ARISTOTLE'S

METAPHYSICS

A Philological Commentary

by

Wolfgang Class

Volume II

The Composition of the Metaphysics

© Verlag Senging e. K., Senging 11, 94163 Saldenburg, 2015.

Preface

It cannot be said that the composition of the Aristotelian Metaphysics is a favorite topic of contemporary philologists or even philosophers. Szlezák (2003, p. viii) observes that today the Metaphysics "is widely-read globally, but almost always selectively. And this means: (almost) nobody treats the Metaphysics as one book. The study of Book Z (sometimes together with H and ?) belongs to the basics of philosophical education […]. Other books are less 'read' than 'used' by chapter or section, what […] is tantamount to neglecting more or less consciously the context established by the author." Basically, this means a return to the medieval practice of "quaestiones disputatae".

The best-known relevant work is still Werner Jaeger's Studien zur Entstehungsgeschichte der Metaphysik des Aristoteles ("Studies in the History of the Genesis of Aristotle's Metaphysics") of 1912, the first part of which is entitled "Die Komposition der Metaphysik". While praised as "path breaking" ("bahnbrechend") and having been authoritative for decades, today its results are no more accepted as definite. If I undertake to put anew the question about the literary unity of the Metaphysics, I will try it on a larger basis: treating not only the overall structure of the Metaphysics, but also the internal structure of the singular books, down to singular passages the logic of which is unclear. So this second volume, together with the first one, covers the field of immanent interpretation, whereas the two remaining ones are dedicated to intertextuality: the Metaphysics in the context of the Aristotelian and pre-Aristotelian philosophy (vol. iii), and in the context of the later metaphysics and criticism of metaphysics (vol. iv).

As to the technicalities, I have changed my mind in designating the singular books no longer by Roman numbers, but by Greek letters; "A 10" is more elegant than "Book I, chapter 10". It is:

? (Alpha) = Book I

? (Alpha élatton, "Small Alpha") = Book II

? (Beta) = Book III

? (Gamma) = Book IV

? (Delta) = Book V

? (Epsilon) = Book VI

? (Zeta) = Book VII

? (Eta) = Book VIII

?1 (Theta1) = Book IX, chapters 1-9

?2 (Theta2), Book IX, chapter 10

? (Iota) = Book X

?1 (Kappa1) = Book XI, chapters 1-8, 1065a26

K2 (Kappa2) = Book XI, 1065a26-1069a14 (excerpts from the Physics)

? (Lambda) = Book XII

?1 (My1) = Book XIII, chapters 1-9, 1086b21

M2 (My2) = Book XIII, 1086b21-1087a25

? (Ny) = Book XIV

The distinction between the two ?'s, K's and M's was made by modern philologists because of the obvious heterogeneity of the respective components.

The division into chapters is of recent date. According to Hamberger (p. 271: "Die Eintheilung in Capitel komt grossen Theils von Conrad Gesner.") and Hoffmann (p. 273: "Die Capitel-Eintheilung ist fast durchgängig nach den handschriftlichen Anmerkungen Gesner's veranstaltet.") it goes back to Conrad Gesner. This scholar is mentioned by Michael Isingrin in the preface to his edition of Aristotle's works (Basel 1550): "Praeterea totum autorem in capita distinximus, et Latinis translationibus, ubi ea extabant, accommodavimus: ubi vero desiderabantur, distinctiones ipsi addidimus, et brevibus argumentis illustravimus, adjuti Gesneri opera, qui id in suo libro magna ex parte fecerat, ut Lectores has capitum quasi stationes in quibus respirent habeant, et quae velint facilius discreta locis inveniant, inventaque melius ac tenacius mandent memoriae." Already in the title ("Aristotelis … opera … in capita diligenter distincta") the division into chapters is presented as an user-friendly innovation.

This division widely agrees with Bessarion's translation, but not totally, as Makin (p. xi) asserts.

Without indicating it, I have made free use of my dissertation Ist die aristotelische Ontologie zugleich Theologie? (München 1974).

Contents

Books and Articles referred to 11

Introduction 17

The Singular Books 31

The Thread of A 33

A in Context 44

Book ? 49

Book B 53

B in Context 57

The Thread of ? 61

? in Context 72

Book ? 79

? in Context 81

The Thread of E 85

E in Context 94

The Thread of Z 97

Z in Context 116

The Thread of H 121

H in Context 124

The Thread of ?1 127

?1 in Context 132

?2 in Context 135

The Thread of I 139

I in Context 142

The Thread of K1 145

K1 in Context 161

The Thread of ? 187

? in Context 195

The Thread of M1 199

M1 in Context 206

The Thread of M2 211

M2 in Context 212

The Thread of N 219

N in Context 223

Conclusion: Different Conceptions of Lecture Courses 227

Books and Articles referred to

Annas, Julia: Aristotle's Metaphysics. Books M and N. Oxford 1976.

Arnim, Hans von: Zu Werner Jaegers Grundlegung der Entwicklungsgeschichte des Aristoteles, in Wiener Studien. Zeitschrift für klassische Philologie. XLVI (1928), 1-48.

Aubenque, Pierre: Sur l'inauthenticité du livre ? de la Métaphysique, in Zweifelhaftes im Corpus Aristotelicum. Berlin · New York 1983, 318-344.

Bast, Friedrich Jacob: Commentatio Palaeographica, in Gregorii Corinthii et aliorum grammaticorum libri de dialectis linguae Graecae. Leipzig 1811, 701-861.

Blass, F.: Aristotelisches, in Rheinisches Museum 30 (1875), 481-505.

Bonitz, Hermann: Aristotelis Metaphysica. Pars Posterior. Commentarius. Bonn 1849.

Bostock, David: Aristotle. Metaphysics. Books Z and H. Oxford 1994.

Brandis, Christian August: Über die Aristotelische Metaphysik, in Abhandlungen der historisch-philosophischen Klasse der Königlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin. Aus dem Jahre 1834. Berlin 1836, 63-87.

--- Scholia Graeca in Aristotelis Metaphysica. Berlin 1837.

Broady, Sarah: A Science of First Principles, in Aristotle's Metaphysics Alpha. Symposium Aristotelicum, edited by Carlos Steel. Oxford 2012, 43-67.

Cherniss, Harold: Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy. Baltimore 1944.

Christ, Wilhelm: Studia in Aristotelis libros metaphysicos collata. Berlin 1853.

--- Kritische Beiträge zur Metaphysik des Aristoteles, in Sitzungsberichte der philosophischen, philologischen und historischen Classe der kaiserlichen bayrischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Heft 4, 1885, 406-423.

--- Aristotelis Metaphysica. Nova impressio correctior. Leipzig 1903. (First edition Leipzig 1886.) [Cited simply as "Christ".]

--- Geschichte der griechischen Litteratur bis auf die Zeit Justinians. Nördlingen 1889.

Colle, Gaston: Aristote. La Métaphysique. Livres II et III, traduction et commentaire par Gaston Colle, Louvain 1922.

Cooper, John M.: Conclusion - and Retrospect, in Aristotle's Metaphysics Alpha. Symposium Aristotelicum, edited by Carlos Steel. Oxford 2012, 335-364.

Cousin, Victor: De la métaphysique d'Aristote. Deuxième édition. Paris 1838.

Crubellier, Michel: Aporiai 1–2, in Aristotle: Metaphysics Beta. Symposium Aristotelicum, edited by Michel Crubellier and André Laks. New York 2009, 47-72.

Delatte, L., Rutten, C., Govaerts, S., and Denooz, J.: Aristoteles, Metaphysica, Index Verborum: Listes de Fréquence. Hildesheim, Zürich, and New York 1984.

Denniston, J. D.: The Greek Particles. Second Edition. Oxford 1934.

Devereux, Daniel: The Relationship between Books Zeta and Eta of Aristotle's Metaphysics, in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy XXV (2003), 159-211.

Diogenes Laertius: Lives of Eminent Philosophers. With an English Translation by R. D. Hicks. London 1925.

Düring, Ingemar: Aristoteles. Darstellung und Interpretation seines Denkens. Heidelberg 1966.

Fonseca, Pedro da: Commentarii in libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Stagiritae. Romae 1577-89.

Frank, Erich: The Fundamental Opposition of Plato and Aristotle, in American Jounal of Philology LXI (1940), 34-53 and 166-185.

Frede, Michael, and Patzig, Günther: Aristoteles 'Metaphysik Z'. 2 volumes. München 1988.

Gigon, Olof: Review of Paul Gohlke, Aristoteles. Die Lehrschriften, in Gnomon 24 (1952), 316-324.

Goebel, Karl: Weitere kritische Bemerkungen über Aristoteles' Metaphysik, in Jahresbericht über das Archigymnasium zu Soest am Schlusse des Schuljahres von Ostern 1890 bis dahin 1891. Soest 1891. 3-23.

Gohlke, Paul: Aristoteles. Metaphysik. 2. Auflage, Paderborn 1961. (First edition 1951.)

Hamberger, Georg Christoph: Zuverlässige Nachrichten von den vornehmsten Schriftstellern vom Anfange der Welt bis 1500. Erster Theil. Lemgo 1756.

Hoffmann, S. F. W: Bibliographisches Lexicon der gesammten Litteratur der Griechen. Erster Theil. Leipzig 1838.

Hölscher, Uvo: Das nächste Fremde. Von Texten der griechischen Frühzeit und ihrem Reflex in der Moderne. Herausgegeben von Joachim Latacz und Manfred Kraus. München 1994.

Isingrin, Michael (editor): Aristotelis … opera … in capita diligenter distincta. Basel 1550.

Ivánka, Endre von: Die Polemik gegen Platon im Aufbau der aristotelischen Metaphysik, in Scholastik 9 (1934), 520-542.

Jaeger, Werner: Studien zur Entstehungsgeschichte der Metaphysik des Aristoteles. Berlin 1912.

--- Zu Aristoteles Metaphysik ? 9, 1051 a 32 ff., in Rheinisches Museum für Philologie 67 (1912), 304-305.

--- Aristotelis Metaphysica. Oxford 1957.

--- Aristotle. Fundamentals of the History of His Development. Second Edition. Oxford 1962.

Kirwan, Christopher: Aristotle. Metaphysics. Books ?, ? and ?. Second Edition. Oxford 1993.

Laks, André: Aporia Zero (Metaphysics, B 1, 995a24–995b4), in Aristotle: Metaphysics Beta. Symposium Aristotelicum, edited by Michel Crubellier and André Laks. New York 2009, 25-46.

Lasson, Adolf: Aristoteles. Metaphysik. Jena 1907.

Madigan, Arthur: Aristotle. Metaphysics. Book B and Book K 1-2. Oxford 1999.

Makin, Stephen: Aristotle. Metaphysics. Book ?. Oxford 2006.

Mansion, Augustin: L'objet de la science philosophique suprême d'après Aristote, Métaphysique, E, 1, in Mélanges offerts à A. Diès. Paris 1956, 151-168.

--- Philosophie première, philosophie seconde et métaphysique chez Aristote, in Revue Philosophique de Louvain 56 (1958), 165-221.

Merlan, Philip: From Platonism to Neoplatonism. Third edition. Dordrecht 1975.

Michelet, Charles Louis: Examen critique de l'ouvrage d'Aristote intitulé Métaphysique. Paris 1836.

Muskens, G. L.: De ente qua ens metaphysicae Aristoteleae obiecto, in Mnemosyne 13 (1947), 130-140.

Natorp, Paul: Ueber Aristoteles' Metaphysik, K 1-8, 1065a 26, in Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie I (1888), 178-193.

--- Thema und Disposition der aristotelischen Metaphysik, in Philosophische Monatshefte XXIV (1888), 37-65 and 540-574.

Owens, Joseph: The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics. Toronto 1951.

--- The Present Status of Alpha Elatton in the Aristotelian Metaphysics, in Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 66 (1984), 148-169.

Pierron, Alexis, and Zévort, Charles: La Métaphysique d'Aristote. 2 volumes. Paris 1840.

Primavesi, Oliver: Aristotle, Metaphysics A: A New Critical Edition with Introduction, in Aristotle's Metaphysics Alpha. Symposium Aristotelicum, edited by Carlos Steel. Oxford 2012, 385-516.

Ravaisson, Félix: Essai sur la Métaphysique d'Aristote. Tome I. Paris 1837.

Reale, Giovanni: Il concetto di "filosofia prima" e l'unità della Metafisica di Aristotele. Sesta edizione 1994 (Prima edizione 1961).

Ross, Sir David: Aristotle's Metaphysics. Oxford 1924. Revised edition 1953.

Sandbach, F. H.: A Transposition in Aristotle, Metaphysics ? c. 9 1074b, in Mnemosyne 7 (1954), 39-43.

Schwegler, Albert: Die Metaphysik des Aristoteles. Dritter Band. Des Commentars erste Hälfte. [Books A-?] Tübingen 1847.

--- Vierter Band. Des Commentars zweite Hälfte. [Books E-N] Tübingen 1848.

Spengel, Leonhard: Review of Hermann Bonitz, Observationes criticae in Aristotelis libros Metaphysicos, in Gelehrte Anzeigen. Herausgegeben von Mitgliedern der k. bayer. Akademie der Wissenschaften. Siebenzehnter Band (1843), 905-910 and 913-918.

Susemihl, Franz: Review of Aristotelis Metaphysica. Recognovit W. Christ, in Wochenschrift für klassische Philologie IV (1887), columns 6-12.

Szlezák, Thomas Alexander: Alpha elatton: Einheit und Einordnung in die Metaphysik, in Zweifelhaftes im Corpus Aristotelicum. Akten des 9. Symposium Aristotelicum (Berlin, 7-16. September 1981). Berlin · New York 1983, 221-259.

--- Aristoteles. Metaphysik. Berlin 2003.

Theiler, Willy: Die Entstehung der Metaphysik des Aristoteles mit einem Anhang über Theophrasts Metaphysik, in Museum Helveticum 15 (1958), 85-105.

Thomas Aquinas: Sententia libri Metaphysicae, in Corpus Thomisticum. Subsidia studii ab Enrique Alarcón collecta et edita Pompaelone ad Universitatis Studiorum Navarrensis aedes ab A.D. MM.

Tricot, Jules: Aristote. La Métaphysique. Paris 1966.

Ueberweg, Friedrich: Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie des Alterthums. Dritte Auflage, Berlin 1867.

Wilpert, Paul: Zur Interpretation von Metaphysik ? 15, in Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 42 (1960), 130-158.

Wundt, Max: Untersuchungen zur Metaphysik des Aristoteles. Stuttgart 1953.

Zeller, Eduard: Review of Paul Natorp, Thema und Disposition der aristotelischen Metaphysik, in Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie II (1889), 264-271.

--- Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung. Zweiter Teil. Erste Abteilung. Sokrates und die Sokratiker. Plato und die alte Akademie. 5. Auflage, Leipzig 1922.

--- Zweiter Teil. Zweite Abteilung. Aristoteles und die alten Peripatetiker. 4. Auflage, Leipzig 1921.

Introduction

In the prooemium of his commentary (4. 6-8), Asclepius describes the deficiencies in composition which strike also the modern reader: "that some parts are missing for the continuity of the text, that others have been brought in bodily from other treatises, and say the same things several times [a clear allusion to the nearly literal agreement of A, 990b2-991b9 and M, 1078b34-1080a8]" (???? ??? ??????? ?? ???? ?? ??????? ??? ??????, ?? ?? ?? ????? ??????????? ???????? ???????????? ??? ???????? ?? ???? ??????). The reputation of the author Aristotle, who was known as an able writer from his dialogues, called for an apology, which was accomplished by two alternative assumptions:

1) that it was not for Aristotle to finish his work, i. e. to make it ready for publication (Asclepius 4. 8-121, the famous Eudemus story) - an "etiological combination", according to Jaeger (1912, p. 33),

2) that behind the apparent disorder there is a well-considered didactic order, which has to be detected by the commentator.

The task required by the second alternative assumption was accomplished by Alexander of Aphrodisias, especially in his lost commentary on Book ?, and Averroes, in his commentary on the same book, which is based on Alexander's. Because this "unitarian" reading became authoritative for the Middle Ages, well into the modern age (Fonseca, Ravaisson, Michelet), Averroes's summary may be quoted here in full (pp. 59-65 Genequand; I have substituted the Arabic letters, which designate the singular books of the Metaphysics, by the Greek ones):

"We say: Alexander begins by saying that those who say that this Book ? is the last of this science are right because some of the other books he wrote concerning this science contain the difficulties that must be solved in it after they have been critically examined and others the solution of these difficulties; this is what he did in the books which come after this book. In some books, he talks about the characteristics of being qua being, but in this book, he talks about the principles of being qua being and about the principles of the first substance which is absolutely real. He does it by showing that there is a substance which is in this state and what this substance is; the elucidation of this substance is the final aim of this discipline. For in the two books which come after it, he does not explain anything pertaining to his primary aim, nor does he establish in them any personal view concerning it. They contain [60] only the refutation of the assertions of those who say that the principles of beings are the Forms and the Numbers. He [= Alexander] says: he [= Aristotle] had already discussed these ideas to some extent in the book called great ? (which is the second book of this treatise); then he dealt with them exhaustively in these last two books. He says: one could also prove by means of what he says at the beginning of Book ? and elsewhere that this book is the last in which he deals with this discipline. This is all that Alexander has to say by way of introduction to this book.

What he says to give an idea if the contents of the other books dealing with this science (i. e. Metaphysics) is a summary. This is perhaps the passage which most deserves to be summarized.

We say: since this discipline investigates being qua being and this requires investigating the principles of being qua being and its necessary properties, for any theoretical discipline includes these two kinds of knowledge, then this discipline is divided first into two parts, and since the Ancients put forward certain false views concerning the principles of beings and it is necessary for him to refute them, this will be the third division of this discipline. So the first parts of this treatise are three: one dealing with being qua being, one with the necessary properties of being qua being, and one with the false opinions put forward concerning the principles of being. Since every theoretical discipline is also divided into two branches of research, the first containing the method of investigation of this discipline, its foundations, its starting-point and final term and how definitions are to be used in it, which is called logic proper to this discipline, and the second being the science of that which this discipline contains, then this discipline too will be divided into two parts, a logical part proper to it and a part containing that the knowledge of which is aimed at in this science. There are, then, two major parts, one of which is divided into three, so that this science has four parts. Since this discipline must also undertake to refute those who make speculation impossible and reject its principles, this will become as it were a fifth part. As it also investigates the classes of beings and one of these classes is made up of mental beings, it must also investigate the principles of this kind of beings and refute the false opinions which are held regarding it.

Having investigated these different classes, Aristotle chooses to teach them in the best didactic order.

[61] He begins in the first book, which is designated by the letter small ?, by defining to which extent this science is difficult and to which extent it is easy, and says that what individual men have apprehended of it, although it is little, is fairly important when put together. Since the first duty of the follower of this science is to lead to its conclusions the inquiry on the causes, for they are the existents which were sought, he showed in this book the finiteness of the causes after the beginning which we mentioned. Then, he concludes it with the definition of the greatest causes of error which come into theoretical matters and particularly into causes, namely what people build upon of the false views laid down by them, as though they were the Revelation concerning speculative matters.

Since the inquiry into causes requires defining the number of their first genera and what his predecessors have said about it, he begins in the book designated by the letter great ? by defining the first genera of causes discovered by the Ancients and explains that they are four. He argues to that effect from the fact that on close examination of what they say about causes, one does not exceed the four causes. He then gives their opinions concerning the causes of beings, particularly those of the metaphysicians among them, not of the physicists, because he had already done it in the science of Physics; they are the people who say that the principles are mathematical entities and numbers. He merely formulates some criticisms against them in this book and reserves a complete refutation of them for the two books following ?, namely Books M and N.

A scientific research is complete only when one has previously examined the dialectical arguments pro and contra because if one has not examined something critically, one does not know the extent of the knowledge of it one has acquired after being ignorant of it, nor the extent of what escaped one of the knowledge of it before one knew it; thus he thought that the best didactic procedure was to devote a special inquiry to the problems of this science and their investigation together with the dialectical arguments which raise doubts concerning each one of its aims in a separate book. Then, in the remaining books of this treatise, he sets out to solve the problems arising in this science. He does that in the third book of this treatise, which is designated by the letter B. This book necessarily follows the first and second books and precedes all the other books. It follows the first two books because their [62] contents are also established by the discipline of dialectics: I mean the fact that there are four causes and that each genus of them cannot proceed ad infinitum. It precedes the following books obviously because the books which follow it contain one of two things, either the solutions of the difficulties mentioned in this book, or the knowledge of things which are necessary to solve the difficulties mentioned in this book.

Since the difficulties mentioned in this book are of two kinds: difficulties concerning the method of this science and difficulties concerning its aims, the first duty of anyone undertaking an apodictical inquiry into this science is that he previously know the solution of these difficulties, because by knowing them he will find the right apodictical inquiry into this science; it is this method of inquiry which distinguishes for him (= Aristotle) the discipline called Wisdom. He thinks that he must begin by solving the difficulties which concern the method of inquiry of this discipline. Moreover, since theoretical research is valid only when the first premises are accepted, he thinks it to be incumbent to argue first against those who reject these premises and refuse theoretical research. He deals with these two problems in one book and makes it follow B; it is designated by the letter ?. This book contains two kinds (of research): one of them is the logic proper to this science and the other the assertion of the first principle among the principles we possess by nature. I mean the principle which precedes all, namely that affirmation and negation cannot be united simultaneously; for this is the principle of theoretical research. Therefore, anyone who rejects this principle cannot argue soundly, nor can he put forward any positive or negative argument.

Having settled this problem in this book, he thinks it absolutely necessary that it should be followed by a detailed statement of the notions for which terms are used in this science. The best didactic procedure appeared to him to make separate mention of them in one book. He does this in the book of the letter ? and places it after Book ? and before the other books, because the starting-point of anyone who decides to give an apodictical solution of any problem is to explain the name given to that problem if it can have several meanings, especially those names which are used analogically. These are the proper objects of this science, since the term "being" is applied analogically to that which he (= Aristotle) explains in this science.

Having fulfilled his aim in this book, he wants to inquire about the objects of this science, namely the knowledge of the causes of beings. There are three kinds of being: being by accident, being in [63] the soul and being outside the soul; so he thinks it necessary to begin by explaining the kinds of these beings and to state that the kind of being which is the primary aim of his investigation is that which is outside the soul. He examines this problem in the book following ?. Since his inquiry in this book is concerned with distinguishing being by accident and being in the soul from real being, and this can be done only by him who knows that this discipline is concerned with all kinds of being qua being, he mentions at the beginning of this book what has already been explained in book ?, namely that this discipline is concerned with being qua being and that it is different from Physics and Mathematics, not as a mere repetition, but as a reminder. He explains this in ways different from the previous. He does all this in the book following ?, in which he had explained the terms; it is Book ?. He places it after ?. It was also necessary that this book should precede what follows it and follow what precedes it.

As it is clear that beings by accident and beings in the mind are defective, and that those the study of which is the aim of this science are real beings, existing outside the soul, he afterwards sets out to inquire about this being, and since substance is the principle of this being, he begins to seek what the principles of substance are. He begins with the principles of the substance subject to generation and corruption and explains that they are form and matter. He then goes on to explain that forms are substances envisaged from the point of view of their definitions. I mean that having shown that definitions designate, in sensible substances, something which is their essence, and that they designate forms, he concludes from that that forms are substances, and that they and the thing of which they are the form are one and the same thing, and therefore that accidents are not substances and that it is unnecessary, in order to know things, to introduce separate Forms distinct from sensible forms on the assumption that what is designated by the definitions of things is distinct from these things. It is also clear that this substance which comes into being and corrupts is generated by another substance which comes into being and corrupts similar to it in species and genus, that that which comes into being and corrupts is the thing composed of form and matter, that forms neither come into being nor corrupt, except by accident and that therefore the Platonic Forms, if they exist, are useless to explain generation (I mean the separate Forms [64] postulated by Plato). It is also clear that universals are not substances existing outside the soul, although they denote substances, and forms are substances, not as elements or composed of elements, but as a third substance. He investigates the differences between the two substances and then explains the divisions of first substances and distinguishes the parts of the forms from the parts of matter. He does all this in the book designated by the letter Z, and in the book designated by the letter H.

Having ascertained in these two books the principles of the sensible substance subject to generation and corruption, he thinks it necessary to begin after that an inquiry about the general properties of being qua being. He inquires first about potentiality and actuality and their relation to the first principles in them. He shows that actuality precedes potentiality, and this is the book designated by the letter ?, which follows H.

Then he inquires, in the following book, called by the letter I, about the one and the many, the individual, the similar, the contrary and other general properties of being qua being.

After that, he deals in Book K with motion and infinity because the metaphysician inquires about them from a point of view different from that of the physicist. Since he has decided to deal, after this book, with the principle of the first sensible substance, and this is his primary aim in this science because it is the end he aims at, he mentions at the beginning of this book (I mean Book K) all the difficulties which he had mentioned in Book B, and mentions summarily the solutions already arrived at in the preceding books. He also mentions summarily the impossibilities resulting from the rejection of the principles of knowledge.

[…]

Book ? is the book which we set out to comment on. His primary aim in it is to explain the principles of the first sensible substance, but he sets out, in its beginning, to expound the principles of all substances in the absolute sense, starting with the principles of the substance subject to generation and corruption, and mentioning the conclusions of Books ? and ?. Then he expounded the principles of the first substance: he explained that it is a substance, and in how many senses it is a principle. After he had finished putting forward his opinion concerning the principle of all being, he returned to the refutation of the opinions of his [65] predecessors concerning the principles of substance. He did that in the two books designated by the letters M and N.

This exposition has made clear what each one of the books of this science attributed to Aristotle contains, and that they follow the best possible order, and that nothing in them is out of place or order, as we find that Nicolaus of Damascus claims in his book, in consequence of which he had chosen a better order, as he claims, to expound this science."

The conviction that Book ? is the real end of the Metaphysics is the reason why Thomas Aquinas and Fonseca left uncommented the Books M and N.

Since Thomas Aquinas and Fonseca met the Books A and ? in the right order, they needed of course another explanation of the connection of ? with A and B than Averroes: they took ? as methodological introduction into the positive treatment of the principles of being (after the negative one in A 3-10).2

A new debate was initiated after the work of Diogenes Laertius had re-emerged (editio princeps Basel 1533). The latter gives a list of Aristotle's writings (v. 22-27) where the Metaphysics is not to be found. Since the scholars did not take into account the possibility that this list could be of earlier date, i. e. earlier than the publication of the Metaphysics (1st century BC), they got down to finding several writings of the list in the transmitted collection, especially ???? ?????????? (v. 22), ???? ??????? (v. 22), ???? ??? ??????? ????????? (v. 23), ???? ??? ????? (v. 23). After Christian August Brandis, in his Diatribe academica de perditis Aristotelis libris De Ideis et De Bono sive Philosophia (Bonn 1823), had created more clarity about these lost writings, there only remained the identification of ???? ??? ??????? ????????? ("On the Various Meanings of Terms") with our Book ?.

Brandis it was, also, who steered analysis into another direction: "Besides, the inquiry mentioned here is of subordinate importance, the chief business being to find out whether and how far the present Metaphysics is designed by the author as one work, how far it is accomplished by himself, and whether the author is to be taken with reason to be Aristotle?" (p. 65).

His summary (pp. 86-87):

"I think it is evident how groundless the present disposition of the metaphysical books is; but just as much that substituting it by a better one would be precarious, supposing that we possess in them not integrated parts of one whole, but dispersed and isolated members, which were worked out in different times according to different plans, probably none of them ever being realized to the full by Aristotle. At the least, in attempts for better disposition, the delusive appearance of pervading connection had to be carefully avoided, and what belongs to different drafts had to be exactly separated.

The first place would belong to the most comprehensive draft, Books A and B had to be put at the head as introductory, and ?E up to ? and ? had to be annexed to them. Should the position between ? and ? be assigned to Book I, to which it is, admittedly, the most appropriate one, it had to be expressly prefaced that it is to be regarded as an episodic fragment destined to fill the gap between ? and ?. As to the two last books, I would like to dissuade from inserting them as a second foundation of the inquiries of Book ?, because they do not refer, as I, to the inquiries about substance, actuality and potentiality in the Books Z to ?; but no less from making them follow immediately B, which they, admittedly, recur to, because they are separated from this book by a long distance, whereas the Books ? and E engage directly in solving the first ones of the aporiae delivered there. So probably there would only remain to make them follow, as a second fragment of a more comprehensive first philosophy, the series designated on before. As a third fragment, more comprehensive by the outlines and presupposing not Book B but only A, there would follow then K, if we not prefer to assign to it the second place and the third place to the Books M and N, the very reason being that K, despite its brevity, is designed more comprehensively. A fourth place appertains to the outlines of a philosophical synonymics (?); but I would not like to dispute with those who would prefer to attach it, as excursus, immediately to the first, more comprehensive draft. Book ? might at best, like the dubious dialogues in the Corpus Platonicum, be admitted as appendix."

Hermann Bonitz, otherwise agreeing with Brandis (p. 10: "Uno tenore et eodem disputationis contextu scripti videntur esse hi septem libri ???????."), separates Book ? from the series ?-? (p. 28: "Partes enim habemus quatuor ???????, ?, ??, ?").

Werner Jaeger argues that also the unity of the series A-? is not an original one: "From all signs, I conclude without hesitation that the connection, which was taken for granted till now […], proves to be secondary, and that there is no reason to connect the books Z-? […] with B and its next concomitants [??],

though ??? and ??? ignore one another,

though the fact that the doctrine of the sensible substances belongs to the Metaphysics is in opposition to the conception of metaphysics of B, ?, E, in fact of all books,

and though ZH? is not only ignored, but not classed with the present science in respect of content by […] M [i. e. M2, 1086a21-24]." (1912, p. 109)

In his Aristotle (pp. 169-170) he gives the following survey of the results of his earlier Entstehungsgeschichte:

"??? belong together; ?, on the other hand, was still known as an independent work in Alexandrian times, as a sound bibliographical tradition informs us. E is a short transitional passage leading to ???. These three form a whole, but their connection with the previous books seems to be problematical. I, a discussion of being and unity, stands entirely alone; and from this point onwards all inward and outward connection disappears. K simply contains another form of ???, to which are appended some excerpts from the Physics, in themselves just as Aristotelian as any other part of this collection of manuscripts, but out of all relation to their surroundings. Similarly, a passage from the Physics has been inserted into ?. ? is an isolated lecture, giving a general view of the whole metaphysical system, entirely complete in itself, and presenting no trace of connection with the rest. The concluding books MN have no relation to the preceding; this was remarked even in antiquity, and has led to their insertion before ?? in many manuscripts, which, however, does not produce a more plausible train of thought. Their closest relationship is to the first two books."

The analysis is carried on further by Ingemar Düring (pp. 592-593): "We have to realize that Aristotle never has written a manual of metaphysics. The great Aristotelians of our century, Werner Jaeger, Augustin Mansion, Sir David Ross, in spite of their clear insight into the issue, have not managed to rid themselves from the idea that Aristotle has constructed a system of metaphysics and written a book that was published at first as an 'original metaphysics' and then enlarged bit by bit, and that this original ?????????? could be recovered by re-redacting the Metaphysics we have available.

The compilation redacted by Andronicus which we have available consists of the following single writings.

A. Subject: Philosophy is the science of the first, divine principles. On ?????, ??????, ?? ????? [cf. 982a26]; especially on the four ?????? of being. Doxographic reports and systematic criticism of the predecessors. […]

?. A mere fragment. Subject: General introduction into the study of philosophy [993a30-b31]. ???????? ??? ??????? ????? [cf. 994b4], in studying the structure of things we finally arrive at a starting point of the causal nexus, an ???? [994a1-b31]. Remarks on the technique of scientific argumentation [994b32-995a19].

?. Subject: Survey of the central problems of first philosophy in the form of fourteen aporiae. No lecture, but a memorandum for own use, a sort of research program. Basic idea: Up to now, I have discussed the ????? ??? ?????? ??? ????? from various points of view. But there may be, apart from the science ???? ??? ??????, another one which ?? ???? ??? ?????? ??????????? ?????? (997a32). The answer follows in the first sentence of ?.

?. Subject: ???? ??? ?????? ? ??????? [cf. 1005b6-7] or ?? ?? ? ?? ??? ?? ????? ????????? ???' ???? [1003a21-22], the concept existence and its per se accidents. The difficulties met with by one who denies the validity of the principle of contradiction.

?. A dictionary of philosophical terminology. Basic idea: ???????? ????????? (= ????????) is what is designated by the same ?????, but defined by different ????? (Topics I 15). This dictionary was continually revised, so that it contains pieces both from Aristotle's early and late days.

?. Subject: Various questions connected with the topic ?? ? ??. The book has been compiled from fragmentary texts by a redactor (probably Andronicus).

???. Subject: ???? ??? ???? ??? ????? ?????? ??? ???????? [cf. 1037a13-17], how can we explain the unchangeable and imperishable ????? (i. e. existence) of the individually perishable sensible things?

?. Subject: A lecture about the concepts ?? ?? ??? ?? ?? and the related terms identity, non-identity, similarity and contrarity.

?. A post-Aristotelian compilation from ?, ?, ? and Physics III and V, probably meant as compendium or textbook of first philosophy. Subject: The doctrine of the basic concepts of natural philosophy.

?. Subject: ???? ?????? [cf. 1069a18], especially about the ???????? ?????? ?????? [cf. 1071b4-5], i. e. the principles of being and motion. A completely independent, self-contained lecture about the philosophy of the first things. […]

? 1-9a. Subject: Is there, apart from the sensible things, another being, that is unchangeable and eternal? Criticism of the doctrine of the ???????? of Ideas and numbers. […]

? 9b - ?. Subject: The Academic doctrines of the principles, especially Plato's doctrine of ?? ?? and ?? ???? ??? ?????? as ?????? ??? ?????; the doctrine of the ideal numbers. […]"

Progressive analysis found disorder also in the internal structure of the singular books, caused by interpolations of different length, which disturb the context. Obvious examples are the excerpts from the Physics in ? 2 and K 8-12. Especially important for us is, of course, the question whether the references are likely to be interpolated. The references which establish a connection between books or parts of books are too often used as evidence for unity without checking whether they are organically related to their context.

The "unitarian" view of today, mainly represented by Giovanni Reale, is meant to assert not the literary unity of the Metaphysics, but an unity of content and "design" (Reale, p. 339), the thrust being directed against the "genetic ["entstehungsgeschichtliche"] interpretation" initiated by Werner Jaeger.3 This "design" is as follows (p. 338):

"The first four books: ?, ? ???????, ? and ? are dedicated to the formulation of the concept of first philosophy (? and ?) and to the determination of its problem area.

? offers a preliminary clarification about the meaning of the various terms of which the successive discussion will make use.

E briefly resumes the clarification of the concept of first philosophy, then it examines the meanings of being which are to be excluded from investigation, reducing to ????? that meaning of ?? in which the metaphysician is interested.

From Z on, the examination of ????? has its beginning; it is divided into two great parts: a first one which comprehends the books Z, H, ? and I, and a second one comprehending the books ?, M and N, dedicated, respectively, to ????? in general, as well as to sensible ????? and to suprasensible ?????.

The book K, which divides the two groups of books, resumes with much adherence AB?E; underlining the problem of the suprasensible substance and announcing its treatment [1064a36], it prepares the books which follow."

The Singular Books

Because the Books K and M are mechanically assembled out of heterogeneous pieces, these parts are treated separately.

In the "Thread" chapters, I at first - under (1) - compile Bonitz's and Ross's summaries of the single chapters, which are spread over the whole commentaries; then - under (2) - there follow observations made by other interpreters (including myself).

The Thread of A

(1) Ross:

(I) Wisdom is the knowledge of first causes (chapters 1, 2).

(A) Wisdom is a knowledge of causes (chapter 1).

Bonitz: Describitur quomodo gradatim a sensuum perceptione ad cognitionem principiorum ascendatur. Communis animalibus omnibus perceptio est quae per sensus fit - 980a28, ad eam in quibusdam accedit animalibus perceptorum imaginum mansi sive memoria - b26, conjunctae eiusdem rei complures recordationes in homine potissimum experientiam efficiunt - 981a1. Ex experientia ars exsistit et scientia, et praestat quidem ars experientia eo quod et universum spectat, non res singulas, et causam cognitam habet, unde fit ut doceri possit - b13. Artes autem eo plus habere judicantur dignitatis, quo longius absunt a necessitudine vitae, et ut theoreticae practicis praestant, ita summum obtinet locum principiorum cognitio sive sapientia 982a3.

(B) The causes, the knowledge of which is wisdom, are first causes (chapter 2).

Bonitz: a) Quod vulgo statuunt sapientiam ad omnia pertinere et difficillimam esse et accuratissimam et ad docendum aptissimam neque aliunde nisi a semet ipsa suspensam: inde colligi potest, eam primarum causarum cognitione contineri 982a4-b10.

b) Non ad agendum sed ad sciendum pertinere sapientiam ex eo apparet et quod ab admiratione originem cepit, et quod inventa est quum jam suppeterent quae ad victum et cultum sunt necessaria b11-28.

c) Divina jure dici potest sapientia et propter suam dignitatem et propter naturam eius, quam contemplatur, rei b28-983a11.

d) Profecta ab admiratione sapientia desinit in admirationem priori admirationi contrariam a11-23.

(II) The kinds of first cause; confirmation of our list by a review of the doctrines of previous philosophers (chapters 3-10).

(A) Account of previous systems (chapters 3-7).

Early treatment of material and efficient causes (chapters 3, 4).

Bonitz: Quatuor esse causarum principum genera ut est demonstratum in Physicis, ita comprobatur veterum philosophorum auctoritate, qui nullum praeterea genus potuerunt reperire 983a24-b6. Antiquissimi enim philosophi non posuerunt aliam nisi materialem rerum causam, sive aquam, sive aërem, sive alia corpora simplicissima b6-984a16, postea ipsa veritate ducti materiae addiderunt causam movendi, praeter eos qui immotam esse omnem rerum universitatem sibi persuaserunt a16-b8, tum Anaxagoras primus eadem rerum natura ductus tertiam ponendam esse causam intellexit, ex qua quidquid esset boni in omni rerum natura repeteretur, nec tamen eam sejunxit a causa motrice b8-22.

In simili sententia etiam Hesiodus et Parmenides fuisse videntur 984b23-32. Quoniam autem in natura rerum ordo non ubique servatus sed subinde etiam perturbatus cernitur, Empedocles duplicem posuit causam motricem, alteram boni alteram mali b32-985a10. Sed quum hi philosophi duo ponerent principia, materiale et movens, motrice causa parum ad explicandam naturam usus est Anaxagoras - 21, neque Empedocles satis sibi ipse constat - 29, qui quidem praeter duplicitatem causae motricis illud etiam novavit, quod primus quatuor posuit elementa - b4. Leucippus et Democritus, plenum et inane principia esse rerum rati, ex forma situ ordine corpusculorum diversitatem rerum explicuerunt, de motrice causa parum solliciti - b22.

Pythagoreans and Eleatics (chapter 5).

Bonitz: Pythagorei, in numeris cerni naturam rerum rati, numerorum elementa, par et impar, sive indefinitum et definitum, pro principiis materialibus habuerunt, 985b23-986a21. Alii e Pythagoreis paria quaedam contrariorum vel decem vel numero indefinita principiorum numero habuerunt - b2. Videntur autem Pythagorei ad materiale causae genus sua retulisse principia - b8.

Eleatae, qui immutabilem statuerunt entis unitatem, in censum hic non veniunt, nisi quatenus Parmenides opinabilem certe suscepit generationis explicationem - 987a2. denique quid huc usque de principiis a veteribus acceperimus computat - a19, et Pythagoreos primos quidem sed parum diligenter ideale causae genus quaesivisse addit - a28.

Plato (chapter 6).

Bonitz: Plato Heracliteis placitis inductus, ut sensibilia sciri posse negaret 987a29-b1, a Socrate institutus ad quaerendas notiones universales - b4, distinctas a rebus sensibilibus posuit ideas, quarum communione exsisterent res sensibiles - b14; praeter sensibilia autem et ideas res mathematicas medio inter utrumque genus loco ponendas esse - b18, idearumque elementa omnium elementa rerum esse censuit - b22. Quibus in placitis quid habeat commune cum Pythagoreis, quid diversum - 988a7, et quibus usus sit causarum generibus - a17 exponitur.

Summary account of the treatment of the four causes by earlier thinkers (chapter 7).

Bonitz: Perlustratis veterum philosophorum placitis nullum ese causae genus omissum, quum quatuor supra proponerentur, comprobatur 988a18-23, etenim materiale principium omnes posuerunt - 32, addiderunt nonnulli causam moventem- 34, formalem causam attigerunt Platonici - b6, denique finalem causam simpliciter quidem nemo posuit, quodammodo tamen complures - 16. Sed extra quatuor illa genera causarum novum nullus invenit philosophus 21.

(B) Criticism of previous systems (chapters 8-10).

(a) The pre-Platonic systems (chapter 8).

Bonitz: Examinaturus quid recte de principiis censuerint veteres philosophi quid secus, primum eorum exigit doctrinam, qui unam statuerunt causam materialem 988b22-989a19, inde ad Empedoclem progreditur - a30. Tum Anaxagorae doctrinam illustrat et sustentat potius quam redarguit - b21. Hi omnes de sensibili modo rerum natura philosophati erant - b24. Jam inter eos, qui res sensibus exemtas perinde cognoscendas sibi proposuerunt, primum Pythagoreorum placita excutit - 990a32.

(b) The theory of Ideas (or Forms) (chapter 9).

Bonitz: Platonis doctrinam examinaturus Aristoteles primum quidem, postquam per hypothesin idearum duplicari temere rerum explicandarum numerum dixit 990a33-b8, ea excutit argumenta, quibus ad demonstrandam idearum essentiam Plato usus erat, eaque vel carere significat concludendi necessitate vel nimis late patere - 991a8. Deinde quale sit idearum cum rebus sensibilibus commercium et quamvim illae tamquam principia in his exerceant quaerit - b9. Tum ad numerorum naturam transit, ad quam redigere Plato ideas tentaverat, et quae inde oriantur difficultates vel in ipsis ideis ac numeris cogitandis vel in rebus explicandis exponit - 992a24. Sequitur ut universam quaestionem perverse institutam esse doceat, quum spretis iis rebus ac causis, quae in promptu sunt, reconditas quasdam res et inania principia posuerint; nec demonstrari eorum rationibus quae voluerint demonstrare, nec rerum geometricarum naturam cum universa doctrinae indole posse conciliari - b18. Denique quod eadem omnium rerum principia posuerunt, inde consequens est, ut ea nec cognosci nec tamquam insita a natura teneri possint - 993a10.

Epilogue (chapter 10).

Bonitz: Nemo e superioribus philosophis principium posuit praeter quatuor illa causarum genera, sed ea ipsa subobscure divinarunt magis quam cognoverunt.

(2) Book A is clearly structured; it divides itself by six recapitulations: 982a1-3, 983a21-23, 987a27-28, 988a18-20, 988b16-19, 993a11-13, 993a24-25.

The first recapitulation poses no problems; it adequately describes the reasoning from 980a21 to b25. The traditional interpretation of the second one (983a21-23), however, in my opinion, is flawed with two errors.

The first one is that the two questions "what is the nature of the science we are searching for" and "what is the mark which our search and our whole investigation must reach" were referred to different sections. Alexander (19. 10-15) refers the former to 982a3-983a11, the latter to 983a11-21, Thomas Aquinas (Sententia Metaphysicae, liber 1 lectio 3 numerus 17) the former to 982b11-983a11, the latter to 982a3-b10. It is much more natural to read 982b11-983a11 as a protreptic digression. The question about the "nature" is a "What is …"-question, which is answered by the provisional definitions in 982a1-3 and 982b7-10. The "scope" of the investigation is what results from the "nature" of the science.

The second error (which can be found already in Alexander, 9. 8-12) is that by the "first principles and causes" in 982b9-10 Aristotle means the "universal causes of being", i. e. the "first causes of being as such" (?, 1003a31-32, E, 1025b4-5). This interpretation was adopted by Thomas Aquinas (Sententia Metaphysicae, liber 1 lectio 3 numerus 17: "Intendit enim circa primas et universales rerum causas"), with whom Ross (i 124: "he [Aristotle] has now determined it [Wisdom] as knowledge of the primary or most universal causes, i. e. as metaphysics") literally agrees.4 It is based on 982a4-b10. According to Alexander (9. 2-3), the ll. 982b7-10 give the answer to the question raised in 982a5-6 "of what kind are the causes and the principles, the knowledge of which is Wisdom".

Following this interpretation, one gets embarrassed already in explaining 981b28, as appears from Ross's commentary (i, pp. 119-120): "Wirth objects to ?????, since Aristotle in this chapter only proves that wisdom is concerned with certain causes (982a2), and does not prove til chapter 2 that it deals with first causes (982a5, b9). But here (981b27-29) Aristotle is not stating what he has proved, but what he is trying to prove; he proves half of it in chapter 1 and the rest in chapter 2. The passage rather shows that the expressions ????? and ????? ????? are coextensive, corresponding to Aristotelian usage; cf. especially two passages of the Physics:

???? ??? ??????? ????????? ???????, ???? ?? ????? ?????????? ?? ????? ??? ??? ????? ??? ?????? ??? ????? ??? ????????? (? 1, 184a12-14: "For we do not think that we know a thing until we are acquainted with its primary conditions or first principles, and have carried our analysis as far as its simplest elements.").

??????? ?' ?? ???????? ??????? ??????? ???? ?? ??????? ?? ??? ?? ???? ??????? (????? ?' ???? ?? ?????? ??? ?????? ??????) (? 3, 194b18-20: "men do not think they know a thing till they have grasped the 'why' of, which is to grasp its primary cause."). In perfect accord with this is what is said in 983a25-26:

???? ??? ??????? ????? ???????, ???? ??? ?????? ?????? ??????? ????????? ("for we say we know each thing only when we think we recognize its first cause").

Accordingly, the investigation of the "first causes" is characteristic of every science; the additional ????? makes only clear that the question "Why?" (??? ??) is satisfactorily answered only when, within the horizon of the question, an ????????? is reached, a final point. This is explained in Physics B 3 as follows:

??? ?' ??? ?? ?????? ??????? ?? ????????? ??????, ????? ??? ??? ??? ?????, ???? ???????? ????????? ??? ?????????, ? ?' ????????? ???? ??? ???????????? ????? ?????? ???????? ?? ??????. ??? ????? ??? ??????. (195b21-25: "In investigating the cause of each thing it is always necessary to seek what is most precise (as also in other things): thus man builds because he is a builder, and a builder builds in virtue of his art of building. This last cause then is prior: and so generally.")

Asking for the cause of the ?????????? would transcend the horizon of the question, e. g. to ?????????? and ????? in general.

The statement that wisdom is the science of the "first principles and causes" (982b9) is, accordingly, no progress towards 981a12-b13, but only a confirmation by the "notions we have about the wise man" (982a6-7). The tradition is right that the question raised in 982a5-6 is aimed at the "univeral causes" (see especially 982a21-25), but 982b7-10 is not the answer.

In 987a27-28, "and from the others" (??? ??? ?????) poses a problem. Ross translates "and from their successors", following Alexander (49. 17: ???????? ??? ??? ????? ?????? ??? ???’ ????????), an obvious stopgap. Jaeger (1917, p. 491) treats it as a variant reading for ??? ????????; but "??????? (l. 30) must refer to the «Italians» as the contrast of ??? … ?? … shows" (Cherniss 1944, p. 177 n.). Therefore, we must refer it grammatically to ??? ????? in l. 28, whereby ????? must be taken to mean the Pythagoreans. Now it appears that the dichotomy ??? ???????? - ??? ????? corresponds to the one in ll. 9-11, the only difference being that in l. 28, reversely, the ???????? are the ?????; ?? ???????? are the philosophers ????? … ??? ???????? of ll. 9-10.

In the next case, it is not the recapitulation 988b16-19, but the following announcement 988b20-21 which caused problems. In Vol. i, p. 75 we have restored three versions:

"(a) Let us next discuss the way in which each of these thinkers has spoken, and how matters stand about the principles.

(b) Let us next discuss the possible difficulties.

(c) <Let us nevertheless> discuss them [the difficulties] <also in the following way>."

In the first of them, ??? ?????? (literally: "the way in which he has spoken") means "what he has intended to say", i. e. Aristotle is announcing an interpretation (such as he bestows on Anaxagoras, v. 989a30-33 and b19-21). For this usage, cf. 1086a28-29 ???????? ???? ?????? ?? ??????? ??? ??? ???????? ("we must inquire regarding these what they say and in what sense they say it").

As regards the second interrogative clause, von Arnim (pp. 23-24) finds ??? ???? ???? …, interpreted as zero-subject construction ("how matters stand about the principles", "quomodo de principiis se res habeat" Bessarion), "very strange" ("sehr sonderbar"), "and, furthermore, it would be again a question which is not answered by what follows". But already with the ???????????? of the first sentence, the ??? ???? (the real state of the affair) is in view. For the construction cf. Plato, Laches 188 C (??? ???? ???? ???? ??? ????????), Aristotle, Ethica Eudemia H 14, 1247a2-3 (???????? ??’ ???? ????? ? ??? ??????? ? ?’ ??????, ? ??, ??? ??? ???? ???? ?????? = "we must consider whether good fortune is by nature or not."), Politica ? 5,1278a13-14 (??????? ?’ ???????? ?????? ?????????????? ??? ???? ???? ????? = "These reflections carried a little further will explain their position").

The second and third version correspond with the ???????????? ?? ??? in 991a9.

993a11-13

According to Jaeger (1912, p. 17), the words ????? ??? ?? ??? ???????? ????????? ("it is evident, then, even from what we have said before") "point back and refer to" 988a20-22; this is confirmed by the following ??????? ("vaguely"), which occurs both in 988a23 and 993a13.

993a24-25

The words ???? ??? ??? ??? ???????? (or ?????? according to Ab) ????????? ??? ???????? ("On these questions our views have been expressed before") do not refer to what immediately precedes, as Alexander5, Fonseca6 and Jaeger7 believe, but to what has said by the other thinkers, as Thomas Aquinas8 and Bonitz9 correctly explain; for ??? ???????? (or ??????) must be identical with ????? ?????? in the following sentence. ll. 24-25 ????????? ??? ???????? parallels l. 13 ????? ??? ?? ??? ???????? ?????????.

993a25-27

??? ?? ???? ????? ?????? ?????????? ?? ???, ??????????? ?????. ???? ??? ?? ?? ????? ???????????? ?? ???? ??? ??????? ???????. ("but let us return to enumerate the difficulties that might be raised on the same points; for perhaps we may get from them some help towards our later difficulties.")

Jaeger (1912, pp. 17-18) rightly argues that ??????????? ????? cannot refer to the aporiae in B (in his edition of 1957, p. 33, he has revoked: "??????????? ????? ad librum B refert"); for the text makes a distinction between what will come now and what is to be done "later", so that the question arises, "what, then, the ??????? ??????? shall be as distinct from the ones of B?" Ross (i 212) objects: "But the problems of B are similarly described as only the first of the problems which the philosopher must discuss (995a25)", obviously misinterpreting this passage: Aristotle is not speaking of first aporiae, but of discussing the difficulties (????????) as the first thing that must be done.10

However, when Jaeger (1912, p. 18) concludes: "The situation presupposed by these words is the one of the conclusion of A 7" (988b20-21), and (p. 19) that A 10 is "a second version of A 7", he neglects the two ??? in ll. 13 and 24 as well as the difference between ??????????? ????? in 993a26 and ????????? in 988a21. What A 10 announces is a repeated discussion.

Alexander (136. 15-17 and 137. 6-9) has better understood the lecture situation than Jaeger. He believes that the announced reconsideration follows in Book ? - a good example for the desperate assumptions to which a "conservative critic" (Jaeger, p. 19) is forced. (Nevertheless taken up again by Reale, p. 45.) The only possibility left for us is that the announcement was not fulfilled, or its fulfilment is lost. Perhaps, the fact that this gap was felt is the reason why Book ? was inserted.

Interpolations

984a3-5 Christ (p. 10): "?????? … ???????? in margine primum adjecta et ad sequentia magis pertinere sentio."

Jaeger (1957, p. 9) objects: "sed legit jam Theophrastus physicorum opiniones frg. 1. 3 Diels." In Diels (Doxographi Graeci, p. 475) we read: […] ????? ??? ??????? ??? ?????, ?? ????? ??? ????? ?????????, ???? ?????? ??? ????? […]. The sentence incriminated by Christ is, then, at its present place, because Hippo, like Thales, assumed water to be the principle. But the fact remains that l. 4 ???? ?????? ("among these thinkers") can only refer to the thinkers mentioned later in ll. 5-8.

985b6 Jaeger (1957, p. 13): "verba ???????? … ?? ?? seclusi; sunt altera recensio verborum ?????? … 7 ?? ??."

988b31-32 Christ (p. 23): "???? ?? … ???? disserendi ordinem interrumpunt." Ross (in his translation) connects the words with l. 31 ??? ?? ??????? ??????? ("without inquiring how they are produced out of one another, - I mean fire, water, earth, and air"), but this is not possible grammatically (Ross needs to substitute in thought ?? ??????? ????????? for ??? ?? ??????? ???????). Grammatically possible is referring to ll. 24-25 ?? ????????.

A in Context

As we have seen, 993a27 ??????? points forward to Book B, which, however, cannot be the immediate continuation of A 10.

A second ??????? occurs in 984b32: ?????? ??????? ???????. "The promise is nowhere fulfilled." (Ross i 137). So we have, besides ??????????? ????? in 993a26, a second case of missing text.

The chapters 1-2 present themselves as prooemium to a ??????? (or ??????????), both by the recapitulation 983a21-23 and by beginning with a general statement (980a21), cf. Analytica Posteriora (71a1-2: ???? ?????????? ??? ???? ??????? ?????????? ?? ????????????? ??????? ??????? = "All instruction given or received by way of argument proceeds from pre-existent knowledge."), Physica (184a10-11: ?????? ?? ??????? ??? ?? ?????????? ????????? ???? ????? ??? ????????, ?? ????? ????? ? ????? ? ???????? … = "When the objects of an inquiry, in any department, have principles, conditions, or elements, it is through acquaintance with these that knowledge, that is to say scientific knowledge, is attained."), De Partibus Animalium (639a1-3: ???? ????? ??????? ?? ??? ???????, ?????? ???????????? ?? ??? ??????????, ??? ????????? ?????? ??? ????? ????? … = "Every systematic science, the humblest and the noblest alike, seems to admit of two distinct kinds of proficiency …"), Ethica Nicomachea (1094a1-2: ???? ????? ??? ???? ???????, ?????? ?? ?????? ?? ??? ??????????, ?????? ????? ???????? ????? = "Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, is thought to aim at some good"), Politica (1252a1-4: ?????? ????? ????? ?????? ????????? ???? ????? ??? ????? ????????? ?????? ????? ?????? ???????????? … = "Every state is a community of some kind, and every community is established with a view to some good").

The chapters 3-10 presuppose the four causes doctrine of Physica ii 3, which they refer to four times: 983a33, 985a12, 988a21-22, 993a11. In contrast, 989a24 ??????? ?? ?? ???? ???? ?????? [De Caelo iii 7] ???? ????? (i. e. on the mutual generation of the elements) is something like a footnote. The same pattern occurs in De Interpretatione, 20b26 (??????? ?? ?? ???? ???????? ???? ?????), De Sensu, 445b19-20 (??????? ?? ???? ????? ?? ???? ?????? ???? ???? ????????), De Somno et Vigilia, 455a8-9 (??????? ?? ???? ????? ?? ???? ???? ?????) and 24-25 (??????? ?? ???? ????? ?? ???? ???? ????? ??????????), De Partibus Animalium, 660b1-2 (??????? ?? ???? ????? ?? ???? ????????? ???? ???? ??? ????), De Generatione Animalium, 747b5 (??????? ?' ?? ???? ?????????? [a lost work of Aristotle, not the ?????????? preserved to us] ???? ?????), 772b11-12 (??????? ?? ???? ????? ?? ???? ???????????). All these notes may, of course, be later added by a redactor, but Düring (p. 34) objects: "A later redactor would never have been able to establish such a fine-meshed net of connections between the singular writings."

A similar case is the reference to the Ethics in 981b25-29, which is also defended by Düring (p. 261): "After having discussed ???????? and ???? in Analytica Posteriora i 33, 89b7, he [Aristotle] says that the question how the remaining functions of intellect should be distributed on ??????? ???? ???????? ????? ???????? ????? belongs rather to ?????? or ????? ??????. Under ?????? he subsumes what we call psychology; the discussion of the difference between discursive and intuitive thinking belongs to psychology. Under another aspect, however, ???? ???????? ????? ???????? ????? emerge as ????????? ?????, i. e. as 'intellectual excellences', ??????????? ??????. Then they belong to the ????? ??????. Therefore, they are discussed in the three Ethics, Magna Moralia i 34, 1196b34sqq., and Ethica Eudemia v 3 = Ethica Nicomachea vi 3, 1139b14 sqq. […] In my opinion, it is not necessary to consider this reference as a later addition."

The references identified

981b25 ?? ???? ???????: "cf. Ethica Nicomachea 1139b14 sq." (Jaeger 1957, p. 3)

986a12 ?? ??????? is identified by Alexander (41. 1-2 Hayduck: ????? ?? ???? ?????? ??? ?? ???? ???? ??????? ??? ?? ???? ??? ??????????? ?????? ????????????) as reference to both De Caelo and a (lost) monography on the Pythagoreans (mentioned in Diogenes Laertius, v 25 as ???? ???? ????????????). According to Bonitz (p. 79), ???????????? does not apply to De Caelo, 293a23-27, so that only the second reference is left.

991b3 ?? ?? ?? ???????: Plato, Phaedo 100 D.

992a33 ?????????: Plato, Respublica 533 B-E (Jaeger 1957, p. 31).

Book ?

(1) Ross:

General considerations about the study of philosophy (chapter 1).

Bonitz: Veritatis inquisitio quodam modo facilis, eadem quodam modo difficilis est 993a30-b7, eius difficultas non in natura rei cognoscendae, sed in imbecillitate mentis humanae posita est 7-11.

Gratia habenda est iis etiam philosophis, quorum placita non probaveris 11-19. Philosophiae est cognitio veritatis - 23, cernitur autem veritas maxime in summis rerum principiis - 31.

Impossibility of (1) an infinite chain of causes, (2) an infinite variety of kinds of cause (chapter 2).

Bonitz: Causae non possunt esse infinitae, neque intra idem genus causarum si sursum vel deorsum progrediaris 993a1-b27, neque vero genera causarum sunt infinita b27-31.

Different methods appropriate to different studies (chapter 3).

Bonitz: Quam quis potissimum probet docendi rationem, quum ex usu et consuetudine pendeat, eruditione opus est, ut in quolibet genere eam sectetur, quae apta sit ad naturam rei 994b32-995a14; et mathematicae quidem demonstrationis severitas non est requirenda in disciplina physica - a19.

(2) The modern chapter division seems to be adequate. Thomas Aquinas (Sententia Metaphysicae, liber 2 lectio 1 numerus 2) makes the second section begin with 993b19 and be continued in 994a1; but by the particle combination ???? ??? (994a1) the author is "proceeding to a new item" (Denniston, p. 344).

According to Brandis (p. 74), these chapters are "three fragments of reflections about difficulty and easiness of knowing the truth, about the necessity to assume an ultimate principle, and about the demands on stringency of argumentation", i. e. there is no thread. In 995a17-19, the last fragment "reveals itself as introduction not so much into metaphysical as physical inquiry" (Brandis, ibidem; cf. Bonitz, p. 17: "manifesto ad physicam disciplinam transitur", Jaeger 1912, p. 117).

This reading of 995a16-19 is already mentioned in Alexander, who concedes that it is the natural one11. But the Unitarians, of course, cannot accept it. They have offered two different explanations:

1. Aristotle only wants to say that physical inquiry is preliminary to metaphsical; ???????? is not meant to announce what is to follow immediately (Alexander12, Owens13). "But ??? … ????? seems clearly to promise an immediate inquiry into the meaning of 'nature'; and neither B nor any subsequent book fits on to these closing words of ?." (Ross i, p. 221)

2. The question about physics "is simply a particular example" (Pierron/Zévort, p. cxvii; cf. Reale, p. 52). "About that, it is sufficient to say that Aristotle is in the habit of marking examples and analogies as such, what could have been done at little linguistic expense also here; but we read nothing of it in the text. Besides, the phrasing ??? ???????? ?????? ?? ????? ? ????? is unequivocal and leaves no room for doubts." (Szlezák, p. 242) "Let us note that in both Ethics [Ethica Nicomachea, 1094b12-1095a2; Ethica Eudemia, 1216b2-1217a17], the inappropriate (mathematical) exactness is contrasted with the method of that field which the whole work will be about, and that, after rejecting the ideal of exactness, the ?? ?????-question is posed for the eudaimonia as for the proper object of the inquiry (EN I 2, 1095a15 sqq., EE I 7, 1217a20 sqq.). Likewise, in ? 3 the mathematical method is opposed to the physical one, and then it is asked ?? ????? ? ?????; physis is, consequently, the object, and not an 'example'." (Szlezák, p. 244)

It is uncontroversial that Book ? is a preface (?????????). Lasson (p. vii) and Jaeger (1912, p. 117) point to the first three chapters of the Nicomachean Ethics, "where likewise mention is made of the ?????? ??? ???????" (Jaeger, l. c.).

According to Jaeger's attractive supposition (1912, p. 178), "in the designation ??????? ? it is implied that this piece was added to the Metaphysics at a time where the thirteen books were already canonical and could no more be renamed".

Book B

As already stated by Thomas Aquinas (Sententia Metaphysicae, liber 3 lectio 1 numerus 1), Book B is divided firstly into declaration of intent ("dicit de quo est intentio", 995a24-b4) and its execution ("exsequitur propositum"), the latter in turn into a list of the aporiae ("ponit dubitationes", 995b4-996a17) and the dialectical discussion of them ("ponit […] causas dubitationum, inducendo rationes ad singulas dubitationes", 996a18 sqq.).

The usual numbering of the aporiae treated in the third part is the following:

1. 996a18-b26.

2. 996b26-997a15.

3. 997a15-25.

4. 997a25-34.

5. 997a34-998a19.

6. 998a20-b13.

7. 998b14-999a23.

8. 999a24-b24.

9. 999b24-1000a4.

10. 1000a5-1001a3.

11. 1001a4-b25.

12. 1001b26-1002b11.

13. 1002b12-32.

14. 1002b32-1003a5.

15. 1003a5-17.

In the list, the sequence is different, and the 13th aporia is skipped:

1. 995b4-6.

2. 995b6-10.

3. 995b10-13.

5. 995b13-18.

4. 995b18-27.

6. 995b27-29.

7. 995b29-31.

8. 995b31-36.

9. 996a1-2.

10. 996a2-4.

11. 996a4-9.

15. 996a9-10.

14. 996a10-11.

12. 996a12-15.

According to Thomas Aquinas (Sententia Metaphysicae, liber 3 lectio 4 numerus 1), the first four aporiae are epistemological in content ("de quaestionibus pertinentibus ad considerationem huius scientiae"), the 5th concerns the substances ("de quaestionibus pertinentibus ad substantias"), 6-15 the principles of the substances ("de quaestionibus pertinentibus ad principia substantiarum"). This division is adopted by Reale, p. 69.

Natorp (pp. 558-560): "The aporiae are easily divided into three groups. The five first, being mere preliminary questions, concern the limitation of the subject. […] Of the remaining aporiae, two [997a34-998a19 and 1001b26-1002b11] refer to the question whether there exist substances other than the sensible ones, especially whether the mathematical objects and the Ideas (according to the Pythagoreans and the Platonists) are (non-sensible) substances. […] There remains a group (C) of nine aporiae [995b27-996a12] the topic of which is substance, and especially the substance of the sensible things."

Theiler (p. 86): "In the first four aporiae, the question is about the range of «the science which we are seeking», then in the following eleven ones, about the nature of the ???? or ????? […]."

The succession of questions and arguments in B 2-3 is on the whole the same as in K 1, with one remarkable exception: what is (or seems to be) an argument against the thesis that "it belongs to one science to investigate all the kinds of causes", is a separate aporia in K (1059a34-38). The author of K1 was blamed for this, but unjustly; in no way it can be said that this argument is "aptly linked with the first question" in B (Bonitz, p. 453: "Eandem argumentationem habemus B 996a21-b1, sed illic quidem apte conjunctam cum prima quaestione."), whereas it is "very unaptly linked" (Brandis, p. 67: "sehr unpassend verküpft") with the preceeding aporia in K. Thomas Aquinas and Fonseca must take great efforts in order to construct out of 996a21-b1 an additional argument against the thesis that "it belongs to one science to investigate all the kinds of causes".14

The real question is whether "the science which we are seeking" investigates all the kinds of causes. Whether one and the same science can do this is a preliminary issue. As the existing commentaries prove, this logical connection is not easy to detect; it is much easier for the reader to skip the second argument and to continue with 996b1 ???? ???, where the preliminary question is resumed.

The parallel in K (1059a34-38) confirms our interpretation in so far as it is expressly "the science we are looking for" which is at issue. Here, however, the argument is directed against dealing "with the causes which have been mentioned in the Physics" at all. As Thomas Aquinas15 has rightly recognized, it is an argumentum a fortiori: the final cause is picked out because it is the most likely one to be object of this science.

B in Context

There are 3 references, two of them being problematical. Let us begin with the easiest case, 996b8-9, which must refer to A, 982a4-b7; the items 996b10-12 and 13-14 respond to the passages 982b4-7, 982a25-28, and 30-b4.

But the same section 982a4-b7 must be meant with 995b5 ?? ???? ????????????????, about which the commentators since Alexander (174. 10-11: ?????? ?? ??? ??????? ?? ????? ??????????? ?? ???? ??? ?????? ????????) are groping around in the dark.16 The questions "whether the investigation of the causes belongs to one or to more sciences" (995b5-6) and "which of the sciences should be called Wisdom" (996b9) concern both the 1st aporia.

The reference 997b4 ?? ???? ??????? ?????? is identified as A 9 by Schwegler (i 126) and Bonitz (p. 147), as A 6 by Jaeger (1912, p. 36) and Ross (i, p. 231).

All these identifications are rejected by von Arnim (p. 15): "Because of the ???? ?????, the ?????? ????? cannot be referred to Book A of the Metaphysics. Although ???? ?????, grammatically, does not belong, as attribute, to ??????, the sense is the same as if the text were ?? ???? ???? ????? ??????."

Without mentioning von Arnim, Düring (p. 271) adopts this explanation, identifying the ?????? ????? as Physics i-ii: Aristotle "refers to his own doctrine exposed in the two first books of the Physics".

The nearest linguistic parallel is Politics, 1325a30-31. The passage 1325a28-31 (?? ??? ??????? ????????? ? ??? ????????? ???? ??? ??? ?????? ? ???? ?? ????? ????????? ??? ????? ??????. ????????? ?? ???? ????? ?????? ?? ???? ??????? ??????) is translated by Benjamin Jowett as follows: "for there is as great a difference between the rule over freemen and the rule over slaves as there is between slavery by nature and freedom by nature, about which I have said enough at the commencement of this treatise." The reference is to Book i. caput 5, 6, 7. Here ???? ????? refers to what precedes, "on this topic", as in 989a24 (see above, pp. 40-41). It confirms von Arnim's (p. 15) grammatical note that "???? ????? does not belong as attribute to ??????" (as presupposed in Ross's translation "The sense in which we say the Forms are both causes and self-dependent substances has been explained in our first remarks about them"), but von Arnim is wrong when he (ibidem) asserts that "the sense is nonetheless the same". Grammatically, ???? ????? cannot be but an alternative reading to ?? ??? ??? ??????? ?? ???? ????? ?? ??? ?????? ????? ???' ??????, presupposing ??????? <??> ?? ???? ??????? ??????, in analogy with 989a24 (??????? ?? ?? ???? ???? ?????? ???? ?????). ???? ????? therefore must mean "about it", referring to the topic of the preceding sentence, i. e. to A 6, 987b14-18.

The phrase ?? ???? ??????? ?????? occurs also in: On the Heavens, 311a11 (v. Physics, 254b33-256a3), On the Generation of Animals, 778b2 (v. On the Parts of Animals, 640a10 sqq.), Nicomachean Ethics, 1152a12-13 (v. 1144a23-b4), Plato, Laws, 796 D 6 (v. 673 B sqq.). In all these cases, the "first discussions" are meant to be part of the same treatise (??????????, ???????), so that for this reason too, ???? ????? or Physics i-ii are out of question.

So there remains the choice between A 6 and A 9. What speaks for A 6 is the fact that, because M1 refers to B (cf. below, p. 192), a series ABM1 with the doublet A 9 990b2-991b8 = M 4-5 1078b32-1080a11 can only be avoided by Jaeger's (1912, pp. 35-36) assumption that A 8-9 was omitted when the series ABM1 was read. Referring to A 6 requires that we translate ?? by "that",17 for the translation "in which sense" ("in welchem Sinne"), which is preferred by Bonitz and Ross, goes rather with A 9, because the question would fall within the general question ??? ?? ?????? ??????? ?????? (988b20). "The discussion of the problem of Ideas B 2, 997b3 does not presuppose a preceding refutation of the theory of Ideas, but it does presuppose the report in A 6" (Jaeger, l. c., p. 36).

Two linguistic observations suggest that Books A and B belong together:

"A phrase which occurs only in A and B, connecting these two writings, is ? ???????????? ???????? (?????)." (Düring, p. 271)

"The noun ????, 'principle', occurs more often in A and B than in any other book of the Metaphysics, sixty-five times in each; cf. Delatte et al. (1984: 43-5, 485)." (Madigan, p. xxviii)

The Thread of ?

(1) Ross:

Our subject - being as such (chapter 1).

Bonitz: Prima philosophia versatur in cognoscendis causis entis, quatenus est ens.

We must therefore study

(1) substance - the central mode of being to which the other modes are related,

(2) the species of being,

(3) the species of unity,

(4) the species of substance,

(5) the species of plurality.

Confirmation of the view that these form the subject of philosophical study (chapter 2).

Bonitz: Ens licet multifariam dicatur, quum ad unum omne principium referatur, uni est scientiae subjectum, a33-b16, quae primum ac praecipue pertinet ad substantiam, ut quae potissimum ens sit, cognoscendam, b16-19. Eiusdem scientiae est cognoscere entis species, b19-22. Ea autem inter ens et unum intercedit necessitudo, ut, quae sunt alterius, eaedem alterius eiam sint species, quae omnes subjectae sunt philosophiae, b22-1004a9. Et quoniam contraria eadem continentur cognitione, unitati autem opponitur multitudo, quaecunque ad unitatem et multitudinem pertinent vel iis accidunt, ea omnia philosophi est investgare, et ita quidem, ut a substantia cognoscenda proficiscatur, a9-b17. Tam late patere philosophiae ambitum cognoscitur etiam comparatis artibus dialectica et sophistica, b17-26. Contraria quum revocentur omnia ad unitatem et multitudenem, principia rerum, quae contraria ab omnibus ponuntur philosophis, eadem doctrina contineri apparet, b27-1005a13.

Unius igitur est scientiae ens universe, quatenus est, et quidquid ei tamquam enti accidat contemplari, a13-18.

We must study also the axioms and, primarily, the law of contradiction (chapter 3).

Bonitz: Summa cognocendi principia quoniam pertinent ad ens quatenus est ens, a prima philosophia ea pertractari oportet, 1005a19-b8. Eam certissima omnium principia tenere par est, b8-18, certissimum autem omnium est illud principium, quo idem eidem rei non posse simul et inesse et non inesse contenditur, b18-34.

The law of contradiction established by pointing out the difficulties involved in its denial (chapter 4).

Bonitz: Principium contradictionis sunt qui verum esse infitiantur, 1005b35-1006a5; et comprobari quidem, quod hi postulant, ratiocinando illud principium non potest, a5-11, refutari vero possunt principii infitiatores et ut principii veritatem agnoscant adigi, dummodo concedant, se dicendo certum quidpiam et definitum significare, a11-1007a20. Sublato autem principio contradictionis tollitur omnis substantia, ut nihil nisi per accidens praedicetur, nec potest tamen fieri ut in infinitum accidens accidenti accidat, a20-b18; deinde consequitur ut omnia sint idem, b18-1008a2, aliaque id genus absurda concedere coguntur principii infitiatores, a2-b11. Et quamquam dicendo tollunt principium, agendo tamen non possunt non eius veritatem agnoscere b12-1009a5.

Refutation of the arguments for the denial of the law of contradiction, and for asserting that all appearances are true (chapter 5).

Bonitz: Cum infitiatoribus principii contradictionis concinunt Protagoreae doctrinae asseclae, siquidem ab altera sententia necessario ad alteram devenitur, 1009a6-16. Sed in refutandis his adversariis probe distinguendum est, utrum dicis causa illud principium tollant, an ex animi sententia, dubitationibus quibusdam adacti, a16-22. Duplex autem est in natura rerum sensibilium negandi principii contradictionis occasio. Alteri quod ex eadem re contraria progigni viderent, idem et esse et non esse censuerunt; quibus et opponenda est potentiae et actus distinctio, et persuadendum ut esse praeterea naturam immobilem statuant, a22-38. Alteri quod aliis alia de eadem re viderentur, neque esset cuius auctoritatem reliqui suspicerent, et quod in perceptione sensuum omnem contineri veritatem arbitrarentur, quae fere est veterum philosophorum sententia omnium, quod cuique videretur, id verum esse arbitrati sunt, a38-1010a1.

His igitur adversariis principii haec potissimum opponit: unice intentos rebus mutationi subjectis negexisse eos et aeterna corpora caelestia et principium omnium rerum immobile, a1-7, 25-35; deinde non distinxisse eos quantitatis mutationem a mutatione formae, a7-25, ac negato quidem principio contradictionis tolli potius quam defendi mutationem, a35-b1. Tum quod verum esse censuerunt, quidquid cuique videretur, descripta subtilius sensuum vi et natura refellit, b1-1011a2.

Refutation of Protagoras continued (chapter 6).

Bonitz: Qui in diversitate perceptionum sensuum quaerunt, quis sit de veritate et errore judicaturus, ii quidem ipsum demonstrandi principium volunt demonstrari, 1011a3-16. Quod cuique videtur, id non est simpliciter, sed est illi cui videtur et quando et quatenus videtur, a17-b7, ita vero quum ad relativam naturam detrudunt omnia, ne eam quidem constanter possunt tueri, b7-12. Ex principio contradictionis sequitur, ut nec contraria eidem rei tribui possint, b13-22.

Law of excluded middle proved (chapter 7).

Bonitz: Principium exclusi medii variis rationibus confirmatur, 1011b23-1012a17. Quibus rebus ad neganda principia quidam inducti sint explicatur, a17-28.

Falsity of the views that all judgements are true, or that all are false, that all things are at rest, or all in motion (chapter 8).

Bonitz: Falluntur et qui vera et qui falsa omnia esse contendunt, 1012a29-b22, item et qui moveri et qui quiescere omnia dicunt, b22-31.

(2) "The writing ? is in excellent scientific language and one of the most outstanding treatises of the Corpus Aristotelicum, the work of a mature thinker." (Düring, p. 587) This overall characteristics gives no hint of the enormous difficulties offered by the second chapter.

Aristotle starts from the general statement that of each genus there is only one single sensory perception or science respectively; for example, the one science of "grammar" (in its original sense "art of writing") "investigates all articulate sounds" (i. e. all kinds of articulate sounds).

In order to understand the next sentence (1003b21-22), it is necessary, above all, to notice the emphatic front position of the genitive attribute ??? ?????, because it intimates that Aristotle by the following words (??? ???? ???.) is merely repeating (and applying to the ??) the content of what he had said of the sounds; i. e. instead of ? ?????????? ??? ???? ????? ?????? ??? ????? there could be said ??? ????? ??? ???? ???????? ???? ????? ????????? (if ??? ????? were to be emphasized), and, reversely, instead of ??? ???? ??? ????? it should be possible to say ????? ?? ???? ??? ????? (responding to ????? ??? ?????).18

But the text goes on with ?? ?????, ?? ?? ???? ??? ?????, what cannot be translated but by "generically, and to investigate the several species (of being) is the work of the specific parts (literally: "kinds") of the science".19 These words (equally ?? ????? in l. 35) destroy the parallelism with grammar, because that is certainly not only "generically one", so that of each sound there would be a separate science. The restriction "generically" makes sense only if the "???? ??? ?????" are understood not as the concepts mentioned in ll. 33-36 by this name, but as the ?????? ("spheres of being", cf. ?, 1069a30-36) in 1004a2-9. This is what happened in the exegetic tradition since Alexander (245. 37 - 246. 6).

Now already Alexander20 and Schwegler (iii 150 and 155) have recognized the section 1004a2 ??? … 9 ????????? as interpolated. He who inserted the passage about the division of philosophy, corresponding to the "spheres of being," was interested to connect it with the division of "being" which he found. According to K, 1061b17, the spheres of being are "different in genus"; perhaps a misunderstanding of this passage (?? ????? connected with ???) is partly responsible.21

With 1003b22 "?? ??" does not begin a new logical segment. As the more frequent "?? ???", it only brings up a new premise, marking what precedes as a mere partial result (cf. e. g. Metaphysics E, 1025b39; ?, 1072a9; Nicomachean Ethics, 1094a18). 1003b19-36 is, therefore, an integrated subsection, in which Aristotle is showing that the concepts ??????, ??????, ???? etc. fall within the field of one single science.

The real continuation of the subsection 1003b19-36 is 1004a9-34: Because it is the work of one and the same science to investigate a certain concept and its opposite, and plurality is opposed to unity (ll. 9-10), also the opposites of the said concepts, the kinds of plurality, are objects of the said science (ll. 17-20).22

Strictly speaking, only this (ll. 17-20) follows from ll. 9-10. But Aristotle adds ??? ?? ?? (l. 19), i. e. he includes also the species of unity (??? ??????? ???? ?? ??). Thus, the ll. 17-20, which originally were intended as conclusion from ll. 17-20 (9 ???? and 17 ???? belong inseparably together, v. Jaeger 1957, p. 6123), become unexpectedly a summary of all that was shown so far in the section beginning with 1003b19.

From the ambiguity of the word unity there follows the ambiguity of the ontological predicates mentioned in ll. 1003b35-36 and 1004a17-19, because they are defined with the help of the terms unity and plurality (= ???? ????? ???????), cf. ?, 1018a35-37. At first (ll. 23-25), Aristotle stresses that "it belongs to one science to know them [the meanings of the said ontological predicates] all". Since these meanings relate to the ??????, they firstly must be distinguished (l. 28), and then it must be pointed out how each of them relates to the ?????? (ll. 28-29).

What is meant here by ??????? According to Alexander (255. 28-31) it is ?????, according to Ross it is the respective (= in each case different) basic meaning of the terms ?????, ?????? etc. (i 255: "In each case the derivative meanings must be viewed in their relation to the central meaning."). There are two reasons in favor of Ross. Firstly, Aristotle says in ll. 25-28: "And since all things are referred to that which is primary, as for instance all things which are called one are referred to the primary one, we must say that the same holds good also of the same and the other and of contrariety." This is not the manner of speaking of one who holds that substance is equally the ?????? for all said concepts. Secondly, in the case of an identical basic meaning, the conceptual difference of the said ontological predicates would be constituted by the difference of their relation to the common ??????. But ll. 30-31 say in substance that the meanings of all these predicates can stand, e. g., in the relation of ????? and ?????? to their ??????; for ?? ??? … ?? ?? … ?? ?? … refers to the meanings which each of these predicates (28 ???????!) can have.

The very supposition, that with ?????? in l. 1004a25 substance is meant, must, however be made, if ll. 25-31 are supposed to be the reason for ll. 32-33 ??? ???? ???? ?????? ??? ??? ?????? ???? ????? ?????. (Alexander, 257. 7-9). Because it is not so, the conclusion ll. 31-34 ??????? … ?????????? must be an insertion. The question mentioned here is taken up not till the next section. The insertion, therefore, must refer to 1004b9 ??? ???????? ? ?????.

The following piece 1004a34-1005a13 is ignored in the recapitulation 1005a13-18, which mentions the results formulated in 1003a21-22, 1003b18-19, 1003b34-36 and 1004a17-20. From the examples quoted in 1004b2-4, however, it appears that it is still about the concepts quoted in 1003b34-36 and 1004a18-19. In ll. 1004a20-22, contrariety was important enough to be mentioned; therefore, in l. 27 ???????? should be read instead of ??? ????????; as there, contrariety appears together with identity in 1004b2-4 and 1005a12. This context being clear, we will no longer find it "natural" (Ross i, p. 260) to translate ?????? in ll. 1004a34 sq. and ??????? in 1004b20 by "all things". After Aristotle has demonstrated that one science is competent for all concepts like identity and contrariety, he continues in 1004a34: and this science is philosophy qua science of ?????. ???? ?????? therefore means "on all concepts mentioned before ("de omnibus praedictis", as Thomas Aquinas correctly explains), cf. B, 995b25, where ???? ?????? refers to the concepts mentioned before in ll. 20-23.

The section 1004b27-1005a11 (which has no parallel in K) presents itself as additional argument for the unity of the science of being as such (1004b27 ???; 1005a2-3 ??????? ??? ??? ?? ?????? ??? ???? ????????? ?? ?? ? ?? ????????).

The decisive evidence that both 1004b17-26 and 1004b27-1005a11 are out of place (i. e. later insertions) is the fact that 1005a11 ??? ????? must refer to 1004b16-17: because "it is about the properties peculiar to being as such that the philosopher has to investigate the truth", "it does not belong to the geometer to inquire what is contrariety or completeness or unity or being the same or the other" (1005a11-12).

In chapter 3, a problem is posed by 1005a33-b2: universal investigation about being is not the work of the natural philosopher, but of the one who investigates the ????? ?????, a sphere of being beyond nature and pre-eminent to it. This argumentation is at first sight offensive, and it did cause offense: how can something - to be only a genus of being (l. 34) - be used as argument against natural philosophy, that is equally true of the ???? ??? ?????? ?????? ??????????; this substance too is a genus of being (cf. 1004a2-9 and E, 1026a21-22). Without doubt, the offense is justified, if the ????? (divine) ????? is an entity equally defined by additional attributes (?? ??, cf. E, 1025b8) as the ????? (attributes of ?? + motion), but not, if it (as ????? ????????, cf. E, 1026a29) differs from nature only by the absence of motion. In this case, the contradiction is due to the nature of the subject: the divine ?????, although existing as a separate sphere of being, coincides qua object of knowledge with being as such. We will expand on this topic in the next volume.

Minor Interpolations

1. Natorp has recognized 1003b36-1004a2 as interpolated: "The remark ?????? ?? - ?????? together with the reference to the ?????? ??? ???????? seems to be not really to the purpose here, since from 1004a9 on the ??????????? seem to be introduced as a new topic."(p. 41, n. 6) It is inserted at the wrong place: 1004a1 ?????? refers to ?? and ?????? in l. 10, cf. 1004b33-1005a1.

2. As Jaeger (1957, p. 61) has recognized, 1004a10-16 ???????? ... ???????? is an interpolation. It gives a reason why "it is the work of one and the same science to consider negation and privation". This comes as a surprise, because the concept ??????????? (cf. l. 9) comprises the concepts ???????? and ???????? (cf. ?, 1018a20-25). While in ll. 9-10 it is simply presupposed that "it is the work of one science to investigate opposites", in. ll. 10-16 the reason is given for a part of this assertion, in a way as if the reason for another part had been given before (note the emphasized front position ???????? ?? ??? ????????). For the latter we must look in 1003b36-1004a2; indeed, the ??????? rank among the ??????????? (?, 1018a20), and the fact that all ??????? can be reduced to one principle is indeed an argument for the unity of the science which deals with them. The interpolation comes from someone who did not find ll. 1004a2-9 ??? ??????? … ????????? at its present place, but did find ll. 1003b36-1004a2 ?????? ?? … ????????, which he intended to join with 1004a9-10.

3. Christ (1853, p. 8124) has recognized that 1004b33 ????? ?? ??? ????? refers to ll. 28-29 ???? ?????? ??? ????, ??????? ?? ??? ???????; so that 29 ?? ?' ???? … 33 ?????? must be a later insertion.

4. Christ (p. 66) comments on 1005a8-11: "??? ?? … 11 ?????? alterius recensionis esse videntur." Jaeger (1957, p. 64: "ego verba 8 ??? ?? … 11 ?????? alterius recensionis esse puto") formulates the same comment in a way as if he were contradicting Christ.

Kirwan (pp. 85-86) is the first one who yields an interpretation:

"The parenthesis at 8-11 it not easy.

(A) Nicomachean Ethics I 6. 1096a23-8 asserts that the good cannot be «anything universally common and one» on the ground that it «may be so called in as many ways as that which is». Denying universality seems, then, to be equivalent to asserting multiplicity of senses.

(B) «Separable» cannot have Aristotle’s technical sense, according to which substances, but not e.g. affections or matter, are separable (Physics I 2. 185a31, De Generatione et Corruptione I 10. 327b22, II 1. 329a25): the meaning must be 'having unconnected senses'. Thus the parenthesis repeats what was said in the previous sentence, and is doubtless an intrusion. y and z are «related to one thing» x when there are relations R and S such that Ryx and Szx; they «form a succession» when Ryz and Szx."

5. Alexander (267. 14-2125) recommends to transpose 1005b2-5 to after l. 8 ?????, and Jaeger (1957, p. 6526) agrees with him, whereas Bonitz (p. 18527) defends the transmitted order.

6. Jaeger (1957, p. 7628) guesses that 1009a36-38 ??? … ??????? could be a later additament. It is true that 1099a38-b2 ?????? ?? … ???????? refers to 1009a22-23. These two genealogies are interrupted by two objections to the first "opinion" (1009a23 ????): 1009a30-36 ???? ??? ??? … ?? and 36-38 ??? … ???????. I cannot see why the latter should be more in the way of being a later additament than the former.

? in Context

Examining the relation between ? and B is of particular interest because contradictions in content make it imperative "to isolate Metaphysics ?, E 1, K 3-7 from the rest of the context of Metaphysics" (Merlan, p. 205).

According to Thomas Aquinas, in ? 1-3 Aristotle solves the aporiae 2-429, but not the first one30. Fonseca too does not find a solution of the first aporia; he holds that in ? 2, 1003b16-19 the fourth (according to his numeration the fifth) aporia is solved, in 1003b21-22 and 1004a2-9 the two partial questions of the third aporia (995b11-13).31

Brandis (p. 75): "Immediately, the first aporia […] is removed by reducing the different causes to the concept of substance […] and the contraries to the concept of being […]. At the same time, however, by designating the supreme contraries as what belongs to being in itself […], the question is answered whether one and the same science has to discuss substance and what belongs to it in itself […]. Even more evidently the aporia about the deduction of the axioms is solved."

According to Schwegler (iii 150), 1003a31-32 is the answer to the first aporia 996a18-b26, 1003b22-1004a2 answers 995b20-25, 1004a2-9 answers 995b10-13, 1004a9-b4 answers 995b20-25 (!), 1004b5-22 answers 997a25-34, 1005a19-b2 answers 996b26-997a15.

Natorp (p. 46): "The reference to the aporiae 1004a33 [Footnote: "For l. 32 ???? … ?????? is to be deleted."] is associated by preference with the aporia exposed in B 1, 995b18 = 2, 997a25; by the way, already Alexander observed that several other aporiae are answered too; he names the two aporiae B 1, 995b11 = 2, 997a15 and B 1, 995b20 (cited literally in Alexander 207, 8). But as in ? 2 these three aporiae (numbered by me as the 3rd, 4th and 5th) are removed, so already in ? 1 the 1st (B 1, 995b5 = 2, 996a18), likewise in ? 3 the 2nd (B 1, 995b7 = 2, 996b26), so that in the first three chapters the first five aporiae are removed in a coherent discussion. And it is precisely those which cover the subject of the «science which we are seeking» […]."

According to Jaeger (1912, p. 91), in ? 1-3 the first four aporiae are solved.

Ross (i, p. xxiii): "Problem 1 is answered in ?. 1, 2 (though not in the precise form in which it is raised) […].

Problem 2 is answered in ?. 3. 1005a19-b8 […].

Problem 3 is answered in ?. 1, 2 (especially 1004a2-9) […].

Problem 4 is dealt with in ?. 2. 1003b32-1005a18 (1004a32 refers explicitly to this problem)."

In order to have the correct criterion for the following examination, we should first be clear what is to be understood by an "aporia" and its "solution".

When the interpreters say over and over again that this or that aporia is "answered", aporia would be nothing but a question, which is "settled" by a mere statement of Aristotle's on it. This is too low a standard.

According to Topics, 145b16-21, ?????? (literally: "seeing no way out of it") is that state of mind, which is effected by the "equal persuasiveness of contrary argumentations" (?????? ???????? ????????): ???? ??? ??' ???????? ???????????? ???? ?????? ?????? ???????? ???' ???????? ????????, ????????? ???????? ????????. This state of perplexity cannot be remedied by simple asserting one of the two alternatives, but only by refuting the arguments in favor of the other. Therefore Wundt (p. 30) is right in saying "that it is often dubious, whether we are dealing with a real solution; for if, e. g., of the two assumptions opposed in Book B, one is simply maintained, while the other is not mentioned at all or swept aside straight out, this is certainly no real solution, and the awareness of problems is on a higher level in B than in such passages."

When Ross (i, p. 227) concerning the first aporia observes: "The precise difficulties raised here [996a18-b26] , however, are not solved", he himself points to the fact that the decisive criterion for the "solution" of an aporia is not fulfilled.

Besides, in B there is presupposed the opposite of what in ? serves as basis of the argumentation. (This contradiction, which was pointed out by Philip Merlan, p. 165, will occupy us in the next volume.) The aporia, therefore, must be of later date than its alleged "solution".

Of the second aporia, there can be said that it is solved in ?.

As regards the "solution" of the third aporia, in the interpolated section 1004a2-9 it is merely stated that there are several substances (= "kinds of substances" or "spheres of being"); what constitutes the unity of philosophy remains unclear. In the sentence 1003b18-19, this unity is not even asserted; the emphasis is on ??? ??????, as opposed to the other modes of being, not on a ?????, which does not occur at all. Again, the criterion for the solution of a aporia is not fulfilled: the ??????????? (997a19. 21. 24) are not mentioned at all. The alternative 995b12-13 is not discussed, it is simply asserted that the sciences of the different substances are branches of philosophy. According to Book ?, there are three such spheres of being; two of them belong to physics, the third one to "another" science (1069a36-b1). A common title for the inquiry on substance (1069a18) is missing here. In 1005b1-2 it is said by the way that "physics also is a kind of Wisdom" (????? ???); this is an answer to the question raised in B, 995b12-13, no more.

As regards the fourth aporia, 1004a31-33 is indeed a clear answer to the question "whether our investigation is concerned only with substances or also with the essential attributes of substances" (995b19-20), but it is not dealt with the objection raised in B, 997a30-32.

So it appears that in ? 1-3 there is throughout a thematic relationship to the first four aporiae, but not in the sense of "solutions". "The doubts came later."

Book ?

Thomas Aquinas wants to establish a systematic order among the articles: "Primo determinat distinctiones nominum quae significant causas, secundo, illorum nominum quae significant subjectum huius scientiae vel partes eius, ibi, unum dicitur aliud secundum accidens [1015b16]. Tertio nominum quae significant passiones entis inquantum est ens [= ???? ??? ????? ? ??, cf. 1004b5-6], ibi, perfectum vero dicitur et cetera [1021b12]." (Sententia Metaphysicae, liber 5 lectio 1 numerus 1)

According to Book ? (1005a12. 17), however, the denotation "passiones entis" only applies to ??????? (chapter 16), ????? and ???? (chapters 25-26), and ????? (chapter 28). In return, another passio entis, ???????? ??? ??????? (v. 1005a16), is treated already in chapter 11.

According to Schwegler (iii, p. 185), Book ? is nothing but "a series of unconnected sections, in which the most important philosophical terms are discussed by enumerating lexicologically their various meanings".

Likewise Bonitz: "Enumerantur hoc libro aliquot vocabula apud philosophos quummaxime usurpata […]."(p. 18) "Et omnino si quis vocabulorum, quorum usum exponit Aristoteles, vel delectum vel ordinem ad certam legem referre susceperit, operam videtur perdere […]." (p. 20)

Ross (i, pp. 289-290) takes the middle course between Thomas Aquinas and Schwegler/Bonitz: "The subjects treated of in this book fall into certain groups which may be arranged thus:

1. ???? 2. ??????. 3. ?????????.

4. ?????. 5. ?????????.

6. ??. 7. ??. 8. ?????.

9. ?????. 10. ???????????.

11. ??????? ??? ??????.

12. ???????.

13. ?????. 14. ?????. 15. ???? ??.

16. ???????. 17. ?????.

18. ???’ ?.

19. ????????. 20. ????. 21. ?????. 22. ????????. 23. ?????.

24. ?? ?????. 25. ?????. 26. ????. 27. ???????.

28. ?????.

29. ??????.

30. ??????????."

He overlooks that also chapter 29 (??????) and 30 (??????????) form a couple, which reappears in E 4 and K 8 (see below, pp. 92 and 160-161).

It is puzzling why the chapters 9-10 and 13-15 are separated from the chapters 6 and 7, to which they belong.

Interpolations

1. Chapter 2 (on ??????), which agrees literally with Physics, 194b23-195b21, is superfluous after 1013a16-17 ?????? ?? ??? ?? ????? ???????? ????? ??? ?? ????? ?????. "One who speaks like that gives to understand that he is not going to talk about it, and that what has been said of ???? is meant to apply to ??????" (Spengel, p. 915).

2. 1018a38-b8. Jaeger (1957, p. 101): "????? … 1018b8 hoc loco postea inserta esse apparet, cum sententia universali 1018a35-38 tota haec series clausa esse videatur. verba melius post 1018a11 collocarentur."

3. According to Jaeger (1957, p. 104), ll. 1019a23-26 ??? … ??????? "disputandi ordinem interrumpunt, cum hic de facultate passiva agatur;

cf. 21, 26-27, 31. ego verba 23-26 ad alteram recensionem pertinere censeo." The major offense is that ????' ("this") in l. 23 has no antecedent.

4. Chapter 27. Kirwan (p. 177): "This word, ???????, is hardly used by Aristotle outside the zoological works, and the reason for its inclusion here is a mystery. The chapter, alone in ?, does not distinguish more than one sense; but it is an admirable example of a definition by division. Perhaps it started life as an exercise, set by or to Aristotle, which was commended and preserved as a model answer."

? in Context

Brandis (pp. 82-83): "Book ? could be called a draft of a philosophical synonymics, and as such it is cited repeatedly, but without being regarded decidedly as part of the metaphysical inquiries [Footnote refers to Z 1, p. 1028a10-11, I 1, 1052a15-16, I 3, 1055a2, I 4 p. 1056b34-1057a1]. To these this draft, it is true, is more closely related than to the inquiries of other disciplines, but no ways exclusively: in the statements about principle, cause, element, nature, necessity, disposition, habit, affection, privation, it rather joins the Physics; in the synonymics of the concepts of contraries, genus, part and whole, prior and posterior and of the categories, it belongs to the Organon. Metaphysical discussions about potentiality and actuality are referred to as impendent [Footnote refers to ? 7 p. 1017b8-9.], inquiries about accidents in itself (??????????? or ????????? ???’ ????) without determining whether they are already made [Footnote refers to ? 30 p. 1025a33-34.] Which are the previous discussions about numbers referred to [Footnote: ? 15 p. 1021a19] is not clear."

Jaeger (1912, pp. 118-120): "It remains to explain why at some of these passages ?? ?????? is said [1046a5-6, 1055a2, 1055b6-7, 1056b34-35], at other ones, with seeming contradiction, ???????? [1028a10-11, 1049b4, 1052a15-16]. By the former expression, ? is marked as not belonging to the lecture, by the latter, in appearance, the contrary is said. But the two modes of citation harmonize in fact. ???????? or ??????? […] must noways mean «???????? or ??????? within the same lecture». Thus the Physics are cited by the formule ??????? ?? ??????? ????????, in which the two seemingly contradictory adverbial determinations are united, at the following passages:

 De Anima B 5, 417a17,

 De Generatione et Corruptione A 5, 320b28,

 De Generatione et Corruptione B 10, 337a18,

as well the writing De Generatione et Corruptione is cited:

 Meteorologica ? 1, 371b1,

as well De Generatione et Corruptione combined with the Meteorology:

 De Partibus Animalium B 1, 646a15,

 De Partibus Animalium B 2, 648b9,

as well the Meteorology:

 De Generatione et Corruptione B 6, 743a6,

as well De Caelo:

 Meteorologica A 3, 339b36.

Therefore, ?? ?????? and ???????? in the ? citations do not contradict; they do not say that Aristotle later has received into the main lecture that treatise originally distant from it. ? stood quite by itself, beyond the cursus metaphysicus.

This is confirmed by the fact that it is listed as separate writing in the catalogue of Diogenes Laertius (v 23): ???? ??? ??????? ????????? ? ???? ????????? ?. ???? ????????? means ???????? the sense of which is varied and determined by adding other words, e. g. ?? ?? scil. ?? ??????, ?? ??????, ???????, ???????? etc. Of course, the title ???? ??? ??????? ????????? is distorted by confusion of the two modes of citing ???? ??? ???????? ????????? and ???? ??? ??????? (scil. ??????? ???????). So even for Hermippus the Callimachean, ? was a separate treatise.

The same is proved by two citations in ?: ? 7, 1017b9, where Aristotle refers to the lecture ???? ???????? ??? ?????????, designating it as ?? ??????, and ? 30, 1025a33, where it is said of the ?????????? ???' ????: ????? ?? ?????? ?? ???????. So ? too designates itself as separate in relation to the main lecture and the group ZH?."

In his edition (1957, p. 194), however, Jaeger seems to have changed his mind: he comments on the reference to ? in 1052a15-16: "haec postea inserta esse debent, cum constet librum ? a ceteris libris Metaphysicorum separatum exstitisse quando index librorum Aristotelis apud Diogenem conscriptus est (i. e. Hermippi Alexandrini aetate)." In his comment on the same case in Z, 1028a10-11, he (ibidem, p. 128) is more hesitant: "at si verba a10 ?????????? ???????? et I 1052a16 ??????? ???????? ad librum ? eodem loco quo nunc exstat praecedentem spectant, ab editore Peripatetico, non ab Aristotele addita sunt."

The Thread of E

(1) Ross:

Division of theoretical sciences into physics, mathematics, theology (chapter 1).

Bonitz: Philosophia prima, quae versatur in cognoscendo ente, quatenus est ens, neque vero in uno quodam entis genere, 1025b3-18, qua ratione differat a reliquis philosophiae disciplinis exponitur. Ac distinctis primum tribus philosophiae generibus, theoretico practico poetico - 1026a6, theoretica philosophia iterum ex diversa rerum cognoscendarum indole in tres dividitur disciplinas, physicam mathematicam theologiam - a19, e quibus theologia prima est et potissima - a32.

Accidental being the subject of no science (chapter 2).

Bonitz: E diversis entis generibus primum ens accidentale tractare suscipit, 1026a33-b3. In eo cognoscendo nullam versari diciplinam exemplis comprobat et cur id fieri consentaneum sit exponit - b24. Deinde quae sit accidentis natura - 1027a5, qualis eius causa - a15, unde cognoscatur esse re vera accidens - a19 explicat, et scientiam accidentis non posse esse docet - a28.

Nature and origin of accident (chapter 3).

Bonitz: Quae sint accidentis, i. e. rerum fortuitarum, causae.

Being as truth is not primary being (chapter 4).

Bonitz: Ens per accidens et ens tamquam verum quoniam non significant propriam ac peculiarem entis naturam, his omissis transeundum est ad ipsum ens, quatenus est ens.

(2) Düring (p. 115): "This book is compiled from fragments differring in style and substance, maybe posthumously. In the first and fourth chapters we find marginal notes. The second chapter is stylistically the best one, the third one, by contrast, stylistically does not fit in with the context at all. Therefore we will not be mistaken in calling the first chapter a sketch preserved by chance; I consider it a draft of a lecture worked out in advance for special use. [footnote: "The Epsilon consists of drafts of lectures destined for an auditory not very versed in philosophy."]"

Düring (pp. 587-588): "In the four chapters of this book, Aristotle discusses questions connected with the topic ?? ? ??. Stylistically, the chapters are very different, and in substance, they do not form an unit. It seems to me impossible that the arrangement stems from Aristotle himself. I presume that Andronicus has compiled this book from fragmentary texts which he came across."

The first section, which reaches to 1025b18, offers no difficulties concerning the question what it is about.

The interpreters agree that with 1025 b18 ???? ?? a new argument begins. The ????-clause "does not support Aristotle's claim that physics is theoretical, but perhaps is meant to explain why the question is raised" (Kirwan 185). In this way it was (implicitly) understood already by Natorp and Muskens.

"Now a closer look is taken at such theoretical sciences, which deal only with a particular genus, particular ?????, i. e. not with ?? ? ??" (Natorp 48). This section would reach to 1026a23. Jaeger saw it that way too. The question raised in 1026a23-27 appears then as an afterthought, after Aristotle became aware of the contradiction in his concept of metaphysics.32

According to G. L. Muskens (p. 136), the second section treats the question "quaenam ex theoreticis scientiis de ente qua ens agere debeat" (cf. K, 1064a28-30), i. e. Muskens takes 1026a31-32 to be the result headed for from 1025b18 on. This will prove to be correct.

In the discussion about the relation of ontology and theology, triggered by Natorp, nobody remembered what Christ had written as early as 1853 (p. 82): "In libri ?. capite I, quod ad quaestionem, quomodo libri metaphysici cohaereant vel maxime, me judice, attendendum est, priore parte Aristoteles tria genera theoreticarum disciplinarum mathematicam, physicam, theologiam acutissime distinxerat, et theologiae sive primae philosophiae disceptationem de primis immotis atque per se existentibus substantiis vindicaverat. Nunc ex ratione, quae inter arithmeticam et inferiores mathematicae scientiae partes intercedat, primam philosophiam eandem de ente, qua ens, ob id ipsum, quia prima sit (??? ??????? ????? ??? ????? versu 30), agere Aristoteles argumentatur. Haec sententia si probata erit, praeposita verba particula causali ??? annexa ex eo loco, quem nunc teneant, amovenda esse apparebit. Nam ne ulla quidem res inest, qua praecedens sententia confirmetur. Itaque vix ulla dubitatio relinqui potest, quin haec verba postea demum ab Aristotele ad extrema capitis verba ??? ??????? ????? ??? ????? in margine adjecta esse censeamus. Id enim Aristoteles his verbis indicare voluisse videtur: dixi primam philosophiam, ut primam, universalem esse: facile enim aliquis dubitare potest, num sit prima philosophia universalis.

Atque si quis me nauseare etiam nunc censet, is adeat libri ?. capitis VII extremam partem 1064b3-14. Aristoteles enim verba, de quibus quaeritur, in margine libri ?. adjecta, in libro ?. breviore quidem sed multo limatiore in ordinem disputationis redegit: Hoc cum Aristoteles facere vellet, cum verbis ?????????? ?? nova disputationis pars incipienda fuit. Explosa igitur particula causali ??? substituit particulam ??."33

Christ can refer to ?, 1070a31-35, where the phrase ????????? ??? ?? ??? likewise follows the solution of the aporia. The solution is that, in a certain sense, both is true: in ?, that the principles are both different and identical, in E, that first philosophy, which by its very name is science of a genus, in a certain sense is also universal.34 The leading question in ll. 27-32 is (as in ? 3, 1005a29-b2), whether physics or theology is the first (primary, basic) science - the same as in the preceding section 1025b18-1026a23 (note especially the parallelism of 1026a10-13 and 29-30). It is theology in a missing sentence (which contains the said leading question)35, what the pronouns 30 ???? and 31 ?????? must refer to. Just in the Metaphysics, there are a lot of passages where with ?? ??? ??? … ?? ?? … an alternative is discussed: 999b1-17, 1003a12-13, 1007b34-35, 1011b32-35, 1040a20, 1064b9-11, 1081a5-12. This may be the reason why the alternative ll. 23-27 was put first. But it is not that which is discussed then. Therefore, the proposal of Muskens (p. 139) is unsufficient, who wants to insert a sentence which the ??? can refer to: "Dicit enim primam philosophiam omnium scientiarum esse potissimam, quoniam de divino agat. Deinde fingas eum omisisse: «at licet de divino imprimis agat philosophia, tamen de ente qua ens agere ei nihilominus competet»; post quae procedit: «namque dubitet aliquis, utrum prima philosophia sit universalis an de genere quodam certo»."

In E 2-4, there are inextricably intertwined the contrary intentions of treating (1026b3 and 24 ???????, 1027b18 ?????????) and excluding (1027b34 ???????) the accidens, as well as that of excluding (1027b34 ???????) and treating later (1027b29 ??????? ???????????) the ??????.36 After the ?????? in 1026b3, we expect that the meanings of "being" will be treated one after the other. That is done immediately for the accident, up to 1027b18 ????????? ??? ??????, and for the other meanings in the following Books ???. But then, suddenly, the intention is to exclude the ?????? and the ??????????, in this order!

Excluding accidens and what is true or wrong serves the purpose of defing more closely the sense of "being" in the phrase "the principles and causes of the things that are" (1025b3). In so far, E 4 is a dublet of ? 2. There it is limitated to substances, here to the categories. Natorp (p. 549) speaks of a "step back" ("Rückschritt") in comparison with ?.

With the said contradiction, another one is connected, which was recognized by Natorp and Theiler.

Natorp (p. 552): "We expect that now the two remaining significations are discussed, being after the categories and potentially or actually being. Instead it is said: because these two (already eliminated) meanings can be reduced to the «remaining genus» (1028a1), i. e. being after the categories (1027b31), that has to be treated. So the fourth meaning has simply fallen into oblivion; and while the whole discussion (chapters 2-4) can be understood only from the scope to settle with the distinction of four meanings of being established in the book «on the various senses of words», this intention is not even accomplished, since of the four meanings, after two are eliminated, only one remains."

Theiler (p. 92): "Actuality and potentiality are forgotten."

This contradiction comes even more to light in the parallel version K 8 (see below, pp. 160-161).

A simple expedient would be to count among the ?????? ????? ??? ????? (1028a1-2) also ?? ??????? ??? ???????? (1026b1-2), as does Fonseca (on 1028a3-4): "Rejectis ente per accidens, et ente, quod dicitur verum, eademque ratione ceteris entibus rationis, assumit ens per se [???' ????, cf. 1017a22-23] ac proprie [??????, cf. 1027b31-33] dictum in reliquo opere tractandum, ac explicandum; nempe quod in decem praedicamenta, et in actum ac potentiam dividitur, juxta divisionem entis libro 5. capite 7. et initio huius capitis propositam."

But ?????? is restricted to the categories, as ???' ???? in ? 7, see our comment on 1027b31-33 (p. 94).

The close relation of the concepts accident and true-wrong apears from 1028a1-4. That "both", accidens and truth, are ???? ?? ?????? ????? ??? ????? (1028a1-2), is established only for the ??????, 1027b31-33. Likewise, 1028a3 ??? ????? ????? is opposed only to the being ?? ??????; in this respect, it responds to the ?? ??? ?? ??? ???????? in K 8, 1065a24. Both passages are only intelligible, if the accidens is a special case of the ??????, according to ? 30, 1025a14-15.

It is probably no accident that ?????? and ?????????? are placed together at the end of Book ?. In limiting the inquiry to ??????, ? 29 is closer to the origin of the topic in Plato's Sophist (260 A - 268 D). We will follow up this matter in the next volume.

Interpolations

1. 1025b28-1026a6 ??? ?? … ?????.

According to Szlezák (2003, p. 104, notes 1 and 2), "1025b26-1026a6 is a kind of parenthesis", in 1026a6 "the thread of 1025b26 is resumed".37

2. 1026a12 ???? … ??????. Christ (p. 126): "???? … ?????? juxta 13 ? ??? ??? ?????? … 14 ??????? suspecta."

Jaeger (1957, p. 122): "verba seclusi, non interpretatur Alexander, legisse videtur Asclepius; cf. 13-14."

3. 1026a16-18 ?????? ?? … ??? ?????. Mansion (1956, p. 162) notes that "the relevance of this remark is not immediately clear". The ????? in l. 17 presupposes that immediately before it was spoken of the unmoved movers of the spheres, while in ll. 15-16 Aristotle had only said that the object of the primary science is unmoved. It is to this vague characterization that 1026a20 ?? ?? ??????? ????? refers.

4. 1027a15-19 ????? ?? … ??????? ????????. These ll. do not belong at all to an inquiry into the accidens, but outline a demonstration of the existence of "eternal things" (1027a19 ???? ????? as 1015b14), which only takes its starting-point from the accidental. "Later" probably refers to ? 6-7, as the commentators unanimously indicate. There, however, Aristotle proceeds quite differently. So the reference seems to come from the redactor.

5. 1027b14-16 ??? ??? ????? ????? … ???????? as well suggests an inquiry, which is quite irrelevant in the present context. Jaeger (1957, p. 127) notes: "post ???????? in medio abrumpitur disputatio."

6. 1027b31-33 ? ??? … ???????. Christ (p. 131: "pertinent ad 30 ?? ???????.") has rightly observed that these words are inserted; their right place is, however, behind 1028a1-2 (cf. above, p. 92).

E in Context

Schwegler (iv, pp. 1-2): "With the sixth book, we enter the innermost circle of metaphysics. Basic idea and theme of metaphysics is to investigate being as such and the concept of substance. Certainly, this investigation is not made until the seventh book, but the sixth book is so immediately connected with the seventh one, that the two cannot but be conceived as one book; the fact that they are dismembered without any sense cannot be regarded but as a misunderstanding by the redactor of the Metaphysics. If we take together the sixth and the seventh books, the following line of thought results:

(1) Metaphysics, as distinct from the other disciplines, has to investigate being qua being […].

(2) But being is used in many senses. In order to establish that being which metaphysics has to investigate, above all two kinds of being are to be rejected:

a. accidental being, which does not at all fall into the field of science,

b. being as truth, which does not exist objectively, but only in thought […].

(3) After rejecting these two kinds of being, there remain "the figures of predication" […]. Of these, the first category, ?? ???? or ?????, expresses the most primitive and substantial being, which is the foundation of the other categories (modes of being). Consequently, it is substance the investigation of which constitutes the proper and specific subject of metaphysics […]."

Natorp (pp. 47-48) points to the fact "that, after the question [about the "principles and highest causes", 1003a26-27] was turned more definitely to the concept of substance in ? 2 [1003b18-19], […] here it is started again from the unqualified concept of «being» [1025b3-4], whereas the concept «substance» […] is reinstated not until Z 1."

p. 549: "the more exact designation of the topic (not «being» in unqualified sense, but «substance»)" achieved in ? 2 is ignored in E 1, "so that this chapter is a step backwards, not forwards".

According to Zeller (II 2, 81 n.), the imperfectum ?? in 1026a34 "alludes unmistakably to" ?, 1017a7, 22 sq., 31. It seems "to presuppose Book ? as preceding part of the same work" (Natorp, p. 554). A similar ?? occurs in ?, 1041a19 (Theiler, p. 92); cf. also the imperfectum ???? in ?, 1071b3.

The Thread of Z

(1) Ross:

Substance (chapters 1, 2).

 What 'is' in the primary sense is substance (chapter 1).

 Bonitz: E diversis entis generibus primum et tempore et notione et cognitione est substantia, 1028a10-b2, haec igitur investiganda est ei qui ens, quatenus est ens, cognoscere voluerit - b7.

 Various opinions as to the denotation of substance (chapter 2).

 Bonitz: Antequam substantiae naturam investigare ipse suscipit, varias et vulgi et philosophorum de ea sententias paucis enumerat.

Substance as substratum (chapter 3).

Bonitz: Quae potissimum substantiae nomen sibi vindicent, 1028b33-36. De subjecto, ??????????, ut in quo cernatur substantiae vis ac dignitas - 1029a26; materia utrum pro substantia habenda sit necne - a34.

Substance as essence (chapters 4-6).

 What things have essence? (chapter 4)

 Bonitz: Quid sit ?? ?? ?? ????? et quibus in rebus suum ac principem habeat locum.

 Have couples terms an essence or definition? (chapter 5)

 Bonitz: Earum rerum, quae non simpliciter per se sunt, sed necessario substratum aliquod requirunt, num sit omnino ??????? necne.

 Is a thing the same as its essence? (chapter 6)

 Bonitz: Quaeritur utrum idem an diversum sit res quaelibet et eius ?? ?? ?????, et in substantiis quidem utrumque idem esse statuitur.

The implications of becoming (chapters 7-9).

 Conditions of the various kinds of becoming (chapter 7).

 Bonitz: Explicatis generationis generibus, et naturali - a26, et artificioso - b23, et spontaneo b30, nihil omnino fieri comprobat, nisi antea aliquid exstiterit - 1033a5. His adjungit quomodo ex materiae nomine quaedam appellentur - a23.

 Form does not come to be, any more than matter, but only the combination of the two (chapter 8).

 Bonitz: Forma rei non fit sed est, generatur vero id quod e materia et forma compositum est, accedente ad materiam forma - b19; sed propterea non est statuendum, formam ipsam per se tamquam rem separatam re vera esse, quae est Platonis sententia - b29; fiunt enim res non ex ideis tamquam exemplaribus, quae per se exsistant, sed ex aliis rebus eiusdem speciei - 1034a8.

 The conditions of spontaneous production answering (a) to artistic (b) to natural production. The conditions of production in categories other than substance (chapter 9).

 Bonitz: Unde fiat, ut quaedam fortuito perinde ac per artem efficiantur, alia non item - 1034a21. Quidquid fiat, fieri quodam modo ex re cognomine - b7. Formam quod demonstravit non generari, id non solum ad substantiam, sed pariter ad omnes categorias pertinere - b19.

Essence and definition (chapters 10-12).

 (1) Should the account of a whole contain that of the parts?

 (2) What parts are prior to the whole? (chapter 10).

 Bonitz: Quaerit quae partes rei adhibeantur ad definiendam rem, et quae eaedem sint definitionis partes, quae non 1034b20-1035b3; quae partes toto sint priores, quae non - b31. Deinde colligit paucis, quae huc usque disputavit - 1036a12, et exponit quae sit adhibenda cautio, si cui respondendum fuerit ad quaestiones huiusmodi - a25.

 Which parts are parts of the form, which of the concrete whole? (chapter 11).

 Bonitz: Quaeritur quae sint partes formae et quae rei concretae, ac proinde quae sint adhibendae ad rem definiendam, quae non, 1036a26-1037a10; quae praeterea hac de re investiganda sint significat - a20, et quae huc usque de natura ??? ?? ?? ????? excussa sunt complectitur - b7.

 What constitutes the unity of a subject of definition? (chapter 12).

 Bonitz: Qui fiat ut unum sit id cuius definitio ??????? est.

No universal is substance; no substance consists of substances (chapters 13-16).

 The universal is not substance (chapter 13).

 Bonitz: Universale non esse substantiam - 1039a14; inde consequens esse, ut substantia quaelibet simplex sit - a23.

 The Ideas are not substance (chapter 14).

 Bonitz: Quae huc usque disputata sunt, ad refutandam Platonicam de ideis doctrinam convertuntur.

 Individuals, and therefore Ideas, are indefinable (chapter 15).

 Bonitz: Res singulae non admittunt definitionem, sive eae sensibiles sunt - 1040a7, sive cogitabiles, quemadmodum ideae Platonicae - 1040b4.

 Two wrong views about substance (chapter 16).

 Bonitz: Animalium partes non esse actu substantias - 1046b16. Ens et unum non esse substantias - b26. Quid fraudi fuerit Platonicae de ideis doctrinae - 1041a5.

The true view of substance; substance is form (chapter 17).

Bonitz: Quid sit substantia rerum sensibilium docetur, adhibita ad demonstrationem notione causae; esse eam formam rei - 1041b10, non elementum rei - b33.

(2) Let us begin with what is obvious: that the chapters 7-9 and 12 are interpolations. A good summary of the grounds is given by Frede/Patzig (i 24): Z 7 begins without connecting particle. Chapter 10 goes back to 4-6.38 The recapitulation of the chapters 4-10 (1037a21-b7) ignores 7-9, just as H 1. H 3; 1043b16-18 refers to Z 8, but as to "another" writing (?? ??????). A further evidence is the fact that Aristotle, for the thesis that "those things which do not involve matter but are without matter, and whose formulae are formulae of the form only, do not pass away, - either not at all or at any rate not in this way" (1035a28-30), "refers to Z 8 both in Z 15, 1039b26 and in H 3, 1043b16, but not here in Z 10" (ii, p. 182).

"Certain doubts" are aroused by Z 15, 1039b26-27. "Probably, we must assume that this sentence, which can be removed without any negative effect on the context [the effect is even positive, see ii, p. 283: "The ??? ????? seems to refer not to what immediately precedes, but to b22-23"], is part of a revision of Z and H, which followed the addition of Z 7-9" (i, p. 24).

According to Frede/Patzig (p. 24), ? 8, 1049b27-29 seems to suggest that the chapters 7-9 were included already by Aristotle himself, but of this reference the same is true as of Z 15, 1039b26-27.

Things are not so easy with Z 12, which is regarded as inserted by Jaeger (1912, pp. 53-62) and Frede/Patzig (i, pp. 25-26 and ii, p. 221). If we keep strictly to the facts, we can only state certain incompatibilities in the area of 1036b32-1038a35, i. e. at the end of the part dedicated to essence (?? ?? ?????).

(1) 1036b32-1037a5 is incompatible with 1037a10-13: first, it is asserted that there is an intelligible matter (1037a4-5), then the question is raised whether there is such a matter, and the answer is postponed to "later".

(2) A similar relation exists between Z 12 and 1037a17-20. The question raised in Z 12. 1037b11-12 ??? ?? ???? ?? ????? ?? ??? ????? ??????? ????? ????? is "the same which was referred from the present inquiry to a later one few lines before (1037a17-20). How can it go with the ???????? ??????? in 1037a20 that in one breath the treatment of the postponed topic is started? And how, if this treatment presents itself as prosecution not of the problem raised before, but of a problem raised in the Analytics?" (Jaeger, l. c., p. 58).

(3) The two references to "later" (1037a12-13 and 20) collide. "The stereotyped ???????? ???????, without any addition, immediately after the preceding ???????? ??????? in a12-13, has something odd […]." (Jaeger, l. c., p. 55)

(4) In favor of their supposition that Z 12 is inserted, Jaeger (1912, p. 60) and Frede/Patzig (i, p. 26 and ii, p. 221) refer to the fact that it is omitted in the recapitulation H 1.

(5) 1037a5-10 ????? ?? ??? … ?? ???' ??????? is a note on what is to be understood by "primary substance" (????? ?????) and belongs to 1037a27-b7. I cannot subscribe that 1036b32 and 1037a5 "aptissime inter se cohaereant" (Bonitz, p. 341).

The most natural conclusion from points (2) and (3) is that 1037a17-20 is a later insertion, especially because the transition from chapter 11 to 12 and from 12 to 13 is formally irreproachable: ??? ?? in Z 12. 1037b8 follows a long recapitulation as in H 1. 1042a24 (see below, p. 122), and that the recapitulation Z 12. 1038a34-35 goes well with the beginning of Z 13 (1038b1-2) is shown by comparison with A 993a24-26 and Ethica Nicomachea i 4-5 (1097a13-15 ??? ???? ??? ?????? ??? ???????? ???????. ????? ?' ??????????? …). This conclusion from formal criteria agrees with the result of Bostock's (p. 184) analysis that Z 12 represents a stage of Aristotle's views about definition earlier than H 6.

The chapters 7-9 being ejected, the structure of the book is quite clear.

Chapter 1: science of being is science of substance.

Chapter 2: outline of a treatise on substance.

Chapter 3. 1028b33-36: outline of a preliminary inquiry into the meaning of "substance". (This is the topic of Book Z.) Four meanings are enumerated: essence (?? ?? ?????), universal (???????), genus (?????), substratum (???????????). Three of them are treated:

(1) substratum in chapter 3, 1028b36-1029a9,

(2) essence in chapters 4-6 + 10-11 + 12 (unity of definition),

(3) universal in chapters 13-16.

In chapter 17, a new attempt is made. Parallels to 1041a6-7 ????? … ??????????? are Physica viii 7, 260a20-21; Ethica Nicomachea vi 3. 1139b14; vii 1. 1145a15; Ethica Eudemia ii 1. 1218b31; ii 6. 1222b15. (Frede/Patzig ii, p. 308)

The internal structure of several chapters (or parts of them), however, is difficult to recognize; these chapters shall be analyzed in the following.

Chapter 3

"Metaphysics Z 3 belongs to the most important, but also most difficult and most controversial chapters of the Metaphysics." (Frede/Patzig, ii, p. 33)

The discussion may be represented by the following quotations:

Brandis (p. 78): "Conceived as support [???????????], substance can be regarded as matter or form or the union of both. After eliminating matter and such an union, the examination of form leads back to one of the other meanings, quiddity (chapters 4 sqq.)."

Bonitz (p. 301): "formam autem qua ratione possit ad ??????????? referre, equidem non assequor, sed non possum quin negligentiam quandam disserendi in eo cerni putem, quod cum materia et re concreta simul tertium illud attulit, quod plerumque cum iis conjungitur, oblitus, ut videtur, se agere de ??????????. Et ipse quidem Aristoteles et in hoc libro formam, ?? ?????, perquirit non ubi de ?????????? sed ubi de ?? ?? ?? ????? disputat, et alibi, ? 8, ipsas has duas significationes substantiae inter se opponit, ut vel sit ??????????? ??????? vel ???? ?? ??? ????????."

Ross (ii, pp. 164-165): "The treatment of ?? ??????????? as ambiguous, meaning (1) matter and (2) the concrete unity of matter and form, is natural, and common enough in Aristotle (matter underlies actuality or form, the concrete individual underlies its affections or accidents, I. 23, cf. 1038b5); but it is surprising to find (3) form put forward as one of its meanings. The same suggestion, however, occurs in H. 1042a28. Aristotle’s meaning is that the form or essence, instead of the concrete individual, may be thought to be what underlies properties and accidents; cf. the description of the soul as the ??????????? of life, ?. 1022a32. The reference to form, then, is not as Bonitz suggests a slip due to the constant association of matter, form, and the unity of the two, in Aristotle’s thought. Nor is the fact that form is discussed under the head of ?? ?? ?????, not of ??????????? (Bonitz 301) a real objection to its presence here. Substratum and essence present themselves with the universal and genus as rival candidates for the position of substance. If essence turns out to be a kind of substratum, the original division into four turns out to be a cross-division; but we already know from the case of ?? ??????? and ?? ????? that that is so. The original fourfold division is merely a prima facie one."

Düring (p. 613) thinks that "the obscurity in this chapter" is due to the ambiguity of the terms ??????????? and ???. The former means at first "subject of predication", but "suddenly, the structure of predication is interpreted ontologicaly", and "the ??????????? becomes an x plus qualities". ??? is "on the one hand, a functional concept, relative in itself, and invariant only in relation to the ?????, on the other hand, it designates absolutely physical matter".

Devereux (p. 169): "It is puzzling that Aristotle begins with the clear assertion that matter, form, and the composite are underlying subjects, and then proceeds to argue that matter alone is an underlying subject. Even if this is not what Aristotle is trying to show in the argument, the assertion is still puzzling in that it seems to conflict with his claim - made in a number of passages [190b28-29, 412a16-21, 414a12-14, 1038b4-6, 1043a5-7, 1049a27-36, v. p. 166, n. 16] - that the form of a composite is predicable of the underlying matter: if the form is predicable of the matter, it cannot be an underlying subject as defined in the immediately preceding lines (1028b36-7)."

Let us first be clear that considering form as subject is not incompatible with Aristotle's views (as Bonitz and Devereux believe). 1038b5-6, in combination with 1049a27-3639, show that Aristotle did distinguish three meanings of "subject" (???????????), form being contained under "a this" (???? ??) in the former passage. The same tripartition occurs in H, 1042a26-31. The question is, therefore, whether 1029a2-5 ???????? ?? … ?? ??????? fits into the context of Z 3.

If we draw on ? 8, 1017b10-14, we understand why "that which underlies a thing primarily is thought most of all to be its substance" (1029a1-2)40: it is because "substance is thought to belong most obviously to bodies" (1028b8-9). Aristotle is characterizing what Heidegger calls "the vulgar understanding of being": what exists is what is spoken of, i. e., in technical terminology, the "subject". For this understanding, the subjects are entities as "statue" (1029a5), "animal" (1038b6) or "man" (1049a29). It is only ontological analysis which distinguishes between matter and form, and it is only now that subjecthood as criterion of substantiality becomes unsufficient, because "thus matter alone must seem to be substance" (1029a18-19). In 1029a12-18, Aristotle is arguing within the common sense view that substance = body.

Another problem is the transition from chapter 3 to chapter 4. The traditional view41 is that the inquiry among the sensible substances announced in 1029a33-34 begins with chapter 4 and reaches to ?1. But the begin of chapter 4 returns to the disposition given in 1028b33-36, thus finishing the first point of the agenda, the substratum. In consequence of this, modern interpreters expressed a certain discomfort with the traditional view, but without feeling compelled to change their ideas about the role of the following chapters and books. According to Natorp (p. 563), after 1029a32-33 we expect that the inquiry is about form, not about essence (as happens in chapter 4); "that both coincide and in what way, is explained later (caput 7, 1032b1) just in passing, but here, where we expect a remark concerning this, it is withhold. Perhaps we may suppose that Aristotle presumes this equation to be known; after all, it remains inconvenient that just here it is not expressed."

Likewise Frede/Patzig (i, p. 31) observe that "Z 4-6 does not seem to adjoin Z 3 without break". They offer two explanations to choose from:

(1) Form and essence are identical. (ii, p. 57)

(2) Chapters 4-6 originally were not written for the present context. (ii, p. 58)

Jaeger (1957, p. 132) comments on 1029b12 (which he takes to be the real end of chapter 3, see below, p. 114): "post 12 ????? disputatio vix incohata abrumpitur."

As the second explanation proposed by Frede/Patzig, this raises the question where, then, the real continuation of chapter 3 is to be found. It is H 1. 1042a24. In H 2. 1042b9-11, matter is excluded from the inquiry in similar way as in Z 3. 1029a32-33, and then begins what is announced in 1029a32-34.

Chapter 4

According to Frede/Patzig (ii 60), the lines 1029b21-22 present "almost unsurmountable difficulties", because "at first sight, no reference is to be found for the ???? in l. 21". To my understanding, ???? indicates the absurd consequence which results, if "white" (??????) is definition of "surface" (?????????). For then "smooth" (?????) is definition too.

Chapter 5

According to Frede/Patzig (ii, pp. 82), in the section 1030b28-1031a1 it is unclear what l. 35 ?? ?? ?? refers to, and how the infinite progress spoken of in l. 35 comes about.

The said progress comes about by the following procedure:

(1) The expression ??? ???? is permitted.

(2) ???? can be substituted by ??? ?????.

(3) ??? ????? is equivalent to ??? ????.

Hereby we arrive at the ??? ??? ???? in l. 35. If we now again apply point (2), we get "again another nose".42

The second ?? ?? ??, then, must refer to both arguments of ll. 28-35: the infinite progress comes about, if

1. ??? ???? cannot be substituted by ??? ????? (but only by ??? ??? ?????), and

2. ??? ????? not by ???? (but only by ??? ????).

Chapters 7-9

Concerning the section 1033a1-5, grammar permits only of one interpretation: an answer is given to the question whether matter is part of the formula too; for in the elliptical sentence ll. 1-2 ???' ??? ??? ??? ?? ?? ????, ? ??? ????? is to be supplied from the preceding sentence (1032b32). Pseudo-Alexander's and Bonitz's interpretation that it is about the question, whether there is one matter also for the parts of the formula, fails because of the definite article at ???.

Frede/Patzig (ii 131) give two reasons why Aristotle in 1033a25-26 is referring not to 1032a17 (Ross), but to 1033a5-23 (Jaeger): "(i) The remark ?? ? ???????? can be understood only with regard to the second part of chapter 7; (ii) only in the second part of chapter 7, not in 1032a17, it is explained how the façon de parler «a thing comes from its matter» is to be understood."

Chapter 12

1037b24 ???? ??? ??? … ??.

Ross (ii, p. 207) interprets: "For at that rate a genus and all its differentiae would form a unity."

The most simple interpretation was overlooked: if "being present in …" (??????????) by itself is sufficient as reason of unity, then all things become one (in the sense of Parmenides), because for all things there can be found a comprehensive whole, finally the universe.

Chapter 13

1038b2-3.

Wilpert (1960, p. 130) on the compositum: "If this still outstanding issue is treated at all in the course of the Book Z, only chapter 15 comes into consideration". In the beginning of this chapter (1039b20), he finds a confirmation that the compositum is treated indeed, but he must admit that in the course of the chapter (since 1039b27) this issue is "further pursued" in a "modified form".

Frede/Patzig (ii, pp. 242-243) delete the words ??? ?? ?? ??????, firstly because they are neglected in the following sentence, secondly because they presuppose the equations ??????????? = matter, and ?? ?? ????? = form.

The argument of 1038b12-15 is not clear at first sight.

Christ (1853, pp. 69-70): "Extrema enuntiationis pars ?? ??? ??? … ?? [ll. 14-15] proximam sententiam ???? ?' ?? … ????? [ll. 13-14] haud quaquam probat. Nam thesis, universale quoddam unius rei praedicatae substantialem naturam non significare, minime firmatur ea ratiocinatione, quae plurium rerum unam (?? ??? ??? ???) substantiam communem esse sumit. Sed nemo non videbit, hac argumentatione optime antecedentia verba (??????? ? ??? ???? ??) muniri. Itaque trajectis verbis legendum esse censeo: ??????? ?' ??? ???? ??? ?? ??? ??? … ???? ??. Nec tamen video, quomodo omnino interjecta verba ???? … ????? quadrent. Aristoteles enim universalia aut omnium rerum, de quibus praedicentur, aut nullius esse substantias statuerat. Jam cum posterioris dilemmatis membri excutiendi labore supersedisset, argumentatio priore membro disceptato absoluta fuit. Itaque proclivis sum, ut illa verba ad ipsius dilemmatis rationem confirmandam postea ab Aristotele adjecta esse credam; quae quidem opinio etiam tempore futuro probari videtur: tertium non datur, nam si e. g. illud universale unius rei substantia esset, reliquae res ab illa una non differrent."

Ross (ii, p. 210): "The argument is not clear but may be interpreted as follows: 'What will the universal be substance of? Either of all its particulars or of none (for there is no reason why it should be substance of one any more than of the others); but it cannot be substance of all (since, as we have just seen, l. 10, the substance of a thing is something peculiar to it. It follows, then, that it is the substance of none of its particulars). If we try to avoid this conclusion and treat it as the substance of one of them, then (since (the universal will be no less the substance of its other particulars, and) things that have the same substance are identical) this one will be the others; which is absurd.'"

Cherniss (1944, p. 319\*): "I take ???? ?' ?? ?????, ??? ????? ????' ????? to be a parenthetical argument in support of the statement that the universal must be substance either of all or of none of the particulars; then ?? ??? ??? ? ????? … ???? ?? (1038 B 14-15) gives the reason for ?????? ?' ??? ???? ?? (cf. 999 B 20-22; cf. 1036 B 17-20: if one assumes a single "form" for obviously different things, it is possible to set up a single idea for all things, but then all things would be one; contrast 992 B 9-11). The ordinary interpretation (Ross, Metaphysics, II, p. 210; [Alexander], Metaph., p. 524, 3-12) leaves both the disjunction and ?????? ?' ??? ???? ?? without a supporting demonstration expressed. St. Thomas gives an entirely different disjunction: "aut enim oportet quod sit substantia omnium, quibus inest, aut unius" (In Metaphysicam Comment., § 1572 [ed. Cathala, 1926 = Sententia Metaphysicae, liber 7 lectio 13 numerus 7])."

Frede/Patzig (ii, p. 250) assume that two arguments are confused:

"(i) The universal is ????? either of all things to which it belongs, or of no one of them. Of all things it cannot be ?????. Now it is left to us to draw the conclusion that it will be then ????? of nothing to which it belongs. As well it is left to us to draw the further conclusion that it will be then ????? of absolutely nothing. This further conclusion results from the fact that the thing, the ????? of which is the universal, must be among the things, to which the universal belongs. For the ????? belongs to that of which it is ?????. If, however, the universal is ????? of no one of the things to which it belongs, then there cannot be anything of which it is ?????.

(ii) If, among the things, to which the universal belongs, there is even one, the ????? of which is the universal, then all things, to which the universal belongs, will be identical with this one."

With ??????? (l. 13), Aristotle anticipates the result. He is driving at the conclusion that the unversal is ????? of nothing, which he achieves by excluding the alternatives "?????? or ????", as Thomas Aquinas correctly explains.

In 1038b18-20 the grammatical interpretation is controversial, as appears from the following comments.

Asclepius (431. 3-7): ???? ????? ? ???????????, ?? ????’ ????? ????, ?? ??????? ?????? <???> ????? ?? ?? ??????? ????? [?] ???????. ?????? ?? ??? ??????????? ????? ??? ?????????? ???????, ????? ??? ???????? ?? ????? ???? ?? ?? ?????? ????? ??????? ??? ?? ?? ????? ??????????.

Bonitz (pp. 347-348): "Atqui animalis iterum est definitio, in qua quae continentur, ea tamquam ??????? ????????? inesse item oportebit in substantia animalis, et sic porro; oportebit igitur, hoc si quis statuerit, in infinitum abiri. Talem fere argumentationem Aristotelem suspicor in mente habuisse, sed omisisse, quia objici posset, non esse omnium ??? ?? ?? ?????, b20, definitionem."

Ross (ii, p. 210): "In answer to the suggestion now put forward, that the universal is not the substance of things in the sense of essence, but is a substance because it is an element present in their essence, Aristotle replies that the universal can be defined [reading ???? ??? ????? ????? in l. 19], and seems to have meant to add that in that case it will itself contain a generic or universal element, and so substance will be contained in substance, ad infinitum. But, he observes, we need not make this assumption, that everything that is part of the substance of something can be defined [reading ????? ???? in l. 20]."

In his translation, Ross has changed his mind: "Then clearly it [the univeral] is a formula of the essence. And it makes no difference even if it is not a formula of everything that is in the substance." Ross now reads ???? for ???? in both lines 19 and 20.

Frede/Patzig (ii, p. 255) on the interpretation Asclepius/Bonitz/Ross (in the commentary): "What is disturbing about this interpretation is that Aristotle is supposed to break off right at the beginning an argument which does not satisfy himself, instead of deleting it."

Frede/Patzig (ii 255) on the interpretation Ross (in the translation): "This, however, seems to be exceedingly harsh. For it is hard to refer ????? to anything other than ???? […]."

The grammatical question is whether in l. 19 with ????? is meant what is present in the essence (cf. ll. 17-18 ?? ????? ?? ??????????) or the essence itself. Accordingly, l. 19 ????? (the reading of Bekker's codex S and Jaeger, see vol. i, p. 204; for ?????? in combination with ????? cf. 1039b7 and 12) ??? ????? ????? must be translated either with "there will be a definition of it" or with "it (the universal) will be a definition of it (the essence)". On this decision depends the other whether in l. 20 ???? or ???? must be read.

Ross's later interpretation has the advantage of avoiding the break stated by Bonitz, Ross and Frede/Patzig. The objection of harshness (Frede/Patzig) can be removed by accepting it. For only then a perfect argument results: the universal "will be a definition of it", i. e. of the said element present in the substance (e. g. "animal"). But even in this case, namely if the universal "is not a formula of everything that is in the substance [for the phrase ?? ?? ????? cf. M 4. 1079b8-9]", "the same result [as in ll. 9-15, cf. Ross ii, p. 210: "so that the new view that the universal is a substance present in the essence of its particulars turns into the old one which has already (1038b9-16 [rather 15, see below, p. 116]) been refuted"] will follow once more".

1038b29-30.

Frede/Patzig (ii, p. 258) wrongly presuppose that "if ????? is the subject of the protasis, it must be the universal under discussion". ????? cannot be but Socrates and the ????? present in him. As subject in the ????-clause is to be supplied "this ?????: "so that this ????? (man) is ????? of two things, of man and Socrates."

1038b30-31.

Cherniss (1944, p. 320): "I take ? ???????? ??? ??? ???? ??????? to mean infimae species, not, as does Pseudo-Alexander (Metaphysica, p. 525, 17-19), individuals (cf. Bonitz, Metaphysica, p. 348) ; 1038 B 30-34 is not the conclusion of all that goes before in this chapter but only of 1038 B 17-30, and this passage assumes for the sake of argument or example that the substance of the individual man is "man" (1038 B 18, 21), i. e. that "man" is ?? ?? ?? ????? of the individual. From this must be strictly separated 1038 B 34-1039 A 3 which refers to the more general form of the question in 1038 B 8-16: can any universal be substance? From the unrestricted answer in 1038 B 35-1039 A 2 and the additional reference to the "third man" (1039 A 2-3) it is clear that even in 1038 B 8-16 Aristotle does not mean to state as his own doctrine that the specific form "man is substance or essence."

Minor Interpolations

(1) 1028b13-15 ??????? … ???????? - see vol. i, p. 170.

(2) 1029a5-7 ???? … ??? ??? ????? ????? - see vol. i, p. 174.

(3) 1029b3-12 ??? ?????… ??? ?????? ?????.

Bonitz (1842, pp. 129-130): "[…] his verbis ???? ?' ?? ???? ?????????? ?????? ???????? ??? ??????, ??? ?????? ?? ?? ?????? ????? ?? ?? ?? ?????, ????????? ???? ????? argumentandi nexum interrumpi inde apparet, quod proxima verba ??? ????? ??? ?? ??????????? ??? ?? ???????????? nulla ratione cum iis conjungi possunt, sed artissime cum superioribus cohaerent, quibus tertium caput finitur ???????????? ?' ?????? ????? ??? ???????? ?????, ???? ?? ??????? ???????? ??????. Itaque universa illa enuntiatio ???? ?' ?? ???? ???. hinc ejicienda erit et ponenda paullo infra b12 ante ??? ?????? ??????? ???? ???? ????? ???????."

Jaeger (1957, p. 132) rightly believes that reversely the preliminary remark 1029b3-12 ??? ?????… ??? ?????? ????? is later added. When he (l. c.) comments: "post ????? disputatio vix incohata abrumpitur", he does away with the traditional view that the inquiry into essence (in the chapters 4-6 and 10-11) is identical with the inquiry into form announced in 1029a32-33. The latter rather begins with H 2.

This observation has the far-reaching consequence that the whole Book Z turns out to be a study of substance in general, not, from chapter 4 on, of sensible substance. This view is supported by the references ?? ???? ???? ??? ?????? ?????? in ?, 1049b27-28 and ?? ???? ???? ?????? ??? ???? ??? ????? ??????? ?????? in I, 1053b17-18.

(4) In 1032b15-17, we have the choice of adopting Bywater's emendation ?? (for ??) or ejecting, with Christ43, ??? ?? … ??????? as a marginal note. The decisive argument in favor of Christ is that l. 17 ?????? must refer to 1032a32-b14, cf. b23 with b1 and 5.

(5) 1034b7-19.

Christ (p. 149): "?? ????? … 19 ????? pertinent ad caput 8."

Jaeger (1957, p. 146): "7 ?? ????? … 19 ????? additamentum est ad 1033b19 sq. postea sub finem huius disputatiunculae, quae est ???? ???????? […], agglutinatum."

(6) 1035a14-17 ???? ?' ?? … ??? ???????.

"These sentences interrupt the context, which by ??? ??? adjoins to the example of the circle and its segments." (Frede/Patzig, ii 175)

(7) 1036a9-12.

Jaeger (1957, p. 150): "9 ??? … 12 ?????????? postea (nescio an ab Aristotele) addita videntur."

(8) In our interpretation of 1038b18-20 (see above, p. 113) it appeared that the passage 1038b16-23 forms one argument with ll. 10 sqq., to which it refers back by ?????. This line of thought is interrupted by the sentence 1038b15-16 ??? … ???, which introduces a quite different argument.

(9) 1039a30-33.

According to Schwegler (iv 119), 1039a30-32 ?? ??? … ??? ?????? (he omits the words l. 33 ???? ??? ?? ????, which were deleted later by Christ) interrupts the argumentation and does not belong here, but rather "to

one of the argumentations of the preceding chapter". The present argumentation runs as follows: in ll. 27-28 an alternative is brought up: ???? ?? ??? ?????? ?? ?????? ????? ? ??????; the first part of it is discussed in ll. 33-b6, the second one ll. b7 sqq.

Frede/Patzig (ii 267), who criticize Schwegler, do not have regard to this context.

Z in Context

For the external relations of Book Z the following references are relevant:

(1) 1028a10-11, a reference to ? 7.

Jaeger (1962, p. 203): "Here [Z 1] it is perfectly clear that, if E 2 had preceded, either Aristotle would have referred his readers to the full and detailed account of the meanings of 'being' there given, or he would not have enumerated these meanings at all, because every one would have them in mind."

But E 2, in turn, refers to ? 7 (see above, p. 95). It is quite natural that the author cites the source and not a citation of the source.

(2) 1029b1 ?? ????, a reference to 1028b33-36.

According to Jaeger (1912, p. 108; cf. 1962, p. 201), this citation "shows that the beginning of Z once was an ????. This occurs often in the Aristotelian «works»; one only needs to think of the treatise ???? ?????? (Ethica Nicomachea viii, ix), the writing ???? ??? ??????? ????????? (Politica vii, viii) and similar cases."

But ?? ???? corresponds to the ?????? in 1028b32, i. e. to a "start" within Book Z.

?? ???? in a reference occurs at the following passages of the Corpus Aristotelicum:

Categoriae 11b13 (referring to 2a3),

De Generatione et Corruptione 337a25 (referring to Physica iv. 223b18-20),

Ethica Nicomachea iv. 1122b1 (referring to ii. 1103b21-23), viii 11. 1159b25 (referring to viii 1. 1155a22-28), ix 3. 1165b6 (referring to ix 1),

Magna Moralia ii. 1200a30-31 (referring to i. 1185a36-1186b3),

Ethica Eudemia ii. 1227a10 (referring to i 6, which is still part of the prooemium, see i 7. 1217a18 ???????????????? ?? ??? ??????).

The real parallels, however, are the instances where the equivalent phrase ???' ????? refers "to the beginning of a new inquiry within the same book" (see below, p. 217).

(3) 1037a12-13 ???????? ???????

Schwegler (iv, p. 108) and Ross (ii, p. 204) refer to MN.

Frede/Patzig (ii, p. 216): "This may be a reference to Books M and N, especially to M 7-9". But M and N "give only criticism, no positive theory" (i, p. 30).

Bonitz (p. 342) refers to ? 10 and ?.

(4) 1037a20 ???????? ???????.

Schwegler (iv, p. 108) refers to chapter 12, Ross (ii, p. 104) to H 6.

Bonitz (p. 342): "Praeterea quum ex pluribus partibus unam fieri notionem intellectum sit, quaeritur, quomodo hae plures partes unum efficiant, quod proximo capite excutitur; et quum unitatem notionis ex rei unitate repeti consentaneum sit, eadem quaestio de ipsa re oritur. […] Eam rem investigat H 6."

Jaeger (1912, p. 56): "This interpretation is fundamentally wrong. It springs from a harmonistic criticism, which wants to level the roughnesses by supplying what is said twice with distinctive nuances not really belonging to it. Nobody unbiased will read from Z 12 another tendency than from H 6."

Jaeger (l. c., p. 61) concludes that Z 12 is a doublet to H 6.

Jaeger (1912, p. 110): "??????? ???????? does not mean «below», i. e. later in the same «work»; it means «at a later occasion», referring throughout even to other lectures, be it of the same science or of another one."

(5) 1039a22 ?? ??? ???????.

Bonitz (p. 349): "Eam repugnantiam postea se soluturum promittit. Ac videtur quidem proximo libro, H 6, ad eam redire, sed plane eam illic solvisse non potest putari."

Ross (ii, p. 211): "?. 15, ?. 6. Aristotle is not very successful in solving the problem."

(6) 1037b8-9 ?? ???? ???????????.

92a29 ff. (Frede/Patzig, ii, p. 222)

The Thread of H

(1) Ross:

Sensible substances; matter (chapter 1).

Bonitz: Materiam rerum sensibilium et ipsam pro substantia esse habendam, 1042a24-b8.

Form or Actuality (chapters 2, 3).

Bonitz: De forma rerum sensibilium, quae actu sit substantia.

 The various types of differentia or constitutive form (chapter 2).

 Bonitz: Enumerata formarum varietate et ad summa quaedam genera reducta, in forma cerni naturam ac substantiam rei cuiuslibet docet, 1042b9-1043a12.

 In definitionibus describitur aut forma rei aut materia aut res e forma et materia concreta, 1043a12-28.

 Distinction between concrete substance and actuality or form. The former is generated and destroyed, the latter not. Analogy between form or definition and number (chapter 3).

Bonitz: Nomine aliquo utrum res concreta an ipsa per se rei forma significetur ad inveniendam rei substantiam nihil differt, 1043a29-b4.

Forma, qua quid sit aliqua res constituitur, diversa est et distinguenda ab elementis, ex quibus est composita, 1043b4-23. Antisthenis de definienda rerum natura sententia - b32.

Bonitz: De materia, capita 4, 5.

The various causes of generable natural substances, eternal natural substances, and natural events (chapter 4).

Only things subject to generation and change have matter. The relations between matter and its contrary states (chapter 5).

The unity of definition (chapter 6).

Bonitz: Definitioni, ex pluribus notis compositae, quae sit causa unitatis, 1045a7-b23.

(2) The text divides itself by two recapitulations: 1043a26-28 and 1044a11-14. The first one first refers to chapter 2 by "what sensible substance is" (??? ? ??????? ????? ????, cf. 1042b10-11), then to chapter 1 (1042a26-31) by "how it exists" (???). The second one become clear only after we have ejected the fourth interpolation (see below, p. 123).

Interpolations

(1) 1042a22-24 ???? … ????? must be a later addition, referring to ll. 24-25. For the argument ???? ??? … ????? makes sense only if it was said before that the present inquiry (24 ??? as opposite to 23 ???????) is on sensible substances. On the other hand, the ??? does not need a preceding ???????, because it refers to ??????? in l. 4.

(2) In 1042b7-9, the opposition ??? … ?? is equally unapt as, e. g., in 1086a18-21, therefore the reference to the "physical works" (cf. Physica v. 1, De Generatione et Corruptione i. 7) in form of a recapitulation is likely to be inserted by a redactor.

(3) With 1042b23-25 ??? ?? ??? … ??????? and 28-35 ????? ?? … ???????? ?????, we have the same footnote in two versions, both interrupting the context: 1042b24-25 ??? ???? ?? ??? ??????? ?? ?? ???????? refers to 21-23 ?? ?? ???? ??? ???????? ??????? … ???????? (Ross ii, p. 229), 31-32 ?????? ??? ?? ???? ??? ???????? joins to 25-28 ???? ????? … ???????????44.

(4) 1043b23-32 ???? … ?? ??????.

In Ross's commentary, we meet two contradictory informations about 1043b14-23:

"Aristotle has said (ll. 10-14) that if the genus and differentia are treated as the matter of the thing defined, the definition must miss the essence of the thing defined. 'Thus', he continues, 'there is a certain timeliness in the Antisthenean doctrine that definition is impossible, that any definition must miss the essence of its object.' Lines 14-23 must be regarded as a digression." (ii, p. 232)

"???? ??? ??? ???????? … ???????? [1044a11-13] refers to 1043b14-23, ???? ??? ??? ??? ??????? ???????? [1044a14] to 1043b32-1044a11. These, then, are for Aristotle the main sections of the chapter." (ii, p. 234)

Another strange comment is that on the relation between 1043b33-34 (????? ???? ??? ??? ?? ????? ??????? ???????) and 1044a7-9 (??? ? ????? ?? ?????, ???? ??? ?? ??????? ????? ???? ????? ??? ???? ? ??????, ???? ?????????? ??? ????? ??? ??????):

"Aristotle seems rather confused about the view he is attacking. He here describes it as the view that substance is like an aggregate of units; in 1044a8 he describes it as the view that substance is a sort of unit (unless indeed he is there referring to the view of some other thinkers, perhaps a different set of Platonists)." (ii, p. 233)

How does he know that by 1043b33-34 ????? ???? ??? ??? ?? ????? ??????? ??????? there is meant "they are not simply aggregates of units but have a principle of unity which keeps their parts together" (ii, p. 233)? The very problem which our text poses is that ????? has nothing to refer to.45

Both difficulties are removed, if we adjust the two passages 1043b33-34 and 1044a7-9 by reading ??????? <?????> instead of ???????46 and ejecting 1043b23-32 ???? … ?? ?????? as interpolated, so that ????? can refer to ll. 21-23 (???? ??? ??? ???? ?????? ????? ???? ???? ????? ???? ?? ??? ????? ??? ?? ????? ??????????? ??? ??? ????? ????? ?? ??? ???? ??? ?? ???? ???????? ??????), and 1043b14-23 is no longer a "digression".

H in Context

Since Jaeger, it is taken as axiomatic that H 1. 1042a3-22 ???? ?? ????? is a recapitulation exclusively of Book Z.47 But what, then, 1042a4-6 ??????? ?? ??? ??? ?????? ???????? ?? ????? ??? ?? ????? ??? ?? ???????? does refer to? Jaeger (1957, p. 165) indicates: "1028b8", Ross (ii, p. 226) asserts that it refers "roughly" to Z 1. Every reader, however, who is not biased in favor of assuming the "independence" of Books ???, will remember E 1. 1025b3-5, as did Pseudo-Alexander48, Fonseca49 and Bonitz (p. 361): "De conjunctis his vocabulis [?? ????? ??? ?? ????? ??? ?? ????????] cf. ad E 1. 1025b350; eadem conjuncta leguntur ? 1. 1069a26. M 9. 1086a21." As Fonseca points out (see n. 2), Aristotle is combining this passage with the result of Z 1.

1043b16-18 ????????? … ?? ?? ??????, which is a reference to Z 8. 1033a24-b19, seems to be firmly linked with the continuation ?? ?' ???? … ????? ?? ?????, since Aristotle likes to contrast ???? ????? with something already clear, cf. Analytica Priora 65a12-13 (???? ????? ?? ?? ?? ???? ????????, ???' ??? ??? ???????????, ?????), Physica 191a19-21 (??????? ?? ????? ?? ????? ? ?? ???????????, ???? ?????. ???' ??? ?? ????? ????? ??? ??? ?????, ??? ??? ? ?????? ?????, ?????), De Caelo 268a29-30 (?? ?? ??? ?? ?????? ????? ????????, ???? ????? ?? ??? ???? ???' ?????? ??? ?????, ?? …). The words "in other discourses" (?? ??????) suggest that the cited passage is not meant to be part of Z; but they may well have caused the insertion of this text into Book Z.

The Thread of ?1

(1) Ross divides ?1 into two parts: "Potency" (chapters 1-5) and "Actuality" (chapters 6-9).

The first part is subdivided into:

Potency in the strict sense, i. e. power to produce motion (chapter 1).

Bonitz: Transitur a quaestione substantiae ad disputationem de potentia et actu, 1045b27-35, ac primum quidem ??? ???? ??????? ???????? primaria exponitur significatio - 1046a19, activa et passiva potentia et conjunguntur et distinguuntur - a29, opponitur potentia impotentiae tamquam suae privationi - a35.

Rational and non-rational potencies (chapter 2).

Bonitz: Potentiae rationales quid differant ab irrationalibus, 1046a36-b24, cum potentia bene aliquid faciendi necessario conjunctam esse simpliciter faciendi potentiam, non item vice versa - b28.

Potency defended against attack (chapter 3).

Bonitz: Distinctam esse ab actu potentiam adversus Megaricos comprobatur, 1046b29-1047a24, et quomodo ab eo sit distinguenda explicatur - b2.

Possibility further considered (chapter 4).

Bonitz: Falluntur qui dicunt, esse aliquid ??????? ?????, nec tamen unquam futurum, 1047b3-14. Si cum exsistentia unius rei A necessario conjuncta est exsistentia alterius rei B, etiam cum possibilitate rei A conjuncta est possibilitas rei B, et vicissim e conjuncta necessario possibilitate conjuncta item exsistentia colligi potest - b30.

How potency is acquired and actualized (chapter 5).

Bonitz: Diversa potentiae genera quomodo et fiant, 1047b31-35, et vim suam exerceant - 1048a24.

The second half is subdivided into:

Actuality distinguished from potency and from motion (chapter 6).

Bonitz: Actus distinguitur a potentia, 1048a25-b9; mera possibilitas, quae nunquam ad actum progreditur, ab ea distinguitur potentia, quae perficitur actu - b17; actus discernitur a motu - b35.

When is one thing the potency of another? (chapter 7).

Bonitz: Quando aliquid dicatur potentia quidpiam esse, quando nondum, 1048b37-1049a18; quomodo ex potentia sive e proxima materia res nuncupentur - b3.

Actuality prior to potency (chapter 8).

Bonitz: Actum priorem esse quam potentiam et cognitione, 1049b10-17, et tempore - 1050a3, et substantia - 1051a3.

Miscellaneous remarks about potency and actuality (chapter 9).

Bonitz: Bonis in rebus actus melior, malis in rebus deterior est quam potentia, 1051a4-17, unde colligitur non esse malum seorsim quidpiam ac per se exsistens - 21. Propositionum mathematicarum demonstrationes inveniuntur perducta ad actum potentia - 33.

(2) In the introduction (1045b27-1046a4), an inquiry into potentiality (limited to the field of what is moved) is announced, to be followed by a more comprehensive one into actuality, which is to include what is unmoved. The former begins with 1046a4 and is already concluded with 1046a19. There follow detailed questions concerning potentiality, until, with chapter 6 (1048a25), the inquiry into actuality begins, which, if we look at the recapitulation, reaches to 1048b36, but is really finished long ago, namely with 1048b9. Here too, detailed investigations without apparent connection are inserted. Unexpectedly, chapter 7 comes back to the topic of potentiality, whereas chapters 8-9, again at long last, show some connection: the same combination ???????? - ??????? - ????????? occurs in E, 1026a10-23.

1051a21-33 is an appendage. Ross (ii 268): "The passage is evidently out of place. It belongs in principle to the argument for the temporal priority of actuality to potentiality (1049b17-1050a3)."

The aim of the whole inquiry is alluded to in 1045b36-37 ???? ? ????????? ??? ("for our present purpose"). Bonitz (p. 379) explains this phrase by "ad huius disciplinae consilium, ad cognoscendam primam substantiam", using the term "primary substance" according to On Interpretation, 23a23-24: ??? ?? ??? ???? ???????? ????????? ?????, ???? ?? ?????? ?????? ("Some things are actualities without potentiality, namely, the primary substances"). Likewise Schwegler (iv, p. 155) comments that Aristotle, by inquiring into potentiality and actuality, "moves a step closer to the goal of metaphysics, the concluding idea of the whole inquiry, the idea of God". The most explicit is Owens (p. 251):

"?, like ZH, takes its point of departure from ?. There potency was defined as «a principle of change in another thing or in itself qua other».[1020a1-2] This is the fundamental sense of potency, but not the most useful for the purpose of ?: «for potency and act extend beyond the things expressed only according to movement».[1046a1-2] Change, as found in sensible things, serves therefore as the basis for the study of act and potency. The goal of the investigation, however, lies beyond the order of change.

?, accordingly, takes the same position as Z [v. 1029b3-12, 1037a13-14, 1041a7-9, Owens, p. 403, n. 84]. It is investigating a topic in sensible Entities for the purpose of attaining a higher type."

These modern commentators agree with Thomas Aquinas51 and Fonseca52.

Interpolations

1. 1047b7-8 ? ?? ??????????? ?? ???????? ?????.

Ross (ii, p. 247): "? ?? ??????????? ?? ???????? ????? may mean either 'i. e. the sort of man who does not take account of that which is incapable of being' (Liddle and Scott sub ?oce ????????? ii. 1), or 'i. e. the sort of man who does not consider the impossible to exist' (Liddle and Scott ii. 2). In either case there is a reference to ???? ?? ??????? ????? ????? ??????????. The Greek would be somewhat more natural without ?, but the word is well attested. In any case the clause is parenthetical, and ??? ????? ???. gives the reason for ??????? … ?????????????."

Jaeger (1957, p. 181): "? ?? … 8 ???????? parenthesin esse censet Ross, nisi haec verba commentum lectoris sunt, quod interrumpit sententiam, nam 8 ??? ad ?? ?????? ????????????? referendum est."

In his translation, Ross rightly prefers the first alternative; ll. 7-8 ?? ???????? ????? refers to l. 5 ?? ??????? ????? ("the things incapable of being"). The ? becomes quite natural if the words are taken (with Jaeger) as "comment of a reader", belonging to l. 6 ??? ("a man").

2. 1048a30-35 ???? ?' ? ???????? … ?? ?' ????????.

Bonitz (p. 394): "a30 ???? ?' ? ???????? … 35 ?? ?' ????????. Hoc enuntiatum n?n habeo quomodo ad justam conformationem redigam. Parenthesi quidem quin includenda sint verba ??????? … ????????, quae pertinent ad explicandum verbum ???????, vix est dubium, sed ne sic quidem intelligi potest, quomodo verba ?? ?' ???????? superioribus opponi possint; exspectes potius, ut Alexandri interpretatio p. 549, 6 admitti possit, scriptum esse: ???' ????????. Quod equidem in annotatione critica proposui, a verbis ?? ?' ????????, deleta deinde particula ?', novam esse enuntiationem incipiendam: ?? ?' ???????? ????? ??? ??? ???' ?????? … ? ????????? ??????, id excusationem potius ex difficultate interpretandi habebit, quam sua ex probabilitate commendationem."

Ross (ii, p. 251) believes that the vulgate reading ?? ?? ???????? "by no means goes beyond the limits of Aristotle’s love of compression. Cf. for example De Generatione et Corruptione 319b33 ???? ?? ????? ??????? ?? ??????? ????? ? ?????????? ????, ???????, ?? ?? ?????."

Jaeger (1957, p. 183): "32 ??????? ?? … 35 ???????? in margine addit J; extitit ergo recensio in qua haec deerant; jam Bonitz, qui codice J carebat, ea molesta esse sensit et 32 ??????? … 34 ???????? parenthesin fecit."

Decisive is what l. 36 ? ????????? ?????? ("what we mean") refers to. It must be the definition in ll. 30-32, not the luminous explanation of "potentially" (???????) in ll. 32-35.

3. 1048b18-35 ???? ?? … ???????.

Jaeger (1957, p. 184): "additamentum ut videtur ab ipso Aristotele ortum (cf. 35 ????), oratio est admodum dura et obscura et in libris corrupta; verba 35 ?? ??? ??? … 36 ???? recapitulatio sunt, sed eorum, quae hoc additamentum praecedunt (!)."

?1 in Context

Jaeger (1912, p. 108) says about 1045b32 ?? ???? ??????? ??????: "This note proves again [cf. p. 116] that the beginning of Z was the start of a separate series, to which belonged H and ?.53 It was, however, a series, not a single treatise. This appears from another citation, ? 8, 1049b27: ??????? ?’ ?? ???? ???? ??? ?????? ??????. From this we infer, on the other hand, independence of the ?????-treatise in relation to the one on ??????? and ????????."

The latter reference to the interpolated chapters Z 7-9, however, i. e. ll. 27-29 ??????? ?' … ?? ????, is obviously interpolated too: it is irrelevant in the context, l. ??? refers to what precedes it.

This refutes also Frede/Patzig's (i, p. 22) conclusion "that at the time when ? 8 was written, the chapters 7-9 already formed part of Z".

The phrase ?? ???? ??????? ?????? occurs already in Plato, Laws, 796 D 6, where it refers to 673 C 2-3. In Aristotle, the further instances are: On the Heavens, 311a11, On the Generation of Animals, 778b2, Metaphysics, 997b4, Nicomachean Ethics, 1152a12-13, Politics, 1293b2-3, 1295a4-5, 1325 a30-31.

The two references to Book ?, 1046a4-6 ?? ?????? (to 1019a15-16) and 1049b4 ????????? (to ? 11), are firmly embedded in the text and can hardly be considered as later additions by a redactor. The same is true of Z, 1028a10-11 and I, 1052a15-16, 1055b6-7, 1056b34-35. In view of the fact that Metaphysics Z, ? and I are the only books in the Corpus Aristotelicum which begin with an enumeration of meanings, it becomes manifest that these books were planned as a series, conceived on the basis of Book ?. Being and unity (?? and ??) belong together, as appears from B, 998b20-28; 1001a4-b25, ?, 1003b22-33, Z, 1040b16-24; in ? they are treated successively (chapters 6-7).

?2 in Context

Schwegler (iv 186): "This chapter does not belong here. As it is shown in Metaphysica vi 4, an investigation of truth and falsehood, i. e. of that being which does not exist objectively, but only in thought, does not belong in metaphysics at all […]."

Christ (p. 196): "huius capitis decimi summa male huic libro inserta esse videtur ab eodem redactore qui 1028b28 ??? … ??????????? interpolavit."

Contrary to Schwegler and Christ, Jaeger (1912, p. 53) argues that ? 10 "is of Aristotelian origin, being appended by the philosopher himself at the end of the ????? ???? ??? ?????????. This is proved by the transition ? 10, 1051a34-b1, which is meant to be a recapitulation of ?H?. The concept of being is explicated here nearly in the same way as in E 2."

The next parallel is 1045b32-34. The list of meanings is extended with being in the sense of truth and falsehood in order to motivate the treatment of this last mentioned meaning.

Of particular importance is the fact that the text of 1051b1-2 seems to say that the most proper sense of being and non-being is true and false, though grammar and exact wording are not clear. Compare the following translations:

"theils endlich im eigentlichsten Sinne seiend das Wahre und Falsche ist" ("partly, being in the most proper sense, is the true and false"). (Bonitz 1890, p. 194)

"das vorzugsweise Seyende aber ist das Wahre oder Falsche" ("being per excellentiam is the true or false"). (Schwegler ii, p. 161)

None of these translations is literal; the literal one would be: "(because being and non-being) partly, being in the most proper sense, is called true or false"; for grammar requires to supply from 1051a34 ?? ?? ??????? ??? ?? ?? ??, in analogy to the clause ?? ?? … ???????? in 1051a35.

To avoid this obvious nonsense, the translators make tacit emendations: Bonitz and Schwegler both read ?? ?? ????????? ?? <??> ?????? ? ?????? <?????>, but interpret this supposed text differently: Bonitz supplies from 1051a34 ?? ?? ??? ?? ?? ??, Schwegler leaves the construction of the preceding clauses and makes ?? ????????? ?? the subject; for this he could refer to De Anima, 412b8-9: ?? ??? ?? ??? ?? ????? ???? ????????? ???????, ?? ?????? [scil. ?? ??? ??, v. Bonitz, Index, p. 416b10-12] ? ?????????? ????? ("While unity and being has many senses, what is one and exists in the most proper sense is the actuality").

Ross omits the words ????????? ?? and translates: "(The terms 'being' and 'non-being' are employed) thirdly in the sense of true and false". In doing so, he tacitly adds <??> before ?????? ? ?????? (following the example of ll. 5-6 and 1027b18-19). This seems to me the most natural reading. ????????? originally may have been a variant to ??: ????????? ?? <??> ?????? ? ?????? ("most properly, however, in the sense of true or false") is also good Greek. The ?? must then be regarded as a later addition, after ????????? was put into the text and ?? had dropped out.

The real reason for deleting the words ????????? ?? was the fact that they contradict E, 1027b31 (Ross ii, p. 275).54

We are already acquainted with a passage (De Anima, 412b8-9) where it is actuality what is being "in the proper sense". Considering true and false as being and non-being "in the most proper sense" is a good reason for treating it. If we suppose that with E 2 begins a treatise on all meanings of being (what seems to be indicated by the ?????? in 1026b3), we get a gradual progression from the least important (accidens) to the most important. That the focus on being qua categories belongs to another plan suggests itself from our reading of E 2-4 and K 8 (v. pp. 90 and 160). The philosophical background of this conception of being is Plato's Sophist, v. Metaphysics N, 1089a20-21. In the next volume, we will have the opportunity to come back to this topic.

The Thread of I

(1) Survey according to Ross (ii 279-304) and Bonitz (pp. 413-449):

The meaning of unity (chapter 1).

Bonitz: Quatuor distinguuntur modi, secundum quos unitas alicui rei assignatur, 1052a15-b1. Deinde ipsa unitatis notio explicatur, quae cernitur in individua alicuius rei natura ac praecipue vergit ad significandam mensuram - 1053a14. Mensurae ratio et usus amplius exponitur - b3. Denique paucis complectitur Aristoteles, quae de notione unitatis antea exposuit - b8.

Unity not a substance but a predicate coextensive with being (chapter 2).

Bonitz: Unitatem non esse substantiam, sed subjectum sibi habere substantiam, 1053b9-16, duobus demonstratur argumentis, primum quia unitas notio est universalis - 24, deinde quia in reliquis praeter substantiam categoriis subjicitur quidpiam unitati - 1054a13. Unum idem fere significat atque ens - a19.

Unity and plurality; identity; likeness; otherness; difference; contrariety (chapter 3).

Bonitz: Unum et multitudo quomodo inter se sint opposita, 1054a20-29. Exponuntur aliquot notiones, quae vel ab unitatis vel a multitudinis notione pendent, ?? ?????? a32-b3, ?? ?????? b3-14, ?? ?????? b15-23, ?? ???????? b23-1055a2.

Contrariety (chapter 4).

Bonitz: Contrarietas est diversitas plena ac perfecta, 1055a3-33. Contrarietatis quae sit et ad contradictionem et ad privationem ratio - b29.

The opposition of 'equal' to 'greater' and 'less' (chapter 5).

Bonitz: Quomodo par magno simul et parvo oppositum sit quaeritur.

The opposition of 'one' to 'many' (chapter 6).

Bonitz: Unum et multa quomodo sibi sint opposita.

The nature of intermediates (chapter 7).

Bonitz: Media quae dicuntur (?? ??????) ex eodem et inter se et cum contrariis sunt genere, 1057a18-30, et interposita sunt inter contraria - b1, et composita ex ipsis his contrariis - b34.

Otherness in species (chapter 8).

Bonitz: Quid sit ?????? ?? ?????, 1057b35-1058a8, hanc ????????? esse contrarietatem - a16. Distinguitur amplius quae vel ????? ?? ????? vel ????? ?? ????? sint, quae non sint - a28.

What contrarieties constitute otherness in species (chapter 9).

Bonitz: Quae differentiae efficiunt speciei differentiam, quae non, exponitur, ac maris feminaeque exemplo illustratur.

The perishable and the imperishable differ in kind (chapter 10).

Bonitz: Corruptibile et aeternum genere inter se differunt.

(2) The dissent about the title of chapter 10 is only apparent. Bonitz keeps to the text, but thinks as Ross that "in kind" is meant:

"Contraria specie differunt; atqui ?? ??????? et ?? ???????? contraria sunt; ergo specie differunt, a26-29. Syllogismi forma tam necessario in conclusione requirit: ?????? ????? ?? ?????, ut licet invitis codicibus omnibus et consentiente cum vulgata lectione Ioanne Philopono, ????? pro ????? legere non dubitem." (Bonitz, p. 449)

Ross (ii 305): "The premises only warrant the conclusion that the perishable and the imperishable are different in species."

It is factually correct that the perishable and the imperishable differ in genus. Schwegler (iv 208) refers to 1054b28-30: "in genus if the things have not their matter in common and are not generated out of each other (e. g. [????, Ross' translation "i. e." is not justified] if they belong to different figures of predication)". This applies to the four elements of the sublunar region on the one hand and the element of the eternal celestial bodies (the aether) on the other hand. But the logic of the argumentation in ll. 26-29 as well as the context (ll. 30-31) shows that Bonitz is right in emending ?????.

Interpolation

1054b31-32 ?? ?' … ??????? ???.

Bonitz (pp. 429): "[…] verba b31: ?? ?’ ??????? ???????, ??? ? ?????????? ??????? ???, dubito num ab ipso Aristotele scripta sint, nec potius a lectore attento adnotationis loco ad proximum caput adscripta postea in textum irrepserint, et quidem alieno loco. Quum enim postea esse omnino contrarietatem inde commonstret, quod diversitas varios recipiat gradus, ideoque etiam esse quaedam oporteat, quae longissime atque absolute diversa sint, nec aptum nec probabile est antea jam contrarietatem simpliciter subsumi diversitati. Sed utut statuitur de genuina huius enuntiati origine, illud certe constat, proxima verba: ??? ?? ????? ???., ut recte Alexander55 monuit, non pertinere ad id quod de contrarietate diversitati subsumenda proposuit, sed ad illustrandam ipsius diversitatis notionem. Nimirum ad explicandam contrarietatem jam ideo referri nequeunt, quod in variis illis modis, quos usu cognitos habeamus, enumerantur etiam ea quae sunt ?? ????? ????? b35; at contraria semper eodem genere contineri, nec genere sed specie differre, et constans est Aristotelis sententia et in proximis capitibus saepissime monetur. Atque si de diversitate agi conceditur, hoc praeterea apparet, distingui enumeratis omnibus, quos usu cognoverimus (?? ??? ???????? b33), diversitatis modis diversitatem a mera alteritate; quae diversa sunt aliquid habent quo differant, in alteritate non necessario idem locum habet."

Ross's objection that "????? ??? ?????????? (or ?????????? ??) ???????? is meaningless if the subject be ?? ??????????, but significant if it be ?? ???????" (ii, p. 288) is met by our explanation of 1054b34-35 in vol. i, p. 253.

I in Context

Jaeger (1962, p. 201): "Whether I also belonged to the original series, or was added later when Aristotle removed ??? from their isolation and inserted them into the Metaphysics, is difficult to decide. On the whole, it seems to have been added later. I 2, 1053b16, refers to Z, 13-17, thus: «if, then, no universal can be a substance, as has been said in our discussion of substance and being». Here ZH are still thought of as independent, and it does not appear that they come at the beginning of a series to which I also belongs. On the contrary, another passage, in which I refers to B, makes against it: «with regard to the substance and nature of the one we must ask in which of two ways it exists; this is the very question that we reviewed in our discussion of problems, viz. what the one is» (I 2, 1053b9). This indicates that the original independent work consisted only of ???, that I was added when Aristotle was working on the final version of the Metaphysics. That is why it regards B as the introduction."

Düring (pp. 279-280): "Just the particle-less beginning shows that this writing is an independent lecture about the concept 'the One' and the related terms identity, non-identity, similarity and contrariety. It is closely linked to ? and B. Apart from the fact that Aristotle often alludes to definitions given in ?, he three times refers expressly to passages in ? [footnote: "1052a15 to ? 6; 1055b7 to ? 22; 1056b35 to ? 15."]. In the second chapter, we find not only a reference to B [footnote: 1053b10 ?? ???? ????????????.], but the section 1053b11-24 may be shown to be an abridged version of 1001a8-29. In this section of I, in a sentence identical in content with B 1001a19-24, we find a second reference: 'As I have said in my lectures about being and what exists.' This can only be a reference to Z. Being part of an account from B, this second reference is obviously a later addition. I don't know any other passage in the Corpus where we can establish, with the same certainty as here, that references to other writings were inserted as cross-references."

Jaeger' argument can be limited to I 2. This chapter may be added later: it falls outside the scope of the book, which is otherwise dedicated to a mere analysis of the concept unity and its derivates.

The Thread of K1

(1) Ross:

Recapitulation of the problems stated in B. 2, 3 (chapter 1).

Recapitulation of the problems stated in B. 4-6 (chapter 2).

The subject of philosophical study (chapter 3).

Philosophy distinguished from mathematics and physics (chapter 4).

Defence of the law of contradiction (chapter 5).

Inadequacy of the grounds for denying the law of contradiction (chapter 6).

Distinction of theology from mathematics and physics (chapter 7).

Accidental being and being as truth (chapter 8).

(2) While K1 was neglected by the Scholastics because of its supposed content identity with Books B?E,56 it enjoyed great attention from modern philologists, owing to a negative quality: the suspicion of being spurious. Since in the discussion of the authenticity, the thread of K1 is investigated in perpetual comparison with B?E, in dealing with this secundary literature the topics "The Thread of K1" and "K1 in Context" partly overlap.

Concerning 1059a20-23 (cf. B, 996a18-21 and b1-5), Natorp (p. 182) makes only the general comment that "the reasoning is hardly intelligible without comparing the parallel version".

Jaeger (1912, p. 65) notes that "in ?? ?? ?? ???, ????? ??? ?????? ??????; ?????? is without grammatical relation", and that, after the preceding ?? ??? ??? ????, the nominative ?? ?? ?? ??? is "striking".

In vol. I (p. 258) I have proposed to read ????? ??? ?????? ??????; ("which principle does this science [Wisdom] investigate?"), as well as in ll. 25-26.57 This brings the two first aporiae in line with the two following ones (ll. 26-34). In substance, the question is in each case whether "the science we are looking for" has to deal with several objects; if not, the question arises with which of them: in the aporiae 3 and 4 the alternative is: if not with all entities, with which of them (ll. 26-27); if not with both entities and accidents, with which of them (ll. 31-32). In l. 27, this is formulated by means of the genitive ?????. So it suggests itself to interpret the two ????? in ll. 23 and 25 as genitives too. The subject of the sentence ?? ?? ?? ??? in l. 13 is then not "wisdom" (?????), but the science of the causes. This change of subject would explain the transition from accusative to nominative in ll. 21-23, at which Jaeger took offense.

The supposition that the author of K1 has lost sight of his topic 'wisdom' for two aporiae (ll. 23-29) has also grammatical probability against it. The ???? in l. 34 is proof that the subject area of the "science looked for" was the topic also before. Therefore it is factually correct that Bonitz, Ross and Tricot supply "wisdom" (? ?????) as subject both to l. 27 ?? ????? and to ll. 29-30 ???? ??? ?????? ????? ? ??? ?? ???????????. From this, of course, stylistic harshness results. On the other hand, if we read ????? ??? ?????? ??????? in ll. 25-26, the ??? ?????? ??????? can be supplied easily in the following sentence, and perfect agreement is established with l. 35 ??? ????????????? ????????? ??????.

The three times repeated ?????? or ?????? respectively (the genitive ?????? was left in because it can be referred to ????) does not need to be referred to ??? ?????? in l. 21, it is rather without grammatical reference, as e. g. in B, 997a17 (????? ?????? ?????? ??? ????????? ??????): "the present science".

At last, the parallel passage just mentioned makes us think of writing ????? instead of ????? in l. 27.

Thus we have three successive ????? in the same logical function: on condition that in each case one science has to deal with one object (one kind of cause, one axiom and one entity), the question arises: with which has the present science to deal?

On the alternative ?? ?? … ????????? ????? (ll. 27-29) Thomas Aquinas comments: "Et si detur quod de omnibus consideret, cum sit una, remanet dubium, quomodo eadem scientia possit esse de pluribus, cum una scientia sit unius." With "cum una scientia sit unius", Thomas mentions the condition under which the objection ?????? ??? ????????? ???????? ??? ????? ????????? ????? makes sense: usually, one science deals with one ?????. Thus it is clear that what is meant by ?????? must be the different spheres of being: the moved, the unmoved, according to Academic doctrine also the intermediate realm of the mathematical objects. (For this usage see e. g. Z 2, 1028b19-24.)

Thomas's explanation is clearly superior to Jaeger's (1912, p. 66) that ?????? is to be understood "in the most popular sense" as "real existences" like "plants, animals, men, sun, moon and stars". This agrees with 1028b8-13, but does not apply here.

Regarding 1059a34-38, Bonitz58 and Ross59 underline the fact that this section does not have the form of a question, but that is only outward appearance. They did not pay attention to the ???? in 1059a38 by which it is linked with the following section. This ???? ("in general") has the logical function of marking what precedes as special case. Therefore our question must be, of what the matter treated in 1059a34-38 is a special case.

As Schwegler60 has recognized, the argument is based on the supposition that wisdom deals with what is unmovable. The same is supposed in the following section 1059a38-b14. The argument is, according to Natorp (p. 185), "that the science looked for is not about the mathematical objects, because the mathematical is not ????????, and not about the sensible, because the sensible is perishable. Thus it is anticipated [cf. 1064a33-34] again [cf. n. 3] that the science in question must be exclusively about immaterial, imperishable being." The part concerning the "sensible substances" generalizes the question (not expressly stated) of the preceding section whether the science looked for deals "with the causes which have been mentioned in the Physics": if not, does it deal with physical objects at all?

That after the ???? in 1059a38 there follows a second one in 1059b14 is strange in itself; on the equally strange content of the section 1059b14-21 see below (pp. 178-180).

Chapter 2 must be interpolated: in 1060a1-2 it is clearly stated that the treatment of the aporiae is brought to a close.61 And it is this chapter where "the un-Aristotelian ?? ??? is repeated ad nauseam" (Spengel, p. 914). It is the passages 1060a5. 17. 20. b3. 12. Outside of chapter 2, this particle combination occurs only in 1061b8 and 1062b33. We will see that also these passages are interpolated.

Another striking feature emerges from an observation made by Madigan (p. xxxix): "A striking dissimilarity between A-B and K 1-2 is in the frequency of the term ????????, 'separate', which occurs not at all in A and only once in B (995b33), but once in K 1 and ten times in K 2; cf. Delatte et al. (1984: 471-2, 487)." What is really"striking" is the difference between the chapters 1 and 2; it is only this chapter 2, on which Natorp's characterization of the whole treatise K1 is based. He writes on 1060a26-27: "One sees the author is completely suffused with the transcendence of the final chapters of ?; his whole intellectual world gravitates towards this point." ("Man sieht, der Autor ist ganz durchtränkt von der Transscendenz der Schlusskapitel von ?; seine ganze Gedankenwelt gravitirt nach diesem Punkte.") (p. 187)

This impression is presented at the beginning (p. 181) as the "main difference" ("Hauptunterschied"), i. e. the result of the following comparison of K 1-2 with B: "The author of K 1-8 is a little more interested in the transcendent, a little less in the metaphysical foundation of the knowledge of nature than Aristotle; this results in an inclination to an almost Platonizing direction of thought." ("Dem Autor von K 1-8 ist […] etwas mehr am Transcendenten, etwas weniger an der metaphysischen Fundamentirung der Naturerkenntniss gelegen als dem Aristoteles; daraus entsteht […] eine […] Hinneigung zu einer beinahe platonisirenden Gedankenrichtung.")

1060b31 ???? ?' intersects smoothly with 1060a1-2.

K 3 falls into six sections: 1060b31-1061a10, 1061a10-15, 1061a15-18, 1061a18-28, 1061a28-b11 and 1061b11-17.

The first section responds to the two first sections of ? (1003a21-32 and 33-b19). Similarly as in ?, the different meanings of "being" are "reduced" (cf. 1061a2 ?????????) to something "common" (?????? 1060b33 and 35). "But this being in the primary sense to which every being must be referred is not designated here as being substance (there is no allusion to the categories); it is simply «being qua being» (1061a8) or «being» without addition (ib., 16)." (Mansion 1958, p. 215; cf. Brandis, p. 69, and Muskens, p. 132).

Pseudo-Alexander (642. 22-24), in his paraphrase of ll. 7-10, manages with simply substituting ??? ????? ? ?? by ??? ??????: ???? [= in analogy to the examples of ???????? and ????????] ??? ?? ???? ??? ???? ?????, ??? ??????, ???? ?????? ?? ????, ??? ??????????? ?????? ??????· ??? ??? ?? ????? ????? ????? ? ???? ??????? ????.

Likewise, Thomas Aquinas (Sententia Metaphysicae, liber 11 lectio 3 numerus 4): "Et similiter est de multiplicitate entis. Nam ens simpliciter [= ?? ?????, cf. Z 1, 1028a31] dicitur id quod in se habet esse, scilicet substantia. Alia vero dicuntur entia, quia sunt huius quod per se est, vel passio, vel habitus, vel aliquid huiusmodi."

Likewise, Reale (p. 236): "That the ?? ? ?? of which we speak here is ????? we have no doubt, because ????, ????????, ??????? are conceivable with respect to ????? alone and not at all of the abstract ens generalissimum."

The second section (1061a10-15) responds to ?, 1003b36-1004a2. Three differences are to be noted:

1. A link is established to the reduction of the meanings of being (ll. 10-11). Already in 1060b34-35 it was intimated that being is the genus of all what is called "being".

2. It is left open "whether the first differences of being are plurality and unity, or likeness and unlikeness, or some other differences".

3. The reference to a certain writing (?????? ??? ????????) is missing, as in 1004b34-1005a1 ??????? ??? ? ??????? ????. (For the linguistic form cf. Meteorologica 372b9-10 ???? ?? ???? ?????? ???? ???????????? ?? ???? ???? ??? ????????? ????????????.)

The third section (1061a15-18) responds to ?, 1003b19-36. Because it exhibits the same difference from ? as section 1 (ll. 7-10), harmonizing exegesis is again forced to resort to the violent expedient of substituting ?? and now even ?? by ?????.62

The fourth section (1061a18-28) agrees with ?, 1004a9-20 in the first two sentences, but then it presents own material. The "difficulty" concerns contraries, which cannot be considered as "primary differences" of being, and among them "those which have an intermediate" (ll. 21-22)63.

Bonitz and Natorp have taken offense that the apodosis of the ????-clause is missing, but Jaeger (1912, p. 78) rightly refers to 1060b31-33. At both passages, the author gives a reason why he is going to deal with a certain detailed question. From this it appears that the other "parallels" alleged by Jaeger (Rhetorica ii 1402b26 and Metaphysica E, 1027b18-23) are no parallels. It is rather passages like Metaphysica E, 1025b18-21 which are to be compared.

The sentence ???? ????? ?? ?? ??????? ??? ???????? ??? ??????? ?? ??? ???? ?????, ??? ?????????? ?? ??????, which was unintelligible to Pseudo-Alexander (644, 4-6: ?????? ?? ??? ?????????????? ??????????), is in reality perfectly clear. The ?????????? ????? is, as usual, the determinate species which cannot be determinated further (by differentia specifica). He who commits a certain crime (e. g. a theft) is not absolutely unjust, but only "deprived" of a certain kind of justice.

As far as I can see, the sentence ?? ?????? ? ??????? ????? ??? ???? ??????????? ????? (ll. 25-26) was never understood properly. Since Pseudo-Alexander, people connect ?? ?????? with ??????????? (Hengstenberg 210: "so ist darum der ungerechte nicht durchaus des ganzen Begriffes beraubt"; Bonitz 241: "so wird deshalb der Ungerechte nicht gänzlich des Gesamtbegriffs beraubt sein"; Jaeger 1912, p. 79: "die völlige Privation des Begriffes"; Szlezák 192: "so muß der Ungerechte nicht in jeder Hinsicht des ganzen Begriffs beraubt sein"), what obliges to the absurd assumption that by ? ?????? is intermediate between the just and the unjust, that he is "half-unjust" (Schwegler IV 213): ????? ?????? ??? ???? ??????? ???? ??????, ???? ??? ????? ???? ??????? ??? ?????? (Pseudo-Alexander 644, 28-29). (In addition, the pleonasm ?????? … ??? ???? is annoying here.) Comparison with the other passages of the Corpus Aristotelicum, where ?? ?????? occurs, shows however that it is always the validity of the whole sentence what is limited. Take for example Politics, 1257b20-22: ? ?? ???????? ???????? ????????, ?? ?????? ???' ? ??? ???????? ?????????. ("retail trade is the art of producing wealth, not in every way, but by exchange.") In our present passage, we must therefore translate: "It will not be absolutely true that the unjust is deprived of the whole concept", supplying in thought an ????-clause: "but only if it is about an extremely unjust who commits all kinds (????????? ????) of unjustice". It is quite in accordance with the concise style of K1 that this personal contribution is expected of the reader.

The fifth section (1061a28-b11) interrupts the context, and like the interpolated chapter 2, arouses suspicion by the un-Aristotelian ?? ??? (1061b8). It responds to ?, 1004a34-1005a11 (without the addition 1004b27-1005a11).

The sixth section (1061b11-17), which has no parallel in ?, goes on from the results of the first three sections (ll. 11-14) and finishes the topic "contraries", which was maintained also in the fourth section.

Which is "the aporia we stated at the beginning"? Schwegler (iv 214), Bonitz (p. 457), Ross (ii 313) and Tricot (p. 593) refer to 1059a20-23, Jaeger (1957, p. 220), in return, to "1059a27" (i. e. 27-29). It seems that the former assignment was made mechanically because of the indication "at the beginning"; it is not clear in what way the argument of our passage is supposed to serve the solution of the first aporia. If, on the other hand, our interpretation of 1059a27-29 is accepted, a meaningful connection is established.

Each genus has its own "first contrarieties and differences".64 Now it is the business of philosophy to deduce these contraries, which are limited to a certain genus of being, from universal contraries. This was done for the first time in Plato's lecture ???? ???????; it was the kind of metaphysics that Aristotle met. We have an example of it in Metaphysics, 992b4-7:

"i. e. the great and the small are like the rare and the dense which the physical philosophers speak of, calling these the primary differentiae of the substratum; for these are a kind of excess and defect." (???? ?? ???? ??? ?? ??????, ????? ??? ?? ?????????? ???? ?? ????? ??? ?? ??????, ?????? ??? ??????????? ????????? ????? ???????? ??????· ????? ??? ????? ??????? ??? ??? ????????.)

For Aristotle's own favorite see Metaphysics, 1055a33:

"The primary contrariety is that between positive state and privation" (????? ?? ?????????? ???? ??? ???????? ?????).

It must be admitted, however, that the expression ?????????? ("was thoroughly discussed") is then inappropriate: the question "how the same science can embrace several subject-matters" is put forward only as a difficulty which results if one opts for the first possibility (one science deals with all entities).

K 4 (1061b17-33) responds ?, 1005a19-b2. Unlike ?, an example of "the truths which are in mathematics called axioms" (1005a20) is given: "when equals are taken from equals the remainders are equal" (1061b20), cf. Prior Analytics, 41b21-22. It is true that the validity is limited to the realm of quantity (?????), but no mathematical discipline deals with quantity in general, as appears from ?, 1020a8-14.

Pseudo-Alexander and Mansion see themselves compelled to reinterpret the unequivocal expression "the principles of the things that are" (ll. 28-30) as "the principles of certain things that are".65 But the very concern of the author is that mathematics, physics and philosophy differ in their point of view.

In 1061b32-33, the question is whether ????? ought to be equated with ????????? in l. 25, as do Pseudo-Alexander (647. 1-2: ??????? ??’ ???? ????? ??? ? ?????????? ??? ? ?????? ???? ??? ??????????), Thomas Aquinas (Sententia Metaphysicae, liber 11 lectio 4 numerus 4: "Et ideo naturalem scientiam et mathematicam oportet partes esse primae philosophiae, sicut particularis scientia pars dicitur esse universalis.") and Ross (ii 314-315: "wisdom proper is the more comprehensive science which studies being as such").

But how can mathematics and physics, despite the diversity of respects, belong as "parts" to ontology? Ueberweg (p. 3) thinks that "the context demands ?? ??????". According to Schwegler (iv 215), Aristotle is using ????? in the same sense as ????????? in E, 1026a18-19. Likewise Bonitz (p. 458: "philosophiam universe, non primam philosophiam significat") and Mansion (1958, pp. 217-218: "maybe, the word [?????] is employed to prevent confusion with «philosophy», of which it is question eight lines above [1061b25]").

The chapters K 5-6 respond to the second half of ? (1005b8-1012b31).

The first seven sections (1061b34-1062a2, 1062a2-5, 1062a5-19, 1062a19-23, 1062a23-30, 1062a31-35, 1062a36-b7; 1062a30-31 is inserted and repeats 1062a2-5) are, unlike the parallels in ? (1005b8-34, 1006a5-18, 1006a18-1007a20, 1006b28-34, 1007b18-1008a2, 1005b23-26, 1008a4-6), entirely designed for the examination of Heraclitism: the version of the principle of contradiction in 1061b36-1062a1 is the exact negation of what is, in 1062a36-b2, imputed to be Heraclitus's doctrine (without the proviso made in ?, 1005b24-26), and the expression ??? ???????????? ??????, which is employed in 1062a33-34 for interpreting this doctrine, occurs already in ll. 6, 10, 22, 28.

The eighth section (1062b7-11) is supposed to respond to ?, 1012b13-18, but this applies only to the argument of self-contradiction. The alternative that "everything is false" (1012b17 ????? ?????) is, according to 1012a24-28, the consequence of Anaxagoras's doctrine. The real parallel is 1010a7-15: it is the Heraclitean Cratylus who is meant by those who "utterly destroy rational discourse" (1062b10-11): ????? ???? ???? ?????? (1010a12).

The first section of chapter 6 (1062b12-19) responds to ?, 1009a6-16.

The second section (1062b20-33) begins by summing up the sections 1009a22-30 and 38-b11, which belong together also in ? (1009a23 ? ??? continues with l. 38 ?????? ??). In deviation from ?, in K (1062b31-33) there is referred to the Physics. Two groups of those who contest the principle of non-contradiction are mentioned (ll. 21-22 ?????? ??? … ???? ?'): the natural philosophers, the common fundamental conviction of which is that nothing comes from nothing (Physics, 187a27-29: … ??? ?????? ????? ??? ??????? … ?? ?? ?????????? ??????? ?? ??? ?? ?????), and the adherents of Protagoras. It is only the aporia of the former which is expressly "solved"; hereby also the latter aporia is supposed to be solved; after all, the dictum of Protagoras is traced back to a basic view of the natural philosophers discussed already in Plato's Theaetetus (152 D sqq.), likewise in Metaphysics ? (1010a7-15).

The next section (1062b33-1063a10) begins with a ?? ???. Here too, we are dealing with an interpolation; for firstly, this ?? ??? is not suitable as a transition (i. e. as equivalent to ?????? ?? in ?), and secondly, the section which begins with ???? ?? (1063a10-17) must go back to a physical argumentation, like the parallel in ?, 1010a25-32.

The similarity of 1062b33-1063a6 with the parallel 1010b1-26, indicated by the commentators, is only superficial, in so far as in both passages there is argued against the opinion ??? ?? ?????????? ??????. This is done, however, in quite different ways. To the author of the interpolation, it is clear as daylight that when there is dissense whether a certain thing is sweet or bitter, it is always the same people which are wrong, namely those who are corrupted in point of taste, the faculty of distinction (?????????, this word occurs only here in the whole Corpus Aristotelicum). So the healthy are (to say it with Protagoras) the "measure" (1063a4 ??????) for right and false. This argument is used nowhere else in Plato (Theaetetus) and Aristotle; it is manifestly circular, for reversely, who is healthy can be seen only in the fact that his taste is "right".

Similarly, in 1063a6-10, compared with 1011a31-34, we are dealing with two different experiments, it is only the demonstrative intention which is the same.

The third section (we skip 1062b33-1063a10), 1063a10-17, responds to 1010a25-32 in substance, but the wording is original; for the expression ?? … ??????? ???????? cf. 1084b24-25.

For the fourth section (1063a17-21), the commentators quote as parallel 1010a35-b1, but the concordance is limited to the occurrence of the phrase ??? ??. The real parallel is 1010a15-22. The argument is directed against the opinion that there is nothing but motion; this is the basic view on which rests the conviction that everything is true (1012a24-26), or, according to 1063a21, "that the contradictory statements are not true at the same time".

The proposition borrowed from natural philosophy serves to combat Heraclitism in so far as it shows that it is not ? ??? ???????? ????? (1010a3-4) alone which reigns over the realm of motion, v. De Caelo, 288b29-30: ?????? ?? [scil. ???????] ????? ?? ????? ??? ?? ????? ??? ?????????.

This is confirmed at once in the fifth section (1063a22-28, responding to 1010a22-25), where the evidence of determinateness (ll. 27-28 ??? ????????? ??????) is put forward against the Heracliteans.

The sixth section (1063a28-35) has no parallel in ?; the agreement with 1008b14-17 (on the basis of which the commentators give 1008b12-27 as parallel) is merely formal. By the fact that ll. 34-35 ??? ????? ?????????? ??? ??????? answers l. 22 ??????? ?? ????? ??? ??? ????????, the section is closely connected with the preceding one, as an argument against Heraclitism.

For the seventh section (1063a35-b7), the commentators give 1009a38-b33 as parallel. In reality, the two passages have only in common that they both mention the fact that "even to the senses of each individual, things do not always seem the same" (1009b8-9 ??? ???? ?? ?????? ???? ????? ?? ????? ???? ??? ???????? ??? ??????). In ?, this fact serves to explain the origin of the disputed doctrine about the "appearances" (1009a38-b2), whereas in K it is the point that from the change of our sensations there cannot be inferred that we ourselves change: "But if we do not change, but remain the same, there will be something that endures" (1063b6-7). Thus we have here again an original thought.

The following section 1063b7-15 (which answers ?, 1009a16-2) must be interpolated, since l. 15 "from these arguments" goes back to the preceding argumentations against Heraclitism.

The eighth section 1063b15-19 (we skip again the interpolation) responds to ?, 1011b15-22. The situation is the same: the argumentation in favor of the principle of contradiction is brought to a close, now at last an application is made on the contraries. Thus comparison with ? confirms the fact that ll. 7-15 are interpolated.

The ninth section 1063b19-24 responds to ?, 1011b23-29. What is stated there generally in l. 29: "neither what is nor what is not is said to be or not to be", is illustrated by the example of the white in K ll. 20-22 "If the subject is white we shall be wrong in saying it is neither black nor white".

The tenth section 1063b24-30 agrees with its alleged pendant in ?, 1012a24-28, in nothing but the simultaneous occurrence of Heraclitus and Anaxagoras. But while in ? the difference is what matters, in K it is the fact that their doctrines have the same consequence: "We could not be right, then, in accepting the views either of Heraclitus or of Anaxagoras" (ll. 24-25). Here again, the author of K draws on own material.

The eleventh section 1063b30-35, which responds to ?, 1012b13-18, presents the argument from the self-refutation of scepticism (well-known since Plato's Theaetetus, 170 A - 171 C), which is well suited as an effective final point.

On K 7 Ross (ii 321) comments: "This chapter answers to E. 1 much more closely than the preceding chapters answer to B and ?." It is noteworthy that, here too, the section 1064a19-28 is interpolated: by the introductory words "And since each of the sciences must somehow know the 'what' and use this as a principle" (ll. 19-20), which are missing in ?, it reveals itself as a footnote to ll. 4-6.

Regarding the last chapter, an observation made by von Arnim (p. 38) deserves attention: the sentence 1065a21-25 ?? ?' … ?????????? "strikes me as strange, since the ?? ?? ?????????? was spoken of already and is introduced now, coupled to the ?? ?? ?????? and even placed after it, like something new". Independently, as it seems, Szlezák (2003, p. 201) came to suppose that the section 1065a21-26 is intended to replace 1064b15-1065a21.

K1 in Context

The traditional view was eloquently expressed by Victor Cousin (p. 65): "Before entering this difficult research [theology] and penetrating in a way into the sanctuary of being, we have to make a station here and to recapitulate the results we have obtained; for representing all these results is already a progress, the point of departure and the guaranty of new progresses. Such is the goal of Book K, which can be regarded as an introduction to theology."66

A contemporary adherent of this view, Giovanni Reale, argues that in 1064a36, "the expression ???? ??????????? ????????? cannot but make reference to the book immediately following K, because ? is the only book in which such a demonstration is given" (p. 250). It is interesting to observe how modern philologists deal with this announcement. Whereas Schwegler (iv, p. 218) and Bonitz (p. 463) innocently give "Metaphysica XII" or "? 6 sqq." respectively as reference, Ross is visibly embarrassed: "cf. ? 6, 7. But see vol. I, XXVII f." (ii, p. 321). In his "Introduction", pp. xxvii-xxviii, we read: "There are three passages in other books which may refer to ?. E. 1027a 19 says that the question whether everything is 'for the most part' or some things are eternal must be discussed later, and this is not done except in ?. 6-8. K. 1064a 36 says more definitely 'if there is a substance of this nature - separate and unmovable - as we shall try to prove that there is'. On the other hand, the reference in Z. 1037a12 to a later discussion of the question 'whether there is another substance remote from the matter of sensible substances, and whether we must look for a substance distinct from them such as numbers or something of the kind', seems to refer much more probably to MN. And the other two references may be to a lost (or never written) positive part of the treatise of which MN is the preliminary critical part (cf. the formulation of the problem in M. 1076a 10, 'whether there is apart from sensible substances an unchangeable and eternal substance'). Thus not much can be made of these references in favour of a real connexion between ? and the rest of the Metaphysics."

Ross's supposition that K1 refers to the same missing positive treatise on non-sensible substances as Z must be regarded as auxiliary construction to support Jaeger's view that there is no connection between K and ? - Jaeger did not say anything about the announcement in question (1912, pp. 126-127): "Seemingly, the introduction K 1-8 could be followed rather well by the doctrine of the sensible substances ? 1-5, and this by the main part, the theology ? 6-10. It cannot be denied that this combination is the most appealing one at last, just with respect to size. Here, the disproportion between the three parts of the lecture [A, B??, ???, v. p. 112] is by far more tolerable than if ? is combined with the main lecture [AB?????, v. p. 109]. Nevertheless, also this combination cannot be maintained. Firstly, we have shown above [p. 97] that the ???????? ?????? do not belong into a regular lecture about metaphysics [on the basis of M2, 1086a21-24], in ? they occupy one half of the whole lecture. Secondly, the chapters ? 1-5 do not fit into the explication and solution of the problems put in K 1-8, since it is just K 1-8 where any idea of including the sensible substances into first philosophy is precluded with unsurpassable distinctness. Thirdly, in the course of the inquiry the certainty about the necessity and the tasks of the ????????? ???????? (still 1059a35, 1059b1, 1059b22, b25, 1060a3, a6) is rising immediately, so that 1060b31 it is spoken decidedly of the ??? ????????? ????????. 1064b2 it is called ?????????. And after all that the basic question should be started again whether there must be, besides physics, «another science» [1069b1], the name of which is not yet mentioned? […] Fourthly, what seems to be presupposed or simply posited by the initial sentence of ?, namely that it is ????? what the present ?????? is about, is not said in K 1-8. There is no connection, no idea of unity. Fifthly, where on earth are the solutions of the problems raised in K 1-2, 1060b30 given?"

As regards the relation to A, K (1059a18-20) picks up the thread of A 2, but far more explicitly. After the result of A 1 is recapitulated (l. 18), from the various current definitions of wisdom in A 2 the question arises, if there are as many different sciences called "wisdom".

Thomas Aquinas (Sententia Metaphysicae, liber 11 lectio 1 numerus 1) rightly refers ????? to A 2: "Ostensum est enim in prooemio istius libri, quod sapientia considerat causas altissimas et maxime universales, et est nobilissima scientiarum." The relative clause ?? ??? … ???? ??? ????? does not give reason for the ????? - as Theiler (1958, p. 86 n.: "it seems to be referred mistakenly to the polemic chapters A 8 sq.") mistakenly assumes - but leads over to the aporiae to follow. The message is: What was prepared in A 8-9, we will now work out.

Mansion (1958, p. 213) points out to the fact that in the chapters 1-2, "philosophy is constantly designated by the term ?????, as in the prooemium of the Book A".

Of course, it is especially important to clarify the relation to B?E, which is coupled with the question of the authenticity of K1. Brandis made a detailed comparison which convinced him that in both treatises "not a single difference in style and usage can be found which gave a right to assume different authors" (p. 73). Here is his analysis (pp. 66-72).

"The book begins: «That wisdom is a science about the principles is evident from the first (discourses, or what else may be supplied in thought), in which the aporiae about what has ben said by others about the principles are discussed.» So the author goes on from the inquiries of the first book: for in it the intention is to show that all previous philosophers have aimed at defining more closely one or another or more of the Aristotelian principles. There follow the aporiae, or rather antinomically treated questions, which are worked out more comprehensively in Book B: whether wisdom is one single science or a multiple one; whether one or more sciences have to show the principles of demonstration (???????????? ?????); whether one science has to treat of all substances, whether only of substances or also of their accidents, whether of sensible substances or of others, like the Ideas or the objects of mathematics, and which science has to treat about the matter of the objects of mathematics? Whether the principles of the science in question are to be supposed as the universals or as the simple elements, and if the former, whether as the highest genera, like being and unity, or as species? If they are to be supposed as the individuals, whether there are substances beside the sensible ones, and if so, beside which? If not, whether matter or form are to be regarded as the principle in request? If there were an eternal separable substance, whether it is then principle of all things, of the eternal and the perishable, or is a particular one principle in each instance? But again, if one should be inclined to take being and unity for the principle of all things, how shall these be considered as separable substances subsisting by themselves? Whether one derives numbers as principles from matter or regards lines and planes as principles too. How the principle is to be supposed as substance at all, substance indicating something concrete (???? ??), not universal, but science referring to the latter [I omit Brandis's wrong translation of 1060b21 ??? ??? ???????, "wie auf das Besondere"]. Whether there is something [Brandis erroneously "nichts" = "nothing"] beside the complex of matter and form (?? ???????), and if so, how had such a thing, i. e. the form, to be considered? Whether the principles are the same in number or in kind? (capita 1. 2.)

In Book B, such aporiae are likewise, and even more immediately, tied to the results of the first book (B 1 in., cf. p. 995a5: ?? ???? ????????????????. caput 2 p. 996b8: ?? ??? ??? ??? ????? ???????????. ib. p. 997b4: ?? ???? ??????? ??????. cf. A 2. 9.), and together short reflections are made about the scope and concern of the aporiae, then the aporiae themselves are stated by way of preliminary, and explicated in depth from the second chapter on. In B 2, right for the first aporia it is argued that the different principles do not admit of application on every being, what in K 1 [1059a] l. 34 is attended very improperly with the aporia on the cognoscibility of the accidents; concerning the second aporia, it is questioned whether there can be at all a science of the principles of demonstration (p. 997a2); to the third aporia, it is remarked that, if one science embraced all substances, then also all what belongs to them in themselves (??????????? ???' ????, a term absent in Book K). On the other hand, in Book K an argument against assuming Ideas and something intermediate is exposed with more precision than in Book B (v. p. 1059b5, compared with p. 997b24), and the question about the science of the matter of the mathematical objects is added (p. 1059b14). When questioning whether the principles are to be supposed to be the universals or the elements, in Book B the definitions are regarded to conjointly (caput 3 p. 998b4), not to mention the more comprehensive execution in detail. The aporia whether substances beside the sensible ones are to be supposed is more comprehensively explicated in our book (K) (caput 2 p. 1060a13, cf. B 4 p. 999a34), as in Book B the reason why science cannot confine itself to the cognition of the single sensible objects is assigned with more precision (caput 4. in.). In return for which, in the former book the transition to the inquiry whether perhaps the non-separable eternal matter is to be regarded as the principle searched for comes out more distinctly (caput 2 p. 1060a19, cf. B 4 p. 999b12). In Book B, however, the arguments pro and contra the form are presented much more explicitly, and the inquiry whether the principles are the same in number or in kind (l. c. ll. 15 sqq. 24 sqq.) is connected with them immediately, only then the other question is discussed whether the same principles are to be supposed for perishable and imperishable things (caput 4 p. 1000a5, cf. K 2 p. 1060a27), the historico-critical prosecution being much more convincing here. In Book B, the question whether being and unity, as the most universal concepts, are to be supposed as the real substance is treated not only much more comprehensively, but also in a far better order; in Book K, as you would expect it from an earlier draft (caput 4 p. 1001a4, cf. K 2 p. 1060a36, cf. further caput 5 p. 1002a30 with p. 1060b18). Finally, in Book B it is asked at the end why, beside the sensible and the mathematical objects, still other ones, like the Ideas, are supposed as real at all, and whether the principles are extant potentially (???????) or how else? Contrarily, in Book K (p. 1060b23) it is asked how science is directed both to the universal and substance, and whether, beside the union of matter and form, something existent is to be assumed at all? So that the latter book leaves totally untouched a concept (potentiality) which is of the greatest importance in Aristotle's first philosophy; the former too, it is true, does only touch it.

This antinomic discussion of the main problems of first philosophy is followed, in the short as in the ample draft, by the positive definition of the concept of a science of being as such; but in the former, as it is conformable to a first and provisional draft, by general outlines, which, in the other one, are not only developed further, but often also defined more closely. So the former acquiesces in designating the science in request as science of being in general, whereas the other one (caput 1) describes it as science of being as far as being and, therefore, of what belongs to it in itself (????????? ???' ????), and adds that none of the other sciences has for its object being as such. It is the same with the following demonstration that being, though not something single and simple, relates to something common. In Book ? (caput 2) namely, the relation of being to a single principle is shown in respect to substances, their modifications (????), becoming and ceasing-to-be, even to the so-called non-being, and at the same time it is intimated that substance lies at the foundation of all modes of being, which is why the philosopher has to treat of it; at the same time, by establishing that being and unity coincide in this relation, transition is effected to the deduction of the opposites (????????????) from the concept of being or unity, and to the assumption that, as there are different substances, so different parts of philosophy (caput 2 p. 1003b5); instead in our book (K), less definitely and extensively, substance being omitted, only modification (?????), habit (????) or disposition (????????) or something of that sort (? ??? ????? ?? ??? ????????) are adduced, and then it is remarked that the science of being has to show the opposites (???????????) too. The fact that one and the same science can treat of being and the opposite accidents is illustrated in Book K (1061a28) by the example of the mathematician, in Book ? (caput 2 p. 1004a7) besides, more shortly and convincingly, by the arithmetical consideration of number and its properties, and in doing so it is remarked (p. 1005a11) that the geometer has to define the concepts of opposition, perfection, being and unity, identity and diversity only hypothetically; at the same time, it is uttered more definitely (p. 1005a13) than in Book K, that thus the aporia is solved how one and the same science can treat of being as such what belongs to it in itself, or of substances and their determinations (??? ??????????). The second main aporia, which concerned the principles of demonstration (?? ?? ???? ???????? ????????? ???????? or ?? ????????????? ????? ? caput 3), is removed in the short draft by adducing that mathematics and physics, which make use of these principles, are treating of being only in certain respects; whereas in the more comprehensive disquisition it is shown that the axioms relate to all being, that it is, therefore, the science of being qua being, not some science of a particular kind of being, as physics, which has to treat of them, because such a special science is constrained to always presuppose the validity of these principles (? 3, K 4).

The first section of first philosophy which follows now begins with deduction of the principle of contradiction. In the short draft, it is only marked as such one in respect of which error does not happen (K 5); in the more comprehensive disquisition, it is marked additionally as the principle of all other axioms, most capable of being known (???????????) and not founded on any supposition (??????????), the knowledge or acknowledgement of which lies, for that very reason, at the foundation of all other knowledge and demonstration (? 3 p. 1005b12), and the validity of which cannot be demonstrated directly by deduction from a higher principle, but only by refutation (??????????). (? 4 p. 1006a5) The last point, to be sure, is stated also in the former draft, but in less definite expressions (K 5 p. 1062a2: ????? ??? ??? ????? ?????????, ???? ????? ?' ????) and without referring to he impossibility of following up the proofs ad infinitum. On the other hand, concerning the proof by refutation here the advice is given to procure application to the said principle by convert it into other forms.

Both books, then, proceed from the fact that the opponent must, at least, concede that words, being means of communication, must have one single signification, or, (as expressed more exactly in ? 4 p. 1006b2) significations which are not merely relative (1006b15), but are defined for the speaking and the others as well, whether one word has one or more meanings; and that he, consequently, must concede that contradictory assertions cannot be posited at the same time. In the latter book it is also added that this implies acknowledging the fact that there is something true for us without proof, what was denied by those who asked for direct demonstration of the principle of contradiction. The shorter draft too endeavours to show that acknowledging definite meanings of the words implies acknowledging the principle in question, but intermixes, precariously, the concept of necessity (caput 5 p. 1062a20); then it goes over to applying this discussion to the doctrines of Heraclitus and Protagoras, without emphasizing, as Book ?, that those who deny the validity of the said principle sublate the concept of substance, dissolving all things into mere relations (p. 1007a20) and into an undistinguishable unity or non-being (p. 1007b18), but, by their actions, reveal themselves as not really holding this opinion (p. 1008b12). But the shorter draft remarks, in respect of Heraclitean doctrine, that asserting the invalidity of the principle is self-contradictory, what is more universally conceived in the other draft (K 5 p. 1062a36, cf. ? 4 p. 1008a28). The negation of the principle (which had developed from the assumption of Protagoras and others that all appearances are true, but opposite according to the perceptions of different persons at different times) is refused in both books in a similar way, but in Book ? by far more thoroughly and piercingly, and in doing so the dialectical-sophistical conclusion is examined that being and non-being must exist at the same time (? 5, K 6). But also here disagreements are found, which could not happen if the shorter draft were a mere excerpt (v. especially caput 6 p. 1062b27); not to mention that the excerpt ought to be a very poor one, as important moments of the development have remained altogether disregarded.

In both drafts there follows a deduction of the so-called principle of the excluded third, which, however, in the comprehensive one is conceived far more definitely from the start. [Footnote: "???? ?????? ?????????? ????????? ????? ?????, ???' ?????? ? ????? ? ???????? ?? ???' ???? ?????? ? 7 p. 1011b23. ?????? ?' ???? ??? ??? ????? ????? ???? ?? ????????????? ???' ???? ??? ??? ????? K 6 p. 1063a19"]

In the introduction to the second section of first philosophy, this discipline is defined more closely as science of being as such in its difference from physics and mathematics. Taken together as the theoretical sciences, which divide themselves by the different objects of cognition, they are distinguished from the practical and productive endeavours. Here too, the more comprehensive treatise (Book E) contains, beside further discussions, closer definitions, that are still missing in the sketch (K). In Book E, the before-said tripartition is deduced from mediating thinking (???????) as its origin. In the short draft, the principle of productive and practical activity is called motion in general (??????? K 7 p. 1064a12), in the comprehensive one (E 1 p. 1025b22), the principle of artificial activity is called intelligence or art or faculty, the principle of practical activity is called choice (??????????).

The inquiries into being as such are introduced by synonymic definitions, distinguishing four kinds of being: relative being (?? ???? ??????????), being in the sphere of connection or mediating thinking, the being expressed in the categories, which is independent from thinking, being in respect to potentiality or actuality. Relative being is excluded from the following inquiries, because it is incidental, and therefore not object of science; but the concept of the relative or incidental is justified. The principle of it is not intimated in Book K (caput 8), whereas in Book E (caput 2 p. 1027a13) it is designated provisionally as matter, and jointly as belonging to the sphere of becoming and perishing, without becoming or perishing itself (caput 3). The ultimate decision, however, whether the sufficient reason must be supposed to be matter or rather moving or final cause, is kept back for further inquiry (caput 3 p. 1027b14)."

Schwegler (iv 209) formulates the a priori alternatives for the relation between K1 and B?E: "There can be no doubt that either Book K [i. e. K1] is an excerpt from the three preceding books [B?E], or reversely the latter exposition is a revision of the former one, or that both redactions are based on one and the same writing or some common material. The second assumption is the most probable one."

Christ67 and Natorp (p. 179) plead for the first alternative. Natorp's strongest argument is the fact that 1065a24 ?? ??? ?? ??? ???????? and E, 1028a2 ??? ??? ???????? ????? ???? ????? ??? ????? are similar in wording, but different in sense; this, he thinks (p. 192), cannot be explained but by misunderstanding.

In his commentary (i, p. 366), Ross assumes that ??? has the same meaning "objective" in E as in K; but if we draw on the addition 1027b31-33 ? ??? … ? ??????? (on which see above, p. 94), it is put beyond doubt that with ??? is meant "outside of the categories". In his translation, he follows the traditional interpretation.

In my opinion, we are dealing with two versions of equal value in point of substance and style. If we exclude that the one of them originates from the other one, there remains only assuming a common source. In this, as the author of K1 had it beforehand, the ??? ????? after ????? must have been missing; ??? … ????? ???? ????? (or something like this) can be understood in the way the author of K1 did.

If our explanation is correct, we have, with this passage, a definite evidence that at least the section 1065a21-26 ?? ?' … ?? ????? (which aroused already suspicion in other respect, see above, pp. 160-161) cannot come frome the same author as its pendant in E. He who wants to defend Aristotle's authorship of both texts has no other choice than to accept the explanation given by Ross.

The debate about the authenticity of K1 got a new impulse, when, within the context of the question about the subject of metaphysics, people began to take interest in the passage 1064a28-b14. Muskens's (p. 133) alleged discovery that in 1064a32-33 and b6-8 "being as such" is equivalent to divine being ("scientiam entis divini cum scientia entis qua ens confundi videtur") was exploited in two different ways: as key for understanding the corresponding section in E (Merlan68), and as evidence for the inauthenticity of K1 (Mansion69, Düring70).

Let us call to mind the situation of the lecture! In the chapters 5-6, the sentence ????? ??? ????? ???????? was combated, it was demonstrated that there is not only motion, but also permanent being. But this does not imply that the concept of being is more ??????? than that of motion. This takes place only if, besides the moved ??????, there exist also unmoved ones. In the other case, the ???? could be considered ? ???? too (not only ? ?????????, v. chapter 4, 1061b28-32), but not ? ???????. The aspect of being is then only one among others, and ? ?? is then not equivalent to "universal" (???????). Thus the question "whether the science of being qua being is to be regarded as universal or not" (1064b6-8) does make sense.

Now it gets clear in what way both parties are right and wrong. ? ?? designates an aspect, there is no entity called ?? ? ??. But there is an entity, a separate being, which has no other attributes than those of the ?? ? ??. (In so far Muskens and Merlan are right.) This separate entity is "understanding" (intellect, ????), and this intellect "understands itself" (cf. ?, 1072b19-20, 1074b33-34) by understanding the principles of being, which are at the same time the principles of intelligibility, in the first place "the nature of the determined" (? ??? ????????? ?????), which played a crucially important part already in chapter 6.

Both parties go wrong by supposing that the divine (?????) must have additional attributes. Consequently, by the one (Muskens, Merlan), the ?? ? ?? is topped up with these attributes, while the other deny the identity of the respective attributes (and have to slave away on the problem of the unity of ontology and theology).

Szlezák (2003, p. xvi, n. 5) considers the inauthenticity of K1 to be "as good as certain", convinced by the arguments of Pierre Aubenque in an article of 1983. Aubenque takes his arguments from the following passages.

1059a18-20.

Aubenque (p. 326) remarks on ???? ????? ????????: "Unusual expression. In Aristotle, the object of the science is expessed by a genitive. Cf. B 2, 996b1-2: ?? ?? ??????? ????????? ??? ?????? ???? ??? ????? ?????? ?????; A 2, 982a31; 3, 983a24; B 2, 996b12-14, 997a2, etc … In 995b11, we have ???? + accusative for expressing the object of the science, but the complement is linked to ???????? through the verb ????."

Aubenque has overlooked that ???? + accusative as attribute to ???????? occurs in 982a2 and 5-6. A further example is Topics, 145a26-27 (? ???? ??????? ?????? ????????).

1059a20-23.

Aubenque (p. 326): "The very general aporia (Is wisdom constituted by a single science or by several ones?) is reduced, in the following phrase, to a more limited difficulty: how can one and the same science embrace the principles, although they are not contrary to each other?"

Aubenque sees a mental leap, because he does not pay attention to the context: he does not recognize that, in the argument ?? ?' ????? ??? ????????, the introductory sentence ? ????? ???? ????? ???????? ??? ???? is presupposed. Thomas Aquinas (Sententia Metaphysicae, liber 11 lectio 1 numerus 2) establishes this context by supplying "quae considerat principia" to "sapientiam" ("utrum oporteat sapientiam quae considerat principia, esse unam scientiam aut multas").

1059a23-26.

Aubenque (1983, pp. 327-328): "The aporia formulated here (is it one and the same science which deals with the principles of demonstration?) does hardly make sense. We can, however, explain what is probably an oversight, if we look back to the corresponding aporia of B: is it one and the same science which deals with the principles of essence and the principles of demonstration? This appears clearly from the wording of the aporia (995b6-10), its explication (B 2, 996b26-997a15) and from the answer which is given in ? 3. The redactor will have been misguided by the beginning of the explication in 996b26: ???? ??? ??? ???? ??? ???????????? ????? ??????? ???? ????? ????????? ? ????????, where the ??? does not introduce a aporia which is independent of the preceding one on the causes, but continues the latter: is it the same science (the science of the principles or causes) which is also about the principles of demonstration?

The literal dependence of K 1, 1059a23-24 on B 2, 996a26-27 is confirmed by the fact that the expression ??????????? ???? is not found but in these two passages of the Corpus Aristotelicum. Elsewhere, Aristotle says: ?????????? ???? (cf. Bonitz, Index Aristotelicus 79b40sq.)"

The aporia does make sense. When we (as ficticious listeners of Aristotle) survey the sciences which are known so far, we must doubt which of them can claim with more right than the others to be competent for the principles which are common to all sciences. The object of the aporia seems to be to show the necessity of a science which does not yet exist.

1059a34-38.

Aubenque (p. 327): "This assertion, which reproducts a moment of the argumentation of B, is supported here on an explicit reference to the Physics and a characterization of the final cause as first cause of motion. This latter point overlooks the Aristotelian distinction of the final cause and the efficient cause, to which is generally reserved the function of being principle of motion (A 3, 983a30; B 2, 996a22; cf. Physics VII 2, 243a3-4) or origin of motion (A 4, 985a13). The confusion must have been suggested by a misunderstanding of B 2, 996a22-23: ???????? ????? … ? ??? ??????? ?????, where the ? is disjunctive and does not signify equivalence (the sense of the phrase is: «how will it be possible that in the realm of unmovable beings there is a principle of motion or the nature of the good», i. e. a final causality?)."

According to Book ? 7, the first mover moves qua final cause. In De Anima iii 9 it is appetite (??????) what causes locomotion.

1059a35 ??? ????????????? ?????????.

Aubenque (1983, 328-329): "The Book B employs this expression or an analogous expression (??? ?????????? [?????????]) no more than three times (995a24, 996b3, 32), and in the two latter cases, it was even found decomposed and, in a way, required by the syntax of the phrase. The author of Book K employs it, in a much more restricted space, no less than seven times (one time [1059a35] under the form ????????????, six times [rather seven times: 1059a35, b1, 13, 22, 25, 1060a4, 6] under the form ????????? ????????), not to speak of expressions formed according to the same model: ? ????????? ??? ???? (1060a24), ??? ????? ???? ??? ???????? (1060a27-28). We see how this expression, which in Book B seems to spring spontaneously from Aristotle's embarrassment about designating a science which has to fulfil the exigencies of «wisdom», but the content of which and consequently the name is not yet known, becomes for the author of K a stereotyped expression, all the more so as the presence of the expression from the first phrase of Book B on could seem to make of this book a treatise on the «science which we are seeking»."

1059a36. ?? ???? ???????? ???????.

Aubenque (1983, p. 328): "Expression unusual in Aristotle. For signifying that a predicate (here, a certain type of causality) appertains to a subject, Aristotle employs ???????? + dative (cf., e. g., B 2, 996b6, equally concerning causality). ???????? ?? is found too, but only in local sense (cf. Meteorology, II 4, 360a5: ??????? ?? ?? ?? ???? ???), or, by metaphor, for expressing what is included in the comprehension of a subject, as «man» in «Callias» (? 18, 1022a27).

Inversely, Book K employs a little later ???????? + dative, in the sense of «presence in, immanence to» (1060a13), while one would expect ???????? ??.

At last, it seems to me that the use of ???????? in 1060a10, without special connotation and practically as equivalent of ?????, is post-Aristotelian."

???????? ?? is the most natural expression for "occur in the realm of", cf., e. g., 1026a20-21 or 1090a24-25.

1059b3. ?? ??? ??? ???? ??? ??? ????, ?????.

Aubenque (1983, p. 329): "I do not know any passage of Aristotle where the doctrine of Ideas is dismissed so brutally. In the parallel passage of B 2, 997b5sqq., Aristotle considers as «absurd» the homonymy of the Ideas to the sensible things, but not the affirmation of their existence itself; he even recalls that he has shown elsewhere(A 9) in what sense the Ideas can be understood - in a good sense - as (formal) causes and «essences per se». The quarrel with Plato does not concern the existence of ????, but the fact that Plato conceives them as archetypes of the sensible."

According to Jaeger (p. 73, likewise 1957, p. 214), 1059b3 ?? ??? ??? ???? ??? ??? ????, ????? refers to A 9. Linguistic evidence, however, is against it. The same syntactic structure is met another three times in the Corpus Aristotelicum: Analytica priora, 69a25-26 (? ??? ??? ???????? ??? ????????, ???????? ? ?’ ????? ?? ????????, ??????), Ethica Nicomachea, 1118b27-28 (? ??? ??? ???? ??? ?????? ???????? ??? ???????? ??? ??????, ?????) and 1131a32-33 (? ??? ??? ????????? ??? ?? ????????, ?????). In none of these passages ????? is referring backwards.

1059b3-12.

Aubenque (1983, p. 329 with note): "The passage puts forward the «third man» argument for casting doubt on the existence of mathematical beings, which are idle intermediaries (??????) between the sensible and the intelligible. But it seems that the argument does not have this function in any of the other texts where it is set forth (Plato, Parmenides 132 A; Aristotle, Metaphysics A 9, 990b17; Z 13, 1039a3; M 4, 1079a13; On Sophistical Refutations 22. 178b37ss.); it is directed against the theory of participation, which, understood as relation of resemblance implying each time a model (therefore also a model of the resemblance between the model and the copy, etc. …), leads not only to a tripartition, but to a reduplication ad infinitum, which must be rejected as absurd. The third man of the argument is not intermediary between the sensible man and the intelligible man, he is superior to both qua foundation of their resemblance.

While most of the modern interpreters have recognized the deviant character of this utilization of the «third man» argument, Natorp is the only one so far who made a point of this against the authenticity. Cf. L. Robin, La théorie platonicienne des Idées et des Nombres d'après Aristote, Paris 1908; Ross, II 309, 611-612, and Natorp, p. 185."

Aubenque does not deal with what Jaeger (1912, pp. 73-74) has objected to Natorp: "In 1059b8, the ?????? ???????? is not applied in stereotyped sense, as in A 9, but designates some mathematical intermediate thing between an individual being and an Idea. The expression arises quite naturally, differing unmistakably by the missing article from the known argument of the sophist Polyxenus (Metaphysica A 9, 990b17 o? ?? ??? ?????? ???????? ????????), which is marked as ???????????? by the preposed article. Contrarily, in our case, from the intermediate status of the being of the mathematical objects between their Idea and their sensible individual copies, the existence of an intermediate kind of being between Idea and ???' ??????? of all other things is inferred. This would result, e. g., in «some» third man, an intermediate man, between the Idea of man and the individual man. Without taking offense, Pseudo-Alexander [in metaph. 636, 2—9 Hayduck] interprets in the same way."

1059b15-16.

Aubenque (pp. 329-331): "The expression [???? ??? ??? ??????????? ????] is unique in the Corpus Aristotélicum. And the problem raised (To which science belongs the study of difficulties concerning the matter of the mathematical beings?) has no equivalent in B. The answer given can seem surprising, since it is the «philosophy which we have set before ourselves» which is said to have to deal with that question, although, a little above, it was denied the study of the mathematical beings, be it that they do not exist (b8), be it that they are not separated, i. e. immaterial (????????, b13).

We can exclude Natorp's explication, who, relying on an analogous usage of ??? in K 4, 1061b21, translates: «the object of the mathematical sciences», for then the question posed (Which is the science that deals with the object of mathematical science?) would become tautological. And we must consider as insufficient the explication of Bonitz and of Ross, who interpret that it is ??? ?????, i. e. «practically = space» (Ross [ii, p. 309]). For one cannot see why wisdom should be science of space.

The solution is furnished here, as it seems to me, by Jaeger [Studien ..., 74; Aristoteles, 221, n. 2.] […]. It is indeed the unwritten doctrines which pose, beyond the Ideas and the ideal numbers, two principles or «elements», the One and the Indefinite Dyad, which Aristotle equates to form and matter. Thus, for the Platonists, a «matter» of the numbers does exist, and, as well, of the Ideas (for the matter of the numbers, cf. N 1, 1087b14-16, for the matter of the Ideas A 6, 988a12). And one understands now that the «matter» of the suprasensible, being even more principal than the suprasensible itself, falls within the remit of the supreme science.

The explication of the text, then, is satisfactory, but not the consequence drawn by Jaeger in favor of the priority, and therefore of the authenticity of the Book K, by which it would be situated at the same chronological level as the Book N. But […] the Book N does not only expose the Platonic theory of the two principles: it rejects it; N 2 considers the idea that number can have a matter to be absurd, since, being burdened with potentiality then, it would not be eternal, which is, however, what the Platonists want. How, then, Aristotle, to suppose that he be the author of the Book K, could find use for […] a notion which he held absurd at the same time?

As to the answer given to this question by the author of K, it will be agreed that is hardly convincing: one does not see how recalling the definition of physics and analytics by their respective objects and stating that these sciences are not competent here should lead, by elimination, to the conclusion that the «science we are seeking», i. e. wisdom, can deal with the matter of the mathematical beings (why it, rather than mathematics itself or a science sui generis?).

To give account of this passage (1059b14-21), one will admit, therefore, that the author of K is not content with summarizing B, but that he knows and utilizes other Aristotelian texts, in this case the Book A and probably also the Book N (besides, he utilizes also - albeit irrelevantly - the Physics, as it is shown by the recall of the definition of natural being in 1059b16-17).

But is this utilization timely or simply relevant? Here it is not, since a reader who knows only the Book K (hypothesis required by those who hold the Book K a self-sufficient draught) would be quite unable to comprehend the paradox which makes the «matter» of the mathematical beings more worthy to be studied by wisdom, and therefore more immaterial, than the mathematical beings themselves. I am even afraid that the author of the Book K was himself incited to add this aporia, by the same misinterpretation which suggests itself to his reader: it is because the mathematical beings are sensible substances, as suggests the end of the preceding aporia, that they have a matter!"

The enumeration of the three sciences which come into consideration is presupposed to be a complete disjunction. Note that analytics is not considered to be a science anywhere else in the Corpus Aristotelicum.

1059b21-24.

Aubenque (1983, pp. 332-333): "It is Aristotle himself who, playing in polemic intention with the ambiguity of the term ?????????, affects to believe that the Platonists could hold the eternal beings to be composed: ???????? ??? ??? ?? ?? ????????? (1088b14-15). Cf. 1088b27-28: «If it is true that the elements are the matter of essence, no eternal essence will contain constitutive elements (???????? ?? ?? ????? ????????????)». So the association of ????????? with ???????? and ?????????, which is judged inevitable, opposed to a Platonic conception of ?????????, is found in K and in N, whereas it is not found in B. Nevertheless, we will not conclude that K is Aristotelian, prior to B and contemporaneous of N (Jaeger), but only that the author of K had under his eyes the Book N as well as the Book B. The awkwardness of the disciple may be recognized from the fact that he utilisizes dogmatically, in a passage which had to remain aporetic, an argument of Aristotle which is in itself polemic."

With ll. 23-24 ????? ?? ?????? ??????????? ???? ????????? ????????, the author refers undogmatically to ordinary language, disclosing a difficulty.

1059b27-1060a1.

Aubenque (1983, 333-335): "This passage, which corresponds to the 7th aporia of B (1, 995b29-31), is to my view that which seems to resist best to the suspicion of inauthenticity. While the question posed is indeed the same as in B 1, the development given to the aporia is independent of that of B 2 (998b14-999a23). In K, it relies on the notion of ????????????, of «co-suppression», which designates a sort of intellectual experience which permits to recognize what is «primary» or what is «more of a principle» (ll. 29-30; cf. 34-35, 36-37): if, two realities being given, the supposed suppression of A involves the suppression of B, whereas the supposed suppression of B does not involve the suppression of A, it will be said that A is «more of a principle» (?????? ????) than B. Pushing to the limit this proceeding, the text comes to give this concise and vigorous characterization of «principle»: ???? ??? ?? ???????????, «for principle is what, being suppressed, takes along everything with it».

Natorp sees in the usage of the verb ??????????? (1059b30, 38 and 1060a1), which is absent of the correspondent passage of B, a «terminologic innovation» (p. 186) peculiar to the Book K. In reality, the experience and the method which describes it are ancient and remount to the Ancient Academy, as H. J. Krämer [Der Ursprung der Geistmetaphysik, Amsterdam 1964, 24, 106] has shown. Outside K, the Metaphysics does not know this concept, but in ? 5, 1071a34-35, ??????????? occurs with the same function: ?? ??? ?????? ????? ?? ????? ??????, ??? ??????????. For expressing this idea, Aristotle employs more willingly ???????? in the sense of «subsistent by itself», «self-sufficient», «what does not need anything but itself to exist»; e. g., in Z 1, 1028a31, one of the senses of ????? is made explicit in the following manner: «While none of the other categories can exist separately (????????), but only ?????». Likewise in ? 1, 1069a24.

As Natorp has noted, we must approach K 1, 1059b27 sqq. from Topics vi 4. 141b2-142a, where the method of ???????????? is already applied to the question of knowing whether the genus is «more of a principle» as the species or vice versa, and where, on the other hand, this peculiarly Aristotelian aporia is approached from the question of the order of priority in the series point-line-volume, debated in the Ancient Academy. Must it be said, as it was sustained by Speusippus and seems to be admitted still by Aristotle in the Topics, that, the point being suppressed, the line disappears, etc. …, or, as it will be sustained later by Aristotle (M 2. 1077a31 sqq.), that, the volume being suppressed, the surface disappears, etc. …? In the first case, line, surface and volume will be constructions obtained ?? ?????????? from the principle, the point. In the second case, what is primary is the volume, and all else is only by abstraction (?? ??????????).

B. Dumoulin has shown that the text of K must be approached, at least by its terminology, from the Protrepticus, fr. 5 a Ross, B 33, 35-36 Düring [Cf. B. Dumoulin, pp. 60 sqq.; as well as Recherches sur le premier Aristote, Paris 1981, pp. 123-126], where Aristotle, in a sense still Platonic or rather Speusippean, applies the ???????????? to demonstrate the priority ????? of number in relation to the line, of the line in relation to the surface, of the surface in relation to the volume. But the text of K, if it proposes an analogous method for answering the question of knowing whether the genus is prior to the species or the species to the genus, does not pronounce itself on the substance. Therefore, contrarily to B. Dumoulin [B. Dumoulin, p. 62. See, however, p. 58 n. 3], I cannot see here that the application of the ???????????? is made «in an inverse sense» of its usage in the Protrepticus and the Topics, what would permit to see in K 1-2 a determinated stratum in the evolution of Aristotle's thought. In reality, even if the terminology is ancient, nothing permits to say that here is the «turning point» where Aristotle turned away from what was covered by this terminology in the usage of the Academy and the young Aristotle.

It remains that the passage 1059b27-1060a1, even if it corresponds to a aporia of B, ameliorates the presentation by using an independent terminology, which happens to be that of the still platonizing young Aristotle. I, for my part, would conclude either that the author of K had knowledge of the text of Topics vi 4, or, more probably, that he had under his eyes, together with B, another catalogue of aporiae, probably prior to that of Book B, where Aristotle was still using the Academic method of ???????????? for posing the problem of the relation of priority between genus and species."

1060a6-7.

Aubenque (p. 335): "Where has it been said? According to Ross (ad loc. [ii, p. 311]), «the reference seems to be to 1059b31-38». But there are two arguments in this latter passage, and neither seems to justify this reference: in the second one (1059b34-38), it is asked whether genus or species is more of a principle; according to the given answer, one will say that the sought science bears on the genera or the species, but not on neither of these two; - in the first argument, it is shown, conformably to B 3, 998b14-28, that being and unity do not be genera, but this does not exclude that the veritable genera (less general than the «transcendentals» being and one) and a fortiori the species be objects of the first science.

In fact, the author of K will have summarized mechanically the corresponding passage of B, where it is equally said: ??? ???????? ???? ???????????? (999a32). But in B the sense of the reference is clear: it is the long development 998b14-999a16, where it is shown successively that the pretended first genera «being» and «one» (?? ????? of the line 999a31) do not be genera and that the lowest genera themselves (?? ?????? [????] of 999a31) do not exist apart from the individuals and that it is better to attribute the dignity of principle to «what is predicated of the individuals» (999a15), an expression understood by all commentators as designating the lowest species (cf. also 999a4-6).

The apparently internal reference given in K 2, 1060a5-7 is therefore in reality to a passage of the Book B, which has no equivalent in K and wherefrom, besides, an erroneous conclusion is drawn, since the passage denies the quality of being principles to the genera (to the «lowest» as well as to the «highest»), but not to the species."

As often, two successive ??? point to an interpolation. The second one in l. 7 furnishes a quite sufficient argument that "the science we now seek" treats neither of genera nor of species, so that the first one is abundant.

1060a10-11.

Aubenque (p. 336): "The text says here: ?????, whereas in this context (and on the parallel question of knowing if there is a science other than physics and superior to it) Aristotle employs almost always ?????, which marks more strongly the heterogeneity. Cf. E 1, 1026a28; A 1. 1069b1 (but ???? in 1069a33); M 9. 1086a25; Physica I 2. 185a2; De Caelo III 1. 298b20. Cf. also in K: 1060a13, 18, etc. …"

1060a22-23.

Aubenque (p. 336 n.): "The constant doctrine of Aristotle is that the form is not subject to becoming. Cf. Z 8. 1033b5-7: ?? ????? … ?? ??????? ???' ????? ????? ???????; H 5. 1044b21: ???? ???????? ??? ?????? … ?? ????; Physica v 1. 224b5. In H 3. 1043b15, Aristotle admits that the form, successively, is and is not present, so that it can be said at most, as the essence (?????, in the sense of formal essence), to be ??????? ???? ??? ??????????; but this manner of speaking is incorrect itself, and it is appropriate to speak rather of eternity (??????, ibid.).

M. Dumoulin communicates to me a text which seems to have escaped our predecessors: Physica i 9. 192b1, where it is said that physics bears ???? ??? ??????? ??? ??? ??????? ?????. But it seems it is a brachylogy for: «the forms of the physical and corruptible beings»."

In my view, this survey shows that the arguments propounded for the inauthenticity of K1 are partly unfounded, partly their validity can be limited to the passages from which they are taken (especially to chapter 2).

The Thread of ?

(1) Ross:

The three kinds of substance. Change implies matter as well as form and privation (chapters 1, 2).

Bonitz:

1) Quaeritur de substantia. Substantia rerum omnium prima est, 1069a18-30.

2) Substantiarum genera tria distinguuntur, 1069a30-b2.

3) Mutatio ut possit esse ponenda est materia, 1069b3-34.

Generation considered. If form ever exists apart from the concrete individual, it is in the case of natural objects (chapter 3).

Bonitz: Nec materia prima nec forma prima generatur, 1069b35-1070a1.

Quae generantur omnia generantur e substantia sibi cognomine, 1070a4-9.

In what sense all things have the same causes (chapters 4, 5).

Bonitz: Diversarum rerum diversa quidem sunt elementa, quodam modo tamen omnium rerum eadem sunt elementa, 1070a30-b21.

Ad elementa tria tamquam quartum accedit causa movens, 1070b22-30; ea quomodo cohaereat cum forma rei exponitur - 35.

Substantiarum causae etiam accidentium sunt principia, 1070b36-1071a3.

Causarum genera ad potentiam et actum rediguntur, 1071a3-17.

There must be an eternal prime mover (chapter 6).

Bonitz: Esse substantiam aeternam immobilem, 1071b3-11, eamque actum esse, non potentiam demonstratur - b26, refutatis aliorum philosophorum placitis - 1072a7. Ea substantia quomodo et motus caeli et inde universae generationis sit principium significatur - a18.

Nature and mode of operation of the first mover (chapter 7).

Bonitz: Summum principium movens deus est, aeterno actu se ipsum cogitans.

The number of the eternal moving principles (chapter 8).

Bonitz: Quot sint numero principia aeterna moventia.

The mode of existence of the supreme reason (chapter 9).

Bonitz: Summi intellectus eam esse, quam supra descripsit, naturam, ut sit sui ipsius intellectus, excussis dubitationibus quibusdam confirmat.

How the good exists in the world (chapter 10).

Bonitz: Quemadmodum id quod est bonum et pulchrum insit in universitate mundi, 1075a11-25.

Difficulties in other views.

Bonitz: In quas incidant difficultates qui aliter statuerint ac nunc est expositum, 1075a25-1076a4.

(2) Since Alexander of Aphrodisias the Book ? was considered as the crowning conclusion to the Metaphysics:

"[…] in this book, he talks about the principles of being qua being and about the principles of the first substance which is absolutely real. He does it by showing that there is a substance which is in this state and what this substance is; the elucidation of this substance is the final aim of this discipline [probably equivalent to ??????????]." (Alexander in Averroes, p. 59 Genequand)

The commentators who followed Alexander were faced, however, with the question to what purpose the "sensible substance" (??????? ?????) is treated in the first 5 chapters. The unanimous answer: As K is a recollection of ???, ? "recollects" (Thomas Aquinas, Sententia Metaphysicae, liber 12 lectio 1 numerus 1) ??. In both cases, the treatment of the sensible substance "subserves" (Fonseca) the treatment of the immaterial substance. This explanation is based on Z, 1029b3-12 and 1037a10-17.

The traditional view is maintained by Jaeger (1962, p. 220): "The lecture is sharply divided into two unequal portions. The first of these (capita 1-5) discusses the doctrine of sensible reality; its analysis results in the conception of matter, form, potency, and act. The second (capita 6-10) begins straight away with the speculative idea of the unmoved mover and with the assertion of a supersensible reality. Unlike the second, the first part is not an end in itself; it is there simply for the sake of the second, to which it serves as foundation."

Frede (2000, p. 5) objects: "There is no suggestion that the first part concerning sensible substances is just supposed to introduce the material on the basis of which we then can consider the real subject of the treatise, namely immaterial substance." This is, however, an argumentum e silentio.

Brandis (pp. 80-81) remarks on chapters 1-5: "The initial destination of these reflections, strung together most loosely, here and there in an quite external manner [Footnote: "e. g. caput 3 repeatedly by ???? ????? sc. ??? ?????? and the like"], seems to have been to connect the results of first philosophy, come forward in the preceding books, with the results of the Physics, especially to allocate the tripartition (form, privation and matter) known from the Physics [Book i] in the former results. But evidently, there exist only the first outlines; apparently, Aristotle did not arrive at filling up them."

Regarding the chapters 6-10, he observes that they "bear very definitely the traces of a first plan ["einer ersten Anlage"]".

What does the text say about its aim? As in ? (1003a26 sq.), Aristotle places himself in the tradition of those who searched for "the principles and the causes" of being (1069a18sq.). Then, again as in ?, the reduction to substance is accounted for, then the question becomes important, how many substances there are (cf ?, 1004a 2 sq.). From this we cannot but conclude that he intends to search for the principles and causes of just these (three) substances.

But few lines after (32 sq.), we meet an incidental remark ("of which we must grasp the elements, whether one or many"), which limits the search to sensible substance. Be it interpolated or not (see vol. i, pp. 267-268), it describes exactly what happens in the following section (1069b3-34): the three "causes" and "principles" mentioned 1069b32-34 are 'elements', i. e. inner principles (cf. 1070b22-24 and ? 1, 1013a19 sq.).

On the other hand, we search in vain for a similar inquiry on the principles of the other two substances. That there are principles of the unmoved substance, too, is mentioned by the way in 1072b1-3:

"That the final cause may exist among unchangeable entities is shown by the distinction of its meanings. For the final cause is (a) some being for whose good an action is done, and (b) something at which the action aims; and of these the latter exists among unchangeable entities though the former does not."

This passage was overlooked by Frede (2000, p. 6): "The first lines of ? might make us think that we are going to inquire into the causes and principles of substances quite generally. And since later in the first chapter we distinguish between two, or three, kinds of substances, respectively, we might think that, in the first part of ?, we will get an inquiry into the causes and principles of sensible substances and, in the second part, an inquiry into the causes and principles of immaterial substances. This expectation is fully met by the first part, but sorely disappointed by the second part. The explanation for this is not that immaterial substances do not have any principles, except that trivially they have essences and are principles of themselves in so far as they are identical with their essence. For, though it is true of God that there are no antecedent, distinct, principles of him, it is at least questionable in the case of the other unmoved movers whether or not they do have principles also in a non-trivial sense. The fact that they are unmoved does only mean that they do not rely on principles which would account for their being the cause of certain kinds of motion by their being themselves moved. We might think that Aristotle when he wrote ? 1 had planned to write ? 6 ff. also about the principles of non-sensible substances, but never got around to fulfilling the promise of ? 1, since it turned out to be difficult enough to establish their existence, nature, and at least something about their number. This, of course, cannot be ruled out. But, even if we did assume that ? was written in great haste, it would seem strange that Aristotle does not care to make any remark, one way or the other, about the principles and causes of immaterial substances, if this was his initial plan. There is not even a token gesture in the direction of fulfilling the supposed original promise, if only to mark the place for such a discussion. Hence it would seem to be much more plausible to assume that when he says at the very beginning of ? that one is inquiring into the principles and causes of substances, what he has in mind rather are just the mundane sensible substances in the world around us. He is not telling us that we should, and hence are going to in this treatise, inquire into the principles of each and any kind of substance."

The final cause (?? ?? ?????) did not occur hitherto in ?. We must go back to ? 1, 1059a34-38 in order to understand the background.

The reader is also frustrated by the division given in 1069a33-36, which agrees with M, 1076a19-22. "It is the disposition that is followed throughout the Book M. One expects to find somewhere in the Book ? a refutation of these doctrines, but the refutation given in chapter 10 follows quite another disposition." (Ivánka, pp. 535 sq.)

The inquiry on sensible substance is divided into 4 sections (1069b3-34, 1069b35 - 1070a4, 1070a4-30, 1070a31-1071b1), which are loosely arranged together without any visible connection, the most obvious manifestation being the formula ???? ????? ??? (1069b35. 1070a4), "ex qua apparet eum breviter quasi in commentariis designare, quae sint exponenda, neque vero exponere" (Bonitz, p. 24). It is striking that the recapitulation 1071b1 sq. skips just the sections 2 and 3, which are introduced by the said formula.

On the structure of the first section 1069b3-34, Gigon (1952, p. 323) notes: "1069b 3-9 leads already to the main result recapitulated in b32-34. This could be followed by b24-26, where the keyword ??? is resumed and where it is shown that both grades of the ??????? ????? mentioned in a30-33 have a ???. Perhaps this remark was removed from its original place, when there were inserted, firstly, a schema of the four types of ???????? (b9-14) and, secondly, an explication of the conceptual pair ??????? - ???????? (b14-20)."

And (l. c.) on the recapitulation 1069b32-34: "Except the relative clause ?? … ????????, it is a correct formulation of the result of 1069b3-9. Contrarily, in the relative clause there are concepts introduced which neither occur in what precedes nor arise from it. To put it bluntly, one needs to know Physics A 6-9 for knowing about them. This is one of the many cases in which the recapitulation is not congruent to the text to which it claims to belong."

The inquiry on unmoved substance is guided by an instruction given in the Posterior Analytics (ii 1. 89b31-35): "but for some objects of inquiry we have a different kind of question to ask, such as whether there is or is not a centaur or a God. (By 'is or is not' I mean 'is or is not, without further qualification'; as opposed to 'is or is not [e.g.] white'.) On the other hand, when we have ascertained the thing's existence, we inquire as to its nature, asking, for instance, 'what, then, is God?' or 'what is man?'." Accordingly, at first the existence of such a substance is demonstrated, (1071b3-1072b13), then the essence is described (1072b13-1073a13).

This general inquiry is followed by the specific question about the exact number of the unmoved substances (1073a14-1074a31). After an interpolation concerning the uniqueness of the world (1074a31-38, 1074b3 ????? must refer to 1074a30 sq. ????? ???????, assimilation of case), the astronomical excursus is concluded by a reference to popular religion (1074a38-b14).

Further specific questions are concerned with intellect (1074b15-1075a10). Loosely connected, there follows a reflection on the role of the Good in the world as a whole (1075a11-25). The book concludes (1075a25-1076a4) with a criticism of the predecessors.

Chapter 8 was rightly recognized by Jaeger (1962, p. 346) as an interpolation: "Remove it, and chapters 7 and 9 fit smoothly together."

Düring (p. 191) denies this: "Chapter 7 finishs with a typical cadenza, with formulations marking the conclusion of a reasoning. In the 9th chapter, Aristotle opens a new question, but this is what he does in the 7th chapter too. It is obvious that the first sentence of the 8th chapter is closely connected with the first sentence of the 7th chapter."

Observing the Aristotelian parlance tips the scales in favor of Jaeger. After a recapitulation with ??? ??? ??? …, ????? (or ???????), Aristotle likes to continue with ???? ?' ??????? or similarly, as can be seen from the following passages: 988b16-21, 1039a11-14, 1059b3, 1091a28-30, furthermore Physics i 6. 189b27-29 (??? ??? ??? …, ???????? ?????? ?? ???????, ??????? ????), viii 10. 266b25-28 (??? ??? ??? …, ?? ?????? ?????. ???? ?? … ????? ???? ?????????? ???? ??????? ??????), Politics iii 9-10. 1281a8-11 (??? ??? ??? …, ??????? ?? ??? ?????????. ???? ?' ??????? …), 13. 1284b22-26 (… ??? ??? … ??? …, ???????? ??? ????? ???????? ???' ??? … ???? ?????? ???????), Categories 14. 15a15-18 (… ??? ??? … ??????? ??? … ??? ?? … ???? ???? ???????). If we connect 1073a13 ????? ??? ??? ???? ????? ?????? ???? ??? ?????? with 1074b15 ?? ?? ???? ??? ???? ???? ????? ???????, we have a further example of this pattern. That is hardly a coincidence.

On the other hand, Aristotle shows no predilection to use ??? ?? ????????? after ??? ??? ??? (or ??????); the only (apparent, see above, p. 160) example is 1064a16-21.

Minor Interpolations

1070a24-27 ?? … ????.

Jaeger (1957, p. 245): "verba 24 ?? … 26 [recte: 27] ???? postea addita sunt ut videtur."

1070b24 ?? ?' … 29 ??????????.

These words are included by the sentence ??? ??? ????? ?????????? ? ????, which, with the same wording, occurs in l. 24 and ll. 29-30. It is the same case as in 1004a10-17 and 1005a8-11, where Jaeger (1957, pp. 62 and 64) marks the text between as insertion. Therefore it is surprising that he here, reversely, brackets the including sentence both in l. 24 and ll. 29-30. Jaeger discusses this typical case at length in his "Praefatio" (pp. xvii-xviii): "difficultates etiam eo ortae sunt editoribus Peripateticis, quod in schedis separatis vel in margine additamenta inveniebant, quae Aristoteles iterata lectione fecerat, eaque in textum recipere temptabant, e. gr. 1005a8 a ??? ??? ????? (om. Ab) nova incipere videtur sententia, sed post haec verba oratio interrumpitur et alia sententia inculcatur (ab 8 ??? ?? ?? ???? … 11 ?? ?? ??????), quae olim hic non exstabat, sed in margine vel in scheda separata scripta fuerat, post eam ? eadem verba ??? ??? ????? iterat, post quae sententia additicia interposita erat, ita ut interpolatio jam in ? ab utraque parte verbis ??? ??? ????? inclusa sit. sed non satis est primo loco verba ??? ??? ????? cum Ab omittere vel cum Christio delere, sed cognoscere debemus cur in ? haec verba utrobique servata sint, i. e. propter additam sententiam. plura huiusmodi occurrunt, quae hic non enumero." It is to these "plura huiusmodi" that our passage belongs. Suspicion is raised also by the fact that ll. 25-26 ???? ???????? ??? ???' ????????? ????, ?????? ?? ??? ????? ???????? competes with l. 32 ?????? ???? ???? ????? ?? ???, ??? ?? ???????.

1074b28-30.

As Sandbach (p. 40) has rightly seen, these lines continue the aporia raised in ll. 18-20. Transposing them to after there, however, is not possible, because it is not true that "the sentence ??? ??? ??? ????? ?? ?????? ???? ??????? becomes the natural continuation of ???? ?? ?? ??? ?? ?????????? ? ? ????, ?? ?????????".

? in Context

According to Frede (2000, p. 1), "there by now seems to be general agreement on one fact which is of great importance for the student of Metaphysics ?. ? originally seems to have constituted a treatise of its own which only later was inserted into the Metaphysics." "One would overstate the case, though, if one claimed that ? has nothing to do with the rest of the Metaphysics. When one considers the beginning of ?, or - for that matter - ? as a whole, it is obvious that ? can only be understood in a certain context. This context is not the Metaphysics as we have it. We ourselves have to supply a context. But Aristotle clearly presupposes that it is understood that in ? we are doing metaphysics and that the crucial part of the metaphysical theory will be a theory of substances. So it is clear enough that ? is the sort of treatise the writing beginning with Z, H, ? was meant to be, as far as the subject-matter is concerned." (p. 3)

As to the references, 1072a4 ??????? ?? ??? and 1073a5-7 are unclear. For the first one, cf. the comments of Bonitz and Ross:

Bonitz (p. 492): "His verbis respici ab Aristotele ad ? 8, quod Schweglerus judicat, equidem non arbitror. Etenim non respicit ad superiores Metaphysicorum libros Aristoteles iis locis libri ?, ubi ad eos delegari lectores prope necessario exspectes, cf. ad 1. 1069a 20, al. et prooem. p. 25; hoc autem loco si voluisset diligentem illam et accuratam libri ? respicere disputationem, non erat cur multo minus distincte hic de eadem re exponeret. Atque ex constanti Aristotelis usu jure exspectes, si quid e prioribus libris respici a lectoribus voluisset, eum addidisse ?? ?????? vel ???????? vel simile quidpiam. Quare hoc verbum ??????? referendum potius esse arbitror ad ipsam huius capitis disputationem, b22 - 26; ibi enim, quamquam non aperte explicuit, at significavit certe, singularum quidem rerum potentiam priorem esse, quam earundem rerum actum, sed ut possit omnino quidpiam esse, ponendum esse pro summo principio actum a potentia immunem."

Ross (ii, p. 371): "It is not very clear whether this refers to 1071b 22-26 or to ?. 8. Bonitz contends that when Aristotle refers in one book of the Metaphysics to another, the reference is always fuller in form than this. ?. 1042a3 and N. 1090a15 hardly form exceptions to this rule, since ZH and MN so clearly belong together respectively. The only genuine exception is K. 1064a36, which seems to refer to ?. 6, 7. In the other works the only instances I have noted of very vague references in one work to another are De Generatione et Corruptione 336a15, De Caelo 271a21, De Respiratione 477b12, De Sensu 436a1, De Generatione Animalium 715a1. On the whole Bonitz seems justified in inferring that the reference here is to 1071b 22-26. That passage does not definitely say in what sense potency and in what sense actuality is prior, but indicates obscurely that though each individual potency is prior to the corresponding actuality, there must be some actuality prior to all potency."

Of the second reference, three different explanations were given.

Bonitz (pp. 503-504): "Aeterna et immobilis substantia, quae summum est principium movens, eadem exemta est ex omni magnitudinis et extensionis notione, immunis a quolibet affectu et alteratione. Hoc quum dicit demonstratum esse, ????????? ?? ??? a5, non potest videri respicere ad 6. 1071b21: ??? ?????? ?????? ??? ??? ?????? ????? ???? ????? ??????? ??? ???, ibi enim licet quidpiam significatum sit, quod huc pertinet, tamen nequaquam res ita discussa est et demonstrata, ut eo possit lectores ablegare. Respicit potius ad Physica VIII 10. 267b 17 sqq., ubi uberius et accuratius de eadem re exponitur, cf. de caelo I 7. 275b 22."

Ross (ii, p. 382): "Bonitz thinks the reference is to Physica 267b 17, but Aristotle’s mode of reference to a separate book is almost invariably fuller than this (cf. 1072a4 n.), and, since the first ??? clause (3-5) and the third (11, 12) clearly refer to the results of the immediately preceding argument, it is pretty certain that this one does so too. Aristotle has not, strictly speaking, shown that the primum movens is without extension, but he has proved something from which it readily follows (cf. ll. 7-11), and ????????? expresses this fact, though rather loosely."

Frede (2000, p. 48): "In fact it has long been observed that ? stylistically greatly varies from section to section, that, for instance, there are sections which conspicuously avoid hiatus or sections which otherwise stand out for their careful diction, whereas in other parts Aristotle is rather careless in his formulation, often just listing points to be discussed, introducing them, for instance, by ‘and then’ (cf. 1069b35 and 1070a4), as if he were sketching for himself what the fully worked-out treatise would have to address at this point of the overall argument. But this does not in itself constitute strong reason to deny that ? is written in one piece. Rather, it is tempting to think that ? was written in something of a hurry, in part making use of earlier material, some of it drawn from literarily highly polished earlier work. The ????????? in 1073a5, which does not seem to refer to anything we have in the preceding text, might be an indication of such hurried use of earlier material."

Thus there remains as clear reference only 1073a32 ?? ???? ????????, which is identified by Ross (ii, p. 384) as "Physica viii. 8, 9, De Caelo i. 2, ii. 3-8".

The Thread of M1

(1) Bonitz:

Aristoteles quaestionis, quam instituit, rationem describit et singulas disputationis partes distinguit, 1076a8-32.

I. De rebus mathematicis, caput 2. 3.

a) Res mathematicas non inesse tamquam substantias actu exsistentes rebus sensibilibus, 1076a38-b11.

b) Res mathematicas non posse poni tamquam substantias sejunctas a rebus sensibilibus, 1076b11-1077b14.

c) Res mathematicas cogitatione potius et abstrahendo sejunctas esse a rebus sensibilibus, non re et essentia, 1077b14-1078b6.

II. De ideis, caput 4. 5.

Quibus rationibus Plato inductus sit, ut ideas esse statueret, 1078b7-32,

ideas nec ponendas esse nec pro causis habendas rerum sensibilium - 1080a11.

III. De numeris idealibus, caput 6-9. 1086a21.

A. Diversae tres rationes, quibus numeri substantiales poni possint, singulae examinantur, 1080b37-1083a20.

a) Si numeri ponuntur consociabiles, 1081a5-17.

b) Si numeri ponuntur inconsociabiles et ita quidem, ut quaelibet unitas a qualibet unitate differat, 1081a17-b35.

c) Si numeri ponuntur inconsociabiles ita, ut eiusdem numeri unitates eiusdem sint generis, diversorum autem numerorum unitates inter se differant, 1081b35-8. 1083a20.

B. Refutantur aliorum Platonicorum dissentientium a Platone placita, 1083a20-b8.

C. Pythagoreorum doctrina reprobatur, 1083b8-19.

D. Varia congeruntur argumenta, quibus doctrina de numeris idealibus refutetur, 1083b23-9. 1085b34.

1) Qua ratione numeri oriantur ex principio materiali, quale Plato posuit, 1083b23-36.

2) Quot sint statuendi numeri ideales, 1083b36-1084b2.

3) Quale principium unitatem esse velint quaeritur, et quae cum ea re conjunctae sunt dubitationes excutiuntur, 1084b2-9. 1085a7.

4) De principiis geometricarum rerum, 1085a7-b4.

5) Explicari non posse, quomodo ex unitate et multitudine numeri fiant et ex similibus principiis magnitudines, 1085b4-34.

Concluditur universa de numeris idealibus disputatio, 1085b34-1086a21.

Ross:

Two supposed kinds of immaterial substance to be discussed - mathematical objects and Ideas (chapter 1. 1076a8-32).

I. Mathematical Objects (chapter 1. 1076a32-3. 1078b6).

Mathematics considers as if they existed separately objects that do not exist separately (chapter 3).

II. The Forms (chapters 4, 5).

History and criticism of the theory of Forms (chapter 4).

The Forms do not explain the changes in the sensible world (chapter 5).

III. Numbers as Separate Substances and First Causes (chapters 6-9. 1086a18).

Various ways in which numbers may be conceived as the substance of things (chapter 6).

Examination of Plato's view (chapter 7-8. 1083a20).

Examination of the views of other Platonists and of the Pythagoreans (chapter 8. 1083a20-b23).

Arguments against all Theories of Self-subsistent Number (chapter 8. 1083b23-29. 1085b34).

(1) How are the numbers produced from the material principle?

(2) How many ideal numbers are there?

(3) What is the nature of the One?

(4) Difficulties about the first principles of geometrical objects.

(5) The difficulty of generating numbers and spatial magnitudes as the Platonists generate them.

Summing up of Criticism of Ideal Numbers (chapter 9. 1085b34-1086a18).

(2) The structure of the book according to Jaeger (1962, pp. 178-180):

"A. Introduction, M 1, 1076a 8-32.

B. Part One. The objects of mathematics (purely as such), 1076a32-1078b9.

1. They cannot be in sensible things, 1076a33-b11,

2. nor separate from them, 1076b 12-1077b 11.

3. The manner of their existence is peculiar (they are sensible things qua quantitative), 1077b12-1078b9.

C. Part Two. Ideas (purely as such, without reference to numbers), 1078b9-1080a 11.

1. Historical analysis of the origin of the theory, 1078b 12-32.

2. Dialectical refutation, 1078b32-1079b 11.

3. Refutation by means of physical considerations, 1079b 12-1080a11.

D. Part Three. Numbers as separable substances, 1080a12-1085b34.

1. Derivation of all possible forms of the theory, 1080a12-b36.

(a) Three forms are conceivable, 108oa18-b5.

(i) Numbers are inassociable.

(ii) They are associable.

(iii) Some are associable and others not.

(b) Each form has found supporters (except i), 1080b 6-36.

(i) Ideal number and mathematical number—Plato.

(ii) Mathematical number only—Speusippus.

(iii) Ideal and mathematical number are the same—Xenocrates (‘another thinker’).

2. Refutation of these forms, 1080b37-1085b34.

(a) Refutation of Plato, 1080b37-1083a17,

(i) if all units are associable, 1081a5-17.

(ii) if they are all inassociable, 1081a17-b35.

(iii) if those in different numbers are differentiated, but those in the same number undifferentiated, 1081b35-1082b1.

(iv) There is no possibility whatever of differentiating units and hence none of making them Ideas, 1082b2-1083a17.

(b) Refutation of the other number-metaphysicians, 1083a20-1085b34.

(i) Distinction of three possible forms, 1083a27-b18.

(?) Speusippus, 1083a27-b1.

(?) Xenocrates (‘the third version’), 1083b1-8.

(?) The Pythagoreans, 1083b8-18.

(ii) Refutation of these doctrines, 1083b19-1085b34.

E. Conclusion, 1085b35-1086a20.

1. The disagreement between these thinkers makes their doctrines suspicious.

2. The modern representatives of the doctrine have not improved on Plato.

3. Their failure is due to the falsity of their first principles.

This train of thought shows a strictness of construction that we do not often find in Aristotle. His lecture-notes are usually too liable to continual alteration for any polish of form to appear, but this book is arranged on one plan throughout, and has obviously been carefully elaborated."

Somewhat less enthusiastic is Annas (p. 78):

"(a) 1076a8-37 (chapter 1). Aristotle proposes to discuss platonist theories of Forms and numbers; theories are classified according to whether they accept the existence of either or both. Mathematical objects will be treated first; then, briefly, Forms; the third inquiry is whether numbers and Forms are the principles and realities of existing things.

(b) 1076a37—1077b17 (chapter 2). Criticisms of the platonist conception of mathematical objects.

(c) 1077b17—1078b6 (chapter 3). Aristotle’s own alternative account.

(d) 1078b7-1080a11 (chapters 4-5). Criticism of Forms (taken over, with minor alterations, from A 6 and A 9).

(e) 1080a12—1083b23 (chapters 6, 7, 8). Refutation of the theory that Form numbers are made up of combinable units. This is imperfectly worked into a framework of argument against all platonist theories of number.

(f) 1083b23-1086a21 (chapters 8-9). An unconnected series of arguments pointing out various difficulties and confusions in Plato’s theory of Form numbers and Speusippus’ theory."

Annas (pp. 79-80): "In M 1 Aristotle proposes to discuss platonist theories under three headings: (i) mathematical objects, (ii) Forms, (iii) the question whether Forms and numbers are causes and elements of things.

(i) is done neatly in chapters 2-3, and (ii) in 4-5. But then we get complications. The long section 10B0a12-1086a21 appears to be a digression. In fact it is an attack on platonist theories of number, but aimed at specific versions and not against the general presuppositions of any such theory, as chapter 2 was. (The section 1080a12-1083b23 seems to be an early broadside worked into a more general framework.) Chapters 6-9 are at first glance an untidy mess, yet there is a unifying aim—the arguments are all applied forms of Aristotle’s general objection to platonism. None of these arguments deal with numbers and Forms as causes (except the arguments in M 5 against Forms as causes, and their presence is clearly due to the fact that the whole passage M 4-5 has been lifted bodily out of A 9 and not much rewritten)."

Annas (p. 80) does not share the common view that M1 and M2 are different treatises: "At 1086a21 […] we are returned to the theme of M 1 [1076a29-32]: we are to move on to the third topic [cf. p. 78: "the third inquiry is whether numbers and Forms are the principles and realities of existing things"]. This confirms the impression that Aristotle regards everything up to 1086a21 as concerned with the first two topics of M 1 [1076a22-29]: problems with the existence of Forms and of numbers." In this, she agrees with Syrianus's interpretation of 1076a29-32 (160. 6-8: ????? ?????? [1086a21 ????? ??????] ????? ?? ? ?????????, ?? ?? ???? ??? ?????? ??????????? ???? ?? ? ???????????· ??????? ??? ??????, ?? ????? ?? ???? ??? ?? ???????.), which is, however, obsolete since Schwegler (iv, p. 297) and Bonitz (p. 527, on 1076a22 ???????? - 32 ??????): "Haec placita ut via et ratione examinemus, primum de ipsa mathematicarum rerum natura disputandum est, caput 2 et 3, deinde de ideis, 4 et 5, denique quaerendum utrum numeri et ideae substantiae et principia rerum sint. Hanc tertiam quaestionis partem persequitur caput 6 - 9. 1086a21; ideales enim numeros, de quibus illic disputat, ponunt esse ?????? ???????? ??? ??? ????? ?????? ??????, 6. 1080a14."

Interpolation

1084a27-29 ??? ?? … ???? ?????.

Bonitz (1842, p. 131): "[…] verba […] adeo manifesto sententiarum nexum interrumpunt, ut secludi certe ab editoribus debuerint."

Ross (ii, p.449): "Bonitz thinks this is an interpolation, belonging to the criticism not of ideal numbers but of Ideas in general (cf. 1080a 2-8). The passage is, however, interpreted by Alexander and Syrianus without any suspicion of its spuriousness, and it seems quite possible to connect it with what precedes, if we interpret ???? as meaning ideal numbers, which in view of the repeated identification of Ideas with numbers we are entitled to do. Aristotle has just referred (ll. 25-27) to the arbitrary assertion of the existence of Ideas of numbers up to 10, and the arbitrary denial of their existence beyond that point. Here he points to a similarly arbitrary distinction. 'Forms are introduced to explain being and becoming. Yet some things (negations 1079a 9, relations 1079a12, manufactured objects 1080a 5) are and become without being supposed to have Forms answering to them. Why have they not Forms? The fact that the Platonists can dispense with Forms in these cases shows that Forms are not the causes of being and becoming.'"

Annas (p. 180): "This is clearly out of place, and belongs in chapter 5. Displacement is not very surprising, considering the state of this section. Ross makes it relevant by taking 'Forms' to mean 'Form numbers', but this is surely wrong, for there is no warning of this, and the parallel at 1080a2-8 tells against it."

M1 in Context

The beginning of M1 (1076a8-12) presents itself as transition from an inquiry into sensible substance to non-sensible substance. "At first, we must consider what is said by others" (1076a12-13); what is meant to follow is the positive theory, which, however, is missing.71 Equally missing is what the phrase ???? ??? ??? (in l. 8) refers to: an immediately preceding inquiry into "the substance of sensible things".72 Instead of this, we get a reference to two remote texts: for the matter, to Physics A73, for the form, to Metaphysics H 274. To my eye, we have here one of the clearest examples of a reference inserted by a redactor. Supposing this, we avoid the difficulty which caused Bonitz to resort to Pseudo-Alexander's explanation (pp. 526-527): the fact that Aristotle in M1 "quae contra ideas Platonicas per libros Z et H disputavit, ne verbo quidem respicit" (p. 27). If the reference is to H 2, Bonitz's observation is an additional argument for athetizing it.

The only clear reference to another writing is 1076b39-1077a1 ?? ???? ??????????, "almost word-for-word correlation with B, 998a11-13" (Düring, p. 281, n. 212).

The fact that M1 refers to B, and B to A, poses the problem that we get a lecture course with two almost identical refutations of the doctrine of Ideas: A 9 and M 4-5. Jaeger (1962, p. 171) proposes the following solution: "These two versions, which correspond almost letter for letter, cannot both have been intended for the same draft of the Metaphysics. If the version in M, which fits perfectly into the whole argument of that book, was meant to remain where it is, this can only have been because Aristotle intended either to write a new introduction, or at the least to omit the partly duplicated chapters at the end of the introduction as we have it (A 8-10)."

In 1078b5-6, "further discussions on the causality of the beautiful are expressly promised. Though the author returns to the concepts of beautiful and good, this promise is not fulfilled." (Brandis, p. 86)

By 1076a28-29 ??? ??? ?????????? ?????, Aristotle is, according to Jaeger (1962, p. 256), "referring to the second book of the dialogue On Philosophy". This information is based on Syrianus, 159. 33 - 160. 3 (on 1086a18-21): ???? ??? ??? ????? ???????? ????? ????????? ???? ??? ??????? ????????? ???’ ???? ????????????? ???? ?????????? ????????, ????? ?????? ??? ??????????? ????, ???????? ?? ?? ?? ??????? ??? ???? ??? ?????????? ?????? ?????? ??? ??????? "???? ?? ????? ??????? ?? ?????, ?? ??????????? ??, ???????? ???? ????? ??????? ??????? ??· ??? ??? ??? ?? ???????? ???? ???????? ????? ???????;" ("Aristotle himself admits that he has said nothing against the hypotheses of the Platonists and quite fails to keep pace with the doctrine of the ideal numbers, if these are different from the mathematical. This is shown by the words in the second book of the work On Philosophy: 'Thus if the Ideas are a different sort of number, not mathematical number, we can have no understanding of it; for of the majority of us, at all events, who comprehends any other number?'") See Jaeger, l. c., p. 126: "On Philosophy is expressly mentioned as having attacked the doctrine of Ideal numbers; and it is in fact the sole literary work of which we definitely know that its contents were anti-Platonic. This criticism apparently formed part of a general refutation of the doctrine of Ideas, for it deals not with Speusippus’ view that the mathematical numbers were independent substances, but with Plato’s own later form of the doctrine, according to which the Ideas were numbers. 'If the Ideas were another kind of number, and not the mathematical, we should have no understanding of it. For who understands another kind of number, at any rate among the majority of us?' Syrianus has preserved these words for us from the second book of the dialogue. The speaker is Aristotle himself, expressing his aporia about Plato's doctrine half in protest and half in mockery."

The Thread of M2

(1) Ross gives as a summary of the whole M2 what applies only to 1086a31-b13: "It [the doctrine of Ideas] assigns separate existence to universals".

Bonitz omits the introductory part 1086a21-30:

"Ideas qui ponunt id peccant quod easdem universales simul et singulares substantias statuunt, 1086a31-b13;

sed omnino quaeritur, utrum elementa et principia universalia sint an singularia - 10. 1087a25."

(2) In 1086a24-32 a survey is given of what is to follow. The matter (ll. 24-25 "the views of those who assert that there are other substances besides the sensible") is divided into (a) "those who posit numbers only, and these mathematical" (ll. 29-30), and (b) "those who believe in the Ideas" (l. 31). From the limitation "and these mathematical" we must infer that under (b) the theory of ideal numbers is included. But the author shows no intention of keeping to this disposition. He concentrates on the doctrine of Ideas in its original form, apart from the later interpretation of the Ideas as numbers. Skipping the item ?? ????????, he gets onto the subject of "in what sense they say it" (??? ????????), the "way of thinking" (??????). The information about the formally skipped item is, however, tacitly supplied by what follows: what is interpreted appears to be simply the thesis "The Ideas exist" (cf. 990b9), the term "Ideas" being interpreted by "the universal" (1086b1-2), and the term "existence" by "separate" (1086b16-19).

It is important also for our next chapter that the sentence 1086a34-35 ????? ? ??? ??? ????????? ?????????? ???????? must be interpolated (no matter what ???????? refers to); for the brutal "not possible" is a stronger statement than the ironic "might be called an absolutely perfect difficulty"75 (1086b12) and would make all further discussion superfluous.

Interpolation

1086b27 ??? … ????????.

Christ (p. 296): "27 ??? … ???????? in parenthesi interjecta sunt."

Jaeger (1957, p. 291): "??? … ???????? quid in hoc contextu sibi velint nescio. fuitne nota marginalis?"

M2 in Context

From a formal point of view, the transition in 1086a18-21 is irreprochable; the syntagma ???? ???? ??? … ???? ?? occurs also in De Generatione et Corruptione 334a15-16, De Partibus Animalium 674a19-21, De Generatione Animalium 757a12-14 (???? ???? ??? ?????? ???? ?? ????????. ???? ?? ??? ??? ?????? ???????? ?????????? ?? ??? ???.), Ethica Nicomachea 1108b6-7 and 1145a33-36, the third parallel being the closest one. But there are various reasons for separating M2 from M1.

Firstly, the observation made by Jaeger (1962, pp. 180-181) that "the sentences just preceding the break (M 9. 1086a15-20) […] are wholly in the manner of an epilogue. Aristotle loves to conclude a lecture with a line of poetry; as in A, or in the lecture on Friendship which was later incorporated into the Nicomachean Ethics (Books viii and ix), so here he finishes with a quotation from Epicharmus; and just as he takes leave of his audience at the end of the Sophistical Refutations, or completes a lecture on the ideal state by referring those listeners who are still unconvinced to another occasion, [Footnote refers to Politics vii 1. 1323b36.] so here he has a parting word for his hearers, who included apparently students of the opposite persuasion, not yet shaken in their faith. 'He who is already convinced might be further convinced by a longer discussion. But one still not convinced'— the train of thought breaks off."

Secondly, as Schwegler (iv, p. 334) remarks: "It is strange that in §§. 30 and 31 [= 1086a26-30] an inquiry into the doctrine of Ideas and numbers is announced as something new and to be made just now (??????? ???????????)."

Likewise Jaeger (1912, pp. 43-44): "Further, it must be noticed that in 1086a26 sq. the advocates of the theory of Ideas are spoken of as if they came in the author's way for the first time, not as if the very detailed refutation of the theory of Ideas M 4-5 and of the ideal numbers M 6-9 as well as of the mathematical objects M 2-3 did not have preceded and been finished just now. M 9. 1086a28 is a fresh attempt. We are told as if it were new to us that the existence of non-sensible substances is assumed by those who hold the doctrine of Ideas or ideal numbers."

Thirdly, M2 follows another plan than M1: whereas M1 quotes an inquiry into sensible substance as preceding immediately (see above, p. 207), M2 (1086a21-24) gives reason why "the views expressed by those who discuss only sensible substance" are not to be treated. These views are reported at length in A 3-4, and Schwegler (iv, p. 334), in his comment on 1086a23-24 ?? ???? ???????? ???????, rightly remarks: "It is striking that no attention is given to Metaphysics A 3." From this, we cannot but infer that in the plan of M2 there is also no place for Book A 3-10.

We have three references to earlier discussions; what can they tell us about the position of M2?

The interpolated (see above, pp. 211-212) reference 1086a34-35 ????? … ???????? stands out linguistically by the misuse of the word ?????????, which means "discuss the pro and contra of a thesis". Such a discussion differs from a refutation, as the whole Book B shows. Impossibility (l. 34 ??? ?????????) must be "proved", not "discussed", i. e. the right word would be ?????????. But why, then, did the interpolator use the wrong word? It must be because he found the relevant passage marked as a ?????????. Now the difficulties of "separating" the universal are not discussed in Book B (where the previous commentators, without success, sought for evidence76), but in M, 1078b30-1079a4. And this passage is (indirectly) characterized as ????????? by the phrase ?????? ?? ??????? ???????????? ?? ??? in 1079b12.

As to 1086b2-3 ????? ?' … ????????, Ross (ii, p. 462), influenced by Jaeger, gives "A. 6 (= M 4)", but Cherniss (1944, pp. 189-190) makes a strong case for M 4: "If 1086 A 21 ff. is an earlier version than M, chapters 1-9 (1076 A 8-1086 A 21), the reference cannot, of course, be to 1078 B 17-31, and Jaeger consequently takes it to be 987 B 1 (Aristoteles, p. 195, n. 1). The passage at 1078 B 12-32, however, even if a later composition, since it is far more circumstantial than 1086 A 37-B 10, cannot have been based upon the latter. If the passage in M, chapter 9, then, does not refer to that in M, chapter 4, the natural supposition is that both are based upon the passage in A, are in fact resumes of that passage. In 1086 A 37-B 10 the doctrine of the instability of sensibles and Socrates' concern with definitions are the two factors which produce the theory of ideas; the same account is given in M, chapter 4, where, however, the name " Heraclitean " is expressly given to the doctrine of flux, and in A, chapter 6, where besides the designation " Heraclitean " the name of Cratylus is connected with this doctrine. In M, chapter 9, however, Socrates is expressly said to have " provoked " the theory of ideas and there is no mention of Pythagoreans, and in M, chapter 4 the Pythagoreans are mentioned only parenthetically along with Democritus to be dismissed as not invalidating the remark about Socrates; but in A, chapter 6 the Pythagoreans occur frequently, and in one place it is at least insinuated that a fundamental conception in the theory of ideas was borrowed [190] from them. In M, chapter 9, although the account of Socrates is much briefer than in M, chapter 4, special attention is given to the fact that he did not separate the universal and on this point he is praised as against the partisans of the ideas; in this respect M, chapter 9 resembles M, chapter 4 more closely than either resembles A, chapter 6 where the account of Socrates is reduced to a minimum. Finally in M, chapters 9 and 4 the account passes directly from the statement of the separation of the universal as the origin of the ideas to the criticism that as a result the idea is merely a duplication of the particular (1086 B 9-11, 1078 B 31-36). This is lacking in A, chapter 6, the charge of duplication beginning the criticism of the ideas in A, chapter 9. Now in M, chapter 9 it is precisely in connection with the account of Socrates, which is much shorter here than in M, chapter 4, that reference to a previous treatment is made; we should expect in that passage, then, to find a more circumstantial account of the activity and influence of Socrates, and such is found in M, chapter 4 but not in A, chapter 6 where even less attention is given Socrates than in M, chapter 9 itself. No one will doubt that, if the second passage in M does not refer to the first, then both have a single passage as their common source; but that passage must have had details of content found now in M, chapter 4 but lacking in A, chapter 6. If, however, to escape this difficulty one should again with Bonitz make 1086 B 2-3 refer to M, chapter 4, there would still remain to be explained the relationship of the account there with that in A, chapter 6."

In my opinion, there can be no doubt that, according to the will of the editors, the reference is to M 4. If we take it to be originally Aristotelian, we must assume that it was because of it that the editors placed the text 1086a21-1087a25 at the end of M. More probably the reference is added by the editors. Confirmation of this can be taken from the fact that the phrase ?? ???? ????????? (??????) is frequent in Plato, but not in Aristotle (only De sensu et sensibilibus 448b15-16 ? ?' ????? ??????? ?? ???? ????????? ???? ??????, which may be later inserted too).

The reference 1086b15-16 ??? ???' ????? … ???????? is unanimously identified as B 1003a5-17 (Schwegler iv, p. 336; Bonitz, p. 567; Ross ii, p. 463). But what does "before, at the beginning" (Ross's translation) mean? The fact that Schwegler (translating "anfänglich") and Bonitz (translating "früher") tacitly omit either the ???????? or the ???' ????? makes us become aware of the fact that ???' ????? … ???????? is pleonastic. The only comparable case in the Corpus Aristotelicum is De Generatione Animalium 778b2 ???' ????? ?? ???? ??????? ??????; in all the other instances (Analytica Posteriora 84a32, Physica 260a11, De Anima 427a29, De Partibus Animalium 678b22, De Generatione Animalium 776b10, Metaphysica 1006b12, 1061b15, Ethica Nicomachea 1104a2, 1149b27, Ethica Eudemia 1239b7, Poetica 1448a25) ???' ????? stands alone. So it is probable that ???????? and ?? ???? ??????? ?????? (which is equivalent to ???' ?????) are alternative readings for ???' ?????.

Let us keep to the more exact information "at the beginning". Does it mean that B is the first book of a series to which M2 belongs? Among the instances of ???' ????? just quoted, this is the case in De Anima iii. 427a29, which refers to i.404b8-405b10 and 405b13-19, Ethica Nicomachea ii. 1104a2, which refers to i. 1094b11-27. The other possibilities are: referring

(2) to a preceding series as a whole (De Partibus Animalium iv. 678b22 to Historia Animalium iv. 528b30 sqq.),

(3) to the beginning of the book (Analytica Posteriora 84a32 to 72b6-7, Physica 260a11 to 253a22-24, Metaphysica 1061b15 to 1059a28-29, Ethica Eudemia vii. 1239b7 to vii. 1, Poetica 3. 1448a25 to 1. 1047a16-18),

(4) to the beginning of a new inquiry within the same book (Metaphysica 1006b12 to 1006a21, Ethica Nicomachea 1149b27 to 1148b15-31).

The same picture presents itself regarding the equivalent ?? ???? ??????? ??????. The instances can be divided into

(1) De Caelo i. 270a17 (referring to Physica i. 7), De Generatione Animalium v. 778b2 (referring to De Partibus Animalium i. 640a10 sqq.), Metaphysica B 997b4 (referring to A 6, see above, pp. 59-60), ? 1045b32 (referring to Z 1), Politica iv 1293b2 (referring to iii 1279a35 sqq., 1286b3 sqq.), Politica vii 1325a30-31 (referring to i),

(2) Physica viii. 263a12 (referring to Physica vi. 233a21-31), De Caelo iv. 311a11 (referring to Physica viii. 254b33-256a3), De Partibus Animalium iv. 682a3 (referring to Historia Animalium iv. 531b34), Ethica Nicomachea vii. 1152a12-13 (referring to vi. 1144a23-b4),

(3) Politica iii 17. 1288a37-38 (referring to iii 2, 3).

I think our ???' ????? in 1086b15 is clearly attributable to group (2). But then we are confronted with the absurdity observed by Schwegler (see above, p. 213) that M2, for "the views expressed by those who discuss only sensible substance", refers to the "works on nature" instead of A 3-4.

The common impression about the three references to earlier discussions is that they presuppose the Metaphysics in its present order, i. e. that they are inserted later. The second one, at least, must come from a teacher, as the first person plural ???????? shows.

The reference to ??????? (1086a30) is firmly embedded in the text and cannot be inserted later. Ross (ii, p. 462) gives: "N. 1090a7-15, 20-b20, 1091a13-22". However, he disavouws this comment remarking (ii, p. 470) about the introductory sentence of N that, more probably, M2 "is a fragment which does not really belong to the main structure of MN but was introduced by an early editor as dealing with the same subject. In any case the distinction between M and N as dealing, the one with ???????? ?????, the other with its first principles, is not well maintained; we hear a good deal in M of the One and the indefinite dyad."

Annas, who says nothing about this sentence, likewise refers to N, although she must concede that N as a whole does not perform what 1086a21-30 makes us expect: "The reference to people who posit only mathematical numbers (and treat them as causes), i. e. to Speusippus, is taken up in N at 1090a2 ff., and 1092b8 ff. Aristotle does not deal with forms as causes in N; his arguments against them in this role are to be found in M 5, no doubt because the material in M 4-5 has been taken over wholesale from A 9. This means that there is a gap here, and it is perhaps because of this that Aristotle here launches a short digression on Forms." (p. 188)

The most natural conclusion of all this seems to be that M2 is the beginning of a separate cursus, presupposing only a prooemium introducing an inquiry "on the principles".

For 1086a23 ?? ???? ???? ?????? Schwegler (iv, p. 334) and Ross (ii, p. 462) give Physics i 4-6, De Caelo iii 3. 4 and De Generatione et Corruptione i 1.

The Thread of N

(1) As a result of his false understanding of the words ??? ?????? ?????? in the inroductory sentence 1087a29 (see below, pp. 223-224), Ross (ii, p. 466) takes chapter 1 to be point (B) of a "Criticism of the Doctrine of Ideas", which begins in M 9, 1086a18 with point (A) and reaches to N 2, 1090a2 (ii, p. 460).

The said point (B) is divided into the sections:

The ideal theory treats contraries as first principles (chapter 1. 1087a29-b33),

Objections (chapter 1. 1087b33 - 2. 1088b35):

(1) Objection relative to the formal principle. [1087b33-1088a14]

(2) Objections relative to the material principle. [1088a15-b13]

(3) Objection to regarding eternal entities composed of elements. [1088b14-35]

The mistake on which the theory rests (chapter 2. 1088b35-1090a2).

The "Criticism of the Doctrine of Ideas" is followed by the

Criticism of the Theory of Numbers (chapter 2. 1090a2 - 6. 1093b29).

(A) The theory that mathematical numbers exist separately (chapter 2. 1090a2 - 3. 1091a12).

(B) Absurdity of ascribing generation to the numbers if these are thought of as eternal (chapter 3. 1091a12 - 4. 1091a29).

(C) Relation between the first principles and the good (chapter 4. 1091a29 - 5. 1092a21).

(D) Relation between number and its first principles (chapter 5. 1092a21-b8).

(E) Numbers as causes of other things (chapter 5. 1092b8 - 6. 1093b29).

Likewise Bonitz considers N to be the continuation of M2; accordingly, his survey over N begins with point

"2) Aeternarum substantiarum non posse esse principia contraria, 1087a29-b4.

Platonici, quum contraria ponerent pro principiis, alterum e contrariis materiae loco habuerunt - b5;

eorum varias sententias Aristoteles enumerat - b33,

principium formale - 1088a15,

deinde materiale principium judicat - b13,

nec posse omnino aeternas substantias ex elementis constare demonstrat, 2. 1088b14-35.

Platonicae sententiae quae videatur origo - 1090a2.

3) Numerus et omnino res mathematicas per se et absolute esse, unde posset comprobari, 1090a2 - 3. 1091a12.

4) Aeternarum rerum non posse esse generationem; a Pythagoreis autem et Platonicis non verbis modo, sed ipsa re poni earum generationem, 1091a12 - 4. 1091a29.

5) Principiis aeternarum rerum quae intercedat cum summo bono necessitudo, 1091a29 - 5. 1092a17.

6) Quomodo ex elementis progigni putandi sunt numeri ideales, 1092a21-b8.

7) Numeri quomodo causae esse possint rerum omnium, parum definiri, 1092b8 - 6. 1093b24."

(2) Annas (pp. 78-79):

"(i) 1087a29-1088b14 (chapter 1). Criticism of the two Academy principles and the various ways they are described.

(j) 1088b14-1090a2 (chapter 2). Criticism of having principles of eternal things, and of treating the two principles as principles of being and not-being.

(k) 1090a2-1091a29 (chapters 2-4). A string of arguments against the assumptions that numbers exist and that they are 'causes'.

(l) 1091a29-1092a17 (chapters 4-5). Difficulties in relating the Platonist principles to the good.

(m) 1092a17-1092b8 (chapter 5). A brief section of problems about the Academy principles.

(n) 1092b8-1093b29 (chapters 5-6). A string of arguments against the supposed 'causal' role of numbers."

p. 80:"Sections (i), (j), (l), and (m) are separate discussions of different types of inadequacy found in the Academy principles. (The first three are quite long and may have been written as independent essays.) Only the two sections (k) and (n) discuss the inadequacies of numbers themselves as causes; and these are among the least finished parts of N, consisting of long strings of arguments presented in a linear way."

Led astray by the said misinterpretation of the introductory words, Bonitz and Ross are imprecise in designating the topic of the first section: it is not about the "eternal substances" (Bonitz) or the "ideal theory" (Ross), but about the "first principle of all things" (???? ??????). (For this expression cf. 983b25.) According to ???? ???????, Plato held unity and infinite duality to be "principles of all things" (?????? ?????).77 In Aristotle, these pair of principles is replaced by the one unmoved mover, to whom nothing is contrary (cf. ? 1075b21-22). It is he who must be meant by ??? ?????? ??????. So it appears that we come directly from a positive exposition of the theology. This fits in very well with Jaeger's (1962, pp. 223-227) observation of the near relation between N 1 and ? 10, 1075a25 sqq.

Interpolations

1088b14-28 ????? ?? … ????????????.

Christ (p. 302) comments on 1088b28-35 ???? … 35 ???????????: "pertinent ad posteriorem partem capitis 1." Since 1088b28 ???? ?? ????? … intersects with l. 13, it is, however, better to take, with Gohlke (pp. 425-426), 1088b14-28 ????? ?? … ???????????? as an interpolation, also regarding the fact that a general question is raised (l. 14 "We must inquire generally") which interrupts a more special discussion.

1089b4-8 ???? ??? … ?? ?????.

Bonitz (p. 577) has rightly seen that l. 8 ??? ?????? ???? … ??? ????? ????? does not connect with what precedes immediately, but wrongly concluded that 1089b8-15 ??? ?????? ???? … ??? ????? ????? is a "digressio". Firstly, l. 8 ??? ?????? ???? connects with 1089a34-b4 ?????? ?? … ?????? (introducing the ???? ?? after the ???? and ???? in 1089a35). And secondly, it is obvious that ll. 4-6 ???? ??? … ????????? does not hold as a reason for a35-b4. Annas (p. 204) rightly insinuates that the "aberration" (??????????) is meant to be "the desire to provide a principle of plurality in general". But to find this in the text, we must go back to 1008b35-1089a6 ????? ??? ??? … ?? ????? ?????.

1089b16-20 ????? ?? … ??? ?????.

Ross (ii, p. 476) calls these lines a "digression", but this is not enough. For ???? ?? ?????? in l. 20 requires supplying ?????? from l. 15 (as Ross does, translating "And it was much more necessary"), and the phrase ? ????? ????? (l. 17) is left hanging in the air. Translating it as "the holder of these views" (Ross; "der Urheber dieser Ansicht" Bonitz) is very vague; a better sense is obtained, if we take ?????? in its technical sense as "posit" and refer ????? to the ???? ??? ?????? posited by Plato (who must be meant by the singular ? ?????). Then our passage belongs to 1089a35-36.

N in Context

The opening words 1087a29 ???? ??? ??? ??? ?????? ?????? ??????? ???????, according to von Arnim (p. 73), require "that they have been preceded by an exposition by Aristotle himself of his doctrine of the ????? ?????, as we read it in Metaphysics ?". Book ? - as ? 10. 1075a25-1076a4 - "was destined to follow an exposition of Aristotle's own metaphysics" (Ivánka, pp. 530-531). We saw confirmation of this in the preceding chapter (p. 222).

Relations to other writings are indicated by:

(1) 1088b24 ?? ?????? ??????.

The reference is clearly to ? 8. 1050b12-14 ?? ?? ??????? … ???????. De Caelo i 12, to which Pseudo-Alexander78 points, is not an equally plausible alternative, as Ross (ii, p. 474) thinks.

(2) 1090a15 ??????? ??????.

The sentence 1090a13-15 ?? ??? … ?????? is translated by Ross: "for the theorems of arithmeticians will all be found true even of sensible things, as was said before" (cf. Bonitz, p. 309: "denn die arithmetischen Lehrsätze müssen, wie erörtert, alle auch für das Sinnliche gelten"). For the construction ??????? ???? + genitive (= "is true of", frequent in the Prior Analytics) cf. 1067b33-34 (??????? ?? ?? ?? ???? ??? ?????????? ?????).

The reference is to M 2-3 (Schwegler iv, p. 350), "especially 1077b17-22" (Ross ii, p. 480). "There it was shown that the mathematical objects are ?? ?????????? ["the result of abstraction", cf. 1077b9-10], and that it is not necessary to promote them to separate existence (????????), so that the theorems of the mathematicians apply to them" (Schwegler, ibidem).

(3) 1090a28-29 ??????? ??????? ????????.

The reference is equally to M 2-3 (Schwegler iv, p. 361, cf. Bonitz, p. 580, Ross ii, p. 481). Cf. especially 1078a2-4.

According to the sentence ????? … ????????, for l. 27 ????? we have to substitute ??? ????????79, but according to the logic of the passage ??? ??????????? (anticipation of l. 29 ?? ??????????)80. The imperfect ??????? (l. 28) means (as in 1089a21-22) "they used to argue"; as often, the future tense marks the consequence as absurd.

He who made the note together with the reference to M1 must have misunderstood the ?????. He must have been a lecturer (?????, ???????) who used Books M and N in their present order. For the same case cf. above, p. 217.

As result we have one reference to ?1, which is, however, part of an interpolation (see above, p. 222), and two references to M1, the latter of them being demonstrably spurious; this casts suspicion also on the former.

Conclusion: Different Conceptions of Lecture Courses

Since the Metaphysics has (at least) two authors, Aristotle and Andronicus (cf. vol. i, p. 5), the question about its literary unity must be twofold: first, what is the plan behind the transmitted disposition, and then only, whether there shows through another one, originally intended by Aristotle. The first question was the one which the unitarians of ancient times, in effect, cared of exclusively, and the extreme separatist Ingemar Düring not at all (cf. our Introduction, pp. 27-29). Werner Jaeger follows up both questions. In his Studien zur Entstehungsgeschichte der Metaphysik des Aristoteles he aims to reconstruct the process which led from the postulated original form of "discourse" (?????) to the book transmitted to us. Therefore it is our final task to compare the observations we have made in the course of our inquiry with Jaeger's results.

Jaeger's view

Let us begin with Jaeger's explanation of the transmitted arrangement (p. 183):

"? was placed behind A, because it was seen as a second introduction or a supplement to the first one. Further, the final words of A 10 seemed to suggest that B could not follow behind immediately. The sequence of B and ? was protected by the enumeration of aporiae in B. That ? must come after ? was seemingly proven by the promise or request ? 2, 1004 a 28 that, before any inquiry, there must be considered the plurality of meanings which has the concept to be delved. The fact that in E 4 fin., for the first time in the Metaphysics [an error, see above, p. 95], there is referred back to ?, together with the seeming promise in ?, called for placing ? between ? and E. Even the authority of K, which does not know of such an interruption in the discussion of the introductory aporiae, was of no effect against this conclusion. Equally confirmed was the sequence ????, by the words at the end of E […].

With I, the difficulties begin, which the later Peripatetic and Neoplatonic commentators failed to master. […] Why K was placed between I and ? remained unclear. […] It seems to have been placed here as a sort of recapitulation of what was said before Z, in order to attach ?, which, in its first five chapters, seemed likewise to recapitulate ???."81

On the end position of MN Jaeger (p. 184) remarks: "In the lagging behind of these two polemic preparatory books, which should be followed by the main doctrine of Aristotle, there reveals itself the hopeless aporia of the editors."

The reconstructed startingpoint is what we know about the practice of ????? or ??????? at the times of Plato and Aristotle. Jaeger's examples are: Plato, Parmenides 127 B - 128 E (Jaeger, pp. 138-139) and Aristotle, De Sophisticis Elenchis 184a8-b8 (Jaeger, pp. 144-145); for the "distribution by ????????" he (p. 145) quotes Plato, Phaedrus 228 D-E and Phaedo 97 B-C.

According to Jaeger, the following original ??????? can be identified in our Metaphysics:

"The first ???????, a general introduction into the basic problem of metaphysics, the problem of first principles, covers Book A. It performs for the metaphysical inquiry the same as the second ??????? of the ???????? for this science." (p. 165)

"The second ??????? B indicates its extent, inner homogeneity and its aim so clearly that there is nothing more to say. It is cited as ???????????, ???????. The independent status of B is also indicated by the particle-less beginning of both B and ?, aside from the sharply limitated content." (p. 165)

"The ? of the Metaphysics deals with the solution of the introductory aporiae concerning the unity of the primary science and the proof that the highest axiom of demonstration belongs to its field of cognition. In the course of it, the connection of this line of thought - not of the book - with the aporiae is expressly emphasized [1004a32 and 33-34], but the importance of the principles of contradiction and excluded middle for metaphysics is substantiated in such detail that the book almost becomes a special treatise on the foundation of metaphysics. It is characterized as an independent lecture unit also by the particle-less beginning of both ? and E." (pp. 167-168)

"? is a paricularly fine example for our view, because it functions as an independent writing even in the list of Diogenes Laertius." (p. 168)

"Also the fifth ??????? E stands alone, without formal connection with the other books." (p. 168)

"The sixth treatise, Z-H, expatiates on the meanings of being, especially of the ?????? ??." (p. 168)

"That the treatise on the ??????? ?? and ???????? ?? in ? was an independent ??????? cannot be doubted too. This seventh ??????? is closely connected with the sixth one." (p. 171)

The eighth ???????, Book I, "again gives the most vivid idea of such an unit. Its subject is the problem of the One, which was first raised in B 4. 1001a4-b25." (p. 171)

"Equally, K 1-8 [our K1] is a separate ??????? (the ninth in the transmitted series), and does not fit in its place. Since it is parallel to ???, its content can be designated as a self-contained ["geschlossene"] introduction and foundation of metaphysics." (p. 173)

"The tenth treatise is ? - again a model of an Aristotelian inquiry. At the beginning the announcement of the topic. At the end, as in ???? ?????? Ethica Nicomachea I, an impressive saying of a poet as conclusion." (p. 173)

M1 and N are considered by Jaeger (p. 173) as the eleventh and twelth ???????, M2 being "the sketch of a revision of the transition-passage leading over from M to N".

"The present Metaphysics must be considered as a collection of such treatises; a distinction must be made, however, between a primary collection, dating back to Aristotle, a secundary one, arranged by his direct successors, a tertiary one, made by even later generations. So the degree of connection and affinity is quite different between the singular books. Primarily related are ????; what is preserved of their continuation is MN and, possibly, I; secondarily connected with these writings are ?-?; tertiary is the addition of ? and ?, as well as of K. Whether ? belongs to the second or the third class I would not venture to decide, inclining, however, to the latter." (p. 174)

Criticism of Jaeger's view

To begin with the "tertiary" stage, Jaeger is underrating Andronicus. Andronicus's edition is divided into four clearly distinguishable parts:

1. AB?, an introduction, connected by references. In ? 1-2, the task of finding the principles (A 1-2) is specified to finding the principles of substances.

2. ?????, an inquiry into the convertible basic concepts being (??) and unity (??), formally connected by the constant reference to ?, which begins in E 2 (overlooked by Jaeger).

3. K?, a complete cursus metaphysicus, linked by the reference 1064a36 (ignored by Jaeger), but isolated from all other books by the lack of any mutual reference.

4. MN, two books which do not pick up the thread of an immediately preceding text, are added as an appendix. Perhaps Andronicus believed that at the beginning of N too the ??????? ????? is meant. In every case, he did the best he could do. M and N are linked by two references to M1 in N (see above, pp. 224-225).

The picture changes when we pay attention to the difference between references firmly embedded in the text and such which may be or must be interpolated. (What Jaeger failed to do.) The latter must belong to the secondary stage.

Of the references to B, only two are firmly embedded, both occurring in M1 (1076a39-b1 and 1076b39-1077a1); the others (? 1004a32 and 33-34, ? 1053b10, ? 1086b15-16) are likely to be interpolated. So Jaeger's assertion that some connection between B and ? is "expressly emphasized" (see above, p. 229) does not go for the primary stage.

In his characterization of E, Jaeger overlooks the clear reference to ? in E 2 (see above, p. 95), in his characterization of ZH the reference to E (see above, pp. 124-125). In considering E 1 as continuation of ?, he disregards Natorp's objection (see above, p. 95); in his analysis of E 2-4 he neglects Natorp's important observation mentioned above, p. 91. He rightly recognizes two contradictory tendencies: excluding all meanings of being except the "figures of predication" (??????? ??? ??????????), and treating all four meanings enumerated in E 2; but he overlooks that the latter tendency begins already with the "first" (??????) in 1026b3 (cf. above, p. 91). This double tendency continues with ZH: at first, an inquiry into substance is initiated, the inquiry into the non-sensible substance being planned as crowning conclusion (this must be meant with the ????????? ????? in H 1042a4), but then, after the preliminary study of the sensible substance, the inquiry turns off to the analysis of the remaining meanings of being (?1 and ?2). With M1, we probably have the (incomplete) continuation of the former inquiry (cf. above, p. 207).

A similar case was book A: as the need arised, it was used as a whole or selectively, for once without the chapters 8-10 (see above, pp. 59 and 207-208), for once without the chapters 3-10 (see above, p. 213 and below, p 233). So we can likewise assume that also in the case of E 2-4 (and K 8, see pp. 90-91 and 160-161), depending on which continuation was intended, the unsuitable passages were omitted.

In characterizing I, Jaeger unfortunately relies on the probably interpolated (see above, p. 143) chapter 2.

Regarding K1 and ?, Jaeger (as mentioned already) ignores the reference 1064a36, which is embedded. Jaeger believed to have proved (against Natorp) the authenticity of K1 (1912, pp. 63-86), the communis opinio of today, however, is on Natorp's side (see above, p. 173). After our study, a distinction is to be made between an original version, the authenticity of which must remain open, and additions which are doubtlessly spurious. This original version is more consistent than ?? inasmuch the two offenses taken by Natorp (see above, pp. 91 and 95) are avoided: because K 3 does not even proceed from "being as being" (?? ? ??) to "substance" (?????), there can be no step back; and because K 8 gives no enumeration of the meanings of being containing potentiality and actuality, this meaning cannot fall flat. It is noteworthy that K 8 (as well as E 2), with "first" (??????, 1064b16-17), promises a treatment of all meanings of being; therefore it cannot be spoken of as a "self-contained" (Jaeger, see above, p. 229) treatise. We are dealing with the same conflict as in E 2-4: complete treatment of the meanings of being contra limitation to the "properly being"; the difference is that then, with ?, only the latter tendency gets the word.

Noticeable is the small extent of K 1 compared with B.

Regarding M1, Jaeger (l. c., p. 110) is guided by the interpolated (see above, p. 207) reference 1076a9-10, from which he infers that M1 must belong to another series than ???. Consequently he overlooks that M1 resumes literally the result of H 2. 1043a26-28.

The positive theory of the "immovable substance" (???????? ?????), announced implicitly in 1076a10-13, is missing.

M2, in its original state (i. e. without the interpolated references, cf. above, pp. 213-217) has nothing to do neither with M1 nor with N; it is rather the begin of a separate cursus metaphysicus, which presupposes nothing but a prooemium like A 1-2 (see above, p. 218).

N is, like ? 1075a25 sqq., the conclusion of a cursus, which was preceded by a positive theory of the "immovable substance" (cf. above, pp. 223-224).

1 ???????????? ?? ???? ?????? ??? ????? ????????????, ??? ?????? ??? ???????? ??????????? ??????? ????? ?????? ?? ?????? ????? ?? ?????, ???? ??????? ??????? ?? ????? ?????, ?? ??????, ????????? ??? ??????? ?????????? ???????????. ?? ?? ??? ???? ????? ?????????? ??? ??????????? ???? ??? ???????.

2 Thomas Aquinas (Sententia Metaphysicae, liber 3 lectio 1 numerus 1): "Postquam philosophus in secundo libro ostendit modum considerandae veritatis, hic procedit ad veritatis considerationem.

Fonseca (Tomus primus, pp. 29-30: De inscriptione, et partitione huius operis): "In 2. agitur de modo investigandae veritatis."

3 See the two citations from Jaeger's Aristotle on pp. 12-13: "It is totally inadmissible to treat the elements combined in the corpus metaphysicum as if they were a unity, and to set up, for purposes of comparison, the average result of these entirely heterogeneous materials." (Jaeger, p. 168)

"On no account must we, by assuming that it is philosophically homogeneous, cover up the problems which its content as well as its form presents at every step. We must reject all attempts to make a literary whole out of the remaining materials by rearranging or removing some of the books, and we must condemn the assumption which overhastily postulates their philosophical unity at the expense of their individual peculiarities. Each of these papers is the result of decades of untiring reflection on the same questions; each is a fruitful instant, a stage in Aristotle’s development, an approach to the solution, a step towards new formulation." (Jaeger, p. 170)

4 The latest example is Sarah Broady, p. 43: "In Metaphysics A 1, according to the modern division into chapters, Aristotle has established that ?????, i.e. whatever the discipline may be that most deserves that honorific title without qualification, is a science (????????) concerned with certain principles and causes (982a2).The natural next question, and the one from which A 2 begins, is: 'Which principles and causes?' (982a5). Aristotle proposes to address this by detailing our existing presuppositions or assumptions about what sort of person counts as ?????, or as more ????? than some other sort, and then showing that these unanimously point to the conclusion that ????? par excellence, i.e. the distinguishing quality of the ????? par excellence, is the science that studies first principles and causes (982a6-b10)."

5 136. 3-7: ????? ?? ???? ?????? ?? ??????? ???, ??? ???? ??? ?? ???? ??? ?????? ???? ?????????? ????? ??? ??? ????? ????? ?????????, ??? ???? ??? ??? ??????? ????? ?????????????, ?? ??? ????? ????? ?? ???? ?????? ?????, ????? ???? ??????????, ???? ?? ??? ?????.

6 "Ait Aristoteles, se superius etiam ???? ????????, hoc est de talibus seu potius talia quaedam declarasse, quia simile quid dixit de Anaxagora, cum eius sententiam de natura materiae explicaret eamque ad verum reduci posse doceret."

7 1912, p. 17: "Die Worte ???? ??? ??? ??? ???????? ????????? ??? ????????, die diesen Gedanken beschließen, können nur heißen: von ähnlichen Fällen (wo der Autor selbst seine wichtigsten Konsequenzen nicht zu ziehen vermocht hat) haben wir oben schon gehandelt (cf. 985a4 und 986a11-18)."

8 Sententia Metaphysicae, liber 1 lectio 17 numerus 14: "De talibus ergo quae ab aliis imperfecte dicta sunt, dictum est prius."

9 p. 127: "ad omnia referendum esse, quaecunque de summis rerum principiis vel investigaverunt vel obscurius divinaverunt veteres philosophi"

10 The same interpretation of ???? ??? ??????? ??????? is maintained by Cooper (pp. 352-353): "I take these later difficulties to be simply those that arise consistently everywhere in the books subsequent to B, when Aristotle undertakes to argue out and propose his own views on the content of the knowledge that wisdom encompasses - that is, on what the first principles in fact are of whatever has being, and of how those principles operate and relate to other causes subordinate to them." Besides, he sees himself forced to assume that ??? ?? ???? ????? ?????? ?????????? ?? ???, ??????????? ????? does not, or not exclusively, refer to the difficulties discussed in A 8-9: "Aristotle is not saying we need to go back through these ???????, or not them alone, in order to find or develop the ??????? of B. The points he wishes to go back to include various ones that have come up throughout the course of the discussions he has engaged in in chapters 3-6 and 8-9, first in expounding the views of his predecessors on causes and principles and then in raising these difficulties for them. What is to be gone back to include certain questions about principles and causes (material ones, as well as moving, formal and final) that Aristotle's historical and then critical discussions of his predecessors have brought up in one way or another. In fact, the ??????? of B do bear this sort of relation to what Aristotle has said in these parts of A at many places even if Aristotle does not point this out there.

It remains to be observed, however, that some of the ??????? of B, most notably and indeed explicitly the very first one, arise not from points that came up in the discussion of the predecessors, but rather in the discussion of theoretical sciences and the science of first principles in the first two chapters of the Book." (pp. 353-354)

Since ???? ????? ?????? refers, via 993a24-25 and 993a11-13, back to 988a20-22, what "we need to go back through" are not ??????? at all, but the opinions of "those who speak about 'principle' and 'cause'," and ????? must mean "a second time after A 8-9".

11 137. 12-15: ???? ?? ????? ??? ?? ????? ?????, ?? ????? ????? ?? ?????? ????? ??? ????????? [i. e. ??? ???? ?? ??????], ???? ??? ??????? ??????????? ????????? ??? ?? ??? ???? ?????? ?? ???? ???? ????, ??? ??????? ?? ????? ? ?????, ????????.

12 169. 26 - 170. 4: ?? ?? ??? ?????? ??? ????? ????? ????????? ???? ????????? ??? ?? ??????? ????? ??? ??? ???? ????? ??? ??????????? (? ??? ???????????? ?????? ?? ???? ????? ??? ????? ???? ????? ? ??????, ????? ????? ??? ?? ??????? ??? ???????????? ?? ??? ???? ?????), ??? ??? ?? ??? ??? ????????????? ?? ???? ????? ????? ??, ??? ??? ??? ????? ??? ??????????? ??? ???? ??? ??????? ???????????????? ???? ??? ? ????? ??? ???????????, ??? ? ?? ?? ???? ??????? ?????? ????????????? ????? ?? ??? ???? ??? ????? ??????????? ????????????? ???????.

13 1984, p. 165: "[…] the main thrust is towards the aporia raised by the alternatives at ? 1. 1026a23-32 and ? 7. 1064b6-14. If there is eternal and immobile and separate being, that aporia states, the science dealing with it will be superior to both natural philosophy and mathematics, and will treat universally of being qua beìng. ? in its third and final chapter smooths the way for this aporia and the discussion immediately preceding it, by showing that reality (????? - 995a18) has first to be examined to see whether all reality contaìns matter."

14 Thomas Aquinas (Sententia Metaphysicae, liber 3 lectio 4 numeri 4-5): "Deinde cum dicit amplius autem [996a21 ??? ??] secundam rationem ponit, quae talis est. Diversorum pertinentium ad unam scientiam, quaecumque scientia considerat unum considerat et aliud, ut patet in contrariis, quorum diversitas secundum se pertinet ad unam scientiam non per reductionem ad aliquid aliud unum: sed non quaecumque scientia considerat unam causam considerat omnes causas: ergo consideratio omnium causarum non pertinet ad unam scientiam. Minorem probat per hoc, quod diversae scientiae sunt de diversis entibus; et multa entia sunt, quibus non possunt attribui omnes causae [996a21-22 ??????? ??? ????? ??? ????????? ?????]."

This is the reconstruction which Ross found in Gaston Colle's commentary of 1922: "This, as Colle has pointed out, becomes intelligible as an objection to there being one science of all the kinds of cause, only if that be taken to mean that a science which apprehends one kind of cause necessarily apprehends them all. If the objects of certain sciences are unaffected by some kinds of cause, those sciences will know some kinds of cause without knowing all." (Ross i, p. 227)

In the latter case, Aristotle is left with the dilemma pointed out by Madigan (p. 35): "The arguments of 996a21-b1 leave Aristotle with a dilemma either to drop the claim of wisdom to study unchanged entities and mathematical entities, or to drop its claim to study all the causes."

Fonseca: "Si qua scientia omnia causarum genera consideraret, ea maxime id faceret, quae est omnium accuratissima, cum scire sit rem per causas cognoscere. atqui Mathematicae scientiae sunt omnium accuratissimae, nec tamen omnia causarum genera persequuntur: nulla est igitur scientia, quae omnia causarum genera consideret."

15 Sententia Metaphysicae, liber 11 lectio 1 numerus 11: "[…] quia maxime videretur esse circa causam finalem, quae est potissima inter alias."

16 Madigan (p. 26): "It is natural to take 'in our prefatory remarks' as a reference back to A, but no passage in A as we have it discusses the present aporia. One explanation is that Aristotle does not mean that he has raised this aporia in A, only that the aporia concerns the first principles discussed in A: namely, the causes; cf. Alexander (174.7-20), Ross (1924: i. 224). But ????????????, 'we went through aporia', clearly refers to something that Aristotle did before B, presumably in A. Presumably Aristotle is referring to A 3-10, and perhaps he regards the vindication of the completeness of the list of four causes in those chapters as an example of going through aporia."

Düring (pp. 270-271): "This phrase, however, can only refer to something what he has said as an introduction to the present writing […]. The usual explanation that ?? ???? ???????????????? means the whole Book Alpha is even more difficult, because, firstly, it is evident that Alpha is not an introduction to Beta, secondly, that the first aporia in Beta does not occur in Alpha.The explanation given by Ross in his commentary is a stopgap and not convincing."

Bonitz (p. 138) and Ross (i 224) too fall in with Alexander.

Christ (p. 41) solves the problem by transposing ???? ?? ?? ???? ???????????????? ???????????? to after l. 7 ??? ??????: "5 ???? ?? … 6 ???????????? referri oportet ad ??? ??????."

Laks (p. 28 with n. 9): "The reference is not entirely transparent (it seems to be to A 2. Cf. especially 982b7f.: 'Judged by all the tests we have mentioned, then, the name in question falls to the same science; this must be a science that investigates the ?rst principles and causes'."

Crubellier (p. 47): "The mention of ‘prefatory remarks’ refers certainly to book A. But there is a dif?culty about the verb ??????????, which normally means to give an account of a philosophical problem in a precise technical form, the very form that is displayed throughout in book B, so that we would particularly expect ?????????? to have that technical meaning here. Now, what we can ?nd in book A differs appreciably from this pattern."

17 For ?? ??? ??? in the sense of ??? ??? ??? cf. Politica 1266a22-24: ?? ??? ??? ??? ?? ??????????? ??? ????????? ??? ?????????? ??? ???????? ?????????, ?? ?????? ??????? … ("These considerations tend to show that states like Plato's should not be composed of democracy and monarchy").

18 This conclusion is denied by Reale (p. 107, = p. 120 Catan): "The logical connection of this passage with that which precedes it can be clarified as follows: Aristotle has distinguished the ???? ??? ????? and he has shown that they constitute the object of a single science and he adds: to the ???? of being will correspond as many ???? of one science. That there are as many parts of philosophy as there are ???? (identical, similar, and so on) could give rise to mistakes. Against this possible misunderstanding Aristotle provides some distinctions: there are not as many «parts» of philosophy as there are ???? of being and unity, but rather as many parts of philosophy as there are genera of substance or genera of being (that is, the sensible and the supersensible); the identical, the similar, and so on form not many parts, but, we should say, sections of single parts or of one of these parts."

19 ?? ????? must be interpreted as dativus limitationis (with Alexander, 245. 23-24: … ???? ???? ?? ?????, ???????? ???? ???? ????? ...), not as dativus commodi (with J. Owens, pp. 376-377: "?? ????? at b22 ... seems parallel with the objective genitive ?????? after ??? at b19, and so should be a Dative of Advantage after ???? at b21. The change of construction at b21-22 placed ????????? in the genitive, and so calls for a change from the genitive ?????? at b19 to a dative").

20 250. 32 - 251. 6 Hayduck: ??? ??? ?? ????????? ? ????? ???? ?? ??? ?????? ????????, ?? "?? ??? ????’ ????? ? ?????, ??? ?????? ?? ???? ??? ????? ??? ??? ?????? ????? ??? ?????????" ????? ??? ????????? ?? ??? ??????? ???? ?????????? ???? ??? ?? ??????. ??? ??? ?? ?? ????????? ?? ????????, ?? ?? ? ????? ???? ??????? ??? ??? "?? ?? ?? ?? ??? ?? ?? ??????", ?????????? ?? "??? ??? ??? ????? ?? ???? ???????? ???? ????? ????????? ?? ?????, ?? ?? ???? ??? ?????" ????????? ??? ????? ?? ??? ??????? ???? ?????????? ????? ???? ??? ?? ??????.

252, 3-6: ??? ?? ???? ? ????? ???? ?????????? ?? "?????????? ?? ????? ???? ?? ?? ?????? ??? ????????." ?????? ??? ??? ???? ?? ?? ? ?? ????????? ?? ??? ?? ???? ??? ??? ?? ?? ????????????, ??? ????????? ??? ??? ???? ??? ??? ?? ?????.

21 Christ (p. 62: "ab ????? primum scriptor ad 1004a2 ??? ??????? transiisse videtur omissis quae interjecta sunt et ??? ?? ?? 1004a5.") wants to save Alexander's identification of the "species of being" with the "genera of being" by eliminating 1003b22-1004a2 as a later addition (likewise Jaeger, 1957, p. 60, and Kirwan, p. 82); but in doing so, he overlooks that 1004a17-18 ???? ?????????? refers to 1003b35-36.

22 Cf. Kirwan (p. 83) on 1004a9: "Aristotle now uses the thesis argued in the paragraph beginning 1003b22 - that metaphysics studies the concept of unity - in order to show that otherness and several related concepts also come within its scope."

23 "haec sententiae structura (???? … cum ???? in apodosi) jam perrumpitur altera recensione interjecta (10 ???????? … 16 ????????); cf. huius rei exemplum 1005a8 et 11."

24 "Quo refers ????? ?? ??? ?????? ad principia contraria priorum philosophorum proxima in enuntiatione (31-33) enarrata referri nequeunt, quia haec ad unitatem et multitudinem neutiquam reducta sunt. Manifesto respiciuntur priora verba ???? ?????? ??? ????, ??????? ?? ??? ???????." Cf. 1903, p. 66: "????? … ????????? [1004b33-1005a2] pertinent ad 29 ???? … ???????."

Without mentioning Christ, Jaeger (1957, p. 63) comments: "verba ?? ?' ???? … 33 ?????? orationem interrumpunt, sed ex eodem fonte sumpta videntur ac sequentia."

25 ????? ?? ??? ???? ? ????? ??’ ?? ????? ??? ?? ?????????? ????? ???? ??? ????????, ??? ??? ???? ?? ????????? ??????, ??? ????? ????? ???? ??? ?????? ???????? ??? "??? ??? ??? ??? ????????? ??? ??? ???? ????? ??? ?????? ?????????? ? ?????? ??? ???? ??? ????????????? ????? ????? ????????????, ?????." ???? ?? ??? ?????? ???? ????????????? ?????????, ??? ? ??? ?? ?????????? ????? ???? ??? ????????, ???? ?? ???????????? ???, ??????? ?? ??????????? ??? "???????? ?? ??? ??????? ??????????."

26 "ea a contextu aliena esse scribendi genere ostendit J, ab Aristotele postea addita videntur."

27 "Revocanda sunt e superioribus in memoriam verba a29: ?????? ?????? ??? ???? ????? ????????????? ???????? ?????? ?? ???? ?????, ?? ????? ? ??, cum his enim conjungenda sunt cogitando ??? ? ?????????? ???., quae verba hunc in modum arbitror construenda: ??? ?? ????? ??? ???????? (intellige ???? ??? ?????????) ?????????? ?????? ???? ??? ????????, ?? ?????? ??? ??????????? ?????, h. e. quod autem quidam ex iis physicis, qui axiomatum mentionem tamquam necessariam suae admiscuerunt scientiae, disserere susceperunt, qua ratione accipi oporteret veritatem, se non satis eruditos et praeparatos esse doctrina analytica ipsi prodiderunt; talia enim dijudicare, veluti quae demonstrationem requirant, quae non […], alia id genus, non physicae est scientiae sed analyticae, quae illam praecesserit oportet. Ita apte post haec verba demum videbitur concludere ??? ??? ??? … ?????."

28 "Hoc argumentum minus elaboratum et laxius agglutinatum, sed per se gravissimum nescio an postea addiderit Aristoteles."

29 Sententia Metaphysicae, liber 4 lectio 1 numerus 6: "Deinde cum dicit ens autem [1003a33] hic procedit ad solvendum quaestiones in praecedenti libro motas de consideratione huius scientiae: et dividitur in tres partes. Primo solvit quaestionem, qua quaerebant, utrum huius scientiae esset consideratio de substantiis et accidentibus simul [fourth doubt], et utrum de omnibus substantiis [third doubt]. Secundo solvit quaestionem qua quaerebatur utrum huius scientiae esset considerare de omnibus istis, quae sunt unum et multa, idem et diversum, oppositum, contrarium et huiusmodi [cf. 995b20-23], ibi, si igitur ens et unum et cetera [1003b22]. Tertio solvit quaestionem, qua quaerebatur utrum huius scientiae esset considerare demonstrationis principia [second doubt], ibi, dicendum est autem utrum unius et cetera [1005a19]."

30 Sententia Metaphysicae, liber 3 lectio 4 numerus 16: "Hanc autem quaestionem [the first doubt] Aristoteles in sequentibus expresse solvere non invenitur: potest tamen eius solutio ex his, quae ipse inferius in diversis locis determinat, colligi."

31 "[…] tres conclusiones subjicit. Prima est, Agere de ente, ut ens est, ad unam scientiam pertinere [1003b15-16], etiam [von mir corrected aus entia] si ens non unam aliquam naturam, sed multas ac varias significet. Secunda, Scientiam, quae agit de ente, ut ens est, praecipue agere de substantia [1003b16-19], Tertia, Agere de omnibus speciebus, ad eamdem scientiam genere spectare, de singulis autem speciebus ad singulas species scientiae [1003b21-22].

Primam conclusionem hac ratione probat, Quia non tantum ea, quae una ratione dicuntur, id est in natura una conveniunt, sed <et> ea, quae attributione ad aliquid unum, sub unam scientiam cadunt, ens autem, etsi non unam, sed multas naturas significat, dicitur tamen de quodam ente primum ac praecipue, de ceteris autem per attributionem ad illud. Priorem propositionem et exemplo et ratione probat. Exemplo quidem, Quia, etsi sanum non dicitur univoce de iis, quae sana appellantur, sed analogice, nihil tamen obstat quo minus omnia, quae proprie, sive non figurate dicuntur sana, ad unam Medicinae scientiam pertineant. Ratione vero, Quia quae dicuntur talia per attributionem ad unum tale, quodammodo eadem ratione conveniunt.

Posteriorem ex eo ostendit, quia ens praecipue dicitur de substantia, de ceteris autem per attributionem ad substantiam, id quod exemplo Sani et Medici perspicue docet.

Ex hac conclusione intelliges, partes subjectas, in quas primo et immediate ens dividitur, esse substantiam, prima accidentium genera et reliqua omnia quae dicuntur entia non ratione alicuius superioris naturae. Ex eadem patet solutio quintae quaestionis superioris libri, qua quaerebatur, num haec scientia circa solas substantias, an circa ea etiam, quae per se substantiis accidunt, versaretur. Dicendum est enim, versari circa omnia entia, quatenus entia sunt, etsi ens, ut complectitur substantias et accidentia ac reliqua omnia, quae dicuntur entia, non sit natura aliqua una simpliciter, sed analogum quid."

"Ex hac tertia conclusione habes solutionem tertiae quaestionis superioris libri, quod ad priorem eius partem attinet. Quaerebatur enim in priori eius parte, Num eadem scientia circa omnes substantias versaretur [995b11]: hinc autem patet, eamdem scientiam genere versari circa omnes, non tamen eamdem specie, sed diversas. Tametsi quatenus omnes substantiae conveniunt in ratione substantiae, quae sine materia concipitur, non dubium est quin haec scientia de omnibus substantiis disserat."

"Divus Thomas Albertus Commentatores et alii nonnulli existimant Aristotelem hoc loco [1004a2-9] distinguere partes huius scientiae, et inter eas ordinem naturae constituere ut ea sit natura prior, quae agit de eo substantiarum genere, quod naturae ordine prius est, ut pote de substantia immobili, de quo liber 12., ea vero posterior natura, etsi doctrinae ordine prior est, quae disserit de eo, quod est naturae ordine posterius, quod est substantia mobilis, de qua libri 7. et 8. Verum haec sententia non placet. Primum, quia quae hoc loco vocantur partes Philosophiae, mox vocantur scientiae, et superius appellatae sunt species scientiae: partes autem eiusdem specialis scientiae non dicuntur plures scientiae, minus etiam plures species scientiae. Deinde, quia Philosophia et partes eius comparantur hoc loco cum Mathematica et partibus eius: at Mathematica non est species aliqua infima, sed genus quoddam, cuius etiam partes mox vocantur scientiae, et alia prima, aliae secundae ac ceterae deinceps. Potius ergo dicendum est, Aristotelem solvere hoc loco posteriorem partem tertiae quaestionis superioris libri, qua quaerebatur, Num plures essent scientiae, quae circa substantias versarentur (id enim priori quaestionis parte quaerebatur), omnes ita essent cognatae, ut communi sapientiae nomine appellandae essent, an vero aliae nomine sapientiae, aliae alio vocabulo [995b12-13]. Cum igitur Aristoteles jam hoc capite priorem partem huius quaestionis solverit, ut supra diximus, consentaneum rationi fuit, ut hoc loco solveret posteriorem."

In 1004a31-34, according to Fonseca, the fourth (according to his numeration the fifth and sixth ones) is solved:

"Solvit ex dictis quaestionem quintam superiori libro propositam, atque adeo sextam, cuius erat eadem difficultas. Quaerebatur enim in quinta, Num haec scientia in substantiarum tantum consideratione versaretur, an etiam in consideratione eorum, quae illis per se accidunt [995b18-20], quae quidem in sexta quaestione mox explicata sunt his verbis, De eodem et diverso, de simili, de identitate et contrarietate, de priori et posteriori deque aliis huiusmodi omnibus [995b20-23]."

32 Natorp (pp. 49-50): "The result is commonly supposed to be that the philosophical basic science deals, on the one hand, with being generally, on the other hand, or rather for that very reason, with a particular realm of being, the immutable and immaterial. The fact that this ambiguous conception of first philosophy implies an intolerable contradiction […] seems not to have been realized."

Jaeger (1962, pp. 216-218):

"His [Aristotle's] original metaphysics was theology, the doctrine of the most perfect being; it was hard to combine abstract dialectic with this once the Ideas were gone. But he tried to link them up by means of their common relation to being as such (?? ? ??).

Whereas in this connexion the highest form of philosophy appears as the universal science, it is immediately followed by a different picture in E 1 (= K 7), where Aristotle is trying to distinguish metaphysics, physics, and mathematics, by their objects. He here divides sciences into theoretical, practical, and productive. Physics is a theoretical science; it studies the being that is capable of motion, and therefore regards the conceptual essence and form only in so far as it is joined with matter. To abstract from the matter would always be a mistake in physics. Even psychology must be pursued in this manner, so far as we are concerned with the realm of the psychophysical. Mathematics is also a theoretical science. Aristotle raises the question, indeed, whether its objects really have an unmoved, separate, and independent reality, as the Academy maintained. (He here decides against this doctrine, while at the same time adopting the Academy’s tripartite division of theoretical philosophy and its assignment of mathematics to a place between ontology and physics.) But, however that may be, mathematics at any rate regards its objects as unmoved and independent (? ??????? ??? ? ??????? ??????), which only makes it clearer that the study of real unmoved and transcendent being (if there is any such) will be the task of a theoretical science. But what is this science? It cannot be physics, for the objects of that, although independent (???????) are not unmoved; nor can it be mathematics, for its object, while partly unmoved, is not independent and separate. Only the highest form of philosophy studies a sort of being that is both independent and unmoved. This definition by itself would suffice to conclude that Aristotle is thinking of the unmoved mover, and he says himself in the next sentence that the principles he means are the causes of the visible divine things (????? ???? ???????? ??? ?????), in virtue of which he calls metaphysics theology (?????????).

But now this determination of the nature of metaphysics purely by means of its subject-matter, namely unmoved and transcendent being, makes it one special science among others. Whereas elsewhere it is considered as the universal science of being as such, and sharply contrasted with the sciences that examine only a special kind of being (?? ?? ??? ????? ??), here it is itself merely the knowledge of the highest kind of being (???? ?? ?????????? ?????). Its object is said to be being of this kind (??????? ?????), and it is to be looked for in a particular genus of reality, namely in the cosmic region of what is visible but imperishable. The contradiction is undeniable, and Aristotle himself observed it. In a note that obviously breaks the train of thought, and must therefore be a later addition, he makes the following remarks.

‘One might raise the question whether first philosophy is universal, or deals with one genus, i.e. some one kind of being (????? ???? ????); for not even the mathematical sciences are all alike in this respect—geometry and astronomy deal with a certain particular kind of thing, while universal mathematics applies alike to all. We answer that if there is no substance other than those which are formed by nature, natural science will be the first science; but if there is an immovable substance, this is ‘ prior ’ to the world of sensible appearances, and metaphysics is the first science, and universal just because it is first. And it will belong to this to consider being as being—both what it is and the attributes which belong to it as being.' [E 1, 1026a23-32]

This gloss does not remove the contradiction. On the contrary, it only makes it more obvious. In attempting here to combine the two definitions he understands by a universal science a science of the ‘first’ object, which is a principle in a more comprehensive sense than are the other kinds of being; but in ? 1 and the beginning of E universal meant that which does not refer to any particular part of being at all, and Aristotle could not and does not assert that the immaterial movers of the stars are not ‘particular beings’ nor ‘one sort of being’. One might perhaps be inclined to suspect that neither the problem nor its solution, which looks so much like an observation made en passant, comes from Aristotle himself; but since it also appears in the other version in K 8, and since it expresses a contradiction that is really present, there is nothing for it but to admit that the philosopher did not find the solution of the problem, or at any rate that it did not occur to him until after the two versions were already fused together."

33 Cf. the two notes in his edition (1903, p. 126): "post ????? primum [in 1026a22] sequebantur 27 ?? ??? ???." and "23 ????????? … 27 ????? post 31 ????? collocanda esse videntur."

34 For the expression ????? ??? cf. Metaphysics B, 996a25-26 and On the Sense, 448a30-b4: ??? ??? ?? ??? ???? ?????? ???? ?????? ????? ? ?????????? ? ?? ?, ?? ?? ?????, ??? ?? ?????? ???? ? ??? ?????? ?? ???, ????? ???? ?? ??????? ??? ?????? ??? ????????? ?????????? ???? ??? ?????????. ("Again, if there is any magnitude, whether time or thing, absolutely imperceptible owing to its smallness, it follows that there would not be either a thing which one perceives, or a time in which one perceives it, unless in the sense that in some part of the given time he sees some part of the given thing.")

35 As the text stands, 30 ???? would have to be referred to 29 ????? ????????, cf. Thomas Aquinas (Sententia Metaphysicae, liber 6 lectio 1 numerus 27): si est aliqua substantia immobilis, ista erit prior substantia naturali, et per consequens philosophia considerans huiusmodi substantiam erit philosophia prima. So Thomas gets out of it by referring the second predicate 30 ????????? ????? not to 30 ????, but to a subject 'philosophia considerans huiusmodi substantiam' added in thought.

Jaeger (1962, p. 218) and Mansion (1956, p. 165) resort to the same measure.

36 Jaeger (1912, p. 23) "We are amazed to note the yawning contradiction betwen this additament and the ???????, ??????? which follow - please do not brush them aside easily by a ?? ??? or ??? ?????? «to be supplied» [as does Pseudo-Alexander (458. 11-12): ??? ???????.]."

Jaeger's point is supported by 13 passages "without a concomitant ?? v?v or ??? ??????" (overlooked by Jaeger, l. c. p. 22): Metaphysics, 1034b34. 1074a17. Physics, 224b27. On Generation and Corruption, 327b31. Nicomachean Ethics, 1096a10. 1130b20. 1155b8. 1159b23. 1171a33. Eudemian Ethics, 1219b31. Politics, 1300b36 (???????), Metaphysics, 1029a31. Politics, 1275a6 (???????). In Nicomachean Ethics, 1155b8-9, it is added ?? ??? ?????? ??? ???????? ??????? (cf. 1159b23-24 ??? ??? ????? ????????????). This is what must be meant by ??????? and ??????? in 1027b34 and 1028a3 respectively.

37 In 1025b28, ?? ??? ?? ???? and ?? ?? ???????? must be alternative readings, because Ross's translation "about substance-as-defined [or "substance-in-the-sense-of-form", as in i 354] for the most part only as not separable" contradicts 1026a2-3. The reading ?? ??? ?? ???? ????? would say "that physics studies form rather [literally: "most of the time"] than matter" (cf. Ross, l. c., who refers to Z, 1037a17), ????? expressing an "only" in comparison to metaphysics, which, as we must conclude, is "always" (or "exclusively") "about substance-as-defined"(???? ?????? ??? ???? ??? ?????).

38 Natorp (pp. 563-564): "with ch. 10 the inquiry returns to definition."

39 The reference to "? 8, 1049b27-29" in Frede/Patzig ii, p. 243 is a lapsus.

40 Here and in 1038b6-7, Ross wrongly joins the adverb ??????? with ????? ("to be in the truest sense", "to be in the fullest sense"). He has not realized that, in the latter passage, ????? and ??????? are connected by their emphasized front and end position. For this stylistic device cf. vol. i, p. 30.

41 See Fonseca: "[…] primum quidem, hoc est, usque ad librum decimum, de formis substantiarum sensibilium, quas omnes esse fatentur; deinde vero de formis separatis. […] Nam de hac forma [scil. de natura specifica], quatenus reperitur in substantiis sensibilibus, incipit Aristoteles disputare initio capitis sequentis, appellans eam quidditatem."

42 Cf. Thomas Aquinas (Sententia Metaphysicae, liber 7 lectio 4 numerus 19): "[…] in infinitum fiet repetitio eiusdem nominis, semper posita nominis definitione pro nomine. Constat enim, quod cum dico, nasus concavus, loco concavi potest accipi simum, quia concavitas in naso non est nisi simitas, et loco simi iterum nasus concavus, et sic in infinitum."

Fonseca: "Absurdum vero est progressio in infinitum, quae hoc pacto videtur colligi. Quamvis simum et concavum non omnino idem sunt secundum se considerata, re tamen vera idem omnino est nasus concavus, quod nasus simus: simum enim nihil adjungit naso, nisi solam concavitatem, ut patet. Si ergo, cum dico nasum simum, loco simi posuero definitionem illius, quae est nasus concavus, ut tota oratio sit, nasus nasus concavus, potero rursus loco nasi concavi ponere nasum simum, itemque loco simi ponere nasum concavum, ut tota oratio sit, nasus nasus nasus concavus, et sic deinceps in infinitum."

43 Christ (1853, p. 68): "Verba quae sequuntur ?????? ?? ??? ??? ????? ??? ?????? ??????? ???????? ad hanc sententiam minime referri possunt, sed cum iis, quae antea versibus 11-15 exposita sunt, arctissime cohaerent. Nam cum antea Aristoteles in universum sanitatem ex notione sanitatis effici docuisset, nunc eandem rationem (??????) ad singulas partes (?????????, ?????????), unde perfecta atque absoluta sanitas prodeat, transfert. Perperam igitur verba ??? ?? - ??????? ordinem disputationis interrumpunt, nec quo pertineant difficile cognitu. Etenim cum Aristoteles versibus 9 et 10 operationis (????????) obiter mentionem fecit, postea in margine sui exemplaris, quomodo operatio a meditatione differat, adnotasse videtur."

44 Cf. Thomas Aquinas (Sententia Metaphysicae, liber 8 lectio 2 numerus 5): "Deinde cum dicit sumenda autem [?????? ???] concludit, quod ex quo in differentiis consistit esse rerum, et sic intendenda est earum cognitio, utile est sumere genera differentiarum."

45 Schwegler (iv, p. 142) refers 1043b33 ????? to what follows.

46 Cf. Jaeger (1957, p. 171): "nisi forte ??????? conjicias collato 1044a8."

47 Ross ii, p. 226, Bostock, p. 248.

48 544. 2-4: ?? ?? ?? ??? ?????? ?????? [Z] ??? ?? ??? ??????? [E] ???????? […] ???????????????.

49 "Hoc ex principio libri superioris colligi potest, junctis iis, quae initio quarti, et sexti dicta erant. Ostensum est enim primo capite libri 7. ens simpliciter dictum esse solam substantiam, reliqua autem dici entia, quatenus ad substantiam referuntur; saepe autem dictum fuerat praesertim locis citatis, entis quatenus ens est, principia, causas, et elementa quaeri. Dictum est igitur haec quaeri praecipue de substantia, minus praecipue de ceteris, quo pacto hic locus intelligendus est."

50 p. 279: "Apte autem hoc loco Aristoteles vocabula affinis significationis ?????, ?????, ???????? b3, 5, 7 cumulat, quoniam ab initio universe disputat necdum horum vocabulorum discrimen ad rem magnopere pertinet."

51 Sententia Metaphysicae, liber 9 lectio 1 numerus 3): "Et primo de potentia quae maxime dicitur proprie, non tamen utile est ad praesentem intentionem. Potentia enim et actus, ut plurimum, dicuntur in his quae sunt in motu, quia motus est actus entis in potentia. Sed principalis intentio huius doctrinae non est de potentia et actu secundum quod sunt in rebus mobilibus solum, sed secundum quod sequuntur ens commune. Unde et in rebus immobilibus invenitur potentia et actus, sicut in rebus intellectualibus."

52 "Potentia, quae cernitur in rebus materialibus, dicitur non esse utilis ad hanc tractationem, non quia utilis non sit, sed quia non est utilis quasi propria solius Metaphysici […]."

53 Cf. Jaeger 1962, p. 201: "We have an example of «at the start» used in a central book to refer to its own beginning in the discussion of friendship in the Nicomachean Ethics (VIII-IX) [1152a12-13], and there is no doubt that this was originally an independent work."

54 Ross (ii, p. 275): "If retained, ????????? ?? must go with ?????? ? ??????, 'that which is true or false in the most proper sense of those terms', in contrast to truth and falsity ???? ?? ????????, which Aristotle treats of later (l. 17-1052a4). But it is highly unnatural to sever ????????? ?? from ?? ??." The construction proposed by Ross was adopted by Tricot (p. 522: "et enfin selon le vrai et le faux, au sens le plus propre de ces terms") and Makin (p. 14: "third as what is in the most proper way true or false"). It is not "a possible reading" of the text as it stands, as Makin (p. 248) assures, but requires reading <?? ??> ????????? ??. The worst thing about it is that it creates another contradiction to E: there, "being" was not limitated to a special meaning of "truth".

Hölscher (p. 213) proposes to read ?? ?? <???? ??> ????????? ?? ??????, referring to Poetics, 1458a23 ?? ???? ?? ??????.

1458a22-23: ??????? ?? ???? ??????? ??? ????????? ??? ????????? ??? ??? ?? ???? ?? ??????.

"By strange, I mean metaphor, lengthened - anything, in short, that differs from the normal idiom."

This means that Hölscher refers ????????? to the two senses mentioned in 1051a34-b1, in accordance with his understanding of 1027b31, where he reads ?????? with EJ instead of ??????, the reading of Ab which is preferred by Ross and Jaeger: "The ????? are of course the categorial being of substance and the being of potentiality and actuality […]" (ibidem). This understanding, however, is problematic (see above, p. 92), and Hölscher gives no translation which would clarify the syntactic structure. Besides, the superlative (?????????) sounds odd when it marks two of three.

55 Pseudo-Alexander, 618. 16-17: ???, ????, ????? ???????????, ??????? ???????? ????? ?? ???? ???????????, ?? ??? ???' ?????? ?????.

56 See, e. g., Fonseca in his Prooemium to Book K: "Nunc autem aggressurus jam tractationem de immaterialibus substantiis [? 6-9], tamquam Primae Philosophiae propriam ac praecipuam extremamque manum huic operi impositurus, non pauca hoc libro repetit, non solum ex primo, tertio, quarto, et sext? huius operis, sed etiam ex secundo, tertio et quarto, et quinto de Naturali auscultatione, quae futurae disputationi usui futura sunt, rebusque explicandis non parum lucis allatura: repetiturus etiam in primis quatuor capitibus libri sequentis [? 1-5, according to the usual chapter division] alia quaedam, tum ex hoc opere, tum etiam ex primo Physicorum, quae propinquius ad rem institutam expediendam erunt utilia."

57 Natorp (p. 182) calls the question ????? ??? ?????? ?????? "aimless" ("ziellos"), as the same question in ll. 25-26. Jaeger (1912, p. 66) objects that the aim is to establish the common quality of these sciences, because then it will appear whether metaphysics belongs to this circle of sciences.

58 p. 452: "Neque enim quaestionis habet formam, quam reliqua omnia in his duobus capitibus, sed simpliciter aliquid contenditur […]."

59 p. 308: "This passage differs from the rest of the chapter in not propounding a problem but simply stating a fact about ?????."

60 iv 210: "The argument is as follows: ? ????? ???? ?? ???????? ?? ? ?????? ??? ?? ?? ????? ?? ???? ????????? ??? ?????? ? ????? ??? ??? ???? ???? ?? ?? ?????." Likewise Natorp, p. 183: "[…] the argument would make sense only if it were established that the science «looked for» is about the immutable, and that exclusively".

61 According to Madigan, p. xl, 1060a1-2 "suggests" that K 1 "may have stood alone for some time".

62 Pseudo-Alexander, 643. 3-7: ???? ?? ?? ???? ?? ????? ???? ?? ?????? ??, ??? ??????, ???????? ??? ??’ ????? ???? ???????, ???? ??? ???? ?? ?????? ??, ???? ??? ???? ? ????? ?????, ?????, ????, ???????? ???? ???? ?? ?? ??? ??? ????? ???? ??? ????? ???????? ????????? ???? ???? ?? ??.

Thomas Aquinas (Sententia Metaphysicae, liber 11 lectio 3 numerus 6): "Et sicut substantia est proprie et per se ens, ita proprie et per se unum."

63 Cf. Categories, 11b38-12a25: ??? ?? ??? ???????? ??????? ????? ???? ?? ??? ?????? ????????? ? ?? ???????????? ????????? ????? ??????? ????????, ?????? ????? ????? ??? ?????·[?? ?? ?? ?? ????????? ??????? ????????, ?????? ???? ?? ??? ????? ??????.] ???? ????? ??? ?????? ?? ?????? ???? ?????? ?????????, ??? ????????? ?? ??????? ???????? ?? ??? ???? ?????? ? ????? ? ???????· ??? ???????? ?? ??? ?????? ??????? ????????????, ??? ????????? ?? ??????? ?? ?????? ???????? ? ???????? ? ??????· ??? ??? ???? ?? ?????? ????? ??? ?????, ???? ????? ??? ??????? ???? ???????? ??? ??????. ?? ?? ?? ?? ????????? ??????? ????????, ?????? ???? ?? ??? ?????· ???? ????? ??? ?????? ?? ?????? ?????? ?????????, ??? ??? ????????? ?? ??????? ????? ???????? ?? ??????, — ?? ??? ??? ???? ?????? ? ????? ?????·— ??? ?????? ?? ??? ????????? ???????????? ??? ??? ???’ ???????? ??? ???’ ????? ??????, ??? ????????? ?? ??????? ????? ???????? ???????? ?? ????????????· ?? ??? ????? ???? ????? ? ???????? ?????. ??? ???? ?? ?? ?????? ??? ?????, ???? ??? ??? ?????? ??? ??? ??????? ?? ????? ??? ????? ??? ??? ???? ???????, ??? ?? ?????? ??? ??? ????????? ?? ???? ?????? ???? ?????????. ??’ ????? ??? ??? ??????? ?????? ???? ??? ?????, ???? ?????? ??? ??????? ?? ????? ??? ?????· ??’ ????? ?? ??????? ??? ??? ??????? ?? ??? ????? ?????????, ?? ?? ???????? ??? ????? ???????? ?? ??? ????? ????????, ???? ?? ???? ?????? ???? ????? ??? ???? ??????? ???? ??????. ("Those contraries which are such that the subjects in which they are naturally present, or of which they are predicated, must necessarily contain either the one or the other of them, have no intermediate, but those in the case of which no such necessity obtains, always have an intermediate. Thus disease and health are naturally present in the body of an animal, and it is necessary that either the one or the other should be present in the body of an animal. Odd and even, again, are predicated of number, and it is necessary that the one or the other should be present in numbers. Now there is no intermediate between the terms of either of these two pairs. On the other hand, in those contraries with regard to which no such necessity obtains, we find an intermediate. Blackness and whiteness are naturally present in the body, but it is not necessary that either the one or the other should be present in the body, inasmuch as it is not true to say that everybody must be white or black. Badness and goodness, again, are predicated of man, and of many other things, but it is not necessary that either the one quality or the other should be present in that of which they are predicated: it is not true to say that everything that may be good or bad must be either good or bad. These pairs of contraries have intermediates: the intermediates between white and black are grey, sallow, and all the other colours that come between; the intermediate between good and bad is that which is neither the one nor the other. Some intermediate qualities have names, such as grey and sallow and all the other colours that come between white and black; in other cases, however, it is not easy to name the intermediate, but we must define it as that which is not either extreme, as in the case of that which is neither good nor bad, neither just nor unjust."

64 Cf. Metaphysics I, 1057b15-19, Analytica posteriora, 97a1-2 (????? ?? ??????? ???? ???? ??? ?? ???? ???? ????????.), De generatione et corruptione, 323a6-8 (???? ?? ????? ??? ????? ??? ????? ???????, ????? ?? ??????? ????? ?? ??? ??? ?? ???? ??? ?? ??????? ??? ???????????? […]), 329b16-18 (????? ?? ?????? ??? ????? ?????????? ????? ?????? ???????? ??? ???????????.), 330a24-29 (????? ?????? ??? ????? ?? ????? ???????? ????????? ??? ??? ?????? ????????. ????? ?? ?????? ??? ????????· ???? ??? ?? ?????? ???? ????? ? ???? ?????, ???? ?? ????? ???? ?????? ? ???? ??????, ???? ?? ?????? ??? ?? ????? ???' ??' ?????' ???' ??? ?? ?????? ??? ?? ????? ?????? ???' ?????? ???????? ????? ??????.), De partibus animalium, 643a20-24 (????? ??? ????? ????? ??????, ?? ???????? ?????? ?? ?????, ?????? ?' ???????? ?????, ??? ????? ??? ?? ????? ??? ??? ??????, ?? ?????????? ???????? ??????? ? ???? ?? ?????? ??? ??' ???? ???????????????? ??????? ?? ??? ?? ????.).

65 Pseudo-Alexander (646. 28): ??? ??????? (????? ??? ????? ????).

Mansion (1958, p. 216): "entendez de certains êtres".

66 Cf. n. 42 and Thomas Aquinas (Sententia Metaphysicae, liber 11 lectio 1 numerus 1): "ad manifestiorem considerationem de substantiis separatis habendam, primo sub quodam compendio recolligit [Aristoteles] ea quae dicta sunt tam in hoc libro, quam in libro Physicorum, utilia ad cognitionem substantiarum separatarum. Secundo de ipsis substantiis separatis inquirit, circa medietatem sequentis libri, ibi, sed quoniam tres sunt substantiae [1071b3 ???? ?' ???? ????? ??????]."

67 pp. 218-219: "Liber hic undecimus, cuius prior pars ex metaphysicorum ???, altera ex physicis excerpta est, num ab Aristotele conscriptus sit ita viri docti dubitant, ut L. Spengelius totum librum damnet, siquidem ?? ??? (1060 a, 5. 17. 20 etc.) in genuinis libris Aristotelis non inveniatur, Bonitzius posteriorem eius partem inde ab 1065 a, 26 ab inepto compilatore additam, priorem a philosopho ipso ante libros ??? adumbratam esse dicat. Equidem neque video, cur Aristoteles quae in hoc libro p. 1059 b, 15-21 de materie mathematicorum adumbrasse dicitur, postea in plena expositione plane abjecerit, et duas partes huius libri arcte inter se cohaerere et eadem neglegentia disputandi et hiantis orationis similes esse judico. Inde ad Spengelii sententiam ita inclino, ut auctorem huius libri unum ex Aristotelis discipulis fuisse necdum librum ? metaphysicis insertum invenisse putem."

68 For the first time in From Platonism to Neoplatonism, p. 178: "«being as such» means the supreme, unmoved, incorporeal sphere of being".

69 Mansion (1958, pp. 218-219) on 1064a28: "The two points of view, from which this science studies being, being and separation (from matter): are they equivalent and, in a way, synonymous to the eye of the author? When we keep to the doctrine exposed in chapters 3 and 4 and at the beginning of the present chapter, we must answer no. But when we read the subsequent lines and the whole end of this chapter, we realize that it is separate being alone what interests him, the immaterial and immutable substance, God, whose existence will be tried to be established [1064a34-36] (later). And consequently, the viewpoint of being, which is no longer at issue in the immediate context, is likely to be confused with the viewpoint of separate being. So, without any previous advertisement, and in contradiction with the previous statements which ought to clarify the use employment made here of the classic expresion ? ??, «qua being», we will have to comprehend that the being envisaged in this text is being in the strong sense, or the primary being to which all other beings must be referred."

pp. 219-220 on 1064b6-8: "If we take the expression [??? ??? ????? ? ?? ?????????] in its obvious sense, responding to that which appears from the chapters 3 and 4, the question is void of sense: it is too clear that the science of being is the most universal of all. It is then without doubt that anew, as in 1064a29, being is understood in the sense of immaterial and separate being; otherwise the appeal to the existence of such a separate and immutable substance, which is made in the solution of the doubt, would not have any sense."

70 p. 279: "The compilator did not grasp the difference between the concepts ?? ? ?? and ????? ???????? ???????."

71 Ivánka (1934, p. 531): "the part presupposed and continued in N - the exposition of Aristotle's own metaphysics - is to follow here".

72 For ???? ??? ??? at the beginning of a book cf. 1045b27, 328b26 509a27 749a10, 763b20 1301a19. That the reference is to what had preceded immediately becomes definitively clear, if we compare l. 10 ???? ?' ? ?????? ???? with Z, 1038b1-2 ???? ?? ???? ??? ?????? ? ?????? ????, ????? ???????????. In both passages, Aristotle, so to speak, "excuses" himself for having been occupied with a topic not strictly pertaining to his real subject. Of course, this makes sense only if he is coming directly from this topic.

73 Pseudo-Alexander (722. 14-15): ????? ??? ??? ???? ??? ??? ??? ???????? ?????? ?????? ??????? ?? ?? ? ??? ??????? ?????????.

74 Theiler, p. 95. The literal agreement with 1042b10-11 is compelling. That the relation of this text to the Physics is designated as "later" seems to be the earliest evidence for the didactic order ?? ?????? - ?? ???? ?? ??????. Pseudo-Alexander (722. 15-16: ??????? ??, ????????? ?? ?? ? ??? ??????????? ???????, ???? ??? ???' ????????? ??? ??????? ??????) understood "later" as "later in the Physics", i. e. in Physics B, but, as Schwegler (iv, p. 297) rightly objects, "??????? ?? is evidently opposed to ?? ?? ?????? ?? ??? ???????" (cf. Ross, ii, p. 407: "The position of ??? and ?? shows that ?????ov ?? does not refer to the Physics").

75 Ross's translation "This in itself, then, would be one difficulty" does not convey the allusion to Platonic vocabulary.

76 Bonitz (p. 567): "propter ?erbum ????????? probabile est respici librum ??? ????????????, B 6. 1003a5, quamquam haud scio an eadem ad c. 4 et 5 huius libri referri possint."

Ross (ii, p. 462): 34. "?????????? suggests a reference to Book B (cf. similar references in ?. 1004a32, I. 1053b10, ?. 1076a39, b39, M. 1086b15); and B. 1003a7 is quite relevant. The same point has been discussed in Z. 13. There is nothing in M. 4, 5 (which Bonitz suggests) that quite suits the reference."

77 ????? ?? ? ?????????? ??? ???? ??????? ?????? ????? ??? ????? ??? ????? ?? ?? ?? ???? ??? ? ???????? ????, ?? ???? ??? ?????? ??????, ?? ??? ?? ???? ???? ??????? ??????????? ??????????. (Simplicius, in Physica 151. 6-8 = Ross , Aristotelis Fragmenta selecta, pp.116-117)

78 804. 23-26: ???? ??? ????????? ?? ?? ???? ??????? ??? ??????? ??????? ??????? ?????? ????? ???????, ???' ???????? ???? ??? ????????? (?????? ??? ??? ??????????? ??????? ??? ??? ??????? ?? ?????? ?????? ??????????????.

79 This is what Ross translates: "but it used to be urged that these sensible things could not be the subject of the sciences."

80 This is what Schwegler and Bonitz translate:

"sondern sie berufen sich zu gunsten ihrer Ansicht darauf, dass keine Wissenschaft des Mathematischen möglich wäre, wenn die Zahlen nicht als fürsichseiende Substanzen existiren würden". (Schwegler ii, p. 351)

"sondern man gab als Grund nur an, es würde sonst keine Wissenschaft von dem Mathematischen geben." (Bonitz, pp. 309-310)

81 Cf. above, p. 189.