, and the approach predicts that the class of potential demonstrata becomes numerous. A rational interpreter, as one might assume, knows the context of an utterance well, including expectations and background assumptions shared by the actual participants at a given stage of the conversations, but excluding the knowledge of those of the speaker’s attitudes and intentions that are not intersubjectively decodable.

For instance, in the key scenario, the most likely reason for grasping the bunch of keys while uttering “these” is to demonstrate at least some (but potentially all) keys from the bunch. This is at least the most likely folk
psychological generalization regarding the action involving grasping this or that bunch of keys. This is even more transparent if the previous conversation concerned the speaker’s plan to return home or the if end of the work hour is approaching. But this might be canceled given alternative constraints imposed by the context. In the Venice-beach scenario, the most likely reason for using the pronoun “she” and making the gesture have a certain direction and scope is to single out a person located in that direction within that scope and (at least) looking as having a particular gender. Given that assumption, the candidate for a demonstratum is every object that satisfies the general constraints. Finally, in the fish scenario, the crucial assumption regarding the context is that the speaker is exploiting a certain convention linking “yea” with a certain abstract object being the length.

Consider yet another scenario. Suppose that in a certain building there are two rooms that are phenomenally nearly indiscernible. One contains the portrait of Carnap, the other – the portrait of Agnew. The speaker mistakes the second room for the first and without looking at the wall utters: “This is a picture of one of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century”. She thinks that she is in the room that contains the picture of Carnap but is actually in the room that contains the picture of Agnew. In this case, the normal, attentive and reasonable participant of the conversation will not be able to guess that the mistake has been made so she will consider the portrait of Agnew as the only object that is the candidate for the demonstratum. However, if the mistake is common and it is an element of the background knowledge that it is easy to mistake the rooms, the situation changes dramatically: both portraits may become candidates for a potential demonstratum in such cases.

The theory of demonstrative utterances that is closest to this interpretation of the idea of pragmatic filter is the coordination account of Jeffrey King (2014). Its main semantic point is that the referent of the demonstrative in the context must meet two conditions: (A) it must be intended as a referent by the speaker, and (B) “a competent, attentive, reasonable hearer” must recognize it as the intended referent (ibidem, 225). As far as “a competent, attentive, reasonable hearer” means “the rational interpreter,” the accounts share the common intuition that the speaker must do enough to enable the recognition of the intended object in the context. They differ,
however, with respect to the assumption of what counts as “enough”: in King’s account, a single object must be recognizable, while in the account sketched in this paper, this applies to potentially numerous classes of objects. Another difference between the accounts is that King talks about the intended referent of the demonstrative, while the account described here talks about the intended demonstratum. The difference might not be visible in regular cases, but in cases involving deferred reference, the two objects might be different. Additionally, the predictions of King’s account and the account sketched in this paper might differ in particular cases. For instance, if there is only one female-looking object within the scope of the gesture (King’s original scenario does not specify this), the interpretation sketched above predicts that the reference is secured no matter what the truth-conditional extension of the account looks like. The predictions of King’s account depend here on whether a competent, attentive, reasonable hearer is capable of singling out the object which must be (at the very same time) intended as the referent. In cases where the number of objects that count as female-looking is greater than one, the prediction regarding reference depends on the choice of a particular truth-conditional extension of the theory: in the case of weak demonstrativism, for instance, the reference is secured as far as the deictic intention of the speaker matches at least one of the female-looking objects; in the case of strong demonstrativism, the reference is not secured. Here we may actually apply King’s idea and treat conditions he proposes as additional constraints that take us from the class of potential demonstrata into the the actual demonstratum (and referent, if we are not dealing with the case of deferred reference)\textsuperscript{12}.

The alternative method of unpacking the idea of pragmatic filter is to appeal to Kaplan’s (1989) idea of the Fregean Theory of Demonstrations (FTD) but slightly modify it to enable situations in which the “reference” of a demonstration is not singular and apply it outside of the domain of perceptual demonstratives (the restriction assumed by Kaplan). Kaplan (1989) suggested (he abandoned the theory later) that demonstrations can be adequately characterized in terms of the (appropriately extended) Fregean categories of manner of presentation and reference:

\textsuperscript{12} I would like to thank one of the anonymous reviewers of this paper for bringing this to my attention.
(...) the analogy between descriptions (...) and demonstrations is close enough to provide a sense and denotation analysis of the <<meaning>> of a demonstration. The denotation is the demonstratum (...), and it seems quite natural to regard each demonstration as presenting its demonstratum in a particular manner, which we may regard as the sense of the demonstration. The same individual could be demonstrated by demonstrations so difference in manner of presentation that it would be informative to a competent auditor-observer to be told that demonstrata were one. (514)

Kaplan discusses several principles that govern the use of demonstrations and enable to establish “isomorphism” between demonstrations and definite descriptions. The most important are (the names of the principles are mine):

**The Basic Principle**
“A demonstration is a way of presenting an individual” (Kaplan, 1989: 525)

**The Principle of Non-rigidity**
'It is not required that an occurrence of a demonstration have a fixed content.' (Kaplan, 1989: 525)

**The Principle of Contingent (non-)Emptiness**
“A demonstration which fails to demonstrate any individual might have demonstrated one, and a demonstration which demonstrates an individual might have demonstrated no individual at all.” (Kaplan, 1989: 525)

**The Detachment Principle**
“A given demonstration might have been mounted by someone other than its actual agent, and might be repeated in the same and different place.” (Kaplan, 1989: 525)

**The Involvement Principle**
“(...) it does seem to me to be essential to a demonstration that it presents its demonstrata from some perspective, that is, as the individual that looks thusly from here now.” (Kaplan, 1989: 525)
Some comments concerning the principles are in order. The *Basic Principle* equates demonstrations with ways of presenting demonstrata. It has an easily identifiable analogue in the realm of descriptions: they can also be said to be ways of presenting the things described, ways that exploit properties expressed by the appropriate predicates occurring in the description. It entails, among other things, that the notion of a demonstrating procedure becomes very capacious: it can be applied to all appropriately situated manners of presenting an individual. This consequence is very welcome: the diversity of possible ways of demonstrating something is an empirical fact that must be somehow acknowledged by every adequate theory of demonstratives and demonstrating procedures. FTD offers exactly this: a flexible notion of demonstration and the support for *heterogeneity*.

The *Principle of Non-rigidity* and the *Principle of Contingent (non-)Emptiness* state together that demonstrating procedures might behave like non-rigid definite descriptions that are neither necessarily empty nor necessarily non-empty. This does not, however, rule out cases of rigid demonstration. In fact, our “yea” example belongs precisely to this category (the respective convention warrants that the connection between the distance and the length is fixed across all possible worlds). The *Detachment Principle* and the *Involvement Principle* attempt to draw a demarcation line between essential and contingent properties of demonstrating procedures; the latter attempts also to provide identity conditions for them. Although the *Detachment Principle* says that the location of a demonstration is not essential, while the *Involvement Principle* says that the perspective (which is essential for the demonstrating procedure) involves somehow both time (as here) and place (as now), there is no inconsistency here: the values of here and now are supplemented contextually (Kaplan writes here about setting a demonstration in a context) and, though determinative for the perspective, are external with respect to it. The *Involvement Principle* applies only to visual demonstrating procedures and uses of perceptual demonstratives, but I see no reason why it could not be extended to other kinds of demonstrating procedures. This would require, of course, a capacious enough idea of “looking thusly” from a certain perspective as well as a detailed analysis of various roles that senses or manners of presentations might play (cf. Zalta, 1988: 154-158). Last but not least, as I have stressed
above, we also have to consider another modification of the theory. In order to accommodate the idea of the class of potential demonstrata being numerous, demonstrations should be interpreted here as analogous to indefinite descriptions. This does not require substantial changes in principles governing FTD.

The two interpretations of the idea of pragmatic filter differ with respect to the way they approach the problem of determination of potential demonstrata. Roughly speaking, the interpretation appealing to the idea of a rational interpreter claims that:

(A) An indication $I$ qua product contributes $a_1...a_n$ as potential demonstrata in virtue of the link among $a_1...a_n$, the beliefs of the rational interpreter $R$, and an indication qua action that has $I$ as its product.

while the FTD-motivated interpretation holds:

(B) An indication $I$ qua product contributes $a_1...a_n$ as potential demonstrata in virtue of the link between $a_1...a_n$ and the properties $F_1...F_n$ of the indication qua action that has $I$ as its product.

It should be noted here, however, that the two characteristics are not logically exclusive. In particular, one may want to ask: “what grounds the link between particular properties of an indication and potential demonstrata?” And (A) might provide an answer to this question supplementing the ‘semantics’ of indications (B) with the appropriate “metasemantics.” According to such a hybrid approach, the relevant properties qua being responsible for the fact that an indication is associated with a certain manner of presentation have this status because without the properties in question, it would be difficult (potentially impossible) to explain or to make sense of the occurrence of the indication in this particular context.

Indications might be also more or less conventionalized. Roughly speaking, the more conventionalized an indication is more explicit are the properties an object must posses in order to count as a potential demonstratum. Less conventionalized an indication is less explicit and more current knowledge dependent the choice of relevant properties is (we might think of the typology of indications resulting from a degree of its
conventionaliation in terms of the *ostensive continuum*). Another way of classifying (A) and (B) is to think of the former as applicable to conventionalized indications and to think of the latter as applicable to non-conventionalized ones.

I do not want now to decide which of the two interpretations is more accurate. My aim here is modest: I want stress that that the two accounts of pragmatic filter are supplementary rather than contradictory.

Let me close this section by showing how the ideas of pragmatic filter and demonstration qua product might be employed in the analysis of more complex examples. Consider the following scenario (Siegel (2002), Radulescu (2019)):

You are a salesman in a tie store. By reaching past an opaque door into a display case, you put your hand on a blue silk tie. At the same time, another salesman is reaching through the cabinet and touching a red silk tie. Through the glass top of the cabinet, you can see the red tie being held by the other salesman, whose arm looks like yours. You mistake his hand for yours and you believe that you are the one touching the red tie. You say to a customer, who was looking in another direction for a red silk tie, ‘This one is red’.

The theory presented here gives us the opportunity to provide an account of the scenario as involving an ambiguous utterance (I believe also that such an analysis is intuitively compelling). In particular, we might note that there are two indications that occur in the scenario: one connected with gaze and the other with touch. Given this we actually have the following two distinct speech acts that are packed in the single utterance:

\[ \text{[i1]} \langle \text{‘This one’, indication}_1 \rangle \text{ (where: indication}_1 = \text{the gaze)} \]

\[ \text{[i2]} \langle \text{‘This one’, indication}_2 \rangle \text{ (where: indication}_2 = \text{touching)} \]

The pragmatic filter in the first case indicates objects towards which the gaze is directed and which meet some additional circumstance-sensitive conditions connected with practical interests of the participants of the exchange (e.g. that presupposition that the conversation concerns ties etc.). The second speech act involves objects that are touched or are parts of an object that is touched that also meet some additional circumstance-sensitive
conditions. The two indications contribute two distinct (singleton) classes as sets of potential demonstrata neither of which deserves to be called the actual class of potential demonstrata. The appeal to plans of the speaker and to intentions in general is irrelevant when addressing the question what proposition has been expressed by the utterance. At the very same time it is relevant (as it should be) when addressing the question regarding the charitable interpretation of the utterance and the resulting disambiguation.

6. Conclusion

Considerations presented in this paper show, firstly, that demonstrations qua actions and demonstrata qua products might be conceived as linked respectively to two dimensions of every demonstrative utterance: the intention to ask the interpreter for an explanation of the action of pointing and the intention to make her guess the intended demonstratum. Secondly, they show that the theory that comprises the distinction can be truth-conditionally developed in several ways, making it compatible with selected assumptions of demonstrativism and intentionalism. Finally, they also show the need of an additional theory explaining how the class of potential demonstrata is determined. As I have suggested above, the explanation might make use of the idea of a rational interpreter of an indication as well as of the Fregean Theory of Demonstrations.

The general picture of demonstrative communication that emerges from the framework presented above puts a special stress on the ‘interaction’ between the speaker and the rational interpreter. The latter concept plays, firstly, the role in determining the class of potential demonstrata and, secondly, that of a factor that determines the fulfillment or success conditions for demonstrations. One of the main questions that emerges from it is if the analogous considerations could be applied to pure indexicals which, at least according to the popular picture\textsuperscript{13}, have the reference secured automatically, irrespective of the attitudes of the participants of the conversational situation. I think that, among others, the cases of distributed utterances, that is

\textsuperscript{13} The picture has been challenged by several authors (cf. Predelli (2005), Mount (2008)) but remains popular among many others.
cases of utterances where more than one indexical occurring in the sentence is linked to a single aspect of the context which may take different values relevant for the interpretation of the respective indexicals (like in the sentence: ‘It is now 3 o’clock and it is now past three’ uttered by the speaker who intentionally started speaking at 3 o’clock but finished one past three) suggest a similar pragmasemantical mechanism governing the use of indexicals and demonstratives (cf. Ciecierski (2019)). The mechanism in question takes into the account both the intentions of the speaker and the class of potential values of contextual parameters predicting that the successful reference emerges as the result of interaction between the two factors. If I am correct, the theory sketched in this paper may prove to be an important building block of the unified account of indexicals and demonstratives.

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